5 Regionalist parties in Belgium (N- VA, FDF)

5

Regionalist parties in Belgium (N-VA, FDF) A renewed success? Emilie van Haute

5.1 Introduction Since the end of the 1970s, the Belgian party system has been split along the linguistic divide between French-and Flemish-speakers, to the point that observers refer to two separate systems (De Winter and Dumont 1999). Parties from both sides of the linguistic divide only compete against one another in the Brussels region, but they have to cooperate to form the federal government (Deschouwer 2012). In this context, all parties in Belgium can be regarded as regional parties. However, it does not mean that they all hold the same views on the state structure and the role of the regions in this state structure. This chapter focuses on the parties that are considered to have emerged from the tensions over the centre-periphery cleavage and that have positioned themselves primarily on the periphery side of the divide: the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance, N-VA) and the Fédéralistes Démocrates Francophones (FDF). On the Flemish side, the N-VA was born out of the ashes of the shrinking Volksunie (People’s Union, VU). Tensions around the negotiations of the fifth reform of the state led to a bloody divorce and the split of the VU (Wauters 2005). Two parties emerged out of the VU: Spirit, which gathered most of the former elite of the VU and adopted more left-wing positions and placed less emphasis on the centre-periphery issues; and the N-VA, which gathered some leading figures such as Geert Bourgeois and the majority of the base of the party, adopted more right- wing positions and put more emphasis on centre-periphery issues. The electoral potential of these two successor parties was not rated high in the polls (van Haute 2011). After various changes of name and strategy, Spirit dissolved in 2009. This chapter focuses on the remaining heir of the VU: the N-VA.1 On the francophone side, the regionalist parties were historically divided, with one party defending the interests of the francophones in Brussels (the FDF) and another party defending the interests of the francophones in Wallonia (the Rassemblement Wallon – RW – see van Haute and Pilet 2006). The RW disappeared in 1985. This chapter focuses on the remaining party: the FDF. At the turn of the millennium, questions were raised regarding the future of these parties. At that time, one of the arguments to explain the difficulties of the two parties was that their core programme had been implemented. Their policy

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Regionalist parties in Belgium 87 success was regarded as one of the main challenges for their survival (van Haute and Pilet 2006). This was especially true for the VU/N-VA. Indeed, the centre- periphery relation gradually inverted to the benefit of Flanders (Frognier et al. 1982). Most of the initial VU demands for legislation on language protection and cultural and economic autonomy were met. Belgium was recognized as a federal state in the Constitution in 1993 and found an agreement on a fifth reform of the state in 2001, granting even more power to the Regions and Communities. The FDF, too, can be regarded as partly successful in terms of policy output: the federal structure includes Brussels as a third region next to Flanders and Wallonia, and its protectionist project translated into a regime of “facilities” for French- speakers in municipalities around Brussels.2 However, policy success as a partial (FDF) or total (VU) realisation of the party’s goal has led to electoral decline, policy reformulation towards more radical demands, and renewed electoral and office success. In the 2010s, the N-VA became the largest party in Flanders and in the country after the regional, federal and European elections in May 2014, a distinction that its predecessor, the Volksunie, had never achieved. The FDF ran again as an independent party, for the first time since 1991, and ranked as the third party in Brussels, a position that it had not reached since the mid-1980s, some thirty years previously. This chapter will look into these processes, and at the links between electoral/ office success and policy success, in a dynamic perspective. It is structured as follows: first, we look at the electoral success of the two parties and consider some explanatory factors for this success; then we investigate the parties’ success in terms of office; and finally we analyse their success in terms of policies.

5.2 Electoral success After the split of the VU, the two successors of the historical regionalist party faced an electoral dilemma (van Haute 2011). With a new 5% threshold introduced at the federal, regional and European elections (Delwit and Pilet 2004), the two parties felt very uncertain about whether or not they could reach the threshold and get representatives elected. This led the N-VA to start negotiations in 2002 with the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) to form a cartel for the 2003 federal elections. However, no agreement could be reached and the N-VA decided to have a first test run as an independent party (Table 5.1). This first test was not conclusive, with the party managing to get only one candidate elected (Geert Bourgeois, leader of the party). Consequently, the party restarted the negotiations with CD&V to form a cartel for the regional elections of 2004. This time around, an agreement was reached. The cartel managed to get 26.3% of the votes in Flanders. Both parties considered it to be a good result, although it has to be nuanced if we consider that the score is the sum for two distinct parties. They managed to take the lead and to form a coalition at the regional level in Flanders, in which the N-VA gained one ministerial portfolio (see infra). The electoral growth was more pronounced at the 2007 federal elections (Pilet and van Haute 2008). The cartel obtained 30.1% of the votes and ranked as the first party in Flanders, which was the aim


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88 Emilie van Haute Table 5.1 N-VA results at regional, national and European levels, 2003–14 Regional level (Flanders) Year

Vote share

Seats

2004 2009 2014

26.3* 13.2 31.9

6 (out of 35)** 16 43

Year

Vote share (overall/in party’s core region)

Seats

2003 2007 2010 2014

3.1/4.9 (FL); 2.2 (BHV) 18.5*/30.1 (FL); 12.1 (BHV) 17.4/28.0 (FL); 12.2 (BHV) 20.3/2.6 (BRU)***

1 7 (out of 30) 27 33

Year

Vote share (in nation-state/in core region)

Seats

1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014

6.0/9.7 8.5/13.9 5.4/8.7 4.4/7.1 7.6/12.2 17.4*/28.4 6.1/9.9 16.8/26.7

1 2 1 1 2 4 1 4

National level

European level

Notes: EU level: results are for the VU until 2004; EP group = EFA until 2014; post-2014 = ECR. *In an electoral cartel with the Christian Democrats (CD&V). **N-VA had 6 seats at the start of the legislature; on 12 January 2009 it was brought back to 5 due to the defection of one representative to LDD (Gino De Craemer). ***The constituency in and around Brussels was modified after the 2011 state reform. Source: Direction of Elections, SPF Home Affairs, except for vote share in party’s core region (Renard and Dodeigne 2012).

of the CD&V. The part that can be attributed to the N-VA in this result is hard to evaluate. The aftermath of the 2007 elections saw Belgium entering a long crisis around the formation of a federal government. After many twists, an asymmetrical government was formed in March 2008 under the leadership of Yves Leterme. The government was composed of the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) and Liberals (OpenVLD), and the French-speaking Christian Democrats (CDH) and Socialists (PS). The N-VA decided to support the government without entering it. This created tensions in the CD&V-N-VA cartel, which became difficult to mitigate when during the summer of 2008 the government established a dialogue


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Regionalist parties in Belgium 89 between communities to deal with institutional matters. As a consequence, the N-VA left the coalition at the regional level in September 2008. This decision signed the death certificate of the cartel, with N-VA sitting in the opposition and CD&V sitting in power at both the federal and regional levels. So it was back to square one for the N-VA, and the fears for its electoral survival re-emerged. This was even more the case since the political agenda was centred on the financial crisis and its socio-economic consequences, thus far from the party’s core business of institutional reforms. However, Bart De Wever, as the new leader of the party, managed to get a lot of public attention with his appearance and good performance during 10 weeks in a row on one of the major popular TV shows on the VRT.3 In the meantime, the popularity of another alternative right-wing leader, Dedecker, was decreasing due to various scandals and his strong management of his party, the Lijst Dedecker (LDD). Contrary to expectations, the big winner of the 2009 regional elections in Flanders was the N-VA, and not the LDD. The party obtained 13.2% of the votes and 16 seats in the regional parliament. This result had a lot to do with the popularity of De Wever, who obtained the second best personal score after Kris Peeters (CD&V), Minister-President of the region at the time. In his constituency of Antwerp, the N-VA even obtained 16.8% of the votes (third party). The party’s results at the concomitant European elections were a bit less impressive, with 9.9% of the regional votes (1 seat). During the spring of 2010, the Flemish Liberals (OpenVLD) left the federal coalition due to institutional disputes related to the periphery of Brussels. The political agenda focused on institutional matters during the campaign, which was much more favourable to the N-VA. The party made a spectacular breakthrough with 17.4% of the votes (28% of the Flemish votes at the lower Chamber and 33% of the votes at the upper Chamber, where Bart De Wever was candidate). The N-VA and Bart De Wever stole the leadership in Flanders and got 27 representatives elected. The party took part in negotiations for the formation of a federal government during more than a year (until July 2011), but no agreement could be reached with the six other parties involved in the negotiations, mainly due to disagreements on institutional issues. As a result, the negotiations continued without N-VA, leading to an agreement on the sixth reform of the state in October 2011 and the formation of a federal government on December 6th, 2011, 541 days after the elections. At the next local elections in 2012, the party managed to present lists in 306 municipalities in Flanders (as compared to 155 in 2006). It performed extremely well, especially in the province of Antwerp, where it overtook the existing coalition and Bart De Wever was appointed mayor. In the aftermath of the long political crisis, it was decided to hold simultaneous elections in 2014 (regional, federal and European). The N-VA broke new records with a score of 31.9% (43 seats) at the regional level and 20.3% at the federal level (33 seats), and it became the first party in Flanders and in Belgium. On the French-speaking side, after the Rassemblement Wallon (RW) lost all of its parliamentary representation in 1985 and disappeared, only one regionalist party remained with political representation: the Front démocratique des francophones


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90 Emilie van Haute (FDF), defending the rights of francophones in Brussels and its periphery (van Haute and Pilet 2006). However, in 1993, the party signed an agreement with the French-speaking Liberals (PRL) to form a federation. It allowed both allies to remain the first party in Brussels for the next decade. In 1998, the federation welcomed another partner, the Mouvement des citoyens pour le changement (MCC);4 and the federation renamed itself Mouvement Réformateur (MR) in 2002. If the relabeling deepened the integration between the components of the federation, each component kept its independent organisation. The electoral curve of the federation displays an erratic pattern. At the 2003 federal elections, the MR confirmed its electoral growth from 1999 despite governmental participation (Table 5.2). It clearly became the second party after the Socialists in French-speaking Belgium, and the gap between it and the third party (CDH) deepened. However, the MR faced a setback at the 2004 regional elections in Brussels and lost the symbolic first place to the Socialists. It was sent back to the opposition benches at the regional level for a decade. Yet, at the 2007 federal elections, the party confirmed its previous good result of 2003. It did not gain much in terms of votes and even lost one seat, but it was more a symbolic success with the federation ranking first on the francophone side of the political spectrum and ranking first in Wallonia for the first time in its history (Pilet and van Haute 2008). The 2009 regional elections left the MR with mixed feelings. Despite losing some percentage points and one seat in the Brussels regional parliament, the MR regained its symbolic first place in the region from the Socialists. The 2010 federal elections were even more disappointing (Dedecker 2011). Their role as second player was confirmed, and the dreams of domination of the political landscape, hand in hand with the Flemish sister party (OpenVLD), faded. Yet the MR took part in the negotiations for the sixth reform of the state in 2010–2011. The negotiators reached an agreement that included specific dispositions regarding Brussels and its periphery. The FDF was very disappointed by these dispositions, arguing that they were not favourable enough for the francophones living in the periphery of Brussels. As for the N-VA, the negotiations around the sixth reform of the state were a breaking point for the FDF. In September 2011, the party decided to break away from the MR federation. In preparation for the 2012 local elections, the party launched an attempt to develop its organization and presence beyond Brussels and its periphery and opened several local sections in Wallonia. However, with less than a year to plan it, the success of this initiative was mitigated at the 2012 local elections (see infra), although the party performed well in its stronghold of Brussels. At the 2014 elections, the FDF confirmed that it is still a party very much anchored in the capital city. The party performed extremely well in Brussels and its periphery. It became the third party at the Brussels regional elections with 14.8% of the votes in the French-speaking group, surpassing the Greens (Ecolo) and the former Christian Democrats (CDH). However, the FDF managed to gather only 2.5% of the votes at the Walloon regional elections, not enough to pass the threshold and get representatives elected to the Walloon parliament. Consequently, the overall score of the party at the lower Chamber (federal elections)


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Regionalist parties in Belgium 91 Table 5.2 FDF results at regional, national and European levels, 2003–14 Regional level (Brussels) Year

Vote share

Seats

2004 2009 2014

32.5* 29.8* 14.8

10 (out of 25)** 11 (out of 24) 12

Year


Seats

2003 2007 2010 2014

11.4*/21.6 (BHV) 12.5*/22.7 (BHV) 9.3*/19.2 (BHV) 1.8/11.1 (BRU)**

3 (out of 24) 3 (out of 23) 3 (out of 18) 2

Year


Seats

19791 19842 19893 19944 19994 20044 20094 2014

7.6/19.7 –/6.4 – 9.2/24.2 10.2/27.0 10.5/27.6 9.9/26.0 1.2/3.4

1 (out of 1) 0 0 1 (out of 3) 0 (out of 3) 0 (out of 3) 0 (out of 2) 0

National level

European level

Notes: * The FDF in an electoral cartel with the PRL and the MCC under the MR umbrella. ** Two of these 10 representatives left the parliamentary group (one was excluded in November 2004 – Danielle Caron; one quit in February 2007 – Souad Razzouk). The FDF in an electoral cartel with RW (Walloon regionalist party). The FDF under the banner FDF-CFE (Front démocratique des fédéralistes pour la communauté française et l’Europe). 3 The FDF under the banner FDF-ERE (FDF+Europe, Régions, Environnement). 4 The FDF in an electoral cartel with PRL-MCC-PFF (under the MR umbrella). 1 2

was rather small (1.8%), but its geographical concentration got them two representatives elected, both from the constituency of Brussels.5 Similarly, the party faced difficulties attracting voters at the European elections (1.2% of the votes in the French-speaking group). To sum it up, both parties can be considered as electorally successful in the last decade. The N-VA’s success is on a larger scale, whereas the success of the FDF is still confined to the Brussels region.


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92 Emilie van Haute This renewed electoral success cannot really be explained by macro-level factors. Most of the structural and institutional features of Belgium have not evolved much in the 2000s. First, the socio-economic performances of the various regions have not drastically changed. Flanders is still performing better than the other two regions of the country; yet Brussels is still the economic and financial capital of the country. It is rather striking that no successful regionalist party defends the interests of the socio-economically more marginal Wallonia. Second, none of these parties operate in a geographically peripheral territory. The FDF operates at the centre of the centre, and given the size and shape of Belgium, Flanders cannot really be considered as geographically peripheral. Third, if there are some differences in terms of subjective identity in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia, these have not drastically evolved over time (Deschouwer and Sinardet 2010). Lastly, the electoral rules have not been radically changed in the last decade. The introduction of the threshold even precedes the electoral success of the parties. Therefore, one has to turn to other, meso-level factors to explain the success of the two parties. First, saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage, embodied by the issue of the reform of the state in Belgium, may have played a part in the renewed success of both parties. One could argue that the issue of the reform of the state has been at the forefront of the political agenda ever since the aftermath of the 2007 elections, and that it could be one factor feeding the electoral success of the N-VA and FDF. Yet the first electoral successes of the N-VA date back to 2004 and 2007, when the party was in an alliance with CD&V. At that time, the issue was not at the forefront of the political agenda. Besides, looking at saliency among the electorate, the issue of the reform of the state was not salient, even in Flanders, and even among the N-VA electorate (Swyngedouw and Abts 2011; van Haute 2014). We would thus argue that it is the N-VA’s electoral success and access to negotiations at the federal level that have brought institutional issues back to the political agenda, and that its growing electoral strength has put a lot of pressure on the other parties to take on this issue too (see infra). Second, the structural changes in the composition of the electorate and the inadequate political offer can partly explain the success of these parties. On the Flemish side, the N-VA attracts an electorate that scores above average on authoritarian and individualistic scales, low on economic equality, and is tougher on repression of criminality and immigration (Swyngedouw and Abts 2011; van Haute 2014). Their electorate could be characterized by right-wing rigour. They locate somewhere between the electorate of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, and the Extreme Right. What distinguishes them from the electorate of the other parties is that they also score higher on political efficacy and on political cynicism and more to the periphery side on the centre-periphery scale (but this is mainly due to a core group of voters). Interestingly, since 2010, the N-VA is truly a catch-all party as regards the socio-demographic profile of its electorate, except that it tends to attract non-practising Catholics. There is clearly something happening on the right side of the political spectrum in Flanders. The N-VA has built its success beyond its core business of centre-periphery


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Regionalist parties in Belgium 93 issues by attracting voters to the right of the spectrum. Indeed, there is a growing level of volatility in Flanders, but it is volatility within blocks rather than between blocks (Dassonneville and Baudewijns 2014). While the electorate in Flanders tends to detach itself from the traditional pillars and from Catholicism, the political offer is still very much built on these pillars (van Haute et al. 2013). Voters may then turn to political alternatives. In 2004 it was the Lijst Dedecker that capitalized on this volatility; since then, the N-VA has taken over that role. In a sense, the electoral success of the N-VA capitalizes on the difficulties of the other parties to the right (OpenVLD, but especially CD&V) to renew themselves. Furthermore, the N-VA also attracted former extreme right (VB) voters tired of the cordon sanitaire who saw in the N-VA a party that could play the same anti- establishment role and push some of their issues (Flemish independence, and to a lesser extent, security and immigration). Finally, the N-VA attracts protest votes, and its electorate tends to have lower levels of satisfaction and trust compared to the electorate of the other parties in Flanders (extremes excepted – see van Haute and Hooghe 2014). On the French-speaking side, some similarities can be pointed out. The FDF attracts an electorate to the centre-right on socio-economic issues (especially economic development and initiatives), but to the centre-left on redistribution, moral issues and environmental issues. It benefits from the electoral difficulties of the former Christian Democrats (CDH) and can even capitalize on dissatisfied (and volatile) Green (Ecolo) voters (Delwit et al. 2010). For example, at the 2014 elections, the party capitalized significantly on the environmental issue of flights over Brussels. A few months before the elections, the federal government (and the CDH Minister in charge, Melchior Wathelet) decided to modify the flying routes from/to Brussels international airport (located in Flanders) so that there would be fewer planes flying over the periphery of Brussels (Flanders and Wallonia) and more planes flying over Brussels. This decision triggered a massive mobilization of citizens in mostly wealthy Southern Brussels, the stronghold of the FDF.6 The issue was gold for the party, as it could be framed in territorial terms and could attract voters away from the CDH (in charge of the matter) and from Ecolo, which had cold feet on the issue due to prior sour experience in 2003.7 Next to political demand and offer, the role of parties and their organizations is crucial. Even though it was created in 2001, the N-VA is not a completely new party and was not built from scratch. It can be considered as a successor party (Beyens et al. 2015) built from the ashes of the VU. It could capitalize on the VU’s experienced representatives, its membership base, the existing local branches and financial resources. This may explain how the party managed to cope with such rapid growth. Similarly, the FDF never ceased to exist as an independent organization and maintained its local sections (Delwit and van Haute 2014). The party’s electoral strength lies at the local level. The party has built some strongholds in several municipalities, especially the south east of Brussels (see infra – success in office). As it operates in a rather restricted territory, this local anchorage is its best asset.


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94 Emilie van Haute This might also explain why the party’s success did not extend beyond the perimeter of Brussels and its periphery. In Wallonia, it cannot rely on these roots and it did not have enough time or resources to build local anchors. Finally, one should not neglect the role of the party leaders. We have already mentioned the role of Bart De Wever as the leading figure of the N-VA and his increasing popularity after his participation in a popular TV show in Flanders. Prior to De Wever, the N-VA was led by Geert Bourgeois, former head figure of the VU. Bourgeois was not charismatic or popular, and the party’s electoral success began after the change of leadership. Olivier Maingain has led the FDF since 1995. His primary role in the party’s success is not necessarily to attract voters under his name. Rather, he has played a major role in the strategic decision to split from the MR and run again as an independent party. In summary, institutional and structural factors cannot explain the renewed electoral success of these two parties. Rather, one has to turn to the interaction between electoral demand and political offer, and to the specific role of party organizations and party leaders, to better understand the electoral success of the N-VA and the FDF.

5.3 Success in office When the VU split in 2001, it was part of the Flemish government at the regional level. The question was, therefore, how the two successor parties would deal with the situation. As the political figures in the coalition government belonged to the more left-wing moderate wing that eventually founded Spirit, Spirit continued to support participation in power once it was established, whereas the newborn N-VA did not (Table 5.3). The N-VA developed a dual relationship to power, very similar to that of the former VU (van Haute 2011). On the one hand, the party has participated in regional coalition governments ever since its foundation, almost independently of its electoral results. On the other hand, the party adopted a more conflictual opposition style at the federal level, which prevented it from accessing power, despite its electoral successes, until 2014. At the regional level, its first participation in power was facilitated by its alliance with the Christian Democrats (CD&V), a party eager to go back to power after a very unusual period of opposition at all levels; by the good electoral performance of the Extreme Right (VB); and by the agreement on a cordon sanitaire to prevent the VB from access to power. After the 2004 regional elections, there were few mathematically viable options for coalition governments excluding the VB. It took an unusual amount of agreement between five parties to form such a coalition, although two of these parties were the successor parties of the VU in alliances with other traditional parties. Despite being a junior partner in the coalition, the N-VA managed to get one ministerial portfolio that was allocated to Geert Bourgeois, former VU leader and founder of the N-VA. The party claimed competences dear to its heart: foreign affairs and tourism (representation of Flanders


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2>0

1>0

2

4

2004–2009 2

2009–2014 2

2014–2019 3

VLD, SP, Agalev, VU

44.4

Bourgeois N-VA, I CD&V, OpenVLD

Vice minister-president of the Flemish government Administrative Affairs, Local and Provincial G overnment, Civic Integration, Tourism and the Brussels Periphery Finance, Budget, Work, Town and Country Planning and Sport Minister-president of the Flemish government Vice minister-president of the Flemish government Home Affairs, Integration, Housing, Equal Opportunity and Fight against Poverty Mobility, Public Works, Brussels Periphery, Tourism, Animal Well-being Employment, Economy, Innovation, Sport

Administrative Affairs, Foreign Policy, Media and Tourism

Home Affairs, Administration and Sport

Culture, youth, Brussels affairs and development aid

Composition Portfolio of coalition

10>0 Leterme I/ CD&V, Peeters I VLD, SP.a, Spirit, N-VA 22 Peeters II CD&V, SP.a, N-VA

20>0 Dewael I-IV/ Somers I

In N % Name of Government a seats seats coalition

1999–2004 2

Period

Regional level

Table 5.3 Government participation of the N-VA at the regional level in Flanders, 1 999–2014

(Continued)

Philippe Muyters

Ben Weyts

Geert Bourgeois Liesbeth Homans

Philippe Muyters

Geert Bourgeois

Bert Anciaux (until 2002)1 Johan Sauwens2/ Paul Van Grembergen3 Geert Bourgeois4

(VU) N-VA figure


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Michel

MR, N-VA, CD&V, OpenVLD

Theo Francken

Johan Van Overtveldt Elke Sleurs

Finances Equal Opportunity and Fight against Poverty, Scientific Research, Cities Asylum and Migration

Jan Jambon

(VU) N-VA figure

Home Affairs, Security

Composition Portfolio of coalition

Source: http://www.crisp.be/documents-politiques/gouvernements/

1

a

0 = no; 1 = external support; 2 = junior coalition partner; 3 = senior coalition partner; 4 = single-party government; bold = PM from regionalist party. Bert Anciaux resigned in 2002. After the split of the VU in 2001, Anciaux founded a new party, Spirit. As only Spirit continued to support the Flemish coalition, and not N-VA, it lost weight in the coalition and had to give up one portfolio to the benefit of the Liberals (OpenVLD). 2 Johan Sauwens had to resign in May 2001 after a media scandal around his alleged participation in an extreme right meeting. 3 Paul Van Grembergen replaced Johan Sauwens in May 2002. He stands for Spirit. 4 Geert Bourgeois resigned in September 2008 because of the tensions between the N-VA and traditional parties at the federal level and the split of the cartel with the Christian Democrats (CD&V).

27.7

3

2014–

5

In N % Name of Government a seats seats coalition

Period

National level

Table 5.3 (Continued)

Regionalist parties in Belgium 97 abroad), and administrative affairs (including the administrative management of the periphery of Brussels). One could have expected the same bandwagon effect to play at the federal level after the 2007 elections. The cartel CD&V-N-VA obtained good results and ranked first. This success placed them in a good position to form a coalition government. However, if governing at the federal level is a ‘natural’ situation for the Christian Democrats, that has never been the case for the N-VA or its predecessor, the VU. The only experience of federal participation in power and making the necessary compromises that it involves have been traumatizing for the VU. In the negotiations, the N-VA pushed hard to have an agreement on a further reform of the state. However, no agreement could be reached with the other partners in the negotiation. The hard line of the N-VA created tensions within the cartel, with the CD&V more ready to make compromises to enter a coalition government. These tensions led to the implosion of the cartel, which had consequences at the regional level, where the N-VA lost its portfolio and Geert Bourgeois had to resign from his ministerial position. After the 2009 regional elections, the N-VA negotiated as an independent party to form a Flemish government. Again, the good electoral performances of the extreme right and the reluctance of other parties to negotiate with the Lijst Dedecker (LDD) put the N-VA in a favourable position. The party could claim an electoral success and their participation was mathematically necessary for the coalition. The N-VA entered the Flemish government under a new status of full partner with two portfolios, expanding beyond their core business (Table 5.3). The same pattern was replicated at the 2010 federal elections. Despite its exceptional electoral growth, the party led negotiations but could not reach an agreement with other partners. Given its electoral legitimacy, it took longer for the other parties to make it acceptable not to include the N-VA in the coalition. Only in July 2011, more than one year after the elections, did the negotiations continue without the N-VA at the table. Again, the hard line of the party on institutional issues made an agreement very difficult to achieve. At the 2014 elections, the party ranked first again. The negotiation processes for government formation at the regional and federal levels began in parallel. Bart De Wever had declared that he wanted to form a federal government first, and then a regional government. However, the French-speaking parties very quickly formed a regional government, pushing De Wever to act quickly at the regional level too. An agreement with the Christian Democrats and the Liberals to form a right-wing coalition was reached in July 2014. The Liberals were not mathematically necessary but linked their participation in a centre-right coalition at the federal level to a participation in the regional government. At the federal level, the party and its leader faced a dilemma. As the first party of the country but without the majority of the seats, they had to lead the negotiations to form a coalition government. Failure to form a government could have destroyed the image that their leader had worked so hard to build: the image of a party that is willing to take responsibility but that has been brushed out by the establishment parties. If it did not succeed, the electorate’s perception of the party could easily


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98 Emilie van Haute turn from victim to tyrant. Yet the party would take huge risks by entering a government. The VU’s previous experiences at the federal level had been disastrous for the party. It is difficult for a party defending the independence of Flanders to enter a federal government and embody Belgium, an entity that they want to make disappear. This was even more the case as the party had to enter a government that would not discuss institutional matters. As the previous government had just agreed on a sixth reform of the state that still had to be implemented, the issue was not on the agenda of the governmental negotiations. Therefore, the party went for a middle way: it led the negotiations to form the federal government and took the lion’s share of the portfolios (home affairs, finances, defence, public administration, asylum and migration, science policy, and other smaller portfolios).8 Yet they did not take the Prime-Ministership, as is usually the case for the bigger party of the coalition. Doing so would have forced them to pay a high price for a position that is traditionally seen as linguistically neutral. The party’s main figure, Bart De Wever, is not part of the government. By remaining mayor of Antwerp, he can play the insider-outsider card or be the ‘stepmother’ of the government. The FDF also benefited from its alliance with a bigger partner to secure its participation in coalition governments. However, it did not face the same difficulties that the N-VA did with regard to participation at the federal level (Table 5.4). At the federal level, the FDF secured a portfolio of secretary of state in all federal coalitions in which the MR took part, from 2003 to 2010 (Bernard Clerfayt). At the regional level, the FDF was in government between 1999 and 2004. However, the MR (and therefore the FDF) was sent back to the opposition benches for a decade, and the region was led by an olive-tree coalition of French-speaking parties (Socialists [PS], former Christian Democrats [CDH], and Greens [Ecolo]). The split of the federation was beneficial for the FDF at the regional level. With its more central position on socio-economic issues and other progressive positions, the party could find an agreement with the PS and the CDH after its good result at the 2014 regional elections. Running for elections again as an independent party may facilitate the entry of the party in regional coalitions, but it will probably make it more difficult at the federal level, given its limited electoral results and its positions on centre-periphery issues. The FDF is also present in office at the local level in many Brussels municipalities and in the Brussels periphery. At the 2012 local elections, the party managed to get representatives elected in 17 of the 19 municipalities in Brussels, to enter the local executive in eight of these municipalities (opposed to 11 in the two preceding local legislatures), and to get three mayors (opposed to four in 2006–2012, and five in 2000–2006). Local electoral rules tend to favour big parties, and the breakup of the MR may have slightly reduced its bargaining capacity. Furthermore, opposition parties sometimes coalesced to send them back to the opposition benches after a long period in power in some municipalities. Out of the 35 municipalities in the periphery of Brussels (Halle-Vilvoorde), the FDF got representatives elected in 12. Finally, the party only managed to get representatives (mostly one) elected in 11 other municipalities out of the 262 municipalities in Wallonia.


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1 1

2

2

2

2

2

2009–2010

Regional level 1999–2004

2014–2019

25.0

4.5

CD&V, MR, PS, OpenVLD, CDH

CD&V, MR, PS, OpenVLD, CDH CD&V, MR, PS, OpenVLD, CDH

Simonet/de Donnea/ MR, CD&V, PS, Ducarme/Simonet VLD, SP.a Vervoort II PS, CDH, FDF, OpenVLD, CD&V, SP.a

Leterme II

Van Rompuy I

Leterme I

VLD, PS, MR, SP.a-Spirit

Composition of coalition

Bernard Clerfayt

Bernard Clerfayt

Bernard Clerfayt

Gisèle Mandaila Malamba*

FDF figure

Environment, Water Policy, RenovaDidier Gosuin tion, Conservation and Cleanliness1 Employment, Economy Didier Gosuin Secretary of State Cécile Jodogne International trade Urgent media aid and fire stations Public service and health (for the French-speaking community in Brussels)

Secretary of State Family, Disabled Adjunct to the Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health Secretary of State Adjunct to the Minister of Finances Secretary of State Modernization of public service, environmental taxes, fight against fiscal fraud Adjunct to the Minister of Finances Secretary of State Modernization of public service, environmental taxes, fight against fiscal fraud Adjunct to the Minister of Finances

Portfolio

Notes: a0 = no; 1 = external support; 2 = junior coalition partner; 3 = senior coalition partner; 4 = single-party government; bold = PM from regionalist party. * From July 2004, after the reshuffling related to the regional and European elections of 2004 and the departure of two MR figures to the European level. 1 And Foreign Trade, after 2003.

2

1

1

4.5

4.5

Verhofstadt II

March 2008– December 2008 2008–2009

4.8

2

2003–2007

1

In N % Name of coalition Governmenta seats seats

Period

National level

Table 5.4 Government participation of the FDF at the federal and regional levels, 1 999–2014

100 Emilie van Haute

5.4 Policy success Both regionalist parties have evolved over time in their programmatic appeal, in their strategies to set the agenda and weigh in on the policy-making process, and, ultimately, in their policy success. The VU initially started off as a single-issue party focused on a federalist project. Its electoral success pushed the party to develop a larger programme. However, the weight of the linguistic and institutional issues remained proportionally much higher than in other parties. In its programme, the VU had evolved from a national- federalist position until the end of the 1970s to a European federalist and then a confederal project (Müller-Rommel 1994; De Winter and Türsan 1998), reinventing its project in parallel with its progressive realization (see infra). At the same time, the party became increasingly divided over the place to give and the position to take on other aspects of its programme. Typically, socio-economic issues divided the party between a more left-wing and a more right-wing side. These internal tensions are part of the explanation for the party’s split in 2001 (van Haute 2011). The N-VA started where the VU left it with a European federalist project, referring to a “free Flemish state, . . . a full member state of a democratic European Union” (N-VA 2013), but the manifesto does not stipulate what exactly that entails. The 2003 N-VA manifesto even literally repeats a metaphor that was used by the VU in 1999: neither party wants Flanders to be an isolated ‘island’ but they rather see it as a member of the EU. One possible reason for this is that the ‘young’ party keeps its options open, trying to cater to the ‘old’ VU voters while also trying to appeal to a new electorate (Beyens et al. 2015). However, the N-VA evolved towards more Eurosceptic views and a separatist project in 2010 and 2014. Article 1.1 of the party statutes refers to an independent republic of Flanders, and since 2014 the party has joined the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the European parliament. On other issues, the N-VA was free to take clearer positions than the VU where two wings had to find a compromise. The party progressively developed clear, right-wing rhetoric on social security, economic policy, equality, immigration and integration (Beyens et al. 2015). By 2010, the N-VA proposed policies that were not directly related to what the VU had proposed in 1999 and presented ideas in a language that clearly positioned it more to the right of the political spectrum. As in the case of the VU, the FDF initially emerged from the tensions around language and cultural issues and the institutional solutions proposed for Brussels. It developed as a single-issue party before it adopted larger platforms as early as the 1970s (Pilet and Dandoy 2014). However, the real break happened after the decision to collaborate with the Liberals. Pilet and Dandoy (2014) show that after 1993, the proportion of their programme dedicated to institutional and linguistic issues is divided by almost three. Yet, these questions have made a comeback since the party took its independence back. Initially, the FDF defended a protectionist project (van Haute and Pilet 2006). Its electoral success led the party to shift to a national-federalist position, advocating the creation of a real status and territory for Brussels. This is still the party’s position today.


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Regionalist parties in Belgium 101 On the other issues, its platforms resemble an accumulation of pragmatic and concrete suggestions rather than a coherent ideology and societal project. The party oscillated between left and right on socio-economic issues (Pilet 2005). Its collaboration with the Liberals has settled the party on a centre-right position on socio-economic issues and centre-left on societal issues. Interestingly, since the very start, the party has developed its programme around two additional themes: environment (mobility, planning, nature preservation, energy, and fight against noise pollution) and culture (Pilet and Dandoy 2014). Both the VU and the FDF have had an important impact on the party system. Their early electoral success in the 1960s and 1970s led to the split of the traditional parties along the linguistic divide, thereby doubling the number of parties and increasing the fragmentation of the party system. In the last decade, the split of the VU also had an impact on the party system in Flanders. Both heirs of the VU initially opted for the strategy of electoral cartels and thereby modified the balance of power between the traditional parties. It allowed them to weigh in on the content of the electoral campaigns and to maintain a governmental strategy despite their small electoral size. The renewed independence of the FDF has also changed the balance of power between the French-speaking parties in Brussels, pushing the Greens and the former Christian Democrats down the podium to the fifth and fourth places respectively. This shift in power allowed the party to maintain and even reinforce its governmental strategy. Freed from its alliance with the Liberals, the FDF can now take over the pivotal role once played by the former Christian Democrats in the Brussels party system. This allows them to enter either a centre-right or a centre-left coalition. After 2014, they opted for a centre-left alliance and negotiated important portfolios. However, their position at the federal level is very weak and is likely to remain so. Both parties also had an impact on policies, although the VU was more successful than the FDF in that respect. The VU managed to progressively get its programme regarding linguistic and institutional issues implemented: adoption of the linguistic border and progressive federalization of the state until the federal character of Belgium was recognized in the Constitution in 1993. It forced the party to adapt its positions through the years (see supra), pushing it to increase the demands to keep its raison d’être (van Haute 2011). The VU’s policy success was mainly obtained by its tribune strategy in the 1960s and 1970s. The party mobilized its grassroots support thanks to its deep relations with the Flemish movement, and it organized protests, marches and mobilizations. The party then turned to a more governmental strategy in the 1980s and 1990s, although this brought less success than the tribune strategy (van Haute 2011). Indeed, this governmental strategy mainly revolved around non- linguistic or institutional issues, as it was successful at the regional level but not at the national level where these issues are discussed. The N-VA pursued the same governmental strategy at the regional level. At the national level, the N-VA faces the same tensions between participation and tribune that led to the split of the VU (Table 5.5).


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102 Emilie van Haute Table 5.5 The policy success of the N-VA, 2003–14 Year

Regional policy success (yes/no)

Regional policy success: Area(s)

Year

National policy success (yes/no)

2004

Yes

2003

No

2009

Yes

2007

No

2014

Ongoing

Electoral regulation, external affairs, language, and media regulation Immigration, electoral regulation, language, and state structure

2010

Yes

2014

Ongoing

National policy success: Area(s)

State structure

Conversely, the linguistic-institutional programme of the FDF has not been fully implemented, for example regarding the borders of the Brussels region and the rights of the francophones in the periphery of Brussels. Therefore, the party always kept its raison d’être and never fully disappeared, although what remains of their linguistic demands is weak. Today, the FDF is still a national-federalist party, defending the Wallonia-Brussels entity in the Belgian federation: solidarity between the two French-speaking regions and rights of the francophones in Brussels, its periphery, Wallonia and the communes à facilités (FDF Statutes, art. 1). The lesser success of the FDF may be attributed to its smaller size and absence of roots in a social movement comparable to the Flemish movement, which did not allow the party to adopt a tribune strategy or maintain the independence of the party as long as the VU did. The governmental strategy of the FDF allowed it to have an impact on policy-making, although the impact relates to other issues (environment, mobility or culture) rather than the party’s core institutional issues. However, while their position at the federal level is very weak and is likely to remain so, this is where their core issues are discussed. Therefore, they may end up in the same paradoxical position as the N-VA: as part of the system at the regional level on less relevant issues, and (willingly or not) not really part of the system at the federal level where their core issues are discussed (Table 5.6). Table 5.6 The policy success of the FDF, 2003–14 Year

Regional policy success (yes/no)

2004 2009 2014

Year

National policy success (yes/no)

National policy success: Area(s)

No No

2003 2007

Yes Yes

Ongoing

2010 2014

No No

Social welfare Financial regulation


Regional policy success: Area(s)

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Regionalist parties in Belgium 103

5.5 Conclusion At the turn of the millennium, the regionalist parties in Belgium were regarded as political actors in decline, due to their own success (van Haute and Pilet 2006). A decade later, their situation has drastically changed. In 2014, the N-VA became the largest party in Flanders and in the country, while the FDF ran again as an independent party for the first time since 1991, and ranked as the third party in Brussels. This points towards a recent renewed electoral success for the two regionalist parties. The success of the N-VA is larger in scale, whereas the success of the FDF is still confined to the Brussels region. This chapter has argued that their renewed electoral success cannot be understood in terms of classic system-level explanations, as Belgium has faced no major changes in its socio-economic or centre-periphery structures. Rather, the explanation of this success could be found in the changes in the political supply and demand. In Flanders, the N-VA capitalizes on the high level of volatility on the right side of the political spectrum. It attracts voters who do not recognize themselves in the political offer based on the traditional pillar parties, but the party also attracts voters who are tired of the cordon sanitaire surrounding the VB, as well as protest voters. In Brussels, the FDF capitalizes on the difficulties of the former Christian Democrats (CDH) and seeks to overtake its position as the pivotal party. The renewed success of regionalist parties was also facilitated by relatively strong party organizations and their leaders. The N-VA could rely on the resources and linkages built by its predecessor the VU, but it could also rely on the huge popularity of its leader, Bart De Wever. The FDF could also rely on a strong local anchor in Brussels, which goes hand in hand with recognizable and popular political figures. This renewed electoral success is paired with partial success in governmental participation. The N-VA developed a dual relationship to power, very similar to that of its predecessor, the VU. The party participated in regional coalition governments from the beginning, almost independently of its electoral results, thanks to electoral alliances. However, it adopted a more conflictual opposition style at the federal level, which prevented it from having access to power until 2014. Since 2014, the party has walked on a thin rope. It entered the federal government and took the lion’s share of the portfolios. Yet it did not go all the way in: it did not take the Prime-Ministership, and the main figure of the party, Bart De Wever, is not part of the government. Furthermore, one of the conditions of its entry into national government was to leave its institutional baggage at the door. This strategy may allow them to play the insider-outsider card at the federal level for a while, but it may not be a tenable position for an entire legislature. The FDF benefited from its alliance with the Liberals to secure its participation in coalition governments, including those at the federal level, independent of its electoral results. However, while the FDF’s renewed independence may facilitate their entry into regional coalitions due to their pivotal position, it will probably make it more difficult at the federal level given its narrow results and its positions on centre-periphery issues.


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104 Emilie van Haute Lastly, evidence from the past decades raises doubts as to whether a governmental strategy is the best strategy for these parties to achieve policy success. They have gained most of their policy successes regarding institutional and linguistic issues while conducting a tribune strategy. These policy successes have even forced the VU and the N-VA to adapt their programme and radicalize their institutional demands. Their governmental strategy has led to successes on other issues rather than on their core issues. Therefore, both parties may end up in the same paradoxical position: as part of the system at the regional level on less relevant issues, and (willingly or not) not really part of the system at the federal level where their core issues are discussed.

Notes 1 Although the Vlaams Belang (VB) initially emerged from the VU in 1978–79, the party reoriented its core programme towards radical right themes at the end of the 1980s and is now considered part of the populist radical right family (van Haute and Pauwels, forthcoming 2016). Therefore, it will not be covered in this chapter. 2 These facilities grant citizens of a minority language – in this case French-speaking residents in Flanders – special linguistic rights in a region that is officially monolingual (in this case, Dutch): nursery and primary schools may be organised in French, and residents may require French to be their language of communication with the administration of the municipality (although the conditions of implementation of that principle have varied over time). 3 Slimste mens ter wereld (“the smartest man in the world”); the show attracts on average 1,300,000 viewers in Flanders, or 63 to 66% of the audience share. 4 Splinter of the French-speaking Christian Democrats. 5 Note that since the sixth reform of the state and the reshuffling of the constituencies around Brussels, voters in 6 of the 35 municipalities in the periphery of Brussels (the ‘communes à facilités’) are offered the choice to vote either for the lists in Brussels or for the lists in the constituency of Flemish Brabant. A majority of voters opted for the lists in Brussels (52.5%), among which the FDF scored 17.9% of the votes (2nd party). The party also scored well among voters who decided to cast a vote for the lists of Flemish Brabant (36.8% of the voters): it ranked as the third party with 14.3% of the votes. 6 See the website of the movement: http://www.pasquestion.be/en/wathelet-plan. 7 The two ministers of the party had to resign from their first governmental participation at the federal level due to a clash between them and the other partners of the coalition on the regulation of night flights at the Brussels airport. 8 See http://www.gouvernement-federal.be/en, accessed on 8 December 2014.

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