7th Australian Information Security Conference

The Proceedings of the

1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference

30 November to 2 December, 2010 The Duxton Hotel, Perth, Western Australia

Proceedings of the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference

Published By secau – Security Research Centre School of Computer and Security Science Edith Cowan University Perth, Western Australia

Edited By Dr Anne Aly secau – Security Research Centre School of Computer and Security Science Edith Cowan University Perth, Western Australia [email protected]

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Table of Contents

The Internet as Ideological Battleground

1

Anne Aly Hearts and Minds, Psuedo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based Upon Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60) & Rhodesia (1964-1979)

7

Bill Bailey The Malarkey of Money Transfers: Overlooking E-Bay whilst the Hawaladars are Hunted

15

David M. Cook and Timothy Smith The Piracy and Terrorism Nexus: Real or Imagined?

24

Karine Hamilton Review: Disillusionment with Radical Social Groups

31

Kira J. Harris Moral Disengagement: Exploring Support Mechanisms for Violent Extremism Among Young Egyptian Males

40

Dr Paul S Lieber, Dr Yael Efreom-Lieber and Dr (LTC) Christopher Rate The Emergent Challenges for Policing Terrorism: Lessons from Mumbai

45

Simon O‟Rourke “Make A Bomb In Your Mums Kitchen”: Cyber Recruiting and Socialisation of „White Moors‟ and Home Grown Jihadists

54

Robyn Torok Countering Home-Grown Terrorists in Australia: An Overview of Legislation, Policy and Actors Since 2001 Michael G Crowley

62


Conference Foreword Welcome to the 1st Australian Counterterrorism Conference proceedings. This is the inaugural conference to be held as part of the secau Congress. The conference brings together academics and practitioners in a forum to discuss emerging trends in terrorism and counterterrorism and, more broadly, their implications for human security. The range of papers presented in these proceedings attests to the diversity of the field of counterterrorism studies. Since the devastating terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001, terrorism and counterterrorism studies have attracted much attention. There has been a staggering 400 percent increase in publications on terrorism and related fields since 2001. Yet, the field is still developing as an area of academic interest and will no doubt continue to develop as the international community faces new threats and novel challenges to peace and stability. As a relatively new field of study, counterterrorism draws from the disciplines of psychology, political science, international relations, defence studies, media studies and security. These proceedings include papers that cover such diverse areas of interest as piracy and terrorism, terrorist recruitment, group psychology, policing, terrorism laws, terrorist operations and the use of new technologies. All submitted papers were subject to a double blind peer review process. Of the 11 papers submitted 9 were accepted for final presentation and subsequent publication. This year the best paper award is sponsored by the Western Australian Police. The award will be presented on the night of the Congress dinner. I take this opportunity to thank the contributors to these proceedings who have devoted their time and professionalism. I would also like to thank the conference committee and the paper reviewers for their efforts in ensuring that the proceedings are of a high standard. I trust that you will enjoy reading the papers in these proceedings and that they will inspire your thoughts about terrorism, its challenges and indeed, its resolutions. Dr Anne Aly Conference Chair Conference Organising Committee Conference Chair: Congress Chair: Executive Chair: Track Chair: Track Chair: Track Chair Track Chair: Committee Member: Committee Member: Committee Member: Committee Member: Congress Organiser:

Dr Anne Aly Professor Craig Valli Professor Murray Lampard Dr Andrew Woodward Dr Trish Williams Dr Dave Brooks Dr Christopher Bolan David Cook Peter Hannay Patryk Szewczyk Ken Fowle Lisa McCormack


The Internet as Ideological Battleground Anne Aly secau – Security Research Centre School of Computer and Security Science Edith Cowan Univesity Perth, Western Australia a.al y@ e c u. ed u.a u Recent global events that have brought to light the use of new technologies by terrorist groups have focused attention on the role of the internet in the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals and groups towards a violent extremism. In 2007, the case of Abdul Basheer, a law graduate in Singapore arrested for attempting to join the Taliban in Afghanistan drew attention to the use of the Internet as a source of inspiration and information for would be terrorists. More recently Sydney man Belal Khazaal became the first person to be convicted on the charge of making a document connected with assisting in a terrorist act after using material already available on the internet to develop his own publication "The Rules of Jihad - Short Judicial Rulings and Organisational Instructions For Fighters And Mujahideen Against Infidels". Both cases point to the developing role of the Internet in the process of radicalisation and suggest that the Internet has become an important tactical tool in the terrorists‘ repertoire. The role of the Internet in radicalisation and the extent to which it contributes to the process through which latent beliefs translate into violent actions is not fully understood. However, with the developing strand of terrorism studies that deals with the diffusion of intent as an integral component of counter terrorism efforts has come an understanding of terrorism as a battle of words and ideas. Nowhere is this more evident than on the internet.

RADICALISATION Radicalisation may be described as a process by which individuals progress from a passive or inactive belief in a particular political, social or ideological dogma to extreme or violent action. Several theories have been put forward to describe this progression, particularly in the context of radical or extreme Islamism. Many draw on the behavioural sciences for theoretical models of how terrorist groups indoctrinate and influence members. The combined works of Kuran (1998), Sustein (2002) and Koker and Yordan (2006), for example, place group pressure as fundamentally sustaining the dynamics of terrorist groups. According to Koker and Yordan (2006) Terrorist organisations are pressure groups with an inner hard core of activists and an outer ring of nonactivists. By definition, hardcore activists seek recruits by propagating their views in order to win more support for their particular cause. Recruits, who tend to be non-activists at the time of recruitment, increase the organisation‟s power base. The resulting collectivity professes support for a specific cause, forming a pressure group. Despite an increased awareness and understanding of radicalisation, the reasons why some individuals become radicalised to violence remain ambiguous. Experts on terrorism are still at odds with regards to any kind of psychological predilection for terrorism and have concluded that it is difficult, if not impossible to, profile terrorists. The absence of any viable psychological profile of terrorists, suggests Payne (2009, p.116), is indicative of the limited success of al Qaeda propaganda which he contends has ―failed to mobilize the masses, or to control any significant territory‖. Yet, most scholars are in agreement that terrorism relies on the circulation and proliferation of key messages that construct the world in terms of a battle between good and evil: where Islam is under threat of annihilation at the hands of Western forces and where ―They [the West] are aiming to destroy us [Islam] ... we are under attack, we are being destroyed‖ (Aly 2007, p.36). The counter terrorism responses of Western nations reflect a concern with the ideological battleground and recognition of the need to incorporate measures that address four dimensions of security: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Monitoring threat through intelligence and evidence assessment; Neutralising capability through disruption tactics Crisis management and; Defusing intent by addressing the personal and environmental factors that contribute to radicalisation.

Since the terrorist bombings of the London public transport system in 2005, the UK has responded to the threat of ‗homegrown‘ terrorism by introducing measures aimed at preventing radicalisation through social reform. In March 2009, the United Kingdom‘s Home Office revealed Contest 2: The United Kingdom‟s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, a reinvigorated version of the original Contest strategy developed in 2003. The strategy 1|P age


emphasises a preventative approach to the threat of home-grown terrorism and highlights the challenge for democratic societies to maintaining the delicate balance between democratic freedoms and national security. The strategy also recognises the importance of soft approaches designed to prevent radicalisation by engaging vulnerable members of Muslim communities. These measures such as addressing disadvantage and inequality and actively engaging with Muslim communities are framed by an understanding that radicalisation is more likely to thrive among the disadvantaged and disenfranchised. A similar approach was taken by the Netherlands which has adopted a strategy that focuses on polarisation and isolation of individuals and groups as key indicators of a dispensation towards radicalisation. Likewise, the United States Government‘s National Strategy for Homeland Security (October, 2007) recognises community engagement and outreach as significant elements of counter-radicalisation. In Australia also, community engagement and social harmony feature strongly as mechanisms for combating radicalisation to violent Islamist ideologies. The Counter Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting our Community released in 2010 consists of four key elements: Analysis, Protection, Response and Resilience. Resilience refers to ―building a strong and resilient Australian community to resist the development of any form of violent extremism and terrorism on the home front‖. Typically resilience relates to crisis management and defensive activities. However, in the White Paper it is used to refer to a soft counter terrorism approaches that emphasises community harmony and targets groups vulnerable to radical or extremist influences.

EXTREMIST CONTENT ON THE INTERNET Among Muslims in Australia, the term ‗Sheikh Google‘ has become a popular slogan to describe the trend for Muslims in diasporic communities to seek religious guidance on the internet. The use of the term belies a complex set of issues relating to Muslim identity in secular states like Australia (see for example Aly, 2007) but also reflects the ubiquity of the internet in all matters of everyday life; religion included. A simple Google search on the internet using the term ‗mujahideen‘ yields well over 1 million returns. Sifting through the various conservative think tanks, blogs and policy documents takes only minutes and the discerning user is quickly and easily able to access a plethora of extremist content: terrorist propaganda videos; graphic videos of beheadings and other terrorist operations; and ‗how to‘ manuals such as ―The preparatory manual of explosives‖; ―Illustrated Manual of Sniper Skills‖; and the ―Organic Chemistry of Explosives‖ all of which are freely available through the Unjustmedia website. Extremist websites on the internet vary in their content, purpose and origin ranging from sympathetic websites dedicated to ‗inciting believers‘ to those run by militant Islamist groups that openly advocate the use of violence. Some websites use propaganda to validate the terrorist cause in religious, political and ideological terms. These websites promote conspiracy theories but do not openly endorse the use of violence. Regardless of where extremist websites sit on the spectrum of sympathy for the terrorist cause to the open call for armed conflict, all present a worldview that is embedded in a construction of oppositional forces of good versus evil, honour versus dishonour and Muslim versus the West. The audience is compelled to take a side: to be either with us or against us. Being with us offers potential recruits to the terrorist cause incentives of honour through martyrdom. One website features biographical narratives of ―Prominent Martyrs of Iraq‖. The story of Abu Umair As Suri al Halabi, known as the Ascetic Worshipper, is a typical example of the kind of propaganda used to woo new recruits with the promise of renown, religious absoluteness and martyrdom. An abridged version of this narrative appears below: Martyrdom is a privilege bestowed on only the greatest of the Ummah‟s sons. In Iraq, many brothers are desperately waiting their opportunity to carry out martyrdom attacks because these type of operations can not be controlled by the occupiers. Abu Umair, may Allah have mercy on him, came to the theatre of Jihad alone where he met the martyr Abu Khattab Al-Yemeni Al-Hindi Al-Hijazee, who we will talk about later insha‟Allah. Together they travelled to the city of Fallujah, the city of Honor and Jihad and resided with one of the Sheikhs who used to help the Arab Mujahideen. However Allah destined that he should become a Martyr, and he talked with me about his intense desire to join our ranks. I replied to him: “Do you pledge to us to die (for the sake of Allah), for we do not accept but the one who seeks martyrdom.” That day he laughed and said: “I am searching for it, I intensely desire it, do we aim for anything other than that? Then I gave them an appointment and moved them to the house of Abi Abdullah Ash-Shami. Indeed, a group of audacious and daring brothers had gathered in that house. These brothers were marked by shining light on their faces; they used to select their words carefully so as not to hurt others. They were indeed brothers for the sake of Allah, whom you could sit with to increase your Faith. When mentioning Allah, you would 2|P age


feel their souls humble before them, the Qur‟an in their hands, with smiles upon their faces, they would pray day and night seeking to get closer to their Lord. While this hero was waiting for the moment that Allah would cure the breasts of the believers, an intelligence battalion identified a crucial target being the general headquarters for the Polish army in Karbala city. The heroes took a look around the place until they found a security hole in the facility. A building located near a sub-street had been erected to house the unbelievers' servants and as they became more comfortable, they let their guard down and a gap in security resulted. With that, Abu Umayr al-Suri, his brother Abu Zubayr al-Kuwaiti and another brother set off to execute the plan. Abu Umayr broke through the gates and struck the towers that had been raised high in the sky and mixed with the impure blood. Soon after, Abu al-Zubayr drove a truck filled with five tons of explosives into his target. The number of casualties for the enemy was estimated in the hundreds but alas, this was suppressed in the media, one of the enemy‟s best tools. Narratives found on similar websites that aim to promote public support for terrorists causes by constructing appealing to the concept of violence and death as a pathway to achieving martyrdom adhere to a strict format. In this format the narrative typically presents the qualities of the martyr as:    

The martyr is always devout and his religion unquestionable; He is not from among the poor, the uneducated or the disenfranchised; He demonstrates absolute submission to Allah and an intense desire to fulfil the greatest possible demonstration of his piety He makes contact of his own accord, is never selected, recruited or radicalised but is ‗destined‘ to join the ranks of martyrdom

Internet sites maintained by terrorist or extremist groups can be broadly classified into three categories: 1. 2. 3.

Media sites Organisation sites Interactive sites.

Media sites are typically online television and newspaper resources that offer videos and reports of aggression against Muslim populations in Palestine and Iraq. The Arab television network al Manar (based in Lebanon) for example, produces and broadcasts propaganda videos as part of its normal programming. Al Manar has been banned in France, the United States, Spain and Germany for its anti- Semetic content and servicing issues have made it unavailable to audiences in Australia, South America and Canada. Despite these bans and broadcasting issues, al Manar videos and propaganda are freely available to audiences on the World Wide Web. Propaganda videos are also disseminated on the popular video sharing site Youtube. JihadMedia TV is a channel hosted on Youtube where users can view over one hundred videos ranging from messages and interviews by prominent ‗jihadists‘ to videos produced by the Global Islamic Media Front that document ‗martyr operations‘ and by Revolution Muslim.org that propagate the notion of war between Islam and the West. Among the videos available to view are those that capture graphic footage of American soldiers being killed in Iraq, terrorist training videos, propaganda videos that advertise the terrorists‘ cause and messages from prominent terrorists and religious figures. In its first six months of operation, JihadMedia TV acquired almost 300 subscribers; an indication that the channel is achieving some measure of success in reaching its intended audience. Organisational sites are the official or unofficial websites of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Such sites are open sites that offer news and information about the organisation‘s mission, its history and its ideology. Their format is similar to news media websites but often also have links to their own media statements, publications and video channels. These sites offer news blog, links to Youtube channels, lectures and statements by religious figures and online journals. Interactive sites are social networking sites such as bulletin boards and forums where discussions range from everyday banal topics such as family life and education to religious or ideological discussions. These social networking platforms offer access to an audience of like minded individual and groups through secure forums.

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THE ROLE OF THE INTERNET IN RADICALISATION Notwithstanding the various radicalisation models that are available in the literature, there appears to be a dearth of research devoted to exploring what actually motivates individuals and groups to seek out radical or extremist content in the first place. Scholars and experts in terrorism agree that dissemination of the terrorists‘ message through propaganda is a key factor in the progression of al Qaeda from a ‗base‘ to a global Islamist ideology. The extant literature on the contemporary phenomenon of international terrorism concurs that the War on Terror is essentially an information war where the ideological battlegrounds exist in cyberspace (see for example Aly 2009; Dauber 2009; Payne 2009). Several analyses have been offered regarding how terrorists use new technology including the internet to develop their capability in terms of both financial and human capital (Dauber, 2009; Bergin et al, 2009). Apart from being a central component of the terrorist media strategy, the utility of the internet for terrorists has expanded to encompass tactical functions. In the contemporary terrorist environment in which psychological warfare plays an integral part, having a presence on the internet is as critical to the terrorists‘ success as financial, tactical or organisational capability. The internet offers a communicative space where terrorists can identify, recruit, indoctrinate and influence potential members using the various utilities available on the internet. From the perspective of the terrorists‘ audience, there is value in looking at the role of the audience as active agents in the communicative process with a view to understanding the particular appeal of the internet. Research into how the media serves the needs of audiences have yielded several classifications of user needs broadly based on the informational and entertainment functions of the media. Contemporary approaches recognise the following four needs (Katz et al, 1973, McQuail, 1983): 1. 2. 3. 4.

Information– relates to the cognitive needs and the desire for understanding which are served by the surveillance function of the media; Personal identity- relates to strengthening confidence and credibility and value reinforcement; Social integration and social interaction- relates to personal relationships and the need to strengthen social contact and affiliate with a group; and Entertainment- relates to the need to escape and release tension.

This model is known as the uses and gratifications model and describes how use needs motivate media use. In applying this model to the role of the internet in the radicalisation process, it is necessary to position internet use within a broader context that takes into account the social realities that create needs in the first place and are antecedent to internet usage. Aly (2009) identified the following factors that characterize the contemporary context of Muslims and their media needs: 1. 2.

3.

4. 5.

Transnationalism and the emergence of a Muslim diaspora; The development of a shared identity among Muslims around the globe grounded in victimhood and validated by the concept of the ‗ummah‘- a brotherhood that transcends boundaries of nationhood, ethnicity or race; A widely held perception among Muslims in the diaspora that the Western media is a complicit actor in a conspiracy to undermine Islam and subsequent disengagement with the Western media as a source of news and information; and Access to new media. The presence or perceived presence of a personal and communal crisis. This crisis is framed in terms of an ideological battle for the survival of Islam and expressed in terms of a war (violent jihad) between Islam and the West.

These five factors form the context in which Muslim media needs are constructed and which provide an antecedent to media use. Such an approach positions terrorist propaganda on the internet in the context of a range of motivations and needs. It suggests that exposure to propaganda alone cannot account for radicalisation in its entirety but that propaganda may satisfy informational, personal identity or social integration needs. At the same time context alone should also not be mistaken as the singular cause of radicalisation and efforts to counter radicalisation should not be solely directed at the social situations of vulnerable individuals or groups. The internet, through its various media functions, acts as a facilitator of needs both in terms of content (news, information, propaganda, images, training manuals) and attributes (real time, interactive, consumptive, productive, 4|P age


participatory). The social situations of Muslims generate media needs that are gratified by different content and functions of the internet. These content and functions are generated by the aims of terrorist organisations to identify, inform, influence and indoctrinate potential members. The role of the internet in radicalisation lies in the presentation of alternative realities and alternative truths through which people can engage with a social network where the boundaries of belonging are set by terrorists. These boundaries are ideological belief but also common victimization, common enemy and a shared hatred of the enemy. The diagram below illustrates the internet radicalisation model showing the interface between context, user generated needs, internet functionality and extremist generated content:

Figure 1. A Uses and Gratifications Model of Internet Radicalisation (Aly 2009) The model of internet radicalisation distinguishes between four elements: the user or audience context; the use or audience needs that motivate internet use; the internet content and functions that meet these needs; and the terrorist groups‘ goals for which they generate internet content. These four elements present different aspects of internet radicalisation that need to be addressed with different counter measures. Arguably, terrorists have always made strategic use of the media and new technologies for publicising their cause, influencing audiences and gaining potential recruits. The invention of the printing press presented Anarchist groups in the 1800s and early 1900s with a communication mechanism for spreading their ideology across borders through books, newspapers, pamphlets and journals. Widespread distribution of the Anarchist ideology and technological advances in communications and transport meant that Anarchy was able to spread throughout Europe, America and Asia. In the contemporary information age, almost all terrorist groups incorporate the use of media technologies as an important and central component of their media strategies. Governments and agencies charged with countering terrorism are facing a new challenge of countering extremist violence on the internet. The role of the internet in the process of radicalisation is still not fully understood while the Australian government is exploring possible strategies for combating violent extremism online. Within this context, technical solutions and legislative or policy options are limited in their capacity to address the growing problem of internet radicalisation. Firstly such strategies tend to target the producers of internet sites (often hosted in countries outside of Australia) and focus attention on content. Secondly, the Hydra-like quality of internet terrorism means that cutting off one head will only grow more in its place. An approach, which also attends to the terrorists‘ internet audience, would address the reasons why certain people become attracted to the internet as a source of inspiration. 5|P age


While significant focus in counter terrorism strategies has been on social reform and to activities that engage Muslim communities, attention could also focus on the motivations for seeking information or social networking functions on the internet. In particular the trend towards seeking religious guidance and affirmation of religious identity using Person to Person (P2P) and Person to Content (P2C) applications which allow users to participate in religious discussion and offers charismatic leaders real time access to ready audiences needs addressing. Further exploration of the role of the internet in religious identity would be a useful addition to the literature and to inform future strategies.

REFERENCES Abu Ismail al- Muhajir, ―The Noble Lives of Abu Alhalabi, , Abu Hamza Alurdani, Abu Hurayra Al-hijazee and Saif Al-Ummah,‖ Prominent Martyrs of Iraq. Available at http://www.jihadunspun.com/features_prom_martyrs1.html (accessed 12 June 2009). Aly, A (2009). ". ―The Terrorists‘ Audience: A Model of Internet Radicalisation.‖ Journal of Australian Professional Intelligence Officers. Volume 17:1, pp. 3- 19 Aly, A (2007) ―Australian Muslims responses to the media discourse on terrorism: Pursuing public spheres in a secular state.‖ Australian Journal of Social Issues, Volume 42:1, pp 27-40. Bergin, A, Bte Osman, C Ungerer & NAM Yasin, (2009) ―Countering Internet Radicalisation in Southeast Asia,‖ Australian Strategic Policy Institute Special Report. Available at http//www.aspi.org.au Dauber, C E (2009) ―Youtube War: Fighting in a world of cameras in every cell phone and Photoshop on every computer‖, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Available at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2010), Counter Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting our Community. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia Home Office: Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, The United Kingdom‟s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism. Available at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news -publications/publicationsearch/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf (accessed 12 June 2009) Katz,E., M Gurevitch & H Haas, (1973) ―On the Use of the Mass Media for Important Things‖, American Sociological Review ,Vol 38 (April 1973) pp. 164- 181 Koker, T, & CL Yordan, (2006) ―Microfoundations of Terrorism‖. Paper presented at the 2006 International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, CA: March 25, 2006. Kuran, T (1998) ―Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades‖. Journal of Legal Studies Vol.27:2 (1998), pp 623-659. McQuail, D (1983), Mass Communication Theory, 1st ed., London: Sage Payne, K. (2009) ―Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology, and Terror‖. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.32 (2009) p. 116. Revolution Muslim n.d., http://revolutionmuslim.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=17 Sustein, C. R. Why They Hate US: The Role of Social Dynamics. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy Vol. 25:2 (2002) pp. 429-440.

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Hearts and Minds, Psuedo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based upon Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60) & Rhodesia (1964-1979) Bill Bailey secau – Security Research Centre School of Computer and Security Science Edith Cowan University Perth, Western Australia b .b ail e y@ e c u.ed u. a u

Abstract Pseudo gangs form the steely side of Hearts and Minds and were used with great effect in counter-insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952-60) Malaya (1948-60) and Rhodesia (1964-1979). Although the use of pseudo gangs was not new to counter-insurgency tactics, with the British using a similar tactic in the Boer war (1899-1902), the use of such gangs was certainly perfected during these later campaigns producing good results. The Kenya Police Special Branch re-instigated this concept, developing its use during the „Emergency‟. The principal concept was to „turn‟ or co-opt insurgents through a series of inducements to change sides and join the counter insurgency as part of the Government forces but not as regular forces. Rather the co-opted kept their actual identities or their „assumed‟ identities and return to the conflict areas as part of a „gang‟, which would be made to appear as if it is still fighting for the insurgents. This „pseudo‟ gang would then rejoin or flush out the opposition and either capture, gain further intelligence or eliminate them. Based on my ongoing PhD research into these three campaigns, this paper will briefly outline an alternative model that could be developed for current conflicts against insurgents.

Keywords Campaigns; counter-insurgency; ‗Emergency‘; gangs; hearts and minds; insurgents; Kenya; Malaya; pseudo gang; Rhodesia; Special Branch.

INTRODUCTION ―Hearts and Minds‖ has become almost synonymous with counter insurgency policy transforming itself from a concept into an actual strategy; however it is certainly not the panacea politicians or the press would like to think it is. This paper will argue that for counter-insurgency campaigns to be successful they require ―the iron fist in the velvet glove‖ to directly influence the insurgents. This means not only the capability, but also the ability, to sway the minds of the insurgents over to the side of the security forces. The famous ―Hearts and Minds‖ phrase used by General Templer, in the Malaya insurgency, is often quoted to convey the necessity of having a political dimension as part of the counter-insurgency tactics that corresponds to the military one. "Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population‖ (Galula, 1964, p. 63). However, as Charles Colson, chief counsel to President Nixon, once said, "if you grab them by the balls, the hearts and minds will follow" the context is the same but moves away from the much vaunted idea of ‗hearts and minds‘ as a soft approach, and the sole tactic in counter-insurgency, and more to one where the control of the situation is more in the hands of the security forces. They must use ruthless determination to achieve desired success and not pander to sentiment. Galula (2006) argues the central aim for a successful counter-insurgency campaign is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory. Gaining support of the population can be interpreted many ways but rarely do ‗kind‘ acts achieve strategic successes. The need for a more directed approach is one that is reviewed in this paper. This paper forms part of my current PhD research examining previous counter- insurgency campaigns in an attempt to identify what strategies and tactics were successful (why they worked) and how these proven approaches could be used again in current conflicts. Although the research to date is primarily based on interviews with ex Kenyan Policemen, a thread has emerged from these initial interviews concerning ‗pseudo gangs‘. I am undertaking further interviews with other former combatants involved with the Kenya, Malayan and Rhodesian counter-insurgency campaigns to analyse how these tactics developed in Kenya and Malaya evolved through the later campaigns. The human sources used for this research are identified by their code to maintain anonymity.

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The ability to gain intelligence and to infiltrate the opponents camps is very much a sought after tactic within conflicts; the use of spies has been much publicised over the centuries to achieve this. However, a method which has been used, predominately by the British, in numerous counter insurgency campaigns over the years, and later by the security forces in both Rhodesia and in South West Africa by the South African Defence Force (SADF), has been the use of ‗turning‘ ex gang members so that they return to their erstwhile colleagues and deceive them in to believing that they are still on their side; when in fact they have changed sides. This tactic has been labelled ‗pseudo gangs‘; by those who implemented this tactic in Kenya and my recent research indicates this approach was far more successful than many analysts have hitherto understood. The concept of ‗Hearts and Minds‘ has become central to all discussions concerned with counter insurgency and asymmetrical conflicts. Although this concept is often attributed to General Templer, during the Malayan conflict( 1948-1960. Lyndon B. Johnson, certainly was keen on using the phrase, often inverting it to ‗minds and hearts‘ when discussing the war in Vietnam. Many think he took this from President Jon Adams‘s letter dated 18 th of February 1818: The Revolution was affected(sic) before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people; a change in their religious sentiments of their duties and obligations.... This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution. (Adams cited in Dickinson, 2009) This quote by Adams clearly identified what was at stake, the support of the people. The overall concept has been analysed further by many others such as David Charters in The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-7 (Charters, 1989), Richard Stubbs Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla warfare (Stubbs, 1989) and Thomas Mockaitis ―British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 (Mockaitis, 1999); as well as in countless military documents. Susan Carruthers analyses the total concept of the hearts and minds strategy, by highlighting British government ―attempts to influence opinion about challenges to colonial rule in four counter-insurgency campaigns‖ as well as how the propaganda war is fought by stigmatising opponents (Carruthers, 1995, p. 2). Clearly the hearts and minds approach to counter-insurgency is not a new concept, nevertheless it is a concept that needs ongoing analytical refinement so that it may be utilised effectively in contemporary and future counter-insurgency operations. By the same token the hearts and minds concept must not be overplayed either as the ultimate panacea. Counter-insurgency operations utilising a hearts and minds component will always need to be combined with security forces that are demonstrably more than capable of winning due to their superior soldiering skills, fire power, logistical support and greater resources to back up their campaign. The ability to convince the population that you will eventually win is an essential part of the overall strategy, ―[the] counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgents‖ (Galula, 2006, p. 64). The ability to convince insurgents to change sides is central to success if the insurgency is to be overcome. Therefore convincing individual insurgents that changing sides is in their own best interests particularly if they wish to come out of the conflict on the winning side. Evidence suggests that the desire to gain an advantage, or not to lose it, is core to this concept of changing sides according to those that took part in these campaigns. The ability to ‗turn‘ an insurgent was the key and was certainly the hall mark of the Selous Scouts during the Rhodesian campaign, which will be discussed later in this paper: . . . [T]he best recruiting method was to send another former insurgent to visit him in hospital . . . and have a long conversation, dwelling in particular upon the hardships the insurgents were experiencing in the bush . . . The process of turning insurgents was eased considerably by the knowledge that they could be hanged as violators of the Law and Ord Maintenance Act. He would then be examined thoroughly by members of the Selous Scouts to ensure his loyalty―not to the government of Rhodesia, but to the members of the unit itself. The insurgent also would be offered a cash lump sum for joining the Selous Scouts (together with receiving the same salary as a soldier, with the funds being paid by Special Branch), and if possible, his family would be moved to the Selous Scouts base, where they received free rations, housing, education, and medical care. (Reid-Daly, 1999, pp. 106107)

KENYA The Mau Mau ‗Emergency‘ in Kenya was declared by the British colonial government in 20 October 1952. The roots of the conflict began much earlier and had been brewing for a number of years between the Kikuyu and the settlers over land issues and rights (Furedi, 1989). However it was not considered to be serious by the Colonial 8|P age


Government until deaths occurred on several settlers farms in 1952. The police force was then increased threefold with the addition of five British army battalions, as well as one full Kings African Rifles (KAR), plus the backing of the Royal Air Force (Lonsdale, 1990, p. 394). The military were employed as an aid to the civil power; as described by Huw Bennett, in his paper on the Mau Mau Emergency (Bennett, 2007). The capacity to control the psychological sphere of influence became crucial to fighting the Emergency. John Lonsdale develops a series of interesting themes concerning the ‗mind games‘ involved stating that the Mau Mau insurgents took over the minds of the white settlers, when the intention should have been very much the opposite, but clearly there was a great deal of fear amongst the settler population as they were greatly outnumbered by the indigenous population. The thrust of the ―hearts and minds‘ policy should have been to dominate the local population i.e. the African (Lonsdale, 1990, p. 394). General Erskine‘s strategy in Kenya involved three key elements. Firstly, secure what were called the ‗Reserves‘ in the tribal areas by securing them from attack and intimidation; this was called ‗villagisation‘ in Malaya. Secondly, round up as many known Mau Mau as they could, which they did as part of ―Operation Jock Scott‖. Thirdly, take the offensive to the terrain in which the insurgents were operating (Melshen, 2007, p. 675). It is this last aspect that is of interest and needs to be assessed and analysed as this became central to the campaign with development of psychological warfare and the use of what would become known as ‗Pseudo gangs‘ as part of this strategy. It is this issue associated with mind games that opens the way for the development of the concept of co-opting or turning known insurgents to betray their own comrades and become a pseudo gang. The argument over the word Mau Mau is an important one in this debate as it centres on the very nature of the conflict and how this was fought out in the ‗minds ‘of those involved. The demonising of your enemy is not new and runs throughout history, however in post World War II world order this had now become a key element in the ability to retain the support of the ‗colonised‘ population; who were starting to shun the notion of external control over their lives and their country. Leakey takes the confusion over the word Mau Mau even further by describing the organisation as a pseudo religious one, set up to replace the imposition of Christianity upon the Kikuyu (Leakey, 2004, p. 42); stating their zeal turned the adherents into ―fanatical, murdering maniacs‖ (Leakey, 2004, p. 51), which certainly added fuel to the propaganda war which was being conducted in both the British and Kenyan press. Furthermore, the pseudo links to religion may be borne out by the research that indicates a ready acceptance by the captured insurgents to redeem themselves by accepting de-oathing ceremonies (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012). The other aspect that needs to be assessed was that in both insurgences, Kenya and Malaya, the perpetrators of the insurgency attacked those that they thought supported the Colonialists, an aspect developed very succinctly by Leakey(Leakey, 2004). The divisions within the Kikuyu tribe were ruthlessly exploited allowing the colonial security forces to harness any support against the Mau Mau to their advantage and turn their own people against them. Once again this laid the foundation for the idea of pseudo gangs to take hold as a tactic. This would appear to have been crucial in the ability to gain the upper hand and start to dominate the campaign, after the advantage had been lost following the general surge from the Mau Mau post operation ―Jock Scott‖ 10 th of Oct 1952. ―The operation to arrest 120 of the known leaders of the Mau Mau had seriously back fired and in fact had caused the insurgency to blow out of control rather than nipping it in the bud as had been envisaged‖ (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012). The other critical element is the role played by the colonial police force, Deflem, articulates their unique position within the campaign structure, especially under the indirect rule concept adopted by the Colonial office. The Police, together with the Kenya regiment, were crucial to counter insurgency tactics (Deflem, 1994, p. 47; Husain, 2009; Kitson, 1960; Smith, 2005). Beckett develops this theme further, pointing out how important their detailed knowledge was in the overall strategy (Beckett & Pimlott, 1985; Kitson, 1960). Bennett also deals with use of force elements and the criticality of command and control of those forces on the ground (Bennett, 2007). All of these factors indicated the important role the Colonial Police force played in being able to dominate the counter insurgency because of their local knowledge of language and customs. In Kenya a certain Captain Kitson, an intelligence officer who was attached to Kenya Police Special Branch developed an idea together with Ian Henderson and a few others (including a respondent in this current research) about trying to infiltrate the Mau Mau . There is considerable dispute as to how the idea morphed into the full use of ‗Pseudo gangs‘, however Captain Kitson played a central role and details the gradual evolution of the strategy in his book (Kitson, 1960; 1990).

THE PSEUDO GANGS What is of particular interest to the research is what tactics used by the Colonial forces were decisive in winning their campaigns. Turning captured Mau Mau into instruments that could be used to counter the enemy was certainly 9|P age


significant in this campaign, destabilising the enemy. Once they were captured a series of inducements were used to get them to lead a ‗party‘ back to where their former colleagues were operating and infiltrate them. By using this tactic, Police Special Branch (SB) infiltrated the gangs, sometimes for quite some time, gleaning valuable intelligence (Franklin, 1996; Kitson, 1960). The ability to capture additional potential collaborators was very appealing too as it would diminish the opposition and dishearten them once they found out that there erstwhile comrades had joined the ranks of their foes. This destabilisation tactic became a valuable tool as it dejected the Mau Mau gangs creating distrust amongst them which caused many to change sides ―self preservation...he thought that the white man was going to win eventually and it was better to be on the winning side than the Kikuyu‖(respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012) There were a substantial number of Kikuyu, who were on the side of the Colonial forces and in fact made up what was called the Kikuyu Guard, who were opposed to the demands of the rest of their tribe who had joined the Mau Mau. The ability of the some members of the Colonial forces to speak the language, in this case Kikuyu, was core to being able to achieve this aim of infiltrating the Mau Mau. Although the white members were not usually part of pseudo gang, at times they took a gamble and did join the fray. Amazingly enough this seems to have worked with little adverse reaction from the Mau Mau gangs. This could be because it was so unexpected and therefore did not raise suspicions or perhaps, as has been pointed out, the gangs were often high on Khat or alcohol and did not really know who was who in the gloom of the forests (respondent K-1, 2010, Bailey, 2012). Nonetheless it was the use of ex-members of the Mau Mau that made the difference and allowed the Security forces to gain a substantial upper hand. ―There is only one way we are going to beat the Mau Mau, and that‘s to have gangs disguised as Mau Mau to go into the forests and live as Mau Mau and destroy them in their lairs‖ (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012). Working closely with Ian Henderson of the Kenya Police, the respondent was involved with establishing ‗pseudo-gangs‘ within a specialised unit formed in Special Branch called the Special Bureau.‖ (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012). There were only six of them in the unit at the start: four Europeans and two Africans, only one of which was a Kikuyu the other was Wa-Kamba. This was the start of a very valuable tool in the arsenal of tactics against the insurgents because they were able to gather valuable intelligence pin-pointing the active Mau Mau gangs which was vital to the campaign. The idea blossomed once it was found that it was not that difficult to turn captured Kikuyu and send them back in with Kenya Police handlers or Kenya Regiment, as they spoke Kikuyu; to ensure they did not vanish back into the forests and developed as a tactical strategy (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012). It was essential that the right people were turned and that meant selecting them carefully, according the Kitson there was also a distinct methodology to be followed to achieve success Briefly it is that three separate factors have to be brought into play in order to make a man change his allegiance. First, he must be given an incentive that is strong enough to make him want to do so. This is the carrot. Then he must be made to realize that failure will result in something very unpleasant happening to him. This is the stick. Third, he must be given a reasonable opportunity of proving both to himself and to his friends that there is nothing fundamentally dishonorable about his action.(Kitson, 1960, pp. 171-172) The lessons learnt from Kenya and transferred to the Rhodesia campaign remained the domain of the Special Branch (SB), which seems to be behind this in Malaya, Kenya and Rhodesia, even though pseudo gangs were run from within the army unit of the Selous Scouts, SB were the puppet masters maintaining control over the intelligence gathered and used. Although Kitson points out in his book that all the men who were used from the Kenyan Regiment spoke Swahili, this in fact was not the language required(Kitson, 1960, pp. 120-121). My informants have indicated that in fact there were very few white officers in the Kenya Police that spoke Kikuyu , Swahili yes, but not Kikuyu, and that is why Ian Henderson was so important to the success of the ‗pseudo gangs‘ as he did speak Kikuyu; as did others and that drove the operation who were drawn from predominately the Kenya Regiment (respondent K-2, 2010, Bailey, 2012). The Kenyan Regiment was drawn from the settler population, hence their ability to speak local dialects such as Kikuyu, Meru, Kamba, Luo and Kalenjin

MALAYA The ―Emergency‘ in Malaya started in 1948 and was serious from the start unlike in Kenya with ruthless attacks on rubber plantations, core to the war in Korea, which were well planned and executed by the Communist insurgents. Furthermore the idea that this was a further push by International Communism against the West was taken as a very grave threat. The Communist insurgents were well trained and had been at the back bone of defeating the Japanese. 10 | P a g e


Now they were keen to take power reaping their reward and transform Malaya into a communist state. Initial reports sent to London stated ―there were five thousand active fighters and 250,000 Min Yuen 1 supporters in towns and villages‖ (Barber, 1972, p. 25). There is no doubt the conflict here was far more severe than in Kenya and could easily be described as a ‗civil war‘ from the start even though Kenya received far more press (Carruthers, 1995, p. 72). The strategies that were developed in Malaya, separating the insurgents from their support base in the villages, and to a large extent copied in Kenya, are continually cited by Joes as successful for counter insurgency campaigns (Joes, 2004, p. 232; Thompson, 1974). Joes and Beckett agree with this interpretation. Beckett develops the discussion further stating that General Templer (often cited as the architect of ‗hearts and minds‘ (Beckett, 2001, p. 102) was able to develop this strategy and to build up the critical elements that are necessary to prosecute this type of approach: allowing the police to set up a Special Branch(SB) operation to concentrate solely on the insurgents. The evidence analysed thus far indicates the importance of SB to the setting up of strategies to defeat the insurgents. According to Roy Fellows the Malay Police accounted for more of the enemy, Communist Terrorists and Insurgents, than any other force. (Follows & Popham, 1990) Templer created a combined intelligence unit together with a staff intelligence training school; establishing a new psychological warfare section in addition to the creation of ‗safe villages‘ which was the back bone of the strategy to deny the rebels succour from the local population, ―the shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us‖ (Beckett, 2001, p. 102). But the development of pseudo type gangs seems to have been very much determined by Special Branch who used every opportunity to manipulate any captured ‗communist terrorists‘ (CT‘s), as they were known, to turn them against their erstwhile comrades using them in a similar way to Kenya. At this stage it has not been possible to positively identify cross fertilisation between Kenya and Malaya with the use of pseudo gangs as such, although similarities indicate this might have occurred. The full quote by General Templer is worth noting when he says ―the answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but rests in the hearts and minds of the people. Winning ‗hearts and minds‘ requires understanding the local culture.‖ (Charters & Tugwell, 1989, p. 195). It is very much this ability that comes to the fore when the running of the pseudo type gangs is considered; the ability to understand the culture. Furthermore the ability to speak the local language was key to the success of this type of operation in all counties, as it allowed direct conversation rather than one that is carried out through an interpreter where there is always the chance of misinterpretation or bias creeping in. An important characteristic based upon the evidence indicates that there is a need for the turned ‗insurgent or terrorist‘ to identify with the his new found allies to the point of almost becoming more anti than those they have joined, ―they could only justify their escape from Communism by being personally involved in the struggle against it-which is why time after time they begged to lead patrols back into the jungle to attack their former comrades‖(Barber, 1972, p. 196). Cline discusses the challenge of using ‗turned‘ insurgents, highlighting how using pseudo gangs creates a dilemma when it comes to winning the psychological battle and that is the treatment of those that have changed sides. It is paramount that all those who change sides are treated well, so that this becomes common knowledge; so that changing sides has very positive benefits for those that chose this route. However, there was a need to keep their identities secret or else they risk retribution from their former comrades, which did take place in many cases(Cline, 2005). This obviously presented a tactical quandary, which was only addressed with limited success. Within tribal societies news travels fast, which will always make using pseudos a moral dilemma. ―Intelligence has to come from the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe, and it does not feel safe until the insurgent‘s power has been broken‖(Galula, 1964, p. 96). The ability to create safe havens is central to gaining the trust of the population.

RHODESIA It is clear that the concept of pseudo gangs was one that was built up from previous campaigns and finding the direct link with Kenya or Malaya has been difficult but as many of those that had been in these early campaigns; either 1

Min Yuen was the name used for the Communists. The.Min Yuen were more than just supporters. The Min Yuen collected ―Taxes‖ from the villagers and carried out assassinations. They were the ones who instilled fear into the local population. The MRLA were the uniformed armed wing and the Min Yuen were the plain clothed and far more sinister wing 11 | P a g e


returned or immigrated to Rhodesia, the transfer of such successful tactics can be traced to 1966. This was certainly the case in Rhodesia where those who had fought in both Kenya and Malaya returned to take part in the ‗bush war‘. In fact Ron Reid Daly was in Malaya with ‗C‖ squadron of the Rhodesian SAS, and later returned home to head the formation of the Selous Scouts, who used the pseudo gangs as a central part of their strategy with some well documented successes. The concept of using pseudo gangs was however put forward first by Oppie Oppenheim of the British South African Police (BSAP) in 1966 at a joint exercise run by the Special Branch, with army observers using troops from various units. Some of the instructors were formerly in Kenya (Stiff, 1984, p. 48),thus establishing a link between Kenya and Malaya. The exercise did not meet with universal approval and it was to take several more years before the concept of using pseudo gangs was to gain wider the acceptance of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) for the Rhodesian Security Forces. Once again it was through Special Branch of the BSAP, that the merits of this type of activity were put into operational use, this was 26th of January 1973. A small team of six; four former insurgents and two African Police Constables were dressed to appear as insurgents and were sent into the field to gather intelligence(Reid Daly, 1982, pp. 24-26). This tactic soon started to have positive results with the army now using this idea and developing it, but with the use of Europeans leading the groups, who were made of both former insurgents and black soldiers that formed the bulk of Selous Scouts; headed now by Major Ron Reid Daly. It was considered essential to have this level of control to ensure discipline and channel intelligence succinctly. This unit was to go on to make this type of activity its hall mark throughout the ‗Bush war‖ (Reid Daly, 1982). Special Branch continued to supply intelligence and the army the men for the operations. The core to success of these pseudo operations was the ability to morph into becoming an insurgent; knowing the language, customs and the terrain. The difficulty was to find such people however recruits were sourced from those who had spent a life time in the bush, such as administrators, famers and park rangers(Stiff, 1984, p. 45). Essentially the success of these units was underpinned by their ability to roam the bush gathering intelligence and feeding this back to their handlers in the Special Branch. Rather than the pseudo gangs taking offensive action themselves, which could lead to them being compromised, the Rhodesians would use what was called ‗Fire Force‘ This unit was predominately the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), which employed the limited helicopter capability they possessed (due to sanctions) to drop small sticks of soldiers and engage the enemy based on the sound intelligence they had gleaned from the ‗pseudo gangs‘. The role of the pseudos , according to Reid Daly, was ― to infiltrate the tribal population and terrorist networks, pinpoint the terrorist camps and bases and then direct conventional forces in to carry out the actual attacks‖(Stiff, 1984, p. 76) The ‗pseudos‘ also had another important role other than intelligence gathering and offensive operations, and that was destabilisation. As the opposing forces in the Rhodesian war were made up of competing groups, based upon tribal loyalties, there was intense rivalry between these groups namely, Zimbabwe People‘s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The more it could be made to appear that one group was cheating on the other, particularly as they also represented differing revolutionary ideologies, the more this caused resentment and retaliation. The Selous Scouts were very successful in achieving this in their operations often posing as one group and attacking the other. This form of psychological warfare was very effective and created paranoia amongst the insurgents. Stiff posits that as much as 68% of the insurgents killed during the ‗Bush War‘ in Rhodesia can be attributed either directly or indirectly to the Selous Scouts(Stiff, 1984, p. 330). ―It is in men‘s minds that wars of subversion have to be fought‖(Mockaitis, 1999, p. 186). The ability to play these mind games is an essential component of asymmetrical warfare; the Rhodesians followed by the South Africans became masters of this tactic.

CONCLUSION ‗Hearts and Minds‘ is therefore far more than just a political dimension of counter-insurgency Pseudo gangs clearly represent part of what is a suite of operational tactics designed to convince, insurgents that their path is doomed to failure and they would be better served joining the Government forces and affecting change from the inside rather than being killed, maimed or imprisoned. The use of ‗pseudo gangs‘ in Kenya, Malaya and Rhodesia proved to be a very successful tactic despite recent controversy over the use of such methods in contemporary insurgencies. These tactics have a proven track record which should be taken into consideration for modern day conflicts.

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However the success of this tactic does attest to the requirement to have a political agenda as well as a military one. As Robert Thompson states ―the ‗First Principle‘ of counterinsurgency warfare was that the government must have a clear political aim‖(Thompson, 1974, p. 51). This statement can be tempered with a further remark: not only must there be a clear political aim, it must be a shared political aim with those that form the back bone of the country, as ultimately if they do not share this aim then any military victory will prove pyrrhic; as was ultimately the case in Rhodesia. My ethnographic data shows that language too plays a crucial role in the ability to harness the obvious advantages that pseudo gangs can bring to combating the insurgents. However this clearly only works if you are able to converse directly in the local language; as a local and not as an intruder. The lessons of Kenya and Malaya were put to very good use in Rhodesia, with most of the Security Forces utilising their local skills and linguistic prowess to the full; speaking both Shona of ZIPRA forces and Ndebele of the ZANLA forces. The ability to conduct an interrogation directly in the same language as the captured person allows for a greater understanding of the intelligence being gathered. The use of an interpreter greatly disadvantages the process, as one is never sure whether what has been interpreted is correct or whether a further slant or nuance has been placed upon the words that were not in the original tongue. Clearly the greater the number of the counter insurgents forces that speak the local language, the greater the advantage to the security forces. In the final analysis, as with all counter insurgencies there is never one single tactic but a series of multiple tactics that operate at several levels as in multiple dimensional chess. The rules of the game continually change as the world adopts new and altered moral restraints upon what it considers to be legitimate in its efforts to win. This does not make the situation any easier for those charged with prosecuting the insurgency, but what is obvious is that the past will always have lessons for the future and adapting these lessons is the difference between success and failure, countering insurgency is no different in that regard. The success of pseudo gangs has been greatly underestimated with a need for more research to portray the value of this tactic and allow modern day strategists the option of reevaluating whether or not they are still a potent tool in their arsenal for fighting counter-insurgencies.

REFERENCES Bailey, W. J. (2012). Contemporary directions for counter insurgency campaigns based upon experiences from previous campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya(1948-60) and Rhodesia ( 1964-1979) ( Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia. Barber, N. (1972). The war of the running dogs: The Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960. New York: Weybright and Talley. Beckett, I. F. W. (2001). Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750. Oxon, UK: Routledge. Beckett, I. F. W., & Pimlott, J. (1985). Armed forces & modern counter-insurgency: Taylor & Francis. Bennett, H. (2007). The Mau Mau Emergency as part of the British Army's post-war counter-insurgency experience. Defense & Security Analysis, 23(2), 143-163. Carruthers, S. L. (1995). Winning hearts and minds: British governments, the media, and colonial counterinsurgency, 1944-1960: Leicester University. Press. Charters, D. (1989). The British army and Jewish insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47. London: Macmillan Press in association with King's College,. Charters, D., & Tugwell, M. (1989). From Palestine to Northern Ireland: British adaptation to low-intensity operations: A comparative analysis. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers. Cline, L. E. (2005). Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Other Countries. Strategic Studies Institute. Deflem, M. (1994). Law enforcement in British colonial Africa: A comparative analysis of imperial policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast and Kenya. Police Stud.: Int'l Rev. Police Dev., 17, 45. Dickinson, E. (2009). A bright shining slogan. Foreign Policy., Sept/Oct(November 2009). 13 | P a g e


Follows, R., & Popham, H. (1990). The Jungle Beat: Fighting Terrorists in Malaya, 1952-1961. London: Cassell. Franklin, D. (1996). A Pied Cloak: Memories of a colonial police ( Special Branch) officer. London, England.: Janus publishing company. Furedi, F. (1989). The Mau Mau War in Perspective. Nairobi, Kenya: Heinermann Kenya Ltd. Galula, D. (1964). Counter-insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York, USA.: Frederick Praeger. Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency warfare: theory and practice. Westport, CT, USA.: Praeger Trade. Husain, E. (2009, 5:28PM GMT 14 Mar 2009). We must stop appeasing Islamist extremism Telegraph.co.uk, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/4991879/We-must-stop-appeasing-Islamist-extremism.html Joes, A. J. (2004). Resisting rebellion: the history and politics of counterinsurgency: University Press of Kentucky. Kitson, F. (1960). Gangs and counter gangs. London: Barrie & Rockliff. Leakey, L. S. B. (2004). Defeating Mau Mau: Routledge. Lonsdale, J. (1990). Mau Maus of the mind: Making Mau Mau and remaking Kenya. The Journal of African History, 31(3), 393-421. Melshen, D. R. P. (2007). Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical Considerations in Counterinsurgency Campaigning. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 18(4), 665-698. Mockaitis, T. R. (1999). British counterinsurgency, 1919-60. London: St. Martin's Press. Newsinger, J. (1990). A counter-insurgency tale: Kitson in Kenya. Race & Class(31; 61). Reid-Daly, R. (1999). Pamwe chete: the legend of the Selous Scouts. Weltervreden Park, South Africa: Covos Day. Reid Daly, R. (1982). Selous Scouts: Top secret war. Alberton. R.S.A.: Galago Publishing (PTY) Ltd. Smith, D. L. (2005). Kenya, The Kikuyu and the Mau Mau. Herstmonceux, UK: Mawenzi Books. Stiff, P. (1984). Selous Scouts. Alberton, R.S.A.: Galago Publishing Stubbs, R. (1989). Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: the Malayan emergency, 1948-1960. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thompson, S. R. G. K. (1974). Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (seventh ed.). London: Chatto & Windus.

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The Malarkey of Money Transfers: Overlooking E-Bay whilst the Hawaladars are Hunted David M. Cook1,2 and Timothy Smith1 Edith Cowan University, 2secau- Security Research Centre Perth, Western Australia [email protected], [email protected]

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Abstract Informal Money Transfer systems represent one of several persistent loopholes in the fight against the War on Terror. Terrorist groups and criminal networks continue to use the Hawala system, as well as other informal transfer systems, to escape the regulatory and administrative control of formal international banking transactions. In an age where global financial regulation is underpinned by international agreement through Basel and others, the ongoing use of IVTs in Australia is cause for increasing concern. Yet Hawala is only half of the informal equation. E-bay and its associated bedfellows outstrip Hawala transfers through the same commercial imperative that drives the modern world, simply by doing business. This paper describes the escalating risk in Australian and International money transfers, and the need for a reconsideration of the prevention strategies that conceal the support for terrorist and criminal activities.

Keywords Hawala, Hawaladar, Informal Value Transfer, Non Government Organisations, Islamic Banking, money laundering, prevent strategy, eBay, Paypal Since September 11th 2001, there has been a large focus on limiting the financing of terrorism as key to successful prevention of a critical event (Heng & McDonagh 2009, p.53). As former US President George Bush commented only a month later ―the first shot in the war was when we started cutting off their money, because an al-Qaeda organisation can‟t function without money‖ (Bush, 2001). As a result of this focus Informal Value Transfer Systems were identified as a major hole in security for any country at risk of terror attacks. What followed was a united international movement to register and regulate all informal remittance operators to mitigate the risk of a terrorist cell gaining its finances through any such system (AUSTRAC, 2009). While any informal system is at risk of being abused for the purpose of money laundering and the financing of terrorism, one of the largest and easiest money laundering systems has been overlooked to the point where, upon realisation of this major and seemingly defenceless security loophole, any informal system loses its commercial imperative. The security weaknesses which the authors identify in this paper are not so focused on Hawala and Hundi money transfers, but instead depict a lack of attention paid to the online auction site eBay and its preferred method of payment transfer, PayPal. This paper will outline an escalating risk in Australian money transfers that incorporates a review of both Hawala-style money transfers and online mechanisms. In doing so, the need to balance the focus on Hawala against current security weaknesses with established remittance providers such as PayPal and Western Union becomes a matter for closer consideration. A balanced approach to the security of different money transfer systems requires an understanding of the manner in which both Hawala and PayPal contribute to money laundering and terrorist financing (Malkin and Elizur 2002, p61). Informal money transfers have been repeatedly linked to the funding of terrorist attacks. The twin towers attack on September 11th saw more than $270,000USD sent through a variety of means including formal bank transfers, Hawala remittances, and Western Union transfer branches (NCTAUS, 2004). Hawala money transfers or Hundi, as they are commonly described in Southern Asia, involve both legal and illegal mechanisms that are so opaque to financial scrutiny that Hawala is considered the black sheep of the money transfer family (Heng & McDonagh, 2009). This form of money transfer involves less cost in transfer fees because Hawaladars make many transactions in their network, without physically transferring each transaction back and forth. Instead they use a familial network of trust that remits individual amounts to users but may balance their payouts amongst fellow Hawaladars with far less frequency (Levi, 2007). In the modern Western context Hawala is considered less legitimate than Western banking and transfer systems. Historically, Hawala is closely aligned with transactions that are of middle-Eastern and south Asian origin. Many of the regular tithes and charity donations that are prescribed as part of the Muslim faith are sent via a Hawala transaction. Again, Hawala transfers have been linked to terrorist operations, and as a result the act of donating money for a charitable purpose has come under fire as an easy way to disguise transfers of large sums under the

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mask of international aid (Heng & McDonagh 2009, Navias 2002). Yet by comparison with Western transfer constructs such as PayPal, Hawala transactions receive far more discredit and mistrust than their western counterparts. This is an interesting phenomenon, since many well-known and well documented terrorist attacks use money laundering and transfer systems other than or in addition to Hawala systems (Acharya 2009, AUSTRAC, 2007).

INFORMAL VALUE TRANSFER SYSTEMS Informal Value Transfer Systems come in many different forms from many different cultures. Such systems include the Chinese ‗Flying Money‘, the Sanskrit based ‗Hundi‘ which means collect, and the Arabic ‗Hawala‘ which means change or transform and trust (Perkel, 2004). The most recognised of these systems is the Arabic Hawala system which came to notoriety after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the shutdown of al-Barakaat due to allegations of terrorism financing (Passas, 2006). These remittance systems were originally created and used due to a lack of any formal banking avenues with which to conduct business. As a result of this the use of IVT‘s has become traditional and is still used today. Wide spread use of IVT‘s is especially prevalent in countries that are in or recovering from conflict, suffer from a weak banking system, political corruption, and usually have a history of funding terrorism (Sharma, 2006). Systems such as Hawala are very susceptible to criminal abuse due to their informal nature. The most prominent abuse is the laundering of money which can occur through the use of these systems in two ways, as a result of the primary function of the system (by the customer), and in order to settle accounts between operators (Razavy, 2005, Maimbo, 2003). The primary function of a Hawaladar is to allow access to funds from a trusted colleague or family member, i.e. another Hawaladar, in another country or town by accepting the funds from a member of the public. The transfer is facilitated through a phone call, email, or text message to the other operator but no funds are physically transferred (Perkel, 2004). Any outstanding debts between operators are settled at different intervals depending on the difference, e.g. a larger debt may be settled on the day or within a week, but smaller differences are usually settled every month. Settling accounts can occur through a number of different avenues yet two are the most prominent, through trade, and through formal banking avenues via satellite (Maimbo, 2003). It is the settlement through trade that constitutes money laundering and it appears to be common for the formal system to be used as a precursor to settling through trade in other countries, as opposed to direct transaction of money which incurs a transaction fee (Maimbo, 2003, Ballard, 2005, Razavy, 2005). Within Australia, the government response to informal money transfers has crossed several key milestones in mitigating the movement of funds likely to be used for either money laundering or terrorist funded activities. AUSTRAC has systematically blanketed a ‗Know Your Customer‘ (KYC) policy (AUSTRAC, 2009) over those involved in any kind of remittance services as well as monitoring those working in the area of Bearer Negotiable Instruments (AUSTRAC, 2008). In December 2006 the agency stepped up its requirements for electronic funds transfers including non-reportable fund transfers of small amounts. In June 2007 it institutionalised a system of AML/CTF Compliance reporting, and by December of the same year had embedded customer identification programs across all known transfer systems. These have built onto the FTR Act of 1988 and now include the reporting of suspicious transaction reports (SUSTRs), Wire Transfers (IFTIs), and significant cash transactions (SCTRs), (AUSTRAC, 2007). Yet the notion of money laundering through the practice of over invoicing, under-invoicing and the use of eBay and PayPal for goods noted as sold but never actually sent, remains almost impossible to regulate. Within this context, the focus on Hawaladars over and above the focus on the substantially larger volume of known eBay/PayPal dealings indicates a rather large elephant in the room (AGD, 2010). The Australian Federal Minister for Home and Justice announced in April 2010 the intention to strengthen the reporting and identification for remittance providers, including a closer scrutiny of the familial networks that underpin both Asian and Middle-Eastern informal transfer arrangements (ibid, 2010). This strengthening of reporting still fails to prevent eBay transactions for fake goods that are sold for large sums in order to fund terrorism (Daily Mail, 2006). The issue of whether the goods sold are not genuine or whether the goods are even sent at all is irrelevant. The current Australian Government regulations have no verification method to determine any aspect of the arrival or acceptance of goods. Whilst AUSTRAC can determine that a cash amount has been transferred, it cannot determine acceptance or validity of goods sent in consideration for each remittance. The sale of goods through informal means or by mechanisms that encourage online shopping to a global audience is not exclusively the domain of eBay. However eBay‘s dominance of the online shopping market, and its ownership of money transfer systems like PayPal, make it a likely target for money launderers who effectively become amateur remitting agents for the duration of each sale (eBay, 2009). EBay is quick to explain that they do not act as financial 16 | P a g e


agents or remitting agents, yet their transfer arm PayPal clearly operates as an enabler for hundreds of thousands of buyers and sellers for exactly the purpose of remitting payments. Whilst this activity is broadly overlooked as too difficult to monitor, agencies such as Australia‘s AUSTRAC are increasingly demanding more identification and reporting metrics about each individual remitter who uses a transfer system like Western Union (AUSTRAC 2009). PayPal appears to escape the same scrutiny because either the amounts are too insignificant or the transaction claims some sort of legitimacy based on the pretext of a sale of ‗goods‘ that can be identified through the formalised system of trading known as eBay. Despite the reinforced attention on remittance providers, the inability to classify individuals within the broader context of using eBay and PayPal transactions as remittance providers has two effects. Firstly, the increased reporting for remittance providers makes the informal remitting agents in shops increasingly divide into two camps. In one camp resides agents such as Australia Post with highly procedural and robust internally regulated methods for dealing with money transfers, and in the other camp sit ad hoc businesses whose main commercial activity might be fast food, late night grocery supplies, or small ethnically focused travel services. For these businesses in the second camp the opportunities to offer both regulated transfers as agents for Western Union and the possibility to assist a customer using a familial-based networked informal transfer such as Hawala must present a difficult decision. Secondly, as this renewed focus by AUSTRAC pursues registered remitters, the number of people likely to shift to money laundering through multiple disguised purchases on eBay and then PayPal is likely to increase (AUSTRAC, 2009).

FEAR OF TERMINOLOGY As mentioned previously, Hawala has been identified as a priority target for counter terrorism financing (CTF) action which has manifestly produced an international movement to regulate Hawaladars (Borgers, 2009). As a result of this international push Hawala has become a pejorative term, shifting from its previous position of legitimacy to one of alignment with terrorist threat, criminal activity, or underhanded dealings. The central reasons for at least some of this perception are; that Hawaladars do not keep records in the same way that banks and other money agencies, the familial network of trust between international and interregional Hawaladars keeps records in private, and quite often notations are destroyed after debts are settled (Razavy, 2005). The Hawala link to terrorism has developed a certain global notoriety that has travelled right down to alternative remittance operators. This effect has been repeatedly demonstrated to the authors when casually enquiring about Hawala at money transfer businesses in the Perth metropolitan area. When quizzed as to how their money transfer service operates and whether it is anything like a Hawala system, most shop vendors‘ immediate reaction was that of apprehension and nervousness. They generally stated that they thought Hawala was illegal in Australia and that they know nothing about it, all the while presenting verbal and physical signs of reluctance and hesitation to continue discussion on the matter. These anecdotal observations are merely part of the motivational pretext for some of the inquiry that is pursued within this paper. The need for a more empirically rigorous investigation into street vendors who might purport to offer informal money transfers is certainly acknowledged by the authors and forms one of the key conclusions at the end of this paper. Nevertheless, there is alternate empirical evidence in the market depicting various informal money transfer offerings that suggest that whilst Hawala (and its various aliases) operates beneath the formalised catchment of most financial regulation in Australia, it does so in concert with other remittance pathways. In the case of ethnic publications in print and online, the sample listed below in table 1 shows the placement of Hawala and Western Union advertisements alongside each other, and in some cases operating within the confines of the same business shop front.

HAWALA IN THE MARKET At first glance, the existence of informal money transfers appears virtually non-existent in Australia. There is only one single entry for an advertised Hawala dealer in the Australian Yellow Pages (Sensis, 2010) and no formal online advertising for their existence in Australia. In contrast there are 20 advertised main offices for Western Union in the Yellow Pages and more than 5000 Western Union agents actively operating in Australia (Western Union, 2010), any of which could trade in an item (or pretend) and transfer money, and globally there are 70 million active PayPal accounts (Parliament of Australia, 2009). Advertising for money transfers, other than formal services such as Western Union, only shows up in foreign shops and markets operating in small precincts and cultural ghettos. There are some mentions inside ethnic magazines printed in Australia such as the Middle East Times (Kuwait), Indomedia (Indonesia), and the Punjab Express (India) that all refer to money transfer businesses (Community Relations Commission, 2010). All of these put forward telephone numbers and none mention websites or in-print information relating to their business. They remain informal insomuch as their information requires either face to face exchange based upon telephone contact and referral. 17 | P a g e


Formal advertising remains low, whilst word of mouth is the principal method of marketing amongst Hawala agencies. Hawala business takes place by way of person to person contact. Michael Sanders‘ (2007, p. 792) account of an American hawaladar working part time as a taxi driver in Washington is a useful descriptor for the informal backgrounds that Hawaladars live by in Western nations such as the US, Australia and the UK. In these countries there are typically no shops and no signage depicting the term ‗Hawala‘. Instead Hawaladars are blended into the background, forming adjuncts to seemingly more legitimate shops and enterprises such as delicatessens, cafes and bookshops (Rees, 2010). Yet despite this subterranean system that cloaks the informal movements of cash, there is a convergence of sorts between these informal Hawala operations and the more institutionalised end of money transfers as deployed by Western Union. Whilst the mainstream advertising pathways of Australian media seem devoid from informal money transfer advertising, and seem only to focus on Western Union, the ethnic media papers of Australia reveal a different story. Taking the newspaper listing from the Community Relations Commission of New South Wales and examining each online newspaper, the authors discovered a total of 45 money transfer advertisements. Of these 29 % were for Western Union. The remainder was of a less formal nature insomuch as the advertisements included money transfers among a range of other non-financial services from a single vendor such as groceries, travel services and fast food (Community Relations Commission, 2010). Table 1 depicts the various money transfer agents that choose to advertise their wares through ethnic media within Australia.

The close grouping in ethnic publications of both Hawala-style transfers and formalized remittance systems such as Western Union in Australia suggests that decisions about what type of transfer system takes place vary according to each customer and the perceived risk of a transaction. At the informal adjunct end of the money transfer market remitters will still look to Hawala-style transfers if they perceive there is no risk of prosecution. By contrast, Post Offices in Australia will always default to their institutionalized alliance with Western Union and will follow accepted mechanisms of reporting and identification to ensure compliance with AUSTRAC requirements.

No necessity for formal banking or finance qualifications In Australia it is necessary for professions such as lenders, financiers, accountants, and nurses to adhere to certain standards of qualification. For example in order to be considered an accountant it is necessary to complete a three year undergraduate degree at least (MIT, 2010). Similarly to be a nurse and do the tasks a nurse is generally responsible for you must have completed at least a three year Bachelor of Science in Nursing (ECU, 2010).

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Therefore without these qualifications you are unable to legally undertake such employment without proper experience and recognition. So despite there being some notional adherence to Sharia governance and upstanding / honorable recognition within the Muslim community, (peer, word of mouth, and or blood relations), the same devotion to western standards and formal regulatory qualifications appears absent from those who act as Hawaladars. But even with a standard of operation, there has still been a realization of increased risk as stated by the alternative remittance company Western Union. In their 2010 annual investors report Western Union executives note that they are beginning to realise the increased risk they are exposing themselves to by allowing their agents to operate franchises without any formal qualifications (Western Union, 2010). Hawaladars are not compelled to show any specific financial qualifications. Hawala operates under two important umbrellas. The first is that Hawaladars build up trust with other Hawaladars over time and through repeated transactions so that a bond of trust grows. Hawala account keeping is based upon shared trust rather than financially regulated record keeping. The cement that bonds the numerous Hawaladars in to a trusted exchange network is usually, or at least partly, based upon familial connections. Relatives or members of one‘s extended family ensure that trust is kept at the highest level, and within the social codes of each Islamic community (El-Qorchi, 2002). The second umbrella is that Hawala operates according to Sharia principles. In this sense Hawala is closely aligned with formalized versions of Islamic Banking because it undertakes to prohibit usury and financial risk, or be used for investments pertaining to non-Islamic vices such as alcohol, pornography or gambling (Khosrokhavar, 2009). The Australian Government requires no formal training or qualifications for an individual or business to operate in the area of remittances and money transfers, but does insist that each remitting party is registered and complies with the existing regulations regarding record keeping and identification of clients (AUSTRAC, 2009).

The shift towards larger sums of money What has for many years been depicted as low-level financial activity that allows for the remote payment of Zakat, Islamic charity, and alms donation, now appears to facilitate the transfer of vast sums of money by NGO‘s for disaster relief and humanitarian aid. According to Ballard (2003), the global scale of money transferred is approximately $100,000 million per year, 60% of which flows into third world countries. It is also suggested that this number could be underestimated by thousands of millions of dollars because many countries are incapable of making accurate estimations about the informal/formal economic activity in their state. Maimbo (2003), states that humanitarian aid and business transactions flowing from international sources into Afghanistan through Hawala range from thousands up into the tens of millions to the point where Afghanistan‘s whole economy is reliant on Hawala as its banking system. However large transfers are not restricted to conflict recovery or international business, in fact it is quite common for Non-Government Organisations to use informal networks like Hawala to allow access to aid funds for countries recovering from natural disasters due a loss of formal remittance avenues (Weiss-Fagen & Bump, 2005). It is clear that Hawala has morphed beyond the realms of mere Islamic charity and Zakat. This is reinforced by the estimated level of remittances via IVT‘s globally, the complete economic dependence on Hawala in Afghanistan, the extent to which NGO‘s make use of Hawala and its relative systems following disasters in order to allow access to humanitarian aid when formal systems have failed, and the ease with which these systems are criminally abused (Ballard, 2003, Maimbo, 2003, Weiss-Fagen & Bump, 2005, Rees, 2010) At the other end of VT formalities, PayPal is keen to attract new transactional business amongst NGOs. Drawn by the sheer volume of remittances, and the opportunity to enter into new market segments that are dominated by Hawala, PayPal has developed a sister system called Webnow. This system is an offshoot of PayPal‘s Blackbaud (2009), and is a remittance system and website combined into one unit so that NGOs can create a simple online transaction system that is tailored for charities and NGOs so that it operates largely above the transnational fees and charges of most IVTs. PayPal has recently (2009) moved to secure an EU (enforceable undertaking) with AUSTRAC to ensure greater scrutiny with PayPal transactions. The key problem with this is that it targets the seller and not the buyer. In a system where the possibility exists that goods never end up being sent, scrutiny of a seller where the seller has established his or her legitimacy, (via means of multiple transactions and safe trading history), is unlikely to deter future transactions where the buyer is sending the money. PayPal currently has no system for scrutiny of ad hoc purchasing arrangements, except those transactions that are of such large amounts that they trigger preset limits. Hawala is likely to retain a firm foothold in countries where sophisticated financial infrastructure is reduced. In Iraq, for example, the institutional banking system does not allow for the transfer of monies. In places where there is less trust in the banking system, Hawala thrives (Altman, 2006). The growth of Islamic banking in general, coupled with

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the additional security of Islamic financial institutions and the commitment to Islamic banking secrecy and confidentiality, ensures the continued expansion of Islamic funds management.

The flow of money Regardless of whether describing a Hawala transfer, an eBay/PayPal remittance, or a Western Union transaction, the flow of money between actors can take a variety of paths. In any of these cases, and particularly with respect to eBay / PayPal transactions, there is no formal mechanism for determining whether goods are dispatched or are authentic. Genuine buyers have a mechanism for complaining, however non-genuine purchasers may pretend to receive goods (or pretend to receive goods of a certain value), in order to effect the passage of funds in a normal manner. The sheer volume of transactions and the global reach of eBay and PayPal make this vulnerability one which is persistent as long as buyers remain free from the same scrutiny leveled at IVT agencies like Western Union. Figure 1: The Flow of Money in typical IVT systems.

Source: Passas 2005 p 24.

CONCLUSION Hawala transfers can still be exploited for the funding of terrorist organisations across international borders and without institutionalised regulation at either end of the contract. Yet in a complex global system of countless transactions the use of PayPal and eBay should share a commensurate amount of attention with other IVTs. The

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effort of AUSTRAC in Australia to institutionalise PayPal is commendable but largely ineffective against terrorist laundering tactics where money is sent but no goods are transferred. Concentrating on Hawala, whilst only glancing at eBay and PayPal is a dangerous misallocation of resources. Whilst Hawala is undoubtedly more ethnically embedded in the broad global dispersion of al-Qaeda terrorist cells, one must not overlook al-Qaeda‘s persistent penchant for using Western mechanisms, Western systems, and Western objects to symbolically underpin their terrorist operations. PayPal and eBay are earmarked as controlled environments for counter terrorist purposes. Yet given the ‗Goliath‘ status of eBay and PayPal in the global sense, and the recurring ease with which PayPal users can send money worldwide, the notion that terrorists can transfer money in exchange for ordinary goods that may or may not exist remains a colossal threat that dwarfs most others. This paper has outlined the differences and similarities between a range of IVTs to raise the issue of neglected threats from eBay and PayPal. The existing ‗prevent‘ strategies deployed by the Australian Government through AUSTRAC and other agencies are successful in registering and collecting information about informal remittance providers. Yet whether it is Western Union, Hawala, or PayPal, the over-riding concern is that all three of these systems represent the ‗bread and butter‘ of informal cash movements. Where one becomes difficult the other becomes popular. AlQaeda has demonstrated on repeated occasions that it can use all of these systems for funding its operations. Where banking sophistication is low, IVTs turn to Hawala-based systems. Where internet becomes reliable, PayPal takes the prominent role. Where operational complexity demands widespread secrecy, all three become the front-runners of an IVT ‗mash up‘ (Medea Group, 2007). Using a combination of IVTs requires a layered approach to security. Until eBay and PayPal are treated with the same intense scrutiny as other IVTs, there will always be a hole through which money laundering and terrorist financing will be able to operate. The ‗Know Your Client‘ (KYC) strategy of international banking, the adherence to enforceable undertakings, and the registration and information gathering of IVT remittance operators is enormously important in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. However a holistic view needs greater emphasis on the registration, training and education of all remittance providers. With informal IVT remitters there are two groups that are major participants in transfer systems, yet remain largely invisible. The typical Western Union agent operating from ―Mandy‘s Late Night Snack Bar and Kebabs‖ might also arrange Hawala transfers on the side. In truth she needs no formal training for either. Until governments move past registration into the requirement for educational qualifications the proliferation of IVT illegal transfers will continue to grow. Mandy might make tasty halal kebabs, but she could also enable better financial practices to emerge from under the counter.

REFERENCES Acharya, A. (2009) Targeting Terrorist Financing: International Cooperation and New Regimes, Oxford: Routledge. AGD (2010) Anti Money Laundering: Enhanced AML/CTF regulation of the alternative remittance sector, Attorney General‘s Department, Retrieved 15th September from http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Anti money_laundering Altman, D. (2006) Managing Globalization: Ins and Outs of Underground Money, International Herald Tribune, 12 July, retrieved 18th November 2009 from http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/11/business/glob12.php AUSTRAC (2007) Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, Australian Government, Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), retrieved from http://www.austrac.gov.au/industry_consultation.html AUSTRAC (2008) Austrac Annual Report 2008-09, Australian Government, Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Retrieved 15th September from http://www.austrac.gov.au/annual_report.html AUSTRAC (2009) Enabling and Support Functions, 2009-2010 Annual Report, Australian Government, Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Retrieved 15 th September from http://www.austrac.gov.au/enabling_it.html Ballard, R. (2005). Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial within Informal Value Transmission Systems: The operational dynamics of contemporary hawala networks. Journal of Banking Regulation, 6(4). Blackbaud, (2009) What is Webnow?, Blackbaud Webnow, PayPal, Retrieved September 9th 2010 from http://www.bbnow.com/webnow/ 21 | P a g e


Borgers, M. J. (2009). Regulating and Combating Underground Banking. Criminal Law Forum, 20(97). Bush, G., W. (2001) ―President holds prime-time news conference‖, 11 October 2001 Retrieved on August 2 nd 2008 from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011 -7.html Community Relations Commission, (2010) Ethnic Newspapers: Community Relations Commission for a multicultural NSW, Ethnic Media, Retrieved on September 29 th 2010 from http://www.crc.nsw.gov.au/ethnic_media/newspapers Daily Mail (2006) Fake relics sold on eBay ‗funding terrorism‘, Mail Online, Daily Mail UK, retrieved on September 3rd 2010 from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -417967/Fake-relics-sold-eBay-fundingterrorism.html eBay (2009) eBay 2009 Annual Report, Retrieved on September 29 th 2010 from http://investor.ebay.com/ ECU. (2010). Bachelor of Science: Nursing. Retrieved November 1st, 2010, from http://www.ecu.edu.au/futurestudents/our-courses/view?id=K45 El-Qorchi, M. (2002) ―Hawala – How does this informal funds transfer system work and should it be regulated?‖ Finance & Development, quarterly magazine of the IMF, December, Vol 39, Issue No.4. Heng, Y.K. & McDonagh, K. (2009) Risk, Global Governance and Security: The other war on terror, Routledge: London. Khosrokhavar, F. (2009) Inside Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide, London: Paradigm. Levi, M. (2007) Lessons for countering terrorist financing from the war on serious and organised crime, in Thomas Bierstalker and Sue E. Eckert (eds), Countering the Financing of Terrorism, London: Routledge. Maimbo, S. M. (2003). The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: a study of the Hawala system in Afghanistan. Journal. retrieved 11th August from http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/16/000090341_20031016085357/Rende red/PDF/269720PAPER0Money0exchange0dealers.pdf Malkin, L. & Elizur, Y, (2002) ―Terrorism‘s Money Trail‖ World Policy Journal, Spring, pp60-70., retrieved September 4th from http://worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj02 -1/Malkin.pdf. Medea Group (2007) Internet Banking, Hawala and Terrorism: The Dynamics of Islamic Terrorist Groups, Groundwork for Institutional Fraud, retrieved 11 th August 2010 from medeagrp.com/index.php?option=com_docman&task MIT. (2010). Bachelor of Business (majors in: Accounting, Marketing, and Management). Retrieved November 1st, 2010, from http://www.mit.edu.au/courses/279/ Navias, M. (2002) Finance warfare and international terrorism, Political Quarterly, Vol 73, No.1, August 2002. NCTAUS (2004) The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (NCTAUS), retrieved 5th July 2008 from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm Parliament of Australia (2009) Inquiry into Cyber Crime, Submission from PayPal Australia, retrieved on 29 th September from www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/coms/cybercrime/.../sub60.pdf Passas, N. (2003) Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering: A Report to the National Institute of Justice, retrieved 5th August from www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208301.pdf Passas, N. (2006). Fighting terror with error: the counter-productive regulation of informal value transfers. Crime, law and social change, 45(4), 315-336.

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Perkel, W. (2004). Money Laundering and Terrorism: Informal Value Transfer Systems. American Criminal Law Review, 41(83), 183-224. Razavy, M. (2005). Hawala: An underground haven for terrorists or social phenomenon? Crime, Law & Social Change, (44), 277-299. Rees, D. (2010). Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risks Posed by Alternative Remittance in Australia. Retrieved. from http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/A/8/7/{A876C9D4 -152E-4FDD-93BB3F98F8C5ED70}rpp106.pdf Sanders, M., I. (2007) Joint Ventures involving tax-exempt organisations, Third Edition, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons. Sensis (2010) Yellow Pages Find, Sensis, Telstra Corporation Limited, retrieved on 29 th September from http://www.yellowpages.com.au/search/postSearchEntry.do?clueType=1&clue=western+union&location Clue= Sharma, D. (2006). Historical Traces of Hundi, Sociocultural Understanding, and Criminal Abuses of Hawala. International Criminal Justice Review, 16(99). Weiss-Fagen, P. & Bump, M., N. (2005) ―Remittances in Conflict and Crises: How Remittances Sustain Livelihoods in War, Crises, and Transitions to Peace.‖ The Security-Development Nexus Program Policy Paper, International Peace Academy, New York: NY. Western Union (2010) Western Union Australia, 2009-2010 Annual Report, retrieved on 29th September from http://ir.westernunion.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=203395&p=irol -reportsannual

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The Piracy and Terrorism Nexus: Real or Imagined? Karine Hamilton Sellenger Centre Edith Cowan University Perth, Western Australia [email protected]

Abstract The waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have been the location of a dramatic proliferation of pirate activities in recent years. Security officials around the world are concerned about the risks posed by Somali piracy to maritime shipping and to national security. These risks relate to the susceptibility of world trade shipments to terrorist attack and to the emergence of an increasingly powerful Islamist movement in Somalia with connections to global terrorist networks. Whilst Somali piracy has been the topic of growing media speculation, reliable information about the phenomenon is scant. This paper reports on research conducted in Kenya where over 100 Somalis are being prosecuted for piracy. It aims to give insight into the motivations of Somali pirates and argues that the weight of current evidence strongly suggests that piracy off the East African coast is strictly an economic crime.

Keywords Piracy, Somalia, terrorism, maritime security

INTRODUCTION Since 2008, piracy off the coast of Somalia has captured world headlines. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported 406 pirate attacks around the world in 2009, of which over half were conducted by Somalis (2009 Worldwide, 2010). In 2010, the number of Somali pirate attacks appears to have decreased slightly due to the impact of international navy patrols off Somalia‘s coastline and also due to the use of better defences by vessels travelling through effected waters (Pirates face, 2010). Nonetheless, Somali pirates are adjusting to naval patrols by launching attacks in higher seas and the waters around Somalia are still the most pirate-risky in the world: 100 pirate attacks and 27 hijackings were reported around Somalia during the first 6 months of 2010. Most analysts and journalists have interpreted Somali piracy as an economic venture, however a significant number have speculated that it is linked to terrorism. For example, two analysts recently wrote that ―piracy on the high seas is currently becoming key tactics of terrorist groups – many of today‘s pirates are also terrorists with ideological bents and a broad political agenda‖ (Hong and Ng, 2010). The sorts of maritime terrorist acts that have been hypothesised include the use of ships as floating bombs to ram other vessels or carry explosives; attacks against ferry or cruise ships to kill large numbers of civilians; jamming thin water passages to obstruct trade; and, causing deliberate environmental catastrophes such as oil spills (Moller, 2009). Both ‗piracy‘ and ‗terrorism‘ are terms that have been subject to ongoing debate about their definition and legal meanings. The 1958 Convention on the High Seas defines piracy as any of the following acts (Moller, 2009, p. 17): (1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State. On the other hand maritime terrorism refers to ―any illegal act directed against ships, their passengers, cargo or crew, or against sea ports with the intent of directly or indirectly influencing a government or group of individuals‖ (Samuel Menefee cited in Valencia 2005, p. 79). These two definitions highlight that the key distinction between piracy and maritime terrorism relates to motivation. Pirates are motivated by ―private ends‖, generally financial gain, whilst maritime terrorists are politically motivated and they aim to influence government policy through the use or 24 | P a g e


threat of violence. This paper argues that there is no substantial evidence to support claims that Somali pirates maintain links, or lend support to, Somali terrorists. It draws on news reports of pirate and Islamic groups associated with terrorism in Somalia, as well as research conducted in Kenya which involved interviewing imprisoned Somalis accused of piracy and other key stakeholders. The first two sections of the paper provide background information about the nature of statehood and Islamist politics in Somalia. The final section focuses on outlining the relationship between piracy and Islamism and clarifying the motivations of pirates from Somalia.

SOMALIA: A FAILDED STATED It is estimated that there are around 9 million people inhabiting Somalia: a semi-arid country made up of mostly pastoralists and agriculturalists (Menkhaus, 2010). Somalia has always been one of the poorest countries in Africa but its situation has increasingly deteriorated and for the last three years it has been ranked number one on the Failed States Index (The Failed States Index, 2010). Most analysts link the emergence of Somali piracy with the Somali state‘s disintegration during the early 1990s. In 1991 the ruling regime in Somalia was toppled and civil war began (Stevenson, 2007). The civil war was an outcome of internal conflicts between different clan groups whose divisions had been aggravated by many years and various forms of outside intervention in the country. During the colonial period, different areas of Somalia were ruled by European powers including the British, Italians and the French. Throughout its history Somalia has also been in conflict with its two neighbours, Ethiopia and Kenya, over certain land areas dominated by ethnic Somalis. Somalia was also the site of superpower machinations during the Col War period. As a result of the civil war in the early 1990s, Somalia lost a functioning central government and came to be divided into distinct regions: Somaliland is the northernmost third that asserts its independence and is relatively stable; adjacently Puntland maintains semi-autonomy; and at the bottom sits Jubaland. Since the civil conflict in 1991, conflict, famine and a series of failed international interventions have created disastrous humanitarian conditions in Somalia. The situation is particularly serious in the south-central region of the country. Most recently, 1.5 million Somalis have become internally displaced and hundreds of thousands have either been killed or have sought asylum in neighbouring countries due to fighting in south-central Somalia (2010 UNHRC). The fighting in this region is predominantly between the western-backed Transitional Federal Government, deeply beleaguered and located in the capital city Mogadishu, and the forces of Islamic groups led by Shabaab: a grouped openly aligned with Al Qaeda and the focus of American policies associated with the War on Terror. In contrast to the south-central areas, Somaliland and Puntland are relatively stable and are run by functioning administrations. Somaliland seceded in 1991 though its independence has never received formal international recognition. Somaliland is economically booming and is one of the most democratic areas in Africa (Economic success, 2007). Neighbouring, Puntland is an autonomous zone that was created in 1999 and is not as functional as Somaliland but also has a booming commercial economy, especially in the port city of Bosaso where large numbers of livestock and people come and go between Somalia and the Gulf countries. Understanding the different regions of Somalia is significant because piracy is not a Somali-wide phenomenon. It is planned and operated from particular areas. For example, the ports of Somaliland have never had hijacked ships anchored in them and pirate attacks launched from Somaliland shores have averaged 1 every two years since 1999 (Hansen, 2009). The administration in Somaliland has responded to pirate groups in their organisational phase and have ultimately been successful in controlling piracy. On the other, Puntland is the area most strongly associated with piracy. Authorities in Puntland had hired a British security organisation to train a coast guard, but the involvement of a foreign group was locally unpopular and a Puntland coastguard never eventuated. Moreover, Puntland authorities were unable to fund local law enforcement during 2008 which allowed criminal gangs like pirates to operate and develop their resources. In short, piracy is specific to certain areas in Somalia and so far, these areas have been quite separate from the emergence and dominance of the Islamic terrorist group Shabaab.

ISLAM IN SOMALIA: A “VEIL LIGHTLY WORN” Somalia is the only country in the Horn of Africa that is nearly exclusively Islamic, over 99% of Somalis are Muslim and most of them are of the Sunni sect (World Trade Press, 2010). Historically, the strand of Islam which took root in Somalia differs significantly from other more rigid forms of Islam in the world, such as those associated with Saudia Arabia and Al Qaeda (ie. Wahabbism). Islam in Somalia has been described as a ―veil lightly worn‖ (Menkhaus, 2002, p. 111). It is part of everyday life and family traditions in Somalia but there is no culture of religious zeal. Moreover, most Somalis view attempts to 25 | P a g e


establish Islam as a form of governance in their country with suspicion or as an Arab intrusion that encroaches on their independence. There is no natural affiliation between Somalis and Arabs but instead Somalis are touchy about what they perceive to be patronising attitudes directed at them from Arabs. When contrasted to its neighbours, Kenya and Ethiopia, Somalia has not generated an equivalent radical Islamic politics that has emerged in these countries. Kenya and Ethiopia have much high numbers of Christians and religious divisions between Christians and Muslims in these countries have given shape to more politically active and intense forms of Islam (Menkhaus, 2002). In contrast, Somalis predominantly draw their political motivations from their clan identities and throughout Somalia‘s history Islam has been secondary to clan relations and identities. Despite this historical picture of Islam as a relatively apolitical cultural practice in Somalia, observers note that since the fall of the Somali state in 1991 Islam has clearly taken a more visible role on the Somali political stage (Menkhaus, 2002). Its appeal largely rests with people‘s discontent with existing political structures, the primacy of the clan system, prevalence of corruption and repression, and limited job opportunities. In the initial phase of state disintegration during the early 1990s, Islamic activists (Muslim brotherhood and later called al-Ittihad or AIAI and made up of educated young men who had studied in the Middle East) tried to seize some strategic areas but were easily defeated in some parts of Somalia and successful in others. Islamic forces that came to rule town and ports were actually acknowledged by domestic and international observers as much fairer than other Somali militia forces and they were also much more effective at providing locals with security. Aside from AIAI, other Islamic activists also provided genuine humanitarian assistance to the Somali population and a variety of Islamic institutions were able to step in and provide for people‘s needs including schooling, medical care, and aid (Menkhaus, 2002). The other key developments of Islamism in Somalia during the 1990s was the emergence of a system of local Sharia courts. These Islamic courts were formed by local businessmen and clan elders who wanted to reinstate order following the loss of government and the rule of law. This rough sketch of Islam as it emerged in Somalia over the 1990s is emphasising that its growth reflected local needs for alternatives to existing authorities and for greater order and security. Its growth over this period did not reflect a hardline Islamic movement that sought to impose an Islamic republic in Somalia or take on the West in part of a wider global jihad. The September 11 attacks against America in 2001 however, generated much speculation amongst American policymakers and security analysts that Somalia represents a threat to world security due to its status as a failed state and thus as a real or potential haven for global terror networks like Al Qaeda (Afyare Abdi Elmi, 2010). These concerns appear to hold some legitimacy in light of the recent ascendancy of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group called Al Shabaab (the youth), which currently controls most of south-central Somalia. South Central Somalia is supposed to be governed by a Transitional Federal Government which was formed in 2004 during an internationally-sponsored reconciliation conference. The TFG however, has always been weak and lacking in local legitimacy. One of the TFG‘s main sources of disconnect from local communities in Mogadishu was its leader‘s (Abdullahi Yusuf) staunch opposition to most forms of Islamic organisation, such as Islamic schooling and hospitals. When American officials approached the TFG and asked it to help capture Al Qaeda operatives thought to be hosted by local Islamic Somali groups, the TFG divided internally between those who agreed to America‘s request and those who were opposed to it (Menkhaus, 2008). The TFG group who agreed to the request formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, and they came into direct conflict with Islamic activists who defeated the Alliance and effectively ended TFG rule. In the place of the TFG, the Islamic Courts Union (coalition of various Islamic groups) arose and took control of Mogadishu and south-central Somalia in 2006. The ICU was quickly recognised domestically and internationally as a highly successful administration in terms of the provision of security and stability. Unfortunately, some of the ICU leadership were politically uncompromising and aggressive in terms of their attitude to Somalia‘s long-standing enemy- Ethiopia. At the end of 2006, Ethiopia, with the backing of America, responded by invading Somalia, removing the ICU and occupying Mogadishu. On the heels of Ethiopia‘s invasion, the formerly banished Transitional Federal Government returned to Mogadishu to take over governance whilst being propped up by Ethiopian military support. Since 2007, the TFG has engaged in an ongoing battle with local Islamic opposition groups who are opposed to the TFG and the intrusion of foreign parties, Ethiopia and America (Menkhaus, 2008). These battles have been especially devastating for civilian communities who have been displaced in their hundreds of thousands, killed, injured and now lack access to basic needs such as jobs, water, homes and food. Against this backdrop of foreign intrusion, the Islamic group Al-Shabaab has arisen to prominence and this is the group which journalists and analysts regularly speculate is connected to piracy. Al Shabaab was first created n 2003/4 and included a few hundred militiamen who had been a hardline group within the Islamic Courts Union. The group was able to assert itself at the forefront of the local insurgency against the Ethiopian presence. By the end of 2008, Al Shabaab had taken control over most of south Somalia and soon after Ethiopian troops withdrew (January 2009). 26 | P a g e


Since its original formation as a strictly local Islamic group in the early 2000s, some of Al-Shabaab‘s leaders have gone on to declare their alliance with Al Qaeda (2007) and have hosted foreign Al Qaeda operatives (Menkhaus, 2008). The group though contains many non-committed militiamen who work for pragmatic, as opposed to ideological or religious, reasons and many openly oppose dealings with Al Qaeda. Those Al Shabaab leaders who maintain a connection with Al Qaeda are motivated by their internal weakness in Somalia: most Somalis are not especially fond of Al Shabaab because of its social conservatism (its attempts to impose strict Islamic laws): Shabaab has banned smoking, watching soccer during the World Cup, moustaches, bras, music (Hartley, 2010). Shabaab is also association with a foreign power, which has created the view amongst Somalis that it is a puppet for outside interests. Unlike other Islamic groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, Shabaab is not so much in a position of political control or influence in Southern Somalia which is still run by clan authorities. Al-Shabaab cemented its standing as an international terrorist group when it carried out bombings in Uganda during the recent World Cup, which killed over 70 people in an Ethiopian restaurant and a sports arena (Al-Qaida-linked militants; Gyezaho & Dixon, 2010). The group claimed that the attacks were directed against Ethiopia and were also retaliation for the presence of Ugandan peace keeping forces who were defending the TFG.

ISLAMISTS AND PIRATES IN SOMALIA Any connection between pirates and terrorism must account for the nature of Islam in Somalia as outlined above. Even though certain elements within Shabaab are increasingly aligning their objectives with Al Qaeda, the affiliation between the two groups is loose. On the whole, the rise of Shabaab and its use of violence internally and abroad largely relates to Somalia‘s domestic and regional conflicts rather than to the conflict between America and Al Qaeda. Hence even in the event that a connection between piracy and Shabaab was confirmed, it would not automatically relate to the global war on terror. Regardless, a connection between pirates and terrorism has never been clearly established. Geographically, pirates and Islamists are largely based separately from each other. The Shabaab operates in south-central Somalia and the pirates are mostly based further along the coast, especially around Puntland in northern Somalia. The occasions that pirates and Islamists have had contact have shown that any relationship between them is one of dispute and confrontation. The period during which the Islamic Courts Union came to power in Mogadishu during 2006 effectively ended piracy in the region. The ICU publicly outlawed piracy and declared it as Haraam or anti-Islamic: threatening death or amputation for any Somali caught in the act of piracy. The ICU initiated an offensive against ports used by pirates which led to pirates being injured, expelled or left in hiding. Pirate attacks from the area had averaged around 40 a year prior to the ICU and none were recorded whilst the ICU was in power (Freeman, 2008). The Ethiopian intervention which terminated ICU enabled pirate groups to regroup. There are other instances of open dispute between Islamists and pirates in Somalia. In 2008, pirates captured the Sirius Star a super-tanker from Sauid Arab that was carrying 100 million dollars worth of crude oil. The Islamic Courts Union condemned the capture as a ―major crime‖ (Karon, 2008). More vehemently a Shabaab leader informed journalists that "Saudi is a Muslim country, and it is a very big crime to hold Muslim property … I warned again and again, those who hold the ship must free it unconditionally or armed conflict should be the solution. If they don't free the ship, we will rescue it by force" (Karon, 2008). One of the pirates involved clarified with a journalist that: "Every Somali has great respect for the holy kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We have nothing against them but unfortunately what happened was just business for us and I hope the Saudis will understand" (Freeman, 2008). The Shabaab sent armoured vehicles loaded with armed fighters to the pirate‘s base, the port town Harardhere, and the pirates fled to avoid direct confrontation. The incident highlights the economic motivations behind piracy and the hostility between pirates and Islamists in Somalia. More recently, in April of this year (2010), the chief pirate base Harardhere (located mid-way along the Somali coast) was taken over by the Islamic group Hizbul Islam, which is Shabaab‘s main rival. Shabaab itself had tried to take the port town but locals instead invited Shabaab‘s rival Hizbul Islam who proceeded to drive pirates out of the town. A Hizbul Islam member was quoted: ―Piracy has become too much. It‘s an anti-Islamic business, and we won‘t accept it … We want to bring law and order to that country of Somalia, and we want to show the good name of Somalis‖ (Wadhams, 2010). Both Shabaab and Hizbul Islam were angered by recent pirate attacks on Indian ships which had disrupted the flow of further Indian cargoes into Somalia; ships that had been an important source of revenue by way of port tariffs in Islamic controlled ports. Essentially, Islamic groups want to rid coastal towns of pirates in order to secure an important revenue stream in the form of ship tariffs. In the nearby coastal town in which the pirate fled to, Hobyo, pirates were recently enlisted by local officials to act as an armed defence against Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. Pirate leaders in Hobyo claim to have deliberately amassed a significant on land arsenal of militiamen and weapons in order to ward off Shabaab and Hizbul Islam (Gettleman, 2010). 27 | P a g e


While conducting research in Kenya where over 100 Somalis accused of piracy are currently imprisoned and undergoing prosecution, I found general consensus that Somali piracy was unrelated to Islamic politics and was instead strictly an economic crime (Kontorovich, 2010; Treves, 2009). The main aim of the research was to interview imprisoned Somalis in order to understand their motivations for piracy, however all but one of them refused to admit to engaging in piracy and instead claimed to be either fishermen or people smugglers. Almost all of the prisoners interviewed came from Bosaso, which is Somalia‘s chief port city located in Puntland and is known for its fishing and illegal immigrant industries. A small number of the pirates came from in or around Mogadishu. Aside from these imprisoned Somalis accused of pirates, we spoke to other key stakeholders such as European Union personnel and Kenyan police and judicial officials involved in prosecuting pirate cases. In general, talking to Kenyans about the purpose of my research, it was obviously common knowledge that the Somali community was financially benefitting from the pirate industry. Kenyans, and Somalis, were quick to point to flash new residential homes known to be owned and inhabited by Somalis and explained that it was usual for Somalis to buy whole apartment buildings at exorbitant prices and then demolish and rebuild from scratch. The money financing these redevelopments was understood to partly come from piracy which was only ever spoken about in terms of its obvious financial profits for Somalis. People more directly involved with the prosecution of pirate cases in Kenya concurred. The police officer in charge of investigating pirate cases in Kenya explained that ―these people are looking for money‖ (Personal communication, June, 2010). A British naval officer stationed in Kenya stated that ―I would suspect that they [Somali pirates] see it as business‖ (Personal communication, June, 2010). This Naval Officer and an EU appointed lawyer who liaised with Kenyan judicial officials had both debriefed hostages after their release from Somali pirate captors and none had ever indicated that their Somali captors are motivated by anything other than economic consideration. According to the EU lawyer, apparently some of the pirate guards are quite vocal about talking with the hostages and its frankly to get them and their families out of Somalia and to another country, … I want to make this much and then I will get out. (Personal communication, June, 2010) In his role, he never came across a hostage who heard their Somali captors make reference to any ideological or religious motivations for their actions, rather they confided to the hostages that they wanted to improve their lives. The one Somali prisoner in Kenya who admitted to being a pirate during interviewing corroborated this picture by stating that his chief concern was to get a proper education whilst he was in jail, principally he was keen to learn English as the international language. He wanted to leave prison in a better position to make something of his life and he was motivated by wanting a better life. The navy officer who likewise had spoken to hostages post-release concurred that Somali pirates were quite talkative about their motivations to their hostages and they never mentioned Islam or wider conflicts between East and West. Instead, Somali captors told their hostages that ―they wanted to get x thousand, x one thousand dollars, uh false documents cost this much, however there are so many members of my family‖ (Personal communication, June, 2010). In short, Somalis in communication with their hostages made it clear that they were seeking money in order to better their lives. In terms of pirate attitudes towards their hostages, there was mistreatment but not of a systematic directed kind, more along the lines of not allowing them to shower and keeping them in cramped living spaces. Injuries and fatalities amongst hostages have been accidental. Whilst pirates treat their hostages badly as a way of putting pressure of ransom payments, they are quiet strict about not harming the hostages and compromising ransom payments. For these reasons, the individuals involved in prosecuting Somalis accused of piracy all took the view that pirates were motivated by financial gain and that the phenomenon of piracy from Somalia was strictly an economic crime.

CONCLUSION Current knowledge about the nature of terrorism and piracy in Somalia all point toward the conclusion that the two phenomenon are distinct from each other both in terms of geography and practice. Moreover the history of Shabaab, the Islamic group most strongly associated with terrorism, shows that it emerged and developed quite separately from piracy in Somalia. Shabaab‘s recent alliance with Al Qaeda remains disputed within the group itself which means that establishing a clear connection between Somali pirates and Shabaab does not necessarily entail an obvious link between piracy and the War on Terror. So far, Shabaab‘s agendas have clearly curtailed piracy whenever it has come into a position of power within a pirate-active location. Overall, the two groups appear more in 28 | P a g e


competition with each other over access to ports and money than they appear in any form of cooperation. The research that I conducted in Kenya, whilst obviously restricted by the informal nature of my sources of information, likewise indicated that Somali piracy is unrelated to terrorism and stems from financial ambitions.

REFERENCES Al-Qaida-linked militants claim Uganda blasts. (2010, July 12) MSNBC. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38194835/ns/world_news -africa Economic Success in Somaliland. (2007, May 20) Aljazeera. Retrieved August 4, 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2007/05/2008525184822903218.html Elmi, A. A. (2010). Revisiting United States policy toward Somalia. In M. S. Smith (Ed.), Securing Africa: Post-9/11 discourses on terrorism (pp. 173-192). Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. The failed states index. (2010). Foreign Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2010, from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates Freeman, C. (2008, November 23). Pirates on Saudi oil tanker face ultimatum from Islamists. The Telegraph. Retrieved August 4, 2010, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/ 3507653/Pirates-onSaudi-oil-tanker-face-ultimatum-from-Islamists.html Gyezaho, E. & Dixon, R. (2010, July 13). Somali militant group claims responsibility for Uganda blasts. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved November 20, 2010, from http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/13/world/la -fguganda-bombings-20100713 Gettleman, J. (2010, September 1) In Somali civil war, both sides embrace pirates. The New York Times. Retrieved September 1, 2010, from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/02/world/africa/02pirates.html?_r=1&pagewanted=2 Hansen, S. J. (2009). Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, misconception and remedies. Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research. Retrieved May 27, 2010, from the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research site: http://en.nibr.no/publications/reports/1221/ Hartley, A. (2010, July 24).Tea with a terrorist. The New York Times. Retrieved August 2010, from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/opinion/25hartley.html Hong, N. & Ng, A.K.Y. (2010). The international legal instruments in addressing piracy and maritime terrorism: a critical review. Research in Transportation Economics 27, 51-60. Karon, T. (2008, November 25). Battling the Somali pirates: The return of the Islamists. Time. Retrieved August 4, 2010, from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1861698,00.html Kontorovich, E. (2010). ―A Guantanamo on the sea‖: The difficulty of prosecuting pirates and terrorists. California Law Review 98, 243-275. Menkhaus, Ken. (2010, July 23). Viewpoint with James Zogby: Robert Malley, Ken Menkhaus. Arab American Institute. Retrieved August 4, 2010, from http://www.aaiusa.org/dr-zogby/entry/viewpoint-with-jameszogby-robert-malley-ken-menkhaus/ Menkhuas, K. (2008). Somalia: A country in peril, a policy nightmare. Enough strategy paper. Retrieved August 2010, from http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/somalia -country-peril-policy-nightmare Menkhaus, K. (2002). Political Islam in Somalia. Middle East Policy 9, 109-123. Moller, B. (2009). Piracy, maritime terrorism and naval strategy. Retrieved January 20, 2010, from the Danish Institute for International Studies site: http://www.diis.dk/sw72905.asp

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Pirates face new resistance as navies strike back, says IMB. (2010, 15 July). International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services. Retrieved August 4, 2010, from http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=418:pirates -face-new-resistance-as-naviesstrike-back-says-imb&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 Treves, T. (2009). Piracy, law of the sea, and use of force: Developments off the coast of Somalia. The European Journal of International Law, 20, 399-414. 2010 UNHCR country operations profile – Somalia. (2010). Retrieved September 18, 2010, from the United Nations Refugee Agency site: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483ad6.html Valencia, M. J. (2005). Piracy and terrorism in Southeast Asia: Similarities, differences and their implications. In Johnson, D. & Valencia, M. J. (Eds.), Piracy in Southeast Asia – Status, issues and responses (pp. 103-121). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Wadhams, N. (2010, May 7). Somali pirates vs. Islamists: A dispute over business. Time. Retrieved August 2010, from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1987855,00.html#ixzz10t0Yucxp World Trade Press. (2010). Somalia society and culture complete report: An all-Inclusive profile combining all of our society and culture reports (2nd ed.). Petaluma: World Trade Press, 2010. 2009 Worldwide piracy figures surpass 400. (2010, January 14). International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services. Retrieved May 27, 2010, from http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=385:2009 -worldwide-piracy-figures-surpass400&catid=60:news&Itemid=51

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Review: Disillusionment with Radical Social Groups Kira J. Harris secau – Security Research Centre School of Computer and Security Science Edith Cowan University Perth, Western Australia [email protected]

Abstract Disengagement from radical social groups is a complex process initiated by the experience of a crisis, or disillusionment causing a re-evaluation of involvement. This paper provides a review of the experiences that hinder group involvement and increases the likelihood of disengagement. Utilising the categorisation by Klandersman (2005) and Demant et al. (2008a), the factors are discussed under the themes of normative, affective, and continuance. Normative factors rely on the ideological premise to ensure membership is viewed as a moral obligation, while the affective factors incorporate the social and organisational aspects facilitating emotional attachment to the group, and continuance factors are those influencing the cost and benefits of group involvement. Commitment to radical social groups becomes vulnerable when the material, psychological and communal benefits of membership are outweighed by the resources required for association and the inability to achieve desirable outcomes.

Keywords Disengagement; Disillusionment; Extremism; Radical social groups

INTRODUCTION Research on the defection from religious groups, cults, gangs and criminal organisations indicate similar contributing factors to disengagement despite differing ideologies (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Fink & Hearne, 2008). The operational definition of disengagement within this paper is characterised by Fink and Hearne (2008), and Bjørgo and Horgan (2009) as a behavioural change resulting in the exit from a radical social group (characterised as secular and cohesiveness, ethnocentric, totalitarian and with a propensity for violence), notwithstanding any cognitive shifts, or deradicalisation. Models of disengagement by Skonovd (1979, April) and Ebaugh (1988) emphasise how members experience a crisis or disillusionment causing doubts to arise and the re-evaluation of membership (Fink & Hearne, 2008; Mellis, 2007; Mushtaq, 2009; Wright, 1987). This cognitive opening begins the psychological process for possible disengagement by allowing alternative viewpoints and lifestyles to be considered. As a break down in the insulation from the outside world occurs, disengagement can be accelerated when combined with social and economic support, education and counselling. As the initiating stage of the process, it is imperative to the study of disengagement to identify the reasons for disillusionment caused by the incongruence between the individual‘s expectations and the reality of membership, whereby the discrepancies between the two do not align forcing membership to be viewed as less meaningful (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Dechesne, Janssen, & Van Knippenberg, 2000; Demant, Slootman, Buijs, & Tillie, 2008b). For some, the disillusionment gradually builds until the desire to disengage exists, for others, there can be a singular catalytic event prompting a more abrupt psychological disengagement. The aim of this paper is to identify and review the contributing factors towards disillusionment with radical social groups in the literature.

CATEGORISING THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF DISENGAGEMENT The process of disengagement is inherently complex and multi-layered, influenced by an amalgamation of issues and personal factors compounding on the individual. Bjørgo (2002, June; 2005, 2009) discusses the causes of disengagement in terms of ‗push‘ and ‗pull‘ factors; that is, negative social forces which make membership unattractive, and factors attracting the person to a more rewarding alternative. The effects of push factors can be difficult to predict as negative sanctions can lead members to disengage or have the converse effect by increasing the group‘s solidarity and cohesiveness (Bjørgo, 2005). Demant et al. (2009) noted influences causing individuals to defect involved complex psychological processes rarely operating in isolation, allowing both push and pull factors to co-exist, and the difficulties in effectively measuring each factor. Building on Bjørgo‘s foundation, Klandermans (2005) and Demant et al. (2008a, 2008b) compartmentalise individual disengagement factors into three components – normative, affective, and continuance ( see Table 1.). These categorisations coincide with previous literature (Allen & Meyer, 1990) focusing on the psychological states of organisational commitment where all categories are influential in the decision to disengage, and its ensuing success. In short, strong affective commitment allows 31 | P a g e


members to stay because they want to, strong continuance commitment encourages members to stay because they need to, and strong normative commitment causes members to stay because they feel they ought to (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Table 1 Normative, Affective and Continuance Factors Contributing to Disengagement Normative: Ideology is no longer appealing Change in individual‘s viewpoint Desired future is not achievable Rejection of means to achieve goals

Affective: Disappointment in movement

Continuance: Cost of membership

Frustration with group dynamics Disloyalty between members

Longing for ordinary life

Mutual competition, contempt and distrust between members Failing leadership

Competing social relationships

Negative social sanctions

NORMATIVE The normative factors rely on the ideological premise of the group to maintain commitment and ensure membership is viewed as a moral obligation (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Klandermans, 1997). The ideology provides a constructed model of beliefs, aims and ideas to direct one‘s goals, expectations and actions. It offers a set of ideals, principles or symbols to explain how society should function, and for distinct radical social groups, combines a collectively defined grievance, with a clear definition of those responsible – producing an ‗us against them‘ mentality and fostering moral outrage (Klandermans, 1997). As an alternative ideology, the adopted beliefs can instigate collective action for the intent to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing power system to uphold ideological values (Dechesne et al., 2000; Demant et al., 2008a). The alignment between individual and group ideologies is positively correlated with normative attachment, and corresponding disengagement is an indication of failings in the group‘s ideology that makes membership and worldview unattractive (Demant et al., 2008b). When no longer provided with a satisfying world-view, meaning to the existing order, a desirable future or a means to achieve this future, the member has an increased susceptibility to alternative options (Demant et al., 2008a). While the changes to the individual‘s perception and acceptance of the group‘s ideological basis can lead to the rejection of radical views, it is more common for the changes in belief and value systems to occur after disengaging from the group (Horgan, 2005).

Lose faith in ideology The experience of self-doubt in aspects of the ideology can motivate the individual to view one‘s beliefs, and what the group is fighting for, as morally or politically wrong (Horgan, 2005). A failure to provide meaning or response to the member‘s concerns causes further doubts in the relevance of the group, as can the perceived lack of success in achieving the ideologically stated goals. When the individual‘s needs and motives no longer coincide with what the ideology is able to provide, the individual is more likely to disengage and deradicalise, or seek out an alternative group more suited to the individual‘s needs (Demant et al., 2008b). A study of three separate radical movements by Demant et al. (2008a) unveiled causes for the loss of faith in group ideologies; the changes in interpretation by the consensus, inconsistencies between aims and ideals between members, and the inability to implement a politically acceptable ideology that is radical enough for extreme members. As the movement evolves into a political influence, the radical ideological beliefs previously imposed on members may be compromised to appeal to a greater audience and gain greater community support. As a consequence, the member may find the ideological impetus for radical acts no longer exists, or may view the group as ‗selling out‘ and seek an alternative radical group to engage with (Noricks, 2009). Rommelspacher (2006) argues interactions that disrupt the group‘s world-view, and provide alternative explanations perceived as justifiable, can have a significant influence on the member‘s disengagement process. This cognitive disruption can also be caused by interactions with others who do not comply with the ideology or conform to existing stereotypes. The result of the inconsistencies between ideology and personal experience can alter the view of society (or the segment of the community) as the enemy. For example, Johnny Clarry, the ex-Grand Imperial Wizard of the 32 | P a g e


Ku Klux Klan refers to the meetings with African-American Reverend Wade Watts, where his expectations of the ‗enemy‘ were shattered, ―and then when Reverend Wade Watts was being kind to me - and he outsmarted me in that debate, I started realising that maybe not all white people were superior to black people‖ (Denton & Jacoby, 2005, Septemper 5). Despite attempts to demonise Watts, Clarry notes the conflict in his expectations and experiences acted as a trigger to questioning his beliefs. This was also supported by Garfinkel‘s (2007) study where ethnocentric beliefs were challenged by compassion from the despised out-group, conflicting with their endorsed stereotypes. Although, as conveyed by Garfinkel (2007), this disruption only occurs if the recipient has the humility and courage to accept previously held beliefs may be flawed. The self doubt in the group‘s ideology can lead to questioning the validity of the group and if it is unable to address these concerns through dialogue or attempts to address the grievance, the member is at risk of disengaging. However, while normative factors may be perceived as deficient, interactions can be maintained due to affective and continuance factors, as discovered by Photiadis‘ (1965) study of Mormon commitment and conformity. Participation on a social level provided greater influence on commitment and conformity to group norms, independent of ideological differences. Thus, despite doubts in the ideological basis for the group, disengagement can be significantly inhibited by social and lifestyle benefits of commitment.

Frustration at lack of success Socialisation into radical groups requires a high level of commitment and enforces a collective identity where group ideology and goals are fused with the individual‘s identity (Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003). As a consequence, the inability to distinguish between goals means success or failure is taken personally with emotional reactions of shame and guilt. Failed radical attempts at altering the status quo, and the realisation that despite the personal sacrifice of group commitment and acting in the most extreme, the desired goal is no closer, produces a demotivating effect and uncertainty regarding the group‘s radical actions (Demant et al., 2008a; Fink & Hearne, 2008). Failure at achieving ideological success generates a diminished sense of urgency and the realisation that initial aspirations associated with membership are removed from day-to-day responsibilities of the adopted role. When the individual determines their investment has been quite substantial, yet the goal remains a distant realisation, the probability of defection is heightened (Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Horgan, 2005; Wright, 1987). The effects of failure have been measured in mainstream contexts with Snyder, Lassegard and Ford‘s (1986) study of successful and unsuccessful university groups. Participants led to believe they had failed a task displayed less interest in participating in future group activities and were less inclined to self-identify with the group, while the opposite effect occurred for successful groups. The social distance between the individual and group failure serves as a strategy to avoid negative evaluation and protects self-esteem. However, De Cremer and van Dijk‘s (2002) found when negative feedback on group performance was provided, only those with salient personal identities (as opposed to salient collective identities) would reduce contribution to the group, proposing group failure is only precursor to disengagement for individuals without a salient group identity. When distancing is observed by core members, the attempts to restore the self identity at the expense of the collective is viewed as a lack of commitment and disloyalty (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). At this point, members with salient personal identities, and behave with greater self-interest, are more likely to be rejected and/or expelled by group members with greater salient collective identities (Branscombe et al., 1999).

Rejection of violence Arguably, the most common reason for leaving radical social groups is the personal or indirect experiences of violence due to extremist ideologies and hatred (Fink & Hearne, 2008; Horgan, 2005; Noricks, 2009). The underlying reasons for rejecting violence can be of an ideological, strategic or organisational nature (Demant et al., 2008a). The ideological rejection of violence includes the individual‘s attitudes and morals surrounding violence, such as violence is inherently bad or creates undesired animosity. Strategically, violence is no longer seen as a successful method to achieving desired outcomes, and finally, the influence of violence on the organisation, such as in-group violence causing fragmentation within the movement. These violent stresses can lead to the rejection of violence and the rejection of the social group, causing disillusionment and an increase propensity for disengagement. While disengaging does not determine the violent behaviours of the individual, the rejection of violent means to achieve ideological aims is considered part of the deradicalisation process. Husain (2007) details the horror experienced with the death of an innocent life and the realisation of the violent situation he had helped create. The halaqah endorsed the belief the life of a kafir is inconsequential in accomplishing Muslim dominance and Husain experienced anxiety over the method of violence. Rommelspacher‘s (2006; as cited in Demant et al., 2008a) study into German right-wing extremists found confrontation with violence caused some of 33 | P a g e


the movement‘s members to rethink involvement because of the view ‗it was taken too far‘. Supporting the experience of violence as a precipitating factor to disengagement includes the analysis of the Moluccan and squatter‘s movements (Demant et al., 2008a), and gangs in America (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996), whereby the personal confrontation with violence contributed considerably to the decline of group membership. Decker and Van Winkle‘s (1996) interviews with ex-members from St Louis‘ street gangs found experiences of violence, directly or indirectly, to be a consistent reason for disengagement, with the period immediately after the violent confrontation being the most susceptible for cognitive shifts. However, intervention must be swift to prevent the solidarity imposed by the gang‘s interpretation of the violence as favourable.

AFFECTIVE The affective factors are the social and organisational aspects facilitating or impeding emotional attachment to the group, and are central to an individual‘s propensity to maintain affiliations even when ideological differences are present. This affective attachment incorporates psychological investment to the group, emotional attachment to the group‘s goals and values, as well as the individual‘s role (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Feeling competent and comfortable in a role within the group is arguably the strongest antecedent to emotional attachment. A positive correlation exists between affective attachment to the collective and the identification and involvement, and conversely, disappointment with intra-group interactions can weaken commitment and willingness to participate (Demant et al., 2008a; Klandermans, 1997). The failure in organisational capacity results in the group‘s inability to fulfil social and cultural functions or utilise sufficient new sources (Demant et al., 2008a). Affective commitment is subjected to dual processes; whereby reduction influences the member‘s perspective and highlights perceived deficiencies in normative and continuance spheres, or the reduction may be a consequence of an existing deficit.

Failing group interaction Radical social groups adopt various organisational structures; from fixed, hierarchal organisations with authoritarian leaders, to fluid and decentralised networks, yet all are susceptible to negative organisational factors which influence both maintenance and disengagement with intra-group relationships. Whether formally recognised or not, each member is assigned status where leaders are viewed as ‗exemplary‘, and ethically and morally consistent with the group‘s ideals and goals, and group members who do not uphold the prototypical characteristics are viewed as less worthy, causing internal conflict (Demant et al., 2008a). Internal conflicts such as power plays, competition between members and disloyalty can dishearten members, and rejection or receiving negative feedback from the collective can cause personal uncertainty regarding acceptance (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Branscombe et al., 1999; Demant et al., 2008a; Horgan, 2005). The antagonism within members can produce paranoia and, in terms of radical groups, fears of infiltration from rival groups or authorities. The mutual competition, contempt and distrust can cause disillusionment as the individual does not achieve the level of security expected when joining (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009). Rejection from the group can be perceived as a threat of expulsion, the removal of membership status, or the unwillingness of the group to accept the individual as a prototypical member of the group (Branscombe et al., 1999). The strength of identification with the group will determine the individual‘s reaction. Members low in identification may disidentify in anticipation of further rejection, maintaining self-esteem by attaching a positive emotional response to their non-prototypical identity and applying a self-categorisation into a group interpreted as a ‗better match‘. Those high in identification are more likely to experience low self-esteem as they continue to admire prototypical members and view themselves unfavourably (Branscombe et al., 1999). The interpretation of rejection from the social group renders disengagement and intervention more practical for members with low identification.

Failing leadership Jacob‘s (1987) interviews with voluntary religious defectors emphasised four sources for disillusionment with the leader; physical abuse, psychological abuse, emotional rejection, and spiritual betrayal. The study indicated psychological abuse and emotional rejection were the predominant causes of disillusionment, with rejection derived from unfilled expectations of the spiritual god or the affective relationship between leader and follower. The spiritual betrayal is linked to the leader not fulfilling expectations of a moral and pious lifestyle. As leaders are representative of the prototypical member or presented as the ‗hero‘ for members to admire, inconsistencies between leaders and group ideals, or the message propagated can lead to the interpretation of the ideology and methods to achieve goals as insincere (Demant et al., 2008a; Rommelspacher, 2006; Wright, 1987). The double standards in lifestyle

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regulations between leaders and members can lead to resentment and cause doubts in the sacrifices required to achieve group goals (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009). Members can also become disillusioned by the inability of leaders to provide sufficient direction and focus, or adapt to changing circumstances and inspire members (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al., 2008a; Fink & Hearne, 2008). A lack of leadership and political influence structurally can cause member‘s to doubt the group‘s capability to achieve societal change (Demant et al., 2008a). While this may be a reason for departing the social group, it can also cause members to seek out another, more radical, social group.

CONTINUANCE Continuance commitment is the awareness of consequences and personal costs associated with leaving, and are linked to the practical life circumstances making membership attractive or unattractive (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Klandermans, 1997). Two factors influence the strength of continuance commitment: the degree of investment to the role and group, and the perceived lack of viable alternatives. The individual interprets a profit associated with maintaining participation, and a cost associated with leaving, thus, any changes to the social identity are viewed with the knowledge of negative consequences and penalties (Becker, 1960; Demant, Wagenaar, & van Donselaar, 2009; Klandermans, 1997). Demant et al. (2008a) proposes continuance factors only play a supporting role, providing extra motivation to the normative and affective factors of disengagement. Only when practical life circumstances become prominent and provide a negative variant, such as outside pressure and stigmatisation, does it have a direct role in disengagement.

Maturation Some radical social groups tend to consist of young participants and furthermore, Weinberg (2008) argues the longer the organisation exists, the younger the recruits become. In comparison to the founding generation, Weinberg (2008) suggests youthful members are less ideologically or religiously sophisticated, lack an understanding of the long term purposes of the organisation, and are typically ‗looking for action‘. While street gangs and racist groups can reflect this analysis, Weinberg‘s (2008) argument conflicts with Sageman (2004, 2005) and Horgan‘s (2008) study of terrorism with the average age of Jihadis to be 26, and 25 for al-Qaeda – well past adolescence. The opposite is also true for one percent motorcycle clubs as Veno (2003) asserts the average age in the 1980‘s was approximately 25 years old, but demographic changes has seen the average age rise to the late 30‘s. Despite older cohorts, the effects of aging within a radical lifestyle are still influential in the practicality of group involvement. Veno (2003) notes as members of the one percent motorcycle clubs age, participating in group activities becomes increasingly difficult; for example the inability to handle the cultural symbol Harley-Davidsons, opting for trikes or cars, or the inability to endorse ‗hard living‘ lifestyle of alcohol and partying. The isolation of the groups from institutions can result in members avoiding medical treatment, and in the case of one percent motorcycle clubs, years of harmful lifestyle choices can lead to medical conditions preventing further involvement in group events and celebrations (Veno, 2003). In consideration of youthful recruits, there are many advantageous – and disadvantages – to drawing on this demographic. An advantage is their ability to devote themselves in terms of time and resources to the movement due to the lack of restraints from familial or employment responsibilities (Demant et al., 2008a; Silke, 2003). There is also the idealistic notion of having the ability to change the world and possess the energy to pursue group tasks (Gendron, 2006). However, the problem faced by the group is maintaining this level of dedication as the youth develop into more adult roles and identities. The importance of membership wanes as they no longer have the same need for excitement, have less energy or crave a more subdued lifestyle (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al., 2008a; Horgan, 2005). Not only is the maturation of an individual member influential on the group, but members typically outgrow the movement and leave as an aggregate. For the group to exist after the members disengage, it needs to recruit and replace with a younger cohort, posing more concerns regarding the attractiveness to a younger generation.

Competing social relationships The realisation that further radicalisation will require the permanent severance of interpersonal connections can frighten members from furthering their involvement, particularly those with previous connections to society (Demant et al., 2008a). However, those from minority groups are expected to experience a different process as the connection to society is not felt as strongly as those from the majority (Demant et al., 2008a). It is more likely the lack of 35 | P a g e


connection contributed to the first step in the radicalisation process for minorities, while it acts as the final barrier to radicalisation for the majority. These social groups meet members‘ social and affective needs, and in some cases can serve in place of primary or quasi-primary groups; for example, as a surrogate family (Wright, 1987). However, when disillusioned with the group, external relationships increase in influence and place strain on the resources the individual commits to the group. When associated with external people the radical trusts and respects, the interaction can operate in opposition to the group and intervention can be initiated through ideological dialogue (Demant et al., 2008a). The respect for these individuals increases the openness to alternative opinions and world-views and encourages doubts and questioning of the group‘s ideology (Demant et al., 2008a). Social groups are aware of the strain dyadic relationships can place on members‘ time and resources, and frequently there are formal and informal regulations restricting two-person intimacy, or the world-view endorses attitudes to counter the dyadic formation. For example, encouraging celibacy or sexual pluralism, or the attitude of the opposite sex as inferior and a threat to group stability (Wright, 1987). Failure to do so can threaten membership in various ways, such as one member of the dyad wants to leave and persuades the other, or as the relationship intensifies greater emotional investments is placed in the dyadic relationship at the expense of other existing relationships. Increased interaction with non-members can cause normative ambiguity due to the lack of reciprocity over shared beliefs and the affirming of peaceful behaviours (Garfinkel, 2007). Family and partners are a source of support and provide a sounding board for concerns and emphasise the plausibility of alternative and socially acceptable options (Fink & Hearne, 2008). The establishment of a family external to the group also places demands on member to adopt new responsibilities for both the spouse and children, Horgan and Bjørgo (2009) argue this is one of the strongest motivations for the defection from radical social groups. The reduction of insulation from the outside world can have negative implications for group relationships acting as vehicles of meaning and values. By disrupting the meaningful interactions between a member and the group, the dependent socialisation and commitment processes are interrupted (Wright, 1987). This provides a stimulus for altering discredited perceptions of the larger society by removing group boundaries; therefore, minimising group distinctions and undermining the importance of belonging to a unique social group. While it is proposed members will seek affirming reactions from external social relationships when group relations no longer fulfil affective needs, contextual factors of memberships need to be acknowledged, particularly, the argument of only members who join the social group to fulfil social requirements are likely to drift to external relations if their needs are not met, and in contrast, movements successful in meeting members affective requirements will cause members to leave for reasons independent to unfulfilled affective needs (Wright, 1987).

External pressures and stigmatisation Involvement with radical social groups and associated activities can cause emotional strain and be detrimental to relationships and future opportunities. Those operating in a clandestine manner and experiencing threats of violence or punitive actions by enemies or authorities can find themselves longing for a ‗normal‘ life; including lifestyle factors unavailable while maintaining membership, such as marriage and beginning a family, and/or developing a career, or living without fear (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Fink & Hearne, 2008; Horgan, 2005). While some members perceive the notion of a normal way-of-life to be dull, the experiences of stigmatisation, social isolation and the consumption by intense hatred can exhaust the individual leading to a break down or exhaustion. A radical social identity can produce negative repercussions in other social contexts and influence the perception and treatment from others outside the radical milieu. The individual identity that exists externally can be disregarded in social situations where the expectation is to be assessed on individual characteristics or merits; such as employment interviews (Branscombe et al., 1999). The stigmatisation may produce feelings of discrimination and disappointment when the individual deems their radical identity as irrelevant or illegitimate to the context. The lack of opportunities due to negative relationships with the community can increase dependency on the organisation, or may cause the evaluation of the costs associated with maintaining the radical identity. For those encountering low identification with their social group, this discrimination can emphasise intergroup heterogeneity and/or further disillusionment with their membership (Branscombe et al., 1999).

BARRIERS TO DISENGAGEMENT The decision to leave the radical collective behind is as significant and complex as joining with several factors impeding the process. Devoting significant amounts of time and resources to the collective can result in the perception of withdrawal as a personal failure. Taylor (1988, p. 168) refers to this as the concept ‗spiralling of commitment‘ in radical groups, where previous investments and organisational pressures entrap the individual into

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remaining despite doubts. The barriers enforcing group commitment consist of three fundamental elements; (1) ensuring the member‘s behaviour requires socio-psychological investments, (2) decisions reinforcing this investment are advocated as the only feasible option, and (3) any efforts to avoid the investment only serve to consolidate the entrapment of the member (Taylor, 1988). These barriers are designed to ensure the dominance of the radical ideology, the individual‘s social dependence on the group and instil practical lifestyle barriers that make withdrawal unattractive. Demant et al. (2008a) identifies examples of barriers in radical groups as the costs involved in disengaging, fear of reprisals from the group, the loss of reputation and protection, and the marginal position following disengagement. Disengaging from any social group can have negative repercussions in terms of the loss of identity and community; however, the radical groups can produce additional and more severe consequences that need to be considered by the individual.

SUMMARY Social groups are a significant component in human interaction and the investment of time and resources, as well as the emotional attachment, make departing a painful experience. The nature of radical social groups ensures members are socially and psychologically invested and utilise socialisation practices to prevent withdrawal. As a consequence, disengaging can have negative repercussions for the self-identity and well-being of the ex-member. The aforementioned contributing factors to disillusionment in themselves may not be valid, solitary reasons for disengaging; however, produce significant rationalising effects on the initial phase of doubt and help to overcome socialisation barriers. Commitment is likely to wane when material, psychological and communal benefits of membership are outweighed by the resources required for association and the inability to achieve desirable outcomes.

REFERENCES Allen, N. J., & Meyer, J. P. (1990). The measurement and antecedents of affective, continuance and normative commitment to the organisation. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 63, 1-18. Becker, H. S. (1960). Notes on the concept of commitment. American Journal of Sociology, 66(1), 32-40. Bjørgo, T. (2002, June). Exit Neo-Nazism: Reducing recruitment and promoting disengagement from racist groups (Paper No. 627). Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Bjørgo, T. (2005). Reducing recruitment and promoting disengagement from extremist groups: The case of racist sub-cultures. In C. Benard (Ed.), A future for the young: Options for helping Middle Eastern youth escape the trap of radicalization (pp. 1-30). Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division. Bjørgo, T. (2009). Processes of disengagement from violent groups of the extreme right. In T. Bjørgo & J. Horgan (Eds.), Leaving terrorism behind: Individual and collective disengagement (pp. 30-48). New York: Routledge. Bjørgo, T., & Horgan, J. (Eds.). (2009). Leaving terrorism behind: Individual and collective disengagement. New York: Routledge. Branscombe, N. R., Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1999). The context and content of social identity threat. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears & B. Doosje (Eds.), Social identity: Context, commitment, content (pp. 35-58). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Brockner, J., & Rubin, J. Z. (1985). Entrapment in escalating conflicts. New York: Springer-Verlag. De Cremer, D., & van Dijk, E. (2002). Reactions to group success and failure as a function of identification level: A test of the goal-transformation hypothesis in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38(5), 435-422. Dechesne, M., Janssen, J., & Van Knippenberg, A. (2000). Derogation and distancing as terror management strategies: The moderating role of need for closure and permeability of group boundaries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(6), 923-932.

Decker, H. S., & Van Winkle, B. (1996). Life in the gang: Friends, family and violence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

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Demant, F., Slootman, M., Buijs, F., & Tillie, J. (2008a). Decline and disengagement: An analysis of processes of deradicalisation. Amsterdam, Netherlands: IMES, University of Netherlands. Demant, F., Slootman, M., Buijs, F., & Tillie, J. (2008b). Deradicalisation of right-wing radicals and islamic radicals. Retrieved March 29, 2010, from http://www.annefrank.org/upload/downloads/Mon8-UK-Ch11.pdf. Demant, F., Wagenaar, W., & van Donselaar, J. (2009). Racism and extremism monitor: Deradicalisation in practice. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Leiden University, Anne Frank House. Denton, A., & Jacoby, A., (Executive Producers). (2005, Septemper 5). Enough rope with Andrew Denton [Television broadcast]. Sydney, Australia: ABC. Ebaugh, H. R. F. (1988). Becoming an ex: The process of role exit. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Fink, N. C., & Hearne, E. B. (2008). Beyond terrorism: Deradicalization and disengagement from violent extremism [Electronic Version]. International Peace Institute, 1-27. Retrieved April 12, 2010, from http://www.ipinst.org/asset/file/384/BETER.pdf Garfinkel, R. (2007). Personal Transformations: Moving From Violence To Peace [Electronic Version], Special Report 186. Retrieved October 20, 2009, from http://origin.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr186.pdf Gendron, A. (2006). Militant jihadism: Radicalization, conversion, recruitment [Electronic Version]. Trends in Terrorism Series, 4, 1-19. Retrieved October 10, 2009, from www.carleton.ca/cciss/res_docs/itac/gendron_e.pdf Horgan, J. (2005). Psychological factors related to disengaging from terrorism: Some preliminary assumptions and assertions. In C. Benard (Ed.), A future for the young: Options for helping Middle Eastern youth escape the trap of radicalization (pp. 65-91). Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division. Horgan, J. (2008). De-radicalization or disengagement? Perspectives on Terrorism, 2(4), 3-9. Husain, E. (2007). Farwell fanaticism. In The Islamist: Why I joined radical Islam in Britian, what I saw inside and why I left (pp. 154-164). London: Penguin Books. Jacobs, J. (1987). Deconversion from religious movements: An analysis of charismatic bonding and spiritual commitment. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 26(3), 294-308. Klandermans, B. (1997). The social psychology of protest. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Klandermans, B. (2005). Politicized collective identity: Collective identity and political protest. Advances in Group Processes, 22, 155-176. Kruglanski, A. W., & Fishman, S. (2009). Psychological factors in terrorism and counterterrorism: Individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis. Social Issues and Policy Review, 3(1), 1-44. Mellis, C. (2007). Amsterdam and radicalization: The municipal approach [Electronic Version]. Retrieved May 3, 2010, from www.nuansa.nl/uploads/0H/qA/0HqAi1Ir9nUPUtioUlPwGQ/nctb-bundel-ed.doc Mushtaq, R. (2009). De-radicalization of Muslim communities in the UK. Unpublished Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Noricks, D. (2009). Disengagement and deradicalization: Processes and programs. In P. K. Davis & K. Cragin (Eds.), Social science for counterterrorism: Putting the pieces together (pp. 299-320). Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Photiadis, J. D. (1965). Overt conformity to church teaching as a function of religious belief and group participation. American Journal of Sociology, 70(4), 423-428. Post, J., Sprinzak, E., & Denny, L. M. (2003). The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(1), 171-184.

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Rommelspacher, B. (2006). Der Hass hat uns geeint. Junge Rechtsextreme und ihr Ausstieg aus de Szene. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding terror networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Sageman, M. (2005). Understanding terror networks. International Journal of Emergency Mental Health, 7(1), 5-8. Silke, A. (2003). Becoming a terrorist. In Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences (pp. 29-53). Chichester: Wiley. Skonovd, L. N. (1979, April). Becoming apostate: a model of religious defection. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Sociological Association, Anahiem, CA. Snyder, C. R., Lassegard, M., & Ford, C. E. (1986). Distancing after group success and failure: Basking in reflected glory and cutting off reflected failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(2), 382-388. Taylor, M. (1988). The terrorist. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers. Veno, A. (2003). The brotherhoods: Inside the outlaw motorcycle clubs. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin. Weinberg, L. (2008). Two neglected areas of terrorism research: Careers after terrorism and how terrorists innovate [Special issue]. Perspectives on Terrorism, 2(9), 11-18. Wright, S. A. (1987). Leaving cults: The dynamics of defection. Washington, DC: Society for the scientific study of religion.

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Moral Disengagement: Exploring Support Mechanisms for Violent Extremism among Young Egyptian Males Dr Paul S Lieber, Dr Yael Efreom-Lieber and Dr (LTC) Christopher Rate University of Canberra (Australia) Calvary Hospital (Canberra, Australia), US Army War College [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract This study applied Bandura‟s (1986) eight mechanisms of moral disengagement to a sample of young, Egyptian Muslim males (N=660). Findings uncovered two distinct scoring groups, likewise a statistically significant (p