A model of family decision making

European Journal of Marketing A model of family decision making Richard W. Pollay

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To cite this document: Richard W. Pollay, (1968),"A model of family decision making", European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 2 Iss 3 pp. 206 - 216 Permanent link to this document: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/EUM0000000005254 Downloaded on: 16 February 2015, At: 12:01 (PT) References: this document contains references to 0 other documents. To copy this document: [email protected] The fulltext of this document has been downloaded 618 times since 2006*

Users who downloaded this article also downloaded: Christina K.C. Lee, Sharon E. Beatty, (2002),"Family structure and influence in family decision making", Journal of Consumer Marketing, Vol. 19 Iss 1 pp. 24-41 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/07363760210414934 Tendai Chikweche, John Stanton, Richard Fletcher, (2012),"Family purchase decision making at the bottom of the pyramid", Journal of Consumer Marketing, Vol. 29 Iss 3 pp. 202-213 http:// dx.doi.org/10.1108/07363761211221738 Christina Kwai-Choi Lee, Brett A. Collins, (2000),"Family decision making and coalition patterns", European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 34 Iss 9/10 pp. 1181-1198 http:// dx.doi.org/10.1108/03090560010342584

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A model of family decision making by Richard W. Pollay University of Kansas/Lawrence


Husband-wife decision making is investigated by looking at the distribution of utilities to the two participants, introducing concepts of priorities, distributive justice and utility debts. Samples of the bargaining process are presented. Relation of this model to traditional concepts and potential applications of this model to marketing are also discussed. Most recent works in marketing involve sophisticated, or at least complex models of the forces that impinge on a person making marketing decisions.1 Despite the fact that most of these models recognize the influence of other people on an individual, the basic orientation remains on the decision processes of a single person. Other people are taken into consideration only because the individual has goals of 'belongingness' or affiliation. Despite the recognition of the importance of the family in marketing, however, little attention has been paid to the processes by which family members interact or how the family makes decisions as a unit.2 There have been studies on such interactions in the behavioural sciences, largely in the fields of social psychology, conflict resolution, and family studies. Our model and application to marketing will draw most heavily from the knowledge and concepts in the first two of these areas and then be related to some traditional dimensions in the study of families. Our immediate concern is with the question of how two or more individuals, say a husband and a wife with children, who possess different preference structures interact to make decisions, particularly marketing or purchase decisions. ASSUMPTIONS A N D NOTATION

Let us consider, initially, two people who are interacting to reach a mutually compatible decision 1

For a recent example of the sophistication of analysis used in the discussion of individual decision making see (7). Less analytic approaches more commonly presented are exampled by (4) and (6). 2 The area is, of course, not totally ignored. For an interesting collection of papers on the subject see (2), but these papers seem to fail to capture the internal dynamics of the decision making process. For an experimental approach to the problem see (5). 206

in the selection of a product for purchase. Let us call these people our players and identify them as player i and player j . They face the decision of selecting a product, P k , from a certain product class h. We will assume that there are a finite number of product offerings in product class h and that each player has a product preference, which we will note as Pi or Pj corresponding to our identification of the players. We assume that an individual is able to determine which of the products in the product class yields him the most utility and that he is also able to evaluate alternative products and assess the utility that their purchase would generate. Since there is a relatively large body of literature exploring the question of how an individual does decide on a preferred product, we will largely ignore the question here of how this preference structure is determined. We may also conceive of all the products in our product class being placed along a single attribute dimension.3 This serves to simplify the discussion


since we can now graphically portray a utility structure where the utility for different products decreases the further that product is from the preferred point. Figure 1 is such a graphical presentation of utility versus product offerings, P i , . . . P k , . . . P n , where Ui and Uj are the utilities of the two players. Lastly, we will assume that players are motivated to maximise their own utility and to maintain distributive justice. This distributive justice concept will be explained more fully later, but for now we can say that it represents the players' long term interests in seeing to it that rewards or utility are distributed among the players on some agreed-upon, mutually satisfactory basis. Before we explore this further, let us discuss factors that lead to utility structures and factors that lead to priority structures, the basis for utility distribution. UTILITIES

In its simplest form we can say that utility is derived from some need satisfaction for the individual. The effectiveness of any product in providing such need satisfaction is dependent on at least two variables; the frequency of product usage and the amount of satisfaction generated by each product usage. In addition to this basic utility of product need satisfaction, there is also a utility generated out of empathy. For example, player j , a wife, and player i, a husband, assumedly have some affectional bonds so that product usage utility enjoyed by the wife U jk , leads to some increase in the husband's net utility because he enjoys making his wife happy. Thus a more refined view of net utility, U, is that U ik =f(N i , F i k , Sik eij Ujk) (I) where: Uik = the total utility to player i that would result from the selection of product choice Pk Ni =need intensity for player i F i k = frequency of product usage by player i of product Pk 3

See (1) for a further discussion of unidimensional scales.

Sik = satisfaction of needs to player i per product usage of Pk eij = the empathy player i feels for player

j4

For a given individual the basic utility decreases with deviation from the most preferred product, P i , because both Fik and Sik decrease. Alternatives to the most preferred product are less efficient in satisfying player i's needs and we might also expect a decline in the frequency of product usage. The effect of adding the concept of empathy is, perhaps, to change the location of the preferred product choices,Pi,and Pj, but this in no way invalidates the representation of the problem as portrayed in Figure 1. PRIORITIES

Given a utility each member of the decision making unit (D.M.U.) will derive from a product, P k , a decision is still not prescribed until we add a concept of priorities. A given decision within the D.M.U. is rarely made with the aim of generating equal utility for all members of the D.M.U. Within a family, for example, priority may be given to the utility of the husband over the wife, or priority given to the utilities of the children over the parents, etc. The priority structure at a given point in time for a particular product decision is dependent on three major factors. The first, which provides a base point for the other two, is some notion of normal position preference; the degree to which a player, on the average or in the long run, receives consideration for his desires. This is reflective of a number of factors 4

The interdependence of the utility functions through empathy does not have the effect of making the net utilities infinite, a state identifiable only as something beyond extreme ecstasy as some readers might suspect, unless (eij)(eji)= 1. This can be shown by looking at the equations for the interdependence. (NU)ik=Uik+eij(NU)jk (NU)jk=Ujk+eji(NU)ik Solving these simultaneously shows that (NU)ik= (Uik+eijUjk)/( 1 -eijeji) 207


Family decision making

like standard role behaviour, degree of child orientation, etc. Here the concept of status congruence might also be included. This concept states that a person feels his opinions, utilities, etc. ought to be considered commensurate with his relative status within the decision making unit, regardless of the relevance or salience of the particular decision to his life style. The second factor is the relative risk to be assumed by player i in the purchase, ownership, and consumption of the product. The third and last major factor is the existence of utility debt between the parties. The magnitude of this factor is determined by the prior history of the decision making unit, being particularly concerned with the prior decisions and behaviour of the decision making unit as having led to a just distribution of utilities. We will return to this concept in the discussion of distributive justice. Overall we can say that: Bih = f(Rih,Dji, (NPP)i) (2) where: B i h =a priority index for player i for product class h Rih =risk assumed by player i in product class h Dji =utility debt owed from player j to player i (NPP)i=normal position preference of player i DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The principle of distributive justice states simply that the players within the decision making unit should share rewards (receive utility) proportional to the priority structure.5 Stated mathematically, the criterion for an equitable product selection, P k , from product class 1, is that the following condition be met: Ui/Bi=UjBj (3) If this condition is not met, the rewards (utilities) are being disproportionately distributed, that is, someone is not getting his 'fair share.' In a long term relationship, like some marriages, this criterion needs to be satisfied over a long run basis. Ideally, 5 For a more complete and more general discussion of the concept of distributive justice see (3, p. 232-264).

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each decision would yield results that would meet this criterion, but such an occurrence may, in fact, be rare. In the marketing context, a product alternative may not be available which has attributes necessary for this balance to be met. When the balance is not met on a given decision, the player receiving the disproportionately large share accumulates a utility debt to the other player, who accumulates a utility accounts receivable. This explains the inclusion of the debt concept in the priority determination at any given point in time. DECISIONS: FAIR A N D UNFAIR

It appears then, that there are at least three possible conditions which can lead to a decision agreeable to both players if we also assume an unrestricted willingness to accumulate 'utility debt.' If there are constraints on the amount of debt one or both players are willing to maintain in their accounts, then the possibility exists that any or all of the three conditions will fail to be agreeable to the parties. The three conditions are: (1) When both parties have the same preference: Pi=Pj; (2) When the most preferred choice of one party is such that the criterion of distributive justice is almost or exactly met; (3) When a compromise product selection, Pk, neither Pi or Pj, meets or closely meets the distributive justice criterion. On the face of it, condition (1) involves a minimum amount of conflict to be resolved for the two parties since they both, in isolation, prefer the same product choice. In fact, however, this situation may involve considerable disagreement. Suppose, for example, one player has low utility for P i , despite the fact that it is the most preferred alternative of the products, while the other player has a high amount of utility for Pj. While they both feel that Pi=Pj=Pk is the best choice of the product alternatives, the reward (utilities) are such that the purchase of this product fails by a wide margin to satisfy the distributive justice criterion. The conflict may be over what constitutes a fair division, i.e. what the appropriate priorities are, or over what the utilities are and, even if a priority structure is agreed upon and an appropriate utility debt mutually recognized, either player


may be reluctant to have that much utility debt enter the account receivable or payable, as the case may be. Either player, but more probably the 'shortchanged' player, may be agreeable to the decision only if the utility debt can be immediately paid off, probably in some other dimension. Similarly, condition (2), where one player gets his most preferred choice and both players get close to their fair share, may involve conflict and disagreement. The crucial concept is 'close' to fair share. Again players may not agree on what constitutes a fair share and may have constraints on the utility debt they are willing to carry. Condition (3), one of compromise where neither player gets his first preference introduces the problem of utility assessment for yet another alternative, as well as problems mentioned above. Here, even if what would constitute a 'fair' decision can be agreed upon, the finite number of product alternatives may make it impossible to find an alternative to meet the agreed upon criterion. In this and in all of these conditions each player always has the problem of assessing the other player's utility for different alternatives, as well as assessing his own. How two individuals, like a husband and wife, bargain to reach a decision is our next problem for consideration. Here we are primarily concerned with how people within a decision making unit communicate or miscommunicate their own utilities, strive to alter the other's utilities, negotiate over priority structures and attempt to cope with utility debt. BARGAINING: INFLUENCE A N D COUNTERINFLUENCE

We have listed three situations which lead to decisions; situations which we might consider already ranked in terms of preferability, in that, within the product class and the alternatives presented, the first maximizes the utility of both players, the second maximises the utility for one player and the third maximizes neither players' utility. We have also recognised that to reach these situations bargaining and cross-influence has to occur. 3

Phase 1: Utility Bargaining 6

Let us assume that initially, before any communication, the two players have different product preference points, Pi, and Pj. Each player, since he wants to maximise his own utility, will seek to convince the other player that his utility is such that he should also prefer the same product. That is, player i tries to influence player j to bring Pj in line with Pi. This we will call Phase I bargaining. Since we are already considering the need of an individual, N i , to be independent of the product Pk selected from the product class, influencing the need of the other individual does nothing to change the other's relative preferences. The preference structure can be influenced, however, by influencing the other's perception of the relative usage and the relative need satisfaction that will accrue to him upon deciding on different product. Quite naturally player i attempts to convince player j of the attractiveness of i's preferred product, Pi, and to also convince player j that Pj is not really as satisfactory as perceived. Player i can also increase j's utility from Pi by increasing eji. By making j more emphatic to i, j's utility for Pi increases since j now enjoys i's basic utility. This last process is probably used more frequently than is immediately recognised, as evidenced by the common plaint 'If you really loved me, you'd be glad to buy me (Pi).' This obviously does not create true spontaneous empathy, but it does create something akin to empathy, largely through guilt. Empathy is also often enhanced by stimulating affectional responses. Witness the wife who plays up to her husband to get her own preference. This last method, particularly if sexually stimulating, as well as its counterpart, the threat of loss of love, is close to the border of another strategy we will discuss later; the making of other needs more salient than the needs satisfied by the product. 6 The numbering of the phases of bargaining should not be taken as implying a necessary sequence in time. It should be recognized that negotiations often include simultaneous bargaining on all available dimensions. The numbering of these dimensions as phases is done only to provide a conceptual partitioning and to facilitate later discussion.

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Changing utility by influencing the perception of product usage and concomitant need satisfaction is very commonplace and is often the main focus of a family decision making discussion, particularly for families or couples who pride themselves on their 'rationality' and avoid the not-too-subtle tactics of empathy production and who also avoid recognition and recognition of anything but a normal, debt free, priority schedule. Examples of verbal exchanges to accomplish these ends are almost trivial. 1. 'Just think of all the occasions on which you could have used (P i )' 2. ' I think you'd really find (P,) handy to have around' 3. 'You're always saying how much you could use something to do (functional advantage of Pi)' 4. 'This is exactly what you've been looking for' 5. '(P i ) would be ideal for (satisfying a need)' 6. 'You'd never use (Pj); it doesn't have (attribute of Pi)' 7. 'I've heard (Pi) is always in need of repair' 8. 'John Doe bought (Pj) and never used it'

tion particular to the other party. Failure to do this, and instead pointing advantages of Pi that accrue to both player j and player i runs the risk of greatly increasing player j's perception of the utility i will receive. Thus while player j may also be made to prefer the selection of Pij his perception of the distribution of utility may be such that he expects a large 'utility debt' to be recognised. This debt expectation is minimised, however, either if there is a concomitant increase in player i's priority or if the empathy player j has for player i is large enough that player j shares player i's utility.

Phase II: Priority Bargaining If one of the players is successful in influencing the other so that Pj becomes to equal P i , a decision may be made, although the priority structure still remains to be negotiated and assessed before an appropriate 'utility debt' can be mutually agreed upon. If both players fail in this initial bargaining and influencing effort, then the priority structure determination takes on prime importance before a decision can be reached, since this determination is required to explore the feasibility of Pi, Pj and all Needless to say our focus on the messages that other potential alternatives, P k , as solutions meeting attempt to influence has thus far slighted the or approximating the distributive justice criterion. responses to those influencing attempts. Quite In any event, therefore, the priority structure has to obviously, each of the above statements has an be negotiated, which process we will call Phase II appropriate retort or at least a denial of the imbargaining. portance of the influencing evidence. Each player is Given a utility mapping and a product preference, most interested in convincing the other to 'changeover' and is, at least initially, resistant to being con- our players, like before, are each interested in verted himself. Whether this approach, attempting maximising the amount of consideration given to to generate compatible first preferences, is successful their own preferences, which relates directly to the for either player depends on the player's communica- concept of maximising one's own utility. The tion and forensic skills, his perception of product priority structure is negotiated by a process of attributes which will be favourably appreciated by influencing the three factors that contribute to the other party, and the other's general receptivity to priority: the 'normal' position preference, the risk to influence. Success here is, of course, also dependent be assumed, and the debt owed. Since a given player on the degree to which there was initial disagreement. wants to increase his own priority, his communications are directed to positively influencing the perIt is important to note something that may inception of the magnitude of the factor that he holds. fluence utility through emphasising need satisfaction Example statements which portray these influencing and frequency of usage. While any influence which attempts are: converts the other's preference is desirable, the superior strategic alternative is the influence attempt 1. 'You know damn well that if we buy (Product k) that points out frequency of usage and need satisfacI'll be the one that has to take care of it.' (Risk) 210


2. But we just bought you a new coat.' (Debt) 3. ' I earn all the money around here, so what I say is important.' (NPP) 4. 'We've always decided these things your way.' (Debt) 5. 'It's a husband's place to make these decisions.' (NPP) 6. 'Remember, we must consider the kids.' (NPP) 7. 'If something goes wrong with (Product k), I'll be the one that gets the blame.' (Risk)

know little about each other and appear to be peers, the equitable priority structure and split of utilities is a simple 50/50 equality. This, if accepted by the players, helps to greatly reduce the communication and bargaining needed along this dimension. Phase III: Post Decision Utility Debt We have already spoken about the importance of utility debt as a factor contributing to priorities before the decision. This utility debt is the net residual from the family's prior history of decisions and behaviour. Similarly, following any decision there is again the problem of agreeing upon the utility debt residual. This we will call Phase III Bargaining and involves not only the assessment of the appropriate debt, but also the level at which one or both of the parties is willing to tolerate the debt. This Phase III will be necessary, at least implicitly, in almost every instance. The only exception is the decision where there is perfect agreement on the utilities, perfect agreement on the priorities, and the availability of a product which exactly satisfies the distributive justice criterion. The evaluation of the debt remaining after the decision is, of course, predicted on the bargaining and assessment of the utilities and priorities discussed above and how well these intersect to meet the distributive justice criterion. Debt need not be negotiated and agreed upon immediately following the decision and, in fact, a lot of claims and disclaims of debt probably occur well after the decision, during the stages of product ownership and usage. At that stage, utilities are being experienced rather than just cognitively fantasied as during the decision making stage, and a lot of debt claims probably stem from failure of the chosen product to lead to the realisation of the utilities expected. Witness the following common influencing statements:

Quite obviously most of these statements have counterparts which serve to play down the other's priority rather then enhancing one's own, which have the same effect on changing the relative priorities. In this area conflict may be intense and bargaining difficult, primarily because each decision now is recognised to contain implications towards long run role priorities. This is evidenced most strongly by the decision making problems of marriages which, when faced with marital problems, suddenly find themselves each unwilling to 'take a back seat' to the other. This concept also helps to explain the protracted decision making of newlyweds who have relatively undefined and unagreed upon priority structures. Perhaps the only thing that makes the situation easier for newlyweds is the high degree of existing empathy which serves to make their utility mappings more coincident so that real conflict arises most rarely. The importance of clarity of role definition and established priority structures is also evidenced by the difficulties that might be faced by an individual trying to decide with some neighbour what power lawn mower they should cooperatively purchase. If the neighbour is also his boss, the decision process is likely to be easy and the bargaining brief because they have a priority structure already well established through other joint experiences and mutually recognised status and power differentials. If the neighbour is a newcomer, the bargaining may be 1. ' I never get to use (Product k), you're always more lengthy, since they have little experience and using it.' knowledge about each other on which to base a 2. 'Product k doesn't do the job you said it would.' priority structure. The saving factor here is the 3. 'You use (Product k) a lot more than you thought widely accepted cultural norm which says if you you would, don't you?' 211

couple may evidence this. Such a couple, because of their other conflicts, may have low tolerance for debt, perhaps through the fear they may never Similarly, claims for utility debt can stem from a collect the debt. And, of course, because of the later realisation of just how much priority was given estrangement there are a limited number of dimenthe other player, as exampled by: sions on which such a debt might be collected. As a sidelight, we might also note the effect of low 1. 'You really ignored me when you bought this.' tolerance for debt on one of the decision situations we 2. ' I don't know why I ever let you pick this.' discussed earlier: the situation where both players 3. 'You got your way that time, didn't you?' prefer the same product. As we noted before such a 4. ' I should have stuck up for my rights.' situation appears to involve no difficulties, until we As we have already mentioned, it is important to entertain the possibility that, while Pk may be the include in this discussion of utility debt some most preferential product for both players, the notion of individual tolerance for debt. An indi- utilities generated by that product's purchase may be vidual may have constraints on both the amount of far from meeting the distributive justice criterion. debt he is willing to hold as an account payable and Thus a family unit with low debt tolerance and, the amount he is willing to hold as an account hence constrained to alternatives which meet the receivable, although the latter is certainly the more distributive justice criterion, may not be able to common and, probably, the more severe of the two accept the alternative which they both prefer. They, instead, seek an alternative which, while an inferior possible constraints. alternative to each player, gives each their fair share Statements which demonstrate everyday attempts of utility. That such an apparently 'irrational' to communicate a tolerance for utility debt are: decision would ever occur is indicated by the 1. ' I can't go along with that. We made the last four familiarity of the statements: decisions in your favour.' 1. 'Sure I also liked (Product k) but I just wouldn't 2. 'You've been having all the fun. It's time I got give him the satisfaction.' into the act, too.' 2. 'Yes, that's a good product, but you'd get to use 3. 'It's my turn to make the decision.' it much more than I would.' 4. 'You've been real nice to me lately. If I don't 3. 'What you really need is (Product class k).' watch it, soon you'll be asking for a fur coat.' 4. 'Here is the chance to get what you've been 5. 'You've been too good to me. You must be after waiting for so long.' something.' 5. 'Who needs it!' 6. ' I'll never be able to repay you.' 6. 'Since when did you think I'd have any use for that?' This concept of debt tolerance is important


4. 'Somehow, it never seems appropriate to use (Product k).'

because if one or both players have a low debt tolerance it may mean lengthy and difficult bargaining with the greater possibility of not being able to reach a decision. This results because, with a low debt tolerance, the distributive justice criterion must be closely approximated. This involves more exact determination of both the utilities and the priorities and also involves a potentially longer search through product alternatives seeking just the right one. Again the decision making difficulties of an estranged 212

OTHER BARGAINING STRATEGIES

Before we leave this discussion of the basic processes that precede family decisions we ought to mention at least two other common methods for resolving the conflict involved in disagreement situations. One is the turning to another product class for a compromise and the other is the strategy of making other needs more salient than needs satisfied by the product class being considered.


The first method of conflict resolution really avoids the conflict rather than resolving it. Here two players, particularly when they experience difficulty finding a mutually agreeable solution, may turn to another product class or behavioural dimension for their compromise. Of course the utility obtained in this compromise may not result from the satisfaction of the same needs the product would have satisfied but the compromise may be readily agreed upon and known to be mutually agreeable. This type of behaviour is characterised by a family who, unable to reach a decision, gives up, decides it's not worth all this trouble, takes the money they might have spent on Product k, and goes out to eat in a restaurant instead. This may be a 'good' decision compromise in that a substantial amount of utility might be obtained and distributed in an equitable, mutually agreeable fashion with a minimum incurrence of the costs of the bargaining effort. The compromise may, however, be a 'bad' one to the extent that it has left certain needs totally unsatisfied, needs which the original decision making confrontation set out to satisfy. The second method, that of making other needs more salient, strives to make the other player relatively indifferent to the product decision and perhaps even to the distribution of utility. This is accomplished by making the other player so concerned about some other need that he becomes unconcerned with the product decision. If this other need is satisfied he may even be indifferent to the distribution of utility derived from the product because he is getting his utility share on another dimension. This is primarily what happens when, in the heat of the negotiations, one player threatens the other with loss of love or attempts to sexually excite the other player. By raising a greater need the player forces his counterpart to be preoccupied. Later satisfaction of these raised needs restores the other player to equilibrium again; but in the interim, the one player has, in essence, created a utility for the other player to somewhat compensate for the utility accruing to the first player in the product choice, thus maintaining some measure of distributive justice.

RELAXING S O M E ASSUMPTIONS

There are at least two of our original assumptions that we ought to relax briefly to discuss a more complex decision process: the assumption of only two players and the assumption of the selection of product alternatives from a unidimensional product class. With more than two players involved the basic process remains the same. Reaching a decision when there are n players is more difficult, since now there are n utilities and n priorities to be assessed for each of the product alternatives. Thus, agreement on the most preferred product, or any total agreement, is less likely, and the influence process now involves a communications network with n(n—1)/2 channels, rather than the one back and forth channel that exists when n=2. Removing the dimension of unidimensional product alternatives under consideration complicates and clouds the issue without, we believe, substantially altering the basic decision making processes. What we can say is that when widely disparate alternatives are being contemplated as alternatives, such as the case when the husband wants to spend the Christmas bonus on a fishing boat and the wife wants a new fur coat, it is unlikely that attempts to influence and change utilities will be very successful. Also, unless there is a large amount of empathy, either product choice leaves one player feeling greatly shortchanged and creates a substantial amount of utility debt which may not be acceptable to the players. In addition, it is not clear what constitutes an effective compromise, except by moving to yet another dimension. In our example here, the husband and wife may finally agree on spending the bonus on a week's vacation. RELATION OF THE MODEL TO S O M E TRADITIONAL FAMILY CONCEPTS

There exist a number of family concepts which are often used by marketing people to classify families without, perhaps, a full appreciation of the differences between families classified according to these concepts; particularly differences in the area of decision making processes. It behoves us, therefore, to show how some of the concepts introduced in 213



this paper relate to some of the presently widely used concepts. The most straightforward transference involves the familial concepts of wife oriented families vs husband oriented families and child oriented families vs parent(s) oriented families. These concepts relate quite directly to the concept we used of priorities. Directional orientation of families is most closely aligned with our concept of normal position preferences. To this we have added the concepts of utility debt and risk assumption, thus giving our concept of priorities more power than the orientation concept in understanding particular individual decisions. More commonly used concepts in discussing family organisation are those relating to stages in some family life cycle. Four such stages which we will consider are: young marrieds—childless; married with children; estranged marriages; and mature marriages—children grown. Young marrieds, especially newlyweds, probably start off with relatively different and unique product preferences since they share less common experience than do older couples. This disparity of basic utility mappings and product preference is minimized somewhat by efficient selection of compatible mates. The importance of this disparity is really minimised by the high degree of empathy (love) that tends to make their net utility mappings highly overlapping. Also as a function of a relative lack of common experience, they have weakly determined priority structures, but this too, has a compensative factor; here adoption of the 50/50 norm, an adoption made easily because of the mutual evaluation of the mate as a highly significant other. The real advantages newlyweds and young marrieds have that make decisions easy are a desire to communicate, a receptivity to influence, and the ability to pay off utility debt, should it occur, with ease. About the only source for difficulty, and it is minor, occurs when a young couple is so loving that each player attributed more than 50 per cent priority to the other and, hence, wants to give the other the lion's share of the utility. This type of difficulty is almost inconsequential since the high degree of empathy 214

tends to escalate the utilities to a level approaching ecstasy and it is hard to get riled up about the distribution of something so bountiful as that ecstasy. The case of married couples with children introduces the problem of size of the decision making unit, which we touched on when we relaxed the assumption of two-party bargaining. The introduction of children forces the parents to come to some priority decision on the importance of the children relative to the parents. If the children are given universally low priorities as is, sadly, often the case, the decision making process is not any more complex since the child's utilities and preferences are not considered and need not be evaluated. The child can still, however, try to influence the parents' preferences and whether this complicates the process depends largely on the parents' receptivity to influence from the child. Where the child is given some measure of priority consideration and allowed a vote in the decision, this precipitates all the complexities of larger decision making groups that we have already mentioned. Families suffering through internal conflict so that the players are estranged have already served as an example of some points made earlier. Such estranged couples are characterised by low, or at least greatly reduced degrees of empathy and, perhaps, a growing realisation of vast differences in utility preferences. Very likely there is also ripe conflict over the priority structure where each player believes he (or she) deserves the larger share. Overriding this are low desires for communication, at least meaningful communication, low receptivity to influence and low tolerance for debt. This greatly reduces the chances of reaching decisions since both players are reluctant to engage in the necessary interaction and even if they did engage in this interaction, the debt constraint greatly reduces the number of even feasible alternatives. Under such conditions it is easy to see why decisions are difficult to make and why those made are usually unsatisfactory to at least one of the parties. The last family state we consider is the mature couple whose marriage is not estranged. These couples no doubt have some degree of continued


empathy and they have a large amount of experience in common, both of which help to make utility mappings more coincident. Through experience they have developed a high degree of definition on the priority structure, so that it may rarely even be a topic of discussion. They have a high degree of knowledge of the other's utilities and preferences without communication and should communication be necessary it is likely to be very efficiently dispatched. There is common understanding of the existence of debt and what constitutes payment of that debt. All in all, decision making in these marriages occurs with a minimum of difficulty, communication, and time.7 The last commonly used dimension for classifying families that we will relate our model to is that of social class. Here the variable on which the social classes might differ most is that of priority, because of the differences between classes on the relative amount of contributions made by husbands and wives to the family survival and welfare. In lowerincome families the husband and the wife contribute roughly equal amounts to the family's total welfare, the husband providing the income necessary for survival and the wife providing the child rearing effort and the maintenance of domestic bliss. In higher-income groups, of course, the husband's contribution is significantly greater while the wife's contribution does not so increase. Thus we might expect that upper-income families would make decisions giving more weight to the husband's utility than would lower-income families. This would also result from the tendency of husbands in upperincome families to have greater autonomy in the handling of the family's financial affairs, thus increasing his risk assumption on any purchase decision.8 7 The same conclusion also seems to hold for military decision making groups rich in common experience as exampled by (8, p. 41-48). 8 It is recognized that this is only a very partial analysis of possible class differences, but space prohibits a more lengthy discussion. It is reinforcing to note, however, that evidence reported by (9) on the purchase of clothing (p. 353) and on the purchase of cars (p. 355) supports our theoretical conclusions.

SOME MARKETING IMPLICATIONS

At the present the function of this paper is largely to create some greater sophistication on the part of the reader in discussing, contemplating, and understanding of interactions within the family unit that lead to mutually satisfactory decisions and purchase behaviour. The concepts and relations expressed herein, while meaningful, are of limited practical import in their present form. The making of these concepts more operational in the solving of marketing problems is an effort underway but not yet completed. Even before that effort is completed, however, it is apparent that these concepts are of tremendous practical significance to all those in marketing. Without going into detail, it is obvious that this model should provide more meaningful dimensions on which to segment markets, whether for selective product offerings and/or advertising or simply for analytical and research purposes. Within a market segment or for a complex market served by a specific product, family purchase behaviour could be analysed in such a way that we could generate a distribution of the relative degree to which specific players' utility satisfaction from the product determines the product selection of the family. Knowing this, we would be able to identify an optimal product design which would have a balance of utilities to the family members that satisfied the decision criterion of the greatest number of families. The same data would help identify situations where multiple product offerings or product differentiation was called for to reach untapped market segments. Information would also be available to indicate an optimal proportion of the total promotional effort to be directed toward enhancing each family member's perception of product utility. Although the discussion is covered in terms of family members, the concepts can be applied just as well to the industrial marketing area. The labels used would, in the transition, shift from husband, wife, etc. to purchasing agent, production manager, design engineer, etc. Identification of optimal product design, optimal product mix, and optimal 215


advertising could be carried for industrial markets as well as for consumer markets.


SUMMARY

This model provides a perspective with which to look at the interactions within a family unit that lead to a purchase decision by that family unit. It provides a mechanism for analysing the interactions of the members in any decision making unit although the primary focus within the paper is on family behaviour, since that is the most common decision making group in the consumer area. Had the focus been in industrial marketing, the group analysed might well have been the purchasing committee. The model is based on three major concepts: (1) A distribution of utilities to various members of the family, (2) a distribution of priorities the family members hold, and (3) the matching of these two distributions to satisfy the criterion of distributive justice. To this was added the concept of utility debt formation following decisions which cannot meet the distributive justice criterion. The interaction processes of influencing the perceptions of utility, priority, and debt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution was discussed and example situation and statements were provided to demonstrate that the model has captured ' reality.' The model was then used to identify meaningful differences in decision making that might exist for families with different member orientations, families at different stages in the life cycle, and for families in different social classes. Potential uses for this model in marketing management, advertising, product planning and market research were then discussed. Given the heavy emphasis of almost all marketing theories on the purchase behaviour of individuals, almost to the exclusion of interaction concepts, it seemed necessary to take a closer theoretical look at the decision making unit and to discuss the interactions of the members therein. This model does that and while it is still, perhaps, naive in many respects, the model does seem to pinpoint relevant

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concepts and allow us a means for understanding the purchase decision with a little greater sophistication. GLOSSARY OF TERMS Basic Utility: the utility derived both directly from product usage and indirectly from product ownership or usage as a means of identification with others. Distributive Justice: the distribution of utilities according to a priority structure so that all parties perceive the distribution to be mutually agreeable and fair. Empathy: the result of emotional attachment which leads one player to enjoy some utility simply by observing the utility satisfaction of the other player. Net Utility: the sum of basic utility and any additional utility derived through the process of empathy. Normal Positional Preference: some base point of priority, determined by normal role predominance, a standard power balance, relative status, etc. Priority: the degree to which a player has the right to expect consideration of his preferences and utility, as compared to the consideration of the other players' utility. Risk Assumption: the degree to which the purchase and/or ownership of a product involves the assumption of any risks by one of the players. Utility Debt: the result of previous failures to meet the criterion of distributive justice so that one player 'owes' some satisfaction or utility to the other player. Utility Debt Tolerance: the degree to which a player is willing to owe, or be owed, a utility debt. REFERENCES 1 Coombs, Clyde H.: Theory of Data, New York: Wiley, 1964. 2 Foote, Nelson N.: ed., Household Decision Mating, New York: New York University Press 1961. 3 Homans, George C : Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, New York: Harcourt Brace 1961. 4 Howard, John A.: Marketing Management: Analysis and Decision, Homewood, Illinois: Irwin 1963. 5 Kenkel, William F.: ' Influence Differentiation in Family Decision Makings,' Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 42 (Sept.-Oct., 1957), pp. 18-25. 6 Kotler, Philip, Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning andControl, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall 1967. 7 Nicosia, Francesco M.: Consumer Decision Processes, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall 1966. 8 Remarque, Erich M., All Quiet on the Western Front, Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett 1964. 9 Zober, Martin, Marketing Management, New York: John Wiley 1964.