A Myth of Peace: 'The Vision of the New Middle East ... - SAGE Journals

© 2006 Journal of Peace Research, vol. 43, no. 3, 2006, pp. 297–312 Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) http://jpr.sagepub.com DOI 10.1177/0022343306063933

A Myth of Peace: ‘The Vision of the New Middle East’ and Its Transformations in the Israeli Political and Public Spheres* YAACOV YADGAR Department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University This article studies the transformations of the narrative of ‘the Vision of the New Middle East’ as a political myth in Israel from its conception in the early 1990s to this date. Borrowing its analytic framework from Georges Sorel’s concept of political myth, the article opens by offering a narrative analysis of the paradigmatic vision, as formulated by Shimon Peres (then Israel’s Foreign Minister). The article goes on to trace the reception of this narrative and the uses made of it in two of the main arenas of the Israeli political and public spheres: the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) and the mainstream Hebrew press. The article argues that, while ‘the New Middle East’ has become an idiomatic phrase synonymous to peace, a closer look at its appearances in the Israeli public and political spheres suggests that the uses and transformations of ‘the New Middle East’ in effect signal its failure to become a politically mobilizing myth or image. Instead, this notion has become an icon of a utopian, abstract, and rather apolitical notion of peace in the Middle East. This case study thus suggests an interesting lesson as to the potential and limitations of using peace as a mobilizing political myth.

Introduction Since its inception in the early 1990s, the term ‘the New Middle East’ – coined by Shimon Peres, leader of Israel’s Labor Party – has become associated if not identified with a rather tangible vision of peace in the Middle East. Outlining both the path to and the end result of such much-desired peace, this vision became synonymous with the peace process in the Middle East. In the following pages, I will suggest that Peres’s ‘Vision of the New Middle East’ should be studied and analyzed as a political myth, in particular as this term is formulated by * The author would like to thank Bernard (Baruch) Susser, Stuart Cohen, and the anonymous reviewers of the manuscript for their comments and ideas. E-mail: [email protected].

Georges Sorel (1908/1999). This is not to imply that I am suspicious of this vision’s plausibility or of its factual validity. Indeed, such understanding of the use of the term ‘myth’ (that is, what has become the popular usage of the term, confusing ‘myth’ with ‘legend’ and ‘fantasy’, or more simply with ‘falsehood’) has prevented many from realizing the immensely important political implications of myths. Instead, I would argue that an emphasis on a study of ‘the Vision of the New Middle East’ as a mythic narrative of the inevitability of peace enables us both to better understand its conception, acceptance (or rejection), and transformations and to study this vision as a unique case of a purposeful construction of peace as a mobilizing political myth, on its potentiality and limitations.

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As I would argue, although Peres’s notion of a New Middle East succeeded in becoming a phrase synonymous with peace, a closer look at the uses made of this phrase in the Israeli public and political spheres suggests that the uses and transformations of ‘the New Middle East’ in effect signal its failure to become a politically mobilizing myth or image. Instead, this notion has become an icon of a utopian, abstract, and rather apolitical notion of peace in the Middle East.

Why Sorel? The study of political myth has captured social scientists’ attention for several decades now. Coming from various scientific traditions and ideological inclinations, scholars seem to agree on several basic premises, emphasizing both the narrative structure of myth and its function as a conveyer of meanings, beliefs, and values (Gusfield & Michalowicz, 1984; Klatch, 1988; Schopflin, 1997). While most formulations of myth analysis focus on its narration of past events and the ways in which it constitutes (or reaffirms) the sociopolitical order, few have focused on what should be viewed as a unique stream of mythic narratives of futuristic or eschatological visions of sociopolitical reform and redemption. Interestingly, it is in one of the earliest discussions of the political importance of myth (see Tudor, 1972) – that is, the work of Georges Sorel – that the myth’s orientation towards the future receives the most elaborated attention and analysis. For Sorel, the most important feature of myth is its ability to mobilize its adherents into political action. Thus, Sorel, who was suspicious of political speech, saw the passage from abstract ideas to political action as always involving the motivating power of myth: ‘men who are participating in great

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social movements always picture their coming action in the form of images of battle in which their cause is certain to triumph. I proposed to give the name of “myths” to these constructions’ (Sorel, 1908/1999: 20). Myth, Sorel observed, leads to action through the construction of an ‘imaginary world’, which functions as a mobilizing image, for the realization of which people are willing to sacrifice. It is this willingness of political participants/adherents to sacrifice that captured Sorel’s political and philosophical imagination. According to Sorel’s argument, myth functions in the deeper, obscure levels of the human psyche, the analysis (and critique) of which is irrelevant for the prevalent social scientific methods. As formulated by one student of Sorel’s work: While most human activity proceeded from the calculation of self-interest or evolved from daily routines, myths gripped the mind with a much greater tenacity than self-interest or habit and enabled people to act in radically new ways. Myths produced their effects spontaneously without leading to reflection or a search for precedents. (Tager, 1986: 626)

An important organ in Sorel’s theorizing of myth is the distinction he draws between political myth and utopia. Unlike myth, which is for Sorel a consequence of pure chance of history (hence the impracticality of purposefully constructing or ‘engineering’ political myth), utopia is typically a deliberately engineered intellectual product. The origins of myth cannot be studied, as intellectual activity is not involved in the process; Utopia, on the other hand, is a creation of a theorist, who formulates a model of society, used for criticizing the existing social order. Sorel also highlighted the personal political aspects of this construction: the utopian model usually promotes political reform that would benefit the intellectual who devised it. Furthermore, Sorel’s study of utopias reveals that these usually propagate visions of a

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universal supranational order, in which old customs and traditions no longer dictate behavior (Sorel, 1908/1999: 27–31; Tager, 1986). It is precisely this orientation toward a future reformation of sociopolitical reality that captures one’s attention when reading Peres’s manifestations of his political ‘Vision of the New Middle East’. Written and published in the midst of the devising and signing of the historic Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO,1 the book bearing this vision’s title (Peres, 1993b,d),2 as well as various public speeches, newspaper columns, and media appearances by Peres, has presented the Israeli public with a concise yet elaborated narrative of such an ‘imaginary world’, the inevitability of which is clear to Peres. As I will argue, this property of Peres’s narrative and its apparent acceptance in the Israeli public sphere suggest that, in order to better understand Israeli society’s attitudes toward peace, we should study ‘the Vision of the New Middle East’ as a mythic – or rather utopian – vision, in the analytical framework put forth by Sorel. On its most basic level, the narrative of the New Middle East is a story of an immanent future of regional, international – 1 Peres manifested his vision prior to the negotiations in Oslo and originally presented it as the guiding logic of the bilateral and multilateral talks between Israel and the Arab countries in the framework of the ‘Madrid Summit’ (see, for example, Knesset Protocol, 25 January, 1 March, 11 May 1993). Nevertheless, the vision won considerable momentum after the signing of the Oslo Accords, and Peres’s book (see note 2 below), which was published after the Accords were signed and opens with a short memoir on the negotiations in Oslo, was aimed at capitalizing on the momentum created by the signing of the Accords (see also Knesset Protocol, 11 October 1993). 2 The book was published simultaneously in both Hebrew and English versions. These versions are largely identical. Interested in the Israeli political sphere, I use the Hebrew version as my primary source, using the English version as the official translation where available. Other translations, noted separately, are mine. The two books were written by Peres with the help of Arye Naor, whose name does not appear on the front covers of the two books. See Nakdimon (1993).

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if not supranational – economic prosperity and political tranquility. Borrowing its framework from the European experience of a unifying political system based on a common market, this narrative is a promise for a bright, prosperous, and rich future of calmness in a Middle East, driven by the undefeatable logic and power of the market. In what follows, I offer a discursive and sociological analysis of ‘the New Middle East’ narrative as deployed in the Israeli political context. In order to do so, I will first attempt to reconstruct the symbolic–political narrative put forth by Peres. I will do so mainly through a narrative–symbolic discourse analysis of his book, newspaper articles, and parliamentary speeches. A similar analysis will then be applied to study the appearances and uses made of this mythic narrative in both the Israeli Parliament and the mainstream Hebrew press.3

Peres’s Vision: The Paradigmatic Formulation Much like Sorel’s mixture of social-scientific analysis with political dictation, Peres’s presentation of the New Middle East is an interplay between two levels of narration: on the one hand, an analytical, quasi-scientific narrative of the history – and especially the future – of the Middle East, as well as an overarching analysis of global geopolitics in general, told by the experienced and informed statesman; on the other hand, a personal, prophetic, and rather enthusiastically political narrative of the inevitability of this future and the need to mobilize under its flag. 3

Using the computerized index of the Knesset protocol, all appearances of the term ‘New Middle East’ – a total of 243 references up to the date of completion of this article – were collected and analyzed. Similar indexing tools, as well as a manual search of newspaper archives, were used in order to trace the term’s appearances in the three main daily Hebrew newspapers, Yediot Aharonot, Maariv, and Haaretz.

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This is, rather straightforwardly, a prophetic vision of the inevitability of future economic and political developments. As Peres himself put it: ‘Regarding the vision, I plead guilty: I have always believed that without a vision, there will be catastrophe’ (Peres, 1996a); ‘Peace is the Future’ (Peres, 1996b). Given the political and partisan context in which it was devised and prophesized, this vision takes on an image of an explicit call for political action. It does so by outlining a narrative of progress, which necessitates not only a presentation of the future, but also a reconstruction of the past. The Past – Necessary but Mistaken The narrative’s construction of the past is of unique relevance here, especially in the context of the Zionist meta-narrative (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983; Zerubavel, 1995) upon which Peres has built himself as a political figure for more than three decades before devising his Vision of the New Middle East. Like other constructs of national myths (Hosking & Schopflin, 1997; Smith, 1997), this Zionist meta-narrative also assigns unique importance to the past as legitimizing the Zionist project, as well as dictating its course. Nevertheless, aiming at a peaceful, supranational future that is in sharp contrast to the violent history of the Zionist project, Peres is compelled to reconstruct this past in order to legitimize a narrative that calls for a revolutionary overcoming of this past and the present situation that has sprung from it. Peres’s narrative’s attitude towards this past can be best described as a ‘sympathetic detachment’. Peres does acknowledge this past and justifies it and the nationalistic logic driven by it, but he constructs it as a mistake that has to be overcome in order for the inevitable New Middle East to arrive. Peres also remains loyal to the narrative of progress and modernization, which is an important organ of the Zionist meta-narrative, suggesting that ‘we’ should continuously ‘move forward’.


Accordingly, Peres’s outline of history (with which he opens his narrative of the future) is rather straightforward: a Jewish past of persecution in the exile that culminated in the Holocaust, the establishment of the State of Israel as the inevitable outcome, the transforming passage toward a ‘new’ Jewish identity, the violent reality of the Israeli–Arab conflict that ensued, and the culmination of the narrative in a vision of an inevitable peaceful future. Peres also weaves his own biography into this story: I am a child of a generation that lost one world and went on to build another. We established the modern State of Israel and renewed the independence of the Jewish people in their ancient homeland. But only after the old world had been destroyed and we had taken a long and harrowing journey could we build a new, more just world – a place in which we could unite our yearning for national freedom with our craving for social justice. Sadly, shaping this world meant terrible wars, suffering, and pain. So much suffering, so much pain that Israelis and Arabs were blinded, making us incapable of changing our images of either ‘them’ or ourselves. (Peres, 1993d: 2)

This past – and the present it gave birth to – thus become an obstacle, which prevents us from seeing the future, a darkness that overshadows the dawn of a new day: ‘We must study history to learn its critical lessons, but we must also know when to ignore history. We cannot allow the past to shape immutable concepts that negate our ability to build new roads’ (Peres, 1993d: 3). As the prophetic hero of his own narrative, Peres – who also highlights his own role as an architect of the Israeli national defense, especially by establishing its nuclear program (cf. Peres, 1993d: 4–5) – is the pioneer who overcomes this obstacle and can envision the opportunities manifested in this future: I was well aware that, in the half light of dawn, we had to drive away the shadows of the past. Nighttime fades on its own; the darkness of the past penetrates every component of our lives. But what is done is done. We cannot

Yaacov Yadgar change the past. When circumstances are propitious, and so much is at stake, we must forget the past for the sake of the present. (Peres, 1993d: 2–3)

Hence the necessary move of detaching oneself from the past while acknowledging it. A nation that had for centuries trained itself to remember now has to learn how to forget: People tend to remember more and think less. Our memories are familiar, affectionate, nostalgic. Our thoughts, which concentrate on the unfamiliar, are less welcoming. However, we must focus on this new Middle East reality. (Peres, 1993d: 85)

Peres’s reconstruction of the national past as a necessary mistake demonstrates the need of future-oriented myths to encourage a reevaluation of this past, thus to undermine an important element of the prevailing formulation of national identity. As the Israeli response to Peres’s formulation will demonstrate, such a re-evaluation of the national past is a difficult and problematic task, especially in the context of a predominant national meta-narrative. Peres’s Four Pillars of Peace In Peres’s broader picture, a New Middle East is to be built upon a new conception of regional politics and economics; ‘Establishing peace and security requires a conceptual revolution. It is not a simple task, but it is essential’ (Peres, 1993d: 62). This new regional conceptualization is based upon four pillars: (1) Political stability, that is, in Peres’s analysis, an internationally collaborated war on transnational Islamic fundamentalism. This is to occur only in a revolutionarily new political regional framework, which ‘will provide the potential for economic and social growth, extinguishing the fire of religious extremism and cooling the hot winds of revolution’ (Peres, 1993d: 62).

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(2) Economics, which is awarded the utmost attention by Peres. More on this below. (3) National and regional security: Identifying long-range missiles as the new danger to world peace and security, Peres outlines a plan for regional cooperation in security matters – not unlike the NATO alliance, but based on existing, independent national armies: ‘A cautious and timely Roman proverb teaches: “Let him who desires peace, prepare for war.” The time has not yet come to dismantle our weapons and send our soldiers home’ (Peres, 1993d: 69; see also Knesset Protocol, 25 January 1993). (4) Democratization throughout the Middle East, not only as a means of granting individuals their human rights as well as their political privileges as citizens, ‘but also as a watchdog for peace, working to dispel the factors that underlie fundamentalist agitation’ (Peres, 1993d: 64). Economy and Politics As aforementioned, the most prominent component of Peres’s narrative is the economy, or business factor. The new political reality of peace is to be the outcome of preceding economic cooperation and prosperity. The logic behind this vision is the rather simple logic of self-interest. After all, Peres reminds his readers, ‘he who lives in comfort promises comfort also to his neighbor’ (Peres, 1993d: 30). Accordingly, the New Middle East is, first and foremost, a vision of economic reform and growth. Peres’s vision is, in this sense, a reformulation, or rather localization, of a global narrative of progress and modernization (see Peres, 1996a). Economy seems to be Peres’s solution to practically all the region’s maladies, whether social, environmental, security-oriented, or cultural/ ideological. The economy’s centrality to this vision is what orients it towards the successful example of a European political unity

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based on a joined market. In Peres’s narrative, Jean Monnet’s vision of a unified Europe based upon economic cooperation should also be used as a model for peace in the Middle East. Thus, although the coming of this geopolitical and economic change toward peace is inevitable, it still necessitates a visionary, prophetic ability: The Middle East needs a Jean Monnet approach today. We need courage and forethought, imagination and insight. . . . Today more than ever, we need men and women with novel ideas and creative concepts – leaders unafraid of the hardship encountered in building a brave new world. David BenGurion said that all experts are experts on what already was. We need experts on what will be. (Peres, 1993d: 71)

Tellingly, for Peres, a prominent leader of Israel’s Zionist-Socialist (at least nominally) party, the Labor Party, this economic basis for peace must be a supranational narrative of globalization, guided by the capitalist market. His plan of a ‘three-tiered pyramidal program’ for the New Middle East is basically a move from a national system towards a global one, driven by the market’s logic. Nevertheless, unlike other popular formulations of the inevitable triumph of a marketdriven globalization (such as Friedman, 1999), Peres is more rooted in European visions of a top-down globalization, in which the state plays a crucial role – such as that of an initiator and conductor of massive regional (mostly international) infrastructure projects (Peres, 1993a; 1993d: 72–73). A rather capitalist, business-like language is Peres’s way of explaining the driving force behind his vision, which necessitates the abandoning of Zionist discourse’s guiding logic of total national independence: Beyond the particularist nationalist aspirations, nations of the region constitute a heterogeneous conglomeration of socioeconomic levels, standards of living, and per capita income. To overcome this problem, we need to view the region as wrapped in four

volume 43 / number 3 / may 2006 economic-political belts. The first belt is disarmament4. . . . The second belt is water, biotechnology, and war against the desert, it aims to paint the Middle East green. . . . The third belt is transportation and communications infrastructure. . . . And the fourth belt is tourism. (Peres, 1993d: 74)

Herein lies a promise for collective as well as personal prosperity: ‘We are capable of providing for such a dream, and its realization will provide for us’ (Peres, 1990). As will be discussed below, this promise for economic profits, a rise in the standard of living, regional openness (at least in terms of tourism), and the vast business opportunities contained in it attracted the attention of Israeli journalists and commentators and won considerable articulation in the Israeli press. The economic impetus of Peres’s narrative also dictated much of Peres’s activities to promote his vision. This was done mainly through the Peres Center for Peace, which was established after Peres lost his post as prime minister to Benjamin Netanyahu in the 1996 general election. As the center presents itself: Nobel Laureate Shimon Peres founded The Peres Center for Peace in 1996 with the express aim of realizing his vision of a ‘New Middle East’. . . . Our projects are based on a genuine identification of common Arab and Israeli economic and social interests, which are formed into peace building projects through our partnerships with regional and international players. (Peres Center for Peace, 2005)

Democratization and Market Politics The market’s complementing mechanism is democratization, which would guarantee both a fair distribution of the wealth brought about by globalization and the political stability needed for the market to flourish: 4

Interestingly, in the Hebrew version of the book, disarmament is the last belt.

Yaacov Yadgar Thus, economic and social development are the criteria for successful democratization of the Middle East. . . . Democratization will put an end to the danger to regional and world peace. But for the democratic process to take hold, we must first overcome poverty and ignorance – the cradle of fundamentalism. (Peres, 1993d: 40–41)

Hence, economic development gains precedence over democratization. This was further highlighted by Peres later on, as his political opponents presented the Arab countries with a demand to ‘modernize’ and ‘democratize’ as a precondition for an Israeli–Arab peace process to commence (see Peres, 1996a). These opponents were coming mainly from the Israeli political right, namely, the Likud party, headed at the time by Netanyahu, as well as other right-wing opposition parties and politicians. Studying recent developments in the former Soviet world, especially its rapid shift towards capitalism and democracy, Peres again stresses the same global truth of the market, this time as it is applied to politics: There is a connection between the emergence of these new regional organizations [in the former Soviet states] and the spread of democracy. In an economic democracy, goods are chosen as are leaders in a political democracy – the best product wins. The market continuously demands new products that attract consumers. Competitive marketing is no less vital to an economy’s growth than are production possibilities – and perhaps even more. (Peres, 1993d: 97)

Peres generally does not consult the relevant actors (that is, mostly Israelis and Arabs) about whether they would like to play the game of globalization: for him, this game is immanent, and it leaves the two sides (as well as the rest of the world) with no real choice but to adapt (see Peres, 1993d: 98; Knesset Protocol, 9 May 1995). Only in passing does Peres address what would later become the crux of Arab opposition to his narrative: the well-known fact that the wealth and prosper-

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ity brought about by global markets are usually based upon Western exploitation of cheap labor in other parts of the world and are distributed unevenly and unjustly. Peres’s vision thus seems to be read in Arab countries as a narrative of Israeli hegemony in a capitalism-driven Middle Eastern market.5 As put by one Israeli commentator, manifesting a radical-left critical view of Peres’s vision, ‘the Palestinian masses must now pay the price for the creation of the “new Middle East”. The new order, called the “peace process” . . . creates a role for the Palestinian people as modern slaves’ (Aminov, 1995: 16). Nevertheless, for Peres, the only question is whether the two sides would evolve into this new way of seeing the world around them or not: ‘Both we and our neighbors have to adjust to another way of thinking; not a broken, outdated, backward and militaristic Middle East, but a Middle East that adjusts itself to the a new global rhythm, a Middle East that functions according to the inevitable rules of the new age’ (Knesset Protocol, 11 May 1993). The Palestinians and Iran as the ‘Other’ One of the past’s imagery misconceptions with which Peres’s narrative has to deal is the 5

It is beyond the scope of this study to closely trace and analyze the reactions to Peres’s vision outside of Israel. Unfortunately, there is hardly any secondary literature on the subject. Few Israeli journalists reported on the cold reception of Peres’s idea in some Arab countries (e.g. Levi, 1996; Markus, 1995). Yet, according to one report, the unauthorized Arab translation of Peres’s book was a hit in Damascus (Shalev, 1994). In any event, it seems that a comprehensive study on the subject is yet to be published. Similarly, there are mostly anecdotal indicators of the European reaction to Peres’s New Middle East. These seem to suggest that Peres’s narrative gained substantial popularity and support in Europe. Such indicators range, for example, from Peres’s apparent personal popularity among European political elites to the EU’s focus on economics and its support of infrastructure projects in the Middle East as the main venue through which to exercise its involvement in – and influence on – the conflict in the Middle East. Also, the ‘New Middle East’ discourse was often used by the EU’s representatives (such as Miguel Moratinos, the EU’s emissary to the Middle East; for example, Maariv, 3 December 2004).

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image of the villain in the Zionist metanarrative – ‘the Arab’, and more particularly ‘the Palestinian’ as the Jewish-Israeli national ‘significant Other’ (see Yadgar, 2003a). Predictably, being Israel’s main partner to peace and to bringing the Vision of the New Middle East into reality, the Palestinians can no longer act as the Other in Peres’s narrative. Interestingly, Peres does not ‘buy into’ a Palestinian narrative of historic nationhood. When discussing the relevant chapter in history, he seems to be questioning the Palestinian claims for such nationhood, while putting it in the shadow of the ZionistJewish historical narrative: I know that what happened to the Jews was unprecedented: a nation returned to its homeland and its ancient language after centuries. I thought that something unprecedented could also happen to the Palestinians: a group who had never been a people could now be a people among peoples. (Peres, 1993d: 15, emphasis added)

Similarly, the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat – apparently the natural, necessary partner of Peres and Yitzhak Rabin (then Israel’s prime minister) in the peace process – is mostly missing from Peres’s narrative. ‘Why we decided to choose Arafat’ (Peres, 1993c) then becomes a complicated question to answer. When he does appear in the narrative, Arafat is portrayed not as an equal partner to the visionary endeavor of a brave new world of peace, but as a hesitant political tactician to be respected and suspected.6 6

Tellingly, one of the most apparent differences between the Hebrew and English versions of Peres’s book are the front covers. While the English book cover carries the picture of Peres delivering his speech during the historic signing of the Oslo Accords in the White House, accompanied by then-US president Bill Clinton and Palestinian leader (then yet to be elected as chairman/president of the Palestinian Authority) Yasser Arafat (Yitzhak Rabin, who took a leading role in this historic event as prime minister, is missing from this picture), the Hebrew book is covered by a portrait of Peres in his office: Arafat and Clinton are missing from the image presented to the Israeli public, as is Rabin. On Peres’s attitude toward Arafat, see also Knesset Protocol, 23 November 1994.


This is not to say that the Vision of the New Middle East lacks a coherent image of the Other. Iran, as the political embodiment of Islamic fundamentalism, is awarded this role. In Peres’s narrative, Iran and the Islamic fundamentalism it is driven by are the source of all evil, an ultimate enemy to be fought against if the vision is to be realized. Iran, Peres tells his readers, feeds global terrorism and hampers the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, by funding and guiding the Palestinian opponents of the peace process, such as Hamas and Hezbollah; ‘Iran sees Israel as the collective reflection of Salman Rushdie. The Iran of today – extremist to the point of insanity – wants to destroy Israel and the peace process’ (Peres, 1993d: 19). This enemy threatens not only Israel and the Middle East: it is also the ultimate enemy of Western civilization as a whole. ‘Khomeinism’ is Peres’s keyword for summing up this image, echoing ‘Communism’ in the American meta-narrative of the Cold War era: ‘Khomeinism’ is a conceptual product, inherent in and originating from the system itself; and as such, it is a threat to the peace and stability of the entire region. With the destruction of communism, there remains only Khomeinism as the sole proponent of the principle of the end justifying the means: to achieve its lofty revolutionary goal of establishing the kingdom of Allah and the holy Imams on earth, one may lie, bribe, steal and murder. (Peres, 1993d: 40–41)

Peres depicts a horrifying image of an Islamic octopus sending its arms throughout the Middle Eastern states, threatening the entire region, driven, again, by economy. The guiding logic of ‘economy precedes politics’ is relevant here, too: ‘In the Middle East, we too have a common enemy: poverty. The father of fundamentalism, poverty is a threat to progress, development, freedom, and prosperity’ (Peres, 1993d: 72). Although he acknowledges that it is impossible to explain fundamentalism solely in economic terms, Peres concludes that ‘it is clear that economic

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backwardness, unemployment and despair from the possibility to advance in life push people to find refuge with the religious priests’ (Peres, 1996a). As highlighted by Sorel, although inevitable, the future revolution put forth by the myth’s narrative is always accompanied by the complementing image of the calamity that would occur were people not to support the advent of this revolution. In Peres’s narrative, this is done by a presentation of the other vision – the Other’s vision – that is, the vision of fundamentalism: a nightmare of an endless war and uninhibited, fruitless violence. The choice then becomes even clearer: Instead of visions of blood and tears will rise visions of happiness and beauty, life and peace. We are at a historic crossroads. Do we choose the path of the tongues of fire, billowing smoke, and rivers of blood, or of blooming deserts, restored wastelands, progress, growth, justice, and freedom? (Peres, 1993d: 46)

The Inevitability of Peace The ‘most Sorelian’ aspect of the narrative put forth by Peres is the inevitability of the future it predicts. For Peres, although a dream, the Vision of the New Middle East is bound to materialize into reality. As Peres was quoted saying, referring to a reported ban on his book in some Arab countries: ‘My book might be banned, but the New Middle East that will arise cannot be stopped’ (Maariv, 3 July 1995). The inevitability Peres foresees is first and foremost an outcome of the economic logic driving it: Peres sees the ensuing globalmarket agenda as immanent, as are also the political changes it would induce. As mentioned earlier, Peres’s is a positive, welcoming attitude toward the advent – indeed, total victory – of the capitalist market. In this vein, some of Peres’s arguments are clearly ‘dialectical’ in nature: In the process of transformation from an economy of war to an economy of peace there might be some difficulties . . . but they can be overcome. In a dialectical way these difficulties might even accelerate and speed up warming up of relations between the different states and a speeding up of the establishment of the regional framework. (Peres, 1993b: 88)7

The choice confronting Israel is a choice between a nightmare of violence and war and a great dream of peace in a new Middle East. (Knesset Protocol, 1 March 1993)

The division and the prediction emanating from this picture are clear: ‘The forces of rejection, the forces of yesterday, will continue to spread destruction, violence and bombs. But against them, and here lies the novelty, have risen new forces, and to them belongs the future, not the past’ (Knesset Protocol, 25 October 1993). Thus, Israelis and Arabs alike face a reality in which the main political feature is ‘a battle in which the two novel forces, modernization and peace on the one hand and radical fundamentalism on the other hand, pull each towards its own direction’ (Peres, 1996a). Similarly, as the Middle East deteriorated back into violent conflicts, the choices facing ‘us’ have become even clearer: ‘either a Middle East of nuclear weapons or a New Middle East of economic peace’ (Knesset Protocol, 17 October 2002; see also Knesset Protocol, 16 October 2002).

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In the same vein, Peres does not hesitate to recruit Hegel’s idea of zeitgeist and the derived ability to foresee the future in order to convince his readers of the truth he himself envisions (see Peres, 1993d: 96). This also explains why for Peres, his vision is not a utopian prophecy, but a simple realpolitik deduction: ‘the world had changed. And the process of change compels us to replace our outdated concepts with an approach tailored to the new reality’ (Peres, 1993d: 34). Peres, the (former?) socialist, is well aware of the connotations such a prophetic discourse of dialectical inevitability might give rise to, and chooses to recruit them on his side: 7

This part appears only in the Hebrew version of the book.

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jour nal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H In the days of Stalin, Soviet propaganda described the Soviet Union as ‘the world of tomorrow’ – an attempt to present the Kremlin-led transition to socialism as an unavoidable historical necessity. But history had taken a completely different course. . . . The world of tomorrow – the world of our children and grandchildren – will bear no resemblance to the world Lenin envisioned and Stalin tried to create. The principles of totalitarian power will not stand at the center of tomorrow’s world. Rather, the principles of meritocracy . . . will predominate. The national or class collective will not constitute the basis of social organization. Rather, the individual will assume responsibility. National goals will no longer be based on control or territorial expansion, but on improving the quality of life, raising the standard of living, and increasing life expectancy. Twenty-first-century people will reach the goals of social welfare and social justice out of a concern for individual justice. As a consequence, economics will carry more weight than politics in international relations. (Peres, 1993d: 155–156)

The New Middle East in Israeli Political and Public Spheres The impact of Peres’s vision on the Israeli public and political spheres is evident, at least partially, in the wide array of uses made of it and references to it. The term ‘New Middle East’ has become an idiomatic phrase used (and abused) in practically all facets of popular culture and public discourse. Sports news,8 TV shows,9 art,10 popular music lyrics,11 and of course political and economic deliberations and commentaries of all sorts are only a partial list of venues where one can find countless references to the term. In one sense, this wide-ranging use of the term could be the best testimony to Peres’s 8 For example, Maariv-Sport, 7 November, 19 September, 14 March 2004; 27 October, 15 September 2003. 9 The Israeli music channel, for example, named one of its shows, focused on what is termed in Israel Eastern music, ‘New Middle East’. 10 For example, Maariv, 4 March, 28 January 2005. 11 For example, Poliker (2001).


success in propagating his vision. The term ‘New Middle East’ has become a synonym of peace, which constitutes an important element in the structure of the Jewish-Israeli collectivity’s self-image. In this regard, Peres’s vision managed to become a coherent political and historical embodiment of what Jewish-Israelis see as a meta-historic, abstract yearning for peace that characterizes them as a nation (Yadgar, 2003b). Peres’s narrative has thus succeeded in convincing that ‘There is no other way to label’ any sign of compromise, normalization, and peace in the Middle East but as ‘a new Middle East’ (Shamir, 1999). ‘The New Middle East’ has thus become a narrative repeatedly addressed or mentioned in relation to political events labeled as ‘the peace process’. Israeli politicians, mostly (but, interestingly, not solely) from Peres’s and Rabin’s side of the partisan map, have been consistently using it as a framework for understanding political reality and amending it. In the same vein, ‘the new Middle East’ and Peres’s vision of it (or at least a crude interpretation of both the term and the vision) have been invoked in numerous references to a wide array of contemporary events that were viewed as signaling a step forward towards normalization, compromise, and even an end of hostility between Israel and its neighbors. Thus, any sign of peace has been immediately dubbed ‘new Middle East’ and was judged accordingly.12 Similarly, the term and vision have become an idiom repeatedly used as a rhetorical tool in demanding and justifying diverse political, social, economic, and environmental legislation, reform, and quasi-constitutional amendments – reaching 12

There are numerous such uses of the phrase. See, for example, Knesset Protocol, 22 March, 12 July 1993; 18 May, 3 October 1994; 18 January, 4 April 1995; 3 November 1997; 3 June 1998; 16 January 1999; Maariv, 22 September 2004; 10 August, 22 July, 2 July, 29 June, 5 January 2003; Haaretz, 3 April, 21 February 2003; 18 March 1996.

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far beyond the ‘narrow’ issue of the peace process.13 For example, as one Knesset member tried to convince the government that it is in its interest to comply with the Israeli professors’ union’s demand for a pay raise, he resorted to the ‘New Middle East’ as a rhetorical tool: ‘What does the government intend to build the new Middle East with? With professors and researchers who are frustrated by their low pay?’ (Knesset Protocol, 12 January 1994). As mentioned earlier, what was, for Peres, the most important organ of his vision – that is, economy and the globalizing market logic as a driving force of geopolitics – was also what the Israeli press took to be the crux of the vision, emphasizing the promise for personal as well as collective prosperity as the axis around which the notion of a New Middle East revolves. As I have discussed elsewhere (Yadgar, 2003b), the signing of the Oslo Accords marked, in this regard, an outbreak of a flood of references to the term, focusing on the promised economic benefits as the heart of the coming of the New Middle East. The political aspects of an end to war and the outbreak of normalization and peace between Israel and the Arab countries were not neglected, but they were mostly presented as the necessary background for this much-desired economic prosperity. Prominent commentators on economics and politics were quick to embrace Peres’s vision and to reformulate it to be more ‘accessible’ to their readers, highlighting that the end of war is, rather literally speaking, ‘our great profit’ (Plotzker, 1993a) and that peace is ‘a great business’ (Plotzker, 1993b). Indeed, in some cases, these commentaries were merely a concise reciting of the relevant 13 See, for example, Knesset Protocol, 18 October, 30 November 1993; 11 October 1994; 15 May 1995; 28 December 1997; 24 February, 25 November 1998; 28 July 1999; 12 January, 23 February 2000; 26 March, 16 April 2001; 24 December 2003; 16 June 2004.

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chapters in Peres’s book, not only in content but also in tone (Lipkin, 1993; Plotzker, 1993c,d). Similar references to the term depicted the coming new Middle Eastern future as a great promise that would entail an improvement of practically all aspects of personal and collective life (see, for example, Maariv, 15 September 1993). Political Myth and Reality Seemingly, the New Middle East’s success in becoming a phrase synonymous with peace would be an indicator of Peres’s success in creating a mobilizing, ‘Sorelian’ political myth of the inevitability of peace and the duties it entails on Israelis and Arabs alike. However, a closer look at the uses made of this phrase in the Israeli public and political spheres suggests that the uses and transformations of ‘the New Middle East’ in effect signal its failure to become such a politically mobilizing myth or image. Instead, this notion has become an icon of a utopian, abstract, and rather apolitical (that is, one that does not call for concrete political action) notion of peace in the Middle East. The predominant interpretation of ‘the New Middle East’ in the Israeli public sphere has not used Peres’s future-oriented narrative as a concrete receipt for political action (such as supporting the Oslo Accords and their derivatives) – as Peres would want it to be – nor has the vision instigated a powerful mobilization in favor of it, as a ‘Sorelian myth’ would do. Instead, ‘the New Middle East’ has been interpreted and reconstructed as a measuring rod, against which reality – or more specifically, any development that would be put under the rubric of ‘the peace process’ – should be judged. Instead of judging reality against the image of the New Middle East, the vision itself has been constantly judged and its truthfulness measured against current events. If these events did not comply with the myth’s narrative, it would be judged as false.

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The only political action that many Israelis saw themselves as obligated to perform in the light of the inevitable peace narrated by the myth was to (passively) support the Oslo Accords, which were viewed as the embodiment of the myth, a necessary step forward towards this peace.14 However, this was a conditioned support: it was valid only as long as the Accords were viewed as bringing about a quasi-utopian New Middle East – a total end to war and sweeping economic prosperity on both the personal and collective levels. Once the peace process instigated by these accords started to stagnate and suffer severe blows (from the Israeli point of view, this happened only when the Palestinian side did not stand up to its part of the deal, and terror attacks were launched against Israelis), the myth was tagged as false and was abandoned, mocked, and ridiculed – as all false prophesies are destined to be. Thus, although Israelis continue to express their support for – and yearning for – peace, their support of the Oslo Accords and the narrative of the New Middle East has weakened considerably.15 The most telling evidence in this regard would be Peres’s loss to Netanyahu in the 1996 general elections. The New Middle East as an Illusionary Fantasy Given the relevant political, partisan context in which Peres’s vision was formulated and disseminated, it is not surprising that the reaction to it usually follows the well-known lines of division in Israeli politics. Peres’s political opponents – mainly representatives of the Likud party and more extreme rightwing parties – were quick to emphasize his claim to have forecasted the future, and 14 On the Oslo Accords, see Beilin (1999), Freedman (1998), Makovsky (1996), and Watson (2000). 15 For the most comprehensive study of Israelis’ developing attitude toward the peace process, see Hermann & Yuchtman-Yaar (2002).


ridiculed it, presenting him as ‘delusionary’ rather than visionary.16 ‘Delusion’ and ‘illusion’ were but two of the terms repeatedly used by Peres’s opponents to address him and his vision, as well as its political application, the Oslo Accords, and the process they have instigated. Similar terms that were used to present such criticism and to ridicule Peres’s narrative include ‘euphoria’, ‘a book of lies’, ‘messianism’, ‘fantasists’, ‘daydreams’, ‘wild dreams’, ‘deceit’, and ‘mirage’.17 As a matter of fact, in the span of more than 13 years studied here, such negatively critical uses of the term outnumber all other uses – mostly positive – made of it in the Israeli Parliament. They comprise more than two-thirds of the total number of references. The recurring theme in these references to the term is that Peres’s narrative is fundamentally wrong in professing that reality has changed. In this regard, what is at stake here is not only a partisan campaign but also an overall battle of mythic narratives. While Peres’s ‘new’ vision was aiming at discrediting ‘old’, predominant narratives of the past – narratives of Jewish isolation in a hostile world (and the nationalist call to continually arm and stand guard that arises from them) – his political opponents were ratifying these ‘old’ narratives. While, in Peres’s narrative, the world of today and tomorrow is a world of peace and reconciliation based on a new economic order, in his opponents’ narrative, 16

Ironically and anecdotally, Peres did not hesitate to manifest his vision in a special magazine dedicated by Haaretz to discuss the theme of fantasies (Peres, 1993a). 17 The references are countless. In addition to references presented below, see, for example, Knesset Protocol, 20 June, 14 July, 11 October, 22 December 1993; 18 April, 17 June, 6 July, 10 October, 2 November, 27 December 1994; 4 January, 1 February, 12 April 1995; 26 March, 9 June, 11 November, 10 December 1997; 16 February, 2 March, 11 May, 27 July, 17 November 1998; 6 January, 5 July, 5 October, 10 November 1999; 11 January, 21 February, 29 May, 26 June, 10 July, 30 October, 4 December 2000; 20 March, 20 June, 29 August, 23 October, 4 December 2001; 6 March, 4 November 2002; 30 July, 4 November 2003; 17 March, 22 April, 11 October 2004.

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the world is still – and will continue to be – a world of anti-Semitism and wars, in which one must be ready and able to protect oneself in order to merely survive. In such a context, Peres’s vision is not only wrong, but also dangerous. This struggle over narratives was of course influenced by political, historical events, mostly those revolving around the developments of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. These events were used as yardsticks against which the vision’s validity was measured and its merit judged. Thus, while in Peres’s formulation, Palestinian terror attacks against Israelis are in effect Islamistfundamentalist attacks against the advent of the New Middle East, for his opponents these attacks were proof that the Middle East is the same old arena of a generationsold violent battle for national survival. As put by MP Moshe Gafni in the aftermath of one such terror attack: The Jewish People, which has been persecuted for generations, is attacked not because they [the attackers] hate the State of Israel. They attack it because it is Jewish. . . . They have been attacking it in every place on the face of earth, today, yesterday, 500 years ago and 1000 years ago, and there is no new Middle East. (Knesset Protocol, 19 October 1994)

The violent national past – for Peres, an important but mistaken prelude to an optimistic peace – is, for his opponents, the most important lesson, to be used as a model for any present and future action. Peres and his party are thus blamed for neglecting the very basis upon which the national project is built: Illusions of a new Middle East . . . have distracted you. These daydreams distorted the national-Zionist purpose upon which the state [of Israel] was established. You have forgotten that the struggle over the Land of Israel is still in its midst. If you remembered it, you would have acted like our forefathers, the fighters, the builders, the pioneers who established the state. (MP Rafael Eitan in Knesset Protocol, 16 November 1992)

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Events that were seen as distractions from Peres’s vision were immediately presented as a negation of the most basic premises of the vision’s narrative. Judged against current events since the signing of the Oslo Accords, the Vision of the New Middle East has thus been suffering severe blows. As formulated by one Haaretz editorial in the wake of a series of terror attacks against Israelis during March 1996: ‘The phrases “the fruits of peace” and “new Middle East” have practically become a ridicule for many in the Israeli public’ (Haaretz, 5 April 1996). Netanyahu, Peres’s political rival, put it more bluntly in the midst of complications suffered by the peace process: ‘Mr. Peres, you have written a book on the new Middle East, but what can you do, the old Middle East is exploding in your face’ (Knesset Protocol, 18 April 1994). In the same vein, commentators from the press and academia felt secure speaking about ‘the dissipating dream of “a new Middle East”’ (Benbanishti, 1996) and arguing that ‘there is not much left of the vision of a new Middle East’ (Sivan, 1999). The most serious blow to the narrative came at the end of 2000, with the renewed outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians (commonly labeled ‘the second intifada’). What was seen by most Israelis as an ungrateful betrayal by the Palestinians – who, so the predominant interpretation of events goes, answered Israel’s most gracious offer in the July 2000 Camp David summit with violence – was also taken to be proof of the falsity of Peres’s vision. As formulated by Avraham Burg, then chairman of the Knesset and a prominent member of Peres’s party and also an adamant supporter of the Oslo Accords, one year after this wave of violence had erupted: ‘It is a year now that we have all been bewildered. To the people of peace among us, who wanted so much to have a humane peace between us and the Palestinians, it has become apparent that there is no new Middle East’ (Knesset

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Protocol, 29 October 2001; see also Knesset Protocol, 30 October 2000; 27 March 2001; 20 November 2001). Nevertheless, the term had not ceased to be the embodiment of peace in contemporary Israeli political culture. Thus, as the slightest signs of a warming up of relations between Israel and the Arab countries were seen at the end of 2004, the term was almost instinctively brought up as a frame in which to judge these developments (see, for example, Yediot Aharonot, 15 December 2004; Haaretz, 6, 10 December 2004).

Conclusion: Between Myth and Utopia At this point, it would be valuable to return the distinction Sorel draws between myth and utopia. This distinction could suggest that ‘the Vision of the New Middle East’ should be analyzed and viewed not as a political myth but as a utopia. After all, this vision is an intellectual product meant to reform or ‘fix’ the existing order, not destroy it, while both presenting the framework of this reformed order and securing Peres’s place at the top of it. Moreover, as the study of the vision’s appearances in the Israeli public sphere suggests, it has been criticized, analyzed, and judged against political reality. Indeed, it has even been repeatedly dubbed ‘utopia’ by its opponents, who were aiming at the negative connotations the term is charged with. Politically, utopias have a limited capacity, since they lack the motive force of myth. Utopia’s aim is a rather mild one, compared to that of myth, hence its limited appeal to its adherents: it aims at amending the present in the name of bringing about a better future. Myth, on the other hand, should be judged only as a political agent that is directed at breaking down the existing order. Myth mobilizes; utopia encourages passive reflection of reality (Sorel, 1908/1999: 27–31; Tager, 1986).


These differences also apply to the possibility of analyzing and criticizing myth and utopia: A myth cannot be refuted since it is, at bottom, identical to the convictions of a group, being the expression of these convictions in the language of movement; and it is, in consequence, unanalysable into parts which could be placed on the plane of historical description. A utopia, on the other hand, can be discussed like any other social constitution; the spontaneous movements it presupposes can be compared with those actually observed in the course of history, and we can in this way evaluate their verisimilitude. (Sorel, 1908/1999: 29)

However, as students of Sorel’s work emphasize, Sorel himself, who in his theory presents a positive, reaffirming attitude toward myth while criticizing and negating utopia, in fact blurs this distinction between the terms, so as to make them synonymous in his historical analysis (Manuel & Manuel, 1979: 747–756; Ohana, 1991, 1993: 154). In this vein, and in the light of the case at hand, this analytic distinction should be used not as a tool to determine whether ‘the Vision of the New Middle East’ should be labeled a myth or utopia, but as a tool to analyze both is successes and its failures. As a ‘utopian’ vision (I am using the term here in its Sorelian understanding), the New Middle East should be seen as a highly successful intellectual construction of the possibilities inherent in peace. It is a fascinating attempt to put ‘peace’ into (future) political reality, based on a reformation of the existing geopolitical order. And it has been a successful attempt at that. ‘The New Middle East’ has become, for Israelis, an animation of peace, transforming an abstract notion of a reality different from that of war and conflict into a concrete narrative of future economic, political, social, and environmental change. As a ‘myth’, on the other hand, this vision has failed. It did not instigate the kind of political mobilization, and has not been

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successful in encouraging the kind of enduring, unconditional commitment and belief, that a (Sorelian) myth would. The belief in the peace-dominated future of a New Middle East has not, in the overall picture, superseded contemporary political reality of conflict and violence. It has not been capable of ‘mystifying’ political action through a belief in the inevitability of peace. It has not been used as a frame in which to create this future, but rather has been judged against the present reality of war. And in this it has failed. References Aminov, Eli, 1995. ‘“The New Middle East” and the Palestinian National Question’, News from Within, December: 15–16. Beilin, Yossi, 1999. Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Benbanishti, Meiron, 1996. ‘Simhat Aniyim’ [Poor Man’s Joy], Haaretz, 14 November. Freedman, Robert Owen, 1998. The Middle East and the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida. Friedman, Thomas L., 1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux. Gusfield, Joseph R. & Jerzy Michalowicz, 1984. ‘Secular Symbolism: Studies of Ritual, Ceremony, and Symbolic Order in Modern Life’, Annual Review of Sociology 10: 417–435. Hermann, Tamar & Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, 2002. ‘Divided yet United: Israeli-Jewish Attitudes Toward the Oslo Process’, Journal of Peace Research 39(5): 597–613. Hosking, Geoffrey & George Schopflin, eds, 1997. Myths and Nationhood. New York: Routledge. Klatch, Rebecca, 1988. ‘Of Meanings and Masters: Political Symbolism and Symbolic Action’, Polity 21(1): 137–154. Levi, Gideon, 1996. ‘Hapaamonim Hashotkim Shel Haav Huri’ [Father Huri’s Silent Bells], Haaretz, 3 May. Liebman, Charles S. & Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 1983. Civil Religion in Israel. Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

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Lipkin, David, 1993. ‘Barometer Letzipiyot Hamashkiim’ [An Indicator of the Investors’ Expectations], Maariv, 6 September. Makovsky, David, 1996. Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord. Boulder, CO: Westview. Manuel, Frank E. & Fritzie P. Manuel, 1979. Utopian Thought in the Western World. Oxford: Blackwell. Markus, Yoel, 1995. ‘Ya Gamaa, Lean Atem Ratzim?’ [Hey Guys, Where Are You Running To?], Haaretz, 5 September. Nakdimon, Shlomo, 1993. ‘Kach Katavti Im Shimon Peres Et Sifro Hehadah’ [That’s How I Wrote with Shimon Peres His New Book], Yediot Aharonot, 26 November. Ohana, David, 1991. ‘Georges Sorel and the Rise of the Political Myth’, History of European Ideas 13(4): 733–746. Ohana, David, 1993. The Order of the Nihilists (in Hebrew). Jerusalem: Bialik Institute. Peres Center for Peace, 2005. http://www. perez-center.org. Peres, Shimon, 1990. ‘Shalom Mizrah Tichoni’ [A Middle Eastern Peace], Yediot Aharonot, 20 July. Peres, Shimon, 1993a. ‘Bo’uo Nivneh Mizrah Tichon Hadash’ [Let’s Build a New Middle East], Haaretz, 9 July. Peres, Shimon, 1993b. Hamizrah Hatichon Hehadash: Misgeret Vetahalichim Leidan Hashalom [The New Middle East: A Framework and Processes Towards an Era of Peace]. Beney Brak: Steimatzki. Peres, Shimon, 1993c. ‘Lama Hehlatnu Lalechet Al Arafat’ [Why We Decided to Choose Arafat], Maariv, 26 November. Peres, Shimon, with Arye Naor, 1993d. The New Middle East. New York: Henry Holt. Peres, Shimon, 1996a. ‘Bekfitzat Haderech, Dayeno’ [The Quantum Leap Made Is Good Enough in Itself ], Haaretz, 3 April. Peres, Shimon, 1996b. ‘Shalom, Adoni Hamelech’ [Shalom (Hello), My Lord The King], Maariv, 13 September. Plotzker, Sever, 1993a. ‘Harevach Hagadol Shelanu: Hafsakat Matzav Hamilhama’ [Our Great Profit: The Ending of the War Situation], Yediot Aharonot, 30 August. Plotzker, Sever, 1993b. ‘Hashalom Hu Esek Metzuyan’ [Peace Is a Great Business], Yediot Aharonot, 3 September.

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jour nal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H Plotzker, Sever, 1993c. ‘Kulano Optimim’ [We Are All Optimistic], Yediot Aharonot, 12 September. Plotzker, Sever, 1993d. ‘Tikva Aza’ [A Strong Hope], Yediot Aharonot, 31 August. Poliker, Yehouda, 2001. ‘Eich Korim La’ahava Sheli’ [How Do You Call My Love]. NMC Music. Schopflin, George, 1997. ‘The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths’, in Hosking & Schopflin (19–36). Shalev, Hemi, 1994. ‘Sifro Shel Peres – Lahit Bedamesek’ [Peres’s Book – A Hit in Damascus], Maariv, 26 October. Shamir, Shimon, 1999. ‘Betikvah Shehakolot Hashfoyim Yenatzhu’ [Hoping That the Sane Voices Will Prevail], Haaretz, 14 October. Sivan, Imanuel, 1999. ‘Haaravin Einam Otam Aravim Shehayu Po Bethilat Hamea’ [The Arabs Are Not the Same Arabs Who Were Here at the Beginning of the Century], Haaretz, 29 September. Smith, Anthony, 1997. ‘The Golden Age and National Renewal’, in Hosking & Schopflin (36–59). Sorel, Georges, 1908/1999. Reflections on Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tager, Michael, 1986. ‘Myth and Politics in the

volume 43 / number 3 / may 2006 Works of Sorel and Barth’, Journal of the History of Ideas 47(4): 625–639. Tudor, Henry, 1972. Political Myth. London: Macmillan. Watson, Geoffrey R., 2000. The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreements. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Yadgar, Yaacov, 2003a. ‘Between “the Arab” and “the Religious Rightist”: “Significant Others” in the Construction of Jewish-Israeli National Identity’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 9(1): 52–74. Yadgar, Yaacov, 2003b. ‘From “True Peace” to “the Vision of the New Middle East”: Rival Images of Peace in Israel’, Journal of Peace Research 40(2): 177–193. Zerubavel, Yael, 1995. Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition. Chicago, IL & London: University of Chicago Press.

YAACOV YADGAR, b. 1971, PhD in Political Science (Bar-Ilan University, 1999); Senior Lecturer, Bar-Ilan University (2001– ). Most recent book: Our Story: National Narratives in the Israeli Press (Haifa University Press, 2004; in Hebrew).