a revival of the propositional theory of art?

British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 24, No 4, Autumn 1984

A REVIVAL OF THE PROPOSITIONAL THEORY OF ART? R. A. Goodrich this journal, L. A. Reid has in part attempted to undermine the basis of the propositional theory of art upheld by P. H. Hirst, who, though not the first to put forward such a theory, undoubtedly ranks among its most influential proponents within liberal education circles. Not for the first time, Reid's attack largely hinges upon the claim that our 'direct experience of art is cognitive'.1 Subsequently, he does concede that cognition has wider application than has propositional knowledge because it need not involve 'some sort of truth-claim or validity-claim, or at least some sort of objectivity'.2 However, Hirst's stated concern has far more to do with the nature of artistic knowledge than with our aesthetic experience of the arts as we shall shortly see. Bearing this in mind, this brief article, too, will critically investigate Hirst's thesis, but it will have to curtail any close examination of the kinds of knowledge Hirst considers before he opts for the propositional type as befitting the fine arts.3 Nor will it particularly focus upon Hirst's other epistemological claim, mentioned by Reid, that the fine arts constitute one of seven or eight logically distinct forms of knowledge since this contention might well be held independently of the propositional theory of art with which we are expressly concerned. Instead, by taking what at first glance should be a congenial test-case for Hirst, we shall direct our discussion around some instances of representational painting whilst confining ourselves to Hirst's highly influential 1973 paper where he explicitly entertains a revival of the propositional theory of art. Atfirstassertively, later more tentatively, Hirst argues that 'knowledge in art' derives from its 'physically observable features' which not only parallel 'the shape and sound of the words and sentences we use in making statements about the physical world', but are also 'used as symbols, have meaning, can be seen as making artistic statements and judged as true or false'.4 Indeed, given currently revised conceptions of symbols, meaning, language, and the like, the legitimacy of construing works of art in 'this propositional, statement, or know-that sense' cannot be 'ruled out of court'.5 Hence, Hirst urges, if we can countenance the claim that propositional knowledge alone applies 'in' the arts, then we should also accept the assertion that artistic sutements or propositions are irreducible to, or incommensurate with, non-artistic ones. According to Hirst, confusion here mainly arises when we inadvertently identify artistic statements with nonartistic ones as in the case of criticism 'about' the arts or when we are diverted by RECENTLY IN

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the fact that non-artistic knowledge is presupposed by, or is logically prior to, artistic knowledge. On removing these two potential sources of error, argues Hirst, we can then begin to examine how 'the objectivity ofjudgments of art'6 substantiates the propositional theory of art. Whether or not the foregoing is a tenable expression of the theory remains to be seen. After all, we could uphold the objectivity of judgements of colour without ever suggesting that they should substantiate the view that colours make statements. But more immediately pertinent to this paper is that behind much of the above lies the notion of proposition; one which Hirst eschews for that of statement since the latter 'emphasises the particularity' of works of art.7 So, without unduly impinging upon artistic meaning, a topic requiring separate treatment, we shall now investigate Hirst's conception of artistic propositions, the presence of which are said to support arguments for artistic knowledge. In fact, it is in this very realm that the propositional theory of art appears to gain much of its credence. That the arts contain propositions capable of being true or false, and thereby known or believed, -thought or asserted, is the basic premise of the propositional theory of art as conceived by Hirst. But what propositions themselves are is the subject of considerable dispute. The term covers two allied, yet independent, theses.8 On the one hand, propositions are said to serve as that object towards which mental acts are directed, that is, as the intentional object of an act of consciousness. We do not, for example, think, fear, or doubt in a vacuum, but think, fear, or doubt that something is or is not so. We may call the mental act signified by thinking, fearing, or doubting a 'propositional act', but the mental act itself is not what is meant by the term 'proposition'. Similarly, to think, to fear, or to doubt as verbs have been labelled 'propositional verbs', but again verbs are not what is meant by the term 'proposition'. Furthermore, to maintain the view that an artefact is the product of an act or a set of acts of consciousness on the part of its maker is to misconstrue intended objects for intentional ones. It would seem then that propositions as the intentional objects of our mental acts do not constitute the subject-matter of the propositional theory of art envisaged by Hirst. On the other hand, propositions are also said to function as the meaning of expressions by which our mental acts are formulated or articulated. Such expressions usually take the form of declarative sentences in a given language. Yet declarative sentences and propositions are not identical since what can be predicated of one cannot be predicated of the other. For example, the declarative sentence 'Inter arma silent leges' is in Latin, contains four words, and was drafted into this paragraph on Sunday afternoon, the 18th December, 1983. It also expresses the same proposition as does the English sentence 'In wars, laws are silent'; a proposition which may be regarded as true or false even before its demonstration or confirmation became possible, although it would not have then been known (as distinct from believed). On this basis, we can distinguish between a declarative sentence and a proposition in that the sentence acts as a vehicle or instrument of a proposition.9

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However, one obvious problem m this version of a one-to-one correspondence between instrument and proposition is that we would implicitly be maintaining that repeated instances of a declarative sentence ought to involve the same proposition. Yet, for Epsilon to remark a fortnight ago, 'Aujourd'hui, je suis tr&s fatigu6' and for Upsilon to comment five minutes ago, 'Aujourd'hui, je suis tres fatigue' provides us with two propositions, not one, since separate speakers, contexts, and times are involved. Furthermore, consider the situation where two sentences in a given language mean the same thing, for instance, 'Epsilon is slower than Upsilon' and 'Upsilon is faster than Epsilon'. Were we now to argue that different declarative sentences necessarily involve different propositions, this case leaves us with the untenable consequence of postulating two propositions. If we were to revert to making propositions dependent upon thejudgement of the speaker and thus avoid any linguistic dependence, we face similar difficulties. A mental or psychological act of judgement lacks the temporal neutrality characteristic of propositions.10 As a result of the foregoing, declarative sentences m a particular language are by no means the necessary instrument of propositions. Epsilon, for example, may have a longstanding, but tacit, arrangement with Upsilon that clearing his throat twice indicates the time to make a cup of tea. Clearing one's throat twice in this domestic context acts as a vehicle for the proposition that it is time to make a cup of tea. Admittedly, this irrangcment requires a linguistic background so that clearing one's throat twice ultimately stands for a verbal proposition. None the less, it is perhaps from the realization that we are able to have non-linguistic (and non-psychological) instruments of propositions that the propositional theory of art can take root, especially in such fields as painting. Ascribing propositions to the linguistically-based arts—poetry and prose fiction, drama and opera—has a superficial plausibility. However, a far more exacting test of the propositional theory resides with such non-linguistic art forms as painting, music, and sculpture. A supporter of Hirst's thesis must demonstrate what m these arts fulfils the function of being a proposition or a vehicle of propositions. As we saw with Hirst, arguments for the propositional theory not infrequently presume that painting, in the words of Morris Weitz, 'can make certain truth claims mainly through its constituents'.11 In fact, Weitz himself proceeds to give us a brief exposition of several paradigm cases. These include the work of Meindert Hobbema, possibly his Middelhamis Avenue (c. 1689), where 'there is being asserted that nature is the conflict between the old and the new'.12 This, in turn, may be validated by way of'the subject and its traditional transparently symbolic associations that embody the truth claim', or, more specifically, by way of 'the representation of old decaying trees being contrasted with the representation of young, powerful-looking, new trees'.13 Again, taking another work, approvingly mentioned in passing by Hirst, Weitz writes of Pablo Picasso's Guernica (1937):


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One need only look at the painting to sec that the artist is not wondering about the character of Fascism, or denying it, or wishing it, or supposing it, but asserting it. The whole force of the painting leaves no doubt about the assertional character of the proposition, 'That Fascism means the brutal destruction of everything'.1*

If it be thought that Weitz's comments are merely characteristic of a defunct theory, then we may equally cite a recent review of a Turner exhibition by Lawrence Gowing who emphasizes how painting represents our experience of things: It is enough to notice that, in the presence of oil paint solidly trowelled in the likeness of rock and snow or brushed obliquely and wetly down with the storm, we are moved to belief. The intrinsic reality of the paint is so unmistakeable that we have to credit the actuality and the human consequence of what is happening—in the studio and on the mountain.15

Beneath its superficial variants, and using what is commonly agreed to be a representational painting—J. M. W. Turner's Peace—Burial at Sea (1842)—the argument for the prepositional theory of art assumes the following format:16 (i) Knowledge of what a painting states initially depends upon what it portrays, that is, upon what it physically or nominally resembles given that it has no notably incompatible characteristics with the subject portrayed (here, the funeral ceremony at sea of the artist, David Wilkes). (ii) The characteristics attributed to the subject portrayed can then be observed by how that subject is depicted, that is, by what aspects contained by the painting are more similar to the visual appearances of the material or formal class within which the subject falls than to any other class (here, a maritime burial), (iii) Portrayal and depiction allow us to assess the 'veracity' of the representation which acts as the vehicle of the painting's artistic propositions. What propositions are we meant to know in Turner's painting: that death is a sombre occasion, or that death is an illumination of darkness, or that death is a distancing of emotions? By what convention or stipulation does Turner's representation convey one particular proposition and no other? If no such convention or stipulation exist, how could we know that any proposition is being articulated in thefirstplace? Indeed, how could we even begin to settle which, if any, of the three suggested propositions was being asserted by the painting? To resolve the above doubts,17 the supporter of Hirst might muster three major counter-arguments. First, conventions do exist in that Turner explicitly explored Goethe's theory of colour based upon a cycle of positive and negative colours. The negative, ranging from blues to purples, were associated with qualities of negation, darkness, weakness, coldness, distance, and attraction; the positive, including reds and yellows, were associated with action, light, brightness, force, warmth, proximity, and repulsion. Turner has exploited both colour schemes in Peace—Burial at Sea, counter-balanced by white and


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black. Secondly, in addition to the title, Turner appended two lines from his fragmentary poem, 'Fallacies of Hope': The midnight torch gleam o'er the steamer's side And Merit's corse was yielded to the ode. If the second line does not prove to be a candidate for the artistic proposition of the work, still a third consideration may be canvassed. On Hirst's reckoning, neither the first nor the third of the suggested propositions is uniquely artistic; they couldjust as easily be expressed by a psychological treatise. We are thus left with the second proposition as the most likely candidate; a proposition rinding figurative expression in the verse cited. Yet none of this decisively concludes the debate as the counter-arguments on Hirst's behalf are themselves vulnerable to serious objections. First of all, as the appended verse expresses the proposition that 'Merit's corse was yielded to the tide'—figuratively suggesting the proposition that death is an illumination of darkness—and as the painting depicts the verse, then it may seem that the painting suggests a proposition. However, on this very view, the painting acts as an illustration of the verse in the sense that it only indicates a proposition by virtue of that already suggested by the verse. Or, to use a more popular example nowadays, political cartoons in the press represent their authors' points of view by acting as illustrations of accompanying texts or reports. Secondly, were the supporter of Hirst to concede this relatively substantial modification of the propositional theory, he might adopt the tactic of arguing that paintings can be considered as implied propositions. But this concession invites a barrage of questions.18 Does a painting only contain a proposition within itself by the means just outlined? What kind of implication is meant here? If it is not logically implied, then how is the implied proposition implied? Can the uniqueness of artistic propositions, given such a concession, be maintained by Hirst without completely distorting the term 'unique'? Our reservations about the propositional theory of art do not end here. After all, the theory has not dealt with representational painting that lacks the obvious accompaniment of an appended or titular proposition, let alone the conventions of an explicit theory of colour. For example, in an untitled yet acknowledged masterpiece by Giorgione, popularly known as the Tempcsta (c. 1506), we can basically discern what has been depiaed. As a near contemporary, Marcantonio Michiel, recorded, it consists of a 'landscape with the tempest' as well as architectural fragments in the background and a 'gypsy and soldier', if not simply a shepherd and a virtually naked woman and child, near the edges of the foreground. But how the various foreground and background facets relate has proved enduringly elusive. Interpretations of the connection involved vary from seeking a mythological rationale to an allegorical one, from postulating the portrayal to be a pastoral idyll to a dream sequence. Ironically, these critical interpretations, replete as they are with difficulties or ambiguities, may well presume the presence of an artistic proposition; they do not, however, necess-


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arily prove its existence 'in' the painting. We shall briefly return to this point a little later once we have examined a crucial connection underlying the argument for the propositional theory of art. One part of the difficulty facing the propositional theory with respect to representational painting is that its central appeal to the concept of representation, itself by no meansfixedin application,19 usually involves the assimilation of an incompatible conception of resemblance. It is rather questionable whether an account of representation in the propositional theory's terms of resemblance or similarity of appearances can adequately explain the relationship between a given painting and its subject. Indeed, the notion of resemblance or similarity does not provide the necessary and sufficient condition for that of representation. Not only will a given object resemble itself to the ultimate degree by definition, but it will also possess some degree of symmetry with another object .said to resemble it. Representation, by contrast, is neither reflexive nor symmetrical in its relations. WhilstJan van Eyck's Virgin ofAutun (c. 1434) contains a representation of Chancellor Rolin, the Chancellor himself does not represent the painting. Nor for that matter would a portrait undertaken before the lifetime of Rolin, however many features resembling Rohn found in it, be reckoned a representation of Rolin. In a stricter degree, therefore, the only thing to which a given painting has or shares any similarity of appearance is another painting, and this, as already mentioned, does not even provide us with the criterion for conventions of more or less realistic representation. This stricter degree of resemblance or similarity is not what is normally represented by a painting. Now, if it be objected that there arejust as many points of similarity between a painting and its lasar holograph, then we can still point out physical or material attributes that are lacking in the holograph yet are present in another painting. For instance, can the holograph be framed or hung, restored or varnished? Certainly, holographs and photographs of the island of La Grande Jatte, for example, may convey a greater degree of similarity or resemblance to that island than do any of the twenty-three drawings and thirty-eight paintings methodically executed by Georges Seurat, but the problem for followers of Hirst is to explain how a painting (or a drawing) as a physical object represents states of mind and propositional truths when, in the stricter degree and without the guidance of extra-pictorial propositions, paintings resemble paintings. Although the propositional theory of art need not exclusively rely upon the stricter degree of resemblance between a painting and its subject, perhaps we can none the less locate two or three sources of the erroneous conceptual assimilation of representation and resemblance underlying the theory. First, we do employ expressions pointing towards a looser degree of resemblance, such as 'x2 is a better likeness of y than is xt', where x, and x2 are two paintings, say, Goya's Naked Maja and Clothed Maja (c. 1804) respectively. Here, resemblance or similarity performs a normative task. However, what has been ignored is that this task operates within a context where representation has already been


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presupposed. Next, we also speak of'x being similar to y' where x is a painting said to represent y, its subject. But 'being similar' in the looser sense frequently camouflages a shift between two distinct uses. We may unwittingly slide from similarity in terms of qualities ('the pale blue of x is similar to the pale blue of y') to similarity in terms of objects ('x, which is pale blue, is similar to y, which is pale blue'). With the first case, we are focusing upon the degree of similarity of the pale blues as distinct from an identity of quality; in the second case, x and y are identical with respect to being pale blue, but only similar, not identical, with regard to other qualities. Resemblance or similarity, in other words, varies with shifts in our attention; it is not something immutably fixed irrespective of our concerns. Finally, were we to extend the number of objects said to be similar, then we could find that they may be similar without having any specific quality in common as in the case of the dozens of paintings representing the reclining female nude. Representations of the reclining nude by, say, Giorgione, Correggio, Titian, Rubens, Rembrandt, and Velazquez, or, more recently, Ingres, Delacroix, Manet, Gauguin, and Matisse, do not merely resemble each other in being such representations, but also differ in the way in which they are representations. In other words, common qualities cannot be sweepingly equated with similarity or resemblance as has been presumed by the propositional theory of art.20 Another, more crucial part of the problem facing Hirst is that an alternative exists to the propositional theory of art; one he does little to refute. For some (including the present writer),21 this alternative appears to offer us greater clarity, intelligibility, and simplicity whilst covering the same facts. Instead of arguing that, say, Turner's Peace—Burial at Sea states or conveys the proposition that death is an illumination of darkness, we may say that it represents or depicts death as an illumination of darkness. That is to say, Turner represents the subject portrayed as having certain characteristics without necessarily making his painting constitute the vehicle of some proposition claimed to be true or false. We, as viewers of the painting, might formulate a statement about whether or not the painting corresponds to our understanding of death; this statement 'about' the work being classifiable as true or false. In effect, such an alternative avoids the problem of artistic propositions 'in' the work, or, at least, regards them as an elliptical, if not misattributed, expression of critical propositions. Followers of Hirst may interject at this juncture to remind us that the distinction between representing something as something else and stating something seems more apparent than real. Representation, in effect, is propositional: just as we can state truths and falsehoods, so, too, can we represent truths and falsehoods. Moreover, what is stated is distinct and independent from the occasion of stating it, just as what is represented is similarly separate from the means of representing it. Yet there are at least two considerations opposing this contention made in support of Hirst. Firstly, the phenomenon of representation constitutes one of the, if not the most, dominant practices or procedures within


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painting. That is, to revert to an argument first raised by G. E. M. Anscombe,22 we are dealing with the 'institutional' fact of representation; a fact presupposing the observance of more or less fixed or fluid procedures constitutive of artistic practice. By contrast, the phenomenon of stating is a 'brute' fact. It is no more constitutive of arts than it is of sports since it does not presuppose specific practices or institutions outside the medium of language and thereby cannot entail 'institutional' facts. To clarify this distinction, consider the following example. When we undertake to play a game, we commit ourselves to a greater or lesser extent to the observance of certain rules and regulations, codes and canons constitutive of the 'institution' of that game. Explanations of the above may be invoked especially when resolving infringements or doubts or ignorance: Epsilon: Why did he knee the bag past the stick? Upsilon: Because his team needs to score as many goals as possible in order to win the match and have a chance of playing next round. 'Team . . . score . . . goals . . . win . . . match . . . playing . . . round' are all institutionally loaded terms replete with references beyond the brute facts ascertained by Epsilon. Or, to change examples, only when given the institution of money can the act of exchanging pieces of paper and metallic discs constitute the fact that afinancialtransaction of some value has taken place. In effect, representing something as something else and stating something do not belong to the same order of facts or phenomena. Secondly, distinguishing what is stated or represented from the act of stating or representing it is, of course, a more subtle means of re-introducing the argument for propositions than those surveyed previously in this article. But more germane to the present issue is the matter of whether or not stating something operates in the manner of representing something as something else. We would argue that 'stating' conforms to the logic of such propositional verbs as 'believing' and 'judging', 'thinking' and 'wishing' whereas 'representing as' aligns itself with what might be termed cognitive verbs such as 'seeing', 'knowing', and 'hearing'. The distinction is quite marked. For example, whilst it is tautologous to say 'If Turner represents death as an illumination, then it is true that death is represented as an illumination', it is not tautologous to say 'If Turner states that death is an illumination, then it is true to state that death is an illumination'.23 Conversely, it would be contradictory to say 'If Turner represented death as an illumination, then it is false that death is represented as an illumination' whereas it would not be contradictory to say 'If Turner states that death is an illumination, then it is false to state that death is an illumination'. Furthermore, to state something erroneously or mistakenly is still to state something. But to claim to represent something as something else and subsequently to find we were mistaken allows us to withdraw our claim. On


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discovering that the purported object does not answer an act of representation, we can resort to concessions of the type 'Turner only thought he was representing death as an illumination' or 'It seemed to Turner at the time that he was representing death as an illumination'. There is no equivalent concession in the case of statements: stating erroneously is still stating and not simply thinking we are stating, let alone seeming to state. None the less, a supporter of Hirst might attempt to counter the foregoing by asking how somebody can state what is not the case given that whatever we state must be factual. However, this objection confuses the difference between 'Epsilon stated a fact' and 'Epsilon stated something as a fact' or 'Epsilon made a factual statement'. With either of the last two utterances, we are merely indicating the particular use Epsilon made of his statement or the function his statement intended to fulfil; with thefirstutterance, we are overtly acknowledging that his statement succeeded in fulfilling that function. By ignoring this distinction, we would become needlessly puzzled by critical statements of the type, 'Manet's traditionally influenced Olympia, when first exhibited in 1865, was derisively stated to be a total subversion of traditional influence'. By labelling the work as 'traditionally influenced', the critic is identifying its intended function without necessarily implying that it proved successful in achieving that function. Similarly, when saying that Epsilon stated something as a fact, we are identifying an intended function of his utterance, but not necessarily reporting that he actually or successfully stated a fact. So, on the basis of our counter-arguments outlined above, we can conclude that stating something, despite some apparent connections, does not provide us with a complete account of representing something as something else. Perhaps one further observation should be made before concluding this paper. Even if propositions can be said to be 'in' the arts, Hirst never countenances the possibility that they may be unasserted.24 Instances of unasserted propositions include 'Suppose that death were an illumination . . .', 'If death were an illumination of darkness . . .', or 'It is possible that death is an illumination of darkness'. That is to say, we can envisage situations in which propositions are entertained as a possibility or supposition without believing or asserting them, although their specific utterance is required if they are ever to find expression. In this respect, Hirst conspicuously omits any reference to the role of imagination in the arts which, as R. V. Scruton argues, 'involves thought which is unasserted, and hence which goes beyond what is believed' since 'one is engaging in speculation, and. . . not typically aiming at a definite assertion as to how things are'.25 Admittedly, in the light of his article, imagination might nevertheless have been construed by Hirst as a source of knowledge because of its use in the hypothesizing or propositional sense ('seeing that'). But it has another application pertinent to the arts in the realm of aspect perception ('seeing as'). Here, it is not a form of resemblance or similarity since, first, aspect perception and resemblance come under the different categories of activity and


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state respectively, and, secondly, resemblance, unlike aspect perception, implies some degree of symmetry as previously noted, that is, if x resembles y, then y resembles x. In sum, the inability of Hirst's proposed propositional theory of art to account for imagination can hardly be reckoned a strength. We began our examination of Hirst once he had already assigned propositional knowledge to the arts; his arguments for so choosing being beyond the confines of this paper. Consequently, the problem at hand immediately transformed itself into one about the nature of how such knowledge was to be conveyed. In other words, Hirst's initial claim that the 'physically observable features' of an artefact 'can be seen as making artistic statements' (capable of being assessed for their truth or falsity and thus being known)26 became the point at issue under the traditional heading of the propositional theory of art. This brief paper has been concerned to develop both arguments and test-cases for and against this theory since, in his seminal article of 1973, Hirst himself seemed content merely to summarize 'with some slight defence'27 his attitude towards it. Using representational painting as a seemingly untroublesomc testcase for Hirst's thesis, we probed a network of conceptual problems mainly involving the nature of (artistic) propositions, resemblance, and representation. To begin to revive the propositional theory of art, Hirst needs not only to provide us with logically effective reasons for dismissing any alternatives to it, but also to counter some significant difficulties and lacunae within it.28 1

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REFERENCES 'Art. Knowledge-That and Knowing This', and Statements' in Paul Edwards (ed ), The The British Journal of Aesthetics 20 (1980), p. Encyclopedia of Philosophy VI (New York, 329. (Earlier examples of this line of attack 1967), pp. 494-505 and D M. Armstrong, include. Meaning in the Arts (London, 1969), Belief, Truth and Knowledge (London, 1973), pp. 211-19 and 'Knowledge, Aesthetic pp. 38-49 Insight and Education', Proceedings of the Phil' On this distinction in an aesthetic context, see osophy of Education Society of Great Britain 7 c.g John Hospers, Meaning and Truth in the (1973). PP- 66 flf.) Arts (Chapel Hill, 1946), p 158 and M. C Ibid , p. 337. Beardsley, Aesthetics (New York, 1958), p. Our more serious reservations about Hirst's 369 (Beardsley expressing serious reservahandling of epistemological concepts are aons on p 372). detailed in 'Artistic Knowledge, Meaning, 10 Whether or not we are finally led to deny the and Truth in Educational Theory', M Ed. theory of propositions as the meaning of diss (University of Melbourne, 1983), pp. declarative sentences is an issue facing Hirst's 68—82. account of artistic meaning; a concept rang'Literature and the fine arts as a unique form ing beyond the topic of this paper According of knowledge' (1973) in Knowledge and the to Gale, op. at., pp. 502-4, at least two curriculum (London, 1974), p. 152. alternatives appear to face us: either proposiIbid., p 164. aons are redundant and consequently To quote Hirst's somewhat ambiguous forunnecessary or meaning is not a relationship mulaoon, ibid , p 163. between a vehicle and an object Ibid , p 153. •• Philosophy of the Arts (Cambridge, Mass., For two recent critical surveys, see R M. 1950), p. 149 Gale, 'Propositions, Judgments, Sentences, 12 Ibid., p. IJO.


A REVIVAL OF THE PROPOSITIONAL THEORY OF ART? 13 Ibid. Ibid., pp. 150-1 15 'Turner and literature', The Times Literary Supplement, no. 4084 (iojuly 1981), p. 783. 16 See e g Beardsley, op. at , p. 374. Beardsley offers a tentative distinction between 'depiction' and 'portrayal' on pp. 270-8 17 Given voice in a different context by Hospers, op. at., p. 160. 18 Seee g Hospers, op at., p. 161 " For a range of applications of the term and its cognates, see e.g. Hospers, op. at., pp 40 ff and R. A Wollheim, Art and Its Objects (New York, 1968), pp. 11 ff 20 For this and other problems assoaated with notions o f resemblance or similarity, s e e j . L. Austin, 'The Meaning o f a Word' (1940) in Philosophical Papers, ed J O. Urmson & G J W a m o c k (and ed., London,-1970), pp 7 1 - 4 . 21 E . g , Beardsley, op. a t , pp. 375-6 and W o l l heim, op. a t , pp 15 ff. 22 ' O n Brute Facts', Analysis 18 (1958), pp 6 9 72. See also J R. Searle, Speech Acts ( C a m bridge, 1969), pp 50-3 w h o adds the notion

o f 'constitutive rules' to the distinction, and R. V . Scruton, Art and Imagination (London, 1974), pp 34 ff. on the comparable distinction between non-aesthetic ('first order") and aesthetic ('emergent') features o f an artefact. W e are, o f course, not using the terms 'representing' and 'staring' in their legally based sense.

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Here, 'Turner' can be used metonymically for both the artist and his painting. This and the following paragraph draw upon arguments deployed by Gale, o p . a t , pp. 499 and 503. See Scruton, op a t . , pp 8 7 - 9 and, in a literary context, Hospers, o p a t . , p 157 and Beardsley, o p . a t , pp 420-3 S a n t o n , o p a t , pp 97 and 98. Hirst, o p a t . , p. 152. Ibid., p 163. Special thanks are due to Mr W G. S Smith and D r R. M . Foster o f the Faculty of Education, University o f Melbourne, for their helpful comments o n an earlier draft o f this paper
