Administration Review of Public Personnel

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From Postal to Peaceful: Dispute Systems Design in the USPS REDRESS® Program Tina Nabatchi and Lisa Blomgren Bingham Review of Public Personnel Administration 2010 30: 211 DOI: 10.1177/0734371X09360187 The online version of this article can be found at: http://rop.sagepub.com/content/30/2/211

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From Postal to Peaceful: Dispute Systems Design in the USPS REDRESS Program

Review of Public Personnel Administration 30(2) 211–234 © 2010 SAGE Publications Reprints and permission: http://www. sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0734371X09360187 http://roppa.sagepub.com

Tina Nabatchi1 and Lisa Blomgren Bingham2

Abstract This article explores the concept of dispute systems design for workplace disputes, focusing particularly on the first two stages: organizational diagnosis and design. It argues that dispute systems should be designed in light of the conflict-related motivations and behaviors of personnel under existing conditions, as well as the likely consequences of each design choice on their future motivations and behaviors, including incentives to participate in the new system.These assertions are illustrated with an in-depth case study of Resolve Employment Disputes, Reach Equitable Solutions Swiftly (REDRESS), the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) employment mediation program. The case study shows that the organizational diagnosis stage was critical to the successful design of the USPS program in that it provided important information about the dispute behaviors of personnel in the existing system. In turn, this information helped the USPS understand how various design choices would affect individual incentives to participate the future REDRESS system. Keywords dispute systems design, workplace mediation, organizational conflict, employment disputes

Introduction Dispute systems design (DSD) refers to the strategic arrangement of dispute resolution processes within an organization (Costantino & Merchant, 1996). DSD has become an 1

Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

2

Corresponding Author: Tina Nabatchi, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 400 F Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244, USA Email: [email protected]

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increasingly important element of organizational activities, particularly in regard to the management of workplace conflict. This article explores DSD for workplace disputes and focuses primarily on the organizational diagnosis and design stages. It argues that an effective dispute system requires the organization to understand the conflict-related motivations and behaviors of personnel under existing conditions, as well as the likely consequences of each design choice on their futures motivations and behaviors, including incentives to participate in the new system. Moreover, the article asserts that it is especially important for the organization to design the system with the goals of enhancing reciprocity, cooperation, and self-determination and increasing perceptions of organizational justice. These assertions are illustrated with an in-depth case study of Resolve Employment Disputes, Reach Equitable Solutions Swiftly (REDRESS), the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) employment mediation program. The case study shows that the organizational diagnosis stage was critical to the success of the USPS program in that it provided important information about the dispute strategies of personnel in the existing system, which in turn shed light on how various design choices would affect individual incentives and behaviors in REDRESS. To that end, this article first explores DSD and uses public choice theory to give insights about the need for organizational dispute systems, as well as the need for those systems to promote reciprocity and cooperation among participants. The article then discusses the four stages of DSD, paying particular attention to the organizational diagnosis and design stages and their relationships to perceptions of organizational justice and self-determination. The article concludes with an in-depth case study of the USPS REDRESS program.

Dispute Systems Design Dispute systems are the composition, arrangement, and structure of dispute resolution procedures and processes in organizations (Bingham & Nabatchi, 2003). All organizations have dispute systems (by design or not); however, those dispute systems are not always effective at minimizing the various dysfunctional conflicts experienced by organizations. Dispute systems design refers to the deliberate managerial effort to identify and improve the way an organization addresses conflict by decisively and strategically arranging its dispute resolution processes (Costantino & Merchant, 1996). The ideas of DSD have grown in popularity as organizations have recognized their potential to produce satisfactory dispute outcomes in a timely, efficient, and cost-sensitive manner (Bingham, Hallberlin, Walker, & Chung, 2009; Lipsky, Seeber, & Fincher, 2003). Today, DSD efforts are seen in a host of organizations in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to address the myriad disputes organizations face both within and outside their walls. DSD has become especially prominent for workplace disputes, perhaps because these disputes are largely internal matters among organizational members (Nabatchi, 2007) and as such may be the most visible disputes in organizations. Concern about organizational DSD, and particularly DSDs for workplace disputes, is rooted in research that identifies three primary methods of conflict resolution: power,


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rights, and interests (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988). Power is the ability to impose an outcome or decision on others; power-based approaches to workplace conflicts include strikes, lockouts, and work relocation. Rights are fixed rules or principles based on law, contracts, or collective bargaining agreements; examples of rights-based approaches to workplace conflict include adjudication and alternative dispute resolution (ADR)1 processes such as arbitration and early neutral evaluation. Interests are the needs, concerns, and desires of an individual or group; examples of interest-based approaches to workplace conflict include principled negotiation and a wide variety of ADR processes such as facilitation and mediation. In general, interest-based approaches are cheaper and more effective than rights-based approaches, which are cheaper and more effective than power-based approaches (Costantino & Merchant, 1996; Ury et al., 1988). For this reason, most effective dispute systems have at least one ADR process option, with mediation generally being the preferred choice (Jameson, 1999). Before discussing the specific elements of DSD, it is useful to examine the public choice literature in political science, as it provides insights about the need for organizational dispute systems, as well as the need for those systems to promote cooperative strategies among participants. Public choice scholars identify two primary obstacles to the negotiation of solutions to organizational conflicts: transaction costs, which include the costs of measuring and enforcing agreements, and the creation of incomplete contracts, that is, contracts that do not specify all contingencies (Miller, 1992). These obstacles can reinforce each other in a circular causal process: The transaction costs of bargaining to an efficient solution increase as the number of people involved in a dispute increases and as the number of contingencies or unforeseen issues that need to be negotiated increase. High transaction costs, multiple contingencies, and unforeseen issues result in the creation of incomplete contracts. In turn, incomplete contracts increase the number of people involved in the dispute, which increases the number of contingencies and unforeseen issues that need to be negotiated. These problems, at least from a public choice perspective, give birth to the special role of hierarchy in organizations and the creation of a “boss” who has the authority to make unilateral regulations (Miller, 1992). Typically, however, hierarchies involve large numbers of organizational actors, which increases transaction costs and the likelihood of incomplete contracts. Moreover, hierarchies tend to use power and rightsbased approaches to address organizational conflicts. A second solution, though not necessarily a hierarchical one, is the design of a dispute system that favors interestbased ADR processes. Such dispute systems may lessen the transaction costs of bargaining by reducing the number of organizational actors involved in a specific dispute. Moreover, they can enable more efficient bargaining about contingencies that may affect only one or a few of the organizational actors. Regardless of the choice of hierarchy, dispute system, or some other mechanism, public choice scholars readily recognize a problem: No incentive or control system can simultaneously regulate the self-interested behavior of both superiors and subordinates. “For every incentive system that has other desirable characteristics, there will always be an incentive for some individuals to ‘shirk’—to pursue a narrower definition


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of interest that results in equilibrium outcomes that all organizational members recognize as deficient” (Miller, 1992, p. 3). This shirking behavior often promotes and/or exacerbates organizational conflicts and can establish more barriers to their resolution. Among the suggested strategies for overcoming the shirking problem is fostering cooperative behavior among participants. However, according to public choice theory, people do not have a dominant strategy to cooperate. Cooperation is rational only when each person is confident that the other people involved are also cooperating. Moreover, cooperation is most likely to occur in a long-term relationship; in short-term relationships, the long-run gains from mutual cooperation do not balance the short-run incentives to cheat (Miller, 1992). Given that workplace relationships are long term, and that cooperation is a maintainable outcome only over time, public choice scholars suggest that organizations try to “lengthen the shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984). The idea is that efforts to promote longer term participation give employees the incentive to invest in the enforcement and maintenance of organizational norms. This has important implications for DSD. Better dispute systems foster and reinforce norms of reciprocity, which aids in creating shared confidence and trust among disputants, and increases the prospects for cooperation. The extent to which dispute systems achieve reciprocity, confidence, trust, and cooperation determines, in part, the likelihood of reaching satisfying and sustainable solutions to conflicts. Moreover, the better the dispute system is at resolving conflicts in terms of satisfaction and sustainability, the greater the likelihood of employee retention and the possibilities for future cooperation, as opposed to more conflict (Costantino & Merchant, 1996). Although seldom articulated in these terms, DSD scholars recognize the implicit problems of shirking and fostering reciprocity and cooperation among disputants. To assist in overcoming these issues, scholars and practitioners advise organizations to design dispute systems that use interest-based processes as the primary mechanisms of dispute resolution (Costantino & Merchant, 1996; Ury et al., 1988). A significant volume of research shows that interest-based approaches produce more cost-effective, satisfying, long-term, and sustainable solutions to ongoing or recurring problems, particularly when those problems occur within the context of a continuing relationship— such as those in an employment setting (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). Following this logic, scholars and practitioners recommend six general principles of dispute systems design (Costantino & Merchant, 1996): 1. Put the focus on interests (encourage the use of interest-based methods such as negotiation and mediation). 2. Provide low-cost rights and power backups (if interest-based procedures fail to resolve the dispute). 3. Provide “loop-backs” to negotiation (build in procedures that allow parties to return to interest-based procedures). 4. Build in consultation before and after feedback (notify and consult with stakeholders before taking actions and obtain postdispute feedback to help prevent similar disputes in the future).



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5. Arrange procedures in a low- to high-cost sequence (e.g., begin with negotiation, then move to mediation, and finally to arbitration if necessary). 6. Provide the necessary motivation, skills, and resources (ensure that people have the knowledge and ability to use the system effectively). Systems that follow these general design principles are thought to be more likely to produce positive dispute outcomes and improve the organization’s overall capacity for effective conflict management. The actual process of dispute systems design happens in four stages: (a) organizational diagnosis, (b) system design, (c) implementation, and (d) exit, evaluation, and diffusion (Costantino & Merchant, 1996). Although each of these stages is important, the organizational diagnosis and system design stages are critical. An effective system cannot be created unless designers understand the conflict-related motivations and behaviors of personnel under current conditions, as well as the likely consequences of each design choice on their futures motivations and behaviors, including incentives to participate in the new system. Before illustrating this claim with the case study of the USPS REDRESS program, the first two steps of DSD, organizational diagnosis and system design, are explained in greater detail.

Organizational Diagnosis Organizational diagnosis involves an audit of the organization and its disputes. To determine the best design for resolving organizational conflicts, the organization’s structure and culture, as well as the nature of the disputes it currently faces and is expected to face in the future, must be analyzed and understood (Stitt, 1998). If a dispute system runs contrary to the organization, or is not designed to deal properly with organizational disputes, then the likelihood of effective implementation and use decreases. Therefore, the goal of organizational diagnosis is to broadly understand the current state of organizational disputes and to develop a detailed picture of the disputes that create the most organizational stress (Costantino & Merchant, 1996). Smith and Martinez (2009) provide an analytic framework that looks at the goals, processes, structure, stakeholders, resources, success, and accountability of the dispute system. Diagnosis generally begins with a macrofocus, where the goal is to look holistically at the organization. As public choice theory indicates, it is particularly useful to look at power-related issues of hierarchy, autonomy, decision making, and communication, as these are often sources of organizational conflict and/or determine individual and organizational responses to conflict and conflict resolution processes. Likewise, it is important to assess the nature of the organizational conflicts, including the frequency and numbers of disputes and their content, relational, and situational dimensions (Jameson, 1999). For example, it is important to know whether the disputes involve factual, technical, legal, procedural, or interpersonal issues. Information about the disputants is also needed, including who they are, how many there are, and the nature of their relationships. These issues should be examined within the context of disputants’ beliefs and


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expectations about organizational roles, rewards, and structures. Finally, it is important to know the impact of the conflicts on the organization, how disputes are traditionally handled, and what conflict resolution options are available. A proper understanding of these organizational attributes will allow for the design of a dispute system that is congruent with and tailored to the specific needs of the organization and its stakeholders (Costantino & Merchant, 1996). During organizational diagnosis, designers must pay close attention to the behaviors of individuals within the current system. Such understanding can reduce the complexities in understanding the current situation and reveal the incentives that encourage or discourage individual participation. For example, it helps explore elements of the organizational structure and culture that contribute (both positively and negatively) to the behavior of employees. In addition, it is useful to understand the motivations behind individual efforts to address disputes, why employees have these motivations, and how these motivations affect conflict-related behavior. This knowledge becomes particularly useful in the next stage, system design, where it allows designers to think about how particular design choices may affect participant and attendant dispute outcomes.

System Design The system design stage involves following the six general principles of DSD while making decisions about several important components. Bingham (2008, pp. 12-14) identifies 15 “distinct structural variables and/or choices that make up a DSD,” including the following: 1. The sector or setting for the program (public, private, or nonprofit) 2. The overall dispute system design (integrated conflict management system, silo or stovepipe program, ombuds program, outside contractor) 3. The subject matter of the conflicts, disputes, or cases over which the system has jurisdiction 4. The participants eligible or required to use the system 5. The timing of the intervention (before the complaint is filed, immediately thereafter, after discovery or information gathering is complete, and on the eve of an administrative hearing or trial) 6. Whether the intervention is voluntary, opt out, or mandatory 7. The nature of the intervention (training, facilitation, consensus building, negotiated rulemaking, mediation, early neutral assessment or evaluation, summary jury trial, nonbinding arbitration, binding arbitration) and its possible outcomes 8. The sequence of interventions, if more than one 9. Within intervention, the model of practice (if mediation, evaluative, facilitative, or transformative; if arbitration, rights or interests, last-best offer, issueby-issue or package, high-low, etc.) 10. The nature, training, qualifications, and demographics of the neutrals



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11. Who pays for the neutrals and the nature of their financial or professional incentive structure 12. Who pays for the costs of administration, filing fees, hearing fees, hearing space 13. The nature of any due process protections (right to counsel, discovery, location of process, availability of class actions, availability of written opinion or decision) 14. Structural support and institutionalization with respect to conflict management programs or efforts to implement 15. Level of self-determination or control that disputants have as to process, outcome, and dispute system design Decisions about these elements should be guided by the information gathered in the organizational diagnosis stage. For example, an organization with a flat structure, a cooperative culture, and disputes that center on factual or technical matters may likely want or need a system different than that of an organization with a hierarchical structure, a competitive culture, and disputes about interpersonal or relational issues. The question dispute systems designers in every organization will face is, “What design components will produce the system with the best dispute outcomes given the current environment?” Although settling disputes may be the penultimate goal for DSDs, designers may also wish to explore other potential outcomes, such as satisfaction with the resolution, the process(es), and the impact of those process(es) on disputant relationships, as these outcomes may affect workplace culture and climate over the longer term. These outcomes are captured in the concepts of organizational justice and selfdetermination. In addition, they may consider the direct and indirect costs and benefits of the system in relation to organizational citizenship behaviors. Organizational justice explores how perceptions of fairness affect behavior within organizations (Moorman, 1991). In general, organizational justice measures fairness with four related factors: distributive justice, procedural justice, informational justice, and interpersonal justice (Greenberg, 1993). Distributive justice is related to issues of social equity and is based on the idea that social behavior is conditioned by the distribution of outcomes, that is, satisfaction increases to the extent that outcomes are perceived as being fair and favorable (Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982; Rubin & Brown, 1975). Distributive justice is clearly consistent with the assumptions of self-interested, rational actors proffered by public choice theory; however, research suggests that other criteria of fairness matter in organizational settings. Procedural justice suggests that participant satisfaction is related to the steps taken to reach the decision; satisfaction increases when an organizational process is perceived to be fair, regardless of the outcome (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Among the traditional principles of procedural justice are impartiality, voice or opportunity to be heard, and grounds for decisions (Bayles, 1990). Recent research suggests that in workplace mediation, procedural justice has two distinct components: (a) the procedural justice— process component captures disputants’ perceptions of the fairness of the process and


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(b) the procedural justice—mediator component captures disputants’ perceptions of the mediator’s performance as a professional (Nabatchi, Bingham, & Good, 2007). Informational justice refers to the quality of the explanations received about the issues, outcomes, and procedures used to make decisions (Greenberg, 1990; Shapiro, 1993). Interpersonal justice refers to the quality of interpersonal treatment one receives during the enactment of organizational procedures, for example, whether one is treated with dignity and respect, kindness, politeness, honesty, and consideration (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Recent research shows that in workplace mediation, interpersonal justice is experienced between disputants (disputant–disputant interpersonal justice), as well as between each individual disputant and the mediator (disputant–mediator interpersonal justice; Nabatchi et al., 2007). Organizational justice research shows that when managerial decisions and actions are believed to be unfair or unjust, employees experience feelings of anger, outrage, and resentment and may engage in retribution or retaliation. Conversely, when decisions and actions are perceived as being fair and just, organizational citizenship behaviors increase (see Colquitt et al., 2001). In short, when impressions of justice are positive, employees are more likely to cooperate and to enforce and maintain the social norms of the organization; therefore, dispute systems designers will want to make choices that have the greatest chance of improving perceptions of distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal fairness. The concept of self-determination invokes a prescriptive or best-practice model for the selection of dispute interventions to promote organizational justice. The issue of self-determination in DSD occurs at two levels: the overall system level and the individual case level (Bingham, 2002b, 2004, 2008). At the system level, self-determination refers to the power to make decisions about the elements of the dispute system as a whole, for example, what cases are eligible, whether disputants are subject to a silo program (i.e., a stand-alone process) or a set of integrated processes, and what rules apply, as well as other aspects of the overall system. The organization may retain the power to make these decisions or may negotiate. For example, if a union is certified to represent employees, grievance procedures are generally a mandatory subject of bargaining in both public and private sectors. Even in the absence of a duty to bargain, an organization may afford disputants self-determination at the systems level, by granting disputants the power to agree on the time, place, scope, and nature of the process(es), as well as the intervention model, the neutral, and any relevant rules of provider (Bingham, 2002c). Self-determination also occurs at the case level, that is, within a particular case using one or more specific dispute resolution processes as provided for in the overall system; it refers to a single set of disputing parties within a given dispute resolution process (Bingham, 2002b, 2004, 2008). At the case level, self-determination involves two dimensions: outcome control and process control (Bingham, 2002b, 2004; Elangovan, 1995, 1998), which vary according to the particular intervention selected. For example, arbitration affords the third party both outcome and process control, whereas mediation generally gives the third party control over the process but not the outcome (Bingham, 2002b, 2004; Bingham, Nabatchi, Senger, & Jackman, 2009).



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Researchers are only beginning to explore how self-determination affects participant behaviors, justice perceptions, and program outcomes; however, theory and research indicate that self-determination over both process and outcome heightens perceptions of organizational justice, which can in turn produce stronger program outcomes (Bingham, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2004, 2008). This suggests that designers need to consider the degree to which self-determination is enhanced or hindered by particular DSD choices, and how this may affect both justice perceptions and individual behaviors within the system. Thinking through the complexities of DSD in relation to organizational justice, self-determination, and system outcomes can be a daunting task. However, greater understanding of these issues is facilitated if designers begin this work during the organizational diagnosis stage. Specifically, during organizational diagnosis, it is useful to clarify the motivations and behaviors of individuals within the current dispute system. This can help designers predict how various choices about systems design will affect participant motivations and behaviors, especially as they relate to justice perceptions, self-determination, and the norms of reciprocity and cooperation. The following section illustrates this assertion with a case study of REDRESS.

Case Study: Conflict in the U.S. Postal Service Organizational Diagnosis DSD begins with organizational diagnosis, and any diagnosis of the USPS must start with the 1970 Postal Reorganization Act. This Act transformed the 200-year-old Post Office Department into the USPS, a quasi-private federal agency in the executive branch of the government (for a more detailed discussion about the USPS, see Baxter, 1994). With almost 800,000 employees, the USPS is the largest federal civilian employer in the United States (U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO], 1997) and one of the largest civilian employers in the world. During the reorganization efforts, USPS officials created a new management coalition of experts from private mass production and monopoly businesses. Using an “institutionalized logic of efficiency and scientific management,” the coalition embarked on a path of mechanization, job engineering, and stringent performance monitoring (Baxter, 1994, p. 100). The restructuring process involved a reorganization of the USPS hierarchy, an infusion of new personnel, and the automation of work tasks. It was handled as a top-down process with little employee involvement. To overcome problems of scheduling, coordination, and control, the new management coalition created an intensely hierarchical structure, with significant amounts of delegated decision authority (Baxter, 1994). Shift supervisors, superintendents of mail processing, and other line managers oversee craft (labor) employees (those involved in mail handling, processing, delivery, and other routinized tasks) and enforce service requirements, performance evaluations, and standardized procedures. Based on evaluation results, supervisors may reassign, withhold pay increases, and initiate disciplinary


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actions against craft employees who repeatedly and consistently perform below minimum standards. The coalition also infused the USPS with a new workforce. Career postal managers were replaced with private sector managers and business people, and pursuant to federal law, those serving in the military, and particularly veterans, were given additional points on their entrance exams and received a hiring preference for the newly created supervisory and management positions (Baxter, 1994). A diverse population filled labor positions, although many employees do not hold a high school diploma.2 The high number of former military personnel in management positions directing an entrylevel labor force helped reinforce command-and-control managerial methods throughout the organization (Bingham & Napoli, 1999; Napoli, 2004). The USPS, the four major unions representing craft employees, and the three professional associations representing management have experienced divisive workplace relationships.3 The reorganization process also pushed for the automation and mechanization of work. Mail processing was designed to follow standardized mass production approaches with the application of techniques such as time measurement and job design (Baxter, 1994). Although automation lowered the growth rate of the workforce despite increasing mail volumes, it also created highly routinized, repetitive, and mundane tasks, which led to a deskilling and downgrading of jobs, an increase in the use of part-time employees, and falling levels of craft employee satisfaction with work (Baxter, 1994; Bingham & Napoli, 1999; Napoli, 2004). In this automated system, productivity is measured by exceeding the output of the previous accounting period. Supervisors are rewarded for increasing productivity with substantial bonuses; however, under collective bargaining agreements, craft employees do not receive productivity bonuses. The pressure from supervisors for increased productivity and the unequal distribution of rewards exacerbate the conflicts between labor and management. In short, the reorganization coalition created a strict and formalized culture in the USPS where conflict became the norm (Baxter, 1994; Bingham & Napoli, 1999; Napoli, 2004). The foci of conflict in the USPS lies between craft employees and their supervisors because it is at this point in the USPS where productivity pressures are the greatest and where management has the most immediate power over labor. In the late 1990s, the U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, formerly the General Accounting Office (U.S. GAO, 1997, p. 4), vocally criticized the USPS, citing “autocratic management styles . . . adversarial relationships between postal management and union leadership . . . and an inappropriate and inadequate performance management system” as evidence of “the persistent labor-management problems in the Postal Service” (p. 1). Union-based grievances were among the most visible conflicts in the organization. The USPS national grievance arbitration database shows that in 1994, the USPS faced 65,062 grievances involving postal management and union officials at the office level. In 1996, this number increased by 38% to 89,931. The number of backlogged grievances, those awaiting arbitration, also increased by approximately 90% from 36,669 in 1994 to 69,555 in 1996 (U.S. GAO, 1997). The U.S. GAO (1997) estimated the cost of dealing with these grievances at well over $200 million. Representatives of craft



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employees suggested that “the number of grievances filed and the current backlog in the grievance process is directly correlated with the abusive tactics of postal management” (Quinn, 1997). There was also a correspondingly high rate of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints. During the mid-1990s, USPS employees filed between 25,000 and 28,000 informal EEO complaints per year, alleging discrimination under various federal statutes (Bingham & Napoli, 1999). In 1997, almost 40% of all federal sector informal EEO complaints were filed by USPS employees (Bingham & Napoli, 1999). Despite efforts by EEO counselors to conciliate or resolve these disputes, almost half of the filed USPS complaints were appealed beyond the informal counseling stage and became formal EEO complaints (Bingham & Napoli, 1999). Formal EEO complaints require a lengthy and costly process of investigation and adjudicative hearings, and with a backlog of thousands of cases, it can take up to a decade for a formal EEO complaint to reach the courtroom (Bingham & Napoli, 1999). Moreover, in 95% of EEO litigation cases, either management “wins” on the merits of the case or the employee abandons the complaint because of the length of time needed to get a hearing (Bingham & Novac, 2001). The GAO report received the attention of Congress, and in 1997, Postmaster General Runyon was called before the Postal Service Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee to testify about the endemic conflict in the USPS. Shortly after the Subcommittee hearing, Postmaster General Runyon met with members of the USPS Law Department. During this meeting in October of 1997, Law Department staff were scheduled to make a 30-minute presentation to the Postmaster General and the National Management Committee about the evaluation results of REDRESS, a pilot mediation program adopted in settlement of a class action lawsuit in the Florida Panhandle. Impressed by the results of the pilot study, and facing the censure by Congress and the GAO, Postmaster General Runyon directed the staff in the Law Department to prepare a plan for the rollout of REDRESS to all post offices across the nation (for a discussion of the pilot program and its evaluation, see Bingham, 2003; Bingham et al., 2009). REDRESS was designed to address only EEO disputes; the law department was unable to design the program to address union grievances for two important reasons. First, union-based grievance procedures are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Thus, the USPS could not unilaterally add a mediation step to a contractual grievance procedure without bargaining with the relevant union. In the past, it has used union–management pairs to do grievance mediation under certain contracts (Carnevale, 1993). However, adding mediation without bargaining would give rise to unfair labor practice charges. Second, under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974), employees must be permitted to pursue EEO complaints outside the collective bargaining agreement regardless of the grievance procedure. Thus, the USPS could unilaterally offer mediation through the REDRESS program for EEO complaints. As discussion about the national rollout of the program began, the design team realized that although REDRESS could potentially serve all USPS employees, there was


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no incentive for either supervisors or craft employees to use the program—both personnel groups preferred litigation to mediation. Supervisors preferred litigation to mediation for several reasons. First, as noted above, in 95% of EEO litigation cases, management either “wins” on the merits of the case or the employee abandons the complaint because of the length of time needed to get a hearing (Bingham & Novac, 2001). The length of time required for litigation is a second reason for this preference: when a complaint is filed, the supervisor is not held accountable for years, if at all. This position was made clear by the former president of the National Association of Postal Supervisors: “if there’s a grievance, there’s a grievance. We’ll figure it out later down the road” (Palladino, 1997). Representatives of craft employees also recognized this temporal issue: Some managers apparently think that it is ultimately in the interest of the Postal Service to have tremendous backlogs in the grievance and arbitration system, because except for the negative report from the GAO, such delays allow postal management to operate without fear of being called to account for its actions. (Quinn, 1997) Third, supervisors have no stake in the costs and potential losses of litigation; the expenses of litigation and any ordered monetary damages are borne solely by the USPS. The fact that an individual supervisor will prevail in most cases, will not be held accountable for years, and will not have to pay any accrued costs explains supervisors’ preference for litigation over mediation. In fact, these circumstances suggested to the REDRESS design team that supervisors would always prefer litigation to mediation regardless of the outcome. As noted above, supervisors are protected in their jobs, prevail on the merits in most cases, do not have to answer or respond to the complaint for years, and are not accountable for the costs of litigation or its outcomes. In short, and as predicted by the public choice literature, the incentive system for supervisors encouraged them not to try to resolve the complaint. Thus, a supervisor’s first preference would be to litigate win (i.e., have a decision that produced a personally favorable settlement), but his or her second preference would be to litigate and have the craft employee win. This is because even if the supervisor lost on the merits of the case, which only happens about 5% of the time (Bingham & Novac, 2001), the supervisor would not be subject to any penalties and would not have to respond to the complainant for a long time. Mediation requires both disputants; in the supervisor’s absence, there would be nothing to mediate. Just as supervisors preferred litigation to mediation, so too did craft employees share this preference. Given their basic distrust of management, craft employees would likely be suspicious of any mediation program designed by the USPS. The negotiation theory of reactive devaluation suggests that any offer made by the other disputant is devalued simply because of its source (Ross, 1995). Moreover, and as noted previously, cooperation is not a dominate strategy unless one is confident that other involved parties are also cooperating. Because craft employees would have no assurance that their supervisors would reciprocate, they were unlikely to be cooperative participants



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in mediation. Thus, with the option to choose between a mediation program that is perceived to be biased, and a neutral judicial hearing in a courtroom, craft employees would prefer to litigate and have their “day in court.” Thus, litigation was the dominant strategy for both supervisors and craft employees. In short, under the conditions of the existing system, neither supervisors nor craft employees had incentive to participate in a mediation program. The incentive structures at the USPS encouraged noncooperation and avoidance in the day-to-day activities of the workplace, which was highly likely to continue in the new DSD. Given this organizational diagnosis, the design stage had a heightened importance; to be successful, the national REDRESS program designers had to change employees’ preferences. In other words, the USPS had to design the dispute system so that USPS personnel would want to pursue mediation before litigation.

System Design As noted previously, designers must consider several elements of a dispute system during the design stage (see Bingham, 2008). These elements affect not only the structure and function of the dispute system but also the willingness of disputants to use the program. The most important elements of the REDRESS® DSD are discussed below, though not necessarily in the order that the elements are presented above. Table 1 presents Bingham’s (2008) lists of DSD elements, alongside the choices made for the design of REDRESS. Several DSD elements establish the basic characteristics of the program. Among these are the following: the setting or sector of the program, the overall dispute system design, the nature of the intervention, and the subject matter of cases that will be eligible for the system. In this case, the USPS REDRESS program is situated within the public sector and is designed as a silo program using mediation as the intervention for EEO complaints. However, as demonstrated during the organizational diagnosis, litigation was the dominant strategy of both supervisors and craft employees and there was no incentive for either party to mediate. Other elements of the final design needed to induce disputing parties to opt for mediation before litigation. This posed a problem from the standpoint both of self-determination and participation. The USPS was limited in its ability to change the preferences of, and incentives for, supervisors because their employment contracts and the organizational structure of the USPS protect them from the costs and difficulties of litigation. These issues, in addition to the short timeframe provided for the design of the national program (from October 1997-January 1998), limited the ability of the design team to leverage supervisors’ voluntary participation through the other mechanisms. Thus, the design team recognized that because supervisors would be the respondents in the majority of eligible REDRESS cases and because litigation would always be their dominant strategy, it would have to mandate the participation of supervisors in the program, despite the fact that mandatory participation is not a best practice in DSD and mediation, in part because it reduces self-determination.


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Table 1. Dispute System Design Elements in the USPS REDRESS Program Elements of Dispute System Design (Bingham, 2008, pp. 12-14) 1. The sector or setting for the program 2. The overall dispute system design 3. The subject matter of the conflicts, disputes, or cases over which the system has jurisdiction 4. The participants eligible or required to use the system 5. The timing of the intervention 6. Whether the intervention is voluntary, opt out, or mandatory

7. The nature of the intervention 8. The sequence of interventions, if more than one 9. Within intervention, the model of practice 10. The nature, training, qualifications, and demographics of the neutrals 11. Who pays for the neutrals and the nature of their financial or professional incentive structure 12. Who pays for the costs of administration, filing fees, hearing fees, hearing space 13. The nature of any due process protections

14. Structural support and institutionalization with respect to conflict management programs or efforts to implement 15. Level of self-determination or control that disputants have as to process, outcome, and dispute system design

Design of REDRESS Public sector Silo program EEO complaints

Employees with EEO complaints Mediation is scheduled to take place within 4 weeks of the complaint filing date Voluntary for complainants (the vast majority of whom are craft employees). Mandatory for respondents (the vast majority of whom are supervisors) Mediation Mediation, with option to continue in traditional EEO process Transformative mediation Outside neutrals are given training and screened through a quality control process USPS pays the neutrals Case settlement is not a performance incentive The USPS pays for all administrative costs and provides space for the mediation Confidential mediation takes place on site and “on the clock.” Parties may bring any representative(s) with them to the mediation sessions Supervisors must be accompanied by or have immediate access to someone with the power to authorize the negotiated settlement Creation of ADR specialist positions Success stories, publicity, and referrals Participant self-determination at the case level (with the exception of compulsory participation by supervisory respondents) No self-determination at the system level

Note: EEO = equal employment opportunity; USPS = U.S. Postal Service; ADR = alternative dispute resolution.



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Conversely, the USPS could not mandate the participation of complainants for two important reasons. First, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) requires voluntary participation for the aggrieved employee (EEOC, 1999), and in REDRESS, craft employees would file the overwhelming majority of complaints. Second, compulsory participation for complainants would increase the basic distrust and suspicion of craft employees. In contrast, a voluntary program that retained the possibility of litigation for unresolved complaints had a better chance of gaining employee approval and consequent use. In theory, given self-determination with respect to the decision to use mediation, employees might want to try REDRESS before litigation. For these reasons, the USPS decided that the program would be voluntary for the aggrieved craft employee but compulsory for the responding supervisor. Moreover, if the dispute was not resolved through mediation, employees had the option of continuing through the traditional EEO litigation process. Beyond mediation, designers adopted no additional interventions into the original REDRESS design. Although important, these design features would not alter the preferences of craft employees for litigation, because mediation would still be perceived as a biased and less fair alternative, in part because there was little guarantee of cooperation by supervisors despite their mandatory participation. To provide incentives for craft employees to participate in the mediation program, other design elements, such as the timing of the intervention, became critical factors of program design. There are many points during the life a dispute where an ADR intervention can be offered. For example, Bingham (2008, p. 13) notes that ADR may be introduced before the complaint is filed or immediately thereafter, at some point during the traditional litigation process (e.g., after discovery or information gathering is complete), or on the eve of a hearing or trial. Research suggests that resolving disputes as early as possible decreases costs and increases participant satisfaction (see Charkoudian & Wilson, 2006). It may also reduce the average time cases spend in the backlog (Bingham et al., 2009). Such research affirms the suggestion that dispute systems are most effective when disputes are addressed as early as possible and at the lowest possible organizational level (Costantino & Merchant, 1996). In the REDRESS program, if the complainant opts to mediate, then the mediation is scheduled within 4 weeks of the complaint filing date, and usually takes place within 2 to 3 weeks. Given that it could take several years, and in some cases more than a decade to receive a decision (likely an unfavorable one) through the traditional EEO litigation process, designers reasoned that craft employees would probably prefer the drastically reduced time frame of the program, especially if their decision to use it was voluntary. As noted above, the USPS selected mediation as the ADR intervention; however, it had not yet decided on a model of mediation practice. The traditional and, until recently, dominant approach to mediation has been one of problem solving and settlement (Bush & Folger, 1994). Traditionally, mediators tend to be directive in that they control the mediation process and discussion among parties and evaluative in that they appraise the merits of the case and try to persuade the parties to accept a solution based on that appraisal (Riskin, 1994, 1996). The tendency for EEO cases to be evaluated in favor of the supervisor suggested to program designers that a mediation model


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where the merits of a case were assessed and parties were pushed toward settlement would be unsuccessful regardless of other design features (Hallberlin, 2001). Such an approach to mediation would undermine the program’s legitimacy, because if, as in litigation, mediation outcomes favored the supervisor 95% of the time, craft employees would see the mediation process as biased, regardless of whether the mediator was objective (Bingham, 2002c). Given that the traditional models of mediation were not viable, the USPS decided to use transformative mediation. Transformative mediation seeks to give the disputing parties control over their conflict and its resolution by facilitating empowerment and recognition (Bush & Folger, 1994). Empowerment is achieved when parties “establish or regain a sense of strength and take control of their situation” (Bush & Folger, 1994, p. 84). Recognition is achieved when parties “voluntarily choose to become more open, attentive, sympathetic, and responsive to the situation of the other party, thereby expanding their perspective to include an appreciation for another’s situation” (Bush & Folger, 1994, p. 89). In transformative mediation, the neutral does not assess the merits of the case but rather creates an atmosphere that allows (empowers) the participants to express their complaints and hear (recognize) the other party’s position. This explicitly reinforces the norms of reciprocity and cooperation among disputants. Moreover, the mediator does not advocate for a process or a settlement; instead, all decisions during the process, including decisions about settlement, are left entirely to the participants. As such, the transformative model is essentially participant-designed mediation: It affords maximum participant self-determination at the case level (Bingham, 2002c). Although interesting, more details about the particulars of the transformative model is not necessary here (for more information, see Bush & Folger, 1994, 2005). Suffice to say, use of the transformative model, where the mediator may not evaluate the merits of cases and disputants have maximum self-determination at the case level, coupled with the other features of the program, helped increase the perceived legitimacy of the national REDRESS program among craft employees. Moreover, this model helped increase the perceived legitimacy of the program among supervisors because it counterbalanced their mandatory participation and reduced self-determination at the system level. In addition to standard due process protections, several innovations were important in the REDRESS program. First, mediation sessions are confidential and scheduled at the work site during work hours, with the disputing parties being paid as if they were “on the clock.” Second, both complainants and respondents are permitted to choose and bring any representative(s) with them to the mediation session, including legal counsel and union officials, as well as family, friends, coworkers, or others (for a discussion, see Bingham, Kim, & Raines, 2002). This enhanced their sense of empowerment. Third, supervisors are required to be accompanied by, or have immediate access to, someone within the USPS with the power to authorize the negotiated settlement. This enhanced complainants’ sense of recognition. Both these design decisions increased self-determination by fostering the capacity of the parties to solve the problem and determine immediately whether the resolution was permissible by USPS officials.



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Given the selection of transformative mediation and decisions about due process, the REDRESS designers next faced decisions about the selection and payment of neutrals. There is an inherent principal-agent problem in the selection of neutrals: internal neutrals may be differentially vested in conflict outcomes than external neutrals (Putnam, 1994). As Bingham, Chesmore, Moon, and Napoli (2000) note, “inside” mediators (mediators selected from USPS personnel) would be seen as biased because they are not independent but rather are subject to USPS control. This would be especially true if mediations were conducted in USPS facilities with mediators trained, hired, and paid for by the USPS. Alternatively, “outside” mediators (mediators hired from an external roster) would be seen as more objective and impartial, important characteristics needed to overcome the suspiciousness and distrust of craft employees (for a discussion, see Bingham, 2002c). The USPS decided to use outside neutral mediators. This decision was bolstered by research on the pilot REDRESS program showing significantly higher participant satisfaction levels and rates of full or partial resolution with outside neutral models than with inside neutral models (Bingham et al., 2000).Procedural justice theory suggests that control over process is an important factor in perceptions of fairness. This control is an aspect of self-determination. Inside mediators appeared to be more within USPS control than the outside mediators, and this lowered employee perceptions of fairness. In contrast, participants in the outside models had higher satisfaction with fairness at the case level because the USPS had less control over the mediators and because participants chose how the mediation process itself would proceed and conclude (Bingham, 2002c). Following this decision, the USPS developed a rigorous training program for mediators and a screening process for quality control to help ensure that mediators were proficient and consistent in their practice of transformative mediation (Nabatchi & Bingham, 2001). Although the USPS pays for the neutrals, it made a conscious choice to not have case settlement as a goal for REDRESS. Instead, the USPS created two new indicators, employee “participation rates” and “closure” of cases (Hallberlin, 2001). These new indicators eliminated any perverse incentives for mediators to settle cases. If the USPS encouraged high settlement rates from the mediators, then the mediators might have pushed the parties toward settlement, violating the tenets of transformative mediation, and thereby interfering with participant self-determination and perhaps increasing distrust of the program (see Bingham, 2002c). In sum, the USPS designed REDRESS as a silo program using transformative mediation for EEO complaints. Mediators are paid by the USPS but selected from outside of the organization and subject to a rigorous training and screening process. Moreover, and in line with the tenets of transformative mediation, mediators are not evaluated on their ability to produce a settlement among the parties. Participation in REDRESS is voluntary for complainants but mandatory for respondents. The mediation session is confidential and scheduled at the work site during work hours. Participants may bring with them any representative they wish and supervisors must be accompanied by, or have immediate access to, someone within the USPS who can


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authorize the settlement. Finally, the program is considerably faster than the traditional EEO process and litigation, but these options remain open to complainants should mediation not produce a resolution. Together, these design features changed the incentive structure for craft employees such that they would now prefer to seek a favorable outcome through mediation, before engaging in the formal EEO process and litigation. Thus, mediation became the dominant strategy for craft employees, and because supervisors faced compulsory participation, participation in REDRESS was assured.4 Moreover, these design features enhanced the likelihood of fostering and enhancing reciprocity, cooperation, and self-determination among the participants and increasing perceptions of organizational justice. Evidence of these assertions is found in the several evaluations of the USPS REDRESS program. For example, the USPS believed that a key goal of the REDRESS program should be participation rate, defined as the percentage of all EEO filers who accept an offer to mediate an informal complaint (Bingham, 2003; Hallberlin, 2001). Initially, the USPS set a national goal of 70%, which it met in 2000. Subsequently, the USPS raised that target to 75%, which it met in 2001. By 2004, the national participation rate was 88.1% (Bingham et al., 2009). A longitudinal evaluation of the REDRESS program shows that this design also produced high levels of satisfaction across all six dimensions of organizational justice for both craft employees and supervisors, as well as for the representatives that joined them during mediation. An index of satisfaction with process indicators was the same, 92% of complainants, their representatives, and respondent supervisors agreed or strongly agreed that the overall process was fair. Moreover, an index of satisfaction with the mediator was 96% to 97% for these three groups. Satisfaction with outcome was slightly lower for complainants (64%) than respondents (70%) and complainant representatives (67%). Although the difference between complainants and respondents is statistically significant, the majority of both participant groups are satisfied with the outcome of mediation (for a full discussion of these and other evaluation results, see Bingham, 2003; Bingham et al., 2009). Moreover, settlement and case closure rates suggest that the program is effectively resolving disputes. In 2004, the settlement rate for the REDRESS program was 54.4%. However, settlement is not a goal of transformative mediation; therefore, the USPS also tracks case closure rates, which represent the percentage of cases where the parties developed a formal settlement within 30 days of the mediation, or where the complaining party drops, withdraws, or fails to pursue the case to the formal EEO complaint stage (Hallberlin, 2001). Over the life of the REDRESS program, the case closure rate ranged from 70% to 80% and in 2004 it was 72.3% (Bingham et al., 2009). There is also evidence that REDRESS improved the workplace culture and climate at the USPS. For example, an interview study of USPS employees at all levels of the workforce in three cities across the country suggests positive changes in culture and climate, such as an increased perception of “open doors” and fewer employees and supervisors addressing conflict by “yelling, arguing, disciplining, or intimidating” (Bingham, Hedeen, Napoli, & Raines, 2003). Similarly, research shows that as a result of participating in REDRESS training and mediation sessions, supervisors listen



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more, are more open to expressing emotion, and take less of a top-down hierarchical approach to managing conflict (Napoli, 2004). Finally, a quantitative measure showing an improvement in workplace culture and climate is found in the statistically significant decline of formal EEO complaints from a high of more than 14,000 in 1997 to around 8,500 in 2003 (Bingham & Novac, 2001). Moreover, controlling for changes in the size of the workforce, informal EEO complaint filings have dropped 30% since their peak before the USPS implemented REDRESS, and complaints are now coming from 40% fewer people (Bingham et al., 2009). Finally, 14% of cases are now resolved before mediation, suggesting efforts by the parties to resolve a dispute on their own after a request for mediation is made (Bingham et al., 2009). These results support the claims of DSD scholars who assert that the better the dispute system is at resolving conflicts in terms of satisfaction and sustainability, the greater the likelihood of employee retention and the possibilities for future cooperation, as opposed to more conflict (e.g., Costantino & Merchant, 1996).

Implementation, and Exit, Evaluation, and Diffusion The strategic design of the REDRESS program facilitated work on the final two stages of DSD (implementation, and exit, evaluation, and diffusion), as well as the remaining element of DSD (structural support and institutionalization). To assist with implementation, the USPS staffed offices across the county with trained ADR specialists; their job was to support the program and ensure its quality (Nabatchi & Bingham, 2001). In addition, satisfaction with the program was reflected in anecdotes and success stories that were spread by the USPS through video and by word-of-mouth on workroom floors across the country; this served a critical role in encouraging disputants to participate in REDRESS (Hallberlin, 2001). Although the USPS obtained the buy-in of numerous stakeholders by involving them in focus groups before implementing the program, the positive attitudes of employees and supervisors toward the program helped gain buy-in from the top levels of USPS management and helped institutionalize the program throughout the nation’s post offices. Designers customized the REDRESS program for the culture of the USPS by purposefully and strategically addressing the elements of dispute systems design. Although the design choice of mandating the participation of supervisors in REDRESS violates best practice in DSD, the overall design of the program is sufficiently satisfying to craft employees such that they elect mediation over more fact- and law-based approaches to resolving the conflict. In short, the design features of REDRESS were instrumental in changing the incentives of craft employees for participation in the new system, as well as the dispute-related motivations and behaviors of both supervisors and craft employees throughout the USPS (Napoli, 2004).

Conclusion This article argues that dispute systems should be designed in light of the conflictrelated motivations and behaviors of personnel under existing conditions, as well as the


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likely consequences of each design choice on their future motivations and behaviors, including incentives to participate in the new system. Moreover, it highlights the special importance of designing the new system with the goals of enhancing reciprocity and cooperation and increasing perceptions of organizational justice and self-determination among disputants. These assertions are illustrated with a case study of REDRESS, the USPS employment mediation program. Dispute systems designers need to logically think through the consequences for participants of various conflict management strategies and interventions as they are applied in different dispute system designs. Moreover, they need to understand the potential consequences of each dispute system design choice and the relationships among various design choices and participant behaviors and decisions. A better understanding of how design choices affect participants will facilitate the achievement of effective organizational conflict management. Future research should address these issues. The stage is set for such research to commence with the institutionalization of ADR programs in the federal government as a result of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 and 1996 and the EEOC Management Directive 110. Today, there is a wide variety of dispute systems in federal agencies. A systematic comparison of those dispute system designs and outcomes could yield valuable and insightful results. Acknowledgment Grants from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the United States Postal Service are gratefully acknowledged. Any errors are our own.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this.

Funding The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article: Research on the REDRESS program was supported by grants from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the United States Postal Service.

Notes 1. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is an umbrella term for a variety of conflict management techniques and processes (such as arbitration, early neutral evaluation, facilitation, and mediation among others) that are used in lieu of traditional judicial and administrative adjudication. 2. USPS employees can be hired without a high school diploma as long as they pass the Postal Service test for an entry-level position. 3. The four unions representing craft employees are the American Postal Workers Union (APWU), the National Association of Letter Carriers, the National Postal Mail Handlers Union, and the National Rural Letter Carriers’ Association. The three associations



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representing supervisors are the National Association of Postal Supervisors, the National Association of Postmasters of the United States, and the National League of Postmasters of the United States. The diversity of unions is a function of the National Labor Relations Act labor law, which allows for the formation of different bargaining units based on common interests and work assignments. Supervisors are not eligible for union membership under NLRA labor law. 4. The USPS attempted to address all the principles of dispute system design. Transformative mediation in REDRESS provided a comparatively low-cost, interest-based method of dispute resolution. If REDRESS fails to resolve the dispute, rights and power-based approaches remain available through the traditional EEO process and litigation. Loop-backs to negotiation were created with the later design of REDRESS II, which provides mediation for formal EEO complaints. At any point in dispute processing, consultation and feedback are available from EEO counselors. This low- to high-cost sequencing was reinforced with skills training for USPS managers (see Napoli, 2004), and resources were made available for the program across the country.

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Bios Tina Nabatchi is an assistant professor of public administration at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and a faculty research associate at the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration at Syracuse University. Lisa Blomgren Bingham is the Keller-Runden Professor of Public Service at the Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs.
