Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State ...

Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race Author(s): Kathleen A. Bratton and Kerry L. Haynie Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Aug., 1999), pp. 658-679 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647822 Accessed: 31-05-2016 12:51 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms

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Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race

Kathleen A. Bratton State University of New York at Binghamton

Kerry L. Haynie Rutgers University-New Brunswick In this paper, we investigate the agenda-setting behavior of female and black state legislators, and ex-

amine whether women and blacks are as successful as white men in passing legislation. Using a six-state, three-year sample, we test a descriptive representation model in which group members (blacks and women) represent group interests above and beyond the extent motivated by constituency and party pressures. Moreover, in keeping with the social distance between the races, we expect

blacks to be less successful than whites at passing legislation. We find that although constituency influences sponsorship agendas, blacks and women share a set of distinctive policy interests. Women are generally as likely as men to achieve passage of the legislation they introduce, whereas blacks

are, in three states, significantly less likely than whites to pass legislation.

O ne of the most notable developments in American politics over the last two and a half decades has been the increase in the number of African-Americans

and women elected to public office. This increase has been particularly dramatic in state legislatures. Since 1970, the number of black state legislators has more than tripled; by 1993, the number of blacks in state legislatures had risen to 533, or 7% of all state representatives (Joint Center for Economic and Political Studies 1994). The growth in representation of women in state legislatures has

also been striking. Between 1970 and 1995, the number of women state legislators grew more than fivefold, increasing from just over 300 to more than 1,500; women now occupy more than 20% of all state legislative seats (U.S. Department of Commerce 1995).

Research stimulated by this increase in representation of blacks and women has generally concluded that blacks and women do make a difference in state policymaking (Carroll, Dodson, and Mandel 1991; Kathlene 1994; Miller 1990; Nelson 1991; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1991, 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991). Yet, previous studies have failed to distinguish between the influence of

gender or race and the competing explanation that constituency offers of the distinctive behavior of black and female legislators. A constituency representation model presumes that legislative behavior is conditioned primarily by factors such THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 61, No. 3, August 1999, Pp. 658-79

? 1999 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819


Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures 659

as district and party, and that race or gender has little independent impact on behavior. A descriptive representation model, on the other hand, would posit that group members represent group interests above and beyond the extent motivated by constituency and party pressures. In this paper we address three research questions. First, we consider the effect

of group membership on the behavior of state legislators (specifically, blacks and women). Second, this paper explores the possibility that two different minority groups with nonconflictual interests may advance the agenda of each other. Third, this paper examines whether members of minority groups in legislatures

are less likely than other legislators to achieve passage of their bills. We add to previous research by evaluating the effects of race and gender on agenda setting

and bill passage in legislatures while controlling for other influences. Moreover,

we examine important similarities and differences in the legislative behavior and experiences of blacks and women, by investigating whether blacks and women advance each other's interests, and by contrasting gender differences in bill passage to racial differences. By focusing on the legislative behavior of both groups, we hope to provide a better foundation for a more general theory of group legislative behavior than would be rendered by considering either group alone. The question of the link between descriptive and constituency representation is of particular importance in light of the current controversy regarding the cre-

ation of majority-minority districts. Those who argue that the creation of majority-black districts will facilitate the expression of black interests generally

focus on the effects of both constituency and the race of the legislator. Representatives, regardless of race, presumably are likely to attend to the interests of a

majority of their constituents. Moreover, districts with high percentages of black citizens are disproportionately likely to elect black representatives (Button and Hedge 1993; Grofman and Handley 1989), who presumably are more likely than

white representatives to focus on black interests. The Supreme Court appears unpersuaded that the Voting Rights Act requires the creation of the maximum number of majority-minority districts; furthermore, even if the justices were to uphold every minority district, there is a natural limit to the degree to which racial diversity can be maximized through this policy (Swain 1993). Yet, a strong relationship between the race of the legislator and legislative behavior underscores the importance of electing diverse legislative bodies; furthermore, it is important to examine whether reaching the majority-black threshold within the

constituency significantly adds to the likelihood that the legislator will focus on black interests.

Minority Groups and Distinctive Policy Interests Pitkin (1967) distinguishes between descriptive representation, which refers to how the legislator looks, and substantive representation, which refers to how the legislator acts. There are many reasons to expect that descriptive representation


660 Kathleen A. Bratton and Kerry L. Haynie translates into substantive representation, and that African-American and female representatives would indeed introduce new issues to the legislative policy

agenda. Women and blacks have distinct health concerns (Kahn et al. 1994;

Williams and Collins 1996; Woods 1996),' and are more likely than men to face poverty and employment discrimination (Hacker 1992; Massey and Denton 1993). Blacks are more likely than whites to face housing discrimination and crime (Hacker 1992; Massey and Denton 1993). There are racial and gender dif-

ferences in political opinions and behavior: women are more liberal, and more likely to favor social programs, to oppose military action, and to vote Democratic (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Blacks hold more favorable attitudes toward affirmative action, are less in favor of the death penalty, and overwhelmingly vote and identify themselves as Democratic (Welch and Foster 1987). It is

reasonable to expect that these mass public differences in experiences and opinions will translate into differences in legislative behavior. There are a few works that examine the legislative behavior and experiences

of African-American legislators (Button and Hedge 1993; Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983; Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996; Herring 1990; McGriggs

1977; Miller 1990; Nelson 1991; Perry 1976; Swain 1993; Whitby 1985, 1997), and there is evidence that black state legislators do focus on welfare and civil rights issues (Miller 1990; Nelson 1991). It is unclear, however, whether this is due to race or to constituency pressure. The interests of the constituents and the views and behavior of representatives generally converge, particularly on the most salient issues (Erikson 1978; Miller and Stokes 1963; Stone 1979). Thus, we can expect representatives, regardless of race, from majority-black districts to be concerned with the interests of African-Americans.

As the number of black elected officials has increased, scholars have begun to address the competing explanations of the behavior of black elected officials. The majority of this work has focused on policymaking in local government and

roll call behavior in Congress. Generally, research on local government policy has concluded that black representation is associated with more equitable policy; however, when constituency controls are instituted, the relationship is weakened

or disappears (Meier and England 1984; Mladenka 1989). In her study of the re-

sponsiveness of members of the U.S. Congress to black interests, Swain (1993) argues that while there is value to descriptive representation, it is constituency that motivates the behavior of legislators. Conversely, Whitby (1997) argues that both race and constituency play a role in several sessions.

We shift the focus to a less visible stage and less visible arena of the legislative process: agenda setting through bill sponsorship in state legislatures. Agenda

setting is an important element of any political process (Bachrach and Baratz l The health concerns of African-Americans include a racial gap in life expectancy, a slower rate of decline in heart disease among blacks than among whites, and a racial gap between infant mortality rates (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1994). For women, distinct health concerns include breast, ovarian, and uterine cancer, and other reproductive health issues.


Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures 661 1963), and can affect policy preferences and outcomes by redefining the set of

possible outcomes. Agenda setting in the form of bill sponsorship demands a rel-

atively high level of support, commitment, awareness of, and expertise on policy areas (Tamerius 1995). Furthermore, though opportunity costs are present

(Schiller 1995), legislators have more freedom at this stage to express interests and satisfy important constituencies than at the roll call voting stage, when they

are limited to declaring preferences regarding a preestablished set of choices. The lower visibility, greater latitude, and higher degree of commitment de-

manded at this stage of the legislative process may lead to an increased importance of the race of the legislator relative to the racial composition of the

district in determining legislative behavior. Like African-Americans, women are a group that has historically been ex-

cluded from representation. The research on the legislative behavior of women is more extensive than that on the legislative behavior of African-Americans, and

covers agenda setting, roll call voting, and bill passage. As the number of women in state legislatures has grown, numerous scholars have concluded that women

do represent differently than men (Carroll and Taylor 1989; Day 1994; Diamond 1977; Mezey 1978; Reingold 1992; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1991, 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991; Werner 1968). These works on gender and legislative behavior have taken critical steps to-

ward understanding the role of women in state legislatures. They have, however,

been limited in the extent to which the analyses have controlled for factors that would compete with gender in explaining the behavior of legislators. Research on roll call voting indicates that gender differences are less evident when controls for district characteristics and/or party are instituted (Frankovic 1977;

Leader 1977; Vega and Firestone 1995; Welch 1985). Whether gender exerts an independent effect on legislative behavior at the sponsorship stage of the legisla-

tive process remains an open question.

Shared Interests of Minority Groups To what degree do minority groups in legislatures support each other's inter-

ests? Theories such as balance theory (Heider 1958) would suggest that minority groups that are the object of prejudice and discrimination should be attracted to each other. Because both groups have a history of political, social, and economic

discrimination, and because both groups share a relatively recent entry into state legislatures, each group may be sympathetic to issues salient to the other. On the other hand, sociocultural theories would suggest that minority groups might adopt the dominant attitudes of majority groups, including stereotypes of and discrimination against other minorities (Allport 1954). Indeed, within the mass public, women and men live in the same neighborhoods with each other, are ed-

ucated together, and create families together. Thus, white women may not differ from white men in their approach to black interests.


662 Kathleen A. Bratton and Kerry L. Haynie Theories of interethnic tension among minority groups in the mass public have been supported by a number of empirical studies (Dyer, Vedlitz, and

Worchel 1989). However, we do not expect these findings to persist at the elite level. Day-to-day interaction among legislators is likely much more frequent

than among individuals in the mass public, leading to reduced conflict. Furthermore, the rewards of advancing another outgroup's interests may be more apparent in the legislature than in the mass public. Indeed, such a convergence of interests across groups may in part compensate for the lack of diversity within legislatures.

Legislative Success of Minority Group Members Previous research indicates that women are as likely as men to achieve pas-

sage of the bills they introduce (Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1991, 1994). However, very little research has been done on the legislative success of AfricanAmericans. Guinier (1994) argues that the civil rights movement's vision of

politics acknowledged that "legislative responsiveness would not be secured merely by the election day ratification of black representatives" but would de-

pend on "citizen participation, legislative presence, and legislative success in meeting the needs of a disadvantaged group" (69). In democracies, majorities make policy, and there is no intrinsic right of any minority to see their policy

views enacted; nevertheless, a pluralistic democracy is one in which the composition of the majority is not fixed (Dahl 1967). It is clearly of great relevance to know how successful blacks are compared to whites in passing legislation. There is little reason to believe that the success of women representatives in

passing legislation can be generalized to all minority groups within legislatures. The economic and social connections between men and women leads to an ac-

ceptance by men and women of common values (Brickman et al. 1980; Gurin 1985), and reduces the likelihood of conflict between men and women (Coser 1956). Perceived cultural differences and conflicts of interest between blacks and

whites may be far greater than those between men and women. Social distance has been defined as "feelings of unwillingness among members of a group to accept or approve a given degree of intimacy in interaction with a member of an outgroup" (Williams 1964, 29). Emory Bogardus' (1958) social distance study demonstrated that Americans accept or reject other ethnic groups in direct pro-

portion to perceived cultural differences. Though social distance between the races is slowly decreasing, social distance and racial segregation in American so-

ciety persists (Hacker 1992; Massey and Denton 1993; Owen, Eisner, and McFaul 1981). This social distance may be reflected in the fact that racial differences in the mass public tend to be more marked than gender differences (Kinder and

Sanders 1996); African-Americans at the elite level of politics are particularly likely to be liberal (Lichter 1985). Legislation sponsored by African-American


Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures 663 legislators may reflect these ideological differences, and thus be less likely to

pass. Moreover, we know that legislators are unlikely to read thoroughly each piece of legislation before roll call voting, and instead take cues from what

they know about others who support or oppose the bill (Kingdon 1989). If African-Americans are perceived as more liberal than whites, bills introduced by African-Americans may be less likely to pass independent of their actual content.

However, it is also possible that bills that address group interests may be more likely to pass if group members introduce them. Black representatives and

women representatives may be particularly willing to expend resources advancing legislation that addresses group interests. Furthermore, we know that

legislators take cues from colleagues who are regarded as experts in a particular

area (Kingdon 1989). Whether because of their own race or because of the racial composition of the districts they represent, African-Americans may be regarded by other legislators as experts in the area of civil rights and black interests; women may be regarded as experts in the area of gender issues.

Hypotheses The specific hypotheses that we consider are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: We expect that African-Americans will be more likely than whites to focus on "black interest" bills, and that women will be more likely than men to introduce "women's interest" bills. We also expect that women and African-American representatives will be more likely than their white male counterparts to introduce legislation pertaining to education, health care, child welfare, and poverty. Hypothesis 2: We expect that each group will support the other policy interests;

blacks will be more likely than whites to introduce "women s interest" bills, and women will be more likely than men to introduce "black interest" bills. Hypothesis 3: Women will be as likely as men to achieve passage of their

legislative proposals. However, African-Americans will be less likely than their white colleagues to achieve passage of the legislation that they introduce. We also expect that black interest bills will be less likely to pass than

other bills, but that black interest bills introduced by black sponsors will be more likely to pass than black interest bills introduced by white sponsors. We expect that women s interest bills will be more likely to pass if introduced by female sponsors.

Data Our observations consist of all bills introduced in 1969, 1979, and 1989 in the

lower houses of the state legislatures in Arkansas, California, Illinois, Maryland,


664 Kathleen A. Bratton and Kerry L. Haynie New Jersey, and North Carolina.2 Only substantive proposals for new laws were

counted as bill introductions; nonbinding resolutions and memorials were excluded from our analysis. We chose these six states to provide variance in region, in the ratio of the percentage black in the population to the percentage black in the legislature, and in party control of the legislature.

We coded each bill according to its substantive content. For this study, we are concerned with seven issue categories: women's issues, black interest issues, education, health care, children's issues, welfare policy, and government spending.3 In this study, black interest legislation includes those bills that may decrease racial discrimination or alleviate the effects of such discrimination, and those

that are intended to improve the socioeconomic status of African-Americans. Some specific examples are: a bill that requires school integration and a bill that increases funding of sickle-cell anemia research. Similarly, women's interest legislation includes those bills that may decrease gender discrimination or alleviate the effects of such discrimination, and those that are intended to improve the so-

cioeconomic status of women. Some specific examples are: an equal pay act, a bill that provides or regulates day care services, and a bill that requires insurance coverage of mammography. Bills that, in the judgment of the authors, hindered the social, economic, or political advancement of African-Americafts or women 2For New Jersey, bills introduced in 1978 and 1988 were included rather than bills introduced in 1979 and 1989, respectively; state elections were held in 1968, 1977, and 1987, and the years following were those with substantial legislative activity.

3Bills could be placed in more than one category. Introducer lists found in the various state legislative documents were used to match legislators with their proposals. When a distinction was made

between primary and secondary sponsors, only primary sponsors were included (though bills could have multiple primary sponsors). Education measures generally were those involving education curriculum, education personnel, regulation of students, school board policies and regulations, and financing of education, from pre-

kindergarten through higher education (including vocational and adult education). Health policy legislation generally included measures addressing illnesses (including occupational and environmental illnesses); policies regarding the handicapped and disabled; health insurance, Medicare, and

Medicaid; or regulation of medical facilities, personnel, equipment, training, and treatment. Children's policy included such issues as juvenile court policy, child protection policy, child care, child

support, foster care and adoption of children, or children's health. Welfare policy included measures that may alleviate poverty and measures regulating government aid to the poor, such as those dealing with public aid, Medicaid, AFDC, utility lifelines, SSI, food stamps, low-income housing, homelessness, minimum wage, foster care, or educational aid for the disadvantaged, etc. Education measures

generally were those involving educational curriculum, teacher pay and benefits, regulation of students, or educational finance from kindergarten through higher education, including vocational

education. Health policy legislation generally included measures addressing illnesses (including occupational and environmental illnesses); policies regarding the handicapped and disabled; health insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid; or regulation of medical facilities, personnel, equipment, train-

ing, and treatment. Children's policy includes such issues as juvenile court policy, child protection

policy, child care, child support, foster care and adoption of children, or children's health. Welfare policy included measures that may alleviate poverty and measures regulating government aid to the poor,

such as those dealing with public aid, Medicaid, AFDC, utility lifelines, SSI, food stamps, low-income housing, homelessness, minimum wage, foster care, or educational aid for the disadvantaged, etc.



were not included in these categories. For example, bills that attempted to preserve school segregation or end affirmative action were not considered black interest bills. Similarly, a 1969 Maryland bill that proposed requiring a prescrip-

tion for a pregnancy test was not considered a women's interest bill. Thus, black interests were defined in an explicitly liberal fashion, and women's interests were defined in an explicitly feminist fashion.

Methods

Agenda Setting: Bill Introduction

In hypotheses 1 and 2, we outlined our expectations that blacks and women would be more likely than white men to introduce bills focusing on black interests, women's interests, education, health care, children, and welfare policy. The unit of analysis is the individual legislator; we measure the dependent variable, Bill Introduction, as the number of bills introduced that year in that state in a

particular issue category (e.g., black interests). Because our dependent variable is an event count, we use negative binomial regression analysis (King 1988, 1989). In all analyses, we include five dummy variables to control for state effects (omitting New Jersey as a reference category) and two dummy variables to control for year effects (omitting 1969 as a reference category).

To determine the effects of gender and race, we use three dummy variables: Black, Female, and Black Female. In addition to the race and the gender of the

legislator, we include Party as an explanatory variable; Democrats and Republicans tend to have different attitudes about the size and scope of government, and thus party affiliation might influence the substantive content of a legislator's bill introductions (Jacobson 1992). We also control for seniority because seniority is likely to contribute to and enhance a representative's expertise in certain policy areas (Hibbing 1991, 1993). Seniority is measured as the number of consecutive years in the legislature.

To distinguish between a descriptive representation model and a constituency representation model, we include in our model the racial composition of the legislator's district measured as the percentage black in the district (logged), as well

as a dummy variable coded 1 if the district has a black majority and 0 otherwise.4 We also control for the urbanness of the district. Previous studies show that ur-

ban areas are more likely to elect female representatives (Welch 1985);5 given the distinct set of social problems that tend to disproportionately afflict cities

(such as homelessness, AIDS, and high levels of school attrition), it is reasonable 4We also tested other specifications of racial composition in the district (such as percentage black in the district + percentage black in the district2); these specifications did not improve the linear fit of the data.

51n our sample, the mean largest city for districts represented by women (495,480) was substantially higher than the mean largest city for districts represented by men (426,388).


666 Kathleen A. Bratton and Keriy L. Haynie to expect that legislators from urban areas, regardless of their race or gender, may be more likely to introduce legislation related to these policy areas. Drawing on the work of Herring (1990), we measure urbanness as the size of the largest

city in the legislative district (logged). Finally, recognizing that predominantly black districts in urban areas may differ in important ways from both predominantly white districts in urban areas and predominantly black districts in rural

areas (Combs, Hibbing, and Welch 1984; Whitby 1985), we control for the interaction between urbanness and percentage black; this variable is coded 1 if the

district is majority black and if the largest city in the district has a population over 100,000, and coded 0 otherwise. Given that a legislator's behavior is af-

fected by his or her role within the institution (Patterson and Wahlke 1978), we control for membership on relevant committees.6 We also control for the legislator's overall sponsorship activity. Bill Passage In hypothesis 3, we outlined our expectation that blacks will be less likely than whites to achieve passage of the bills they introduce, and that black interest bills will be less likely than other bills to pass. We also hypothesize that women's interests bills introduced by women will be more likely to pass than other women's interest bills, and that black interest bills introduced by blacks will be more likely

to pass than other black interest bills. In analyzing bill passage, we use the individual bills as the units of analysis and present a LOGIT analysis from each state.7 Since bills may have multiple sponsors, we measure race as the proportion of sponsors of the bill that are black, and gender as the proportion of sponsors that are female.8 In this analysis, we control for the proportion of sponsors that belong to the majority party. We control for seniority (averaged across sponsors); more senior members of a legislature tend to be more knowledgeable of legisla-

tive rules and procedures (Frantzich 1979; Hibbing 1991, 1993) and thus more successful in achieving passage of their legislation. As noted previously, women 6 Coding decisions for membership on a committee relevant to a particular issue category were made according to patterns of referral of bills to committee as well as previous research regarding gender and committee membership (see, e.g., Thomas 1994). More detailed information regarding

the coding of relevant committees is available from the authors upon request.

7We choose the bill as the unit of analysis for two reasons. First, it allows us to test more effectively our hypothesis regarding black interest bills and women's interest bills. Second, it allows us to

control directly for the type of measure introduced (i.e., taxation measure, appropriation measure, etc.). When analyzing individual legislators, however, it is clear that in each state blacks are less suc-

cessful than whites in bill passage. In Arkansas, black legislators passed an average of 58% of the legislation they sponsored, compared with an average of 59% for whites. In California, the figures were 53% and 58%, respectively; in Illinois, the figures were 38% and 51%, respectively. In Maryland, black legislators passed an average of 25% of the legislation they sponsored, compared with an average of 33% for whites. In New Jersey, the figures were 8% and 25%, respectively; in North Carolina, the figures were 20% and 43%, respectively.

8 Approximately three-quarters of the bills have single sponsors.


Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures 667 tend to be elected from more urban districts (Welch 1985) and blacks tend to be

elected from districts with a high percentage of black citizens (Button and Hedge 1993). Legislators may be more likely to achieve passage on bills that directly af-

fect their district and enhance their reelection prospects (Arnold 1990; Jacobson 1992). Thus, we control for the size of the largest city and the percentage black in the district, averaged across sponsors. Because legislators in leadership positions may be particularly effective at passing legislation, we include as a control

variable the proportion of sponsors that are in the legislative leadership or chair committees to which bills are referred. We also include a dummy variable coded

1 if a bill has multiple sponsors, because bills with multiple sponsors may be more likely to pass (Browne 1985). We hypothesize above that blacks will be more likely to focus on certain policy areas than whites, but less likely to achieve passage of legislation. It is certainly possible that blacks are less likely to achieve passage of legislation in part because of the type of bill introduced. Thus in the LOGIT analysis, we include seven dummy variables to control for whether the bill is a black interest bill, a women's interest bill, an education bill, a health policy bill, a children's interest bill, a welfare policy bill, or an appropriation bill. We also include a

dummy variable for taxation measures, which, due to public pressure for lower taxes, may be less popular within legislatures.

Finally, we include two dummy multiplicative variables. If the bill introduced was a black interest bill, the first took the value of the proportion of sponsors that were black (and 0 otherwise); if the bill introduced was a women's interest bill, the second took the value of the proportion of sponsors that were female (and 0

otherwise). These terms will enable us to determine whether black interest bills are more likely to pass if introduced by black sponsors, and whether women's interest bills are more likely to pass if introduced by women sponsors. Results

The results of the analysis examining the effects of race and gender in the context of other influences on bill introduction are reported in Table 1.9 In hypotheses 1 and 2, we expected that blacks and women would be disproportionately likely to introduce legislation focusing on "black interests" and

"women's interests". These hypotheses are supported.10 Race exerts a powerful influence on the introduction of black interest bills; black legislators introduce more black interest bills than do other legislators. Similarly, women are more

9 While there are differences across states, in no state are parameter estimates both statistically significant and in a direction opposite to that described in the paper.

1?These results are not artifacts of the difference between blacks and whites or between men and women. The average number of bills introduced by whites is 31.19, whereas the average number of bills introduced by blacks is 32.20; the average number of bills introduces by men is 31.64, whereas the average number of bills introduced by women is 27.83.


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670 Kathleen A. Bratton and Kerry L. Haynie likely than men to introduce women's interest bills. Consistent with our second hypothesis, blacks introduce more women's interest measures than do whites,

and women introduce more black interest measures than do men. Party and committee membership play a role as well; Democrats are significantly more likely

than Republicans to introduce black interest bills, and members of relevant committees are significantly more likely to introduce women's interest bills.

Constituency also plays a role in the sponsorship of group interest bills; the size of the largest city and the percentage black in the district are positively and significantly associated with the introduction of both black interest bills and

women's interest bills. Whether a district has a black majority, however, has no significant impact on the sponsorship of group interest bills. We also expected that blacks and women would be more likely than their white male colleagues to introduce legislation pertaining to education, health

care, children's issues, and welfare policy. This hypothesis appears to be generally supported. Blacks are more likely than whites to introduce bills focusing on education and welfare policy, and measures requiring government appropriations. Women sponsor a higher number of measures than do men in all

categories. Party and constituency also influence the composition of a legislator's agenda. Democrats introduce more measures than do Republicans in each category with the exception of education; party differences are most marked for black interest bills and welfare bills. Legislators from urban districts sponsor a higher number of measures focusing on health policy, the interests of children,

and welfare policy; legislators from rural districts sponsor a higher number of

appropriations measures and measures focusing on education. Thus, we have found that women and African-Americans do have a distinctive policymaking focus. Bill sponsorship is influenced not only by a legislator's party and constituency, but also by the legislator's race and gender. But does such a distinctive policy agenda translate into legislative success? That is, is the race and gender of the sponsor related to the bill's chance of passage? A summary of the LOGIT analysis of bill passage, presenting the direction and significance of the parameter estimates, is presented in Table 2. Because the results differ substantially across states, we present a LOGIT analysis from each state. The full regression results, including parameter estimates, significance lev-

els, and chi-square statistics, can be found in appendix 1-A through 1-C.11 Our hypothesis that blacks would be less likely than whites to achieve passage of their legislation is supported in three of the six states (Arkansas, California, and Illinois). We had hypothesized that female legislators would be no more or less likely than male legislators to pass bills. Our results indicate that in 1 l Because the "average" percentage black in the district, size of largest city, etc., is a somewhat indirect measure of constituency when there is more than one sponsor, we performed the LOGIT analyses on the subset of the bills that had only one sponsor (75% of bills in our original sample had one sponsor). The results are quite similar to the results presented in the paper; race is significantly and negatively associated with passage in Arkansas, California, Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey.


TABLE 2

Effect of Gender and Race on Bill Passage AR Intercept

CA

+

IL

++

MD

++

NJ

NC

++

Characteristics of Sponsors

Proportion of Black Sponsors -- -- -Proportion of Female Sponsors + + Proportion of Sponsors in Majority

Party

+

+

+

+

--

+

+

+

Proportion of Sponsors in Leadership Bill

Has

+

Multiple

Average

+

+

Sponsors

+

++

+

++

Seniority

+

++

+ ++

++

+ + +

Average Size of Largest City (logged)

--

--

--

--

Average Percent Black in

District

(logged)

--

+

+

Proportion of Sponsors from Majority-Black

Districts

+

+

+

+

--

Characteristics of Bills

Black Interest Women's Interest

Education Health Children's

Welfare

+

Appropriation Taxation

+

--

--

+

--

---

+

+

--

+

++

--

-

--

---

Proportion Black Sponsors X Black

Interest

Bill

+

+

Proportion Female Sponsor X Women's Interest Bill 1979 1989

+

++

Number of Cases 2,249 6,515 8,550 3,690 6,955 4,998 Concordant Predictions 62.3% 61.0% 62.5% 68.2% 79.7% 70.4%

Percent of Bills That Pass 59.9% 57.7% 46.7% 33.8% 20.3% 42.5% Probability of Passage of Bill

Introduced by Only Blacks .41 .51 .25 .17 .06 .11 Probability of Passage of Bill

Introduced by Only Whites .61 .59 .47 .34 .19 .41

Dependent variable coded 1 if bill passes, 0 otherwise

Probabilities calculated with all values set at mean values for subsamples of blacks and nonblacks, respectively

+: positive effect, p ' .05; + +: positive effect, p ' .01; -: negative effect, p ' .05; --: negative effect, p c .01 (one tailed test)


672 Kathleen A. Bratton and Kerry L. Haynie Maryland, women are significantly less likely than men to achieve passage of the

legislation they introduce, whereas in California, women are significantly more likely than men to achieve passage of the legislation they introduce. Our hy-

pothesis that sponsorship by blacks facilitates the passage of black interest bills is supported in only California, as is our hypothesis that black interest bills will

be relatively less likely to pass.

Bill subject matter does influence passage. Taxation legislation appears universally unpopular; appropriations bills are significantly more likely to pass in some states (California, Illinois, and Maryland), but significantly less likely to pass in others (Arkansas, New Jersey, and North Carolina). Legislators from urban areas tend to be less successful in bill passage than other legislators. Not surprisingly, in most of the states, being in the majority party, being part of the leadership, and having cosponsors contribute to a legislator's success in passing

bills. Increased seniority contributes to success in bill passage in Maryland and North Carolina.

Conclusions Our research tells us that black and female representatives do indeed pursue distinctive legislative policies, and that these two groups lend each other support. It is possible that, in the absence of black and women representatives, white male

legislators would step into the gap and articulate the interests of blacks and women. However, our research demonstrates that if blacks and women are pre-

sent in the legislature, it is they who pursue these interests. At the agenda-setting stage of the legislative process, they represent blacks and women in ways that white males do not.

Our findings are relevant to the arguments surrounding the creation of majorityminority districts. We see that black legislators do pursue distinctive policy agendas. The creation of majority-black districts, which facilitate the election of black representatives, is thus one path to increasing the diversity of interests on the agenda. However, although the percentage black in the district is positively associated with the sponsorship of black interest legislation, no additional significant

effect is brought about once the percentage black in the district reaches 50%. Our evidence that bills introduced by blacks are not as likely to pass as those introduced by whites raises serious questions about the fairness of the represen-

tative system. It is certainly true that this difference in passage rates is not necessarily due to racial discrimination. The most obvious alternative explanation is that the content of the bills that black representatives introduce is ideologically at odds with the mainstream. Though we attempt to investigate this

by controlling for the policy area of the legislation, more research needs to be done to investigate this possibility. Yet even if ideological differences cause racial

differences in passage, the fact remains that certain interests are less able to use the majority-rule system to accomplish legislative goals, and those interests divide



on racial lines. Indeed, our findings regarding passage indicate that the effect of

race on legislative behavior is in some ways quite different than the effect of gender on legislative behavior. This suggests that any theory of the behavior of legislative minorities must recognize differences between minorities.

We cannot predict whether the rising numbers of blacks and women in legislatures will contribute to increases in legislation in these particular policy

categories. The differences in agenda setting we observe may in fact be due to the status of these two groups as minorities within the legislature and as disad-

vantaged groups outside of the legislature. Further growth in the numbers of blacks and women in legislatures may be accompanied by less discrimination in society, and less reason to pursue distinct policies. Furthermore, independent of trends in the larger society, larger numbers of blacks and women in legislatures

may be less likely to act cohesively. Further research is needed to investigate these possibilities.

Manuscript submitted 4 September 1997 Final manuscript received 7 October 1998

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Kathleen A. Bratton is assistant professor of political science, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000.

Kerry L. Haynie is assistant professor of political science, Rutgers University-

New Brunswick, New Brunswick, NJ 08903-0270.


APPENDIX 1-A

Effect of Gender and Race on Bill Passage: Arkansas and California Arkansas

California

Parameter Standard Parameter Standard

Independent Variable Estimate Error Chi-Square Estimate Error Chi-Square Intercept

-.470

.481

.955

.504*

.233

4.671

Proportion of Black

Sponsors - 1.126** .413 7.449 -.458** .131 12.128 Proportion of Female Sponsors

.178

.282

.402

.274**

.092

8.948

Proportion of Sponsors

in Majority Party .299 .213 1.979 .603** .062 94.216 Proportion of Sponsors in

Leadership

-.104

.157

.440

.171**

.067

6.513

Bill Has Multiple Sponsors .554** .168 10.834 .182 .115 2.496 Average

Seniority

.013

.010

1.835

.010

.006

2.449

Average Size of Largest City (logged) .057 .042 1.856 -.064** .018 12.263 Average Percent Black

in District (logged) -.058** .023 6.451 .002 .027 .005 Proportion of Sponsors

from Majority-Black Districts .431* .261 2.720 .210 .230 .833

Black Interest Bill .294 .634 .215 -.785* .414 3.606 Women's Interest Bill .124 .384 .105 -.141* .204 .477 Education

Health

Bill

Bill

Children's Welfare

-.074

-.245*

Bill

Bill

.132

.139

.865**

-.048

.314

3.129

.318

.303

-.105

.097

7.425

.025

.083

.076

-.126

-.435**

1.584

1.611

.129

.118

.954

13.693

Appropriation Bill -.378** .164 5.318 .159* .077 4.264 Taxation Bill -.744** .138 29.050 -.425** .099 18.276 Proportion Black Sponsor X Black Interest Bill -.399 1.174 .115 2.584** .905 8.157 Proportion Women Sponsor X Women's Interest Bill -.985 1.864 .279 .273 .371 .541

1979 1989

.056

.299*

Number

.120 .161

of

.218

3.438

Cases

Concordant

.092

.304**

2,249

62.3%

.070

1.734

.071

18.093

6,515

61.0%

Dependent variable coded 1 if bill passes, 0 otherwise

*p ' .05 (one tailed test) * * p ' .01 (one tailed test)


APPENDIX 1-B

Effect of Gender and Race on Bill Passage: Illinois and Maryland Illinois

Maryland

Parameter Standard Parameter Standard

Independent Variables Estimate Error Chi-Square Estimate Error Chi-Square Intercept 1.019** .179 32.269 1.377** .303 20.630 Proportion of Black Sponsors

-.892**

.134

44.431

-.281

.219

1.648

Proportion of Female Sponsors

.139

.093

2.222

-.217*

.130

2.792

Proportion of Sponsors in Majority Party -.159** .062 6.527 .024 .137 .030 Proportion of Sponsors in Leadership .408** .079 26.437 .347** .118 8.668

Bill Has Multiple Sponsors .351** .058 36.946 .196** .078 6.290 Average Seniority -.008 .006 1.537 .056** .010 30.547 Average Size of Largest

City (logged) -.059** .014 16.908 -.212** .028 57.641 Average Percent Black

in District (logged) -.005 .018 .079 .102** .044 5.442 Proportion of Sponsors

from Majority-Black Districts .413** .135 9.300 -.139 .175 .635 Black Interest bill -.355 .418 .722 -.367 .816 .202

Women's Interest Bill .159 .213 .559 .173 .328 .279 Education Health

bill

Bill

.005

-.116

.079

.082

.003

2.000

-.210 .128

.174 .115

1.456 1.246

Children's Bill .299* .146 4.208 -.289* .178 2.633 Welfare Bill -.617** .129 22.718 -.439* .229 3.682 Appropriation Bill .518** .099 27.505 1.230** .265 21.585 Taxation Bill -.462** .076 36.586 -.568** .121 22.220 Proportion Black Sponsor X Black Interest Bill .623 .581 1.147 -.865 1.573 .302

Proportion Women Sponsor X Women's Interest Bill .494 .392 1.584 -.417 .595 .492 1979

1989

-

-

.555**

1.

.067

102**

Number

of

.070

68.618

Cases

Concordant

-.642**

248.118

8,550

62.6%

-.531**

.096

.103

44.725

26.331

3,690

68.2%

Dependent variable coded 1 if bill passes, 0 otherwise *p ' .05 (one tailed test) ** p ' .01 (one tailed test)


APPENDIX 1-C

Effect of Gender and Race on Bill Passage:

New Jersey and North Carolina New Jersey North Carolina Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Independent Variable Estimate Error Chi-Square Estimate Error Chi-Square Intercept

1.305*

.642

4.128

-.023

.257

1.678

.116

.321

.005

Proportion of Black Sponsors

-.332

.266

.189

Proportion of Female Sponsors

-.140

.125

1.246

.150

.116

1.664


in Majority Party .662** .083 64.072 .233* .112 4.310 Proportion of Sponsors

in Leadership .327** .076 18.416 .461** .078 34.995

Bill Has Multiple Sponsors .323** .089 13.203 .195* .118 2.711 Average

Seniority

-.010

.011

.850

.028*

.015

3.301

Average Size of Largest

City (logged) -.243** .059 16.766 .047 .031 2.375 Average Percent Black in

District

(logged)

-.034

.035

.903

.032

.050

.417


from Majority-Black Districts .514* .247 4.331 -.690** .275 6.272 Black

Interest

Bill

-.117

.473

.062

-.467

.415

1.268

Women's Interest Bill .254 .268 .900 -1.188** .398 8.919 Education

Health

Bill

-.221*

Bill

Children's Welfare

-.050

Bill

Bill

.115

-.130

.031

3.659

.096

.210

.176

-.417**

.266

.096

.383

.031

.172

-.136

.128

10.583

.116

.201 .271

.687

.732 .250

Appropriation Bill -.163* .099 2.727 -1.786** .104 297.026 Taxation Bill -.589** .129 20.837 -.633** .117 29.319 Proportion Black Sponsor X Black Interest Bill -2.870 2.781 1.065 .072 .712 .010

Proportion Women Sponsor X Women's Interest Bill -.268 .552 .236 .750 .572 1.720

1979 1989

-.137 -.946**

Number

.095 .108

of

2.093 77.042

Cases

Concordant

-

1.024**

-

1.63

6,955

79.7%

1**

.104

96.475

.110

221.044

4,988

70.4%

Dependent variable coded 1 if bill passes, 0 otherwise *p ' .05 (one tailed test) ** p ' .01 (one tailed test)
