Alternative approaches to deindividuation

VOL. 84, No. 6

NOVEMBER 1977

Psychological Bulletin Copyright © 1977 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

Alternative Approaches to Deindividuation Robert L. Dipboye Department of Administrative Sciences Purdue University There have been two different approaches to deindividuation research and theory. One approach has been to view deindividuation as a loss of restraints, afforded by anonymity and other forms of depersonalization. Theorists adopting this perspective, which has its origins in crowd theory, view the experience of deindividuation as a positively affective event. Theorists adopting the other view predict that deindividuation arouses negative affect and serves as a stimulus for behavior that establishes the uniqueness and continuity of a person's self-conceptions. Research testing each approach is reviewed, and areas for possible integration are posited. Individuation was defined by Jung (1946) as "the development of the psychological individual as a differentiated being from the general, collective psychology. Individuation, therefore, is a process of differentiation, having for its goal the development of the individual personality" (p. 561). Individuation has been equated with maturity and selfactualization, whereas deindividuation, the process of losing one's distinctiveness or individuality, has been described as dysfunctional for both the individual and society. Violence in urban areas (Zimbardo, 1969), the lack of creativity in big organizations (Whyte, 1956), the conventionalization of consumer tastes (Van Den Haag, 1957), the dehumanization of women (Friedan, 1963), and student alienation (Keniston, 1970; Reich, 1970) are only a few of the The author wishes to thank Kay Deaux, Howard Fromkin, Don King, and Eric Sundstrom for their helpful comments during the preparation of this article. Requests for reprints should be sent to Robert L. Dipboye, Department of Administrative Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907.

problems cited as symptoms of a deindividuating culture. Despite the relevance of deindividuation to current social problems, the psychological and sociological literature on the topic has been guided by two different theoretical approaches. As a consequence, much of the research and theory lacks integration. According to one view, nonnormative behavior such as aggression, sexual deviance, and vandalism is held in check when the person is a discriminable stimulus in the social environment. Deindividuating inputs reduce moral restraints and may unleash a contagion of random, irrational, and destructive behavior. This is not an undesirable experience for the individual. To the contrary, contemporary man, similar to the invisible man of the H. G. Wells (1897/1968) novel, seeks the anonymity of the mass movement (Hoffer, 1951) or the crowd (Le Bon, 1896) to achieve power and escape inhibitive societal restraints. In contrast with the first perspective, the second posits that man actively seeks a separate and unique identity. A loss of identity

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arouses negative affect and a renewed search for identity. If deindividuation as a loss of restraints may be illustrated by H. G. Well's invisible man, then the appropriate example of deindividuation as identity seeking would be Ralph Ellison's (1947) invisible man, who desperately searches for an identity that a racist society has denied: "You ache with the need to convince yourself that you do exist in the real world, that you're a part of all the sound and anguish and you strike out with your fists, you curse and you swear to make them recognize you. And, alas, it's seldom successful" (p. 8). Several theorists have predicted that conditions reducing one's self-perceived uniqueness (Fromkin, Note 1) and leading to identity diffusion (Erikson, 1968) motivate behavior in the direction of establishing or maintaining a sense of self. If this search involves violence, it is a retaliation against the source of the deindividuation and a reaffirmation of identity, rather than a loss of self-control resulting from the freedom of anonymity. When comparing deindividuation as a release of restraints with deindividuation as a search for identity, one becomes aware of a dialectic. On the one hand, anonymity and the submergence of identity are pleasurable because the self-consciousness that inhibits behavior is minimized. On the other hand, there is the desire to be a discriminable stimulus in the social environment, to define one's self as a unique individual and to maximize a sense of self. This dialectic has been a common theme in the writings of humanistic and existential personality theorists, such as Fromm (1964), Homey (1942), Jung (19S8), Buhler (1951), Angyal (1941), Rogers (1954), Allport (1955), and Maslow (1968). According to these theorists, it is human nature to be unique, and any denial of this uniqueness does harm to the capacity to be spontaneous and creative. Thus, a person who yields to the homogeneity of a deindividuating environment may experience basic changes in personality, in which he or she clings to safety and defensiveness out of fear, tending to regress backward, hanging on the past, afraid

to grow away from the primitive communication with the mother's uterus and breast, afraid to take chances, afraid to jeopardize what he [or she] already has, afraid of independence, freedom and separateness (Maslow, 1968, p. 46).

In the present article, an examination is made of these two approaches to deindividuation, that is, deindividuation as a loss of restraint and deindividuation as a stimulus for identity seeking. The theory and research associated with each conceptual approach are reviewed and evaluated, and suggestions are made for integrating the deindividuation area. Unrestrained Behavior as a Consequence of Deindividuation The largest portion of the social-psychological research on the topic of deindividuation consists of tests of the hypothesis that a loss of identity is the stimulus for unrestrained, impulsive, and uncontrolled behavior (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952; Singer, Brush, & Lublin, 1965; Zimbardo, 1969). The conceptual origins of this view can be traced to crowd theorists, such as Le Bon (1896), Sighele (1901), Tarde (1890/1903), and McDougall (1920), who posited that in a crowd a "group mind" forms in which "the sentiments and ideas of all the persons in the gathering take one and the same direction, and their conscious personality vanishes" (Ross, 1959, p. 431). The dissolution of identity, in turn, acts as a stimulus for the impulsive and irrational behavior of the crowd. Similarly, a psychoanalytic interpretation of crowd behavior is that members of a crowd come to share a common ego-ideal, and through identification with this ideal, participants give up their individual superegos (Freud, 1922/ 1960; Strecker, 1940; Waelder, 1939). With an abandonment of superego, there is a loss of restraint. Jung (1946) proposed that a loss of identity in a crowd releases the violent, primitive side of human nature as evidenced in a "frenzy of unmeasured instinct. It represents horror at the annihilation of the principle of individuation, and at the same time 'rapturous delight' at its destruc-

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tion. The Dionysian is, therefore, comparable to frenzy which dissolves the individual into collective instincts and contents" (p. 261). Deindividuating Inputs

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person becomes an object of his or her own attention (Wicklund, 1975). Second, it has been discussed as the awareness that one is the object of the perceptions of others (Argyle, 1969; Baldwin, 1902; Mead, 1934; Shibutani, 1961). Being an object of one's own perceptions or the perceptions of others is often described as inhibitive. Argyle (1969, p. 373) stated that self-consciousness is "related to ... social anxiety, which is associated with appearing in public, being the center of attention, and being watched by others." In his theory of objective selfawareness, Wicklund (1975) predicted that when persons become objects of their own experience, they are more aware of disparities between their present condition (actual self) and their aspirations (ideal self). In most cases, the discrepancy will be negative, such that a person perceives that he or she has failed to achieve ideals, and as a consequence experiences negative affect and selfcriticism. Deindividuating inputs have been predicted to release restraints against many behaviors by lessening a person's self-focused attention and concern for how he or she appears to others. According to Zimbardo (1969), lowered self-consciousness results in "weakening of controls based upon guilt, shame, fear, and commitment" (p. 259).

Experimental social psychologists have taken the concepts of the crowd theorists and have attempted to state in a more systematic and operational fashion the conditions that create a release of restraints. Most theorists predict that deindividuation will result from conditions that lessen a person's identifiability. In the first deindividuation experiment, Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb (1952) operationalized deindividuation as the degree of identifying that goes on within a group. In a deindividuating group, an individual member does not attend to or remember what other members are doing, and the member believes that others in the group are also oblivious to individual actions. Similarly, Singer, Brush, and Lublin (1965) believed that the perception that one is a nondistinct stimulus in the social environment is the primary deindividuating input. Zimbardo (1969) stated that anonymity, large group size, the sharing, giving up, or diffusion of responsibility, and the presence of coacting others were deindividuating inputs. However, he went beyond typical deindividuation analyses by including in his The Response to Deindividuation list of input variables such diverse conditions as altered temporal perspective (present exSome theorists have stated that deindividupanded, future and past distanced), arousal ating inputs lower self-consciousness and (such as that induced by dancing and ritual), thereby lead to the appearance of behaviors sensory input overload, physical involvement that were previously restrained. Thus, a perin an act, reliance on proprioceptive feedback son may not curse when individuated but and activity of others rather than cognitive does so when deindividuated, or, given the feedback, novel or unstructured situations, protection of anonymity, an individual may and altered states of consciousness (such as express intimate feelings normally restrained. those induced by drugs, sleep, or alcohol). However, Zimbardo (1969) has defined the response to deindividuation as not merely Mediating Subjective Events unrestrained but as a Most theorists predicting a release of restraints have stated that a reduction in selfconsciousness is the critical mediator of input and response. Self-consciousness has been assigned two meanings. First, it has been defined as a self-focused response in which a

high intensity manifestation of behavior which observers would agree is emotional, impulsive, irrational or atypical for the person in a given situation. But that is not enough. In addition, the behavior must not be under discriminative stimulus control. It must be unresponsive to features of the situation, the target, the victim, or the state of self

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which normally evoke a given level of response or a competing response, (p. 259)

In order to test the hypothesis that deindividuating inputs will result in unrestrained behavior or in the nihilistic behavior described by Zimbardo, social psychologists have created deindividuating situations and predicted increases in normally restrained behaviors such as aggression, risk taking, nonconformity, self-enhancement, self-disclosure, expression of obscenities, theft, and cheating. Aggression The effects of aggressor anonymity. The frequency and intensity of aggressive acts have been hypothesized to increase as the probability decreases that individuals within a group will be identified or singled out by authority figures, coacting others, observers outside the group, or the victim. In confirmation of a deindividuation hypothesis, Watson (1973) found that 12 of 13 cultures classified as aggressive masked identity before battle by such means as body or face paint, special garments, masks, and haircuts. Only 3 of the 10 nonaggressive cultures were found to change appearance before battle. Although provocative, an archival study such as that of Watson is subject to other explanations besides deindividuation theory. In several laboratory and field studies, social psychologists have manipulated the anonymity or distinctiveness of the aggressor to provide a clearer test of the hypothesis. Several studies have supported deindividuation notions. Donnerstein, Donnerstein, Simon, and Ditrichs (1971) found that white college students delivered higher intensity shocks to a black victim when the victim could neither see nor identify the aggressor than when the victim could see the aggressor. Dion (1970) manipulated the identifiability of the subject with respect to the experimenter and found that subjects who could not be seen by the experimenter administered longer durations of a noxious noise to a victim than did subjects who were identifiable to the experimenter. Zimbardo (1969) imposed anonymity on individuals in groups of three by hav-

ing these individuals wear hoods and baggy clothes. Also, responsibility for their actions was diffused among members of the group, and the experimenter treated them impersonally during the session. Individuated subjects were clearly identified throughout the session and had individual responsibility for their actions. In confirmation of the hypothesis, subjects who were deindividuated administerd shocks of longer duration than did individuated subjects. Not all research supports the hypothesized effects of anonymity. Diener (1976) found no differences in aggression between anonymous and identifiable subjects. However, analysis of a manipulation check revealed that anonymous subjects felt less identifiable only with regard to the victim and not the experimenter or other subjects. Several other studies suggest that anonymity may, on occasion, decrease rather than increase aggression. Baron (1970) found that subjects visible to the victim showed greater aggression when they wore hoods and labcoats rather than their own clothes and name tags. However, when subjects were not visible to the victim, those subjects wearing hoods and lab coats aggressed less than those wearing more distinctive garments. Zabrick and Miller (1972) found that aggression was more frequent when subjects were identifiable than when they were anonymous. Similarly, Zimbardo (1969) found that Belgian soldiers who were made anonymous with hoods and baggy clothes administered less shock than did soldiers who were identifiable. One inhibiting consequence of anonymity may be to prevent a person within a group from obtaining social support for their aggressive acts. The inhibiting effects of anonymity seem more likely to occur in an established group or a group of acquaintances, since an individual is more likely to seek support from such a group than from a group of strangers. In partial support of this contention, Zabrick and Miller (1972) found that friends who were identifiable felt better about punishing a victim than friends who were anonymous. The effects of group presence. Paloutzian (1972) found that subjects who were seated

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alone in booths aggressed more when they believed there were subjects performing the same task in other booths than when they believed they were the only subjects. Most research has indicated that the presence of a group inhibits rather than encourages aggression. Diener, Westford, Dineen, and Fraser (1973) and Baron (197 la) have reported more aggression among subjects who were alone than among subjects who were in groups. Similarly, Diener (1976) found that subjects given the opportunity to aggress in groups of three aggressed less than subjects who were alone. It may be that before the presence of others can lower selfconsciousness and lead to increased aggression there must be coacting others. For instance, Wheeler (1966) has hypothesized that feelings of anonymity follow rather than precede the observation of others who are committing an act and are "getting away with it." However, a group that is aggressing at low levels or not at all may be seen as a potential audience of one's own acts. Thus, the presence of a passive audience heightens self-consciousness and reduces the frequency of aggression. The effects of responsibility diffusion. Diener, Dineen, Westford, Beaman, and Fraser (197S) found that subjects who were told that the experimenter would take responsibility for the consequences of their actions, in comparison with subjects who were told that they would have to assume responsibility for their own behavior, displayed more aggression against a passive victim. Aggression was measured by observing the extent to which subjects threw newspaper balls, shot rubber bands and ping pong balls at a victim, and struck the victim with a foam sword. Also, subjects led to believe the experiment was merely a game and those given an aggressive model aggressed more than subjects given a more serious cognitive set and a nonaggressive model. Despite the high aggression that resulted from the manipulations, analysis of postexperimental items failed to show dehumanization of the victim, time distortion, loss of memory, and many of the characteristics of the deindividuated state described by Zimbardo (1969).

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The effects of arousal. Diener (1976) found that subjects who were aroused through the prior physical activity of throwing rocks and bottles against a wall aggressed more against a passive victim than did subjects who were not aroused. Consistent with a deindividuation hypothesis, aroused subjects, in comparison with nonaroused subjects, evidenced less concern over evaluation, were less self-conscious, were less accurate in recalling their aggressive acts, and felt more anonymous with respect to the victim and the experimenter. However, an alternative explanation is that the act of throwing objects against a wall served as an unintended cue to subjects that they should aggress against the victim. The effects of objective self-awareness. According to Wicklund's (197S) theory of objective self-awareness, when one is selffocused as the result of such experiences as listening to one's own voice or viewing oneself in a mirror, discrepancies between standards and behavior become apparent. A loss of restraint may result from a reduction in objective self-awareness. In support of this notion, Scheier, Fenigstein, and Buss (1974) found that more intense electric shocks were administered by subjects when they were not self-focused than when their objective selfawareness was heightened as the result of viewing their mirror image. Carver (1974) demonstrated that when a standard exists in favor of aggression, lowered self-awareness may decrease rather than increase aggressive acts. Subjects were assigned the role of teacher under instructions that a high level of electric shock would facilitate learning. Those viewing themselves in a mirror administered more intense electric shocks to male victims than those not confronted with their mirror image. The effects of victim distinctiveness. Turner, Lay ton, and Simons (197S) manipulated victim visibility by either closing or keeping open the back curtain of the cabin of a pickup truck. Drivers were more likely to aggress via horn honking when the curtain was drawn and the driver of the pickup was not visible. Another manner in which a victim may become more identifiable to an ag-

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gressor is by means of visual and auditory cues that reflect the victim's pain. Aggression has been shown to increase as both visual and auditory cues decrease in frequency (Baron, 1971b, 1971c; Buss, 1966a, 1966b; Geen, 1968; Tilker, 1970). Milgram (1974) found that subjects in close physical proximity to the victim were less likely to obey the experimenter's demand to administer shocks than were subjects who were removed from the victim and could only hear his protests. Similarly, aerial bombing or a highpowered rifle at long range may depersonalize the act of killing by removing the aggressor from the victim and decreasing the number of immediately recognizable effects. Also, one could predict that as identifiability of the victim increases as the result of background information (e.g., the victim's occupation and attitudes), restraints against aggression also increase. Seeing and knowing the victim may allow the aggressor to empathize with that person and vicariously experience his or her pain. Such empathy could heighten the aggressor's awareness of his or her own acts and the consequences of these acts, thereby restraining aggression. Risk Taking Theorists have predicted that the loss of identity resulting from participation in a crowd causes a diffusion of responsibility and increases individual and group willingness to take risks. In partial confirmation of this hypothesis, Pincus (1969) found that shifts toward risk on the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire increased as measured identifiability within the group decreased. Identifiability was measured using procedures described by Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb (1952). An experiment conducted by Nicholson and Argyle (cited in Argyle, 1969) demonstrated that total anonymity was not necessary for a risky shift to occur. Subjects wearing nondistinctive clothing were found to shift more toward risk than did subjects wearing distinctive clothing. Reactions to Social Influence Attempts Deindividuating inputs have been hypothesized to increase the frequency of noncon-

formity and noncompliance to social influence attempts. In several experiments, subjects who were anonymous have been found to conform less than identified subjects. For instance, Deutsch and Gerard (19SS) found significantly more yielding to an incorrect majority judgment among subjects who announced their judgments publicly than among subjects whose judgments were anonymous. A number of other researchers have reported similar findings (Argyle, 1957; Asch, 1956; Gorden, 1952; Kelley & Volkhart, 1952; Mouton, Blake, & Olmstead, 1956). Although all these experiments compared anonymity with a condition of identifiability, a partial reduction of identity cues may be sufficient to reduce self-consciousness and increase nonconformity. Evidence of this was provided by Singer, Brush, and Lublin (1965), who found that subjects wearing identical lab coats conformed less to a group judgment than did subjects wearing more distinctive clothing. Duval (1976) found that subjects who were made aware of themselves by confrontation with their mirror images conformed more than subjects not confronted with a mirror. In a second experiment, subjects who were told that they were similar to only 5% of 10,000 other college students were more likely to conform than subjects told that they were similar to 50% or 95% of the college students. According to Duval, feedback that one is different heightens objective self-awareness, leads to the perception that one's beliefs are discrepant from those of one's peer group, and results in efforts to reduce this discrepancy. Objective selfawareness should be less intense for those believing themselves to be highly similar to their peer group. Self-Presentation and Self-Disclosure Because of potential social disapproval, self-enhancement and self-disclosure are normally inhibited, and a state of deindividuation should reduce those inhibitions. The first test of this hypothesis was conducted by Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb (1952). Participants in the experiment were asked to discuss their feelings of hostility toward their

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preme Court definition of what constitutes pornography and were asked to decide if a particular passage was obscene. Half the groups were given a passage from Lady Chatterley's Lover and the other half were given an innocuous passage containing a discussion of a liberal arts education. Subjects were deprived of identity cues by being made to wear bluejeans, smocks, and other nondistinctive clothing. Subjects in the individuated condition were asked to wear dress clothes, were given name tags, and were told they would be photographed. In a discussion of the sexually explicit passages, subjects possessing few identity cues evidenced a more frequent use of obscene words and a greater quantity of discussion than did individual subjects. Other behaviors that are normally restrained when persons are individuated but that may appear with deindividuation are stealing and cheating on exams. Diener and his associates have reported several experiments in which deindividuation resulted in a loss of restraints against both behaviors. Diener, Fraser, Beaman, and Kelem (1976) observed over 1,300 trick-or-treating children on Halloween night. In the nonanonymous conditions the children were asked their names and where they lived, whereas in the anonymous conditions children were not asked this information. Also, children who were alone were compared with children who were in groups. Finally, in some groups one child was assigned the responsibility for any theft and in other conditions there was individual responsibility. The highest rate of stealing occurred in the anonymous-group conditions in which one child was assigned the responsibility (80%), followed by the anonymous group with individual responsibility (57%), the anonymous-alone conditions (21%), nonanonymous-group conditions (21%), and the nonanonymous-alone conditions (7%). In a Other Antinormative Behavior second Halloween study, Diener, Westford, Diener, and Beaman (1973) observed theft Singer, Brush, and Lublin (1965) pre- among children who were either alone or in dicted that only a partial reduction of idengroups and who were aroused with ghost tity cues would be sufficient to reduce social restraints against one type of antinormative sounds or physical exercise or who were behavior, the expression of sexually explicit unaroused. Children who were aroused by language. Groups of coeds were given a Su- sounds or by exercise and who were in groups

parents, on the assumption that guilt and fear of disapproval would place restraints on publicly speaking ill of one's parents. In order to measure anonymity, participants were asked to identify the source of each of a number of statements resulting from the discussion. A loss of restraints was measured by subtracting the number of positive statements from the number of negative statements made about parents by an individual. The correlation between identifiability and the release-of-restraints measure was .45, indicating that the fewer the number of others who could correctly identify a participant, the greater the release of restraints. This finding was replicated by Cannavale, Scarr, and Pepitone (1970). Loeb (1961) tested the hypothesis with experimental groups consisting of three or four persons. Subjects sat in separate booths and responded to a series of personal questions with the expectation that they would later read each other's writing. The questions dealt with negative personality traits, premarital intercourse, and other topics that are not discussed under normal circumstances. In the unidentified condition, subjects did not meet each other and did not sign their communications. In the identified conditions, subjects did meet each other prior to the experiment and signed all their communications. In confirmation of the hypothesis, anonymity reduced restraints, but more so for females than males. For instance, anonymous females, relative to identified females, described themselves in more self-enhancing terms. The differences between anonymous and identified females were not found for the males. Apparently, social restraints on self-enhancement and disclosure were weaker for males than for females. Maslach (1972) reported similar self-disclosure afforded by deindividuation.

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stole more candy than children who were not aroused or who were alone. Diener and Wallbom (1976) made half of their subjects self-aware by seating them in front of a mirror and having them listen to their own tape-recorded voice and made the other half non-self-aware as the result of sitting to the side of a mirror and listening to another's voice. Consistent with deindividuation notions and Wicklund's (1975) theory of objective self-awareness, more subjects who were non-self-aware (71%) cheated on an anagram task than did subjects who were self-aware (7%). Perhaps the most unusual example of how deindividuating inputs may allow the release of normally restrained behavior was reported by Gergen, Gergen, and Barton (1973). Half the subjects were left for an hour in a totally dark room with eight other students under instructions that there were no rules as to what they should do together. Almost 90% of those in the dark rooms purposefully touched each other and approximately 50% hugged, but almost none in the lighted room exhibited these behaviors. In a second study, half the subjects in the dark room were told that they would be introduced after the session and the other half that they would be guaranteed anonymity. According to the authors, "Subjects who were told they would be introduced after the session were less likely to explore the chamber, more likely to feel bored, less likely to introduce themselves, less likely to hug, less likely to feel close to another person, and more likely to feel panicky" (p. 130). Subjective Reactions to Deindividuation According to the loss-of-restraints approach, deindividuation is a pleasurable experience. Unfortunately, only a few researchers have measured the affective consequences of anonymity, diffusion of responsibility, arousal, and the other inputs used to deindividuate. Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb (1952) found a correlation of .36 (p < .10) between their reduction-of-restraint measure and attraction to the group, indicating that the loss of restraint afforded by

deindividuation tended to be associated with liking for the group. Similarly, Singer, Brush, and Lublin (1965) found that as the number of obscenities increased in response to deindividuation, positive attraction for the group also increased. Gergen, Gergen, and Barton (1973) observed that subjects placed in a dark room "gained deep enjoyment and volunteered to return without pay" (p. 130). Also, about 80% reported being sexually aroused, compared with about 30% of subjects in the lighted room. Diener (1976) found that subjects aroused through prior destructive activity were not only more aggressive than nonaroused subjects but were less concerned over what other group members thought of them and were less selfconscious. However, subjects deindividuated by means of arousal were no more attracted to the group than were nonaroused subjects. In another study, Diener, Dineen, Westford, Beaman, and Fraser (1975) could find no evidence for an internal state of deindividuation, although they successfully increased aggression with the deindividuating input of responsibility diffusion. Identity Seeking as a Consequence of Deindividuation In contrast with the first theoretical approach, the second depicts deindividuation as an unpleasant experience that motivates the individual to seek individuation. Identity seeking is the term employed in the present article to describe the behavior that is instrumental to affirming the identity of a person who has been deindividuated. The origins of this position are the humanistic theorists such as Fromm (1965), Homey (1950), Maslow (1968), and Laing (1960) who have stated that humans have a need for a separate identity. For instance, Laing (1960) has described self-consciousness not only as a form of inhibition but also as a feeling vital to maintaining identity. To lose one's selfawareness may lead to the anxiety described by one of Laing's patients: "When I suddenly realized I hadn't been thinking of myself, I was frightened to death. The unreality feeling came. I must never forget myself for a single minute" (Laing, 1960,

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p. 109). Similar to Zimbardo's (1969) deindividuated person, Maslow's (1968) selfactualizing person is totally involved in his or her behavior and is unrestrained: "The creator becomes one with his [or her] work being created, the mother feels one with her child, the appreciator becomes the music" (p. 105). One difference between Zimbardo's deindividuated person and the self-actualizing person described by Maslow is that the former loses his or her self-consciousness in the midst of involvement, whereas the latter retains it (see Maslow, 1968, p. 105). Fromm (1956) stated that humans struggle between the need to escape separateness and the need for a separate identity. Unfortunately, people too often succumb to the former tendency by resorting to conformity, alcoholism, drug addiction, compulsive sexualism, suicide, and obsessive work. Still, humans in our mass society delude themselves into believing they are individuals: Since there is still a need to feel some individuality such need is satisfied with regard to minor differences: the initials on the handbag or the sweater, the name plate of the bank teller, the belonging to the Democratic as against the Republican party, to the Elks instead of to the Shriners become the expression of individual differences. The advertising slogan "it is different" shows up this pathetic need for difference, when in reality there is hardly any left. (Fromm, 1956, p. 12)

Deindividuating Inputs One of the few formal presentations of the objective conditions that stimulate a search for identity was by Ziller (1964): "A person's reactions with respect to individuation vary inversely with the number of bits of information necessary to locate him or her unequivocally within a group of persons; that is, the greater the number of bits of information required to locate the person, the greater the degree of de-individuation" (p. 345). Among the conditions that increase the amount of information needed to locate a person and thereby deindividuate are the "use of categorical appellative rather than individual names," "high rate of personnel turnover (communicating that the position rather than the person is primary)," "large

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groups," "rigid adherence to formal rules," "group as opposed to individual evaluations," "dominant leadership," and "similarity of equipment and tools" (pp. 347-348). Mediating Subjective Events According to James (1892), a person has as many selves as there are individuals who take note and provide feedback of his or her existence. However, something more than a series of images emerges from the interactions with others. R. H. Turner (1968) has termed the more permanent aspect of one's identity self-conception, or the sense of "the real me"—I myself as I really am . . . . The self-image may change from moment to moment. There may indeed be multiple self-images simultaneously in effect, when the individual is aware that his behavior at a given moment looks different to his son, his mother, and his wife. But the self-conception changes more slowly, exhibits a strain toward coherency, and is felt as inescapable fact by the individual, (p. 94)

Two subjective events most commonly hypothesized to threaten the enduring, stable components of identity and to stimulate identity seeking are discontinuity of selfconceptions and nonuniqueness of self-conceptions. Waterbor (1972) described the continuity of bodily feelings, social relations, and values as essential to the "individual's continuing conviction that he is the same person today that he has been in the past" (p. 163). Continuity would seem to require that an individual attribute to himself or herself similar attributes over time and different situations, that there be a consensus among significant others that one possesses these attributes, and that there be a reference group with which an individual may compare and validate these attributes. A second subjective event said to lead to identity seeking is self-perceived nonuniqueness. According to Fromkin (Note 1), low degrees of interpersonal similarity resulting from a high proportion of a small number of attributes that are similar to one comparison other elicit positive affect, as indicated in an abundance of research on interpersonal attraction (Byrne, 1969). However, Fromkin posited a need for uniqueness that is increas-

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ingly frustrated as self-perceived similarity increases. He and his associates have developed a measure for this need (Fromkin & Lipshitz, in press; Snyder & Fromkin, in press; Fromkin, Williams, and Dipboye, Note 2) and have hypothesized that selfperceived similarity elicits negative affect that is directly proportional in magnitude to the strength of the need for uniqueness, the number of others perceived as similar, the extent to which the person and the comparison others share the same reference group, the degree of similarity between the person and others on an attribute, and the number and proportion of attributes perceived as similar. Fromkin's predictions are in marked contrast to Wicklund's (1975) prediction that self-perceived similarity to a large number of others is a desirable state and that dissimilarity, by heightening self-awareness, will arouse negative affect. Although theorists have described continuity and uniqueness of self-conceptions as subjective events that are valued for their own sake, another approach would be to view continuity and uniqueness as valued to the extent that they reduce uncertainty regarding one's self-attributes. Such an approach would be compatible with attribution theory notions as well as with Ziller's (1964) concept of deindividuation in terms of information theory. Indeed, self-conception may be described as a process of attribution in which persons seek to reduce varying self-perceptions to more invariant levels. Similar to the attribution of dispositions to other persons, attributions to one's self should increase in certainty as the consistency and distinctiveness of one's behavior and one's outcomes increase (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967). Deindividuating inputs arouse negative affect and stimulate identity seeking by preventing the individual from answering with certainty the question, Who am I? The Response of Deindividuation Although less research has been conducted to test the identity-seeking effects of deindividuation than to test for a release of restraints, identity-seeking hypotheses may be

posed for aggression, self-presentation, resistance to social influence, and risk taking. Aggression When a person's sense of identity is threatened by deindividuating circumstances, aggression may be one consequence. Rather than representing aggression that is a release of restraints, it may constitute an attempt on the part of the deindividuated person to reindividuate himself or herself. One means of identity seeking may be an attack on the source of the deindividuation. For instance, Camus (1956) has described rebellion, which is motivated by "the negation of everything that denies the individual and the glorification of everything that exalts and ministers to the individual" (p. 45). In the extreme, this may lead to "killing in order to be unique" (p. 45). Aggression may also be a means of gaining the attention of those who refuse to recognize one's separate existence. To illustrate such a prediction, Milgram and Toch (1969) reported evidence that group aggression, such as occurs in a riot, may be intended to dispel and not to induce anonymity. As one resident of the Watts district of Los Angeles explained the motivation behind the rioting of some of his neighbors, "I don't believe in burning, stealing or killing; but I can see why the boys did what they did. They just wanted to be noticed, to let the world know the seriousness of their state of life" (p. 576). Identityseeking aggression may be more rather than less likely to occur when the individual believes that he or she may be detected and caught. For instance, one observer of graffiti in Philadelphia noticed that the "trend is away from profanity and toward simple signatures—a kind of identity thing" ("An Identity Thing," 1972). Although identifying symbols accompanying an act of destruction may increase the probability of being caught, these symbols may be instrumental to establishing one's uniqueness. Such a dynamic contrasts with the previous view of aggression as a release of restraints that is maintained only as long as there is nonidentifiability and an immunity from counteraggression.

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Self-Presentation and Self-Disclosure As revealed in the review of deindividuation as the stimulus for unrestrained behavior, conditions of nonidentifiability may, on occasion, reduce restraints and thereby allow self-enhancement or self-disclosure (Loeb, 1961). In contrast with this approach, one might predict that self-presentation that is motivated by a threat to a sense of self is characterized by attempts to maximize selfconsciousness through arousing the attention of others. In other words, the person will present himself or herself in such a way that others will notice and differentiate that person from the social environment. Maslach (1972) has reported an experiment providing some insight into the dimensions of individuating self-presentations. In deindividuation conditions, the experimenter addressed the subjects more impersonally, had less eye contact with them, and seated them at greater distances than subjects in the individuation conditions. In response to such deindividuation, subjects showed two independent patterns of individuating expressive behavior. One of these she termed "individuation singular," which consisted of attempts to appear different from other subjects. The other dimension, which she termed "individuation personal," consisted of the revelation of personal information. Presenting one's self as different or singular in the eyes of others may take the form of what Klapp (1969) termed "ego screaming." As described by Klapp, such self-presentation is not a spontaneous or unrehearsed release of restraints but a painful search for identity, in which people are seeking audiences, trying to draw attention, rather like entertainers and celebrities. They choose styles—cosmetics, hairdos, beards, sandals, wigs, eye patches, flamboyant costumes, much as would an actor choosing a costume in a dressing room—with an eye to its impact on audiences, to catching attention with startling effects, (p. 84)

Although self-presentation has been discussed as an attempt to gain the approval of others through ingratiation and self-enhancement (Jones, 1964), an individual who is attempting reindividuation may be more concerned with gaining the recognition of others

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than with gaining their approval. Some evidence for this has been provided in an experiment reported by Dipboye and Fromkin (Note 3) in which male subjects described themselves in both socially desirable and socially undesirable terms in the interest of being noticed by an attractive woman. When other bogus subjects described themselves in self-enhancing terms, the real subjects evidenced modest self-presentations. On the other hand, when the bogus subjects described themselves in a modest fashion, the real subjects were self-enhancing. Another setting in which self-presentations occur is in personality testing. Resistance to such tests often results from the unwillingness of persons to be placed in categories and assigned deindividuating labels. For instance, Gordon (1968) has reported a particular category that contained 29% of the responses on the Who am I? test. He called this category the "existential" or the "individuating" one, since it contains what essentially are denials of the validity of the test. Typical answers to the question, "Who am I?" that are found in this category are "me," "an individual," "an existing being," "undefinable," and other responses representing a rejection of being included within nonunique categories. McGuire and Padawer-Singer (1976) studied the relationship between the composition of classrooms on several demographic and physical characteristics and the traits employed by children to describe themselves. According to their hypothesis, children would describe themselves with their most distinctive traits because these are the traits that provide information. In confirmation of their hypothesis, (a) "only 19% of children within 6 months of the class modal age spontaneously mentioned their ages, while 30% of those who were atypically young or atypically old spontaneously mentioned their ages," (b) "only 6 percent . . . [of those born in the city where the study was conducted] mentioned their birthplace, whereas 22% of those who had been born elsewhere spontaneously mentioned their birthplaces," (c) on the physical characteristics of hair color, eye color, and weight, "l£ times as many people having

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unusual characteristics on the dimension spontaneously mentioned it than did those with the more typical characteristics," and (d) "26% of the minority sex in any given class spontaneously mentioned sex, whereas only 11% of those in the majority sex mentioned their sex" (pp. 749-751). Not only do persons seem to describe themselves in a manner that establishes their uniqueness, but they may reject feedback of test results that lump them into a homogeneous category. In recent experiments, Snyder and Larson (1972) and Snyder, Larsen, and Bloom (Note 4) reported that individuals were more willing to accept personality analyses when the assessments were described to the person as being unique. A second dimension of self-presentation, found by Maslach (1972), is the disclosure of personal information. In her experiment, subjects who were deindividuated revealed more personal information about themselves than did subjects who were individuated. This finding provides an interesting comparison between personal disclosure as a means of individuating one's self and personal disclosure that is purely a release of restraints. The latter concept was demonstrated by Loeb (1961), who found that anonymity led to the revelation of more personal attitudes among females as the result of an immunity to social disapproval. A hypothesis for future research to test is that self-disclosure motivated by a threat to self-perceived identity will be oriented toward the individuation of one's self in the eyes of others, independent of the approval or disapproval this self-presentation might incur. Reaction to Social Influence Attempts Theorists have predicted two different reactions to social influence as a function of deindividuation. Some, such as Erikson (1968), have suggested that instability of the selfconcept leads to slavish conformity. Others have predicted that deindividuation will elicit resistance to social influence. According to Laing (1960), the individual whose selfconcept has been threatened may fear "engulfment," as illustrated by one patient's comments to a protagonist: "At best you win

an argument. At worst you lose an argument. I am arguing to preserve my existence" (p. 43). Thus, persons who are uncertain of identity as the result of deindividuation may anticonform (Willis & Hollander, 1964). By drawing the attention of others and by establishing a vivid public identity of rebellion, the person's anticonformity may be instrumental to reindividuation. Some evidence for anticonformity as the result of deindividuation has been provided in observations of group formation and development (Bennis & Shepard, 19S6; Tuckman, 196S). In the initial stages of group development there may be considerable polarization and disunity as members show hostility toward one another and toward the leader as a means of expressing individuality. In support of Fromkin's (Note 1) theory, Weir (1971) found that a subject who perceived his attitudinal position to be similar to that of others was more likely to change his attitudes to a position that was more dissimilar from others. This shift to dissimilarity increased with increases in (a) the number of trials on which the other subjects were similar, (b) the importance to self-definition of the similar attitudes, and (c) the degree to which the individual expected to be dissimilar. Risk Taking Risk taking has been examined by some deindividuation theorists as a mindless release of restraints resulting from anonymity. However, from the identity-seeking view of deindividuation, risk taking may be behavior that is instrumental to reestablishing an individual's identifiability rather than an impulsive reaction to anonymity. One essential element of the high-need-for-achievement person's propensity for risk taking, as discussed by some achievement motivation theorists, is the desire to make some unique contribution (Atkinson, 1958, p. 183). Thus, one could predict that anonymity that releases restraints increases risk taking to the extent that the person is nonidentifiable and others in the group conform to the risky decision. On the other hand, anonymity that threatens identity should increase risk taking to the

DEINDIVIDUATION

extent that the risky choice increases identifiability and distinguishes the person from others in a group. Affective and Cognitive Reactions to Deindividuation Fromkin (1972) has provided some experimental confirmation for the prediction that the degree of negative affect aroused by selfperceived nonuniqueness will increase as the degree of perceived nonuniqueness increases. Subjects were asked to complete a test of 90 items that were constructed to appear as if they measured a large number of attributes, such as personality traits, values, interests, hobbies, and so forth. These subjects were told that they were (a) extremely unique, (b) highly unique, (c) moderately unique, or (d) not very unique. A strong main effect indicated that as the degree of self-perceived uniqueness decreased, the amount of negative affect increased. In other experiments, manipulated self-perceptions of extreme similarity have been found to increase attraction for a stranger with dissimilar attitudes (Fromkin, Dipboye, & Pyle, Note 5), reduce attraction toward highly similar strangers (Brandt & Fromkin, Note 6), lower the self-esteem of subjects with a high need for uniqueness (Ganster, McCuddy, & Fromkin, Note 7), and increase valuation of scarce experiences (Fromkin, 1970). Although the findings of research conducted by Fromkin and his associates appear to confirm his uniqueness theory predictions, feedback that subjects are extremely similar to other persons has never been shown to elicit the negative affect predicted by Fromkin (see Note 1), except when the feedback is in the form of nonuniqueness labels (Fromkin, 1972). Prologue to an Integration Three areas of research are needed to clarify each approach and provide a basis for an integration. First, the distinctions between self-consciousness and self-conception must be explicated, and both need to be related more clearly to social interaction. Second, research is needed to establish the conditions under which specific inputs act to lower self-

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consciousness or threaten important selfconceptions. Third, responses to deindividuation that represent a release of restraints need to be distinguished from responses representing a search for identity. Self-Consciousness and Self-Conception as Processes of Self-Attribution The subjective events hypothesized to mediate deindividuating inputs and the responses to them have been a major source of ambiguity in deindividuation research. Although most theorists have hypothesized that deindividuation causes a loss of identity, few have stated what they mean by "identity" or in what sense a person can "lose" it. Also, few researchers have attempted to measure the affective and cognitive events mediating a release of restraints and identity seeking. There are several events that could mediate deindividuating inputs and an increase in aggression and other nonnormative behavior, including diffusion of responsibility, the belief that one is immune to punishment, retaliation, or criticism, the belief that one is more powerful, and an expanded time perspective. However, if the state of deindividuation is a valid construct, it cannot be defined as any subjective event that happens to mediate input and response. In the present article, a loss of self-consciousness and a threat to the continuity and the uniqueness of self-conceptions have been defined as the crucial mediating events. Both may be discussed as events in the process of self-attribution. Self-consciousness or self-awareness is an orienting response whereby an individual focuses his or her attention on the self, and it can be viewed as the first step in the differentiation between the self and the environment. Self-consciousness is also essential to social control. Shibutani (1961) has described self-consciousness as a consequence of a vicarious trial and error in which an individual anticipates the reactions of others before committing himself or herself to specific behaviors. Deindividuating inputs may reduce social control by decreasing the concerns of a person for the reactions of others. However, people go beyond a simple aware-

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ness of self and attempt to infer attributes that answer with certainty the question, Who am I? Certainty in one's self-perceived attributes results when these attributes are distinctive and are inferred consistently across time, situations, and observers. Deindividuating inputs may reduce self-perceived uniqueness or continuity, eliciting attempts to reestablish the uniqueness or continuity of one's self-attributes. Variables Moderating the Effects of Deindividuation The same deindividuating inputs may reduce self-consciousness and allow unrestrained behavior or they may heighten selfconsciousness and elicit identity seeking. Research is needed that delineates the variables that determine which of the two consequences will occur. Below are three possible moderating variables. Structure of the social system. Morse (1974) has said that collective behavior involves large numbers of relative strangers in ill-defined situations. One common element of the studies demonstrating a release of restraints as a consequence of deindividuation is that they involved groups of strangers in novel situations. Such situations are likely to heighten self-awareness, since an individual cannot predict the reactions of others in the group. Given an ad hoc unorganized group of strangers, one could predict that deindividuation will reduce inhibiting self-consciousness and thereby arouse positive affect. However, in an organized permanent group or organization in which a person occupies a role central to his or her self-concept, deindividuation is likely to serve as a threat, arousing negative affect and a search for identity. The person's self-evaluation. Self-awareness may bring to the individual's attention the discrepancies between what he or she actually is and what he or she aspires to be (Wicklund, 197S). Deindividuating inputs, by reducing self-awareness, should arouse positive affect for the low-self-esteem person. Similar to Hoffer's (1951) True Believer,

low-self-esteem persons may see their lives as spoiled and wasted and crave equality and fraternity more than they do freedom. If they clamor for freedom, it is but freedom to establish equality and uniformity. The passion for equality is partly a passion for anonymity; to be one thread of the men which make up a tunic; one thread not distinguishable from the other, (p. 34)

A person with high self-esteem could be hypothesized to seek out experiences that will heighten self-awareness and to react to deindividuation with negative affect and identity-seeking behavior. In partial support of this prediction, Wicklund (1975, pp. 246247) reported experiments in which high-selfesteem subjects in the presence of a mirror rated themselves more positively and were more willing to take credit for a success than subjects not in the presence of a mirror. Prior self-awareness. It appears that people waver between the desire to minimize selfconsciousness and the attempt to maximize a sense of self. Reactions to deindividuation may depend in part on the preceding level of self-awareness. Following a period of heightened self-awareness, an individual may react favorably to deindividuation. For instance, in situations in which a person wishes to commit some act but is restrained by either internal forces (guilt or anxiety) or external forces (fear of retaliation) one may find considerable introspection and self-awareness. To ask a person to administer electric shocks to another may create a conflict between the desire to obey the experimenter and guilt or anxiety over harming another person. Deindividuation in such forms as anonymity, diffusion of responsibility, or arousal may be welcomed after such a period of internal conflict. Short periods of lowered self-awareness may arouse positive affect. However, Ickes, Wicklund, and Ferris (1973) have shown that the negative effects of hearing one's own voice last only a short time. Similarly, one could predict that the positive affect aroused by deindividuating inputs will last a relatively short time and will be followed by heightened self-awareness and the search for a separate identity. The longer the preceding period of lowered self-awareness, the more

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negative the consequences of deindividuating inputs. These are only three of many variables that serve as possible boundary variables for deindividuation effects. There is a crucial need for research establishing the relationships between specific deindividuating inputs and subjective responses believed to mediate responses to these inputs. The Response to Deindividuation In predicting specific behaviors to result from deindividuating inputs, doubtful assumptions have been made by theorists and researchers concerning the nature of the response. Zimbardo (1969) viewed the behavior that emerges in response to deindividuation as uncontrolled. However, it is unlikely that the responses measured in the laboratory research on the topic have met Zimbardo's (1969, p, 259) criterion of "behavior which . . . is not under discriminative stimulus control." In every study reviewed, the behaviors that resulted from anonymity, diffusion of responsibility, arousal, and other deindividuating inputs did not simply emerge but were instigated by means of experimental procedures. Not only do the responses elicited in deindividuation research appear to have been under stimulus control but the collective behavior these researchers have attempted to stimulate may also be analyzed as purposive, controlled behavior. For instance, Lang and Lang (1970) have questioned the view of riots, mobs, and other collectivities as uncontrolled and random. According to their theory, such groups are engaged in a form of problem solving and possess their own social organization. Rather than defining deindividuation as the stimulus for uncontrolled behavior, other theorists have predicted that deindividuation will result in violations of universally held norms. However, the assumption that there are universally held norms is questionable. For instance, humans are seen by some as having destructive impulses that are restrained in an individuated state because of social sanctions against aggression. In a deindividuated state, destructive urges in people emerge, and they violate these norms. In

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reality, there are no universally held norms against aggression, since in many situations aggression not only may be unpunished but encouraged. A more useful manner of delineating the response to deindividuation may be with reference to norms existent in specific situations. In his obedience research, Milgram (1974) viewed the willingness of subjects to harm the victim not as aggression but as compliance with the experimenter's authority: "The act of shocking the victim does not stem from destructive urges but from the fact that subjects have become integrated into a social structure and are unable to get out of it" (p. 66). Similarly, lowered self-awareness has been found either to increase or decrease aggression, depending on whether the experimenter creates a norm favoring or opposing aggression (Carver, 1974; Scheier, Fenigstein, & Buss, 1974). A basis for using situational norms to distinguish between deindividuation as a release of restraints and deindividuation as identity seeking is Willis' (Willis, 196S; Willis & Hollander, 1964) model of social influence. According to this model, conformity and anticonformity represent a bipolar dimension, indicative of the extent to which a person attempts to behave in total congruence with (pure conformity) or antithetically to (pure anticonformity) group norms. An independent person gives no weight to the expectations of others when making his or her decision. If deindividuation lowers self-awareness or self-consciousness, it should lessen the extent to which persons attend to the expectations of others, and one could predict that independence, as Willis and Hollander (1964) have defined it, will be the response. On the other hand, if deindividuation threatens the stability of self-conceptions, one could predict that subjects will conform. In support of this prediction, Toder and Marcia (1973) found that students with unstable identities, denned in terms of Erikson's (1968) moratorium and diffusion identity statuses, conformed more than students with stable identities, as defined by Erikson's achievement and foreclosure statuses. According to Toder and Marcia, "To the extent that commitment to

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some reference group constitutes an aspect of the achievement of an ego identity, a lack of such commitment may be associated with the same lack of an internal frame of reference that low ego identity is and may be manifested in lower resistance to conformity pressures" (p. 293). Conformity to a group may establish a frame of reference and allow the inference of more stable self-attributes. Once an individual has achieved some degree of stability in his or her self-conceptions, deindividuation may induce anticonformity as the person attempts to establish the distinctiveness of his or her identity. Conclusion Two approaches to conceptualizing the deindividuation process have been reviewed in the present article. Zimbardo (1969), Festinger et al. (19S2), Singer, Brush, and Lublin (1965), and others have shown that anonymity and other deindividuating inputs release restraints and increase the frequency of nonnormative behavior such as aggression, risk taking, self-enhancement, self-disclosure, stealing, and nonconformity. Ziller (1964) and Fromkin (Note 1) have hypothesized that the same responses occur in response to deindividuation, not because of a release of restraints but as a search for a separate identity. There appear to be at least three bases for distinguishing between deindividuation as a release of restraints and deindividuation as a search for identity. First, the former does not require a change in selfconceptions but a momentary reduction in self-awareness. The latter seems to be mediated by a threat to the uniqueness and/or stability of the person's important selfconceptions. Second, deindividuating inputs seem more likely to reduce self-consciousness, arouse positive affect, and release restraints in a temporary, unorganized collectivity. On the other hand, the same inputs are more likely to increase self-consciousness and threaten identity when they affect enduring social relations and roles in organized social systems. Third, responses resulting from a lowering of self-consciousness should be manifested as independence from group norms, in which the person does not attend to

social expectations. Conformity should result from a threat to the stability of self-conceptions, whereas anticonformity to group norms should result from a threat to uniqueness. An integration of these two positions must await additional research clarifying the relationship between specific deindividuating inputs, the mediating response, and either a release of restraints or identity seeking. Reference Notes 1. Fromkin, H. L. The psychology of uniqueness: Avoidance of similarity and seeking of differentness (Paper No. 438). West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University, Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, December 1973. 2. Fromkin, H. L., Williams, J. J., & Dipboye, R. L. Birth order, responses to need for uniqueness scale items, and valuation of scarce commodities. Unpublished manuscript, Purdue University, 1974. 3. Dipboye, R. L., & Fromkin, H. The dating game: The effects of interpersonal undistinctiveness on the use of non-conformity as a self-presentation tactic. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Cleveland, May 1972. 4. Snyder, C. R,, Larsen, D. L., & Bloom, L. J. Acceptance of general personality interpretations prior to and after receiving diagnostic feedback supposedly based on psychological, graphological, and astrological assessment procedures. Paper presented at the meeting of the Southeastern Psychological Association, Hollywood, Florida, April 1974. 5. Fromkin, H. L., Dipboye, R. L., & Pyle, M. Reversal of the attitude similarity-attraction effect by uniqueness deprivation (Paper No. 344). West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University, Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, April 1972. 6. Brandt, J. M., & Fromkin, H. L. Number of similar strangers and feelings of undistinctiveness as limits for the similarity attraction relationship. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, May 1974. 7. Ganster, D., McCuddy, M., & Fromkin, H. Magnitude of similarity and self-esteem: Replication and extension with uniqueness theory. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, May 1977.

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& Fraser, S. C. Effects of altered responsibility, cognitive set, and modeling on physical aggression and deindividuation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 328-337. Diener, E., Fraser, S. C., Beaman, A. L., & Kelem, R. T. Effects of deindividuation variables on stealing among Halloween trick-or-treaters. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 33, 178-183. Diener, E., & Wallbom, M. Effects of self-awareness on antinormative behavior. Journal of Research in Personality, 1976, 10, 107-111. Diener, E., Westford, K., Diener, C., & Beaman, A. Deindividuating effects of group presence and arousal on stealing by Halloween trick-or-treaters. Proceedings of the 81st Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association. 1973, 8, 219220. (Summary) Diener, E., Westford, K., Dineen, J., & Fraser, S. Beat the pacifist: The deindividuating effects of anonymity and group presence. Proceedings of the 81st Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, 1973, 8, 221-222. (Summary) Dion, K. L. Determinants of unprovoked aggression. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1970. Donnerstein, E., Donnerstein, M., Simon, S., & Ditrichs, R. Variables in interracial aggression: Anonymity, expected retaliation, and a riot. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 22, 236-245. Duval, S. Conformity on a visual task as a function of personal novelty on attitudinal dimensions and being reminded of the object status of self. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 87-98. Ellison, R. Invisible man. New York: Signet Books, 1952. (Originally published, 1947.) Erikson, E. H. Identity and identity diffusion. In C. Gordon & K. J. Gergen (Eds.), The self in social interaction (Vol. 1). New York: Wiley, 1968. Erikson, E. H. The problem of ego identity. Psychological Issues, 1959, 1, 101-166. Festinger, L., Pepitone, A., & Newcomb, T. Some consequences of de-individuation in a group. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1952, 47, 382-389. Freud, S. Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. New York: Bantam Books, 1960. (Originally published, 1922.) Friedan, B. The feminine mystique. New York: Dell, 1963. Fromkin, H. L. Effects of experimentally aroused feelings of undistinctiveness upon valuation of scarce and novel experiences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 521-529. Fromkin, H. L. Feelings of interpersonal undistinctiveness: An unpleasant affective state. Journal of Experimental Research in Personality, 1972, 6, 178-185.

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