AMULYA REDDY
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AMULYA REDDY Citizen Scientist
edited by RAVI RAJAN
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Contents Editor's Preface Amulya Reddy: An Autobiography I. On Technology Choice and Development Alternatives 1.
The Nature of Western Technology: Why does it Inevitably Produce Alienation, Unemployment and Environmental Damage?
2.
The Shaping of Science and Technology in Developing Countries
3.
Technology, Development and the Environment: A Re-appraisal
4.
Problems in the Generation and Diffusion of Appropriate Technologies
5.
Lessons from ASTRA's Experience of Technologies for Rural Development
6.
Has the World Bank Greened?
II. On Energy 7.
Development, Energy and the Environment in India: Some Critical Issues
8.
Integrated Energy Planning: The Defendus Methodology
9.
Goals, Strategies and Policies for Rural Energy
10.
The Design of Rural Energy Centres
11.
The California Energy Crisis and its Lessons for Power Sector Reform in India
12.
Nuclear Power: Is it Necessary or Economical?
Bibliography
Editor's Preface Amulya Reddy is an iconic name in the world of energy policy and
development alternatives. His work has inspired several generations of scholars, policy analysts and activists, and continues to remain important and relevant. However, his writings are spread out across a large range of sources – journals, book chapters, newspapers and magazines. e purpose of this book is to collect some of his most salient contributions into one easily accessible reader.
REDDY'S LEGACY Reddy follows a long and distinguished tradition in modern Indian thought on social equity and justice. Beginning with the freedom movement, several eminent people have advanced visions for Indian development. ey range from political figures, such as Mahatma Gandhi, Babasaheb Ambedkar, Ram Manohar Lohia, and Jai Prakash Narayan; to social and natural scientists like Jagdish Chandra Bose, Megnath Saha, Prafulla Chandra Ray, Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis, Satish Dhawan and Amartya Sen. e prescriptions of these luminaries are not always in concert with each other. eir very presence, and vibrancy, however, means that postcolonial India has witnessed several vibrant traditions, wherein scholarship and social and political experimentation have been applied toward eradicating poverty, and improving the lives of ordinary people.
Reddy stands distinguished even amidst such distinguished company. He was a citizen-scientist, and was particularly keen on building scientific and technological traditions that addressed the "needs of the neediest." In this quest, Reddy gave up a rewarding and productive career in the field of
electro-chemistry to embark upon the risky and unfashionable path of taking science to village India, in a bid to build knowledge and artifacts appropriate to the needs of common people. Reddy's work exemplified what the noted social scientist, Ashish Nandy, has described, as "alternative sciences."1 Reddy was also an early pioneer of the idea of participatory science, and through programmes like ASTRA, and field stations like Pura, built prototypes for new institutions, wherein scientists and technologists collaborated with local communities in pursuit of rural development goals. In these endeavours, Reddy demonstrated the vibrancy and originality that characterized all of his work. He became a great advocate of the principle that rural people make rational technological choices. As a scientist who worked in rural areas, he therefore sought to understand the rationality of rural folk, and to develop artifacts and knowledge systems appropriate to such rationalities. He insisted that "scientists must first be students, learning from the people, if they want to be successful teachers to the people." One of the important inferences he made, by adopting this approach, is that the idea of the tragedy of the commons is misinformed. Drawing upon his work at Pura, he argued instead that under the right conditions, human behaviour would produce what he called "the blessing of the commons," a condition when people would interact synergistically for the greater good. Reddy approached renewable energy and appropriate rural technology as occupying a niche within what he referred to as a village ecosystem. In discussing the design and implementation of rural energy centres, for example, he effectively proposed a model of regional planning that took ecological and energetic criteria seriously. He asked: "What are all the inputs and outputs in a given village system?" and "How are you going to intervene on the basis of such information?" His approach, thus, was one that emphasized the need to optimally use local resources to satisfy the needs of local people.
It is important to note that in advocating "alternative" approaches to energy and development, and indeed science and technology policy more widely, Reddy chose not to entirely reject other approaches, or to sustain simple dichotomies, such as renewable versus conventional energy. Instead, he looked upon these approaches as complementary—each relevant to its own context. is refusal to succumb to populist calls for approaching resource dilemmas from within an "environmentalist" standpoint or ideology, reflects another set of remarkable characteristics that underlie Reddy's contributions. Put simply, it consists of intellectual honesty; a commitment to academic rigour; and above all, the discipline to make public comments on issues only aer "thinking through" a given problem himself. What is especially remarkable is that Reddy managed to be a highly original and productive scientist while defying most of the conventions of how knowledge is produced in institutionalized science in India. Equally remarkable is the manner in which he has consistently integrated morality and social vision with his quest for knowledge making. Indeed, Reddy is renowned not only for his work on alternative science and technology, but for his powerful commentaries on nuclear energy and the bomb, and on human rights and the causes of poverty. Although it is possible for reasonable people to disagree with some of his tenets, it is hard for any reflective person to avoid engaging with it.
EDITORIAL RATIONALE
During the course of a four-decade-long career, Reddy published almost 300 papers on topics removed from his first career as an electo-chemist. Choosing a dozen essays from amongst this long and distinguished list has posed, in effect, an intellectual version of Sophie's choice. e process of selection involved reading through each of Reddy's articles; producing long lists; re-reading these selected articles again over a period of several
months; and then, several shortlists later, and almost at the brink, deciding upon the final twelve. e goal has been to provide an introduction, a glimpse, into Reddy's thought, rather than a comprehensive compilation. Hopefully, with appetite vetted, the reader will take the trouble of pursuing more of Reddy's work. Toward this end, a comprehensive bibliography is provided. e book begins with an autobiographical essay, and excerpts of an interview I conducted with Reddy during the summer of 2002. e main body of the book is organized around two broad themes. e first consists of six papers on technology choice and development alternatives. is section starts with three broad conceptual essays on technology and society. ey can be seen as Reddy's diagnostics, his take on the problems with mainstream science, technology and development pathways. e next three take the argument further and also attempt to provide concrete answers. While the articles on Technology, Development, and the Environment present a theoretical programme, the paper on ASTRA is an account of some of the practical attempts made by Reddy and his colleagues at applying his analysis. Finally, the article on the World Bank is an attempt at taking Reddy's analysis of development to critically analyse the policies of a leading international financial institutions. e second half of the book is focused on Reddy's work on energy policy. is section starts out with a broad overview of the energy crisis in India. It is followed by a long essay articulating Reddy's policy making framework, his well known "DEFENDUS" methodology. e next two articles focus on rural contexts, and discuss goals, strategies, and design criteria for energy provision therein. e section ends with two broader papers—on the lessons of the California Energy Crisis, and Nuclear Power, respectively. A couple of quick caveats. First, some repetition is inevitable in such a compilation, although I have striven to avoid this, where possible, through my decisions about selection. Secondly, I have also resorted to excerpting
where and when a concerned paper developed a formal, mathematical model to reinforce the qualitative argument. The latter choice was dictated by the goal of producing a book that took Reddy's ideas to the widest possible audience. Again, I urge a more persistent reader to use this book as a starting point and read the actual, original articles.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS is book would not have been possible but for the generosity and hospitality afforded by Vimala Reddy, during my visit to Bangalore in 2002. I am also grateful to the staff of the International Energy Initiative in Bangalore, for their help with photocopying thousands of sheets of paper, and subsequently, with providing Reddy's bibliography. I am particularly grateful to Dr Antonette D'Sa, Director of IEI for all her help. Next, I am very grateful to Dr Leena Srivastava of e Energy and Resources Institute in New Delhi, for perspectives on the importance of Reddy's legacy. I am also greatly indebted to Dr Nandini Rao, Priti Anand and Vidya Rao at Orient Blackswan, who have blessed this project from the outset and waited for several years for its completion, and to my wife, Priya Rao, for being an incredible source of strength. I owe a special debt to Hemlata Shankar for her unflinching support and for her work on this book. Next, I am grateful for a grant provided by the National Science Foundation, that enabled me to partially defray some of the costs associated with this project. But more than any one, I am greatly indebted to Amulya Reddy himself. He was not only a wonderful scholar and visionary, but a warm and affectionate human being. Ravi Rajan Santa Cruz, CA January 2009
Amulya Reddy: An Autobiography is Introduction is based on two earlier contributions: (1) Reflections of a Maverick, Seminar (409), September 1993, pp. 16–24 and (2) The Evolution of an Energy Analyst: Some Personal Reflections, Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, 2002. e interview that follows is based on a series of taped conversations with Ravi Rajan conducted in Bangalore during September 10–12, 2002.
I was born in 1930 in the South Indian city of Bangalore, which was then known as a pensioners' paradise and as a garden city with its greenery and parks. Its climate was salubrious and I never saw a ceiling fan until I was in my teens. Bangalore always had excellent schools and colleges. I did my schooling in a Jesuit institution, St Joseph's, with the motto: Faith and Toil. I used to walk a couple of miles to school through the centre of town, without my parents fearing that I would be run over. Today, Bangalore is the information technology capital of India, choked with vehicular traffic and highly polluted. As a twelve-year-old, I was determined to join the merchant marine training ship DUFFERIN at Bombay and become a sailor like my hero, my uncle C.G.K. Reddy. 1 And then, out of the blue, I received this long letter written on rough handmade paper from Madras Jail. It was from CGK (in prison for anti-British activities) cautioning me against choosing a career based on who I hero-worshipped and urging me to do what I would love to do and what I believed in. is advice stayed with me throughout my life. But it was not easy to adhere to it because there were many things I loved to do. Between 1945, my last year at school, and 1947, I struggled to choose between the game of cricket and science. Selected to play for Madras
University at the age of sixteen, I was a promising opening batsman and a leg-break bowler. I was crazy about cricket; in fact, I still dream about it. As my father disparagingly said: "What do you see in his room? Books, pictures, clippings, etc. About what? How to hit a ball! Is that all in life?" But, cricket taught me two crucial codes of conduct: playing for the team and accepting the umpire's verdict. And then my eyes were opened to the beauty of science. At school, I was fortunate to have an outstanding and inspiring science teacher, Alec Alvares, who created in me (and innumerable other pupils) an abiding love of science and the importance of systematic work. is interest in science was strengthened during my late teens by my close friendship with my schoolmate, V. Radhakrishnan, and his cousin, S. Ramaseshan, the son and nephew respectively of Professor C.V. Raman, the Nobel Laureate in Physics. ey were mentors who lit a lamp of scientific interest that has never died out. ey encouraged me to read books such as Max Born's e Restless Universe (incidentally, written in Bangalore), George Gamow's Mr. Tompkins in Wonderland and Mr. Tompkins explores the Atom, and Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld's e Evolution of Physics. I still recall the talk that Ramaseshan gave me on the electronic structure of atoms. Even more clearly I remember worrying about the electronic structure of the transition elements when I was fielding at square leg in an inter-collegiate cricket match. Not surprisingly, I dropped a catch. But, association with the Raman family also instilled in me a belief that while I could match them in my efforts, I could never compete with their intrinsic intelligence and creativity.... and therefore my ambitions must be humble. Looking back, I realize that in developing that humility, I was preventing the bitterness that comes from the frustration of unbridled ambitions. In fact, I was laying the basis for a happy life where achievements outstrip aspirations. Whilst still grappling with the conflicting attractions of cricket and science, I was pulled in yet another direction. Aer India became
independent on 15 August 1947, the demand for Responsible Government was raised in the Mysore State by the Congress Party. A strike was announced from 1 September. I decided not to have anything to do with the strike, because my brother-in-law was the Private Secretary to the ruling Maharaja's Dewan. But when I was cycling along to college, I was accosted by my classmate, Vimala Pawar. She asked me challengingly: "What are you going to do for the Responsible Government movement?" I don't remember what I mumbled, but she successfully shamed me into joining the strike. Very soon, I was on the Action Committee and one of its leaders.
en in 1948, my uncle CGK, by then a confirmed socialist, came to Bangalore. He became an even greater influence on me than in my childhood. anks to him, social concerns became a powerful force in my life. rough him, I met famous socialist leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan, Achyut Patwardhan and others. Among them, Rammanohar Lohia was exceptional—a brilliant intellect with tremendous compassion, a powerful man with a gentle affectionate nature, he had a magnetism that was irresistible. A student wing of the Socialist Party was formed. It ran a magazine, which I wrote, typed, cyclostyled and hawked. But, the factional conflicts in the Socialist Party seeped into the student wing. rough this experience, I learnt two important truths about myself:2 I loved writing and did not enjoy politics and its infighting. Provided that what one loves to do does not hurt others; it is far better to do what one loves than what one ought to do. 1949 was a turning point in my life. I was in Madras to watch the IndiaWest Indies cricket test match and on the rest day, I called on my former classmate, Vimala Pawar. We decided to write to each other and through the letters blossomed a love that led to marriage and a relationship that has been (and is) the most sustaining and dominant influence in my life. I was less than twenty-one when I got married in 1951 and obviously not economically independent. I became a Lecturer in Chemistry in
Central College on a grand salary of a hundred and twenty-five rupees a month. Vimala and I overcame our penury and dependence with love and our firstborn, Srilatha. Outside the home, I found fulfilment through teaching, cricket and philosophy. I came under the influence of a group of intellectuals who were deeply concerned about science and society. Amongst them was a very special person, Satish Dhawan, who had just returned from Caltech and joined the Indian Institute of Science. His commitment to science combined with a sensitive social conscience and a warm affectionate nature made a deep impression on me. Our friendship continued for over half a century until his death in 2002. J.R. Lakshmana Rao and M.A. Sethu Rao who taught me Chemistry in my B.Sc.(Hons) course, and K. Srinivasan also had a major influence on me. In the fiyodd years that I have known them, I have never heard them complaining about the many injustices meted out to them by life. ey had a reservoir of contentment, a loiness of character and a robustness of philosophy that I have tried to emulate. Lakshmana Rao also kindled in me an abiding interest in philosophy and social thinking.
IMPERIAL COLLEGE
Aer my B.Sc. (Honours) in Chemistry and M.Sc. in Physical Chemistry in Central College, Bangalore, I went in 1955 to Imperial College, London, for my Ph.D. Vimala joined me there aer a few months. I was a poor student on a meagre scholarship and Vimala had to support herself with a job. Nevertheless, those were wonderful days. We saw plays, visited art museums, participated in poetry reading, and made lasting friends, Leila, Gerry Thomas and Les Allen. We also developed a friendship with Hyman Levy, Professor of Mathematics, Imperial College, and a prolific writer on social thinking. I read his books, discussed them with him, and learnt how to think dialectically about dynamic systems. As Secretary of the Philosophy of Science Club, I organized my understanding in talks on e Scientific Outlook. To that period, I owe the honing of my analytical skills,
which proved invaluable in later years.
1956 was also the year my political illusions were shattered by the revelations of the horrors of Stalinism, the crushing of the Hungarian uprising and the Suez war. With all this political upheaval, I withdrew into research and concentrated on my Ph.D., which was an electron-diffraction study of the structure and growth of electrodeposits. We started our second child and Vimala had to give up her job. ere was no money. So, I looked for the highest-paying temporary job–that of a British Railways porter at London's Waterloo station. I worked there for two months. It was the hardest physical labour that I have ever known. I suffered both humiliating and honourable treatment from passengers whose luggage I carried; I also learnt to see the world through the eyes of physical labourers. Ever since, I have never won an argument with a porter about his charges, because I immediately see myself in his shoes... or lack of footwear.
CENTRAL ELECTROCHEMICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE I returned from England in early 1958 and got a job as a Senior Scientific Officer in the Central Electrochemical Research Institute (CECRI) at Karaikudi. I spent three years there. It was the first home that Vimala and I had—our London accommodation was only a student's bed-sitter flat. Many young friends adopted it and made it theirs. We were very poor. My take home salary was about Rs 450 per month. I moved around on a bicycle. Our monthly trip to the town was in a pony-drawn cart. But, Vimala and I have observed– with sadness–that we have never been as hospitable as we were then. In Karaikudi, I met three outstanding electrochemists–S.R. Rajagopalan (SRR) and S. Sathyanarayana (both of whom worked with me) and S.K. Rangarajan who I persuaded my Director to recruit into CECRI. SRR became a close family friend and we appealed in times of crisis to his
encyclopaedic knowledge on almost everything, even for instance, when our second daughter, Amala, was late in speaking. In CECRI, our group was excited by the research that we did. We worked mainly on the structure and growth of electrodeposits. But, CECRI performed well below its potential; it did not justify the investment on it. One of the main reasons was that hopes of royalties for work led to sub-critical teams. Also, the leadership was driven by unrealistic ambitions of personal scientific glory rather than the best interests of the Institute. With no great vision generating the morale and zeal of the institution, the atmosphere was unpleasant. I saw there the ugliest infighting among scientists I have ever seen. I observed casteism at its worst. I experienced caste discrimination...and had difficulty renting a house in the upper-caste part of the town. For one who did not belong to the highest caste, the orthodoxy was suffocating. Until Karaikudi, I had the naive belief that people disliked you or were hostile to you if you did them some wrong. ere, I learnt that people's attitudes to you were largely a response to what threat you represented to their ambitions and interests. Interpersonal relations among the senior scientists could not have been worse. I was generous in giving credit to my assistants, but this generosity was turned around to argue that I was incapable on my own. I began to doubt my scientific ability. My confidence plummeted to its lowest depth. I developed hyperacidity and was well on my to an ulcer when I received an offer of a post-doctoral fellowship from the University of Pennsylvania. I accepted the offer with alacrity. I le Karaikudi in 1961 with relief. I was, however, very worried about SRR's fate even though I had brought his outstanding abilities to the notice of Ramaseshan.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (1961-66) I arrived in Philadelphia and found the Electrochemistry Laboratory of Professor J.O'M. Bockris consisted mainly of foreigners. Later, I realised
that the post-World War II proliferation of funds for R & D had produced a new breed of "scientific leaders" whose forte was more the ability to get funds than creativity. Once the funds were obtained, foreign scientists— Indians, Pakistanis, Sri Lankans, Yugoslavs, Australians, etc.,—could be bought with fellowships and studentships. And if they came on exchange visas, it was even possible to control their future. But nothing binds people together like a common scourge. ere was a close camaraderie in the lab. But, there was little joy in the science that was being done. Science was not what I thought it was in my youthful dreams, an exciting voyage across the trackless expanses of the unknown; it was an oppressive atmosphere of sponsors, results, deadlines, targets, long hours rather than productivity, vicious competition, dubious ethics, etc. In the everyday life of the laboratory, little attention was paid to social concerns, values and ethics. No wonder that outside, the world of the 1960s had grave doubts about the morality of science and serious concerns about its links with war and destruction. From the point of view of my research, those were wonderful years. I was asked to develop ellipsometry, the study of surfaces through analysis of the changes in reflected polarized light. I developed a new technique called chronoellipsometry and made a well-received presentation4 at the National Bureau of Standards Conference on Ellipsometry in 1963. I also made presentations at the Gordon Conferences on Electrochemistry. I was able to rebuild my confidence that had been shattered in Karaikudi. 1964 was a crucial year. With success came offers of lucrative jobs in industry. I went for several interviews and became more and more demanding with regard to perquisites. But the handsome salaries were not a measure of the freedom to choose problems for work. Scientists in industry seemed to work in a straitjacketed atmosphere. Aer an interview at one of the giant companies where the desks for the scientists were lined up in an endless hangar, I came back and told Vimala that the work would be soul-destroying and I was becoming increasingly
mercenary. She said: "Let's go home!" It was at this stage that I was asked by Bockris to help him edit for publication about 150 typed pages of his lecture notes on electrochemistry. At the very first discussion, he said that what he wanted was something new and not based on his notes. He drew up a contract making me a second author. at was how I got into draing Modern Electrochemistry5 by Bockris and Reddy – a two-volume 1400-page book that a reviewer called the bible of electrochemistry. e book was both an agony and an ecstasy. e agony consisted of interminable discussions ending up with marginal changes, the dra aer dra, the continuous expansion of content, the weeks stretching into months and the months into years, the tension, the massive intrusion into family life (for instance, my youngest daughter, Lakshmi, began to hate anything intellectual because that was what deprived her of her father's companionship), etc. e ecstasy consisted of my discovering electrochemistry for myself, being excited about it and coming up with a very fresh account of that discovery. It was this excitement and freshness that readers found stimulating. ey found it excellent for self-study. e book was frequently stolen from libraries. e book dragged on from 1964 untill I returned to India and it was finally finished only in 1969. For a technical book, it was a best seller and a money-spinner. Above all, it made me famous in the world of electrochemistry.
THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE We returned to India in 1966. Aer six years in the U.S.A. as a postdoctoral Fellow and Research Supervisor, many research contributions, particularly to ellipsometry, and co-authorship of a two-volume textbook, I was made an Assistant Professor in the Department of Inorganic and Physical Chemistry, Indian Institute of Science. But, it was wonderful returning to Bangalore and giving the children a happy home and
atmosphere to grow up in. I began research with a team of students. Experimental work was hard going. Facilities had to be built up. And money was scarce. Eventually, most of the students got their Ph.D.s. Modern Electrochemistry finally came out in print. e two-to-three invitations per year to speak at international conferences were some measure of success. But, my research had no grand theme. It slowly dawned on me that most of the fundamental discoveries had already been made in electrochemistry; it had, therefore, become application oriented. I tried to give my research an applied thrust. Sathyanarayana and I took up the indigenous development of the magnesium- manganese dioxide battery system and started getting some success. I also became a consultant to Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores, Ltd., the company of my college-mate, M.Y. Ghorpade. I helped to recruit and train a team of engineers. We used reverse engineering—we started from the imported technology and tried to understand its design basis. Design know- how is the highest form of know-how; it is superior to construction know- how, maintenance know-how and operational know-how. e team became extremely competent in the field of electrometallurgy and achieved leadership positions in the company. 1973 was a year of personal crisis. First, we came to know that the magnesium-manganese dioxide system that we were developing was being tested in Ladakh. at information upset me because I realised that our work was part of a defence effort against the Chinese and I felt that the people of India had no quarrel with the people of China. I did not want any part of this type of scientific relevance, if this is what it would lead to. Second, it became clear that the electrochemists I had brought into the Department of Inorganic and Physical Chemistry to build a centre of excellence in electrochemistry would do outstanding individual work, but they would never gel into an internationally famous school. at dream of mine would not be achieved. It was only much later that I heard the
saying: "One Indian = three westerners; one westerner = three Indians" which is meant to indicate that, in typical situations, Indians are individually brilliant but hopeless as a team because they do not work together. Not only do they produce no synergy, but also the whole may even be less than the sum of the parts.
THE FORMATION OF ASTRA (1974–75) In this crisis, there occurred a rare event, a single experience that altered my whole pattern of thinking. I heard a lecture on "Poverty in India" by Professor C.T. Kurien (then of the Economics Department, Christian College, Madras) at the Ecumenical Christian Centre, Bangalore. Referring to the book by Dandekar and Rath on the subject, Professor Kurien said that poverty had increased with industrialization. *is observation shattered my faith in the Nehruvian dictum: more science and technology → more industrialization → less poverty. A period of intense searching began. It was neither organized nor focused. I was really groping. I took a small step forward when I presented a paper entitled "An Asian Science to combat Asian Poverty"6 at the One Asia Conference in Delhi organized by the Press Foundation of Asia. I argued that the industrialization-poverty nexus arises from the capitalintensive labour-saving nature of the pattern of industrialization based on imported Western technology and that an attack on poverty required a different science and technology, an "Asian Science". e paper attracted favourable attention at the One Asia Conference from several scholars there including the Swedes, Gunnar and Alva Myrdal. e real personal "break-through" was achieved at Bangalore. India's Minister of Science and Technology, C. Subramaniam was organizing conferences of scientists to get reactions to the National Committee on Science and Technology (NCST) document "An Approach to the Science and Technology Plan". [Was that the last time that scientists were
consulted so widely?] Ramaseshan was so impressed with my paper at the One Asia Conference that he urged Satish Dhawan, the host for the Bangalore Conference, to include me as a discussant of the NCST paper. I presented a paper on the "Choice of Alternative Technologies "6 where I argued that India was a dual society with "... islands of elite affluence amidst vast oceans of poverty of the masses ...", that this poverty was primarily due to inadequate income-generating employment in the rural countryside and that such employment would not come from capitalintensive industrialization. I criticized Indian science and technology for firmly allying itself with the elitist pattern of industrialization and demanded that it should devote itself to the generation of an alternative pattern of capital-saving labour-intensive technologies of relevance to the rural poor. While the essence of this argument is still valid, I soon realized that one must also consider the down-stream benefits of investment. us, capital-intensive chip manufacture can generate considerable downstream employment in the services sector. Remembering the hero of Jack London's e Iron Heel addressing the capitalists club, I expected to be "crucified" by the scientists, but to my amazement, my presentation was received with thunderous applause. One is fortunate if there are a few such moments of glory in a lifetime. But the applause was not for me; it was primarily because I had echoed concerns shared by a large number of people. ere was an interesting episode during the ensuing discussion—a well-known technologist attacked me with the words: "Reddy is asking us to go backwards!" and C. Subramaniam, who chaired the session, jumped up and said: "No! No! He is taking us forwards!" Perhaps it was his Gandhian background that led him to support me. In fact, when I met him years later, he recalled my paper with appreciation. But, what was really gratifying was the large number of faculty from the Institute who came to me aer the presentation to express agreement. Even more important, they declared a desire to do something to
implement an alternative science and technology. It was then that I made the decision to quit electrochemistry. I felt that I had to burn my bridges. Otherwise, I felt that if things became difficult in rural technology, as I was sure they would be, I would escape into the expertise that I had built up in electrochemistry. At that time, I could start from "zero" and derive any one of the equations in the two volumes of Modern Electrochemistry.
A cell for the Application of Science and Technology to Rural Areas was created in the Indian Institute of Science in 1974 to initiate and promote work of rural relevance as a weapon against poverty. It became known by its acronym ASTRA, which means "weapon" in Sanskrit. Quite deliberately, it was designed as a multi-disciplinary effort drawing on the expertise from the various discipline-oriented departments. Major presentations were made to the faculty and students and at the instance of the Institute Director, Satish Dhawan, to the Senate Committee on Research and Academic Policy. ose were heady days. e best and the brightest in the Institute worked for or supported ASTRA. ASTRA's open seminars were widely attended. A number of projects were initiated. There was camaraderie. The support and friendship of Krishna Prasad and Jagadish were particularly precious. ASTRA was an interacting community of scientists and engineers. We had discovered how to build a team out of Indians-create a shared vision. But, the vision must be grand enough to inspire, and the vision had to be shared. Unfortunately, the immediate appreciation of ASTRA's work and efforts in many national and international quarters was in sharp contrast to the scorn and disdain it received from many leaders of the scientific establishment in India. It was all right to make at the NCST meeting–as one distinguished scientist did–an insightful and passionate exhortation: "We as scientists are intelligent observers. What we lack is direct exposure. So, all that we need to do is to live for some time in a rural environment and we will be able to identify the problems." But, once ASTRA tried to
implement the suggestion, exhortation became denigration. Was it because ASTRA was rocking the boat of conventional science, setting an uncomfortable example and demanding a new and threatening orientation to science and technology? In short, was it because ASTRA was changing the paradigm for scientific work?
e Director of a prestigious institution publicly declared that those who were failures in science took to rural technology. e Editor of an Indian scientific journal said: "What Reddy is doing is not science. I will never publish him in my journal!" It was not an easy journey. Mentors became tormentors, friends became opponents, and colleagues became critics. e intensity of the critique increased as national and international recognition for ASTRA's work grew. e situation was aggravated by the BBC film West of Bangalore, which publicised ASTRA worldwide. At the national level, I was awarded the Ravindra Puraskar at Shantiniketan, and aer hearing the citation, Indira Gandhi said to me whilst giving the award: "It must have required rare courage!" In contrast, some leist friends jibed: "is rural technology is a trick of the industrialized countries to keep us in the bullock- cart age! See, the World Bank is supporting it." By the same token, they should have rejected the dams, the power stations, etc., all of which were funded by the World Bank... but they did not. ose who want to change a paradigm must be prepared to struggle and to be lonely. ere was neither a Gandhi nor a Raman to turn to for support. However, there were some steadfast, albeit tacit, supporters among the scientists—Satish Dhawan was a beacon among them-and some fellow- scientists like C.V. Seshadri who also decided to join the shi to rural problems. Above all, Vimala remained "constant as the northern star!" What the ASTRA workers had in abundance was conviction in the path they had chosen and faith that they would succeed. is faith was a crucial source of strength. In the ultimate analysis, faith is what keeps us going when there is no hint that our efforts will succeed and no evidence
to justify what we are doing. Fortunately, the villagers in the areas where we worked developed faith in ASTRA. And ASTRA maintained a publication record. Apart from a stream of concrete and conceptual papers,8 ,9 I edited an Indian Academy of Sciences monograph on Rural Technology 10 that attracted wide attention. It was even suggested that rural technology could become the theme of a separate journal but those struggling to get articles for conventional journals felt that this would undermine their journals. But, the student support for ASTRA was never adequate. e whole outcome would have been different if a political, or student, movement had backed us. e le must assume a large measure of the blame for this situation-by and large, they preferred a pattern of activity where, between office hours, they did not question their work—even if it benefited the elite—as long as, aer office hours, they got worked up over remote causes such as Cuba. More fundamentally, many sections of the Indian le never questioned capitalist technology. In contrast, I was arguing in 1973 that "... technology is like genetic material; it carries the code of the society in which it was conceived, and given a favourable milieu, reproduces that society ...." Later, I humbly learnt that I was only elaborating concerns that Gandhi, Kumarappa and Lohia had already articulated. In 1975, I was involved with M.Y. Ghorpade, then Finance Minister of Karnataka, and Satish Dhawan in setting up the Karnataka State Council for Science and Technology (KSCST) to bring together government and scientific institutions to address the problems of poverty in Karnataka. Whereas ASTRA concentrated on the generation of technology, KSCST would focus on the dissemination of technological solutions. Since then, KSCST has become a model for state councils. It has come up with several novel programmes and activities–Karnataka Rajya Vijnana Parishad (the science popularisation and people's science programme), the Student Projects Programme (to fund relevant student projects in the engineering colleges of the state), the Product Development Centres (to commercialize
the products/ devices from successful student projects), the Drought Monitoring Cell (a database for information necessary for decisions on drought), etc.
APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY AT UNEP (1975–76) In 1975 I went on a sabbatical to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) at Nairobi, Kenya. Before I went there, I was assured that I could make several trips to India to keep in touch with ASTRA. Things did not work out as planned. After landing in Nairobi, I found that the management had changed. I was grounded. e good news was that UNEP asked me to develop the conceptual framework for environmentally sound and appropriate technologies. It thereby provided me with a tremendous opportunity to think about the inherent characteristics of Western technology and about the nature of development. e first thing I learnt was that development must not be equated with mere economic growth (as measured for instance by GDP). Genuine development is a process of economic growth that is directed towards equity–the satisfaction of basic needs, starting with the needs of the n e e d i e s t , empowerment–the strengthening of self-reliance and environmental soundness– harmony with the environment. is understanding of development stood me in good stead for almost two and a half decades. However, the recent controversy over the Narmada valley projects has forced me to include in the definition of development an insistence that the benefits of development projects must start with the people at the project sites and then radiate outwards. Otherwise, the very people at the epicentre of the projects become the victims of development. Further, with my growing understanding of the importance of women as agents of development, and indeed its main objective, I now insist on engenderization as a crucial element of the development process.
I also came to the view that however attractive modern technology may be, there have to be special safeguards against its intrinsically unwelcome tendencies of amplifying inequalities, alienating people from their work and from each other, and degrading the environment. All this went into my UNEP publication Technology, Development and the Environment–a Reappraisal.11 is tract was seminal for the evolution of my perspective, but unfortunately it was not disseminated widely.
RURAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION PATTERNS (1977–81) I returned from sabbatical in 1976 aer resisting the temptations of a UN job with its vulgar salaries and perquisites. Vimala said to me in Nairobi: "If you continue here, you will be destroyed!" I plunged back into ASTRA work. An Extension Centre was established at Ungra, a village about 120 kilometres from Bangalore, and we began our studies of the Ungra village ecosystem with Ravindranath as a valuable lieutenant and an excellent team including Somasekhar. e team lived in the Ungra Extension Centre. We did what was probably the first detailed empirical study of energy consumption patterns in third world villages.12 is study also highlighted in quantitative terms the central role of biomass and animate energy both of which are conventionally ignored energy analysis and also revealed the critical role of the labour of women and children in the patterns of rural energy consumption. Interestingly, these consumption patterns highlighted the importance of kerosene for lighting in unelectrified homes. It also showed that in order to make this lighting source accessible to the poor, the kerosene had to be subsidized. But this subsidy had the associated effect of forcing diesel fuel to be subsidized and tilting the economics of goods transport against railways and in favour of trucks. 13 us, a key to the country's oil import problem lay in the rural domestic sector—an interesting example of unforeseen intersectoral energy interactions.
For our village energy study, we owe a great deal to that wonderful person who is no more, J.P. Naik, then Secretary, Indian Council for Social Science Research. During a coffee break at a Delhi meeting, I mentioned to him that we knew far more about how energy is used in London or New York than we knew about energy in villages ten kilometres away from the Indian Institute of Science. We would like therefore to study the sources and end-uses of energy in Indian villages. He promptly asked me how much money we needed and in a few days we had an ICSSR grant. Such visionary and generous people are rare, and but for them, pioneering and non- conventional work would not take place and mavericks could not survive. From energy consumption patterns in villages, we went on to deepen our study of village ecosystems 14,15 and to design16 and build rural energy centres. e ecosystem work required a great deal of survey work and analysis of data. The team lived in the Ungra Extension Centre. At the height of our activity, Vimala and I made weekly visits to the Centre lasting a couple of days at a time. We lived in a 30-square metrehouse with no furniture, electricity, running water and flush toilets, but those were among the happiest days of our life. It is not irrelevant to mention here the importance of the spouse in unorthodox ventures such as ASTRA—it is difficult to fight a battle in society unless there is unqualified support at home. And Vimala gave me this in abundance! e discussions were excellent and the learning process was intense. We gained many insights. Copying from the West is the conventional approach in India to academic knowledge but we found that learning from the immediate environment is certainly a more powerful heuristic. Unfortunately, much of the work (at least half a dozen papers) was not published even though it was written up by Ravi and his colleagues. e blame was entirely mine for this sin of omission, viz., quitting a field/activity before writing up the papers. In fact, I committed this sin twice before in my career—when I le Karaikudi and when I quit
electrochemistry. By taking up a new venture, viz., global energy strategies, before completing the previous one of publishing our ecosystem studies, I landed in a situation where the urgent new tasks took precedence over important old commitments.
BIOGAS-BASED RURAL ENERGY CENTRES (1981–83) One of ASTRA's first outputs was the 1974 paper on "Biogas Plants– Problems, Prospects and Tasks" published in the Economic and Political Weekly.17 e paper had some errors, but it said many important things that still remain valid. For instance, it showed that the official biogas programme based on family-scale biogas plants would neither make a dent on the energy problem nor spread beyond the rural elite. It revealed the economies of scale associated with community biogas plants. ough it was merely a paper exercise, it immediately attracted international and national attention. On the international front, it was widely cited.
Unfortunately, the national biogas programme felt that we were poaching into its reserves. And so, I discovered an important problem of the sociology of science, perhaps not unique to India—subjects become territories, and when "outsiders" work on a subject, they are treated as invaders. A good deal of the problem arises from the fact that these "outsiders" with extremely limited manpower, money and resources, but with the dedication, freshness and innocence of newcomers, achieve far more than large establishments set up for the subject. ereby, they expose the ineffectiveness of Big Science and its bureaucracies; hence, they are a threat. But, their competition is essential for progress, and it can come mainly from universities, which is why these institutions must be nurtured. ey must also keep their spiritual distance from the powers at Delhi. e biogas paper also revealed that there were new allies of whom we had been unaware. Professor K.N. Raj, the distinguished Indian
economist, called on me at my home to commend the biogas paper and to encourage us to continue work at the interface of technology and economics. He went on to invite me to give seminars at the Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, and join the governing body of the centre, an association from which I have just retired. is inspiration and encouragement from a well- known economist was extremely important to make us feel that what we were doing was important and the way we were doing it was right. e point is that rural technology was forcing us to work in new areas with economic and sociological implications. We went in with great trepidation thinking "Fools rush in where angels fear to tread!" But, many eminent economists were very positive about our writings. I particularly recall the famous Cambridge economist Joan Robinson telling me when I diffidently expressed my ignorance of conventional economics: "Don't worry, you are doing fine!" I have always been impressed by the saying: ink globally, act locally. e challenge of designing and building rural energy centres led ASTRA as early as 1979 to the community biogas plant project at Pura village, two kilometres from our Ungra Extension Centre. During the first phase of this project, we attempted to provide all the households of the village with piped biogas for cooking. We failed because of an overestimation of cowdung resources and an underestimation of biogas requirements. When I was away on a sabbatical at Princeton in 1984, the project came to a standstill. However, on my return, the villagers petitioned me to restart the project with the emphasis on drinking water. is was done with the invaluable support of my colleagues Rajabapaiah, Somasekhar and Jayakumar and with funding from the Karnataka State Council for Science and Technology. e scheme 18 involved villagers supplying cowdung to the biogas plant where it would be anaerobically fermented to yield biogas that would fuel a modified diesel engine that in turn would run a generator. e electricity thus produced would run an electrical submersible pump and
li drinking water for the village, and in addition be supplied to households to provide electrical illumination. When every household was illuminated with a fluorescent tubelight on Mahatma Gandhi's birthday, 2 October, 1989, we felt that we were implementing his vision of the role of science and technology. is modified scheme was successfully operated by the villagers from 1987 up to 1996 and at its best, it demonstrated what we described as "e Blessing of the Commons"19 where there is a confluence of private and community interests. My interaction with the villagers of Pura has been one of the most rewarding experiences of my professional life. I learnt from them the difference between mere popularization of science and the democratization of innovation. eir understanding that technological progress occurs via mistakes was far superior to that of my colleagues in the Institute.
LESSONS FROM VILLAGE WORK e attempt at working on rural problems quickly revealed my serious shortcomings. I was born and raised in a city and therefore knew virtually nothing about life in the villages. I had received a Western type of education and therefore found it difficult to understand traditional attitudes and approaches. I came from a family of middle-class professionals and hence found it very difficult to see the world through the eyes of the poor. My predicament was captured by a poster in my study, which said: "Just when I thought I knew all of life's answers, they changed all the questions!" All this meant that I had to humbly undergo a great deal of unlearning (in addition to learning) before I could attempt to become a scientist capable of understanding and addressing rural problems. e interaction with the villagers of Pura and the Ungra region has been one of the most precious, enriching and enlightening experiences of my professional life. I learnt many lessons,20 a few of which are briefly
described below.
Rural people may be poor and illiterate, but they are not irrational. In fact, the poorer they are, the more their survival depends upon their rationality, upon a proper evaluation of costs and benefits. And, in their attitude to returns and risks, they invariably take the "worst case scenario" more seriously than the "best case scenario" because the former can lead to total ruin whereas the latter oen means only marginal improvement. For example, their choice of traditional seed varieties in preference to highyielding varieties is oen dictated by the fact that the latter can give even lower yields than the former if the inputs are not in the optimum range. us, given the options within their range of awareness, the technological choices of rural people are rational. For example, the load-bearing capacity of traditional bullock carts is low because the average payload in rural areas is only about 250–300 kg. It also follows that scientists must understand rural rationality if they want their technological suggestions/recommendations to be accepted. For example, if smoke from wood-stoves is essential to control termite attacks on the thatched roofs of village houses, then it is unlikely that smokeless stoves will be accepted unless they are accompanied by a solution to the termite problem, for instance, a termite-proof roof. Hence, scientists must first be students (learning from the people), if they want to be successful teachers to the people. ere are several important steps in this two-way information flow between scientists and the people. A scientific understanding of the lives of the people is a crucial starting point. is understanding cannot be acquired through naive questions to villagers such as "How many kilogrammes of firewood do you use for cooking?" One may have to actually use a spring balance to weigh head-loads of firewood being carried back from forests by women, and then find out how long they last and how many persons consume the food cooked with this fuel supply. Second, the focus must be on the identification of felt needs, rather than
perceived, needs. For instance, villagers are completely aware of the fact that thatched roofs leak, catch fire, are attacked by termites, harbour insects and rodents, and need constant maintenance. However, if they are asked what roof they might want, they might express their perceived need for a tiled or reinforced cement concrete roof because those are the only alternatives that they know. But, their felt need is really for an improved roof that does not have the defects of a thatched roof. An understanding of felt needs is therefore essential to work out the design criteria for improved technologies. ird, before a major effort is launched on the development of new technologies, it is vital that the various technological options are presented to the people and their preferences elicited. Fourth, if the intention is ultimately to spread the technology and to ensure that it does not remain a museum piece, it is imperative that the final decision on the selection of technology is made by the people and not by the technologists. Scientists must curb their tendency to develop technologies in response to imaginary and imagined needs identified in remote and alien settings. For example, a number of 'modern' designs of bullock-carts were developed in India with the capacity to carry 1,000–2,000 kg of load even though such high loads do not arise frequently in typical rural situations except, for instance, in the 'catchment area' of a sugar factory. e arduous task of R & D has to be taken up at this stage. e next important step consists of testing the technology in the field and getting the reactions of potential users. is is the democratization of innovation as distinct from the mere popularization of science. Finally the feedback from the field must be used to improve/modify the product/process before the technology is finalized for diffusion. e process of disseminating the technology has to be a multi-institutional effort involving rural users, development agencies, scientists, financial and/or credit institutions, etc. Women are oen the best agents for disseminating technologies for rural development. Unfortunately, even where scientists work with people, the tendency is to restrict popular involvement to the men. is gender bias is oen difficult to avoid because most scientists and engineers
are men; their technologies are oen male-oriented; there are social taboos in traditional societies discouraging direct interactions with women; rural women do not come forward to articulate their views in the presence of their men, etc. But, with many technologies, dissemination takes off once the women are seized with it. Once the women began to have a vested interest through a dung delivery fee in the delivery of dung to the Pura community biogas plant, the operation of dung collection and delivery started running smoothly. Traditional technologies were optimal solutions for the challenges of the past and therefore must not be ignored as possible sources of innovation. ey have evolved over centuries through a long process of the natural selection of innovations.21 For example, computer analysis has shown that the geometry of traditional bullock carts represents an optimum solution. Despite this pristine optimality, almost all of them are sub-optimal and inadequate today because of changed expectations, resource availability, materials and circumstances. For instance, in the past when India was heavily forested, teakwood may have been an optimum material for constructing the highly stressed wheels of bullock-carts, but today teak has become so scarce that it is an expensive and therefore sub-optimal solution.22 On the other hand, the so-called "modern" technologies, which are oen just bad "Xerox" copies of Western technologies, are rarely accessible to the poor. For example, the poor cannot afford modern roofing technology such as reinforced cement concrete. It is therefore a Hobson's choice for the poor—on the one hand, traditional technologies are inadequate, and on the other hand, modern technologies are inaccessible. To enable the poor to escape from this dilemma, scientists and technologists must generate new options, each more effective than the traditional and more accessible than the modern. Ideally, the options should constitute a hierarchy of technologies with upward compatibility. en, with rising incomes, the poor can climb from a cheaper less effective option to a costlier more effective option. Only in
such a situation will the people have genuine choices. us, scientists working on rural problems need to be option-generators and choicewideners. For example, in the matter of cooking fuels and stoves, rural technologists can widen the options of villagers so that they can also choose improved (smokeless) stoves and more efficient fuels. ere are three approaches in generating technological options: cheapen Western technology, develop ab initio an alternative technology and transform traditional technology. For example, in the case of low-cost building technologies, the approach of cheapening Western technologies may consist of developing fibre-reinforced materials, that of ab initio alternative technologies, geodesic domes, and that of transforming traditional technologies, compacted unfired mud blocks. Even though it is a hitherto untapped source, the transformation of traditional technologies is a rich source of, and a promising route for technologies appropriate for rural development. e transformation of traditional technologies involves an understanding of the scientific basis of traditional technologies, followed by qualitative changes achieved through marginal improvements. Appropriate technologies are very likely to be region-specific, locationspecific and culture-specific. And, the local culture may have many surprises. is is probably why Mahatma Gandhi is reported to have advised Laurie Baker, an Englishman who has devoted his life to creative low-cost architecture in India: "When you design for the poor, restrict yourself to materials that are available within a radius of ten miles!" An important lesson is that any fool can make a thing complicated, it takes a genius to make it simple. e end product may have to be, or may turn out to be, simple, but the thinking that goes (or went) into its development can be quite sophisticated. In fact, there is a desperate need for wise ideas and ingenious solutions. Rural technologies are therefore neither trivial nor second-class because they invariably pose the extremely tough challenge of having to be virtually "zero-cost". Of various technologies contending for dissemination, those
technologies succeed in spreading (i.e., penetrating the "market") that simultaneously solve several problems. Charles Berg who enunciated this "theorem" illustrated it by pointing out that energy-efficiency improvements were introduced into the U.S. steel industry during a period of declining energy prices because those improvements were accompanied by other useful characteristics. e Berg "theorem" is very relevant to rural technologies too. us, of the various designs for woodstoves, those that simultaneously eliminated smoke, cut down cooking time and reduced fuel consumption have been successful. .
At the risk of appearing sentimental, I would like to stress that scientists must approach rural work with empathy and affection for the people. Otherwise, they tend to be afraid of the people and hide behind the walls of their rural centres. en, the poor tend to conclude that their poverty is being used as a resource for professional gain. Even if the people do not get something back in return from the interaction, the feelings with which scientists make efforts are extremely important in the eyes of the people. Given the right attitude on the part of scientists, the rural poor are far more understanding of the fact that technical failures are usually precursors of success and technological progress occurs through mistakes. In fact, the understanding of the villagers of Pura was far superior to that of my highly educated colleagues in the Institute who cheer when the satellite goes up and jeer when it crashes into the sea. In response to my public admission at a village meeting that we had failed to deliver sufficient biogas cooking fuel through the biogas project, the villagers highlighted the sincerity of our attempts and insisted that we should change our objectives and focus on pumping drinking water. Eventually, this is what we did.
ENERGY FOR A SUSTAINABLE WORLD (1978–88) 1978 was an important year in my professional life. I met eodore (Ted)
Taylor at an Indian National Science Academy meeting in Delhi and was greatly impressed by him. Here was a nuclear physicist who after designing a whole generation of atomic bombs at Los Alamos had given it all up to lead a crusade against nuclear weapons and for solar energy. at major changes could occur in professional lives intrigued and impressed me. We became good friends and from him I learnt the importance of what he called in any context: "thinking it through". Implementation can fail for many reasons but often it is because the implementers have not "thought it through". In 1978, I also met Jose Goldemberg at a meeting organized by him in Sao Paulo where I presented the results of ASTRA's field study of rural energy consumption patterns. We discovered a shared identity of outlook and affinity of views. us began a lasting friendship that resulted in an important on-going collaboration. On my way back to India, I visited the Centre for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton University. I established instant rapport with a number of well-known scientists—Rob Socolow, Robert Williams, Frank von Hippel, Hal Feiveson, Gautam Dutt and others—who had turned their backs on conventional physics for studies on energy and the environment. I found them to be like-minded souls with deep social concerns and a determination to pursue science with a humane touch. I also came across unexpected reactions, for instance, a leading physicist from the Institute of Advanced Study saying to me aer my rural energy seminar: "I envy you!" My visit to Princeton in 1978 led to annual spring visits during the course of which old friendships deepened and new friendships were formed. It was in 1980 that I had the good fortune to meet omas Johansson from Lund University. Jose Goldemberg, omas Johansson, Robert Williams and I (popularly referred to as the "Gang of Four") began a collaboration that was to play a major role in my subsequent professional life. What initiated and
sustained this perhaps unique and now famous collaboration is of some importance. Each of us started his career as a physical scientist and turned eventually to energy research. Also, we lived and worked in different countries— Brazil, Sweden, United States, and India. And, our cultural backgrounds and experiences were very diverse. ough we were four individuals from four continents, our meetings at various international meetings and visits to Princeton revealed a remarkable measure of shared values and concerns about the interaction of technology and society. ey also showed an identity of outlook, a great deal of like-mindedness and a similarity of approach on matters concerning energy in society. ese interactions showed that the four of us could work together with mutual respect and equality. Above all, we could avoid the hierarchical modes of functioning that nearly always vitiate international, particularly North-South, collaborations. We also had humility in the sense that each one of us knew that we did not know it all and that, in order to develop greater understanding, we had to listen to the others and learn from what we had heard. Our chemistry worked. We have sustained our interaction for over twenty years. Even without an institutional umbrella, we created a "virtual institution" long before modern communication technology. At that time, energy thinking was dominated by growth-oriented, supply- sided, consumption-directed considerations. Deeply troubled by the environmental, security and equity implications of that paradigm, we wanted to evolve a different perspective. To us, the human dimensions of energy were as important as the technological. We were acutely sensitive to the environmental impacts of energy production and use. We were deeply concerned about equity between industrialized and developing countries and within developing countries with their small islands of glaring affluence amidst their vast oceans of abject poverty. Above all, we shared a vision of energy as an instrument of development, and of technology as a crucial mechanism for energy to play this role. is unity
of perspective and values was enriched by the diversity arising from the differences in our backgrounds, culture, experience and expertise. We forged bonds and functioned as a well- knit team. As a result, we produced together what none of us could have produced alone–the whole was greater than the sum of the parts. As we combined our efforts, we were led from a critique of conventional wisdom on energy to a new approach. When significant progress had been made, we felt that we should expound and elaborate the new approach– and that is how our book Energy for a Sustainable World23 came to be written. e book emphasized that energy is not the only major global problem. So, the solution to the energy problem must contribute to, and be consistent with, the solutions of the other major problems such as poverty, population growth, under-nutrition, ill health, environmental degradation, etc. Energy must be an instrument for advancing economically viable, need-oriented, self-reliant and environmentally sound development—what is now referred to as sustainable development. e emphasis on basic needs meant that the focus must be on the enduses of energy and the services that energy provides human beings. Technological opportunities abound for enhancing energy services. Developing countries can therefore leapfrog technologically, avoiding a repetition of the mistakes of the industrialized countries. ese countries can become exciting theatres of technological innovation. Implementation of the new energy paradigm in industrialized countries leads to the possibility of lowered energy intensities and convergence between the energy consumption of industrialized and developing countries. Above all, the goal-oriented, strategy-based policy-driven approach to energy implies–contrary to widely held beliefs–that the future for energy is much more a matter of choice than of destiny. Energy futures compatible with the achievement of a sustainable world are within the grasp of humankind. e joy in our endeavour came from the feeling of being
harbingers of hope rather than prophets of doom. In 1988, our book Energy for a Sustainable World was published. It attracted international attention. It contributed significantly to the new paradigm for energy. It was referred to in the "Brundtland Report".24 It led to an invitation from Scientific American to write an article on our approach.25But, our local scientific journal ignored it for several years. What a contrast to the reception I received from Professor Raman when I presented him Modern Electrochemistry; he promptly sent his secretary to hand-deliver to me his books all autographed with "With kindest regards ... from one author to another".
ENERGY MANAGEMENT (1985–91) Before going on a sabbatical to Princeton in the fall of 1983, I relinquished the convenership of ASTRA to a younger colleague. When I returned in 1985, I was persuaded by the new Director of the Institute to take up the chairmanship of what was to become the Department of Management Studies. ere I continued my study of energy consumption patterns but now focused (in collaboration with a highly committed and indefatigable student, Sudhakara Reddy) on Bangalore metropolis as an ecosystem. Two important papers on firewood and charcoal supply and consumption in Bangalore26,27had an influence on the establishment of tree belts around the city. I also turned my research attention to the dissemination of technologies. is work led to the view that technology shis (for example from firewood to kerosene cooking fuel) are analogous to predator-prey relationships where the predator is the displacing technology and the prey is the technology that is getting displaced. Even the equations describing the technology shis were found to be of the same form as the equations for the time-variation of predator- prey populations.28
My work led me to understand the importance of innovation, which is the process of converting an idea into a product in the economy. Innovation obviously is much more than invention where the process ends with a working device. But if a device works, that does not mean that it will be produced, distributed and accepted by end-users. It is amusing therefore that technology generators consider themselves a breed superior to technology disseminators. Perhaps, as a result, there are important actors largely missing in the innovation chain in India—those who develop the method of making the thousand-off or million-off as distinct from making the one-off prototype. I had a fruitful and enjoyable collaboration with Professor K.N. Krishnaswamy to produce a model backed by several case studies on the factors governing the success and failure of rural technologies.29 is led to two co-edited books e Technological Transformation of Rural India 30 and Rural Energy Planning.31 I also tried to understand the barriers to the spread of energy efficiency improvements by listing the barriers presented by various actors, what caused these barriers and suggesting how to overcome them. A paper on "Barriers to improvements in energy efficiency in energy policy"32contributed to an area of interest that came to be called barrier analysis.
However, the most productive part of my stay in the Department of Management Studies was the energy scenario work. During the 1980s, energy had become an increasing concern of mine. I built up a small team for energy analysis. Starting in 1986, Gladys Sumithra, P. Balachandra, Antonette D'Sa and I constructed a detailed development-focused, enduse- oriented and service-directed (DEFENDUS) electricity demand scenario for the South Indian state of Karnataka.33,34 We then did a detailed comparative costing (on the same terms) of fieen technologies of electricity saving, decentralized generation and conventional centralized generation of electricity. 35We used the results to construct a least-cost mix to meet the requirements arising from a demand scenario. It turned out that the least-cost mix consisted of end-use efficiency improvements and
electricity substitution measures, decentralized generation and centralized technologies (hydroelectricity, natural- gas-based and coal-based thermal power, and nuclear power). e detailed scenarios attracted international attention. ere was even national recognition when I was given the Om Prakash Bhasin Award for Energy in 1988. But many large national energy institutions were upset with us for stealing the limelight. What they did not realise is that our team at the Institute had put in about three years of effort to do the enduse analysis for Karnataka, the comparative costing and the scenario construction. During this time, these institutions strove for influence in Delhi, the national capital, and their leaders scrambled to be in the corridors of power. ere were lessons here. One can strive for political clout via analytical excellence, but not for the former in lieu of the latter, for however seductive it might be, political influence is ephemeral. In contrast, new ideas and sound analysis have a long-term sustainability.
Our in-depth analysis of the economics of nuclear power36was invaluable when a debate on the Kaiga nuclear power plant was organized by the Department of Science and Technology, Government of Karnataka. It showed that in the Karnataka context, nuclear power is neither necessary nor economical—in fact, it is the most expensive technology electricity generation. Its proponents claim that it is safe, cheap, appropriate and modern; but the popular meaning of the resulting acronym SCAM is a better description. Until that debate, I had been silent on nuclear power, much to the disappointment of many anti-nuclear activists. But, my silence arose from an unpleasant experience that I had several years earlier. I had always been in favour of a scientific outlook or what is called in Indian discussions, "scientific temper". What little disdain I had for the faith and beliefs of rural folk disappeared aer I became involved with ASTRA. ere I learnt that ordinary people are not at all ordinary if one considers how they cope with the world despite their economic and social
handicaps. Despite this, when a leading scientist said to me: "I say, that guy is pestering us, so please sign his Scientific Temper declaration", I signed the declaration in the same way that we oen buy charity-show tickets to get rid of the ticket-seller. In doing this, I was certainly irresponsible on a major issue. en, articles started appearing in the newspapers attacking the declaration and its signatories. To my surprise, I found myself agreeing with some but not all of the points made by the critics particularly those pertaining to the arrogance of modern science and the disrespect for traditional knowledge. In fact, I had written a paper entitled "Some oughts on Traditional Technologies" in which I argued that these technologies deserve respect and study-as the scientific- temper critics were now saying. Aer the Scientific Temper episode, I vowed that I would go into advocacy and action only on issues where I had done the analysis on my own." is vow has oen been a handicap but it has increased my effectiveness. I determined to follow the sequence: analysis → Advocacy → action. At the analysis stage, it was crucial to isolate oneself, the subjective analyst, from the object of analysis and also to remove emotions from the analysis. But, once the objective dispassionate analysis is over, it is vital to reconnect with the object and bring in values into the advocacy and action based on analysis.
On 31 July 1991, I retired from the Indian Institute of Science in accordance with its mandatory rule for retirement aer the age of sixty years. e Department of Inorganic and Physical Chemistry, the Department of Management Studies and ASTRA arranged separate farewell symposia to me. At the ASTRA seminar, I said: "I have tried to follow in my own life the philosophy of nish kama karma, doing one's duty without thought of the success thereof. But, success is a function of two variables, internal effort and external support. External support is a probabilistic factor that we cannot control, though there are many people who direct the bulk of their internal effort trying to control external
support. By and large, what is within our hands is internal effort. But, there is also a very interesting "stochastic" relation between success and internal effort–the more intense your internal effort, the greater the chances are that you will do better work which in turn will earn success." Looking back, I do not know whether my switchover from electrochemistry to rural technology and energy analysis has brought me more or less success. If success can be equated to making oneself redundant, I have been successful in ASTRA and KSCST because younger people—K.S. Jagadish and S. Rajagopalan—took over and the institutions have survived and grown during their tenures. What I do know is that what I have achieved is ten times more than the early dreams that Vimala and I had about our future. But, the switch has certainly brought me more happiness. Some of the best people I have met are those I met aer I started work with ASTRA and in the field of energy. I read out to the ASTRA seminar audience an extract from a letter that my teenage grandson had written to his parents: "Another bright spark in my project (on nuclear power) was our trip to ASTRA and a great discussion with thatha (grandfather in Telugu) on the problems of nuclear power. When ASTRA was being set up, I was much too young to understand the whole concept and what it stood for, but now all of what I have understood makes perfect sense." I think that is indeed a tribute. e young man made me feel immortal if immortality consists of one's ideas and influence acquiring an independent existence. It made me conclude by quoting from e Tale of Two Cities: "It is a far, far better thing that I have done than I have ever done before!"
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INITIATIVE My interest in the field of energy did not end with retirement. Aer Energy for a Sustainable World was published, there were frequent questions from supporters and sponsors on the lines of "Now, where is the
church?" ey wanted to know what was being done to implement the ideas? us, the International Energy Initiative (I.E.I.) was set up in 1991 with the generous financial and moral support of the Rockefeller Foundation and other U.S. foundations, and European bilateral donors such as the Dutch, Swedes and the Norwegians. Jose Goldemberg was to have been its President but aer he became a minister in the Brazilian government, I was persuaded to assume this office with Jose Goldemberg as the Chairman. e I.E.I.'s mission 37was to promote the efficient production and use of energy for sustainable development, particularly in developing countries. e I.E.I. was established as a South-conceived, South-led, Southernlocated South-North partnership—a small, independent nongovernmental public- purpose international organization. e Presidency of the I.E.I. involved a completely new set of activities quite different from those that preoccupied me earlier as an academic. I now had to address the challenges of raising funds, formulate work plans for regional energy initiatives (REIs) in collaboration with the regional staff, initiate new REIs, design institutional arrangements for decentralized operation, monitor activities and expenditures to advance I.E.I.'s objectives, promote public relations and write reports to donors. But apart from this, the real challenge lay in addressing the energy paradigms or mind-sets of decision-makers in developing countries, scrutinizing their patterns of thinking and trying to change them if they were obsolete or inappropriate. Once decision-makers adopt paradigms that advance sustainable development, then a favourable environment for projects is very likely to follow. On the other hand, appropriate projects can flourish even amidst obsolete and anti-development paradigms at the national level. us, there can be windmills, solar water heaters, etc., under a government that believes in the old paradigm that the magnitude of energy consumption is the index of development. Unfortunately it is not easy to formulate in project format the activity of changing the
paradigm for the thinking on energy. is means that paradigm-shiing activities require core rather than project funds and raising funds for this purpose is a very much more difficult task. Another challenge is to cope with a changing funding environment in which the development assistance pie is shrinking while there are new claimants to the pie. Even the U.N. is facing a funding crisis. And in the sustainable energy field, U.N. organizations are going to the same funding sources as international NGOs like the I.E.I. Hence, there are signs of a growing competition between UN organizations and NGOs. In the process, NGOs are getting pushed out because their objectives look the same (e.g., energy for sustainable development). Unfortunately, because they work through governments (who are the custodians and defenders of conventional paradigms), U.N. organizations are very weak at changing paradigms, however strong they may be in promoting projects. Fortunately, competition between U.N. organizations and NGOs is quite unnecessary. A strong synergy is possible by exploiting their complementarity. U.N. organizations can exert top-down pressure on governments to implement programs and projects, and NGOs can generate, maintain and strengthen the bottom-up pressure via civil society for paradigm shis. If the NGOs are South-based, then they can achieve their objectives at a fraction of the cost that U.N. organizations would have to bear. Unfortunately, the I.E.I. did not succeed in persuading the relevant U.N. organizations (with identical perspectives on sustainable energy) to submit joint proposals for sustainable energy to appropriate donors. Ideas on energy for sustainable development are necessary, but not sufficient—one needs to get them into the minds of decision-makers. So, in addition to analysis, there has to be information exchange, training, advocacy and action. us, the I.E.I.'s mission was planned to span information exchange, training, analysis, advocacy and action (INTAAACT).
e main information activity of the I.E.I. was envisaged to be its journal Energy for Sustainable Development. e case for an I.E.I. Journal is that there is no international journal either with the efficient production and use of energy as its exclusive focus or directed towards energy actors concerned with energy in developing countries. Neither is there a journal devoted to exchanging developing-country experiences in the field of energy. Above all, there is no international journal focusing on strengthening the capability of energy actors in developing countries to choose, plan, establish, manage, operate and efficiently use energy systems. An essential part of this task of strengthening capability is the use of a journal to forge an interacting community of energy actors concerned with the energy systems of developing countries. I.E.I. thus sees the journal as contributing to the process of building indigenous expertise in developing countries on all aspects connected with the generation and use of energy technologies necessary for sustainable development. e I.E.I.'s journal Energy for Sustainable Development has been published since May 1994. By producing and printing the journal in a developing country like India, the costs have been kept extremely low. On a print order of 1,000 copies per issue, the total costs in the year 2000 were about $3.16 per copy of which the fixed costs were $0.79 and the variable costs, $2.37 per copy.
e I.E.I. has also supported a Fellowships Programme that helps advance its objectives in several ways. is programme builds capacity in the form of energy analysts from developing countries trained in the "new" approach to energy planning; strengthens the training capability of the host institutions through the development of curricula, course materials, laboratories and resource persons; contributes to institution-building through the organization and management of the training programmes; utilizes the human resource potential of career professionals and graduate students for carrying out research on important energy issues in developing countries at relatively low costs; and creates agents of change
who will go into, or back to, energy institutions and influence them to adopt sustainable development approaches to energy. e I.E.I. located suitable institutions in Brazil, China and India, each having qualified faculty who are willing and able to use the fellowships programme to help advance its objectives at $5,000 to $10,000 per fellow per year. Since a small international organization with low secretariat costs can only function in a decentralized manner, regional energy initiatives (REIs) were set up in Brazil and India. Each of these had a director and a small office with a separate budget implementing a work plan and reporting monthly on work and expenditures. A successful programme of fellowships and integrated resource planning was also organized in China based on the Energy Group at the Tsinghua University but this petered out aer the unfortunate demise of Professor Qiu Da Xiong in a tragic road accident. An effort was made to implement an African Energy Initiative (AfEI) but this ended in failure for reasons that are interesting for the future of energy analysis in developing countries. At the initiation meeting at Harare in April 1994, key African energy analysts were unanimous in ascribing the weakness of African energy analysis to the dominant role of donors. They stated that these donors carved up the continent into regions of influence with donor- driven programmes for each region. Recognizing that a common failing of policy formulations is that they proceed without a prior clarification of goals (objectives to be achieved) and strategies (broad plans to reach the goals), the analysts agreed on clear goals (see box) and argued for an energy strategy derived from the needs of the continent. It was envisaged that a Pan-African theme-based network that would overcome the donor-driven balkanization of the continent would implement the strategy.
ENERGY FOR DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA GOALS
To give energy a human face in all regions of Africa by raising dramatically the level of energy services accessible to, and enjoyed by, all sections of the population,particularly women and the rural and urban poor;to go beyond energy and make it a powerful instrument of development through its linkage with all sectors of the economy— industry, agriculture, transport, etc.;to meet the energy needs of human beings and the economy with rationally determined mixes of centralized and decentralized energy sources and of energy saving measures (which are equivalent to a supply option) to use indigenous renewable energy sources particularly hydroelectric, biomass and solar energy ensuring that local, regional and global environmental degradation is minimized, if not avoided, without sacrificing sustainable development objectives and simultaneously to strengthen indigenous capacity and build local, regional and continental institutions so that African energy problems are as far as possible diagnosed by Africans and solved by them. e bad news is that the AfEI petered out aer about a year. In hindsight, it appears that interest in joining the AfEI network was largely based on the expectation that the I.E.I. would support the core costs of their organizations/institutions. Unfortunately, since it was not a donor agency, I.E.I. could only support incremental costs. When it became clear that funding was not available for core costs (salaries, equipment, buildings), many of the participants lost interest in the AfEI. is was understandable because in Africa core costs have to be provided by project sponsors, in contrast to China and India (for example) where university faculty have adequate salaries and therefore only incremental costs are sufficient. e situation was aggravated by the fact that there were activities such as the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) that funded international meetings, consultancies and projects related to mitigation of global warming and
greenhouse gas measurement studies. African energy analysts were attracted away into these more lucrative donor-driven programmes even though they were emphatically rejected at Harare as priority subjects for Africa. Hence, these international collaborative programmes undermined the building of indigenous African energy analysis capacity and the strengthening of African self-reliance. My own energy analysis work in the I.E.I. was part of the INTAAACT work of the REI at Bangalore. To promote the efficient production and use of energy for sustainable development, it is essential that the mind-set of energy decision-makers be shied from a growth-oriented supply-sided consumption-directed approach to a development-focused, end-useoriented service-directed approach (DEFENDUS). is paradigm shi involves research and analysis as well as advocacy. Following initial detailed studies on the demand and supply scenarios for the electricity sector of Karnataka, workshops have been conducted to disseminate the approach and the results to relevant policy- and decision-makers and to NGOs.
ese workshops necessitated the preparation of analytical training materials for integrated electricity planning using the DEFENDUS approach. e course materials were designed for hands-on computerbased spreadsheet exercises in the construction of demand scenarios and least-cost supply mixes (based on comparative costing). Even if the resistance to least-cost electricity planning is overcome, paradigms shied and sustainable energy strategies evolved, the next step is energy planning in which demand and supply scenarios are constructed. It is necessary to have an approach that is particularly suited for beginners. In this context, the I.E.I.'s DEFENDUS spreadsheets seem to offer clear-cut advantages38—they are simple and completely transparent, their parameters are completely under the control of the planners, and they offer a default case that makes it unnecessary to build a model from zero. Apart from the training conducted for several states in India (Workshops
in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka), Latin America, and South Asia, the I.E.I. has repeated these and related activities for other South Asian countries, China and Latin America and for the UNDP in New York.
A case study was conducted of the power sector of the south Indian state of Karnataka.39 It showed that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the financial ills of the utility were not because of the heavily subsidized electricity given to irrigation pump sets (IPS) of farmers. In 1996, this subsidy was shown by I.E.I. to be compensated by cross-subsidy primarily from industrial and commercial consumers. Because the meters on IPS had been removed in 1981, the consumption by IPS and the transmission and distribution (T & D) losses had to be guessed or fabricated every year. If the upper limit of technical T & D losses is taken to be about 20 per cent then the balance (up to about 10 per cent of Karnataka's electricity) is in fact commercial loss (the utility's euphemism for the). I.E.I. concluded that commercial T&D losses were the fundamental reason for the utility being in the red. If these losses had been minimised, if not eliminated, and the resulting revenue brought into the utility's coffers, it would have had a revenue surplus that could have been used as an internal source of funds for improvement of the system and expansion of capacity. Karnataka's power sector used the fabricated IPS consumption to hide many of its technical and commercial shortcomings, in particular its commercial T & D losses. Many of these observations from I.E.I.'s analysis were strongly resisted when they were published, but they have now become conventional wisdom repeated by the authorities in the power sector. I.E.I.'s intervention in Karnataka's power sector as a case study of Analysis leading to Advocacy and Action suggests that it is possible to outline a tentative model for such interventions.40
ENERGY AFTER RIO AND WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT
In 1996, I received an invitation from the Energy and Atmosphere Programme of the UNDP to co-author a book elaborating the crucial links be twe e n energy and poverty, development, environment, and the economy, followed by a statement of the technological opportunities on the demand- and supply-sides of energy systems, and finally a discussion of how to make it happen. e publication was for presentation to the June 1997 special session of the U.N. General Assembly to review and appraise the progress of Agenda 21. While writing has always been for me a pleasurable creative activity, it is inconvenient, if not unpleasant, to get one's writings approved by a committee appointed on "political" and/or geographical considerations. Of course, for a large number of actors and stakeholders to acquire ownership of a document, this approval is essential. e only way in which this dilemma can be resolved is for the writer to have an abundant reservoir of "oriental" patience and detachment, which fortunately I was able to muster. e final product of these efforts was an attractive and lucid document Energy Aer Rio: Prospects and Challenges.41 It was intended to ensure that energy did not disappear from the agenda of important international forums. Hopefully, it succeeded in this objective. Hardly had Energy Aer Rio: Prospects and Challenges been produced when another exercise was initiated by UNDP and UNDESA in collaboration with the World Energy Council (representing private industry) to produce a World Energy Assessment.42 Under the Chairmanship of Professor Goldemberg, a team of ten convening lead authors was asked to assemble groups of lead authors and produce the chapters of the document. I was the convening lead author of chapter 2 on Energy and Social Issues with inputs from eight lead authors. During this time, my long-standing interest in rural energy led me in 1999 to write a paper on Goals, Strategies and Policies for Rural Energy as part of my analysis work for I.E.I.43 On the strength of this paper, I was also invited to serve as a lead author for Chapter 10 of the WEA on Rural
Energy in Developing Countries.
THE AUSCHWITZ EXPERIENCE AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMMORALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS e September 1999 Editorial Committee meeting of the World Energy Assessment was held in Krakow, Poland. ere I had an experience, which if I was religious, I would describe as a religious one, a mental turning point aer which things would never be the same. e visit to Cracow enabled me to visit the infamous Nazi concentration camps of Auschwitz and Birkenau that are now preserved as museums. ere, I came into direct contact with the horrors of the Holocaust. e tour of the camps le me with a completely unexpected feeling. e scale of human extermination was so enormous that I had to remind myself, particularly because the camps have been unpopulated since 1944, that there used to be human beings there. e powerful impression that persisted was of detailed engineering resulting in "the immense technological complex created ... for the purpose of killing human beings." e meticulous organization and rigorous management were characteristic of mega-industries, "gigantic and horrific factories of death". e main gate of Auschwitz displayed the inscription "Arbeit macht frei" ("Work makes free"). Perhaps a more apt announcement would have been "Technology completely decoupled from values". In Auschwitz, it is obvious that nothing happened spontaneously. Everything was designed and planned. Walking through Auschwitz, I began to wonder how the development of the atomic bombs at Los Alamos, the test at Alamogordo and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki differed from the Nazi concentration camps. Of course the Allies in World War II were not driven by the racism of the Nazis, and they were not pursuing a final solution of extermination of any particular religious group. But with regard to the scale of killing, the
recruitment of capable minds, the harnessing of science and technology (some perhaps hoping that the weapons would never be used and others even opposing the use of the weapons aer they were developed), the extent of organization, the resort to effective management, and the choice of targets to maximize annihilation of Japanese civilians, the Manhattan project and its follow-on was like the concentration camps, in fact, even more horrendous in its impact. I started agonizing over what all this meant for India. Since May 1998, the country had witnessed the scientist-politician nexus underlying the nuclear tests at Pokhran, the use of national security arguments to advance political party agendas and the self-serving jingoism of the scientists. Of even greater importance has been the silence of its journals with a few notable exceptions, the obfuscation of ugly reality and the virtual absence of intellectual dissent. For several decades, I had been worried about the conventional view that science is amoral and neutral. Scientists can escape responsibility for the horrors that have sprung, or can spring from, science by the clever excuse of the amorality of science. But, like the youth of the 1960s, I rejected that sophistry. I was disturbed that values, feelings and emotions were considered unmentionable in scientific discussions. Since ASTRA, however, I did not hesitate to refer to them in my seminars, even in Western centres of excellence. e "scientific temper" debate in India raised my level of understanding of the very fundamental issues involved. India's nuclear tests thrust the whole issue of science and morals into the foreground of my consciousness. Aer Pokhran II, there was a distressingly and disappointingly small minority of Indian scientists who spoke up against the nuclear tests. ough I was one of them, 44 my attitude intensified after my Auschwitz experience.45 I became convinced that nuclear weapons are not just another class of weapons in the long history of development of weapons. Nuclear weapons are unique – their impacts are primarily on innocent civilian non-
combatants, particularly women and children; their radiation effects persist for generations aer their detonation; they are intrinsically indiscriminate; they are largely uncontrollable; and above all, they are instruments of mass murder on a scale unparalleled in human history. is uniqueness of nuclear weapons, many aspects of which are common to chemical and biological weapons, has been clearly affirmed in an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice rendered in the month of July 1996. Nuclear weapons have security, political and economic implications. In the ultimate analysis, however, the issue of nuclear weapons is a moral question. It is a question of right and wrong and of good and evil. It is this ethical aspect of nuclear weapons, especially as it applies to the designing and manufacture of nuclear weapons, which became the focus of my presentations.46 I was therefore forced to think about the claim of the amorality of science. is amorality emerges from two conventional prescriptions for the relationship between the scientist (the subject) and the object of scientific study. Firstly, the scientist as subject is urged to separate and distance himself/herself from the object of study even when the object is living. Secondly, it is recommended that the study must be devoid of feelings and values, i.e., it must separate emotion (the non-cognitive self) from analysis (the cognitive self). It must be a purely cerebral objective activity. e amorality of science stems from these two dichotomies–the isolation of the subject from the object and the removal or absence of emotions and feelings. And when the object of the study includes human beings, then people are perceived as "things". e first dichotomy leads inevitably to degradation of the objects of study (even humans) into things, and the second, to the removal of feelings for objects. us, science is claimed to be objective and amoral. I began to feel that there was a way out of this moral crisis. e relationship between the scientist (the subject) and the object of scientific
study must be dialectical so that initial separation (and distance) ends in subsequent unification (and embrace). e suppression of emotion during analysis must give way to emotion aer analysis. e functioning of scientists as individuals, groups and institutions must be constrained and limited by moral strictures and taboos. Otherwise, the synergism between the isolation of the subject from the object and the removal or absence of emotions and feelings leads inevitably to science becoming the instrument of violence, oppression and evil. Science, therefore, must not be neutral. It must be encoded with life affirming values. e link between science and morality must be re-established. e Gandhi talisman is relevant: "Recall the face of the poorest and most helpless person ... and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him. Will he be able to gain anything from it? Will it restore to him control over his life and destiny?"
THE VOLVO ENVIRONMENT PRIZE 2000 e link between science and morality highlights the importance of the energy-equity nexus that has been a recurrent theme of my energy work for two and a half decades (and of the work of the Gang of Four and I.E.I.). A great opportunity to emphasize the human dimensions of energy arose through the award of the Volvo Environment Prize 2000 to Gold e mbe rg, Johansson, Williams and myself for "outstanding collaborative achievement since the early 1980s for working out a new policy-driven approach to the technical analysis of world energy needs and how they could be provided for in the early decades of this century." When I delivered the acceptance speech at Goteborg on behalf of my collaborators and myself on 17 October 2000, I insisted that energy acquires a human face and contribute to "wiping every tear from every face". Among the other visions for energy in the new millennium are the following: drastically reducing, if not eliminating, the coupling between
energy consumption on the one hand and economic growth (GDP), materials use and emissions on the other; re-examining the assumption that energy problems can be solved without changes in life-styles in the industrialized countries–Gandhi said: "e world has enough for everyone's need, but not for every man's greed!"—providing universal access to affordable modern energy services, particularly in developing countries and especially for the poor and for women; harnessing the immense possibilities of information technology; increasing the scope for people's participation with decentralized energy systems; modernizing rural energy systems leading to a dramatic improvement of the quality of life. e bad news is that radical ideas do not become new orthodoxy overnight; they require continuous struggle and persistent effort. e old growth-oriented supply-sided consumption-directed paradigm still dominates the thinking of decision-makers, particularly in the developing countries.
These challenges have been addressed by the Gang of Four with a flurry of additional efforts at analysis, advocacy and action. Mention should be made of the books: Electricity: Efficient end-use and new generation,47 Renewable Energy: Sources for Fuels and Electricity,48 Energy aer Rio: Prospects and Challenges, Energy as an Instrument of Socio-economic Development,49 the World Energy Assessment and most recently Energy for Sustainable Development: A Policy Agenda.50 I concluded the Volvo Prize acceptance speech thus: 51 "e future is difficult, but the present is unsustainable. Fortunately, ideas are powerful and when they become visionary messages capturing the hearts and minds of the people, mighty empires crumble and powerful structures collapse."
CONCERNS REGARDING ENERGY
It has been a rare privilege and a good fortune that I have been able to work on energy problems at the village, city (Bangalore), state (Karnataka), national (India) and global levels. Nevertheless, I am le with two major concerns regarding the future of energy analysis. Firstly, energy analysis in both industrialized and developing countries is dominated by men. But, the management of energy particularly in the rural areas of developing countries is done primarily by women. In addition, experience is mounting that the decisions of women (for example, in micro- lending programmes such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh) take into account the long-term and the next generation, a natural consequence of their linkage with children. It is precisely such a view that leads to sustainability. Hence, women are naturally endowed to be better custodians and implementers of sustainable development.52 at being the case, the gender disparity in energy analysis is serious. It must be remedied.
Secondly, energy analysis is still dominated by analysts from the industrialized countries. A head count on any recent edited book will show that the Southern contribution from developing countries is negligible. Obviously, capacity building in developing countries is given low priority even by organizations that are supposed to be committed to this challenge. Capacity building is a slower time-consuming process and programme executives in a hurry do not emphasise the task. One must also note the negative and counter-productive role played by the major diversion of extremely scarce Southern energy analysis talent into greenhouse gas mitigation analysis for developing countries even though the global warming problem has arisen primarily from Northern energy consumption patterns. Our book Energy for a Sustainable World was particularly sensitive to the importance of building indigenous capacity and strengthening selfreliance in energy analysis. e Gang of Four also organized workshops in Princeton (1980), Sao Paulo (1984) and Princeton (1998) hoping to
stimulate new South-South and South-North collaborations. An outcome of the 1984 Sao Paulo workshop was a 'Declaration on Self-Reliance in Energy Analysis'.53 But, on the one hand, alongside the token mentioning of capacity building, the strengthening of self-reliance is not being ensured in most energy programmes and activities. One even wonders whether it is on the agenda of those organizing these programmes and activities. On the other hand, there is a proliferation of Northern-located energy analysts (oen expatriates from developing countries) to intercept the donor funding for energy analysis pertaining to developing countries. In addition to their proximity to Northern donors, their advantage is their nexus with developing country elites. ey soon develop a vested interest in competing with and undermining indigenous capacity. us, there are two major challenges: engendering energy analysis, planning and implementation and indigenizing energy analysis capacity.
RETIREMENT A daughter of mine once said to me apropos my health: "Dad, aer 100,000 miles, parts start failing!" and at the age of 65, one of the parts of my body gave me problems–I experienced a pain in my chest when I was on my morning walk. I went through the familiar sequence— electrocardiogram, treadmill test, angiogram and a bypass operation. ough I was out of the hospital in ten days, I was quite depressed for about a month or so until I started working with a laptop and writing a paper. Modern anesthetics and painkillers are so powerful and effective that I have few memories of pain except in the faces of the loved ones who were at my bedside. Nevertheless, a major operation stimulates philosophical thoughts on several issues–the finiteness of life, my mortality, how
medicine has made it possible for me to live longer than my maternal ancestors many of whom did not live into their fiies let alone the biblical three score and ten, how to make the new lease on life meaningful, and so on. I began to seriously review my future particularly when a family member asked me provocatively: "Have you ever heard of any man on his death-bed wishing that he had spent more time at the office?" It became clear to me that I had to start the process of retirement. It was not easy because of worries concerning the future of the organization I would be retiring from. I have had two different types of experiences. e first is with long-standing institutions (or units of institutions) that I entered without a radically different paradigm. Such units, for example the Department of Inorganic and Physical Chemistry, have continued aer my departure with virtually no change. en, there are organizations like ASTRA and KSCST that I have designed and built on the basis of a new paradigm. Unless such organizations are le in the hands of successors who are as committed to the new paradigm, it is inevitable that major distortions in their functioning will take place. In September 2000, I retired from the Presidency of I.E.I. To make this retirement meaningful, several lifestyle changes have become necessary. In particular, there should be no acceptance of new administrative responsibilities and a tapering off of old ones, no writing assignments associated with deadlines, no membership of new committees/boards/ governing bodies and gradual resignation from current memberships except in special cases, no commitments with routine obligations like regular office hours, etc. Unfulfilled interests of yore (such as bookbinding) have to become new hobbies. Hopefully, retirement should not mean cessation of soul-satisfying work, which in my case means study, analysis and writing. e first test case of post-retirement life was my study of the California energy crisis at the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001. I was thrilled to discover the power and possibilities of the Internet. Sitting at my home
computer in Bangalore, India, (but it could have been any telephoneconnected village), I was able to read every day's New York Times and Los Angeles Times for information and analysis on the power situation in California. anks to the quality of their reporting on the topic, I gradually acquired an understanding of the crisis that was hardly inferior to that of privileged analysts in the US, as judged by the reactions to my dra paper. I could also draw the lessons of the California energy crisis for the power sector reform process that was taking place in India and publish a detailed paper on the subject.54 Alongside, my interest in power sector reform issues continued.55 e whole exercise has intensified my optimism regarding the quality of the rest of my life. e big question mark is that I continue to enjoy adequate health and/or that the body parts that fail can be fixed. at is only partly in my hands. But as long as I am able I shall be motivated by my school motto: Faith and Toil, which is perhaps a description of my life.
INTERVIEW WITH RAVI RAJAN RR. At the outset, could you elaborate further the reasons that led you — a promising scientist with a successful career ahead of you—to choose to focus on appropriate technology? Can you elaborate, specifically, on the impact that the 1973 lecture by Professor C.T. Kurien had on your thinking? AR: As I indicated in my autobiographical essay, I belong to a generation that was inspired by Nehru's vision that poverty will disappear with industrialization and with an investment in science and technology. e essence of Nehru's worldview was that that more the country industrializes, the less poverty there would be. Kurien's lecture, however,
drew upon the research of Dandekar and Rath on poverty in India56 and argued that poverty had increased with industrialization! is was upsetting and forced me to think about the connection between industrialization and poverty. I then came to the view that the problem lay in the fact that Indian industrialization had been of a particular type—capital-intensive and labour- saving - whereas poverty-reduction required the opposite strategy. It needed labour-intensive, employment-generating and capital-saving technologies. In other words, what was needed was an "appropriate" technology. at is how the idea of appropriate technology emerged and immediately I connected this with the location of poverty in India—which is largely in rural areas. Hence, the commitment to appropriate rural technology. RR. You have argued in your essay that you were already pre-disposed towards such a view on account of the influence of your uncle early in your life, and subsequent experiences. Can you tell us more about these influences? AR: As I indicated in my autobiographical essay, my uncle, C.G.K. Reddy, who was released in 1946 aer three years in jail for anti-British activities, inspired me to think of a socialist pattern of society. Jayaprakash Narayan's "Why Socialism" had a seminal impact on me. rough my uncle, I also met many Indian socialist leaders. For example, I came to know Rammanohar Lohia who used to stay with my uncle when he came to Bangalore. In fact, I used to be Dr Lohia's driver in Bangalore. I was also the secretary of the Student Socialist Club in Bangalore at a time when the Socialist Party was still a political force. e philosophical writings of the radical British scientists Hyman Levy and J.D. Bernal were also major influences on me. In the early 1950s, I studied Levy's e Universe of Science" 57 and Social inking 58 and Bernal's Freedom of Necessity 59 and Science in History60 and discussed
them with friends with similar interests. e influence of Bernal and Levy was amplified through personal contacts when I was a Ph.D. student in London. I used to attend Bernal's crystallography classes because my thesis topic involved crystallography. During that time, Bernal added a last chapter to e Social Function of Science61 in which he glorified Stalin. is was just before Khrushchev exposed the horrors of Stalinism at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. ere was also the Soviet invasion of Hungary. e event is clear in my memory. I joined a march on the British Prime Minister's residence at 10 Downing Street, London, to protest against the Anglo-French role in the Suez War. Aer the march, I went to Trafalgar Square and there was this enormous meeting which was addressed by Aneurin Bevan62. Soon aer he started to speak against the war, somebody came up to him and gave him a piece of paper. He stopped his speech, read the paper and announced that Soviet troops had marched into Hungary. is was a period of tremendous political ferment. ere was turmoil amongst socially concerned individuals. ere were meetings where people vehemently argued whether the Soviet invasion of Hungary was justified or not, and about the larger implications of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin. In that turmoil, I found little inspiration or guidance or example from Bernal. My impression was that Bernal was not a very warm human being. Perhaps it was this lack of humanity that made his approach to socialism all cerebral; it had little to do with the heart and humanism. Hyman Levy was a totally different person. He was a charming individual who exuded personal warmth. Aer the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the British Communist Party sent a delegation to the Soviet Union to find out what had happened during the Stalin period. Hyman Levy who was a member of this delegation described the interaction thus: "ere was this Suslov63 who was their theoretician. I looked at him and he looked at me. I didn't trust him. He didn't trust me." What happened
to human beings was central to Levy. Based on that visit, Levy said that he resolved that he would never again automatically support the actions of the Soviet Union. is emotional response is what many others had—so that the moment they realized that terrible things had happened under Stalinism, they withdrew from a pro-Soviet position. From the differing attitudes of Bernal and Levy to major political events, I learnt that intellectual analysis was only a necessary step; it was not sufficient. A moral endorsement and a humanistic justification was essential. Aer these early influences in India and England, there was a very long period in which I was not involved with social issues. However, during the 1960s when I was in the United States, I participated in the March on Washington to support the anti-Vietnam war movement. Nevertheless, my centre of gravity was science. At that time, there was a dichotomy in my life between my social consciousness and my scientific work. e connection was built only later, through ASTRA, and intensified by going back to the writings of Gandhi and J.C. Kumarappa.64 RR. Reading your autobiographical essay, I was struck by your description of the role of C. Subramaniam in supporting your early steps towards appropriate technology. To many today, it might seem incongruous that someone who supported the Green Revolution would also be such a fervent advocate of appropriate technology. How do you make sense of this seeming contradiction?
AR: C. Subramaniam firmly believed that there should be democratic participation of scientists in the formulation of science and technology plans for India. So when the National Committee of Science and Technology (NCST) produced a plan, C. Subramaniam felt that it should be critiqued by scientists. He organized four meetings of scientists in Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and Bangalore and to each meeting he invited several hundred scientists, industrialists, etc. At each one of these meetings, the NCST document was presented with a discussant's paper. I see no inconsistency between his support to the Green Revolution and his
support to appropriate technology. Why should one be in contradiction to the other? You can support low-cost housing, you can support small-scale agroprocessing industries, you can support decentralized energy for villages and you can also support the Green Revolution. RR. Well except that one can argue based on what we know today that there could have been research investments made in building agricultural research institutions that take agroecological systems seriously... AR: The option was not presented to him. RR: Is it as simple as that? AR: If had such options been presented, I am sure he would never have opposed them. RR. What were your own responses to the Green Revolution at that time? Did you see it as a liberating thing? AR: I was clear that I should not speak on anything on which I had not done research myself and the fact was that I had not studied the Green Revolution. I began to have some understanding of it only when I began to work in rural areas and then realized that the Green Revolution involved the timely application of a number of inputs, which were capitalintensive. en I realized that the traditional inputs could easily be assembled by villagers and that their technology was robust, although not as high yielding. But the high-yielding options required all these inputs with investments of money and they had to be timely. If all those inputs were not available at the right time, the yield could turn out to be less than what would be obtained from traditional practices, and—the net result could be worse. Aer working in rural areas, I realized that the Green Revolution had worked only in a small part of India, that it did not cover rain-fed agriculture and that what was required was a technology for the rain-fed agriculture areas. is is what Dr M.S. Swaminathan now propounds.
RR. Let us turn to ASTRA. Tell us a bit more about its origins and its central characters? And why was ASTRA successful, whereas others in institutions across India who broadly shared your vision, such as Dr C.V. Seshadri, had more difficulties? AR: Aer the NCST seminar where I made the presentation on the choice of alternative technologies, there were a number of informal meetings in the canteen to talk about what we could do that was relevant. I then wrote a proposal for the formation of a group to be called ASTRA. I passed around that proposal and there was a great deal of support for it. en Professor Dhawan, the Director of the Indian Institute of Science, invited me to submit that proposal to SCRAP, the Senate Committee on Research and Academic Policy, which was the top decision-making body. I went and presented the proposal along with about ten colleagues who shared the vision. is shared vision gave us the conviction that we could do something. e group included Krishna Prasad, a professor of mechanical engineering who specialized in heat transfer, and K.S. Jagadish, a civil engineer. Other civil engineers included Subba Rao and Rama Prasad. ere were also chemical engineers, foremost among them being R. Kumar, S.S. Lokras and M.S. Murthy. ere was an aeronautical engineer, Roddam Narasimha who is now Chairman of Engineering Mechanics Unit at the Jawaharlal Nehru Centre for Advanced Scientific Research (JNASR). In short, a number of people felt that ASTRA represented a reorientation of science and technology that they would support. Many of them went on later to pursue their own inclinations. For example, Madhav Gadgil went on to form the Centre for Ecological Sciences and Krishna Prasad opted for foreign pastures. But, the core group was sufficiently strong and held together for a number of years. It is precisely such a sizeable community that C.V. Seshadri did not have at the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur. As a result, he was very much alone. Interestingly enough, I was invited to speak at Kanpur
on ASTRA and Appropriate Technology and have since learnt that a number of young students were influenced by that presentation. For example, an engineer who is now at Indian Institute of Technology, Chennai (Madras) recently said to me at a meeting where we both spoke: "I will never forget the talk you gave at Kanpur."
In contrast to Seshadri's predicament at Kanpur, we enjoyed considerable support in Bangalore. We were also fortunate in having the support of our director, Satish Dhawan. Professor Dhawan came from a socially progressive past and was a person with a very strong social conscience and sympathies. He and I belonged in the 1950s to a discussion group in Bangalore and we knew each other since then. We also enjoyed the support of Rustom Choksi, the Chairman of the Institute Council, and J.R.D. Tata, the President of its Court. Of course we were helped by the fact that we were not failed scientists looking for new avenues. On the contrary, we were highly successful and some of us were already Fellows of the Indian Academy of Sciences. RR. You note in your essay that ASTRA never received widespread student support and more significantly, that the Indian Le never appreciated the work it was doing. Looking back at the people's science movements of the past two decades, things definitely seem to have shied in this regard. Could you walk us through your own attempts to interact with the Indian Le over the years and comment on their initial intransigence and their subsequent changes in perspective? AR: e first difficulty in persuading scientists from the conventional Le of the arguments for appropriate technology was the dichotomy between their politics and their scientific work. eir approach could be caricatured as follows: "the social implications of what they do in their labs/offices between 9 am and 5 pm need not be scrutinized as long as aer office hours they espouse radical causes!" and "there need not be a linkage between their work in their labs/offices and the slums and villages outside as long as they adopt a radical posture on some far off place such
as Cuba!" us, they evade the challenge of unifying their work and their beliefs. e second difficulty arose because they jumped to the conclusion, or feared, that the proponents of appropriate technologies were proposing them as a substitute for social change. In other words, they dubbed the appropriate technology movement as "revisionist" or supporting the present order. ey did not see that the fight for appropriate technology was a necessary component of the struggle for basic social change. e third problem arose from the understanding of technology among the Le. Because the Soviet revolution thought a new society could be built with the capitalist pattern of technology, their followers did not consider it necessary to question the pattern of technology. ey did not realize that technology is like genetic material—it carries the code of the society that gave rise to it and given favourable conditions tries to reproduce that society. If capital-intensive labour-saving technologies are introduced into a society that has abundant labour amidst a scarcity of capital, the technologies will end up in enclaves, which are the characteristic of dual societies. e construction of new societies requires new patterns of technologies. us, the transformation of rural areas and the alleviation of poverty there depend on the deployment of appropriate decentralized empowering technologies. Fortunately, people's science movements grew with committed scientists using their expertise to address local technical problems. ese movements found that these problems could be resolved only through a growing appreciation of the need for, and power of, appropriate technology. us, appropriate technology found a constituency that was initially different from, but slowly included elements of, the conventional Left.
RR. Let's now get into something very interesting and important – your definition of sustainable development. Please walk us through the history of how you arrived at this definition.
AR: My thinking started with an attempt to define what is "appropriate". e term "appropriate technology" begs the question: "appropriate to what?" I took a stand then that appropriate technology has to be appropriate to development–it has to advance development. is begs a question: "What is development?" In 1975–76 when I was on sabbatical at e United Nations Environment Programme in Nairobi, I wrote a monograph entitled: "Technology, Development and the Environment – A Re-appraisal" in which I argued that one criterion of development was whether basic needs are satisfied. e second criterion was whether it is environmentally sound. But then I realized that one could have a situation where basic needs are satisfied by a dictator and that the process could also be done in an environmentally sound way – but with the people le out as spectators/ recipients/ beneficiaries but not as participants. I felt that such a situation is not sustainable and that unless people are involved and have control over their destinies, they will not participate. So the whole question of endogenous self-reliance came in, a self-reliance that grows from within. Once these three components were there, namely satisfaction of basic needs (starting from the needs of the neediest), environmental soundness and self-reliance, the definition of sustainable development follows. Stated differently, sustainability involves equity, environment, and empowerment. In essence, I have been arguing that just as environmental impact statements are necessary, so are equity impact statements and empowerment impact statements. And it is only when those three statements are available can you say – "yes, this qualifies as sustainable development." RR. In what contexts and to what audiences did you first elaborate this idea? AR: I did this initially through a number of presentations on appropriate technology in India. Later, when I worked for the United Nation's Environment Programme in 1975–76, I was asked to develop a
conceptual framework on appropriate technology and I produced the monograph: Technology, Development, and the Environment – A Reappraisal. Subsequently, when I started working with Jose Goldemberg, omas Johansson and Robert Williams (the so-called Gang of Four) on energy issues, I found that there was an immediate positive response firstly from Jose Goldenberg (Brazil) who also had a view on developing countries as "dual societies" with small affluent politically powerful elites amidst poverty stricken powerless masses. My basic needs argument was therefore immediately appreciated by him. It was also appreciated by Robert Williams in Princeton and omas Johansson in Lund. So the definition was incorporated into our book Energy for a Sustainable World. RR. Explain two of your terms: "village ecosystems" and "rural energy centres." AR: If you want to treat a village as an ecosystem then you have to look at all the categories there and at how the energy and matter flows in and how it flows out. You have to look at villages and their agriculture, transport, draught animals, women. You have to understand energy consumption patterns. You also look at the whole question of crop production in agriculture: "What are all the inputs and what are all the outputs?" en comes the other challenge: "How are you going to intervene on the basis of such information?" at is where the design and implementation of rural energy centres comes in. Rural energy centres are intended to meet the energy needs of the villages using as far as possible resources that are available within the village. What ASTRA tried to do was to use biomass resources - and we built a biogas based rural energy centre to address specific needs. RR. Many conventional attitudes to energy are centred around the idea that energy is needed in aggregate in a centralized kind of way. What you seem to be proposing is a model in which energy is both generated in local arenas as well as used up in local arenas. How do you reconcile these seemingly contradictory approaches?
AR: With regards to the needs of rural areas, the conventional view is that you have to generate the energy centrally and then supply it to the villages. If you adopt a centralized approach then there are transmission and distribution losses that increase with distance. In addition, there is the problem of supplying over long distances to small load centres such as villages for short periods of usage time, say for lighting. So it may well turn out that it is more cost-effective to generate locally and use locally. us we are talking about a niche for decentralized energy within a total energy system that certainly includes centralized energy. RR. You have argued that science should not be neutral and that moral strictures ought to govern scientific institutions. What does this mean in terms of organizing science institutionally and in terms of scientific commitments by individual scientists? AR: There are only two ways individual scientists can proceed. They can adopt the stance that what is the outcome of science is not their responsibility and that their responsibility is only to understand some phenomenon and in general pursue truth. Such a view assumes that any use made of the knowledge that they produce is le to decision-makers who decide how to make use of that knowledge. is conventional attitude amounts to saying that science is amoral. I am arguing instead that that such an attitude is not enough. I am very much influenced by what happened at the Nuremberg trials. e Nazi judges who were on trial pleaded that they were not responsible for the atrocities that followed from their laws and judgements because they were simply carrying out their duty. e plea was rejected and the judgement of the Nuremberg tribunal was that human beings are responsible for the consequences of their actions and have to take full responsibility.
I On Technology Choice and Development Alternatives
1
The nature of western technology: why does it inevitably produce alienation, unemployment and environmental damage?
Most thinking on technology is based on the pattern that obtains in western Europe and north America. is picture is reinforced by the fact that the centrally planned economies of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the major industrialized country of the east, Japan, have also adopted virtually identical patterns. But is this western pattern of technology unique, inevitable and unavoidable—a pattern which developing countries must necessarily emulate and with which developed countries must persist? e pattern of technology is shaped by, and in turn shapes, the society in which it is generated and sustained. More specifically, technologies respond to social wants, which are in turn modified and transformed by technology. e main features of this scheme (see Fig. 1.1) can be summarized in seven principal points. 1. ough most of the innovations underlying the industrial revolution came from crasmen and artisans working outside the formal institutions of learning, the situation is quite different now. Today, it is the institutions of education, science and technology which are the main sources of technological innovation. ese include the universities, the institutions of science and technology, and the
research and development laboratories of government and industry. By and large, spontaneous innovation, as distinct from minor adaptation by the people and extra-institutional groups makes a negligible contribution to the stream of technology generation. (Whether this virtual exclusion of the populace from the innovative process should continue to be the case is another matter.)
Figure 1.1
2. Social wants are not necessarily responded to by the institutions responsible for the generation of technology. ere is a process of filtering these wants, so that only some of them are transmitted as demands upon technological capability, and the rest are bypassed by
these institutions. In other words, there are ignored wants—wants which institutions do not seek to satisfy by research and development programmes of any kind. is filtering process is usually operated by decision-makers, both in the bodies which control the research and development institutions— that is, in government and the big corporations—and in the institutions themselves. ese decision-makers are either conscious agents of political, social and economic forces, or are unconsciously influenced by these forces. In general, and particularly in untempered market economies, only wants which can be backed up by purchasing power become articulated as demands upon the research and development institutions, and the remaining wants are bypassed, however much they may correspond to the basic minimum needs of underprivileged people. us, like all commodities in these economies, technology is a commodity catering to the demands of those who can purchase it, and ignoring those who cannot afford it. 3. e generation of technology involves the so-called 'innovation chain' which is a sequence of steps by which an idea or concept is converted into a product or process. is sequence of steps varies with the circumstances, but can be schematically represented thus: Formulation of research and development objective → idea → research and development → pilot-plant trial → market survey → scaleup → production/product engineering → plant fabrication → product or process. 4. It is essential to note that socio-economic constraints, and environmental considerations (if any), enter the innovation process in an incipient form even at the stage of formulation of the research objective, and then loom over the innovation chain at several stages. ese constraints are in the form of preferences, or guidelines, or paradigms. For example: 'Seek economies of scale', 'Facilitate
centralized', mass production, 'Save labour', 'Automate as much as possible', 'Don't worry as much about capital and energy (in the days before the energy crisis) as about productivity and growth' and 'Concentrate solely on internal costs and ignore external social costs such as polluting effluents and depletion of natural resources'. 5. us every technology which emerges from the innovation chain already has congealed into it the socio-economic objectives and environmental considerations which decision-makers and actors in the innovation chain introduced into the process of generating that technology. Further, at a previous stage in the spiral (see 2 above) the very decision to respond to a particular social want by generating the technology is the result of a deliberate filtering process wielded by decision-makers.
6. e technology that emerges from the innovation chain will become an input, along with land, labour and capital, to establish an industry or agriculture or a service if, and only if, these socio-economic and environmental constraints are satisfied. us it is not only the technical efficiency of the technology but also its consistency with the socioeconomic values of the society which determine whether a technology will be deployed and utilized. 7. Social wants are not static. e products and services that are produced create new social wants, and in this process the manipulation of wants through advertising, for example, plays a major role. Hence the spiral: social wants → products/services → new social wants.
WESTERN TECHNOLOGY PATTERNS Every pattern of technology is socially conditioned; it is a product of its times and context. Because it is the end-product of a process of socioeconomic selection, technology bears the stamp of its origins and nurture.
In a sense, then, technology resembles genetic material carrying the code of the society which conceived and nurtured it. Further, given a favourable milieu, it can be used to try to replicate that society. To the extent that the replication is not automatic and inevitable, the argument is not one of technological determinism; and to the extent that technology itself is socially conditioned, it is not a motive force outside of society. is conclusion may be quite obvious to archaeologists who must proceed from the products of technology—tools and artifacts—to reconstruct the culture of a society; and to social anthropologists who cannot but consider technology—industry—society interactions. But there is a surprising (or perhaps not so surprising) reluctance to accept that, like all patterns of technology, the current western pattern is also a product of specific historical conditions—those of the past thirty to eighty years.
A crucial feature of the initial part of this epoch is the domination of colonies by imperialist powers. Later, and particularly over the past thirty years, this became the domination of politically 'independent' developing countries by the developed countries. ese relationships of dominance enabled the developed countries to commandeer and/or enjoy from the developing countries natural resources, including non-renewable minerals and fossil-fuel energy, at much lower prices than would have been the case if relationships of equality had prevailed. For instance, the prices of raw materials from the ird World have not risen as sharply as the prices of manufactured goods from industrialized countries. (e 1973 oil price increase, the conflicts at UNCTAD IV and the Paris North-South conferences are all part of the drive to redress these historically-enforced inequalities.) is situation has also resulted in the accumulation of capital in the industrialized countries at a rate and in a volume which would not have otherwise been possible. At the same time, the industrialization of the developed countries has invariably taken place amidst shortages of labour. All these factors have had an overwhelming influence on the pattern of
western technology. is is because every technology is only viable within certain limits (upper or lower) of the prices of raw materials, energy, capital and labour, and if the prices of one or more of these inputs changes drastically, the validity of the technology may be undermined. e point has been dramatically demonstrated with the vast number of energyintensive western technologies based on the cheap Middle East oil of the pre-1973 days, all of which are now undergoing exhaustive reassessment. us the old (and still prevailing) international economic order has resulted in the capital-intensiveness, energy-profligacy, recklessness with regard to non-renewable natural resources, and labour-saving character of the western pattern of technology and industry. e second crucial feature of the period of history which spawned the western pattern of industrialization is that the vast majority of its technological innovations emanated from the basic driving force of profit maximization and accumulation. is intrinsic compulsion to minimize internal costs of enterprises, and to disregard as externalities all effects on the social and natural environment of the enterprises, has led to three intrinsic tendencies of western technology and industry: 1. the amplification of inequalities between and within countries; 2. the increase of alienation of men from each other and from their work, and diminution of social participation and control; and 3. the degradation of the environment.
INEQUALITY… e tendency of western technologies to amplify inequalities between and within countries results from a number of factors. First, western production technology has become increasingly capital-intensive, and therefore gravitates to areas and locations where that capital can be mustered and exploited—towards rich nations and away from poor
nations, and towards the urban areas of developing countries at the expense of their villages. Second, the associated increase in energy intensiveness leads to increasing automation and decreasing dependence on labour—and therefore, in the absence of careful central planning, to greater unemployment. is produces, in developed countries, relative poverty for the minority and, in developing countries, a potentially catastrophic accentuation of the gap between affluent elites and the poverty-stricken masses. ird, having largely solved the minimum needs of the populations in developed countries, western product technology is increasingly orientated towards luxury goods for private consumption, and towards military applications. For, when there is inequality in the distribution of purchasing power, the resulting skewed demand structure drives such technology to respond more avidly to the luxury demands of the rich and to assign lower priority to the basic needs of the under-privileged.
…ALIENATION… e inherent tendency of increasing alienation and diminishing social participation and control is an inevitable result of a production technology which has relentlessly pursued so-called economies of scale, mass production and automation. In doing so, it has generated a highly skewed pattern of demands for skills. Only a few are required to possess a high degree of intellectual training or manual skills, while the barest minimum of intelligence and dexterity is expected from the vast majority of the working force, which naturally becomes alienated. is trend is only aggravated by the deliberate organization of the labour process to increase profits, rather than to enrich the lives of workers. But training and skills lead to control over technology, and thereby to power—hence western technology tends to concentrate power in the
hands of the few and deprive the majority of control over their destinies. Push-button warfare is the ultimate example of the technology-power equation. And the virtually complete exclusion of crasmanship and creativity from work in modern machine-dominated factories results in the alienation of men from their work. Finally, western product technology is specifically designed to respond to, and evoke demands from, those privileged with purchasing power. It therefore results in the proliferation of luxury goods for individual consumption and the generation of overly consumption-orientated lifestyles—thus increasing alienation of men from other men.
…AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE e third intrinsic tendency of the western pattern of technology—its disastrous impact on the environment—results from western technology's obsession with an ever-increasing scale of production. is results in an increasing perturbation of ecosystems—the sources of pollution become more and more concentrated and intense till there is a real possibility of pushing them beyond the limits of stability. Western technology has generated risks to the biosphere of increasing gravity ranging from trivial and acceptable to remediable, avoidable and catastrophic, and has increased the probability of occurrence of any given category of risk. us human civiliation and life itself have become threatened by technological 'progress', particularly in weapons. At the same time, the constant drive to manufacture products which are constantly changing in appearance and form but similar in function and content is the cause of the rape and depletion of natural resources, the alarming degree of product obsolescence and the 'throw-away' philosophy. Finally, the tendency of western technology to magnify inequality results in the very rich (countries and groups within countries) damaging the
environment through over-consumption, and the very poor being able to ensure their survival only at the expense of their environment.
THE NEED FOR ALTERNATIVES e unwelcome features of western technology are the result of a process of socio-economic selection, designed to consolidate the old (but still prevailing) exploitative international economic order, which in fact spawned that species of technology. In addition, it is this western pattern of technology which is accentuating the polarization of developing countries into dual societies with small, westernized elites living in metropolitan islands of affluence among vast oceans of rural poverty. e dismantling of these dual societies and their real development requires a pattern of technology with fundamentally different features. ese features are also a necessary condition for the establishment of a new international economic order between developed and developing countries. It is in this sense that the demand for development and a new international economic order must be accompanied by the demand for alternative technologies.
2
The Shaping of Science and Technology in Developing Countries
INTRODUCTION
Scientific
and technological advances are taking place at such a phenomenal rate, and their impacts on society are so profound, that science and technology are invariably viewed as autonomous forces, operating from outside society, and transforming it. Perhaps the most significant manifestation of this view was the anti-science and antitechnology movement in industrialized countries where science and technology were seen, particularly by youth, as malevolent forces of death and destruction. It is therefore an opportune moment to reiterate the question: how does society shape science and technology? is inquiry is particularly important in the developing countries, for, in these countries, science and technology can be extremely powerful instruments of change, and it is vital to understand how to fashion and wield these instruments. The search for this understanding is the theme of this paper.
THE PROBLEM
Over the past twenty-five to thirty years, a large number of countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, achieved political independence and embarked upon a course of economic transformation. A large number of
industries were established. Western lifestyles in food, clothing and houses were introduced. Modern health care, education, transportation and communication systems were established through hospitals, universities, airlines, telephones and television. Agriculture was sought to be transformed through the so-called "green revolution" based on highyielding varieties and inputs of fertilizer, pesticides, etc. As a result of these and other measures, the Gross National Product has shown significant increases in most of these countries.
e Indian experience has been particularly impressive. e key indicators are given in Table 2. As important as these statistics is the fact that India has constructed nuclear reactors, conducted a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE), sent into orbit an indigenous satellite with an Indian launch vehicle, and manufactured aircra of local design. India's plant geneticists have come up with new crop varieties, its surgeons perform open-heart surgeries, its chemical engineers design and erect complex plants, and so on. Table 2.1: Some Indicators of India's Growth
All this shows—if ever such evidence is required—that science and technology can be powerful instruments in the shaping of developing societies. But, behind such appearances in developing countries, there is an unpleasant reality, clearly typified by India. Half the Indian population [of 680 million] lives below the poverty line which is officially defined as a daily per capita expenditure of Rs 1.25 ($ 0.16) or less. e per capita caloric supply is 7 per cent less than the requirement, and this nutritional gap is aggravated by the fact that 80–90 per cent of the population are estimated to be hosts to intestinal parasites which consume about 10 per cent of the calorie intake. About 40 per cent of the population live in oneroom houses, and 60 per cent of the total number of houses are of poor material: grass, mud, etc. ere are 122 deaths for every 1000 children born. About 65 per cent of the population is illiterate. 69 per cent does not have access to safe drinking water. 93 per cent of the country's households cook with firewood, cowdung-cakes and agricultural wastes, and 83 per cent of the houses are illuminated with kerosene lamps. About 80 per cent
of the country's population lives in its 567,000 villages, but 56 per cent of these villages are not electrified and 61 per cent are not connected by roads. And, underlying all these statistics is a life of abject squalor, intolerable hardship and abysmal misery. Against this background, the obvious question is whether Indian science and technology is being used to remove squalor, eliminate hardship and banish misery, that is, to "wipe every tear from every face" (the expression used by Mahatma Gandhi!). e scientific and technological infrastructure for addressing this challenge certainly does exist in India. ere are about 900 science and technology institutions in the main agencies, ministries and departments of the central and state governments, and in the private sector. e stock of scientific and technical manpower is over 2.3 million (Table 2.2), and there are over hundred universities to replenish and increase this stock. Table 2.2: Stock of Trained Manpower in India (1978)
Further, this infrastructure is sustained with an annual science and technology expenditure of about Rs 5 billion ($ 0.6 billion). What needs examination, therefore, is the thrust of Indian science and technology. As a first approximation, this thrust is revealed by the distribution of research and development expenditure in the central sector (Table 2.3). About one-half of the total central expenditure goes to three agencies:
the Defence Research and Development Organization (16 per cent), the Department of Space (12 per cent) and the Department of Atomic Energy (18 per cent). of these, the first is admittedly directed towards military applications. e Department of Space directs its efforts towards the use of satellite technology for communication and resource surveys, and the Department of Atomic Energy is primarily concerned with the generation of electricity through nuclear reactors. But, the work of both of these agencies has obvious military implications: missiles and nuclear warheads respectively. Table 2.3: Central Research and Development Expenditure (1976–77)
e Council of Scientific and Industrial Research has made major contributions to the import-substitution drive of Indian industry, but its major beneficiary has been small-scale industry. e Indian Council for Agricultural Research has provided the indigenous research and development component of the green revolution, but there has been a growing feeling that it is mainly the rich farmers who have gained by these advances and that the problems of rain-fed agriculture, dry farming and drought-prone areas have been largely ignored. e Indian Council for Medical Research has only recently come out with a "Health for All" strategy; it has largely concentrated on a capital-intensive curative approach rather than on preventive medicine and on infectious and parasite-borne diseases such as leprosy, filaria, trachoma, etc. that affect
the poor.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this thrust of Indian science and technology and the pattern of expenditure which sustains it bear little relation to the crucial problems of Indian poverty some of which were listed above. In this respect, India is quite similar to most other developing countries, but perhaps the mismatch between thrust and needs is more disheartening in the case of India because its scientific and technological infrastructure offers far greater potential. e question therefore arises: how is science and technology shaped in developing countries—and in India in particular?
SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS e starting point of the present analysis is the view that technology and the productive apparatus of society (its industry, agriculture and services) responds to social wants,1 which are in turn modified and transformed through a causal chain, or rather, a causal spiral. A deeper understanding of technology-society interactions is facilitated by the simple model shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Technology-Society Interactions
Every society generates wants, and these wants can be satisfied through goods and services produced by industry, agriculture and the service sector either with available technologies or with new technologies developed by the institutions responsible for the generation of technology, viz., the educational, scientific and technological institutions. But, all social wants do not necessarily receive a positive response. ere is a process of filtering these wants, so that only some of them are transmitted as demands upon technological capability, and the rest are bypassed either by the productive apparatus not deploying available technologies or by technology-
generating institutions not developing the required technologies. In other words, there are ignored wants which are not included in the product-mix of the economy despite the availability of technologies, or which the educational, scientific and technological institutions avoid in their research and development programmes even though the satisfaction of these wants requires the generation of new technologies. e process by which a society arrives at a particular product-mix is outside the scope of this paper—it is a matter of conventional political economy. In contrast, the filtering process which results in a particular set of social wants being responded to with science and technology is the main theme of the analysis here. This filtering process is operated by decision-makers at four levels: 1. the national level through the apportioning of national research and development budgets, 2. the agency or corporation level where each agency or corporation gives a specific orientation to its mission or charter, 3. the institutional level through the special emphases given to various programmes, and 4. the individual level through the motivations, predelictions and capabilities of scientists and engineers. All these decision-makers are either conscious agents of social and economic forces, or are unconsciously influenced by those very forces. In untempered market economies, the forces are simple—they are the forces of the market-place. Only wants which can be backed up by purchasing power become articulated as demands upon the research and development institutions, and the remaining wants are bypassed, however much they may correspond to the basic minimum needs of underprivileged people. us, like all commodities in these economies,
technology too is a commodity, catering to the demands of those who can purchase it, and ignoring those who cannot afford it. e generation of technology involves the so-called "innovation chain" which is the sequence of steps by which an idea or concept is converted into a product or process. is sequence of steps varies with the circumstances, but can often be schematically represented thus: Idea → Research and development → Pilot-plant trial → Scale-up → Production/product/ process engineering → Plant fabrication → Product or process. It is essential to note that socio-economic constraints and environmental considerations enter the process in an incipient form even at the stage of formulation of the research objective which evokes the idea and then loom over the chain at several stages. ese constraints are in the form of preferences or guidelines or paradigms, for example, "Seek economies of scale!"; "Facilitate centralized, mass production!"; "Save labour!"; "Automate as much as possible!"; "Don't worry as much about capital and energy (in the days before the energy crisis) as about productivity and growth!"; "Treat polluting effluents or emissions as externalities!"; "Only worry about the unit cost of the product from the point of view of the enterprise, and let social costs, e.g., damage to community health or increased load on the transport system or exhaustion of non-renewable natural resources, be society's problem!", etc.
us, every technology that emerges from the innovation chain has already congealed into it the socio-economic objectives and environmental considerations which actors in the innovation chain introduced into the process of generating that technology. Further, at a previous stage in the spiral the very decision to respond to a particular social want by generating the necessary technology is the result of a deliberate filtering process wielded by decision-makers. e technology that emerges from the innovation chain will become an
input, along with land, labour and capital, to establish an industry or agriculture or service if and only if the aforesaid socio-economic and environmental constraints are satisfied. us, it is not only the technical efficiency of the technology, but also its consistency with the socioeconomic values of the society, which determine whether a technology will be deployed and utilized. Social wants are not static. e products and services that are produced create new social wants, and in this process the manipulation of wants through advertising, for example, plays a major role, and thus the spiral: Social wants → Products/services → New Social wants → … → Since social wants, which are the driving force of technological development, are themselves transformed by technology (and its embodiment in industry, agriculture and the services), it is clear that technology shapes society. e model also reveals that every pattern of technology is socially conditioned. Technology is a product of its times and context, and bears the stamp of its origins and nurture. It is in this sense that technology can be considered to resemble genetic material that carries the code of the society which conceived and nurtured it and, given a favourable milieu, tries to replicate that society. e replication is neither automatic nor inevitable, it is successful only when a host of environmental factors are favourable—hence, the argument is not tantamount to technological determinism. Further, it has been emphasized that technology itself is socially conditioned hence technology is not viewed as an autonomous factor and a motive force outside society. Of course, all this is obvious to archeologists who must proceed from the material products of technology, i.e., tools, artifacts, etc., to reconstruct the vanished society and its culture, and to social anthropologists who cannot but consider technologyindustry/agriculture-society interactions. e analysis must now shi its focus from technology-society interactions to the inter-relationship between science and technology. is
interaction (Figure 2.2) between science, which is concerned with the understanding of nature, and technology, which consists of the knowledge required to produce goods and services from natural resources, takes place through the innovation chain which converts an idea into a product or process. e generation of technology, i.e., the passage through the steps of the innovation chain, has to be based on an understanding of the laws governing natural phenomena, including the properties and behaviour of materials, and the process of transformation of substances. If this understanding already exists, then technology thrives on known science, but if the relevant aspects of nature are not understood, then technology throws up basic problems along with a pressure for their solution. Under this pressure, the fundamental questions of technology become a dominant concern of science and lead to new knowledge. But, science is also propelled along by its previous preoccupations and by the carriedforward balance of unsolved problems. Thus, science develops through the interplay between the momentum of its past concerns and the continual challenges posed by technology.
Figure 2.2: Science-Technology Interactions
Both these driving forces are invaluable. In the absence of an internal dynamic arising directly from previous work and indirectly from its whole history, science will become subservient to technology, rather than an independent ally able to summon accumulated wisdom to cope with the frequent changes in technological goals. In the absence of a technological pressure, science will be deprived of the invigorating effect of new challenges. For, as social demands change, the goals of technology alter, the basic problems which technology poses become different, and fresh scientific tasks arise. Technology, therefore, is a stimulus to science and produces the changes in its principal foci of interest. e effects of technological stimuli are amplified through the distribution of funding over the different fields and sub-fields of science because this distribution is usually strongly influenced by the distribution of funding over the various areas of technology. Technology nourishes science, not only with relevant basic problems, but in a concrete way with the materials, fabrication techniques and scientific instruments to tackle these problems. ese materials, techniques and instruments are supplied by technology to science via industry. In particular, the scientific instruments industry has assumed a commanding influence over science. ere are situations and periods when it is not clear whether the demands of scientific research evoke the supply of scientific instruments, or the production of instruments creates a demand for them and enforces specific types of enquiry. Indeed, the distortion of research by instruments would be more commonplace were it not for the fact that technological pressures are a powerful orienting force on science. It must be concluded, therefore, that science and technology are in strong interaction with each other. Further, since technology and society are closely coupled, it follows that science also is socially conditioned, albeit indirectly. But, the influence of society over science is much weaker than its impact on technology because the internal dynamism of science
makes it more autonomous.
TECHNOLOGY-SOCIETY MODEL FOR STRATIFIED DEVELOPING SOCIETIES IN STRONG INTERACTION WITH DEVELOPED COUNTRIES e model of science-technology-society interactions presented above is only valid for homogeneous and isolated societies. It is too simplistic for most developing countries, as may be shown by considering the case of India. Indian society is not homogeneous; it is economically and socially stratified. is stratification is manifested in a number of ways, but one manifestation is the pattern of distribution of expenditure (Table 2.4). It can be seen that the annual consumption of the richest 5 per cent of the population is slightly greater than the poorest 30 per cent, and the richest 10 per cent of the population accounts for 24 per cent of the expenditure in contrast to the poorest 60 per cent who are responsible for 37 per cent. Such a skewed distribution is the result of income inequalities (Table 2.5). Table 2.4: Distribution of Expenditure in 1967–68
e richest 5 per cent (about 30 million) include the owners of large assets (capital, land, factories, etc.), political leaders, top bureaucrats, technocrats, executives and professionals. e next richest 5 per cent
include the relatively prosperous Indians with household incomes greater than about Rs 800 (US$ 00) per month—rich farmers, bureaucrats, scientists, engineers, white-collar workers, and the other so-called "middle classes". At the other end of the spectrum are the 50 per cent of the population (about 300 million) below the poverty line with household incomes of less than about Rs 300 (US$ 37.50) per month—the poor farmers, landless labourers, tribals, harijans, etc. Table 2.5: Distribution of Incomes
us, in the first approximation, the stratification of Indian society— and that of most other developing countries—can be represented as a dual society—a society of the elite (the richest 10 per cent) and a society of the masses (particularly the poorest 50 per cent) which may not be isolated from the former, but is separated from it by a wide chasm of incomes and consumption patterns. More significantly, there is a tremendous difference in the attitudes and lifestyles of these two societies. e poorest fiy per cent struggle for elementary minimum needs in respect to food, shelter, clothing, health, education, transport, etc. In contrast, the elite in India—and that of most other developing countries—practise; a philosophy best described thus: "all that is rural is bad, all that is urban is better and all that is western is best". us, the elite seek a lifestyle similar to that in the developed countries— above all, in the goods and services they try to acquire. is means that there is a strong influence of the developed countries upon the elites of
developing countries. Hence, most developing countries neither have homogeneous nor isolated societies, and the over-simplified model of science-technologysociety interactions (Figure 2.1) must be elaborated to deal with stratified societies in strong interaction with the developed countries. One possible elaboration (which is not identical to, but closely resembles, that proposed by Herrera2) is shown in Figure 2.3. It involves a replacement of the one circle representing society in Figure 2.1 with the three circles at the top of Figure 2.3 (circles 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3) representing the three societies relevant to the present discussion, viz., the society in developed countries referred to here as "western" society, the society of the elite and the society of the masses below the poverty line.
Whereas there is a tremendous overlap between the wants in developed countries and those of the elite in developing countries (cf. circles 2.1 and 2.2), it is a characteristic of a dual society that there is virtually no overlap between the wants of the elite and the masses in developing countries (cf. circles 2.2 and 2.3). In contrast to the masses below the poverty line whose wants correspond to the basic minimum needs of food, shelter, clothing, health, education, employment etc., elite wants tend to be modelled on the pattern of the developed countries. It is important, however, not to restrict the concept of elite wants only to goods and services for personal and group consumption. e elite equates itself with the nation—its needs are considered to be national needs and its geo-political interests are looked upon as the country's interests.
Figure 2.2: Technology-Society Interactions in Developing Countries
In dual societies, it is the politically powerful elite—the richest ten per cent of the population—which controls the bulk of the decision-making. us, it is the elite which operates the filtering process that selects out some wants for onward transmission as demands upon industry, agriculture and the services (if the technologies for satisfying these demands already exist) or upon the technology-generating institutions (if new technologies are to be developed). By the same filtering process, other wants are completely shelved or drastically under-emphasized. In most developing countries, this elitist filtering process results in
1. the wants of the elite being wholly transmitted as demands requiring satisfaction, and 2. the wants of the masses below the poverty line being largely ignored even though they are an expression of urgent minimum needs. A discussion of the pattern of demands transmitted to the productive apparatus of society, and therefore the bundle of goods and services which is produced, would lead to questions of conventional political economy which are outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to state here that the masses below the poverty line are virtually outside the market economy because of their lack of purchasing power. Industry, therefore, finds its market almost solely among the elite. And, in the choice between expanding the market by increasing the purchasing power of the masses, and keeping the market restricted but increasing the return on each sale, the decision-makers have generally pursued the latter option. Perhaps, this is because the former option requires a drastic redistribution of assets, particularly land, i.e., a solution unpalatable to the richer land-holding sections of the elite.
What, however, is relevant here is the operation of the filter which results in a particular pattern of demands being imposed upon the technology-generating institutions. is filter operates mainly through the funds allocated to research and development, and the data which has been presented (Table 2.3) shows that little emphasis is placed upon the urgent basic needs of those below the poverty line. The motivational processes leading to this result are quite complicated. 1. e neglect of the needs of the masses may not be deliberate. In fact, the decision-makers responsible for dividing the national research and development budget between the different science and technology agencies may well be under the impression that their allocations correspond to the needs of the people. Perhaps the
discrepancy is between the elite's perception of the people's needs and the actual needs of the people. For example, the elite are aware of the desperate need of the rural masses for energy, but construes this as a demand for electricity from nuclear reactors, whereas those below the poverty line require energy mainly for cooking, and electric cooking is neither inexpensive nor thermodynamically sound. 2. e scientific elite is preoccupied by considerations of machismo with respect to the industrialized countries and wants to prove itself in the so-called advanced technologies. e associated dream is to be considered "modern" and "play in the same league" as the developed countries. But, no elite will be considered macho if it is impotent in the face of poverty. 3. e decision-makers on research and development are oen victims of the myth of spin-offs, according to which the best way of satisfying need X, is not to "zero in" on X, but to concentrate on need Y in the belief that the work on Y will lead to spin-offs which will be useful in tackling X. 4. ere is also the simple and naked fact that the sharing of the national research and development cake is associated with empirebuilding tendencies—each agency seeks to increase its budget irrespective of whether or not that increase will lead to a better correspondence between the people's needs and the thrust of science and technology. 5. Geopolitical interests and considerations of "defence" are very significant in the thinking process of science and technology decisionmakers. 6. Many senior scientists also have a firm belief that the technologies for tackling the problems of poverty are all available, and therefore there is no need for research and development to be directed towards these problems. is naive view is the natural result of total unfamiliarity
with these problems and their magnitude. What may be in their minds are the solutions adopted in the industrialized countries, but these may not be solutions at all because they are incompatible with the constraints of capital, population, resources, etc. 7. Finally, these decision-makers usually believe that the real challenge lies in the future when only futuristic technologies will satisfy the projected needs. Hence, in considering the immediate needs of the poverty-stricken masses and their future requirements, the scales are tilted overwhelmingly in favour of the future when what is required is a balanced emphasis on short- and long-term needs.
Coming back to the demands of the elite, these can be satisfied straightaway by the productive apparatus when new technologies are not required. In the case of India, there is a severe restriction on imports, and therefore the demands must be met through the Indian productive apparatus, mainly industry. But, Indian industry is of two categories: 1. Indigenous industry (circle 5-3) which is based on the indigenous technology (circle 4-2) developed by national educational, scientific and technological institutions (circle 3-2), 2. foreign-collaborating industry (circle 5-2) which enters into collaboration agreements with industry in the developed countries, referred to here as "western" industry (circle 5-1) in order to import the technology, which for convenience is termed "western" technology (circle 4-3), generated in their institutions of education, science and technology (circle 3-1). In assessing the relative significance of these two categories of industry, several points should be mentioned.
Indian industry, particularly the large-scale variety, has shown an overwhelming preference for importing technology rather than sponsoring its generation—thus, there have been about 6000 foreign collaboration
agreements for technology imports between 1948 and 1979. Many of these imports have been repetitive in the sense that several enterprises make the same product under different collaboration agreements.
Further, the expiry of one agreement only leads to another agreement, rather than to self-reliance in the technology. Hence, technology imports have been used in most cases as substitutes for indigenous research and development, rather than as spring-boards for technological self-reliance. (is is in total contrast to Japan, which also relied heavily on foreign collaboration, but for every dollar incurred on technology import spent about four dollars on research and development on the same products/ processes, and thereby advanced beyond the foreign competitors.)
In addition, there are a number of fringe benefits to be derived from foreign collaborations: investments with almost no technological risks, trips to, and shopping in, the glamorous cities of industrialized countries, opportunities for the exercise of political-cum-bureaucratic power arising from foreign exchange and licensing regulations, and even commissions for the conclusion of agreements. Above all, the agreements provide the entry into the local economy of brand-name luxury products and geopolitical weapons so much aspired to by the elite. It must be noted here that the industrialized countries have long ago satisfied the minimum needs of their populations, and since then their technologies have turned increasingly to luxury consumptions and military applications. e net result is that only industry which cannot afford the financial costs of foreign collaboration is forced to depend upon national technology-generating institutions for its technology, and this indigenous industry in India is mostly small-scale industry. In most developing countries, therefore, foreign-collaborating industry plays a much more dominant role than the indigenous version. Further, the linkage of the demands of the elite is very much stronger with foreign-
collaborating industry (cf. continuous lines from circles 2-2 to 5-2 or 2-2 to 3-1 to 4-1 to 5-1 to 5-2) than with indigenous industry (cf. dashed lines from circles 2-2 to 5-3 or 2-2 to 3-2 to 4-2 to 5-3). e filtering operation that blocks the transmission of most of the wants of the masses below the poverty line (circle 2-3), i.e., the basic minimum needs of the poverty-stricken population, is indicated in Figure 2.3 in two ways. Firstly, the neglect of these basic needs by the technology-generating institutions is emphasized by the absence of a linkage between circle 2-3 and either circle 3-1 or 3-2. Secondly, the reluctance of the productive apparatus to respond to the needs of the poor is stressed by the lack of lines joining circle 2-3 and either 5-2 or 5-3. Of course, these linkages are rarely zero— for instance, when the rural poor suffer from communicable epidemic diseases, the elite is also vulnerable, and such needs are obviously responded to effectively. In the absence of either modern industry or institutions to respond to the needs of the masses below the poverty line, these masses have no choice except to fall back on traditional industries based on the reservoir of empirical knowledge accumulated over the centuries, i.e., on traditional technologies (cf. the linkage 2-3 to 4-3 to 5-4 and 5-4 to 2-3). ere is very strong linkage between 3-1 → 3-2, between the educational, scientific and technological institutions of developed countries, referred to as "western" institutions, and those in developing countries, the latter being patterned very closely on, and often being set up by, the former. Superimposed on this process is the fact that developing countries receive education and training for a large proportion of their personnel, and in many countries a large influx of expatriates and "experts", from developed countries. In the generation of technology, the educational, scientific and technological institutions of developing countries invariably start with imported western technology as a starting point and as a model, hence the linkage 4-1 → 3-2. us, they emerge (linkage 3-2 → 4-2) aer a process of
imitation, adaptation and innovation (the innovation, rarely!) with a technology which is naturalized. Indigenous technology, therefore, is mostly naturalized technology which in turn is a "blurred xerox copy" of "western" technology because of inevitable copying errors. Even this process of naturalization constitutes an advance towards technological self-reliance with respect to the developed countries, but it is constantly impeded by the preference of industry for foreign collaboration. e situation is best described by an analogy in which local industry is looked upon as the wayward husband, the national technology generating system, the plain wife, and "western" technology, the attractive mistress. As oen happens in such cases, the husband's attentions centre around the mistress, and in the resulting atmosphere of indifference, the wife—in pre- liberated societies!—turns to "irrelevant" activities (for example, knitting or charitable work). is analogy explains rather well the feelings of redundancy, irrelevancy and demoralization in national educational, scientific and technological institutions. e analysis outlined above leads to several important conclusions regarding the shaping of technology in stratified developing societies in strong interaction with industrialized countries. 1. e dual societies of these countries result in the thrust of their technological efforts being oriented towards the demands of their elites rather than the basic needs of their masses. 2. Since these elite demands are an imitation of those in developed societies, i.e., demands of luxury consumption and geopolitical influence, they are best satisfied by western technology.
3. e elitist-western thrust is aggravated by the conscious attempt of national technology-generating institutions to emulate their counterpart institutions in the industrialized world and to acquire "western" patterns of technological capability even though these patterns are unrelated to the basic needs of developing countries.
4. is distortion is further accentuated by the large-scale attempt of developing countries to get their manpower trained in the west, for the most significant result of such training is an increased alienation of domestic needs, particularly of those below the poverty line. 5. An important aspect of this alienation process is a virtually unexamined and unquestioned acceptance of developed-country preferences, guidelines and paradigms into the innovation chain, for example, the implicit faith in "economies of scale" and capitalintensive labour-saving approaches. 6. If direct imports from industrialized countries are prohibited or restricted or constrained because of balance-of-payments problems, local industry is established on the basis of western technology.
7. In doing so, local industry prefers to import technology through foreign collaboration agreements, rather than generate its own technology. 8. Even when it does generate its own technology, this is done by a process of naturalization—imitation, adaptation and innovation. 9. e bias for importing technology is tantamount to an undervaluing of indigenous technological efforts and an undermining of the national institutions of education, science and technology. e institutions become, at best, an insurance against a cessation, interruption or reduction of technology imports, and at worst, wholly redundant except as welfare measures for the support of scientists and engineers. 10. Bere of major technological missions, except where geopolitical interests are concerned, there is a widespread demoralization of technologists. 11. Hence, technological capability is not improved and technological dependence (upon the developed countries) increases. In fact, this
dependence is recursive due to technological advances in the industrialized countries. 12. At the same time, because the basic needs of the masses are largely bypassed in the thrust of technology, inequalities are aggravated. And, this inequality is recursive due to preferential catering to the demands of the elite. Hence, the dual societies of developing countries shape technology into a pattern which amplifies inequalities and erodes self-reliance. Such a pattern is inconsistent with development, if development is viewed as a sustainable process directed towards the satisfaction of basic needs, starting from the needs of the neediest, and towards self-reliance. is then is the technological context in which science in developing countries must evolve. e pattern that science actually assumes is discussed below.
SCIENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES It will be recalled that the simple model of technology-society interactions (Figure 2.1) led on to a view of science-technology interactions (represented in Figure 2.2). According to this view, the vitality of science in a society depends upon: 1. the challenges thrown up by the innovation chain leading to technology and 2. its internal momentum arising from the backlog of unresolved problems. is vitality is also sustained by the supply of instruments, materials and techniques from industry. But, the simple model of technology-society interactions (Figure 2.1)
had to be modified to take into account, on the one hand, the existence in most developing countries of dual societies, and on the other hand, their strong interaction with the industrialized countries. In pursuing this modification, it was found (Figure 2.3) that the coupling with the developed countries leads to the dominance of foreign-collaborating industry based on the import of western technology, and that the dual character of developing societies results in an overwhelmingly elitist thrust of indigenous technology. Further, even these indigenous technological efforts consist almost wholly of the imitation and adaptation of western technology, rather than of innovation.
is almost complete decoupling of science and technology has a profound impact on science in developing countries and produces its first major abnormality. Because of the preponderance of technology imports and the imitative character of indigenous technology, the innovation chain hardly exists in developing countries. As a result, their scientific systems are not subject to the pressure of basic problems emerging from technology. And, without this pressure from technology, indigenous science is deprived of a powerful driving force; if it is to flourish, it must depend solely upon its internal momentum. is internal momentum of science is the product of the "mass" of scientists and the "velocity" or pace of scientific research. e "mass" depends upon the size of the scientific body (and many developing countries just do not have enough scientists!), but not merely upon the number of scientists. What is required is a community of interacting scientists with the well- established traditions of a peer system. Scientific peers are crucial for discussions, brain-storming and testing out ideas, for acquiring different ways of looking at a problem, for enhancing the quality of seminars, symposiums and conferences, for rigorous assessment and constructive criticism of work, for help in improving its quality, for a process of recognition that is appreciated, and so on. In short, without the environment of an actively interacting scientific community there cannot
be the natural selection of scientific ideas and data which only will ensure that the fittest theories and experiments survive.
e tempo of research activity depends upon the existence and maintenance of an atmosphere of excitement which in turn requires a conviction of being "hot on the trail" of important discoveries. Such an atmosphere is facilitated by rapid communication between scientists through personal contacts, seminars, symposiums and conferences and through well-refereed journals which ensure quick publication. e pace of research is usually set by outstanding scientists who attract a following. The point is that scientists tend "to hunt in packs" behind leaders. In examining whether science in developing countries can develop and sustain such an internal momentum, it is necessary to recall the strong interaction between the educational and scientific institutions in industrialized countries and those in developing countries. In many cases, the latter institutions are the direct offsprings of western institutions having been planned, conceived, delivered and nurtured by them. e umbilical bonds are rarely severed, and even when this is achieved, filial ties remain strong. As a result, scientists in developing countries derive from their counter-parts in the west the emerging areas for research, the trends and fashions and the stream of inspiration. ey turn avidly to western scientists for the criteria of excellence, and for assessment, evaluation and recognition. e whole process is accentuated by the fact that large numbers of developing-country scientists have been trained in the institutions of the western world. If they return to their native countries (and many do not!), they spend the bulk of their remaining professional lives continuing the themes of their foreign researches, look back nostalgically to their halcyon days abroad, and above all reinforce the value system of dependence on western scientists and institutions. is dependence results in two further abnormalities of science in developing countries. e filial loyalty of native scientists to their western mentors and alma
maters inhibits serious interaction with their colleagues. An actively interacting scientific community does not form because these scientists are more reluctant to walk to the next laboratory than to fly across continents and oceans to talk to the scientists of the developed countries. Any recognition and praise received in the course of these foreign contacts is deeply cherished—"batteries are recharged", it is said—but this inspiration and stimulation from the west only increases their spiritual distance from their colleagues. Even more vehemently they feel that their work is too sophisticated and advanced to be appreciated in a backward country and that "there is no one to talk to" at home. us, the abnormality is that the peer group which native scientists look up to is abroad in the institutions of the west, and not in their own countries. In the absence of a local peer group of compatriot scientists, rigorous internal assessment and evaluation becomes difficult, refereeing suffers, the quality of journals deteriorates, etc. In addition, the subservience of native scientists to their "teachers" in the west leads to the following approach to the choice of problems and problem-areas: Step 1: Become familiar with the output of "western" research. Step 2: Identify western fashions and frontier areas. Step 3: Concentrate effort on these fashions and frontier areas. If the resulting work is noticed in the west, and appreciated there, then the effort is adjudged successful; if it is ignored, the endeavour is construed as a failure. us, the criterion of success, viz., recognition from the west, only reinforces in a positive feedback sense the whole approach to the selection of research areas and topics.
e result of this approach is that the distribution of indigenous research efforts over the various disciplines and sub-disciplines is very similar to those in the developed countries. But, this distribution is not identical because of the well known difficulties of doing research in
developing countries. ese difficulties include poorly-stocked libraries, long delays in receiving journals, extremely limited opportunities of travelling to the west and participating in foreign conferences, badlyequipped laboratories, import restrictions, inadequate laboratory supplies and infrastructure, non-availability of critical components and materials, bureaucratic interference, etc. As a consequence, the gestation times for "starting up and getting going" are much longer and the tempo of work is much slower. In short, the signals from the advanced countries are received aer a delay time and are responded to much later. Even successful competition with western research is not easy, except by the blessed few in abundantly endowed and well-patronized laboratories. And as for pioneering work, it rarely occurs—there have been very few pathbreaking researches from the developing countries. e similarity between the patterns of research in the developed and developing countries is adjudged an abnormality and a matter of serious concern because it represents an illegitimate driving force which inhibits the autonomous development of an internal dynamic. Most developingcountry scientists, however, view this similarity with approval as a confirmation of the international character of science. If the slogan "science is international" means that the laws of nature are invariant with respect to country, there can be no argument. If, however, it means that the pattern of science is not socially and historically conditioned, then there is much to dispute. e pattern of science is influenced both by the society in which it grows as well as by its own history. is is why the main preoccupations of science have been different at different periods of its history—mechanics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, heat in the middle nineteenth century, electricity in the late nineteenth century, and more recently nuclear and solid state physics in the post-World War II period. It appears that there are two circumstances under which a particular aspect of nature becomes the focus of intense scientific activity: first, when there is a
confluence of the flows of basic problems generated by technology and of relevant background knowledge produced by previous science; and second, when there is a torrent of understanding caused by a conceptual or experimental breakthrough. is view implies that the foci of scientific activity in several countries will be the same if the problems generated by their emerging technologies are identical,3 their scientific systems share a common history, and their scientists belong to the same peer group. is is the case with the "developed countries"—they are characterized by the same pattern of social wants, they are involved in the development of the same technologies, their scientific systems have evolved together and share a common history, and their scientists have belonged to, or become part of, the same peer group during the course of several centuries. Science is certainly trans-national in the set of industrialized countries. But, it is difficult to extend these arguments to the developing countries. Because of the almost complete dependence on technology imports and the imitative-adaptive approach to indigenous technology generation, science in these countries is not subject to the pressure of problems thrown up by technology. e scientific systems, in most of these countries, are only a few decades old.4 And, though their scientists look to the west for their peer group, this view is not reciprocal—by and large, developingcountry scientists are treated as "camp-followers" who can be ignored because their contributions are peripheral. us, most developing countries cannot be included in the set of countries across which science is trans-national. Further, the distribution of their research efforts over the different areas is not the result of autonomous forces, but the natural consequence of following "western" fashions. e similarity of this distribution with that in the industrialized countries is a manifestation of the subservient position of developing country science, and not a proof of the view that it is part of an international effort. ese abnormalities of indigenous science are aggravated by the lack of
a strong instrument industry in developing countries. ese countries are almost totally dependent on instrument imports. It is well known, however, that when a new type of instrument arrives on the scientific scene, there is an initial rush to exploit it but this rush is followed by a levelling off in its use aer the most significant applications are achieved. ereaer, and that is when developing countries succeed in importing the instrument, only the residual applications are le for exploitation. But, the instrument has by this time become such a prized and prestigious acquisition that it assumes a dominating position. Problems are chosen for the sake of the instrument, rather than the instrument being selected to suit the problems. And, in this way, the western instrument industry (which is linked with western technology and science) has a determining effect on the pattern of science in developing countries.
A viewpoint has been presented of how society shapes science in developing countries. It provides quite an accurate description of science in India, but there are some peculiarities in the Indian case which merit mention. Indian science is not a post-independence phenomenon; it has a history of over a century. Being virtually a subcontinent with conditions totally different from those prevailing in the home country of the colonial power, and offering promise of enormous natural resources, a number of scientific survey organizations (Geological Survey of India, Botanical Survey of India, etc.) were established even in the last century. Technical education was also started around that time, and the local intelligentsia took advantage of it. With the establishment of a few universities in the second half of the nineteenth century, science education began to be imparted and many students quickly demonstrated their ability to grasp mathematics and science. With the growth of native business activity and an intellectual community, a movement for national independence began to gather momentum in the first decades of this century. During the late twenties and early thirties, there was a flowering of science in India. It was
during that period that several Indian scientists made outstanding contributions. Raman, Bose, Saha, Sahni and others belonged to this era. ey shared several characteristics: they were all educated in India, they were very patriotic, they displayed an intense nationalistic pride, they had firm roots in the local culture. ey stormed their way into western science by pathbreaking scientific work. But, though they received the highest honours, they remained outside the apparatus of government. Nevertheless, they were the leaders of Indian science, they started its journals, founded its academies and initiated an indigenous peer group system. And then came political independence in 1947, and the national government's decision to give science the maximum possible support. Funding was escalated. A large number of agencies and institutions for education, science and technology were hurriedly established. To direct these funds, agencies and institutions, science administrators and technocrats were required, but neither Raman nor Bose nor Saha nor Sahni became government scientists. In anticipation of the high-level manpower requirements for this increase in technical activity, it was decided to get the manpower trained abroad. e process actually started a year or two before independence, and for several years thousands of Indian students were sent to the universities of Western Europe and North America. It is these foreign-trained scientists and engineers who took over the leadership of institutions when the locally- educated "old guard" retired. e "new breed" brought with them the frontier areas emphasized in their foreign universities. ey had not grown in the atmosphere of local laboratories, and had never experienced the days of glory. ey returned alienated, and many remained so. e incipient indigenous peer system established by the stalwarts of the thirties began to collapse. But the "old guard" could not stop the process as it had no position in the new government system for funding science and developing laboratories.
Little distinction was made in the first two decades aer independence between science and technology. And, all the ambitious steps to set up a vast infrastructure for generating technology did not appear to take into account the fact that the bulk of the technology would be imported and that the generation of indigenous technology would be through a process of imitation and adaptation, rather than innovation. Nevertheless, government technological establishments began to play an increasing role in decision-making about science. In particular, the heads of these establishments became the leaders of science and the arbiters of science policy even though they were preoccupied with managing the process of imitating and adapting "western" technology. In terms of funding, personnel, equipment and infrastructure, the support for scientific research became almost two orders of magnitude greater than in the preindependence era. But, it is a moot point whether Indian science has made the same impact on science as it did during the thirties. It is this phenomenon of vastly increased investments on Indian science producing a diminished impact which has been considered strange, but it only emphasizes the general picture of science in developing countries outlined in this paper.
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES A detailed diagnosis of technology and science in developing countries has been presented. The situation can be summarized thus: 1. Technology in developing countries is oriented towards the demands of the elite which are best satisfied by "western" technology. 2. Science in developing countries is modeled on science in the developed countries; in addition it is bere of the stimulus of indigenous technology which is based on the imitation and
innovation of "western" technology, rather than on innovation. Hence, technology is inconsistent with need-oriented, self-reliant development, and science has neither the driving force of indigenous technology nor an internal momentum. is diagnosis suggests how technology and science in developing countries should be re-oriented. A very brief indication of this re-orientation is presented below. Technology in developing countries should cease to be elite-oriented, it must become development-oriented. e overwhelming thrust should be towards technologies for the satisfaction of basic needs, starting from the needs of the neediest, and for strengthening self-reliance based on social participation and control. In short, the filter (cf. Figures 2.1 and 2.3) that determines which social wants are transmitted as demands upon technology-generating institutions and which wants are ignored must be made to operate in the interests of the poor. Such a thrust will develop only when the felt needs of the poverty-stricken masses are identified in all their complexity and subtlety, and when the interaction between people and technologies ensures social participation and control and therefore self- reliance. What is required therefore is direct contact between technology- generating institutions and the people, and this contact can be best achieved by the commitment of these institutions to the problems of the people. A wider range of technological options will have to be generated to enable the people to escape from the present Hobson's choice wherein the traditional technologies are inadequate and "western" technologies are inaccessible because of their costs, resource requirements, energy demands, etc. is means that the alien guidelines (Figures 2.1 and 2.3) for the generation of technology currently in use will have to be jettisoned, and new paradigms developed. In other words, the satisfaction of basic needs in developing countries will require the generation of alternative technologies appropriate for development. Such alternative technologies may be so location-, resource- and culturespecific that they cannot either be imported or generated by a process of
imitation and adaptation. Innovation will become imperative, and it is this pressure to innovate which will revitalize the technology-generating institutions by defining for them a purpose and mission.
Since many new technologies will be required to achieve the tasks of development, the innovation chains which must be completed to bring these technologies into being, will inevitably throw up a host of basic problems for scientific research. If the local scientific system responds to this pressure, then it would have acquired one crucial driving force for the development of science. In fact, indigenous technology and indigenous science will become mutually reinforcing. If science in developing countries becomes preoccupied with the basic problems thrown up by the task of innovating indigenous technology, there will necessarily be an attenuation of the strong influence of western science particularly in the distribution of research efforts. Such an attenuation will promote interaction between local scientists. If this interaction is further stimulated by concerns arising from the environment, then the process of conversion of a body of native scientists into a community of peers will be facilitated. All this corresponds to the development of an internal momentum which is the other crucial driving force for the vitality of science. When these two driving forces operate on indigenous science, there is no guarantee that the distribution of research efforts in developing countries will remain the same as that in the industrialized world. In fact, it is almost certain that many of the principal foci of research activity will be different in the two sets of countries. e differences will arise mainly over those aspects of science which interface with technology, but these differences will be super-imposed upon an identity of concerns with regard to the fundamental forces of nature, the basic structure of matter, the core of life and the design of the universe. us, there is a distinct possibility of developing-country science being different from developedcountry science—a diversity which can only be in the interests of word
science. In conclusion, therefore, it appears that whether the objective is the revitalizing of science or the re-orientation of technology, the hope lies in a commitment to the local environment. Technology and science will discover their historical missions only if they strike roots in the societies which support them. In that situation alone will the poor in developing countries inherit science and technology and therefore the earth.
3
Technology, Development and the Environment: A Re-appraisal
INTRODUCTION
Development must be viewed as a comprehensive and global process, embracing all aspects of the social system and its interrelationship with the natural environment. In this dynamic interrelationship, technology is the fundamental link between the social system and the natural system—at the same time, it is the essential instrument for the achievement of sustainable and environmentally sound development in the long run. In fact, each technological pattern implies specific approaches to management of resources and is associated with a given value system and lifestyle. us it is through improved technology that development can be achieved but it is also through the application of such technology that man has most impact on the environment. e last fiy years have witnessed the most impressive technological development in human history. our natural habitat is in great measure a man-made environment, resulting from the transformation of nature by the practical and systematic application of scientific and technological knowledge. But, it is not only the natural system which has been modified. Society and its institutions, values, patterns of development and life styles, also reflect the characteristics of technological development. However, it seems that uncontrolled introduction of technology, the
lack of consideration for its adaptability to specific situations, and especially the unawareness of its impacts have produced negative effects. us, technology application has created new opportunities and fostered development, on the one hand, and created new problems, on the other. Environment and development problems are specific to particular parts of the world. Technological development originated in highly industrialized countries are frequently ill adapted to the specific environment and development problems of the ird World. So it is not strange that criticism of technology arises in countries where a large part of the population is excluded from the benefits of technological development, but suffers from the negative effects of its application. In recent years the debate between those against and those in favour of technology has increased and gained a larger audience. e first approach tends to see technology as the solution for mankind's problems, and the instrument to dominate nature. e opposite approach views technology as an uncontrollable process which creates a technocratic state in which the individual is alienated. Both approaches tend to see technological development as an autonomous, dynamic, linear process, and the social repercussions, as a reaction against such a process. Technology, however, is a social product. Social systems are not deterministic, and their development is not linear. e process of development can and must be oriented, but such orientation requires the control of technological development as well as of its application. In fact it requires a clear process of technological assessment and technological choice. Technology should be developed and applied according to the dynamic characteristics of each social and natural system, aimed at the achievement of its environmentally sound and sustainable development. It is precisely in the framework of the relationship between environment and development, and of the role of technology as an instrument of social change, that the concept of environmentally sound and appropriate technology arises. us, every concern for society and its
environment finds expression in the manner in which technology is assessed and chosen. From a theoretical point of view we are in a weak position because prevailing theories that attempt to explain the functioning of social systems do not offer any explanation of technological change. erefore, the attention paid to the conceptual and theoretical basis of technology assessment and choice does not stem from scholarly and speculative preoccupations. Rather the very concept of appropriateness implies a value judgement and, therefore, any consideration of the appropriateness of technology will inevitably reflect a given set of ideas and assumptions about development and the benefits and drawbacks of actions oriented to development. Whereas none of the organizations of the UN system is excluded from doing some work on appropriate technology, only a few of them have attempted to investigate the conceptual content of this notion. 1 One such example is the Governing Council of UNEP, which, in its ird Session, requested the Executive Director to initiate programme activities on environmentally sound and appropriate technology. 2 Under this mandate, two expert groups were organized in 1975 and 1976, and chaired by Professor A. Reddy. e rationale of UNEP's conceptual effort is that any programme or activity in the field of technology research, development and dissemination largely depends on the understanding of the substantive issues underlying these activities. e concept of environmentally sound and appropriate technology has meaning only in the context of a given concept of development. UNEP's particular understanding of the environment-development relationship has led to the concept of environmentally sustainable development, which can only be achieved through the development of environmentally sound and appropriate technology, designed to minimize the risk of environmental degradation beyond the reproductive capacity of the environment. is means that discussion on the assessment and choice of
technology must be an inseparable part of any plan that involves either the environment or socio-economic objectives. UNEP sees its catalytic role as that of strengthening and amplifying such awareness where it exists, and of initiating and generating awareness where it is absent.
CRITICISMS OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY Over the past few years, the case for environmentally sound and appropriate technologies has been repeatedly stated in different ways and from various standpoints. is quest for alternatives has invariably been based on implicit or explicit criticisms of the pattern of technologies now current in the industrialized, developed countries and in the process of massive transfer to the developing countries. ese are the technologies which have been developed with staggering and increasing rapidity, particularly over the past thirty years. since these technologies will necessarily have to be referred to very frequently throughout the course of this report, it will facilitate exposition to refer to them with the term modern. Other terms have also been used in the literature, for example, 'western' and 'conventional'. But, the term 'western' ignores the fact that some eastern countries are involved as heavily in the development, use and transfer of 'modern technologies'; and the term 'conventional technologies' which connotes the widespread belief that the technology of the developed world is the only acceptable brand, is liable to be confused with 'traditional technologies' which are in fact being displaced throughout the developing countries by the modern technologies characteristic of the industrialized countries. On the other hand, the unsatisfactory feature of the term 'modern technologies' is that it may suggest that the proposed or desired alternative technologies (which constitute the subject matter of this report) are the antithesis of modern in the sense that they do not take advantage of the heritage of accumulated knowledge and that they are bere of the theoretical and experimental
power of modern science. In fact, it is intended that alternative technologies be developed by as modern and sophisticated a methodology as the 'modern' technologies of the developed countries. us, it is only for want of a better term that the technology of the developed world will be referred to as 'modern technology'.
e mounting criticisms of modern technology that have emerged not only from the developing countries, but as strongly from the developed countries, constitute the basis for the recommendation of an alternative pattern of technologies. Hence, a description of these criticisms must serve as an introduction to the concept of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies. e various criticisms of modern technology can be classified into three broad categories: environmental; economic; and social; but the overlap between these categories prevents an unambiguous classification. Further, it is oen difficult to establish the precise extent to which modern technology is the sole causal factor responsible for the effects eliciting the criticisms, and the extent to which the overall social structure in which technology operates is in fact the crucial factor. But such difficulties are inevitable when two systems, such as technology and society, are closely interrelated, strongly interacting and dynamically involved. us, in many respects, the classification of criticisms is essentially heuristic.
Developed Countries Environmental Criticisms e prolific advances of modern technology in the developed countries have led to spectacular increases in affluence, but it has been asserted that this affluence has not necessarily resulted in an environment more conducive to the physical and mental well-being of man. Indeed, with the increasing deployment of modern technology, human welfare has been threatened by escalating levels of pollution—of air, water, food, noise and natural beauty. is tragedy of progress in
technology being associated with the deterioration of the environment has been too well documented to need repetition here. It suffices to quote from the series Man's Home,3 "The industries that pollute the most tend to grow rapidly, ...New production technologies that pollute more tend to replace older, cleaner production methods". At the same time, the nature of these technologies (their scale, their demands on energy, water, etc.) has determining influence on the structure and functioning of human settlements. In particular, urban gigantism has become increasingly predominant; and with it, has followed the aggravation of psychological stresses and social tensions, until many a famous metropolis has been le with a decaying core of slums, crime and insecurity. Simultaneously, these giant cities have had major environmental impacts arising from their exorbitant demands for water, energy, sanitation, transportation and housing. All this hyper-activity of production and consumption has involved a scale of 'exploitation of natural resources'—the telling phrase used in common parlance—unprecedented in human history. e word 'exploitation', which accurately describes the essence of the man-nature relationship implicit in modern technology, connotes the very opposite of efficient resource management. No wonder there is alarm at the rapid rate at which non-renewable resources are being depleted. e story can be and has been illustrated with innumerable examples, for example, petroleum and minerals. is mismanagement, which it is argued is an inherent feature of modern technology, extends even to the renewable resources of air, water and land. In short, modern technology has been criticised because it is based on the assumption that nature is an inexhaustible source for the satisfaction of man's escalating resource needs and a limitless sink for his wastes. Modern technologies do not explicitly concern themselves with "the full and heavy responsibility of managing all the resources—human and natural—of this planet".4 e effects of this irresponsibility are already evident in the disturbance
of the finely adjusted ecological balances of nature through pollution, reckless use of resources, elimination or near elimination of various species (blue whales, for instance), destruction of forests, etc. e question is not one of the intrinsic value of stability in ecosystems, but of the inevitably engendered risks that modern technology brings in its wake. ese risks derive from the fact that the effects of these technologies are invariably multiple, oen uncontrolled and rarely predictable and foreseen. Further, the gravity of the risks vary from relatively trivial ones like automobile accidents to potentially catastrophic ones such as all-out nuclear warfare or destruction of the life-sustaining properties of the biosphere. Some of these risks may be cumulative, such as the build-up of nuclear wastes or of optically active pollutants in the atmosphere, or they may be discrete risks, like genetic engineering accidents. In the absence of detailed estimates of the probability of the risks, one can only guess at the shape of a schematic risk distribution curve (see Fig. 3.1).
Two comments need to be made about this curve: firstly, 'progress' in modern technology tends to move it upwards, so that the probable frequency of occurrence of any category of risk will increase in time unless alternative technological options are adopted; and secondly, before the advent of modern technology, there was a virtually zero probability of any risks graver than the acceptable. According to the critics, these diverse, but deleterious, environmental consequences stem from the following fundamental characteristics of modern technology: 1. Its pursuit of economies of scale leads to the ever-increasing size of productive units; and this obsession with large-scale production results in a constantly increasing magnitude of perturbation of natural ecosystems through the spatial localization of pollutant sources and the temporal increase of the rate of emission and
discharge of these pollutants; 2. ese gigantic productive units are highly interdependent by way of inputs and outputs, and they also place stringent demands on infrastructures; hence, these units must be agglomerated into small areas of intense industrialization, and thus compel the concentration of millions of working people into crowded metropolises which then display the well-known environmental problems of excessively large human settlements; 3. e constant urge to satisfy the needs of individual consumption and sustain the large productive units results in a continuous drive to develop and distribute luxury products, which are ever changing in appearance and form, but essentially similar in function and content; and this obsession with product technology is the root cause of the rape and exhaustion of resources, the high degree of product obsolescence and the culture of throw-away objects; 4. e major role of military objectives in determining the development of technology has resulted in the arsenals of many developed countries being filled with weapons so terrible that, if ever used, all life on earth can be destroyed. 5. Its growing energy intensiveness leads, on the one hand, to centralized energy production with an increasing environmental impact, and on the other hand, to a reckless prolificacy in the use of energy sources, particularly fossil fuels. Economic Criticisms From the economic point of view, the major criticism of modern technology is that it tends to magnify inequalities between countries, and within countries (including developed ones!). us, it plays a crucial role in making inequality recursive and increase with time. e contention underlying this criticism is that an inequality in the
distribution of purchasing power leads to a skewed demand structure, which in turn influences technology to respond more avidly to the needs of the rich while assigning lower priority to the needs of those who exert weaker demand. e result is the emergence of technologies of products, technologies of production and technologies of resource use that are more responsive and accessible to the privileged than to the under-privileged. And thus, one comes to the next turn of the spiral. . .the increased inequality resulting from the initially unequal access to the new technologies stimulates the development of further advances in technology which will then accentuate the inequalities even more. Technology has perhaps always played this divisive role, but in the past, the low levels of capital and energy intensity characteristic of primitive technology facilitate virtually equal access. In contrast, modern technology, associated as it is with its high capital and energy intensity, tends to be intrinsically incompatible with equality of access. is inequality-magnifying effect of modern technology has become particularly evident in the relationship between developed and developing countries, which has its historical roots in the era of the exploitative domination by imperial powers over colonies. Today, modern technology has become the principal instrument for widening the disparities between these two sets of countries and for exacerbating their relationship into an irrational and unjust economic order. is economic order involves a "world market system. . .(which). . .has continually operated to increase the power and wealth of the rich (countries) and maintain the relative deprivation of the poor (countries)", according to the Cocoyoc Declaration.5 And, in this world market system, those who control modern technology acquire the power to dictate prices. us, the volume of exports by the poor world increased by one-third over the past twenty years, yet the value of these exports increased by only 4 per cent. Further, the development and control of modern technology today is largely in the hands of multinational corporations, which originate from
and oen represent the developed countries, but are increasingly taking the help of profit-motivated, self-interested independence with respect to their countries of origin. e necessity of bridling these multinational corporations and redressing the inequality and injustice in the relationship between developed and developing countries, has led the poor nations of the world to demand the establishment of a New International Economic Order,6 but this demand has not yet exposed the umbilical link between the current economic order and modern technology. It is not as if modern technology has not had its tell-tale inequalitymagnifying effect within the developed countries too. It has been argued that almost every developed country has its own poor (these may be racial minorities, or immigrant workers or inhabitants of a backward region), and the disparities between the rich and the poor in affluent countries are accentuated by modern technologies which tend to cater to the privileged.7 e under-privileged are thus "le behind to observe vicariously on television how the lucky three-quarters live".8 e social effects of this process are another matter which will be discussed below (Section 2.5(c)). ere are two other criticisms of the economic consequences of modern technology which deserve mention. Firstly, modern technology has been designed to process cheap raw materials, which are mostly imported from the developing countries. It has also been wedded—as pointed out earlier — to economies of scale, and has, therefore, resulted in the gigantism of highly capital and energy-intensive production units. ese units, because of their very size, cannot adjust to sudden or prolonged cessation in raw material or energy supplies, or for that matter to major escalations in the prices of these supplies. And thus modern technology has conferred upon the industries based on it a vulnerability to drastic changes in international trade. For the same reason, the industries are equally vulnerable to internal disturbances, for example, strikes and sabotage. Second, notwithstanding the apparent economic efficiency of
production units based on modern technology, the fact remains that the calculus can be misleading and many costs are ignored because they are externalized and borne by society or by future generations. For example, a factory may discharge its wastes into a river, leaving a township downstream with the cost of purifying the water; or a mine may reduce the cost of mining by working the richest or most accessible strata, but such a procedure only results in future increases in extraction costs which are not reckoned with in the costing. e economic criticisms outlined above have reiterated a point which emerged from the environmental criticisms: the trend of modern technology to establish larger and larger production units in the name of 'reduction of unit costs' sets off a number of unwelcome consequences. In addition, it appears that the capital and energy intensiveness of modern technology, and the orientation of its product technology towards luxury goods for private consumption, give it the highly undesirable characteristic of accentuating economic inequalities between and within countries, and of increasing disparities between the rich and the poor. Social Criticisms e tendency of modern technology to respond to the needs of the rich and to accentuate inequalities has proved a highly divisive and disruptive force in the societies of developed countries. By denying the under-privileged access to its constantly publicised benefits, and at the same time forcing them to live cheek by jowl with its unpleasant features such as pollution, modern technology aggravates their feelings of being dispossessed. e ensuing social stresses and tensions constitute an ideal breeding ground for violence. And when these people are also forced by the technology of transportation and human settlements to concentrate in central slums, the city begins a process of decay which spreads outwards from the core. "e turn of the century could see total disintegration in many of the world's already troubled cities."9 To worsen the whole situation, modern production technology has relentlessly pursued the so-called economies of mass production and
automation. In doing so, it has generated a highly-skewed pattern of demand for skills, in which only a few are required to possess a high degree of intellectual capacility and/or manual skills, while only the barest minimum of intelligence and dexterity is expected from the vast majority of the working force. To this majority, "soul-destroying, meaningless, mechanical, monotonous, moronic work is an insult to human nature which must necessarily and inevitably produce either escapism or aggression".10
e successful exclusion of crasmanship and creativity from work in factories based on modern technology results in the sharp separation of work from leisure, and facilitates the spread of the technology of automated entertainment, where participants are replaced by spectators. e picture is not much rosier at the opposite end of the income spectrum. Modern product technology is specifically designed, on the one hand, to respond to, and on the other hand, to deliberately evoke and stimulate, demands from those privileged with purchasing power. e result is the proliferation of luxury goods for individual consumption and the generation of overly consumption-oriented lifestyles. But "Man has a limited capacity to absorb material goods. It does not help us to produce and consume more and more if the result is an ever-increasing need for tranquilizers and mental hospitals".11 Another result is the uncritical acceptance and slavish following of oriental entrepreneurs and salesmen of "peace" and "bliss". e emphasis on a product technology for individual consumption associated with a production technology in which machines play the dominant role has led—so the critics argue—to alienation of men from each other and from their work. And ". . .(thus) you have a different kind of poverty. A poverty of loneliness and being unwanted, a poverty of spirit, and that is the worst disease in the world today." 12 No wonder that "half the hospital beds in Europe and North America are occupied by mental and psychiatric patients".13 "One is bound to conclude that the whole
thing is not worth the effort and that in the end it can only produce a state of things which no individual will be able to bear".14 At the same time, there looms in the background the technology-power equation. Nations and groups which control modern technology wield power of a magnitude unparalleled in human history, power which has oen been used against majorities and for questionable ends. Further, the spectre of technologies of mass communication, of mass persuasion, of surveillance, and of armed coercion, have produced visions of '1984' come true. And the intrinsic inequalities in access to technology has inevitably led to disparities in access to power. us, modern technology makes the goal of social control over the directions of social change fade into the distance. ese social criticisms of modern technology in the context of the developed countries stem from: its capital-intensiveness and its responsiveness to the demands of affluence, which together have a dispossessing effect upon those who cannot back up their desire for its benefits with purchasing power; its technologies of housing and transportation, which, by tending to be oriented towards wealthy private consumers, concentrate the poor and deprived into urban slums inevitably pushed to the centers of large cities; the emphasis in modern production technology on mass production and automation, which produce alienation through the rigid routine of work and 'leisure'; the unceasing tendency of modern technology to bombard satiated buyers with new products, which leads to the enjoyment of the simple, inexpensive and intangible being devalued, undermined and replaced by the consumption of the elaborate, conspicuous and material, i.e., modern technology gives rise directly to the
consumption-obsessed lifestyles which generate profits for the producers, but rarely peace and contentment for the consumers; the preoccupation with military technology which confers on those who control technology a disproportionate share in the exercise of power—power for the external coercion of recalcitrant countries and the internal control of dissenting groups. Environmental Criticisms One would not expect the environmental effects of modern technology to be as serious in developing countries, which are not as heavily industrialized. However, this expectation is not borne out in reality. is is because the industrialization of most developing countries has been based on the import of modern technology, which by being highly capital and energy-intensive gravitates to regions where such capital and energy are best mustered, i.e., the urban metropolises. One observes, therefore, large concentrations of modern technology in the cities, and in these limited regions the intensity of industrialization can be of the same order as in the developed countries. As a consequence, such urban concentrations of modern technology oen have levels of pollution as high as in the developed countries. In some cases, the levels of pollution are even higher than in the developed countries because not only is there much less lobbying against environmental degradation, but there may in fact be a view that. . . "all (debate over) environmental problems may. . .be potential threats to. . .domestic development" 15 and that developing countries "must not and will not allow themselves to be distracted from the imperatives of economic development and growth by the illusory dream of an atmosphere free from smoke or a landscape innocent of chimney stacks. . .".16 Such views bring to mind a century-old statement from the then industrializing, now polluted, developed countries: "Smoke is an indication of work. . .Therefore, we are proud of our smoke".17 e viewpoint that environmental degradation is a necessary and
unavoidable stage in development can be criticized on two counts. Firstly, it implies the questionable assumption that development must inescapably follow the path used by the developed countries and involve the deployment of modern technologies; and secondly, it does not reckon with the fact that the poverty-stricken inhabitants of developing countries are more adversely affected by pollution because of their much lower level of nutrition and health. Hence, the under-privileged in poor countries can afford pollution even less than the healthier and better nourished people in rich countries.
Further, the non-existent or far weaker environmental lobbies in the developing countries permit many modern technologies based on the plant or mineral resources of the region to use these resources irrationally and wastefully. Serious environmental effects follow, e.g., rayon factories denuding a whole region of its bamboo forests. Such environmentally unsound irrational and wasteful use of resources can also arise from another effect of the introduction of modern technology in developing countries. is effect stems from the creation of urban markets for rural products coming in the wake of rural impoverishment to upset the ecologically sound traditions of resource management. A revealing example of this process is the way urban markets for charcoal have led (and are leading) to rapid deforestation, soil erosion and desertification and the manner in which metropolitan demand for cash crops have resulted in taking away land from food and using it for cash crops. Finally, the introduction of modern technologies into developing countries has also been claimed to be directly responsible, through the well-known sequence of rural impoverishment, mass migration to cities and uncontrolled urbanization, for festering slums which have become major problems from the human settlements and environmental point of view. Another environmental effect of modern technology in developing countries is an indirect one. It arises because, as already argued, this
pattern of technology accentuates inequalities and thus links together affluence and poverty in a cause-effect relationship. e consequence is the perpetuation of underdevelopment. And the ". . .environmental ills of the developing countries are rooted primarily in poverty and underdevelopment".18 To illustrate: the poorest in the land-ownership scale oen exploit their limited land so intensively that they cause soil erosion and deforestation, and their counterparts in the cities establish squatter colonies on the most valuable land in the central areas of big cities. us, criticisms of the environmental consequences of modern technology in developing countries run along lines basically similar to those from the developed countries. However, an extra dimension arises from the role of modern technology—see Section 2.6(b)—in impoverishing the countryside. is results, firstly, in setting up the unending exodus to cities that then cannot cope with the resulting environmental problems and, secondly, in upsetting the traditionally sound ways of managing rural land. Economic Criticisms e most significant criticism of the establishment of modern technology in a developing country is that it triggers off a chain of consequences, the most direct one being a shattering of the traditional rural industries. As a result, many of the occupations traditional in the countryside cease to exist, and vast numbers of people are thrown out of work. e problem is then aggravated by the fact that the urban industries are based on imported modern technology, which by being highly capitalintensive and labour-saving restricts the increase of employment per unit of extra investment. Since unemployment aggravates poverty, and since it is only employment at the higher levels of the capital-intensive modern sector that permits entry into the market of the luxury goods produced by modern industry, the gap between the affluent and the poor increases. Modern technologies of consumption are increasingly energy-intensive, and the inability of the poor to enter the market for commercial energy
accentuates disparities. And thus, one observes the well-known phenomenon in the developing countries of inequalities growing with increasing industrialization on the basis of modern technology. Further, rural impoverishment leads to increasing mass migration to the metropolitan centres. is aggravates the problem of slums and shanty towns, which are festering sores of unbelievable poverty frustrating the best intentions of urban planners.
Simultaneously, the traditionally simple and contented ways of life succumb before the onslaught of the consumption-oriented lifestyles stimulated and catered to by modern technology. e demand for a new product-mix gets generated, and this product-mix invariably has a higher import content than the traditional mass-consumption goods which are usually based on local resources. us, the balance-of-payments situation of developing countries worsens with increasing industrialization along modern lines. At the same time, the import of modern technology requires payment—for technical fees, royalties, services of foreign experts, license fees, etc. And with the continuous advance of modern technology, the number of payments for the import of technology keeps on escalating. With increasing technical dependence, self-reliance is thwarted more and more.
us, industrialization on the basis of modern technology has been criticised because it usually consists of a package-deal involving, on the one hand, increasing income disparities, growing unemployment, rural impoverishment, mass migration to urban slums, and on the other hand, increasing import bills, worsening balance-of-payment crises, increasing technical dependence, decreasing self-reliance and frustration of the goal of development. In the last analysis, this package-deal originates from the fact that capital-intensive, labour-saving modern technology is fundamentally inconsistent with the factor proportions of most developing countries, viz., a shortage of capital and an abundance of manpower. e deal is
worsened due to two further features of the technology of developed countries: firstly, this technology relies on a global resource-base, rather than on locally available resources, and therefore, a developing country which adopts this technology has necessarily to import many raw materials; secondly, the deliberate bias of this technology towards meeting elite demand has the twin effect of accentuating disparities in consumption and increasing imports. In short, the content of the package deal makes modern technology incompatible with development. It is the realization of these harsh facts that has moved local and national groups in developing and developed countries, and also many international agencies, to urge an alternative strategy of development based on a pattern of technologies different from modern technology. Social Criticisms Further criticisms of modern technology arise from the social effects that it produces in developing countries. ese criticisms focus on two main processes: the disintegration of established social forms of organization which have been interwoven through centuries of evolution with ancient modes of production; and the generation of a dual society involving urban islands of affluence amidst vast seas of rural poverty. e disruption of traditional social forms resulting from the drastic changes in modes of production introduced by modern technology has a telling effect on the family (e.g., the trend away from extended families with their type of social security and towards nuclear families), on structures of authority (e.g., the displacement of village elders by literate entrepreneurs), on traditions of village self-reliance (e.g., the strength of collective self-help giving way to the weakness of dependence on urbanbased aid and external development agencies), on social mores (e.g., contentment with one's lot being rejected in favour of acquisitive greed), and so on. It is not suggested here that all was perfect in the ancient social forms, but that usually the 'good' in traditional societies has also been rejected along with the 'bad' and that modernization (customarily equated
with westernization) is not necessarily conducive to social harmony and individual peace.
e dissolution of the traditional society through the process of modernization is associated with the polarization into a dual society: a society, mainly urban, of the affluent ten to twenty per cent of the population, and a society of the underprivileged eighty to ninety per cent, consisting mainly of the rural poor but also including the urban-dwellers. e elite largely controls the political decision-making machinery, with socalled 'politics' becoming equivalent to wrangles between various sections of this elite. e market economy, the social services and the educational system are almost wholly dominated by the elite, leaving the poor (in particular the poorest fiy per cent) in abject poverty with regard to essential goods, services and knowledge. It has been argued that this polarization is the consequence of all modern technologies for goods or services (e.g., health, transport, education) being accessible only to those with purchasing power, rendering all modern technologies, therefore, inherently elitist.
e polarization of the society of a developing country into a dual society with a small, affluent, acquisitive, conspicuously consuming, citycentred elite drawing its ideas, values and lifestyles from the developed countries, and a large mass of poor people le out of the circle of production and consumption by the lack of employment and purchasing power, is an intrinsically unstable situation. It is fertile soil for alienation, tension and aggression. e instability is amplified by the constant exposure to the overwhelmingly greater affluence of the elite who practise conspicuously a philosophy which can be summed up thus: "all that is rural is bad, all that is urban is better, and all that is foreign is best". Several obvious questions follow: "Can we rationally suppose that (the poor) will accept a world 'half slave, half free', half plunged in consumptive pleasure, half deprived of the bare decencies of life? Can we hope that the protest of the dispossessed will not erupt into local conflicts and widening
unrest?"19 If social participation and control over their future cannot assume peaceful forms, it can only lead to explosions of violence. ese potentially explosive social effects of modern technology originate mainly from the incompatibility of modern technology with the proportions of a developing country. e exhorbitant demands which these technologies make on scarce capital and energy resources has the inevitable result of developing urban pockets at the expense of the countryside, and it is this unevenness in development which is the causal basis for the polarization into a dual society. At the same time, the absence of an evolutionary link between modern and traditional technologies leads to the destruction of traditional rural industries, and thus to the damage of the fabric of social life. is damage is aggravated by the intrinsic tendency of modern technology to respond to, and stimulate, lifestyles modelled on those prevalent in the developed countries. But, the inherently inequality-magnifying feature of these technologies means that they can only be accessible to an elite. us, modern technology spreads the desire for affluent lifestyles while restricting to a small elite the means of satisfying these stimulated desires, and thereby lays the foundation for alienation and social conflict.
Figure 3.1: Probability of occurence of risks of differing gravity.
ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND AND APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
e gathering storm of criticism of modern technology has resulted in an increasing number of appeals and demands for a new pattern of technologies, and therefore in a proliferation of new terms to designate it. Apart from "alternative", "appropriate" and "intermediate" technologies, some of the other adjective terms in use are "so", "humane", "liberatory", "rational", "equilibrium", "convivial", "careful", "radical", "inequalityreducing", "people's", "progress", "utopian", "environmentally sound" and "low- and non-waste". is affluence of jargon can prove an embarrassment (of terminological riches!), because the various terms differ in the characteristics considered essential for the new technology to be proposed as a contrast to modern technology; and even more because the set of complete characteristics associated with each term is difficult to identify amidst explicit statements and implicit views to be read between the lines. A scrutiny of the various terms shows, however, that most of them fall into three broad categories: those in which economic goals predominate; those in which environmental concerns are crucial; and those in which social goals are emphasized. Unfortunately, some of the terms have never been clearly defined; and others may have been defined in one way, used in another way, and understood in yet a third way. Further, the intended 'scope' of the various terms is quite different. While some envisage the achievement of fairly limited transitional objectives, others, with a utopian grandeur, seek to achieve all conceivable goals and thus "never put a foot wrong". More importantly, the three broad categories of goals may partly overlap and partly conflict, and therefore the terms are best laid out in the form of
a Venn diagram (Fig. 3.2). Fortunately, it is not necessary to enter the morass of terminology because, notwithstanding the many differences of emphasis, priority and strategy, there is a "shiing core" of agreement underlying the various terms. In particular, it is the agreement that technologies must be chosen by taking into account environmental, economic and social goals. ere is also a broad domain of implicit accord regarding these goals: harmony with the environment, reduction of inequalities (between and within countries) and participation and control by the people are the environmental, economic and social goals. All this is very much in tune with the three guiding principles contained in the 1975 Dag Hammarskjold Report What Now, viz., harmony with the environment, need orientation and endogenous self-reliance.
Figure 3.2: Terminology of new technology
Such a thrust is very much in tune with UNEP's view of the relationship between environment and development. According to this view, the relationship between environment and development is inevitable, intimate and inseparable. If concerns are restricted purely to development objectives, and the environmental context of society is disregarded, then the consequential deterioration of the habitat leads to an indirect, but serious, frustration of those very objectives. us, if environmental considerations are ignored, development cannot be sustained in the long run, and development goals are imperilled. ere is also another side to the coin. If the sole preoccupation is with the physical environment, and the society which pursues its aims and
endeavours in that milieu is amorally forgotten, then the prevailing economic disparities between and within countries may lead to a situation where both the affluent and the needy despoil the environment. e affluent oen damage their surroundings through irrational and wasteful consumption, and the poverty-stricken may have to ensure their survival even at the expense of the environment. Both luxury and poverty can have undesirable environmental consequences. us, if development tasks are forsaken, the environment is jeopardised. It is such a view of the environment-development nexus which has led to a re-statement of development objectives. According to this restatement, development must be directed primarily towards: 1. e satisfaction of basic human needs (material and non-material), starting with the needs of the neediest, in order to achieve a reduction of inequalities between and within countries; 2. Endogenous self-reliance in order to promote social participation and control; and 3. Ecological soundness in order to attain harmony with the environment and make development sustainable over the long term. is view of development is fundamentally different from one in which development is equated with growth. It is focussed on human beings, rather than only on goods and services. It is principally concerned with the quality of life, and not merely with the quantity of goods and services. It is deliberately directed towards the neediest, instead of hoping that the benefits of growth, will automatically and spontaneously trickle down to the under-privileged. Not merely growth (and the magnitude of the GNP), but also the structure and benefits of growth (and the composition and distribution of the GNP) are of central importance. is view of development is global in scope and validity. It is as applicable to the industrialized countries as to the developing countries,
though the precise priorities and programmes for these two categories will obviously be profoundly different. us the industrialized countries, which have already satisfied the minimum material needs of their populations, have major development tasks pertaining to basic nonmaterial needs; while developing countries must necessarily place overriding emphasis on the satisfaction of minimum elementary needs such as food, clothing, shelter, health, education and employment. e advancement of the different development objectives of industrialized and developing countries requires the establishment of a New International Economic Order. It is in this context that technology has an essential role to play, for it is man's crucial instrument for introducing environmental concerns and for the achievement of socioeconomic objectives. However, to perform such a role, it is vital that, the selection of technologies (from those currently available), and the generation of new technologies be linked to Development and the New International Economic Order. For, it must not be assumed that all available technologies (however modern they may be) and all future technologies (likely to emerge in the guise of 'technological progress') are necessarily consistent with development objectives. In fact, there is widespread concern that many of the technologies currently being used and generated in diverse parts of the world are unsatisfactory. It is not merely that these technologies make insufficient use of local factors (which is the usual formulation of the concern), but also that their environmental impacts are oen highly unpleasant and undesirable, and that they are associated with many social effects which are considered to be unwelcome. Further, it is sometimes argued that these technologies are umbilically linked to the old international economic order between developed and developing countries and also to the dual societies into which many developing countries are polarized. It is these concerns that lead to the definition of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies as those technologies which, in general,
advance development and the New International Economic order and which, in particular, promote the development objectives outlined above. In so far as these objectives apply throughout the world, the concept of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies is also global validity. But, what is appropriate in developed countries need not be appropriate for developing countries, and vice versa—and what is appropriate for one developing country need not be so for another. Finally, the extreme urgency and importance of Development and the New International Economic Order makes the methodology of selection of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies an issue of the highest priority and gravity.
SOME CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS ough the clamour for the development of appropriate/alternative/ intermediate technologies has been rising over the past decade or two, the concept has sometimes led to unforeseen apprehensions and unintended impressions. Some clarification is, therefore, in order. At the outset, there are the semantic issues arising from the word 'appropriate', which acquires meaning only when one specifies "appropriate to what or to whom?". Too oen, the sole concern is with appropriateness in relation to the capital and labour endowments of a region or country, but this purely economic view is a narrow, restricted and one-dimensional theory of appropriateness. In contrast, the assessment of appropriateness from the standpoint of development objectives necessitates a threedimensional view in which the environmental and social dimensions are no less important than the economic one. Sometimes it has been assumed that the case for environmentally sound and appropriate technologies, particularly for developing countries, is built upon a rejection of industry and industrialization. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact, it is considered self-evident that
industrialization is essential for meeting the basic needs of growing populations. e case in appropriate technologies based on the development of those products, patterns and forms of industrialization that will advance the type of development described in the paper. It is implicit in such a view that a great deal will have to be learnt from the industrialization process of the developed countries. But, that process—it must be noted—includes both successes and failures, with corresponding lessons. Hence, development does not have to consist of a slavish imitation of the type of industrialization followed by the developed countries.
Similarly, it has oen been assumed that the proponents of environmentally sound and appropriate technology demand a total rejection of the so-called 'modern' technology of the developed countries. In fact, what is demanded is a careful scrutiny of the economic, social and environmental implications of modern technology from the standpoint of the objectives of Development and the New International Economic Order, and an unqualified acceptance of such of these technologies (in original or adapted forms) which advance those objectives. us, what is rejected is the blind faith that all the technologies of the developed countries are universally appropriate, despite the specificity of the historical circumstances which spawned them and the particularity of the demands in response to which they were evolved. Also discarded is the naive belief that these technologies are always an unmitigated blessing, equally satisfying the interests of those who sponsor, hawk, and vend them, as of those who intend to use them to fulfil national development objectives. In some quarters, the argument for environmentally sound and appropriate technologies has been misunderstood as a plea for a total return to, and dependence on, the traditional technologies of ancient peoples. In fact, the plea is quite different. Traditional technologies have undergone a selection process over centuries of empirical testing; hence, they are very likely to represent optimum solutions. But they are optimal
only for the particular conditions, constraints, materials, and needs in response to which they were developed. With the emergence of new conditions, constraints, materials and needs, it is likely that their applicability will have been eroded and the technology rendered invalid. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that these traditional technologies can undergo qualitative changes through minor modifications. ese improvements can be brought about by the use of modern science and engineering to understand and clarify the rational core of ancient practices. Such transformed traditional technologies may well qualify as environmentally sound and appropriate. In addition to the possibility of 'modern' technologies and transformed traditional technologies being environmentally sound and appropriate, there is also the possibility of alternative technologies being specifically designed ab initio to meet the criteria of environmental soundness and appropriateness. Since there are three main sources for the selection of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies, viz., 'modern', transformed traditional, and alternative technologies, it is very likely that the optimal pattern of technologies to advance the development objectives of a country will consist of a mix or blend of technologies from the various sources. e possibility of this mix making up the whole package of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies refutes the alleged bias wholly in favour of traditional technologies or against modern technology. Another important clarification relates to the dynamic nature of the concepts of environmental soundness and appropriateness. e dynamism follows inevitably from the continuously changing nature, on the one hand, of the physical environment in a country, and on the other hand, of the structure of its development goals. us, what is environmentally sound and appropriate at one juncture of history may not be so at a later time. As a result, the concepts of environmental soundness and appropriateness cannot be static; they must evolve with the state of the
environment and with the nature of development tasks. It also follows that the composition of the mix that constitutes the total package of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies may have to change with the passage of time. Still another issue which needs clarification is the scope of technology. Too oen the advocates of appropriate technology have restricted their concerns to production technology. However, if technology is to be an instrument of environmentally sustainable development, it must be understood in a much broader sense as encompassing both product and production, and both soware and hardware. at is, the technologies under discussion must include what type of goods and services are produced, in addition to how they are produced. ey must include soware or disembodied technologies concerned with ways of utilising existing men, machines, devices and materials, in addition to hardware or embodied technologies concerned directly with machines, devices and materials. us, all types of technologies, and not merely production technologies, must be scrutinized for environmental soundness and appropriateness. ere is also the question of the advanced character of technologies. is character should derive not from the trivial criterion of scale of production, but from the extent to which the technologies embody modern scientific and engineering thinking. From this standpoint, it is possible that both transformed traditional technologies and alternative technologies need not be primitive; they can turn out to be as 'advanced'—and 'modern' in the literal sense of the word —as the technologies of the developed countries. is also unfortunate that the technologies of the developed countries are invariably described as 'high' technologies, in contrast to alternative and transformed traditional technologies which are pejoratively referred to as 'low' technologies. But, the terms 'high' and 'low' should depend on whether there is a high or low science and engineering input, and not upon whether the technology
originates from the developed countries or not. Invariably, however, it is this geographical origin of a technology which determines the terms of common parlance— advanced/primitive and high/low. e underlying subconscious belief or conscious policy is the equating of all that is good with what emanates from the industrialized countries. Finally, some votaries of appropriate technology have themselves been responsible for creating the impression that technology alone can remove poverty, redress injustice, solve development problems, and prove a universal panacea (provided it is the right brand!). But, technology is only a subsystem of society, and the development of society hinges not on only technology, but also on the other crucial sub-systems—the political, economic and social sub-systems—as well as on the physical environment of society. In other words, technology is only an instrument for the development of society. Like all instrument, it must be specifically chosen and/or designed to fulfill its intended function. But, the will to use the instrument and the skill to wield it effectively does not depend so much on the instrument itself upon the user. us, the right type of technology (an environmentally sound and appropriate technology) is a necessary , but not a sufficient condition for development. It is also essential that the political structure and the socioeconomic framework are both committed to development goals, and that the environmental context can sustain these goals. Further, technology must always be seen in relation to the social setting, and the question of appropriateness is necessarily specific to the particular social context. Technology, therefore, has both power and limits. But its power to advance development is drastically reduced if it is not environmentally sound and appropriate; hence, the paramount importance of selecting environmentally sound and appropriate technology.
CRITERIA FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SOUNDNESS AND APPROPRIATENESS Having attempted to clarify some of the misconceptions about environmentally sound and appropriate technology, attention will now be turned to the methodology of selection of such technologies. In particular, this attention will focus on two crucial aspects of this methodology: The criteria to be used; and The procedure for using these criteria. e criteria used in the choice of technologies are important for several reasons. 1. When criteria are explicitly stated, they have to be reckoned with, and this enforced reckoning tends to counteract arbitrariness in policy- and decision-making.
2. e spelling out of criteria facilitates their publication. Also, the more broadcast an awareness of the criteria is, the less the risk of their being ignored in policies and decisions; and when they are ignored, the greater the consciousness that this is being done, and the greater the need for an open justification of the omission, deletion or suppression of criteria. Hence, criteria have an impact both on policymakers and decision-makers, and on those who are affected by policies and decisions. From this point of view, the purpose of setting down criteria is to broaden the base of policy- and decision-making. 3. An increase in awareness of the criteria to be used in the choice of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies will, on the one hand, generate a widespread demand for such technologies, and on the other hand, guide those who generate technologies. e significance of this consciousness among scientists and engineers must not be underestimated, because the definition and appreciation
of criteria is an inhibiting factor against the development of environmentally unsound and inappropriate technologies. 4. Notwithstanding the obvious importance of establishing criteria for the choice of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies, it is interesting that no explicit list of criteria exists today. is only means that the criteria are usually implicit. Nevertheless, even implicit criteria can be deciphered from the technologies in vogue and from the decisions that ushered in these technologies. And, if many of these technologies are environmentally unsound and inappropriate, then it follows that the explicit statement of criteria is a vital step in generating and adopting environmentally sound and appropriate technologies.
In so far as criteria must be derived from objectives, the criteria for the choice of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies must emerge from the development objectives indicated earlier. is is undoubtedly a normative approach to the definition of criteria. e approach is based on the following value judgements: 1. that economic development, particularly of the developing countries, is an urgent objective of the highest priority, and that this development is contingent upon the establishment of a New International Economic Order which must, above all, include a new relationship between developed and developing countries; 2. that, in the ultimate analysis, it is a basic need of human beings to participate in the decisions and processes concerning their destiny and to exercise increasing control over these decisions and processes; 3. that the environment is the sole irreplaceable habitat of man and must therefore be jealously protected and husbanded. Stimulated by such a perspective, a list of preferences to be used in the choice of technology can be proposed.
e economic dimension of development requires the exercise of preferences for technologies which are need-based, rather than those that amplify inequalities between and within countries, for example:
1. a preference for technologies which are consistent, rather than incompatible, with the basic factor proportions of particularly countries. e means, for most developing countries, a preference for energy-conserving, capital-saving and employment-generating, rather than energy-extravagant, capital-intensive and labour-saving, technologies; 2. a preference for the technologies of goods and services relevant to mass consumption, rather than to individual luxuries; 3. a preference for technologies based on local materials, rather than materials which have to be imported from abroad or transported from distant parts of the country; 4. a preference for technologies which generate employment for underprivileged masses, rather than for privileged elites; 5. a preference for technologies which produce for local consumption, rather than for remote markets; 6. a preference for technologies which promote a symbiotic and mutually reinforcing, rather than parasitic and destructive, interdependence. is would be, on the one hand, the metropolises of developing countries on their rural hinterlands and on the other, the developed countries on the developing countries. e social dimension of development necessitates the exercise of preferences for technologies which promote endogenous self-reliance by increasing social participation and control, for example: 1. a preference for technologies which lead to an enhancement of the
quality of life, rather than merely to an increase in the consumption of goods; 2. a preference for production technologies which require satisfying creative work, rather than boring routine labour, i.e., for technologies which relate men to work, rather than alienate them from it; 3. a preference for production technologies in which machines are subordinated to, rather than dominate, the lives of people; 4. a preference for technologies which lead to human settlements being designed to suit the collective and individual lives of people, rather than the requirements of agglomerations of productive units; 5. a preference for technologies which promote ease, rather than sophistication, of operation; 6. a preference for technologies which blend with, rather than disrupt traditional technologies and the fabric of social life; 7. a preference for technologies developed endogenously from the local context, rather than transferred from alien settings; 8. a preference for technologies which facilitate the devolution of power to the people, rather than its concentration in the hands of elites. e environmental dimension must be concerned with the rational sustained use, rather than indiscriminate rapid devastation, of the resource-bestowing and life-supporting bio-geophysical environment. Hence, this dimension must involve, the exercise of several preferences in the choice of technologies, for example: 1. a preference for energy-production technologies based on renewable rather than depletable, energy sources (e.g. sun, wind and biogas, rather than oil or coal); 2. a preference for resource- and energy-saving, rather than resource-
and energy-intensive, technologies; 3. a preference for technologies which produce goods that can be recycled and re-used, rather than used once and thrown away, and that are designed for durability, rather than obsolescence; 4. a preference for production technologies based on raw materials which are replenishable (e.g., wood and cotton), rather than exhaustible (e.g., steel or petroleum-based synthetic fibers); 5. a preference for technologies of production and consumption which inherently minimize noxious or dangerous emissions and wastes, rather than those which require 'fixes' to curb their intrinsically polluting tendencies; 6. a preference for technologies of production and consumption which incorporate waste minimization and utilization procedures as integral components, rather than those which require them as appendages; 7. a preference for technologies which blend into natural ecosystems by causing them minimal disturbance, rather than those which threaten the biosphere with major perturbations.
Since every preference implies a criterion and, indeed, can be rephrased as a criterion, the above list of preferences are in fact a set of criteria for the choice of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies. For example, the "preference for the technologies of goods and services relevant to mass consumption, rather than to individual luxuries" can be stated as the criterion: "Does the technology produce goods and services which are within the means of the masses?". Or, the "preference for energy-production technologies based on renewable, rather than depletable, energy sources" can be transformed into the criterion: "Is the energy production technology based on renewable energy sources?". An obvious short-coming of a set of criteria as large as the one presented above is that it is likely to inundate—and perhaps confuse—
even the makers of policies and decisions, let alone laymen. Further, aer a choice of technology has been made, it will not be easy to detect whether one or more criteria have been omitted, deleted, suppressed or ignored. on the other hand, the large set has rightly elaborated upon and made explicit the crucial economic, social and environmental dimensions of development. e conclusion is that a list of explicit criteria is vital for selecting technology, but the list must be much shorter, more manageable and less complex. Of course, the other extreme is a very short list which can be generated naturally from the development objectives: Does the technology advance the satisfaction of basic human needs, starting with the needs of the neediest; and does it reduce inequalities between and within countries? Does the technology promote endogenous self-reliance through an increase of social participation and control? Does the technology increase harmony with the environment? is list is obviously far too brief to facilitate detailed interpretation and unambiguous use. What is required, therefore, is a short list with some number of criteria in between three and twenty-nine. It should be neither too brief and vague, nor too long and cumbersome. e list should be compact, and preferably presentable on a single page. one such list is presented here.
Criteria for the Selection of Technology 1. Satisfaction of Basic Needs a. Does the technology contribute, directly or indirectly, immediately or in the near future, to the satisfaction of basic
needs such as food, clothing, shelter, health, education, etc.? b. Does it produce goods and/or services accessible particularly to those whose basic needs have been least satisfied? 2. Resource Development a. Does it make optimal use of local factors (manpower, capital, natural resources, etc.) by sustaining/generating employment; saving/generating capital; saving/generating raw materials, including energy; developing skills and R&D and engineering capabilities? b. Does it increase the capacity to produce on a sustained, cumulative basis? 3. Societal Development a. Does it reduce debilitating dependence and promote selfreliance based on mass participation at the local/national/regional levels, enabling the society to follow its own path of development? b. Does it reduce inequalities? between occupational, ethic, sex and age groups? between rural and urban communities? and between (groups of) countries? 4. Cultural Developopment a. Does it make use of and build on endogenous technical traditions? b. Does it blend with/enhance valuable elements and patterns in the local/national/regional culture? 5. Human Development
a. does it lead to creative mass involvement by being accessible, comprehensible and flexible? b. does it liberate human beings from boring, degrading excessively heavy or dirty work? 6. Environmental Development a. Does it minimize depletion and pollution by using renewable resources, through built-in waste minimization, recycling and/or re-use and blending better with existing eco-cycles? b. Does it improve the natural and man-made environment by providing for a higher level of complexity and diversity of the eco-systems, thereby reducing their vulnerability? e list of six criteria (each in turn being subdivided into two, making in all twelve) may well be the first of its kind, but it is certainly not proposed with any aura of finality. In fact, it is in the nature of such lists that they generate more controversy than consensus, but that is as should be, for it is by a process of contention and testing that their revision and refinement will take place. e tentative list proposed here covers economic, social and environmental criteria. No attempt will be made in this report to provide a detailed justification for the criteria, because they are based on the conceptual framework for environmentally sound and appropriate technology, dealt with earlier in the text. Hence only a brief description of the list is provided below. e first criterion relates to the satisfaction of basic needs, of which the most important are food, clothing, shelter, health, education and transport/ communication. is criterion compels a scrutiny of the products and/or services that emerge from the technology. ere is no objective justification for any particular set of products and/
or services, but if the normative goal of development is accepted, then several conclusions follow. 1. e simple development=growth equation becomes valid only aer ensuring that the pattern and content of growth corresponds to increasing satisfaction of basic needs, with maximum emphasis on the needs of the neediest. Similarly, the development=production equation is justified only aer confirming that the goods and/or services that are produced are accessible to those whose needs have been least satisfied. 2. ough a vast number of technologies do not satisfy basic needs directly (e.g., energy production technologies), they can do so indirectly if their outputs (e.g. energy) can become the inputs for technologies which directly satisfy basic needs. Whether this indirect contribution to basic needs is the case or not, is the question which emerges from the first criterion. 3. e existence of technologies (e.g. iron and steel) which lead indirectly to the satisfaction of basic needs implies that the time horizon must stretch beyond the immediate present. In other words, many technologies imply a postponed satisfaction of basic needs. It is obvious, however, that if the time horizon stretches indefinitely and the postponement is sine die, then the failure to fulfill basic needs is bound to prevent several other criteria on the list from being satisfied. e failure will increase inequalities, for instance, or diminish creative involvement on a mass basis, or degrade the environment (see page 44). e conclusion is that the deferment in meeting basic needs must not extend beyond the near future. 4. Finally, the basic needs criterion implies a categorical rejection of the current practice, in countries with highly skewed income distributions, of gearing technologies to the demands of those groups with purchasing power and to ignore such needs of the under-
privileged as cannot be backed up with this purchasing power. e utilization and development of local resources is the essence of the second criterion. The term 'resources', which is intended to cover the usual economic factors of labour, capital, natural resources and land, has been deliberately chosen to emphasize that manpower too is a resource which must be utilized and developed. Within the scope of this criterion fall the usual concerns about using capital-saving, employment-generating technologies in countries with shortages of capital and abundance of manpower. But, the criterion used here is more general from several points of view.
e criterion seeks to determine whether the technology makes use of all local resources including raw materials, energy and skills, as well as capital and labour. It probes into whether these resources are being developed, as distinct from being used. is aspect is particularly important for manpower (skill development) and natural resources. It is this development of resources which decides whether the capacity to produce on a sustained, cumulative basis is increasing or decreasing. e question of whether the mix of resources being used is optimum must also be scrutinized. Since different local/ national/regional environments may require different resource mixes, a mix is perfect for one particular environment may become less than perfect when transferred to other (and perhaps radically different) environments. e usual example cited for such an erosion in the optimum features of technologies of is that of capital-intensive, labour-saving technologies generated in capital-rich, labour-short developed countries being transferred to capital-starved manpower-rich developing countries. e third criterion concerns societal development and explores two categories of relationships displayed by a society: external relationships between the particular society under consideration and external societies with which it is in interaction;
and internal relationships between sub-societies or groups within the society. With regard to external relationships, the criterion seeks to determine whether the technology strengthens the society's capacity (vis-à-vis external societies) to determine and to follow its own path of development. is capacity is decided by the extent to which the society is self-reliant and to which its relationships with external societies do not involve a debilitating dependence. Self-reliance in turn is measured by autonomy, and by the extent to which people participate in and control the decisions which affect their lives. Of course, the possibility of mass participation in and control of decisions depends upon the size of the autonomous group, but emphasis should be placed on increasing mass participation and control. us, the criterion requires an examination of whether the technology promotes self-reliance by increasing mass participation in decisions and control over them.
In the matter of internal relationships between the constituent subsocieties of the society, the criterion is directed towards ascertaining whether the technology tends to reduce inequalities between the subsocieties. In particular, does the technology promote equality between occupational, ethnic, sex and age groups? between rural and urban communities? between (groups of) countries? is concern with inequalities stems from the 'state of affairs' between countries, leading to the demand for a New International Economic Order, and within countries, leading to a plea for development. e fourth criterion concerns the impact of the technology on the cultural fabric of society. e technology is bound to bring about changes in culture, and it is the nature of these changes that deserves consideration.
For instance, what effect does the technology have on the endogenous technical traditions, i.e. the non-formalized knowledge and know-how (particularly in relation to the environment) which is invariably an acquisition of stable communities? Does the technology build upon these traditions; or does it ignore them so that they are eroded and gradually lost? Again, it is important to determine whether the technology blends with and enhances, rather than disrupts and destroys, valuable elements in the local culture. For example, does the technology reinforce, rather than undermine, a custom which acts as a cohesive force in the society (e.g., shared labour or shared use of facilities)?
ese concerns arise from a host of anthropological and sociological studies that document the cultural damage and chaos resulting from the uncritical import and introduction of technologies from alien settings. e fih criterion relates to the impact of the technology on individual man, who is considered as the focus of interest, but living in symbiosis with his fellow-men and his environment. e criterion demands an enquiry into whether the technology leads to human enrichment. Creative involvement in social activities, be they of a physical, artistic or intellectual nature, is essential to the spiritual well-being of man, and should, in fact, be considered a basic human need (albeit a non-material one). So, the question is, does the technology facilitate and promote this creative social involvement, and thereby enrich the individuals who become thus involved? e criterion becomes especially significant in view of the importance of employment as a basic need. ere should be a constant drive to make this employment meaningful. Hence, it is essential to ask whether the technology tends to liberate human beings from boring, degrading, excessively heavy or demeaning work. ese issues are related to the problem of the alienation of man from
his fellow-men and from his work. e sixth and final criterion involves the preservation and development of the environment and the impact of the technology on the environment. It is necessary to ask: does the technology (to use the words of an old song) "accentuate the positive . . . (and) eliminate the negative". . . environmental impacts? It is not merely a matter of technological "fixes" which minimize pollution and resource depletion through anti-pollution and recycling measures. e technology should be inherently designed to blend with natural eco-cycles and to minimize waste at all stages of production, distribution and consumption. All this has to do with the protection and preservation of the environment, but the objective of improving and developing the natural and man-made environment is as important. is is particularly so because a definite tendency of modern technology is to reduce the complexity and diversity of eco-systems. But, simplicity in eco-systems oen leads to vulnerability and breakdown of eco-cycles. For example, the reduction of complexity associated with mono-cropping systems increases their vulnerability to attack and failure. Hence, it is important to determine whether the technology under consideration is improving the environment by enhancing complexity and diversity and thereby reducing vulnerability. It is obvious that there is a great deal of overlap in the list of six criteria described above. e criteria are not exclusive, and one criterion may involve another through close interaction. is is inevitable, because the economic, social and environmental aspects of development are interrelated and, in fact, components of a single process. In so far as the process is the reality, and its resolution into components an analytical device, the criteria must be considered together as an integral set. us, the strong coupling between criteria necessarily requires a holistic, rather than piece-meal or sectoral, approach to the choice of environmentally sound and appropriate technology.
Such a holistic set of criteria—of the type described above—has not been proposed hitherto. ere may be several reasons for this lacuna, but one cannot ignore the fact that excessive specialization and professionalization have led to such divergent approaches of the economic, social and environmental disciplines that a common language for transdisciplinary discussions is difficult to maintain. Yet, it is precisely such an integrated approach that must be taken to the selection of technologies designed to serve development goals, because development itself is a unified process, albeit with economic, social and environmental facets. In other words, the economic, social and environmental categories of criteria must inter-lock and converge to promote development. Hence, any methodology which excludes one or more criteria from explicit consideration must be viewed as ipso facto misleading, however rigorous it may appear. In particular, this statement refers to methodologies which only confine themselves to the quantifiable criteria because some of the criteria, e.g., those relating to self-reliance or human enrichment, may be inherently non-quantifiable. e six criteria constitute an extremely demanding and exacting list. Hence, an obvious objection to the list is that few technologies will satisfy all criteria, making the whole travail a worthless exercise. Such an objection is indeed tenable if the criteria are interpreted in a passive, static manner, in which selection is made from a set of existing technologies, and the issue is then closed. But, the objection subsides if the criteria are used in a dynamic perspective as a heuristic device leading to the generation of new technologies. us, at any one time, few technologies may satisfy all the criteria, and there may always be scope for improving them even if they do. But the testing of technologies against the criteria will reveal reasonably clear guidelines for innovation and modification. From this standpoint, the list of criteria is a long-hoped-for yardstick for innovations of environmentally sound and appropriate technology. e obvious implication of the above discussion is that until the new or
modified technologies make their appearance, the best has to be made of the "bad bargain" of existing technologies. is can be done by weighing the criteria and settling for trade-offs amongst them. ere should be little objection to such choices based on weights and trade-offs as long as all the criteria are explicitly and seriously considered and the processes of weighing and trading-off clearly revealed. But perhaps what is of greater importance is that efforts should be made to generate new technologies that allow all criteria, or a greater number of them, to be satisfied at the same time and that lessen the extent of trade-offs. In fact, since most choices of technology imply trade-offs between criteria and since most currently available technologies have been developed without reckoning with a set of criteria of the type proposed here, it is likely that more attention will have to be paid to the generation of new technologies than to the choice between existing ones. us, the selection and generation of technologies constitute a dialectical unity, either one implying the presence of the other and being meaningless in the absence of the other. In particular, the selection of technologies has little meaning unless set in the context of the generation of technologies.
To state the issue differently, it is almost certain that, from the standpoint of the list of criteria proposed here, few current technologies are perfectly environmentally sound and appropriate. It is only a matter of some technologies being more environmentally sound and appropriate than others. But, the revelation of the gap between the ideal and the actual provides the motivation for attempting to narrow the gap, i.e., for increasing the environmental soundness and appropriateness of technologies. In so far as the list of criteria has revealed both the goal of environmental soundness and appropriateness as well as how far away from the goal current technologies are, the list may be viewed as a distinct step forward.
CONSTRAINTS ON THE TECHNOLOGY SELECTION PROCESS
Before turning to the methodology of using the list of criteria for the selection of environmentally sound and appropriate technology, the autonomy of the selection process merits discussion. A consideration of production technologies cannot take place without a priori specification of the product or service. e point is that basic human needs are few in number and there is no sanctity, except native custom or foreign influence, in any particular bundle of goods and services that can fulfil these needs. For example, an element of sweetness may be necessary in the human diet. In all developed countries, and in the cities of most developing countries, crystallized white sugar is produced to satisfy this need. But this is only one way, among many, of providing sweetness to the diet—other ways include jaggery, berries, artificial sweeteners, etc. Hence, the sweetening agent must be decided upon before a selection can be made of a technology for producing it.
e distinction between product specification and selection of production technology generates an important question: is the product specification within the scope of the technology selection process, or is it externally imposed? e answer, of course, depends upon the autonomy of the selection process. In turn, this autonomy depends upon the particular level—local, subnational, national, regional—at which the technology selection takes place and the relationship between this level and the higher/lower level. Two cases can be distinguished. In the first case, the level at which technology selection is being made is in a position to determine the product. Here, the product specification is part of, and internal to, the technology selection process which, therefore, enjoys autonomy in this matter. In the second case, technology selection is done at one level, e.g. the local level, but specification of the product is determined by a higher level, e.g., the national level. Here, the technology selection process is not
autonomous in the matter of product specification, and the latter is imposed as an external constraint on the process. Depending, therefore, on the extent of autonomy with regard to product specification, the selection process can be either free or externally constrained. A similar situation can obtain with respect to the growth rate for products and services, i.e., the rate at which the production output is expected to change over the years. is growth rate has an important bearing on the selection of production technology and, therefore, the crucial question is whether the technology selection process enjoys the autonomy to decide the growth rate, or whether the latter is fixed as an external constraint at a different level. e category of externally decided constraints which affects the technology selection process must also include certain macro-decisions regarding production technology. For example, there may be national decisions regarding the role of centralized, large-scale industries, and these decisions may circumscribe and limit the autonomy of the technology selection process at lower levels.
The Technology-Profile Approach for Selection Once there is an understanding of the extent of autonomy of the technology selection process, and in particular, an identification and definition of the externally imposed constraints (viz., product specification, growth rate, role of centralized production), the selection process can be undertaken. Assessment of Technologies vis-à-vis Criteria Since development is a process which depends upon an integration of economic, social and environmental activities, the selection of technologies to advance development objectives must be based on an integrated use of economic,
social and environmental categories of criteria. e exclusion of any one or two categories of criteria may well lead to a choice of technology, but such a selection is only likely to distort the development process because crucial aspects of this process are ignored. All this means that the technologies contending for selection must be assessed against a total set of criteria of the type set down on page 44. Sequential Selection of Technologies one possible approach to this assessment is to take the whole set of candidate technologies, to pass them through what may be called "decision filters", each filter based upon one criterion, and to eliminate at each stage those technologies which fail to survive the criterion.
Unfortunately, such a sequential elimination of technologies suffers from a number of drawbacks. Firstly, the criteria are such that they do not permit a sharp pass/fail judgement; the result of the test is oen unclear, making the elimination process very difficult and awkward. Secondly, a particular technology may only get rejected because of, for example, the second criterion in the sequence, even though from a total point of view it may be more environmentally sound and appropriate than a technology which barely scrapes through all filters. irdly, the sequencing of criteria encourages the decomposition of the total view represented by the whole set of criteria into narrow, specialized, discipline-based viewpoints. e situation can be caricatured by imagining that the responsibility of wielding different criteria is allocated to different agencies,—different ministries for example. Finally, the sequencing of criteria confers a great deal of significance to the particular order in which the criteria are arranged. A different arrangement may lead to the selection of a different technology. e way to guard against this possibility of non-commutativity of decision filters, i.e., different arrangements giving different results, is to finalize the selection of technology only aer trying out all possible sequences. But the larger the number of criteria, the larger the number of possible arrangements, e.g., 720 possible arrangements with 6 criteria.
e Technology Profile Approach Not only does the last-mentioned criticism of a sequential use of criteria indicate a ridiculous situation, it also suggests an alternative approach. Instead of assessing all technologies against criteria taken one at a time, the alternative approach involves using all criteria against technologies taken one at a time. at is, instead of a sequential decision-making on technologies, the alternative is to postpone the decision of selection until each technology in turn is scrutinized with the aid of the entire set of criteria. Such a scrutiny will result in an assessment or profile for each technology with regard to the extent of its environmental soundness and appropriateness. Only when the profiles of all the contending technologies have been made and compared with each other, can the process of selection proceed further. e Construction of Technology Profiles Attention must now be turned to the construction of technology profiles for the selection of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies.
At the outset, it is clear that some criteria, especially the economic ones, can yield quantitative answers, whereas others are difficult to quantify or have not yet been quantified. In fact, some of these other criteria, for example the social ones, may be inherently non-quantifiable. However, even in the case of a criterion that does not generate quantitative answers, it is almost always possible to judge whether the technology under scrutiny can be rated qualitatively as "satisfactory", "ambiguous" or "unsatisfactory", from the standpoint of the particular criterion. us, every criterion in the list can be made to yield either a quantitative or qualitative judgement. Further, the whole list of criteria will generate, for each contending technology, a profile consisting of a set of as many component judgements as there are criteria. ere may be various ways of presenting such profiles and sets of judgements, but a simple method involves a bar-chart display. In such a display, the profile for a particular technology is represented
by the whole bar, which can be divided into segments, with one segment for each criterion or sub-criterion. Also, the segments can be numbered in the same way as the criteria are numbered in the list proposed for the selection of technology. Further, the rating of the technology with reference to each criterion can be indicated within its corresponding segment. is indication can be shown either with numerical information, (or references to appended notes) if the segment corresponds to a quantitative criterion, or with a simple colour code—for example, green for 'satisfactory', orange for 'ambiguous', and red for unsatisfactory—if the segment represents a criterion which only permits qualitative judgements on the technology.
Figure 3.3: Technology profiles bar-chart
In so far as some criterion permit quantitative judgements, and others only qualitative ones, it follows that the profile for a technology will inevitably consist of a mix of quantitative and qualitative components, and the corresponding bar-chart representation will have numbers in some segments, and colours in others. Profiles involving such mixes of quantitative and qualitative components are unavoidable. or rather, mixes can be avoided today only by suppressing those criteria, e.g. the self-reliance one, that do not yield quantitative answers. But, a bias of this type against non-quantitative criteria will only lead—as already stressed—to the selection of technologies which distort development objectives because they eliminate some of its vital dimensions. On the other hand, however unconventional they may be, profiles of
the mixed type described above have an outstanding virtue—they always include judgements with respect to all criteria. This advantage of totality of view is a recompense for the qualitativeness of some aspects of the composite view. Further, by stimulating a holistic assessment of each technology, these profiles prevent rigorous quantitative judgements on a few criteria from blinding the assessor to the fact that other criteria have been completely ignored. In the bar-chart representation, judgements are indicated (either with numbers or colours) in all the segments, so that if any criteria are ignored, the corresponding segments will remain blank, and therefore, attract instant attention. Also, these empty segments will immediately reveal the incompleteness of what would otherwise appear as a highly sophisticated and rigorous assessment of the technology. e Question of Quantification and Quantifiability Because qualitative judgements must not be given a lower standing in the technology profile than quantitative ones, it must not be concluded that the attempt to quantify can be either abandoned or downgraded. Whatever can be quantified, must be quantified; and whatever quantification can be done more precisely and rigorously, must be done more precisely and rigorously. In other words, there must be a continuous drive to replace colours with numbers in the bar-chart representation for a technology profile. An important step in quantifying the judgement of any technology is to measure, wherever possible, the physical transformation of inputs into outputs. Such measurements are very significant, because the input-output relationships indicate the impact of the technology. Hence, an accurate knowledge of these transformation relationships constitutes an invaluable element of the technology selection process. A number of techniques exist for manipulating these measurements towards an assessment of technologies, and among them are cost-benefit analysis and linear or parametric programming. Of these techniques, costbenefit analysis is the most widely used quantitative technique. It has a
positive role to play in technology selection, and therefore, merits a brief discussion even though it is only one among many techniques which can be used to set out the basic measurable parameters. In essence, all decisions are based on the weighing of benefits (material and/or non-material) against costs. Further, in all cases, the concept of time-preference is involved, since the distribution of these costs and benefits over time will have some bearing on the decision. Also relevant to the decision are the questions of risk and uncertainty. Cost-benefit analysis is designed to reflect all these elements, viz., costs and benefits, time-preferences, and risks and uncertainties. However, there are a number of problems associated with the use of this technique.
e first is that of the so-called externalities. ese may be economic (e.g., the impact of a large project on local wage rates), social (e.g., the displacement of a community in the construction of a dam) or environmental (e.g. pollution of rivers), i.e., externalities as seen from the viewpoint of a particular project, plant or enterprise. From the point of view of society, however, these impacts are no less 'internalities' than various factors such as, labour productivity, which are deemed 'internalities' by the project, plant or enterprise. To include all these impacts in the reckoning, it is necessary to use social cost-benefit analysis, which attempts to cope with these externalities by the use of shadow prices. But, these shadow prices are only approximations and/or proxies, and oen lend themselves to such arbitrariness that the cost- benefit analyst can produce whatever result his sponsor or patron (usually the politician) wants, or that his own social conditioning and/or vested interests bias him towards. is suggests the second limitation of cost-benefit analysis, viz., it is so attracted by numbers in trying to reach the mirage of quantitative results that it tends to exclude from the analysis all or most non-quantifiable factors (such as the loss of communal solidarity when the population
displaced by a dam is moved to a new environment), even though these latter factors may be as relevant to development than the quantifiable factors. A third limitation of the technique is that it requires a decision with regard to how far the net of analysis is to be spread. Second-round effects may be considered, but are third-round effects to be considered, if, in fact, they can be identified?
Fourthly, there are the very real problems of risk and uncertainty. There may be some uncertainty with regard to the effect of a particular project on the environment, or there is a risk that the expected outcome may not occur in the predicted way. Both of these factors undermine the precision of cost benefit analysis. Fihly, there is the very real danger that the technique can be manipulated in such a way as to be used to rationalize decisions reached for other reasons. Finally, a very important drawback of cost-benefit analysis is that it assumes that unlike things (such as apples and oranges) can be compared with a constant unit of measurement, and that equal differences on the scale of cardinal measurement have the same significance, e.g., the difference between ten and eight has the same significance as the difference between four and two. e level at which such an analysis is undertaken is also of great importance, since by its nature it is much more suitable to micro—than to macro-problems. Further, it is possible to undertake an analysis with data of a very 'so', or a very 'hard' nature, and this will determine the degree of trust to be placed in the analysis. Both of these aspects follow from decisions made before cost-benefit analysis is undertaken. Notwithstanding these limitations of cost-benefit analysis, it has an important role in quantifying the judgements with respect to some of the criteria relevant to the selection of technology. The important things is that
the technique should be used in an unjaundiced ex-ante framework, rather than an ex-post rationalizing, where spurious quantification is undertaken in order to justify a decision taken on other grounds. ere are two other main advantages to be derived from the use of cost-benefit analysis. e first is that it forces the systematic quantitative consideration of a number of criteria, and the second is that the technique serves as a heuristic device with regard to quantification of other as-yet-unquantified criteria. e above discussion shows that the constant drive for quantification of judgements, for example, using cost-benefit analysis, though absolutely essential and imperative, must be tempered with a clear appreciation of its current drawbacks and limits. However, there is a time element here. Today, the profiles for technologies may necessarily consist of mixes of quantitative and qualitative judgements; but future innovations in analysis may well confer a quantitative character on judgements which are now perforce qualitative. Comparison of Technology Profiles Once profiles are built up for all the various contending technologies, the next step is to compare these profiles in order to make a selection of the most environmentally sound and appropriate technology. e comparison is facilitated by the bar-chart representation. What is required is an arrangement of the representations of the profiles of all the contending technologies, so that the juxtaposition highlights the differences between the technologies as differences in either magnitudes of numbers (in the case of quantitative criteria) or colours (in the case of non-quantifiable criteria). It is these differences which must provide the basis for the selection of the most environmentally sound and appropriate technology. e simplest, but rather unlikely, situation involves a technology which is superior to the others on all counts. Here, selection is a straightforward matter. Slightly more complicated is a ceteris paribus (other things being equal) situation in which the contending technologies differ only with
respect to one criterion, but are otherwise equally environmentally sound and appropriate. In such situations, the deeper the analysis with respect to the particular criterion that generates differences, the easier the selection procedure. And when the criterion permits quantitative differences, the situation is particularly suitable for cost-benefit analysis. e Problem of Weighing Criteria and Making Trade-offs e real problem, however, arises when contending technologies differ with respect to two or more dissimilar criteria, but are otherwise just as environmentally sound and appropriate. For example, one technology may have a higher capital-output ratio, but the other stimulates much more self-reliance; or one leads to greater human enrichment, but the other is not only less polluting but also less depleting with regard to resources.
e essence of these very common situations is the necessity of choosing between impacts which cannot be compared. In other words, the process of selection cannot avoid assigning weights to each criterion and making tradeoffs. In terms of the bar-chart representation for technology profiles, the weight assigned to a particular criterion can be indicated by the length of the corresponding segment. Since, however, numerical weights cannot be assigned to non-quantitative criteria, little significance must be attached to the precise length of segments, though some idea of the relative weights may be given by the relative lengths of segments. ere may, in fact, be a subjective element in the relative weighting of criteria, but there should be no objection to such trade-offs as long as all the criteria are given explicit and serious consideration. ere is a very important qualitative difference between, for example, completely ignoring the extent to which a technology facilitates self-reliance, and taking the contribution to self-reliance into account, but giving it low weight—or giving it a high weight, but explicitly stating that the technology does not satisfy the self-reliance criterion. In the former case, the decision-making agenda does not even include the self-reliance item; in the latter case, it is on the agenda and compels attention, even though it may be given little
emphasis in eventual trade-offs. At the other extreme, there is room for making a particular criterion, e.g., employment generation, an absolute condition for selection in the sense that if it is not satisfied, the technologies under scrutiny are rejected. But, even here, the total profile for every contending technology must be considered and its other virtues noted. e Context and Standpoint in Decision-Making e weights attached to the various criteria, and therefore, to the corresponding judgements in the technology profiles, are bound to vary with the historical, geographical, economic, social and environmental context, i.e., with where and when the technology selection is being made. In addition, the weights given to the criteria, i.e., to the numbers and colours in the bar-chart representation of technology profiles, depend very much upon the individuals and groups who are involved in the assessment. us, a community which is displaced by a large dam may attach a totally different weight to the effect of a resettlement technology on their culture, i.e., to the cultural criterion, than a group of human settlements experts in a remote capital to whom the economic criteria, e.g., the costs of technology, are the crux of the technology selection issue. As stressed earlier, it is inevitable that different criteria are emphasized differently and that trade-offs are made, but what is essential is that the emphases and trade-offs are explicit and open.
Social Participation in Technology Selection Even this explicitness and openness does not guarantee that the most environmentally sound and appropriate technology has been selected, for that is a matter that only the future can judge. But, the probability of a 'correct' decision may be enhanced by ensuring the participation, in the selection process, of those directly involved in the implementation of the selected technology and of those who will be affected by its implementation. Even if this increase in probability is not achieved, the widening of participation in technology selection, particularly by the procedure of constructing, comparing and
assessing technology profiles, will certainly increase the extent of economic, social and environmental consciousness. is is likely not only among policy-makers, but also among scientists, engineers, technicians, and above all, the population at large. Technological consciousness is bound to become more broad-based and generate demands not only on those who select technologies but also those who develop them, making these two groups more accountable in terms of the criteria discussed here. e Iterative Process of Technology Selection e comparison and assessment of technology profiles is not a 'one-shot, once and for all' process. It must be dynamic in three ways. Firstly, the selection that is made at any juncture must be viewed as tentative, rather than final. It should be considered as the 'best' understanding of the possible effects of various contending technologies, rather than as the 'correct' understanding. In that sense, technology selection is part of a social process involving technology-induced change. As the results of social change manifest themselves, they can be gauged from the standpoint of development objectives. is information can then be used to modify the technology profiles, particularly the profile of the technology which was selected. e point is that information on the actual effects of an implemented technology will reveal far more clearly (than theoretical expectations) how environmentally sound and appropriate it is. If, therefore, the technology selection process is repeated, with actual, rather than expected, technology profiles, it is likely that a more realistic or assured selection can be made. Secondly, it has been stressed that the selection of technology is a heuristic device for the generation of new and/or modified technologies. is means that technology profiles will alter as a result of changes in the contending technologies. Not only the numbers corresponding to quantitative criteria, but also the colours corresponding to qualitative criteria, undergo transformations as a result of research and development. e well-known example is that of technologies with malignant
environmental effects being made benign by inputs of science and engineering—in the bar-chart representation of the profiles for these technologies, erstwhile reds can become orange or even green. e implication is that the results of the comparison of technologies will change because of R&D-induced changes in profiles.
irdly, the list of criteria proposed here are certainly not the last word. As experience with technology selection grows, and as understanding of the interplay of economic, social and environmental factors increases, it is inevitable that the list of criteria will be refined and improved. As a consequence of changes in criteria, the profiles which have been generated by these criteria will also undergo changes, necessitating new comparisons of contending technologies and fresh selections. us, the selection of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies must be an iterative process, with the iteration being compelled by: improved information on the effects of implemented technologies, and/or the continuous influx of new or modified technologies into the arena of selection, and/or the refinement and improvement of the criteria for selection. Problems of Iteration e iteration sequence can be as follows: tentative selection of technology implementation of selected technology in societystudy of impacts of technology improved criteria and/or technologies and/ or information on impacts-better selection of technology. ... Real-time iteration may well be more acceptable, but it is associated with several problems: technologies have a gestation time before they reach full effectiveness, and the larger the scale of technology, the larger the
gestation time, which means that real-time iteration may be an agonizingly long process; technologies have a momentum of their own because of the capital investments made in them. e larger these investments, the more painful and unlikely the process of withdrawing technologies, however environmentally unsound and inappropriate they may prove to be, and the stronger the tendency to live with technological 'frankensteins'; some impacts of technology require such long times to manifest themselves—e.g., environmental impacts may take decades—that, unless ingenious techniques of monitoring incipient trends are devised, it would be too late and futile to wait for real-time manifestations before taking corrective action; if the pace of technological advance is faster than the pace of the iterative selection process, then real-time iteration becomes virtually endless. If, on the other hand, the iterative selection of technologies is done on simulated models of the society, then the validity of selection depends wholly on the validity of the model. It is a moot point whether the stateof-the-art in model building justifies confidence in such an approach. ere is, however, a possibility that a simulation approach to technology selection can be combined with real-time testing of short-gestation, lowmomentum, small-scale technologies, but this may lead to built-in biases against large scale technologies. Trade-offs and the Mix of Technologies e economic, social and environmental criteria are so diverse and stringent that—as stated earlier — few technologies are likely to meet all the criteria. Further, the criteria relating to local self-reliance, human enrichment and cultural compatibility are likely to be best satisfied by technologies
associated with relatively small-scale industries and restricted productiondistribution- consumption economic cycles. At the same time, these technologies are also likely to satisfy the environmental criteria. On the other hand, many of the economic criteria will possibly be best met by the technologies associated with large-scale industries ('economies of scale') and extended production-distribution-consumption economic cycles operating at national, regional or even global levels. With this perspective, it is clear that constraints imposed externally on the selection process (e.g. of growth rates) and trade-offs between criteria will automatically result in a mix of large-scale and small-scale technologies. But, the mix itself may be more rational and optimal than that arrived at without the development-oriented criteria proposed here. Further, the dialectical link between the election and generation of technologies should lead, in some countries, to the strengthening of smallscale technologies for the local level, and in others, to an improvement of large-scale technologies for national, regional or global levels. What is excluded is any naive wholesale rejection of large-scale modern technologies or total acceptance of small-scale traditional technologies. e criteria, and therefore the technology profiles, are not only an elimination mechanism; they are also a constructive device for modifying and improving the "modern" technologies of the developed countries and the traditional technologies of developing countries, as well as for generating new technologies.
In this process, it will not be sufficient only to examine the technology with its hardware and soware components; in addition, the total social structure and process which incorporates this technology will also need scrutiny. In this sense too, the selection of technology is part of the wider development process.
METHODOLOGY OF SELECTION OF ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND AND
APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGIES Structure of Methodology
Several elements of the methodology of selection of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies have been discussed in the preceding sections. In particular, consideration has been given to the constraints on the selection process, the set of economic, social and environmental criteria, the dialectical link between the selection and generation of technologies, the construction and comparison of technology profiles, the trade-offs between criteria and the iterative character of technology selection. e inter-relationship between these elements can be displayed in a diagram (Fig. 3.4) which also reveals the organization of the elements and the structure of the selection methodology. e diagram has been drawn for the case where the decisions on constraints (such as product-mix, growth rate and centralization) are made outside the technology selection process. If, however, such divisions are within the scope of the selection process, the diagram must be amended so that the decision-making on constraints and the selection are within the same activity box.
Figure 3.4: Methodology of Selection of Environmentally Sound and Appropriate Technologies
Feed-back Loops ough the methodology diagram is self-explanatory and in fact summarizes in pictorial form the discussion of chapter 5, the feed-back loops in the methodology need some attention. one feed-back loop links the bank of available technologies to the decision-making on the constraints to be imposed on the selection process. e basis for this link is that informed decisions on product-mix, growth rate and centralization can be made only with a full knowledge of available technologies. For instance, a decision on the product-mix for sweeteners (jaggery or crystallized white sugar) must involve an awareness
of the range of technologies available for all the various sweetener products. In fact, this awareness may be far more important than an understanding of the different technologies for a particular sweetener product, e.g., crystallized white sugar. All this means that information on these technologies must flow from the bank of technologies to the decision-making apparatus—hence, the feedback loop. Another fed-back loop connects the selection process back to the decision- making on constraints. e aim here is that the constraints must reckon with the selection process, so that the constraints may be realistic and catalytic. For instance, a constraint of centralization may be externally imposed on the selection process in the belief that only centralized technologies meet objectives, but the selection process may reveal technologies which are adequately environmentally sound and appropriate despite the fact that they are small-scale decentralized technologies. Such information must obviously be fed back to the decision-making on constraints.
Problems with the Proposed Methodology e methodology proposed here for the selection of environmentally sound and appropriate technologies is substantially different from the methodologies currently in use. is very novelty may retard its acceptance. In addition, the delay may be extended for other reasons. First, even without intending to exaggerate the virtues of decentralized local technologies and the drawbacks of centralized technologies operating at higher levels, the thrust of the whole methodology is likely, in many countries, to strengthen the local level. Quite understandably and predictably, this approach may be construed as a threat by groups with vested interests in the higher levels and in current systems of technology selection. Among these groups are those engaged in centralized decision-making,
management and resource control (including the control over capital), and also perhaps those who are involved in the generation of technologies. Scientists and engineers tend to be universalistic and to search for generalized solutions. Local quirks of needs, conditions and materials are difficult to tackle from far-off laboratories and workshops because they demand intimate field experience. Central administration tends to look for nationally operated systems of resource allocation and control and nationally standardised solutions. e power of such an administration derives from glossing over local peculiarities, and its limits are exposed when grappling with grass-roots problems. Professionals find that rewards, prestige and power increase in the same measure as the centralization of the decision-making. Finally, those who control and run profit-seeking enterprises tend to promote the expansion, integration (vertical and horizontal), and centralization of these enterprises. ere is considerable convergence and harmony of interests of all these groups, not only at the national, but also at the regional and global levels. is unity of interest may operate against the local level and, therefore, against the methodology of technology selection proposed here. Second, it may be argued that the current mode of technology selection has a momentum of its own and the costs of moving to a new system are too great to warrant such a transition. ere is, it is stated, an ongoing system of technologies which is increasingly large-scale and centralized, and "the monster has to be fed"; otherwise, there will be a serious loss of output. ird, the constraint of time is frequently invoked to perpetuate current methodologies of decision-making and technology selection. ere is no time, it is argued, to search for environmentally sound and appropriate technologies, and therefore it is best to adopt technologies used elsewhere. Sometimes, the time constraint is real, i.e., there is a genuine emergency such as flood, famine, drought or disaster. But, very oen, the time constraint may only be imagined, i.e., the urgency is illusory; or it may
even be contrived, i.e., decision on technology are deliberately delayed to force a particular decision. Fourth, there is the question of imperfect information flow resulting in the selection process only looking at—or being allowed to look at—a restricted set of contending technologies. By the time the other possible technologies enter the arena of selection, there is a fait accompli type of situation in favour of current patterns of technologies. Finally, there is the fact that some technologies cater to restricted constituencies, in the sense that they benefit preferentially certain sections in society. If, therefore, the selection is in favour of technologies, which overwhelmingly benefit currently underprivileged groups, the groups in power may not always take kindly to this new distribution of the cake.
Notwithstanding these various problems, the methodology of technology selection proposed here has one important factor in its favour —it is an integral part of the development process. e criteria of environmental soundness and appropriateness have been specifically chosen for consistency with development objectives. us, the attempt to select environmentally sound and appropriate technologies is a crucial aspect of the drive for development within countries and for a New International Order between countries. Seen in this perspective, the obstacles facing the methodology of technology selection urged here are only a technological dimension of the obstacles which must be overcome to achieve development and a New International Economic Order. And to the extent that these national and international objectives are historical necessities, the new methodology of technology selection is inevitable. No claim is made that this new methodology will be precisely of the form set out in this report. on the contrary, the methodology sketched out here is far from complete. It is embryonic in form, tentative in approach and exploratory in spirit, and is primarily meant as a scheme submitted for improvement, modification and refinement. It must be seen as a further step in UNEP's work on environmentally sound and appropriate
technologies, which in turn is an expression of UNEP's commitment to the environment and to development.
4
Problems in the Generation and Diffusion of Appropriate Technologies
GENESIS AND OBJECTIVES OF ASTRA
This experiment is being undertaken by one of the oldest and most wellknown institutions of higher learning in India—the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. Founded in 1911, this Institute has a faculty of about 300, and a student body of slightly under a 1,000, of which about 400 are doing research work towards a Ph.D. degree and roughly another 350 are engaged in master's level studies, the remainder carrying out bachelor's level studies. With about twenty department of science and engineering, the Institute has, at several junctures of its history, played an innovative role in Indian education, science and technology. In 1973, a few faculty members, quite oblivious of the thinking going on abroad, arrived at some of the basic ideas of appropriate technology through their analysis of Indian science policy. Being scientists and engineers, they felt an obligation to reflect these ideas in their technical work. Further, coming as they did from various disciplines and departments, they realized the need to come together as a catalytic group based initially on a loose identity of purpose and community of spirit. e authorities of the Institute soon gave official approval to this desire, and thus ASTRA (Loosely translated, ASTRA means "weapon" in Sanskrit), and this acronym for Application of Science and Technology to
Rural Areas, came into existence on 20 August 1974. ASTRA's initial viewpoint was expressed in a statement from which the following excerpts are relevant to the present discussion. It is becoming increasingly clear from the experience of India and other developing countries that the benefits of urban industrialization, intensive agriculture and medical progress have not trickled down to the rural poor to the extent hoped for and expected. One major reason for this situation is the uncritical import and adoption of the technologies of the advanced countries.
By becoming more and more intensive with respect to capital, energy and skills, imported industrial technologies gravitate away from the countryside and towards urban centres. By emphasizing an agriculture which requires massive investments on machinery, irrigation and expensive inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.), the benefits of the green revolution accrue almost wholly to the rural rich. By diverting attention, firstly to the curative rather than the preventive aspects of medicine, and secondly, to diseases arising from affluence rather than poverty, the exploitation of medical advances does not help the rural poor in any significant measure. By concentrating on luxury goods and services which have a higher import content than goods and services for mass consumption, the technologies of the advanced countries increase the import bill of the country and cater only to an elite. By demanding raw materials which are not available locally, they increase imports and/or load the struggling transport system and thereby necessitate dependence on fossil fuels. By originating largely from the interests of private enterprise, these foreign technologies are inimical to the rational utilization of public resources such as soils, waters, grasslands and forests; the result is a steady loss and degradation of these resources. By consuming non-renewable materials, they squander away precious natural resources. By
purchasing an ever-increasing scale of production, these imported technologies become critically dependent on a supply of raw materials, energy and skills too large to sustain with ease under Indian conditions—the result is long gestation times and under-utilization of industrial capacity. Above all, by emphasizing the saving of labour, they accentuate the already-acute problem of unemployment. us, given this country's resources (including manpower), an indiscriminate adoption of the technology of advanced countries results in rural impoverishment, balance-of-payments difficulties, crises of raw materials, energy and skills, under-utilization of industrial capacity, growing income inequalities, large-scale migration to cities and mass unemployment. It is imperative therefore to consider a totally different approach to development in which the starting point is the following set of facts: 1. four-fifths of India's population lives in the villages 2. three-fihs of the population has a per capita expenditure of less than one rupee per day 3. about 20 millions are unemployed and 100 millions are underemployed. is starting point suggests that a valid development strategy should be based, not wholly on the technologies of the advanced countries, but on alternative technologies that facilitate low capital investment, employment generation in rural areas, dispersal of miniproduction units to the villages and production of inexpensive goods and services of the mass consumption variety. Only such alternative technologies can lead to reduced inequalities through the poorest sections of society having more to spend by virtue of greater employment and at the same time having access to inexpensive essential goods and services which can be bought with the greater
earnings. us, alternative technologies are technologies that are directly in the interests of the unemployed or under-employed rural poor. Despite the vital necessity of developing these alternative technologies, it is unfortunate that the challenge has not been taken up by more than a few institutions. ese few institutions may be committed, and commitment is, of course, a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. Competence too is required, particularly because alternative technologies cannot be—as they oen are—confused with primitive technologies. In fact, alternative technologies can be quite advanced in that they may require sophisticated scientific and engineering thinking. Only major scientific institutions possess the multi-disciplinary competence which is oen necessary to tackle the task of developing alternative technologies. Unfortunately, however, not a single institute of advanced study has interested itself in the challenge, perhaps because their criteria of excellence are derived from alien soils or because alternative technologies are not viewed as glamorous enough to merit attention. At the same time, these institutions have been engaged in a desperate quest for relevance, but this relevance has been almost universally interpreted to mean relevance to large-scale industry and urban problems. e possibility of relevance to rural problems has been scarcely considered. It is amidst the above background that the Indian Institute of Science has created ASTRA. What is being attempted is not a change in the techniques, methodologies and quality of the current programmes of the Institute, but the definition of a new visa with regard to the ultimate endproducts of these efforts. (us, the techniques used for the design of
aeroplane wings can equally well serve, the development of low-cost windmills, in researches in bacterial fermentation in the chemical engineering of reactors and the scientific design of bio-gas plants). e new perspective is such that the present total neglect of rural problems will be transformed into a partial emphasis on work relevant to the needs of the rural poor. e objectives of ASTRA are that it should serve as an agency for increasing the Institute's awareness of the rural situation; and play a key role in correcting the present urban bias in the educational, research and development programmes of the Institute so that a significant fraction of these programmes acquire a rural orientation. In order to achieve these objectives, it is envisaged that ASTRA will, in the first phase of activity: 1. catalyse the development/testing of village-oriented technologies on the Institute campus; 2. establish an extension centre in a village near Bangalore; 3. transfer developed/tested technologies either to the village through the extension centre or to other rural development agencies. e main emphasis in this initial phase is on the Institute educating itself about rural reality, particularly about age-old techniques, empirical knowledge, the problems of those below the poverty line and their response to technologies developed in urban settings. e necessity for this educational phase cannot be overstressed. e standard approach of western-oriented elite institutions is to assume that the needs of villages and of the rural poor can be met with cheaper and cruder versions of imported urban technologies. Not only does such an approach inevitably end up with capital-intensive and
labour-saving technologies, but it accentuates the debilitating dependence of the villages upon the cities and does damage to the fabric of village life. A more appropriate approach is to start with a scientific study of traditional life and technologies and generate qualitative changes with minor alterations and improvements. is presumes, however, a depth of understanding of villages and their poorer sections that can only be acquired by a process of education in the countryside.
PRELIMINARY WORK OF ASTRA In its first year of operation, ASTRA sought to stimulate the interest of faculty and students in rural problems by holding seminars and discussions on a wide variety of subjects such as bullock-carts, bicycles, rural schools, solar energy, bio-gas plants, rural housing, hand-pumps for drinking-water wells, monsoon prediction and agricultural planning algae as food, fuel and fertilizer, and small-scale manufacture of cement and paper. ese seminars attracted unprecedented interest on the campus, as a result of which work on about twelve projects was initiated during the first year. is work involving over 25 faculty members is at present focussed on windmills, hand-pumps, bullock-carts, bicycles, rural housing, low-cost teaching materials, bio-gas plants, small-scale lime pozzolana cement plants, sodium silicate from rice husk, solar air-conditioning, fluidyne engines and Humphrey pumps. Very few such motivational seminars were held during the second year, but the momentum of project generation continued with the result that about 33 faculty members, 15 project assistants and 21 students were working on about thirty-five projects. ese projects included many which were started during the first year (but, not all of them, because a few petered out for lack of manning); in addition, many new projects were
started including field studies of rural energy consumption patterns, silkworm studies, heat pipes, bio-gas melting furnaces, ferrocement roofing, edible cellulose from rice husk, rammed earth construction and soilcement blocks. To choose a suitable location for the proposed extension centre, faculty members in groups of three to five members have made fieen trips during the first year of ASTRA's existence to about 25 villages in the vicinity of Bangalore. Based on these visits, it was decided that the extension centre should be located in Ungra village (Kunigal Taluk, Tumkur District) about 115 km from Bangalore on the banks of the Shimsha river. e area holds out possibilities of work on small-scale sugar and jaggery plants, bagasse- based hand-made paper, castor-oil based plastics, rice-husk and rice-bran oil products, activated carbon from coconut shells, glass from river sand, cement plants from local limestone, silkworm rearing, etc. In addition, there are weavers, potters, black-smiths, bullock-cartwrights and brass workers in the region. e Government of Karnataka has leased about 50 acres of unused land on the periphery of Ungra village so that the Institute can establish its extension centre. The following work is in progress at the Ungra Extension Centre: 1. a techno-economic and energy-consumption pattern survey of Ungra and the surrounding villages is being carried out in order to define the technologies appropriate for development in the area, 2. a master-plan for the extension centre campus and plans for the individual low-cost buildings has been finalized, and construction will begin shortly, and 3. a study of Ungra village viewed as an ecosystem.
ASTRA'S RESPONSE TO BASIC NEEDS IN RURAL AREAS
ough it is to early to assess the whole experiment, it is useful to attempt some evaluations. At the outset, there should be an evaluation of whether the desired change is occurring in the filter which makes Institute faculty ignore some social wants and treat others as demands upon their scientific and engineering capability. In particular, despite the large measure of freedom to choose problems, the faculty of the Institute, as of most other institutions of higher learning in India, have hitherto ignored rural problems. In other words, the filter, has thus far rejected rural problems, and transmitted urban and large-scale industrial problems, and of course the problems fashionable in the advanced countries. Is this operation of the filter changing? e first major objective in the initial phase of ASTRA's work was to become aware of developmental problems in rural areas. e two subobjectives were: 1. to become aware of problems relevant to rural areas, and particularly to the rural poor, and 2. to formulate the technical component of these problems as technical problems worthy of R&D. With regard to the first sub-objective, there has been reasonable success, especially in the case of those faculty members who have been able to make a number of visits to villages. The rapidity with which trained scientists and engineers can become aware of the essential technical problems has been very encouraging. In so far as these faculty members have acted as liaison with the rural countryside, the diffusion of their awareness throughout the Institute has depended upon their ability as communicators and proselytizers, and upon the interest and receptivity of those other faculty and students who have not been able to visit the rural areas for logistical and other reasons. is diffusion has met with partial
success—the seminars have played a major role in this process—but it is obvious that awareness is not easy to come by through "second-hand" experience. At least the logistical problem of enabling faculty and students to see things at "first hand" has to be overcome. e establishment of the campus in Ungra village will obviously be a great help in this matter. e formulation of technical problems relevant to rural development, i.e., the identification of technologies that need to be generated, has been a commendable success. In fact, the actual number of ASTRA projects is far, far less than the number of new problems continuously being posed. What is not certain is whether the solutions to these technical problems, i.e., the technologies generated, will actually advance rural development and reduce income inequalities. is will depend on whether the technologies are intrinsically appropriate for development and whether they can and will be deployed and diffused. It appears, therefore, that the problem of increasing awareness of rural reality has been overcome to some extent. e factors which have facilitated this limited success are the support of the Institute authorities for ASTRA's efforts—the Council of the Institute has commended ASTRA's work, a reasonable budget has been allocated to ASTRA, and the Institute has backed the Extension Centre experiment by taking on lease the land in Ungra village; as well as the existence of a small group of highly qualified scientists and engineers interested enough to explore rural areas. e factors which have diminished the extent of success are: the logistical problems in moving faculty and students to make visits to the countryside; and to a smaller extent, the cynicism and apathy on the part of some faculty and students towards the ASTRA experiment—the "whychange-our-work- routine?" and "it-won't work" attitudes, and the rejection of its underlying philosophy by some others—"there is no point wasting effort on reshaping the instrument of technology when the sociopolitical will to use technology for development ends is weak". But awareness of needs is only one aspect of the problem; an equally
vital aspect is sufficient commitment to work on the problems which have been identified—the second major objective in ASTRA's initial phase. e initiation of about three dozen projects within two years constitutes a definite achievement. e fact that a few scientists of international standing have made the commitment and that ASTRA's activitists have not been dismissed as crackpots underlines the achievement. It is not certain, however, whether the achievement is a result of the zeal of ASTRA's activists, or of the first wave of enthusiasm for a new concept of the Institute's mission, or of attraction to a project supported by the Institute leadership.
But, commitment as an institutional or group characteristic is a dynamic phenomenon—it either grows or decays. us, the initial commitment expressed through active participation in projects is promising, but cannot be taken for granted and cannot guarantee sustainability and growth. is commitment can be seriously affected by both personal and institutional factors. The factors which will promote an increased commitment include: 1. institute recognition, through the concrete mechanisms of funding and new criteria for faculty assessment, to R&D work on what are elsewhere considered as banal, insignificant and trivial problems (A separate budget has been allocated for ASTRA, and it has been asked to prepare a working paper on the assessment of faculty engaged in ASTRA projects); 2. the availability of adequate funds for R&D, despite the fact that appropriate technology generation requires about an order-ofmagnitude less funds than western technology (us far, ASTRA has obtained as much funds as it can cope with, and in addition, has taken the view that funds from international agencies are unnecessary, even when offered); 3. the achievement of major successes in at least a few of these projects
(e projects on hand-pumps and wind-mills appear to have achieved breakthroughs, and the studies on rural energy consumption patterns and alternative energy sources, particularly biogas, have attracted international attention); 4. extra-institutional acclaim from the government and other institutions, and/or the people (ere has been an enormous amount of interest, as indicated by the large number of enquiries and visitors, but interest does not necessarily mean acclaim); 5. the development of a new comraderie and ethos characteristic of new movements (Few other interdisciplinary, interdepartmental programmes in the Institute have succeeded in forming as many friendships and personal bonds); 6. a growing conviction of the social responsibility of scientists (Such a growth of conviction will probably require the work of ASTRA to be part of a wider mission of socio-economic transformation); 7. the realization that in problems relevant to the neighbourhood it is local scientists and engineers who enjoy an incomparably greater advantage over their foreign counterparts in the matter of intimacy with the subtleties of the problems and with the feasibility and acceptability of the solutions (is realization is slowly forming, thanks to the growing numbers of foreign visitors anxious to know about ASTRA's work); and 8. the growth of a new international and national community of scientists and engineers committed to appropriate technology (Such a community is forming quite fast). On the other hand, the factors which will militate against increased commitment to appropriate technologies are: 1. the emergence of a political hostility to development objectives, and to the technologies appropriate for achieving these objectives;
2. persistence, on the part of the Institute, with traditional criteria for assessment of scientists and engineers, e.g., number of papers in foreign journals, work in so-called "frontier areas", etc.; 3. fear that the career and employment prospects of faculty and students will be jeopardised by not working on problems relevant to large-scale industry; 4. reluctance to deviate from the comfortable cocoon of problems which, irrelevant to basic needs and development, have been the central preoccupation hitherto and the main object of considerable intellectual investment bringing kudos, publications, invitations to international conferences, etc.; 5. fear of facing the cruel test of practice—"the wind-mill may not turn", or "the bio-gas plant may stink", or "the innovative roof may collapse"— in contrast to scores of erudite papers which are rarely read and still more rarely cited. 6. difficulty in gaining access to information and contacts relevant to the new technologies, and 7. refusal to cross social barriers in order to understand, emphasize and identify with the under-privileged. How the balance will be tilted by these opposing sets of factors is not easy to guess. But, the initial commitment manifested through the commencement of work on about a dozen ASTRA projects is extremely encouraging and cannot be evaluated as a failure. e two major objectives of the first phase of ASTRA's work, viz., increasing awareness of rural reality and generating a commitment to appropriate technologies, relate in the conceptual analysis 1 to the whole question of a change in the operation of the filter which generates demands upon the institution responsible for technology. e ASTRA
experience shows that, in situations similar to the one in which it worked —funds, autonomy, capability, etc.—educational, scientific and technological institutions in developing countries can operate the filter so as to respond to problems related to the basic minimum needs of the population. Since such an operation of the filter is one of the basic conditions for the generation of appropriate technologies, this part of the picture is not bleak.
ASTRA's EXPERIENCE WITH NEW GUIDELINES FOR TECHNOLOGY GENERATION Attention will now be turned to the second basic condition for the effective generation of appropriate technologies, viz., the evolution and use of a new set of guidelines and paradigms in the innovation process. e ASTRA experience in this matter is quite scanty and the results are too inadequate to draw conclusions. Nevertheless, in the absence of guidelines agreed upon between scientists, engineers, economists, sociologists and environmentalists, ASTRA has had no alternative but to go ahead and use its own loosely formulated set of ad hoc guidelines. It is this ad hoc set of paradigms which may be worth sketching. of course, it must be noted that the first round of ASTRA projects were started primarily to initiate interest on the Institute campus in topics of rural relevance. It was considered far more important to get the work started, than to wait for well-founded guidelines for technology generation to be elaborated. e chances of inappropriate technologies being transferred to the Extension Centre were considered to be small, because a process of estimating the technological impact on the village scene would intervene between technology generation on the Institute campus and their transfer to the Extension Centre.
Satisfaction of Basic Needs, Starting from the Needs of the Neediest
e 35 projects that have been started are directly relevant to basic needs in villages, and the distribution is roughly as follows:
Some comments need to be made on this distribution:
1. e distribution of projects over the basic needs is not intended to define any priorities between these needs; it only underlines the fact that the expertise in the Institute is channeled more in certain directions than in others. For instance, there is scarcely any agricultural expertise in the Institute, and the projects counted under the item—Food, really pertain to water pumping for irrigation. However, it may be possible to build up expertise in agricultural engineering, particularly aer agricultural operations start at the Extension centre in Ungra village. 2. With about 18 projects biased towards the consumption of basic needs, in contrast to about 4 projects directed towards production, and nine projects having both consumption and production implications (the rest are not easy to allocate between production and consumption), the initial bias of ASTRA appears to be towards consumption technologies. of course in the case of consumption technologies, it is relatively easier to estimate whether it is the neediest who are likely to benefit from the technologies, which are generated. Production technologies, if not carefully chosen, can aggravate income disparities in rural areas (cf. many green revolution
technologies); hence, it is necessary to avoid being blinded by the euphoria of "helping villages" into making matters worse for the rural poor by introducing production technologies which primarily benefit the rural rich.
USE OF LOCAL RESOURCES e conscious aim in all the ASTRA projects is to maximize the use of local resources, both natural and human. is is ASTRA's most clear-cut guideline for the generation of technologies appropriate for development. e guideline is being implemented, for instance, in the area of energy (locally available, non-depletable sources such as bio-gas, wind and sun), shelter (e.g., stabilized mud blocks for walls), processing of agricultural wastes (e.g., edible cellulose from rice husk).
LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE The emphasis on the use of local natural and human resources will tend to strengthen local self-reliance, but self-reliance of villages is not in itself a sufficient objective unless it leads to greater social participation and control. In other words, alongside with increased self-reliance of villages vis-àvis cities, the technologies which are introduced must not strengthen the dominance of dominant groups in villages. What impact ASTRA's work will have in this matter is too unclear to comment on at present.
REDUCTION OF INEQUALITIES ASTRA's efforts must be pronounced a failure if it aggravates inequalities in rural areas. one way of avoiding such a disastrous result is to ensure
that newly-introduced production technologies are at least associated with significant employment generation (i.e., low capital-labour ratios), if the production cannot be carried out under cooperative orpanchayat ownership. is whole issue acquires increasing significance particularly because, in the excitement of generating technologies based on locally available agricultural wastes, new avenues of profit-making may be generated for the local elite. All this means that ASTRA must give as much thought to who will benefit from production technologies as to the intricacies of the technologies. Hence, attention must be given to the whole soware package (ownership structure, credit, management, raw materials procurement, product marketing), and not only to hardware development. Thus far, ASTRA has taken few steps in this direction.
STRENGTHENING TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGIES AND CULTURE
ASTRA has started off with a low profile in the cluster of villages around the Ungra Extension Centre so that the interactions may be built on technologies, rather than on speeches and promises. So far, interactions have taken place with village wheelwrights who make and repair bullock carts and with villagers on the design of houses. Interaction will shortly take place with village carpenters on wind-mill fabrication, with village masons on construction of the Extension Centre buildings, and with village youth having acknowledged mechanical skills on hand-pump repair and maintenance. ere has been some interaction with village potters and blacksmiths, but not sufficiently enough to contribute to their traditional technologies. us, ASTRA has made some, but not significant, moves to understand and transform traditional technologies and skills.
ASTRA AND TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION AND UTILIZATION Technology is only an instrument for the development of society. If
development objectives are to be achieved, the instrument of technology, like all instruments, must be specifically chosen and designed for its intended function, i.e., it must be appropriate to the objectives. But, the will to use the instrument, and the skill to wield it effectively, does not depend so much either on the instrument (the technology) or on the fabricators of the instrument (the R&D institution) as upon the users of the instrument (society and its political, social and economic organizations). us, the generation of appropriate technology is a necessary condition for development, but not a sufficient condition. In addition, the technologies must strike root and spread, and the fruits of the technologies must reach those whose basic needs have been least satisfied. In this total development process, involving the generation-diffusionutilization of technologies, an R&D institution can only ensure the generation of appropriate technologies, but the responsibility for the diffusion and utilization of technologies should not be assumed, and cannot be successfully discharged, by an R&D institution, particularly an educational institution like the Indian Institute of Science. e diffusion of technologies requires the coordinated cooperation of a number of institutions and agencies—social institutions like panchayats and zilla parishads, administrative organs of government, development agencies, financial and credit institutions, distribution and marketing agencies, all being activated under an umbrella of political commitment and support. It is therefore naive to imagine that, in general, an educational institution can conduct this orchestration of inputs from so many and varied institutions. It is this perspective that has guided ASTRA's main emphasis on the generation of technologies appropriate for rural development. Of course, the generation and diffusion of technologies are dialectically inter-linked —the problems of technology diffusion should condition the technologies which are generated, and the characteristics of the generated technologies
should influence the detailed process of technology diffusion. Above all, the generation of technologies becomes a pointless endeavour, unless it is inspired by the vision of eventual diffusion. ASTRA has, therefore, given serious consideration to the process of diffusion of its technologies. Four main mechanisms of technology dissemination are envisaged: 1. micro-diffusion to the cluster of villages around the Ungra Extension Centre, 2. meso-diffusion through the Karnataka State Council for Science and Technology to the rural areas of Karnataka, 3. macro-diffusion through rural development organizations and agencies throughout the country and in other developing countries, and 4. long-term diffusion through the establishment of an Institute course which produces a new breed of rural development technologists. ASTRA's efforts towards the micro-diffusion of technologies in the cluster of villages around the Ungra Extension Centre are in the incipient stages. To safeguard against inappropriate technologies being transferred to the Ungra cluster, the technologies generated on the Institute campus will be screened in several ways: by consulting the local people prior, during and aer the innovation process; by scrutinizing the technologies with theoretical criteria of appropriateness, by demonstrating these technologies on the Extension Centre. It is hoped that close interaction with the people will ensure appropriateness and acceptability of these technologies. is interaction has begun in the case of hand-pumps and housing, and will be extended to other projects. e mechanism of meso-diffusion through the Karnataka State Council for Science and Technology is already in progress. A detailed description of this Council and a case-study of an ASTRA-KSCST interaction is given
in other papers by the authors. e macro-diffusion of technologies through rural development organizations and agencies must be based on effective communication of experiences and know-how. is communication may involve several channels—publications, visits, exchange of personnel, seminars and conferences. All these channels are planned to be established, but it is too soon to say how effective ASTRA will be as a technology generation group to assist organizations and agencies more pre-occupied with technology diffusion and utilization.
From a long-term point of view, the most significant way in which an educational institution can contribute to the diffusion of developmentoriented technologies is by training technologists who can be absorbed in the rural development agencies and advance the diffusion processes. With this in view, ASTRA is planning on a course on "Technology for Rural Development" to be run by the Institute in a couple of years. e expertise to give such a course must grow in an organic fashion, and this growth does not depend upon reading books, but on the real-life experience with ASTRA's projects on the campus and in the villages. e sequence which will be adopted is as follows: R&D → diffusion of technologies → growth of expertise → short-term courses → syllabus for 2-year course → 2-year course. When the products of such courses enter the development agencies, and begin to organize the diffusion of technologies, the real multiplier effect of education will be observed. e above discussion only serves to underline the fact that it is far too early to make a definitive judgement on ASTRA's contribution to the diffusion of technologies.
5
Lessons from ASTRA's Experience of Technologies for Rural Development
A
personal introduction: aer almost two decades in the field of electrochemistry, I felt that, like most of the work in advanced institutions of education, science and technology, my own work was largely irrelevant to India's poor, the majority of whom live in the villages. I also felt that I should reorient my efforts towards technologies for rural development. Such a viewpoint found sympathy from many other colleagues at the Indian Institute of Science. is shared vision led to the formulating and implementation of the ASTRA programme in 1974 through which it was hoped that the application of science and technology would be a weapon (or asthra in Sanskrit) in the interests of the poor. However, the attempt at working in rural areas quickly revealed my serious shortcomings. I was born and raised in a city and therefore knew virtually nothing about life in villages; I had received a western type of education and therefore found it difficult to understand traditional attitudes and approaches; from family of professionals I also came, I was a member of the elite, and therefore found it very difficult to see the world through the eyes of the poor. All this meant that I had to undergo a great deal of unlearning (in addition to learning) to be able to function in rural areas. us far, my learning experience has spanned fourteen years of which the first nine were as the Convenor of ASTRA, and the remaining years have involved
its community biogas plant project at Pura village, Kunigal Taluk, Tumkur District, Karnataka. Many lessons have emerged from this experience. Since these lessons may be of some use to others wishing to make similar efforts, they are set down below.
LESSON 1
Rural people may be poor and illiterate, but they are not irrational. In fact, the poorer they are, the more their survival depends upon their rationality, i.e., upon a proper evaluation of costs and benefits. And, in the attitude to returns and risks, they invariably take the "worst case scenario" more seriously than the "best case scenario" because the former can lead to total ruin whereas the latter only means marginal improvement. For example, their choice of traditional seed varieties in preference to high-yielding varieties is oen dictated by the fact that the latter can give lower yields than the former if the inputs are not in the optimum range—as the nursery rhyme goes: "when she was good, she was very very good, but when she was bad, she was horrid."
LESSON 2 We must therefore proceed with the assumption that, given the options within the range of awareness of the people, the technological choices of the people are rational. For example, the draught animals in many parts of the country are fed well only during the ploughing season because most of their traditional year-round functions—water-liing, oil extraction, cane crushing, etc.—have been usurped by pumpsets, oil mills, cane crushers, etc. Another example is the fact that the load-bearing capacity of bullock carts is kept low because the average payload is only about 250–300 kg.
LESSON 3 We must understand rural rationality if we want our technological suggestions/ recommendations to be accepted. For example, if smoke from their wood-stoves (chulas) is essential to control termite attack on thatched roofs, then it is unlikely that smokeless stoves will be accepted unless they are accompanied by a solution to the termite problem, for instance, a termite-proof roof.
LESSON 4 We must first be students if we want to be successful teachers. Information must flow both ways—from the people to the rural technologists, and from the rural technologists to the people. There are several important steps in this information flow process. 1. Scientific study of the lives of the people: is step is crucial because most rural technologists know more about a London or New York than about villages 20 km from their institutions. Hence, there is no option other than starting from zero. 2. Identification of felt needs, rather than perceived needs. For instance, villagers are completely aware of the fact that thatched roofs leak, catch fire, are attacked by termites, harbour insects and rodents, and need constant maintenance. If asked (for instance, through a questionnaire), they may express their perceived need for a tiled or RCC roof because those are the only alternatives that they have seen and are aware of. But, their felt need is really for an improved roof that does not have the defects of thatched roofs. An understanding of felt needs is essential therefore for working out the design criteria for improved technologies.
3. Presentation of options to the people. Before a major effort is launched on the development of new technologies, it is vital that the various technological options are presented to the people and their preferences elicited. 4. Technology selection. If the intention is ultimately to spread the technology and to ensure that it does not remain a museum piece, it is imperative that the final decision on the selection of technology is made by the people and not by the technologists. 5. Technology generation. e arduous task of R&D has to be taken up at this stage. 6. Technology testing. is important step consists of testing out the technology in the field and getting the reactions of the potential users. 7. Technology finalization. e feedback from the field is used to improve/ modify the product/process before the technology is finalized. 8. Technology Dissemination. e process of disseminating the technology has to be a multi-institutional effort involving rural users, development agencies, technologists, financial and/or credit institutions, etc.
LESSON 5 Start with the people, and end with the people! Unfortunately, it is possible for scientists and engineers to get so involved with Step 5 and 7, i.e., technology generation and technology finalization, that they forget all the other steps in which the people (who are the prospective rural users of the technology) have a crucial role to play. is process of by-passing the people is even more easy when the technology dissemination consists of simply transporting a device/equipment (for example, a photovoltaic
module or a biomass-fuelled engine-cum-generator) and installing/erecting it in a village. What these blinkered scientists and engineers disseminate may be rural technology, but it will certainly not be technology for rural development. For, there cannot be development without the involvement of people. It is wise therefore to keep on asking: "Where are the people?"
LESSON 6 Women are oen the best agents for disseminating technologies for rural development. Even where technologists work with the people, the tendency is to restrict popular involvement to the men. is gender bias is oen difficult to avoid because most scientists and engineers are men, their technologies are oen male-oriented, there are social taboos discouraging direct interactions with women, rural women do not come forward to articulate their views in the presence of their men, etc. But, with many, many technologies, once the women are seized with it, the dissemination takes off. us, once the women began to have a vested interest in the delivery of dung to the Pura community biogas plant, the operation of dung collection and delivery has been running smoothly.
LESSON 7 e steps involved in the two-way information flow of lesson 4 are quite similar to those involved in satisfying the demands of urban middle- and upper-class consumers, but the terminology is usually different. In the case of the generation and dissemination of technologies for the middle and upper- classes, the following steps are usually distinguished: Market Survey; Consumer Preferences ("the customer is always right!"); Identification of Market Demand;R&D;Test Marketing; Productionizing and manufacturing; Marketing.
LESSON 8 All this, which is considered so self-evident in the case of affluent customers, is completely ignored in the case of the poor. is bias is perhaps because the poor do not have the purchasing power to articulate their demands through the market mechanism and be rated as "consumers". But, because people are poor, we must not ignore their likes, tastes, preferences and needs. For example, Janata houses for the poorest sections tend to ignore the way in which the spaces in traditional houses are used by villagers.
LESSON 9 We must curb our market tendency to developed technologies in response to imaginary and imagined needs identified in remote and alien settings. For example, a number of "modern" designs of bullock-carts were developed with the capacity to carry 1000–2000 kg of load even though such high loads do not arise frequently in typical rural situations except, for instance, in the "catchment area" of a sugar factory.
LESSON 10 Traditional technologies are optimal solutions for the challenges of the past and therefore they must not be ignored as sources of innovation— they have evolved through a long process of the natural selection of innovations. For example, computer analysis has shown that the geometry of traditional bullock carts represents an optimum solution.
LESSON 11 ough traditional technologies were optimal solutions in the past, almost
all of them are sub-optimal and inadequate today because of changed expectations, resource availability, materials and circumstances. For instance, in the past when the country was heavily forested, teakwood may have been an optimum material for constructing the highly stressed wheels of bullock-carts, but today teak has become such a scarce material that it is a costly and therefore sub-optimal solution.
LESSON 12 On the other hand, the so-called "modern" technologies, which are only bad xerox copies of western technologies, are invariably inaccessible to the poor. For example, the poor cannot afford modern roofing technology such as reinforced cement concrete (RCC).
LESSON 13 It is therefore a Hobson's choice for the poor—on the one hand, traditional technologies are inadequate, and on the other hand, modern technologies are inaccessible. To permit the poor to escape from this dilemma, scientists and technologists must generate new options, each more effective than the traditional, and more accessible than the modern. Ideally, the options should constitute a hierarchy of technologies with upward compatibility. en, with rising incomes, the poor can climb from a cheaper less cost-effective option to a costlier more cost-effective option. only in such a situation will the people have genuine choices. us, the role of rural technologists is to be option- generators and choice-wideners. For example, in the matter of cooking fuels and stoves, rural technologists can widen the options of villagers so that they can also choose improved (smokeless and fuel-efficient) wood-stoves or biogas cooking.
LESSON 14
But, the ultimate choice of technology must be made by the people, because technology choice is too important to be le to technologists and other "experts". ese "experts" have made monumental errors even in the industrialized countries (cf. the Concorde supersonic passenger plane or the US breeder reactor). And, our countryside is littered with blunders in the choice of technology. Rural technologists, like all technologists with careers, fortunes and fame linked with technologies, have clear-cut vested interests in the technologies that they push—they are neither as unbiased nor as objective as they claim or as they are portrayed.
LESSON 15 In generating technological options, there are three approaches for technologists: 1. cheapen western technology, 2. develop ab initio an alternative technology, 3. transform traditional technology. For example, in the case of low-cost building technologies, the approach of cheapening western technologies may consist of developing fibrereinforced materials, that of ab initio alternative technologies, geodesic domes, and that of transforming traditional technologies, compacted unfired mudblocks.
LESSON 16 Even though it is a hitherto untapped source, the transformation of traditional technologies is a rich source of, and promising route for, technologies appropriate for rural development. e transformation of traditional technologies involves an understanding of the scientific basis of
traditional technologies, followed by qualitative changes achieved through marginal improvements.
LESSON 17 As a consequence of the whole process that has been outlined above, the technologies that are developed are likely to be region-specific, locationspecific and culture-specific. And, the local culture may have many surprises. is is probably why Gandhiji is reported to have advised one of the most creative architects in India, Laurie Baker, "When you design for the poor, restrict yourself to materials that are available within a radius of ten miles!"
LESSON 18 Any fool can make a thing complicated, it takes a genius to make it simple. e end-product may have to be, or may turn out to be, simple, but the thinking that goes or went into its development can be quite sophisticated. In fact, there is a desperate need for wise ideas and ingenious solutions. Rural technologies are neither trivial nor second-class because they invariably pose the extremely tough challenge of having to be "zero-cost".
LESSON 19 In the case of most rural technologies (stoves, windmills, biogas plants, wood gasifiers, etc.), there is a market difference between the first generation of unsuccessful devices (which were oen the result of the enthusiasm of unqualified amateurs) and the second generation of successful devices (which emerged from the creative efforts of qualified professionals).
LESSON 20 us, the penetration of the countryside with rural technologies involves a learning curve—in the initial part of the curve there is a very slow penetration of the potential "market", then a rapid climb, and finally a saturation. Unfortunately, most plans of development agencies forget this learning curve and prescribe linearly increasing targets.
LESSON 21 During the initial part of the learning curve, there has to be intense backand- forth interaction between the lab and the field. e feedback from users in the field must lead to modifications and improvements of the product/ process, and the modified/improved product/process needs further "test marketing" in the field. As a result of this interplay between technology generation and dissemination, and between technologists and potential consumers of the technology, the penetration of the "market" is necessarily very slow during this phase. All these points are generally ignored when technology dissemination is planned and implemented. In fact, there is a general tendency for technology generation and technology dissemination to be thought of as two distinct non-overlapping sequential stages with the generation ending when the dissemination begins, and the generators "washing their hands off" the technology dissemination process.
LESSON 22 ere are four main mechanisms for the dissemination of rural technologies involving 1. the market,
2. the top-down approach, 3. the bottom-up approach, and 4. the franchising approach. And it is very important that the appropriate mechanism is chosen. Each of these has its advantages and disadvantages. e market is an excellent allocator of resources, but it ignores three extremely important aspects: equity, the environment and the long-term. In particular, the rural poor are by and large outside the market because they do not have the requisite purchasing power to articulate their demands via the market. e top-down approach—favoured so much by bureaucracies—seems the obvious route when there is clarity at the top, but under-rate the central role of popular participation in technology selection and finalization and of the strengthening of self-reliance. e bottom-up approach starts with popular participation, but may suffer from the inadequacy of technical expertise. e franchising approach in which a centralized technology-generating-cum-development agency franchises local groups/entrepreneurs, may be able to combine the advantages of the large and the small, the public and private initiatives and the technologists and the grass-root workers.
LESSON 23 Of various technologies contending for dissemination, those technologies succeed in spreading (i.e., penetrating the "market") that simultaneously solve several problems. Charles Berg who enunciated this "theorem" illustrated by its stressing that energy-efficiency improvements were introduced into the Us steel industry during a period of declining energy prices because those improvements were accompanied by other useful characteristics. e Berg "theorem" is very relevant to rural technologies
too. us, of the various designs that have been successful (for example, the ASTRA OLE) have been those that simultaneously eliminated smoke, cut down cooking time and reduced fuel consumption.
LESSON 24 e technologist must ensure that all the objectives in a rural user's list are included in his/her design criteria. If the technology designer can achieve the simultaneous inclusion of all the consumer's objectives in the technology, then it does not matter whether the consumer's ranking of the objectives is different from the designer's ranking. is is what seems to have happened in the case of the ASTRA OLE—whereas the designer's priorities seemed to have been (1) reduction of fuel consumption, (2) smokelessness and (3) cutting down cooking time, the rural user's priorities were quite the opposite: smokelessness, cutting down cooking time and reduction of fuel consumption.
LESSON 25 If the designer cannot meet all the user's objectives simultaneously but only in stages, then it is imperative that the designer's sequence must be in the same order of the user's priorities—otherwise, the implementation may run into problems. is is what happened to ASTRA's community biogas plant at Pura—the villagers wanted the biogas to li and pipe drinking water, generate electricity for lighting homes and provide cooking fuel. But they did not stress that order of priorities, and the Astra workers did not pick up the signals—they sought to provide cooking fuel first. e villagers went along with this effort out of solidarity, but the dung availability was limited and the biogas plant had to be stopped for some time. en, the plant was restarted at the request of the villagers, but this time, drinking water was taken up as the first priority—as desired by the
villagers—and the project has taken off again.
LESSON 26 Notwithstanding any successes with the generation and dissemination of rural technologies, technology alone cannot remove poverty, redress injustices, prove a panacea and solve development problems. Technology is only a subsystem of society, and the development of society hinges, not only on technology, but also on the other crucial sub-systems. Technology is only an instrument for the development of society. Like all instruments, it must be specifically chosen and/or designed to fulfill its intended function. But the will to use the instrument, and the skill to wield it effectively, do not depend so much on the instrument as on the users of the instrument. us, technologies are a necessary condition for rural development, but not a sufficient condition. It is also essential that the political structure and the socio-economic framework are both committed to development goals. Rural technological missions will succeed only when they are part of successful societal missions. Rural technology has therefore both power and limits—it is an essential requisite for development, but it cannot be a substitute for economic, social and political change.
LESSON 27 However idealistic and romantic it may appear, it must be stressed that technologists must approach rural work with empathy and affection for the people. Otherwise, they tend to be afraid of the people and hide behind the walls of their rural centres. en, the poor tend to conclude that their poverty is being used as a resource for professional gain. Even if the people do not get something back in return from the interaction, the feelings with which technologists make efforts are extremely important in the eyes of the people. Given the right attitude, the people are far more
understanding of technical failures (which are the usual precursors of success) than the so called educated who cheer when the satellite goes into orbit and jeer when it falls into the sea. Science and technology too stand to gain from these feelings of empathy and affection. e forging of an emotional bond with the people may result in the catharsis, redemption and the resurrection of science and technology which have become so amoral, immoral and violent. At that stage, the poor shall inherit science and technology and therefore the earth.
LESSON 28
e perspective guiding rural technology is also vital. Rural technology is not merely a matter of expediency, a transitory measure and a tactical device to cope with the current predicament of the poor in the countryside. Rural technology is a path to a new society. It is an instrument for development. And development must be seen as a socioeconomic process directed primarily towards the satisfaction of basic human needs starting from the needs of the neediest particularly in the locations of development projects. In addition, development must involve the strengthening of an endogenous self-reliance based on social participation and control. Finally, if this development is to be sustainable over the long term, it must be in harmony with the environment.
6
Has the World Bank Greened?
For more than a decade, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from the industrialized and developing countries have been criticising World Bank projects for being environmentally destructive. Massive infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric dams, power plants, and coalmines have been accused for causing, not only physical destruction or disruption of ecosystems, but also social damage by forcing the resettlement of populations. Bank loans for road-building and agricultural colonization, for example, in the 1981 Polonoroeste programme in northwest Brazil, have been shown to result in several deforestation. Perhaps influenced by these criticisms, Barber Conable, the president of the World Bank, publicly acknowledged in May 1987 that the Bank had been guilty of being part of the environmental problem rather than its solution. He declared that the Bank would make amends for its environmental sins and pledged several courses of action. As a result, there was, between 1987–1990, a dramatic increase in the Bank's environmental staff, a proliferation of new environmental policies, action plans, and task forces, unprecedented increases in lending for environmental projects, and a deliberate attempt to involve environmental and grassroots NGOs in both borrowing and donor countries. Finally, there were repeated "vows to weigh the environmental effects of projects"1 e NGOs concerned with "greening" 2 issues were initially thrilled with the new direction set by Conable. However, they became more and more
disillusioned as time passed. ey began to feel that the main outcome of Conable's call was a "a proliferation of green rhetoric that hides a reality that is largely unchanged" to quote a paper entitled "e Emperor's New Clothes".3 e critics of the Bank declare, with a feeling of déjà vu, that the Bank's present attempt at environmental revolution will fail like its former President McNamara's top-down revolution in the 1970s to make the World Bank a poverty-oriented institution. e bank, however, is convinced that it has achieved a major reorientation and that it has greened. Who is right—the environmental NGOs who say that the Bank has not greened, or the new and reformed Bank, which says that it has? e question is extremely important because the outcome of the Bank's stated intentions and deliberate attempts to turn green has profound implications for the short-term and long-term fate of the global environment. is is because the Bank appears to have been chosen by the industrialized countries as the mechanism for protecting the global environment, i.e., the donors would like the world to be entrusted to the Bank.
THE BANK'S CASE e Bank has a strong case to argue that it has greened. Following Conable's pledge in 1987, the Bank took several organizational steps. Of particular importance is the creation and staffing of the Environment Department (located in the Policy, Research, and External Affairs complex) and four Environment Divisions (each one located in the Technical Department of each of the four Regional Offices). e Environment Department "is responsible for overall policy formulation, research, guidelines, staff training, and some aspects of external relations. It has also acquired responsibility for administering the Global Environment Facility (GEF). 4 e Environment Divisions are responsible for ensuring the environmental quality of Bank operations. e Bank also
claims that increasingly Country Operations Departments and other Divisions in the Technical Departments are taking responsibility for environmental issues. e Country Operations Department also 'coordinates operational activities for the GEF".5 Between 1987 and 1990, there was a tenfold increase in Bank environmental staff, but this "is but the tip of the iceberg" because of "the large number of Bank staff working entirely or partly on environmental matters ... throughout the Operations complex, in Policy Research, and External Affairs, and among Legal, Finance, and Operations Evaluation staff".6 e latest report on e World Bank and the Environment states that there were 140 higher-level and fiy-one support-level staff in the Environment Department and the four Regional Environment Divisions.7 "Overall,... some 270 staff years (regular staff plus consultants) were devoted to environment" in the fiscal year 1991 corresponding to about 6 per cent of total staff time.8
ere are many mechanisms for the Bank to systematically incorporate environmental concerns into its routine operations. Starting from 1988, the Bank has produced a series of papers on country environmental issues, which are now ready as internal documents for almost all countries. e resulting Bank strategies in borrower countries are being addressed by National Environmental Action Plans formulated on a country-by-country basis and regional analyses of specific environmental problems, such as water resource management or pollution. e Bank claims that the environment is taken into account throughout the project cycle and that it also enters into both the economic policy dialogue and the structural adjustment lending involving the Bank and member countries. A growing research effort backs all this up. Approval of the Bank's Environmental Assessment Operational Directive in October 1989 was an important milestone, providing as it does a systematic approach to environmental issues at all stages of project development. International action to combat global environmental problems has focused on initiating and
implementing the GEF and the Montreal Protocol. e Bank has also set up task forces, increased its lending for environmental programmes, and taken some steps towards involving environmental NGOs from both borrowing and donor countries. e 1992 World Development Report is entitled Development and the Environment and the bank has brought out progress reports on e World Bank and the Environment for fiscal years 1990, 1991, and 1992. e Bank took special pride in its Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) which has been described as "the most ambitious environmental programme ever conceived".9 e TFAP was produced in response to the Bank's perception that tropical deforestation was the most obvious and serious environmental crisis in developing countries. is perception is understandable because the forest clearance and submergence resulting from the Bank's agricultural colonization and power-irrigation projects constitute some of the most notorious environmental debacles of the past decade, involving massive destruction of rainforests in Brazil and Indonesia and prime forests in India. e TFAP was launched, therefore, as a global programme to conserve tropical forests. Conable committed the Bank to increasing its forestry investments (from $137 million in 1987) by 150 per cent by 1989, and in September 1989 he announced a further tripling of forestry lending through the early 1990s. us, forestry investments became $800 million annually by 1992. In September 1989 Conable claimed that one-third of the Bank's projects had significant environmental components, and there were also primarily environmental or fee-standing10 environmental protection and research loans such as a loan to Brazil which even the critics acclaim as an excellent project. Implicit in all this environmental activity is the World Bank's strategy for greening, which may be caricatured thus: Greening = Call from the
President + New Environmental Staff + Environmental Issues Papers, Action Plans, etc. + Increased Environmental Lending + NGO Involvement. Is this strategy working?
THE GREEN NGOS' CHARGE AGAINST THE BANK11 Notwithstanding all this reorientation of perspectives and thrust of environmental activity, NGO activists testified at a US Congress hearing on 24 October 1989 that the Bank was systematically violating its own environmental and social policies. For example, in the case of the Sardar Sarovar Dam project in India, they asserted that "the Bank was continuing to finance the project despite five years of non-compliance by project authorities in preparing critical environmental studies and action plans, and in the absence of a resettlement plan".12 e charge was repeated again in a full-page advertisement in the New York Times and Washington Post of 21 September 1992. e purpose of this advertisement was to warn American taxpayers that their tax dollars were financing the Bank-abetted environmental threat from the Sardar Sarovar Dam and to invite them to join a world-wide campaign to cease all funding for the World Bank if it did not reverse courts on the project. It has also been pointed out that there are "scores of ongoing and proposed World Bank ecological debacles ... that have occurred despite a tremendous increase in Bank environmental staff and proliferation of new environmental policies, action plans and task forces".13 The critics have been particularly hard14 on the TFAP, which they assert is "basically a fraud ... prepared without any significant consultation or involvement of NGOs and local communities in tropical forest countries". ey charge that the TFAP is "mainly a plan to promote traditional, export- oriented timber industry investments camouflaged by small components for environmental purposes". It was argued that the "forestry investments proposed would dramatically accelerate the rate of
deforestation through increased logging", and that the "plan seemed to blame the poor for the destruction of tropical forests while promoting investments to open large areas of pristine forests for exploitation, rebaptizing such projects as 'sustainable forestry'. Support for these charges came in February 1990 from a most unexpected quarter when Prince Charles said that the TFAP "is little more than a plan to chop down trees".15 e Bank's reply, apart from distancing itself from the TFAP in the past few years was that "deforestation would proceed uncontrolled without the project and that with the project, logging could be controlled within 'sustainable' limits".16 at is, if a "project is potentially very damaging to the environment, and if Bank participation could do much to reduce the damage but would not eliminate it entirely, the net gains from participation must be the deciding factor".17 Of course, this means that the Bank wants to play the role of an environment-destruction-mitigation agency whereas the NGOs are judging the Bank on whether it is acting as an environment- protection agency. e critics of the Bank have also been harsh on the Bank's way of dealing with the forced resettlement caused by its projects. No single Bank activity has greater immediate social impact than the physical destruction or disruption of rural ecosystems caused by large infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric dams, power plants and coal mines. e forced resettlement of populations that occurs from these projects occurs on a large scale: as of January 1990, an estimated 1.3 million people were being forcibly displaced by over 70 ongoing Bank projects, and proposed projects currently under consideration may displace another 1.3 million.18 e World Bank policy on forced resettlement was established in 1980, predating most other Bank environmental directives. It is the
most important of the Bank's environmental policies that deal with the social consequences of ecological destruction. Bank policy requires that when it finances a project that will forcibly displace populations, a resettlement and rehabilitation plan must be prepared and implemented by the borrower in a timely fashion, such that the affected population is at least put in a position where it is no worse off and preferably better off than before ... the Bank's own internal reviews found very few instances in which a population that has been resettled is economically better off than before or has even regained its previous standard of living."19 e record of the Bank has been particularly poor in the case of the Sardar Sarovar project. It has even been suggested that Conable was so unsure of the truth emerging from internal Bank sources that he created a precedent by setting up an independent review commission—the Morse Commission—which has come out with a report20 that is very damaging to the Bank's recent efforts to implement long-standing environmental policies on resettlement. e situation has led James Scheur, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Agriculture Research, Environment, and Natural Resources to remark that "the Bank has not institutionalized Barber Conable's rhetoric [or] ... demonstrated concern, [either] for the environment [or] for computing the predictable, inexorable environmental damage that these projects will cause".21
SUMMING UP OF THE CASE
Likening the situation to a court case with the NGOs as the prosecution and the Bank's spokespersons as the defence, it is clear that there are several points on which there is agreement. Prior to half a decade ago, the Bank did not have significant environmental concerns in the modern sense—it was little concerned with greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming, pollution and acid rain, deforestation, etc. However, the Bank has taken many steps to develop and implement environmental concerns, particularly in the past five years. In particular, a number of internal units have been established to catalyse the greening of the Bank. Despite these achievements, all parties, including the Bank, are agreed that "more still needs to be done". 22 e reorientation of the Bank is crucial because, despite opposition from many quarters, the Bank is bound to play an increasingly major role in environmental matters—through international initiatives such as the Global Environmental Facility and the Montreal Protocol as well as through country operations. As important as the areas of agreement, are the issues on which there is disagreement, namely, the pace and extent of the greening. Whereas the Bank thinks that its acquisition of an environmental thrust has been very rapid, critics believe that the "Bank is still essentially doing what it has always done: moving large amounts of money to ird World government agencies for capital-intensive projects or—an innovation of the 1980s—for free- market, export-oriented economic policy changes".23 ey also argue that the 'soul' of the Bank is its powerful Operations Complex and that this has not changed despite the increase in environmental staff and the brilliant papers. Consider, for example, the issue of forced resettlement caused by Bankfinanced projects, which could be avoided by environmentally less disruptive investments in energy alternatives. is possibility has in fact been identified by World Bank studies which indicate that "the new demand for electricity in Brazil and India through the year 2000 could be provided through investments in energy conservation and end-use efficiency".24 e saving of about 20,000 MW corresponds to at least ten giant dams or coal-fired plants. e NGOs charge that between 1987 and 1990 "the Bank has made theoretical commitments to increased energy efficiency and conservation investments, but the actual changes have been insignificant... in 1988 and 1989, less than 2 per cent of World Bank
energy and industry loans were for projects that included end-use efficiency as a component".25 e Bank, however, disputes these figures and declares that the actual investments in efficiency are very much higher.26 Such differences must obviously be due to definitions and methodology, but it is very unsatisfactory that even matters of fact have not been resolved between the Bank and its critics. What has become clear is that greening must be looked upon, not as an event, but as a process. If so, are the critics of the Bank being unreasonable by implicitly asking for an overnight greening event or an impossibly fast process?
A MODEL FOR THE GREENING PROCESS In this analysis of the transformation of an organization like the Bank, some insights can be gained from our understanding of the transformation of physiochemical systems from one phase to another phase, for example, the freezing of liquid water to solid ice. In such phase transformations, a necessary requirement is that the surrounding conditions warrant and sanction the transformation, for example, the temperature of the water must fall below the freezing-point of water. But, the satisfaction of this condition is not sufficient. In general, the transformation of the system is not a one-shot affair in the sense that the whole system does not transform at the same time; instead, nuclei of the new phase are born within the old phase, and if they grow, they can take over the whole system by expanding and/or coalescing. us, phase transformations are in fact not events; they take place through a nucleation and growth process. If the greening of the World Bank is a process that has a mechanism similar to the transformation of physicochemical systems, then the crucial questions are the following:
Are the surrounding conditions favourable for greening? Are there nuclei to initiate the greening? Are these nuclei growing? What are the barriers to the growth of the nuclei? Is the growth fast enough to complete the transformation in a reasonable time?
THE CONTEXT FOR GREENING e most valuable environmental lesson that has emerged over the past few decades is that the environment is too important to be le either to international institutions (including the Bank) or to national governments or to producers (industries and agribusinesses) with short-term concerns and high discount rates. Environmental concerns emerge primarily from a concerned public, and environmental protection depends upon public interest and vigilance. e single most important external pressure that led the World Bank to undertake environmental reform came from NGOs in North America, Europe, and many developing countries. NGO pressure made a crucial difference. e green movements in the North and South played a critical role in pushing the bank towards stricter Bank observance of existing environmental policies, more far-sighted Bank leadership in the formulation of debt-forgiveness strategies, greater transparency and accountability in the Bank, and greater substantive participation in the Bank's deliberations of those affected by its projects in the Third World. eir co-ordinated campaign consisted of well-publicised case studies of World Bank-financed environmental disasters, congressional and parliamentary hearings in the USA and a number of European nations, and mobilization of media coverage in the industrialized —and developing
countries. In addition, the obscure environmental and political concerns of affected, but powerless, communities in the ird World were globalized and transformed into international issues. is globalization process requires the unity of NGOs from industrialized and developing countries—demonstrated, for example, in the above- mentioned full-page advertisement in the New York Times and Washington Post on the Bank-abetted environmental threat from the Sardar Sarovar Dam in India. Fortunately, this unity is a growing force that will have to be increasingly reckoned with. But, even more the unity depends crucially on the growth and strengthening of civil rights world-wide and particularly in the developing and erstwhile communist countries. us, a democracy that encourages the free expression of the environmental concern of NGOs and permits the vigilant monitoring of the performance of international and national project implementers is a necessary condition for the greening of the Bank and for environmental protection. And this condition is being increasingly satisfied. e role of NGOs is also becoming more sophisticated and constructive; they are becoming more expert in assessing the environmental implications and impacts of projects and they are turning from mere negativism to a constructive approach of suggesting alternatives. is is understandable because there is a great deal of expertise on issues relevant to Bank projects, and only some of these experts have hired themselves out to the Bank; others are available to the NGOs. Finally, environmental degradation is no more a matter that only concerns nations or regions. Environmental impacts such as the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are of global concern so that the fate of industrialized countries is inextricably bound to what the developing countries do. is globalization of environmental concerns will ensure the establishment and strengthening of international environmental actions such as the GEF and the Montreal Protocol.
ere is another situation of profound significance. In the past, industrialized countries could collude with the elites of developing countries and their governments in environmentally unsound development patterns because the sufferers were primarily the poor of these countries. Now, the situation is different because industrialized countries will also be affected by such global environmental phenomena such as global warming. At some point, therefore, industrialized countries will have to jettison the elites and forge an alliance with the poor in developing countries. If that happens not only will the poor and the meek in developing countries inherit development but also the earth.
THE GREENING AGENTS e organizational steps, following Conable's call for greening, seeded the Bank with many nuclei to usher in its environmental transformation. e recent international environmental responsibilities have also created new environmental agents. e crucial greening agents within the Bank are the: Environment Department (located in the Policy, Research, and External Affairs (PRE) complex); Environment Divisions (each one located in the Technical Department of each of the four Regional Offices); Operations Evaluation Department which is completely independent and reports not to Bank management but to the Bank's Executive Board of Directors; Environmental staff added to the Country Operations Departments and other Divisions in the Technical Departments.
THE BARRIERS TO GREENING
With the external conditions being favourable for greening and with the creation of so many greening agents within the Bank, it may seem that a rapid greening is assured. In fact, such a conclusion would show misplaced over-confidence primarily because of the large number of factors that inhibit and impede the greening process. As in physico-chemical systems, nuclei are unstable; they either grow or decline. e question must, therefore, be asked: "Where do the pressures come from... pressing down on the World Bank to degrade its own procedures" and preventing it "from implementing reform in a meaningful way?"27 ese inhibitory factors or barriers arise from various sources: the development paradigm used by the Bank, the very nature of the Bank as an international institution, some organizational units inside the Bank, and many forces outside the Bank.
The Pseudo-development Paradigm e importance of distinguishing between genuine development from pseudo-development was stressed by Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, when he pointed out in July 1990 that pseudo-development (which he called pseudo-growth) is "growth for the privileged few, leaving the poor with nothing but empty promises" and "forced quantitative expansion, pursued through the disorderly exploitation of natural resources and the ravaging of the environment". 28 Genuine development (which he called high-quality growth) "is concerned with the poor, the weak, the vulnerable... it is growth that does not wreak havoc with the atmosphere, with the rivers, forests or oceans, or with any part of mankind's common heritage". Implicit in this statement is the recognition that most developing countries have dual societies with decision-making elites living in small islands of affluence amidst powerless masses in vast oceans of poverty. Unfortunately, it would be considered interference in internal affairs
and therefore taboo for intergovernmental organizations to probe into whether the ruling elite of a county is, in the name of development, hijacking economic growth and appropriating its fruits. It is also not protocol for such organizations to enquire whether the government of a country represents not only the elite but also its poor. e net result of these taboos is that the Bank tends to collude with the governments of developing countries with dual societies and abet environmentally destructive pseudo-development in the interests of the elite rather than genuine environmentally sound development in the interests of the poor. e resulting conflict between pseudo-development and environmental protection cannot be resolved within the framework of the pseudodevelopment paradigm, which therefore prevents the greening of the Bank. Particularly in the case of forced resettlement, "the Bank has been reluctant to pressure local governments that are unwilling to involve local populations in development planning, even when massive resettlement is planned. Instead, a top-down technocratic approach prevails in which the local peoples are treated merely as 'project-affected populations'".29 The Bank is. Caught in a double bind. e Bank has pledged to incorporate environmental with developmental concerns, but it is constrained to treat these as technical, apolitical matters. Its modus operandi is by definition only with sovereign governments and certain ministries within those governments, but the most crucial environmental challenges are political and social in nature, and call for planning and decision-making that give much more legitimacy and empowerment to nongovernmental, civil society.30 ere can also be a conflict at the global level between pseudodevelopment ecological sustainability. e Bank chose from the 1987 Brundtland Report the concept of sustainable development but has not given the same emphasis to the need to change to a less material- and
energy- intensive pattern of development as the basis of sustainability. us there can be a conflict between the expansion of export capacities required by the pseudo-development paradigm and the ecological soundness of sustainable development. In the case of forestry, for example, the desire to expand export capacities leads to talk of the sustainable logging of rainforests even though forest timber is almost always produced and logged unsustainable and must, therefore, be considered a non-renewable resource. The Intrinsic Unaccountability and Inscrutability of the Bank31 A major fundamental criticism of the Bank is that it Is not directly accountable to civil society within borrower and donor countries, or even fully to the representatives of its member nations. Moreover, the Bank heavily restricts access to information concerning details of its activities. ese practices make scrutiny of the World Bank ... which uses public monies to lend for public purposes, extremely difficult, and places serious constraints on efforts to reform... [e] official avenue of accountability. . . lies with the board of executive directors ...[but the Bank's charter] is ambiguous on the exact status of the directors [who] ... approve every loan and every policy change ... But the Bank withholds from the executive board access to most of the documents produced by Bank staff in the identification and preparation of projects. . .[which means that] the principal recourse for detailed information on projects are oral briefings by Bank staff. Worse still, If there is a relative lack of Bank accountability to its directors, there is an almost total absence of accountability to the people affected by its projects and to the public in member countries. [And] '— without access to information on Bank projects, meaningful involvement and
participation is impossible ... If the Bank is to be a democratic institution committed to greater involvement of local people in development planning, it cannot continue to bar the people from access to basic project information. In defence of its lack of transparency and accountability, the Bank argues that public access to information undermines its negotiating relations with borrowing governments who are their sole clients.
Internal Barriers Since power in the Bank flows from the authority to identify and prepare loans, the Operations Complex has always been more powerful than the Policy, Planning and Research Divisions. e Bank's critics argue that, along with the 1987 environmental reforms, a larger Bank-wide reorganization took place in which the Operations Staff (the Country Directors and Project Officers) were granted greater autonomy and authority. us, the Operations Complex has even more power and scope to ignore and prevent the growth of the environmental thinking and greening influence of the Policy, Planning, and Research Divisions. e brilliant policy, planning, and research papers and analysis are of no avail if they are not implemented by operations. ough the Operations Evaluation Department has the requisite independence and is not subordinate to the Bank management, its evaluation and recommendations do not guide subsequent practices of the Operations Departments and provide the organizational learning for the Bank. e country strategy papers and economic memoranda—the critical economic documents that set the outlines for Bank country lending—need not reflect papers on environmental issues for borrowing countries and their environmental action plans. is bias is facilitated by the fact that the Bank's charter "stipulates that officers and staff are to base their decisions
and actions exclusively on economic considerations". e critics state that "the exclusion of substantive environmental analysis in its most important economic planning exercises, such as country strategy papers, bodes ill for practical attempts to incorporate environmental concerns into such lending in any systematic way. In 1989, only five of the Bank's forty-five adjustment loans explicitly addressed environmental concerns".32 ese numbers cited by the critics are, however, misleading because the picture is rapidly changing and in 1990, forty out of 117 projects had explicit environmental components.33 GEF projects are designed to help developing countries and Eastern European countries to implement projects with global environmental benefits. These projects involve the Operations Complex in two ways: 1. Aer the Bank's GEF staff design the project and get it approved, the implementation is carried out by the Operations staff. 2. If the Bank's co-finances the project, then its Operations Complex has a major role in the project. In either case, there is scope for the environmental concerns of the GEF staff to be thwarted by the Operations staff. From being a catalyst for change in the Bank, its GEF unit may be frustrated. However, there seems to be evidence thus for for the GEF, being a greening agent inside the Bank.34 e senior management of the Bank did not initiate the greening of the Bank. Neither did all of them become greens when the greening process was started by Conable. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Bank's senior management oen rejects the recommendations of its environmental staff. It was also decided—according to the critics—not to include papers on environmental issues in country strategy papers thus making environmental concerns largely cosmetic. "Bank staff advance their careers by building up large loan portfolios
and keeping them moving, not by slowing down the project pipeline to ensure environmental and social quality," the critics assert.35 Consequently and understandably, there is an intrinsic bias towards, for instance, large energy infrastructure projects because efficiency and conservation loans are harder to prepare and move less money. From a greening point of view, therefore, the Bank has not got its incentives right for its staff. Another pressure to lend money for large projects is the tendency of large bureaucracies to measure their success in terms of their own growth and expansion. For the same reason, vested interests and government bureaucracies in borrowing countries prefer big dam projects. ere is also the additional reason in corrupt societies that larger projects mean larger commissions. e intensity of the contradiction between moving money rapidly and ensuring environmental quality of projects is proportional to the amount of money, and will intensify as the Bank gets more money to lend.
External Barriers e ird World debt crisis of the 1980s led to the search for solutions. Two major options for tackling the crisis turned up. e first option of debt- for-nature swaps involves forgiving large portions of private commercial debt and using debt-relief programmes as a mechanism of environmental protection. is could be done by ensuring that some portion of the domestic funds committed to debt repayment and servicing would be invested on environmental protection. e second option required structural adjustment lending along with the imposition of conditions that would increase a country's ability, at least in the short term, to meet its debt-servicing obligations, if necessary at the expense of the environment. Perhaps to rescue their commercial banks which had lent heavily to ird World countries, the major donors, especially the United States,
promoted the second option and pressured the Bank to lend more money to heavily indebted countries and temporarily resolve the debt crisis. e net result of this convergence of interests between the Bank and the donor countries, particularly the United States, has been to exacerbate the Bank's tendency to ignore the environmental consequences of its lending. In fact, many of the conditions attached to structural adjustment loans—such as the reduction of domestic expenditures, currency devaluation, and the increase of exports— invariably have a negative impact on the environment. ey encourage governments to cut down domestic conservation investment and exploit resources unsustainably to increase exports. us, the so-called environment- development conflict is really a conflict between environmental protection and short-sighted, highdiscount, rate-based economics. Barriers to the greening of the Bank have also been raised by the borrowing nations. In particular, they object to the Bank's environmental conditionalities as an added cost and an imposition of industrialized country priorities.
ough the governments of many of these countries have dismal records in the matter of poverty reduction within their own countries, they argue with the Bank that environmental conditionalities are an obstacle to poverty reduction. e most vehement opponents of environmental conditionality among the bigger borrowing nations also have highly stratified societies in which there is little concern for those who suffer from the impacts of development projects. So when the spokespersons of these governments ask for protection of the environment without penalising development,36 it is not clear: development for whom? For their elites? Or for their masses below the poverty line? Even though the poor of the dual societies of most developing countries "suffer a disproportionate share of the adverse effects of large projects and enjoy few of the benefits," 37 the governments of these countries rarely articulate the demands of the poor. Why then are these elitist governments able to secure the collusion of the
Bank in environmentally disastrous projects? Perhaps because the Bank's objective of moving money might be frustrated if it is too strict about environmental policies. On the other hand, Bank support plays a crucial role in legitimizing environmental destruction in the case of projects such as Sardar Sarovar "that might otherwise have died a natural death from divided domestic support and insufficient foreign funding".38 e rural and forest areas of the ird World are invariably viewed by their governments as "consisting of relatively 'empty' and 'undeveloped' expanses of space awaiting planning, inputs, and infrastructure from the outside".39 In fact, the spaces are invariably populated by people with centuries-long records of sustainable management of natural resources. With 'modernization', however, these traditional people are marginalized by their fellow countrymen, who then degrade the environment and destroy its natural resources. e marginalized people are oen tribal minorities who feel increasingly dispossessed and powerless vis-a-vis a development model that is capital-intensive, export-oriented, and favours urban and rural elites. ese elites and their governments turn a deaf ear to the experiences and protests of the victims of environmentally unsound pseudo-development. Unfortunately, this deafness is passed on and readily acquired by international institutions. In this process, the Bank deprives itself of insights into the negative environmental impacts of Bankassisted projects and into the possibilities of sustainable development that could be provided by environmentally affected communities. The greening influence of these communities has been inhibited.
Accelerating the Greening Process 1. Accelerating the shi to a genuine development paradigm. ere is sufficient understanding, both inside and outside the Bank, of how genuine development differs from a pseudo-development in which the poor are ignored and the environment is destroyed. It is the
percolation of this understanding into the Bank's projects that is the crux of the issue. A possible internal mechanism to facilitate the percolation process is to arrive at and use a set of sustainabledevelopment criteria for the identification of Bank projects. And of course an external mechanism is to encourage, listen to, and learn from the views of NGOs, particularly those from the developing countries representing communities affected by actual or potential projects. 2. Making the Bank more accountable and transparent. If there is ambiguity regarding the accountability of the Bank and its staff, this ambiguity should be removed, for instance by clarifying the status of the Executive Directors of the Bank as constituting a body to which the Bank is responsible and accountable. Of course, this accountability becomes meaningful only when the Executive Directors have complete access to information. e situation has to be analogous to a democratic system of government in which officials have to report to ministers, who then have a right to complete information on the work that the officials are doing and propose to be doing. Accountability becomes reasonable only when the activities have benchmarks and targets that are decided before the activities commence. It is to be expected that the Bank will resent any benchmarks and targets so that the Bank is responsible (at least partly), for example, for the achievements of a structural adjustment programme. Nevertheless, such benchmarks and targets are crucial. 3. Empowering the Operations Evaluation Department. e Operations Evaluation Department (OED) is well positioned to carry out postproject evaluation of Bank projects and report on their environmental impacts. But mechanisms must be established to mandatorily incorporate various stages of Bank projects such of those recommendations of OED as are approved by the Executive Directors.
4. Reconciling country strategy papers with environmental action plans. To accelerate the greening process, it must become mandatory for the Operations Complex to integrate the environmental dimensions of the issue papers into the economic memoranda and even more important to incorporate the environmental action plans into the country strategy papers. 5. Reconciling bank projects with GEF projects. GEF projects have been identified taking into account the environmental criteria of GEF, but the associated Bank projects are not identified with the same criteria. It is hoped that the criteria used by the Bank are at least development (as distinct from pseudo-developmental!), if not environmental, criteria. It is important, therefore, to change the criteria used in the Bank projects so that the GEF component greens the Bank component instead of the Bank component corrupting the GEF component. 6. Subordinating rapid movement of money to improvement of environmental quality of projects. To be an agency of sustainable development, the Bank must emphasize project quality rather than rapid disbursement of money. is requires a radical change in the incentives for Bank staff so that they are motivated to promote environmentally sound development projects rather than move money rapidly. And the donor countries must unambiguously support such a change. 7. Debt-for-nature-cum-development solutions to the debtenvironment crises. Instead of the structural adjustment loans that quite oen push debt- ridden countries into environmentally destructive courses of action, there should be debt-for-nature-cumdevelopment solutions that force these countries to divert funds into investments that promote environmental protection along with genuine development. 8. Empowering environmentally affected communities. Underlying the
global environmental crisis are a very large number of local ecological crises. And in most of these local crises, there is a community of indigenous people that is affected by the fate of its ecosystem and has a social, economic, or political interest in the conservation of the ecosystem and its natural resource. Oen this community knows best how to manage those natural resources in a sustainable way. e empowerment of community organizations of all kinds that have a vested interest in the conservation of the world's increasingly threatened systems is of paramount importance to the greening of the Bank. e success of this empowerment depends upon the ability of the local green movement to link its ecological, social, and economic concerns to international environmental issues.
CONCLUSION It is abundantly clear that the greening of the Bank cannot be an event that can be described thus: Conable said "Let the Bank be green!" and the Bank became green. Greening has to be a process similar to the phase transformation of a physico-chemical system. e overall conditions are favourable and there are sufficient nuclei to initiate the greening process. It also appears that the nuclei are growing and that they will eventually take over the whole system. But there are a number of factors that are inhibiting the growth of these nuclei—that is the bad news. However, there are steps that can eliminate or reduce the barriers to the greening process. If these steps are implemented, the greening process can be accelerated—that is the good news.
II On Energy
7
Development, Energy and the Environment in India: Some Critical Issues
There is a growing conflict in India between the lobbies of economic growth and the movements of environmental protection to determine which should guide the fate of the country. Nowhere has this conflict been sharper than over the Narmada River Development Project. e conflict is like a legal battle between two parents for the custody of the child—the father representing promoters of economic growth and the mother, environmental protectionists, and the child, India. e people of India are the jury and the future is the judge. In this conflict, energy is considered by the growth-promoting father (GPF) as an indispensable ally and by the environment-protecting mother (EPM) as a pernicious enemy. The arguments proceed as follows: EPM: All over the world, the growth of energy consumption is leading to rapidly increasing environmental degradation. e local and regional habitats are being ruined by urban atmosphere pollution and/or acid rain. And, the accumulation to greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has raised the spectre of global warming and an uninhabitable earth.' GPF: Don't lay the blame for the increase in greenhouse gases on developing countries like India. is increase was caused
predominantly by the industrialized countries through their voracious appetite for fossil fuels to generate electricity and run their vehicles. Even today, they are responsible for 58 per cent of the annual carbondioxide emissions.1 EPM: at is true, but even if the industrialized countries stabilize their emissions, India and other developing countries will—if they pursue present patterns of energy consumption—produce significant increases in the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, and possibly, disastrous changes in the global climate. GPF: All this talk of global warming is only a tactic of the industrialized countries to divert us from our mission of development. e fact is that India is only a minor contributor to the global phenomenon of changes in the atmosphere—it accounts for only about 2.5 per cent of the total annual carbondioxide emissions into the atmosphere. 2 And acid rain is largely a North American and Western problem. e environmental degradation brought about by energy projects in India is negligible and not worth worrying about. EPM: Not so! Our hydroelectric projects have been responsible for the submergence of prime forests, the displacement of people from the submerged areas, their resettlement aer deforestation in the catchment areas of reservoirs and the resulting soil erosion. In Karnataka, for instance, 42 per cent of the 203,913 hectares of prime forest lost between 1956 and 1984 has been due to power and irrigation projects.3 As for coal-mining, it devastates the countryside. And anyone who lives near coal-based thermal power plants knows about the tremendous atmospheric pollution that they produce. GPF: If there is to be progress, we cannot avoid altogether the environmental consequences of energy consumption. Aer all,
development requires economic growth, which in turn depends upon the consumption of energy. India requires massive increases in the consumption of energy in order to promote development and ensure progress. EPM: Please do not equate development with growth (in the volume of goods and services). Whether socio-economic change is to be deemed as development or not depends upon what goods and services constitute the growth and which sections of society benefit from these goods and services. Mere economic growth that does not result in the satisfaction of basic human needs (starting with the needs of the neediest!) is only a mockery of development. GPF: But, you must admit that the standard of living in a country depends upon its per capita energy consumption (PCEC), which becomes, therefore, an index of development. People like you who oppose major increases in energy consumption are in fact preventing improvements in the standard of living.
EPM: Your view, which is indeed conventional 'wisdom', is being challenged more and more4 because it treats energy as an end in itself. In fact, what people need is not kilowatt hours, tones of coal and barrels of oil but illumination, warmth, transportation, etc. Energy is only a means to the end of providing services, performing useful tasks and satisfying human needs. Hence, the true measure of development is the level of energy services (the amount of light, heat, motive power, etc.) and the distribution of energy services (which determines who are the beneficiaries of energy). In order to advance development, the level of services must be increased and the poor must be the principal beneficiaries of energy supplies.5 For, it is this level of energy services that determines the quality of life and the distribution of services that reveals whether basic needs, starting from the needs of the neediest, are being satisfied.
GPF: All that is obvious! e point is, how can the level of energy services be increased without increasing the consumption of energy? EPM: Energy services are provided by end-use devices (stoves, furnaces, lamps, motors, engines, etc.). e level of energy services depends, not only upon the magnitude of energy supplied to end-use devices, but also upon the efficiency with which the devices convert these inputs into useful energy. Hence, increases in the level of energy services can also be achieved with efficiency improvements. We can get twice the illumination with half the consumption of electricity by switching from one inefficient 60 watt incandescent bulb to two efficient 15 watt compact fluorescent lamps. Judge: Are you suggesting that no further increases in energy consumption are necessary in India? EPM: No! What is being suggested is that if opportunities for efficiency improvements are systematically identified and exploited, the magnitude of energy demand can come down very sharply. In that situation, energy supplies need not become a constraint on growth 6 and many of the grandiose centralized energy supply projects become unnecessary.7 As Gandhi said: 'e world has enough for every man's need, but not enough for everyone's greed!' GPF: Even if energy conservation can achieve a great deal in the present context, India's growing population will compel rapid increases of supplies. EPM: Supply increases cannot be avoided, but they can be minimized! It has been recently estimated 8 that even if India targeted for a level of energy services or activities corresponding to Western Europe in the 1970s (not that such a target is necessarily desirable!), and if the country used for all the activities the most
energy-efficient technologies that are commercial today or near commercialization, the PCEC would only have to be some three times greater than it was (including biomass energy) in 1978. Hence, efficiency improvements are the silver lining; they radically improve the prospects of achieving significantly higher standards of living in the country. ey may also lead to lower population growth rates since these growth rates are generally believed to be reduced by improvements in the standard of living. GPF: Your arguments may well be valid for the industrialized countries where the PCEC is so high that there is tremendous scope for energy conservation. But, the situation is totally different in a poor country like India where the PCEC is so low that there is little room for energy conservation. EPM: You are making the common mistake of confusing conservation with a decreased satisfaction of basic needs and a reduction of the energy services to provide these needs, but the real thrust of conservation should be towards efficiency improvements. And, the fact is that energy is used very inefficiently in all sectors of the country's economy. Indian industry is largely based on energy-inefficient designs/equipment imported from industrialized countries during the era of cheap energy. us, there are tremendous opportunities for energy efficiency improvements.
GPF: You are misleading us. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the industrialized countries reduced their rate of growth of energy consumption by moving away from energy-intensive industries. But, our country cannot make these structural shis because it has to industrialize. So, India cannot reduce energy consumption in the same way as the industrialized countries. EPM: at is true, but, fortunately, India need not find it as difficult to
modernize as the industrialized countries because its stocks of equipment are not as enormous. Hence, we can exploit new technologies that permit dramatic improvements in industrial energy efficiencies much more easily. us, the industrial sector in India is an ideal environment for technological leap-frogging to an energy efficient future. GPF: at may be, but what can be done about the biomass energy sources (fuelwood, agricultural residues and animal wastes) that account for a large fraction of the energy consumption in India? EPM: Most of this biomass is used in the residential sector for cooking in traditional ways at very low efficiencies. By moving to efficient sources/devices for cooking, the country can release enormous amounts of biomass to establish a major base for renewable energy sources (biogas, producer gas, ethanol and methanol). Modern biomass-based devices such as gasifiers and gas turbines can then play a major role. GPF: You admit that a given level of energy services can be achieved without changing the present stock of energy-utilizing devices— however inefficient it may be—by increasing the input of energy. If so, why are you so much against stepping up the rate of growth of energy supplies? EPM: ere are powerful economic and environmental reasons for reducing the ratio of the growth rate of energy to the growth rate of GDP as much as possible. Judge: What is the economic argument for reducing the ratio of energy to GDP growth rates? EPM: Current planning norms used by developing countries assume that the electricity growth rate should be about twice the growth rate of the GDP. To achieve such a growth rate in electricity supplies, astronomical investments are required.
e World Bank recently reported 9 that the developing countries have asked for about $100 billion per year to pursue current patterns of electricity generation and consumption when only about $20 billion would be available as aid. And India's Eighth Plan proposals demand an expenditure of about Rs 100,000 crores to increase the electrical capacity by about 38,000 MW. Without a clear idea of where all this capital is going to come from, what is being proposed is a reductio ad absurdum case that proves that the present patterns of energy generation and consumption are impossible to sustain from an investment point of view. Sustainability requires that the annual bill be decreased by reducing the coupling between energy and GDP. We must lower the electricity-GDP ratio and 'get a bigger GDP bang for a smaller energy-buck'! is is what can be achieved by efficiency improvements in energy production and consumption because they lead to GDP increases without corresponding increases in energy consumption. Since the experience in many countries is that saving a unit of energy is one-third to one-half as cheap as generating it, these efficiency improvements also reduce the unit investment cost (Rs/ kW) and therefore the investment bill. Judge: How will reducing the energy-GDP ratio help the environment? EPM: e alarming increases in energy production and consumption are leading to near-term environmental impacts that are quite serious. us, many hydroelectric projects cause the submergence of forests as well as soil erosion in the catchment areas, and waterlogging and salinity increases in the downstream areas. And, coal-based thermal power plants are a major cause of atmospheric pollution. GPF: You are presenting it as if there are no other supply options. But, there are clean energy sources. You must accept, for instance, that nuclear power does not lead to forest loss. It does not pollute the atmosphere with particulates and emissions that cause acid rain. It
is non-polluting as far as carbon emissions and the greenhouse effect are concerned. In fact, it is the answer to both local environmental and global warming problems. EPM: Don't forget the accident at Chernobyl that polluted vast areas of Europe. As long as we cannot conceive of all the ways in which reactor accidents can occur, we cannot rely solely on automatic safety mechanisms—we must provide for manual override. And the moment we permit operator intervention, we cannot avoid some fool doing a foolish thing. Nuclear power is too unforgiving a technology. GPF: May be the present generation of reactors are unsafe, but don't ignore the exciting developments that are taking place in nuclear technology. Inherently safe reactors are being designed and will soon be available. EPM: But, reactor safety is only one of the problems with nuclear power.Nuclear plants produce high-level wastes which create longterm disposal problems that have not yet been solved. In addition, it is asserted that there is an intimate, inevitable and inexorable link—the power-bomb nexus—between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. is link is either direct through the use of power generation as a spring board for weapons production or indirect through the the of weapons- usable material. Nuclear power, therefore, is not the answer if we want to save the subcontinent, not only from environmental degradation and the potential dangers of global warming, but also from nuclear destruction. In any case, using less energy is the best way of reducing the impact on the environment. Conservation technologies are the most environmentally benign followed by the decentralized technologies based on renewable sources of energy (mini- and micro-hydroelectric, biogas and producer gas power plants, gas turbines, solar water heaters, etc. and in the not-too-
distant future, photovoltaic devices). Judge: Please sum up your arguments now. EPM: e conventional approach based on massive increases in energy consumption is disastrous for India. It is making energy unaffordable for crucial development needs. It is causing serious near- and long-term environmental problems such as forest loss, soil erosion, waterlogging and atmospheric pollution. It is also contributing to changes in the global atmosphere that are likely to make the planet uninhabitable because of climatic changes. Clearly, neither India nor the earth can be entrusted to those obsessed with the promotion of mere economic growth as distinct from sustainable development. Judge: What must India do to achieve a new pattern of energy production and consumption? EPM: India must (for internal economic and environmental reasons) adopt and implement for its energy system a new set of national priorities that are derived from the objective of need-oriented, selfreliant and environmentally sound development, i.e., from the goal of sustainable development. is development focus determines how the benefits of energy are distributed between sections of society and the extent to which the quality of life of the poorest is improved. In addition, energy planning must acquire an end-use orientation that emphasizes energy services rather than energy consumption and seizes the opportunities for efficiency improvements through new energy technologies.
Whether it is new energy carriers or new end-use devices, there is tremendous scope for basic research, technology development and innovation dissemination which means that Indian science, technology and management have to play a central role. In a development oriented to basic needs, the stress has to be on the door as beneficiaries—this means
that scientists, technologists, managers and the people have to work jointly to build the new energy systems of the future. Such a development-focused, end-use-oriented (DEFENDUS) approach10 makes India's energy future a matter of choice; today this future is viewed as destiny because of present trends. As a side-effect and a bonus, a DEFENDUS approach will prevent the country's energy system from aggravating the global problem of greenhouse gases. Judge: Is there any hope for this new future? EPM: us far, industrialized countries and the Indian elite have colluded in promoting a pattern of growth that is revealing itself to be economically unviable, environmentally damaging and globally disastrous and therefore, unsustainable. Now, the industrialized countries are realizing that further promotion of these growth patterns can make the earth a veritable hell. For the first time, therefore, the industrialized countries might have a stake in sustainable development as a way of protecting the global atmosphere. This is the good news! GPF: Sustainable development, with its emphasis on the needs of the neediest, may well be in the interests of the Indian masses. But, it is not in the immediate interests of the lobbies associated with current energy patterns. ese lobbies will put their own vested interests above the interests of their masses, of sustainable development and thereby the global climate. us, it is very likely that there will be a head-on collision between the Indian elite and the industrialized countries. e elite will talk vehemently about the development vs. global climate dilemma—a planetary-scale version of the development vs. environment dilemma within India. And in this context, the resolution of the dilemmas through energy-efficient futures will not be implemented. Instead, India
will continue to be used for the promotion of economic growth and its wretched population will be condemned to adapting willynilly to environmental degradation. Custody of the country should be given to the pragmatic parent who accepts this reality. EPM: ere will no doubt be tremendous opposition to the energyefficient future that advances sustainable development. But, however, difficult it may be to achieve such futures, the fact is that the present growth-obsessed trends is impossible to sustain on economic grounds. Custody of the country should be given to the parent who will ensure a sustainable future in which its people will flourish! Judge: e arguments of the growth-promoting father and the environment-protecting mother have been presented. Now, it is up to the people of India, the jury, to decide to whom the country should be entrusted. Before arriving at a verdict, I hope the jury will remember that "it is human to err" with nature and therefore it is better to make small reversible mistakes rather than colossal irrevocable blunders. Also remember that "fools rush in where angels fear to tread!. The court is adjourned.
8
Integrated Energy Planning: The Defendus Methodology
The process of energy planning involves the estimation of future energy
demand and the identification of a mix of appropriate sources to meet this demand. is mix must emerge from a rational procedure in which various energy generation and/or saving options are evaluated. A powerful, simple and transparent approach to energy planning—the development-focused end-use-oriented service-directed (DEFENDUS) approach—is discussed here. e demand for a source of energy is based on the services for which it is required—the extent to which such services are spread among the population and the efficiency with which they can be delivered. e energy requirement so estimated is then matched with energy-supply and/or energy-saving options, so as to minimize costs. Starting with the reference energy system (RES)—the energy system as it obtains in the present (or the most recent past for which data is available) —the DEFENDUS approach constructs scenarios of future energy demand, paying deliberate attention to the equity and energy-efficiency considerations of alternative scenarios. e costs per unit of energy supplied/saved are then estimated, including both investment and operating expenses as well as the costs of delivery to the consumer and the losses in distribution. Environmental impacts—and the cost of mitigating them—can be taken into consideration in the methodology. e economic impacts of a chosen scenario can also be included. By ranking the energy supply/saving technologies in increasing order of costs, the least-cost mix is
obtained. Whereas with most pre-programmed packages, the planner must accept the format already provided, the DEFENDUS approach suggested here enables one to validate every step of the computation procedure and modify assumptions according to the actual case being considered.1
INTRODUCTION Energy Planning Energy is required to perform the tasks (such as lighting, cooking, and heating) through which consumers obtain the services (illumination, cooked food, and heat) they want. e amount of energy needed by each consumer varies with the level of services desired and the efficiency with which these services can be achieved. e aggregation of individual requirements in a given region leads to sectoral demand and hence to the total energy demand of the region. is energy demand must then be matched by a supply of energy. Oen, this supply is from a mix of various sources. e fundamental premise underlying this paper is that the mix must emerge from a rational procedure in which choices are made from alternative options of energy generation and/or energy saving. The energysaving options (through improvements in the efficiency of usage) have to be considered because by obviating the need for generation to the extent of the energy saved, they are effectively equivalent to supply. Energy planning consists of estimating future energy requirements and identifying the appropriate 'supply' technologies to satisfy these requirements.
Since energy plays such a central role in satisfying human needs and advancing development, energy planning is obviously a crucial activity which deserves prime importance. e purpose of this paper is to discuss a simple, transparent and powerful approach to energy planning.
Existing Energy-Modelling Software ere are a number of soware packages that can be run on personal computers (PCs) to make forecasts in the energy sector. Examples include —LEAP (Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning, LEAP 1990), MEDEES (Modèle de demande en énergie pour les pays du Sud, MEDEE-S 1995), and BEEAM-TEESE (Brookhaven Energy Economy Assessment ModelTERI Energy Economy Simulation and Evaluation, Pachauri and Srivastava 1988). ese 'ready-made' soware packages are based on models of the energy system. ey provide scope for relating energy demand directly to the end-uses of energy at the device and service levels. ey also include macro-economic parameters by which the impact of structural changes in the economy can be monitored. e linkages between the various programs of a package ensure that changes in one sector are transmitted to other relevant sectors. Further, very detailed analyses can be carried out. For instance, in the LEAP package, an alteration in the energy consumption of a device can be tracked from the unit-usage of the device in each sub-sector, to the total demand, which in turn is translated to the primary resource requirements and consequently to a relative change in costs. e models also permit various technological options and choices of fuel-mix in end-use activities. Hence, these energy-planning packages afford a comprehensive analysis of the energy sector, as well as its relationship with the rest of the economy. Obviously, the usual advantages of computers over manual calculations (even with hand-calculators) are obtained—computers perform tasks much faster and more accurately and also eliminate the tedium of repetitive calculation, freeing the analyst for more productive work. A study of five soware packages—Energy Toolbox, ENEP (Buehring et al. 1991), MESAP (Reuder 1990), LEAP and MEDEE-S has been carried
out (S.A. Enerdata 1993) to choose an energy demand projection model for African countries. e study has highlighted three main issues. Almost all African countries have an energy demand model at their disposal (attributable invariably to a project based on a foreign consultant), but the model is not used in energy planning aer the consultant has le. Because of the similarities between the various African countries, there should be a common methodology, but the approach must have the flexibility to cope with the diversities as well. The model must be of the end-use type. ere are, however, disadvantages with pre-programmed packages. Firstly, the formulae employed in the programs are entered at the stage of soware programming, so that the user has little or no control over the actual computational procedure. As such, the energy-planner is forced to accept the general-case treatment instead of evolving a method that could be more appropriate for the particular case under consideration. Secondly, as users are generally not equipped with the source-codes, they remain dependent on the programmers of the package for any alterations. Moreover, in cases where the formulae are not clearly specified in the user-manual, they have first to be derived by the user or else the estimation procedure remains opaque. Because of this, it is also difficult to locate errors. irdly, the form in which data has to be entered may not coincide with that in which information is available, so that a certain amount of exogenous data-processing has to be completed before the package can be used. Fourthly, some packages impose major constraints on the planning process, for example, constant energy efficiencies throughout the planning period. ere are also a number of energy-system models implemented on mainframes, such as MARKAL2 (Goldstein 1990) and its regional version MENSA and BESOM3—both linear programming models, the Argonne Energy Model4, a network model and many others that have been used in
various countries (Meier 1985). ese facilitate much more elaborate calculations than the PC-based systems, but they suffer even more from the 'black-box' syndrome. Since the models are large and complex, the fundamental relationships between the variables and the data parameters are oen taken as 'given' and the users are not able to validate these equations in relation to the region being studied, unless there is continuing soware support. Large-system packages are also less accessible because of their cost.
The Origin of the DEFENDUS Methodology In the context described above, it is essential to evolve a simple method of computing energy demand and supply in which the planner has complete control over the entire procedure. Also, the steps followed must be 'transparent' enough to be easily understood and amenable to easy modification by another planner. Finally, those who wish to replicate computations must be able to use the first computation as a model and 'default case' and therefore avoid 're-inventing the wheel'. All these objectives were achieved by the Development-Focused END-Use-oriented Service-directed (DEFENDUS) methodology for estimating the demand and supply of energy in an energy system. e DEFENDUS methodology was evolved for a number of immediate reasons. When analysing the projections of Karnataka's electricity demand obtained from various planning exercises (Pachauri et al. 1980; PPD-GOK 1981; WG-GOK 1982; GOK 1982; PWED-GOK 1983; CEA 1985; CPRI 1987; LRPPP 1987; CEA 1987; PD-GOK 1989), it was found that the estimation of future requirements of electrical energy is conventionally carried out via projections of demand, that is, via extrapolation of current demand at the rate of growth characteristic of the immediate past. ese business-as-usual projections generally exclude the possibilities of improvements of energy efficiencies and alterations of growth rates, so
that the future is viewed as an amplified version of the recent past. However, an alternative scenario5 approach could be adopted where one would assume that, just as present trends in electricity consumption are the outcome of past policies, new outcomes can be chosen and a specification made of which policies can bring them about. Secondly, the DEFENDUS team had undertaken a project6 that required the evaluation of an energy-planning soware package in the context of developing countries. It was decided to apply the soware to the state of Karnataka and construct energy demand and supply projections for the electricity system. Since the results could not be audited step-by-step with a calculator, it was considered important to verify the results obtained from the soware package. It was also felt that the best verification would consist of developing an alternative methodology and using it for the same problem of electricity in Karnataka. irdly, the perspective in the book, Energy for a Sustainable World (Goldemberg et al. 1988) included energy conservation measures (the use of more energy-efficient processes and devices) and the use of new renewable sources of energy. But such technologies can be brought into actual usage only if the magnitude of energy conservation/generation and the cost involved warrant them. is necessitated the quantification of energy saving and generation possibilities and the calculation of the cost per unit in each case, in order to formulate economically viable plans. Once again a simple model that evaluates alternative scenarios was required.
All these considerations led to the formulation of a DEFENDUS approach to energy planning that was used initially for electricity (Reddy et al. 1991) in the state of Karnataka but had the potential for replicability, i.e., it could be used for other energy sources/carriers and other geographical regions.
Application and Methodology
Since the DEFENDUS electricity scenario was developed in response to a projection for Karnataka made by a Government-appointed Committee for the Long Range Planning of Power Projects (LRPPP), the focus in the DEFENDUS publication (Reddy et al. 1991) was on the application of the methodology to the electricity system of Karnataka. ere were a number of reactions (Parikh 1991; Shah 1991; Banerjee 1991) to the work, but these also focused on the Karnataka electricity scenario and its 'implementability' rather than on the methodology that had been used. For instance, doubts were expressed regarding the practicality of reducing electricity demand through efficiency improvement. Questions were also raised about the validity of using the Karnataka assumptions for other states in India. Discussion then shied to the possibility of using the DEFENDUS methodology for energy planning in other developing countries.7 Questions such as the following have been asked. Can the methodology initially developed for electricity be used for other energy sources/carriers? Can one go from electricity planning to energy planning involving the integration of a number of energy sources/carriers? Can the macroeconomic implications of the DEFENDUS scenarios be spelt out? Does the methodology permit an estimate of the environmental impacts of the scenarios?
ough the answers to many of these questions are implicit in the original Karnataka Electricity Scenario paper, it is clear, in retrospect, that the original presentation buried the methodology in the application. is paper is addressed therefore to an ab initio exposition of the DEFENDUS methodology per se.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENERGY PLANNING A Systems View of Energy Planning A system can be defined as the portion of the universe that is chosen for consideration. Every system is a sub-system of a larger system that constitutes its environment and with which it is in interaction. At the same time, every system has a structure, i.e., it is itself an organization of parts (sub-sub-systems) in interaction. e energy system is a sub-system of the economy, which, depending upon the level of analysis, may be the economy of the world, a country, a state within the country, a city or village, or even a firm or a farm. In order to take a systems view of energy planning, it is necessary to treat the energy sub-system, the economic system (of which the energy sub-system is a part) and the activity of planning. Systems involving human beings are goal-oriented, and the purpose of energy planning is to make the energy sub-system drive the goal-oriented system towards its goal(s). Every goal implies choices, values and preferences, and therefore a goal-oriented approach is a normative approach that defines what is desirable. Whenever questions of planning are raised (whether at the level of the country, state, corporate entity or firm), the words: goals, strategies, policies, policy agents and policy instruments are invoked. Hence, it is worthwhile to adopt clear-cut definitions of these terms. A strategy is a broad plan to reach that goal. A policy is a specific course of action to implement the strategy. A policy instrument is an instrument with which policy is initiated and maintained. A policy agent is one who wields a policy instrument. It may be noted that goals, strategies and policies constitute different
levels of hierarchy in the scheme of concepts, the degree of specificity, the flow of interconnections and the set of actions.
For goals to be attained, strategies must be implemented; for strategies to be implemented, policies must be given effect to and operated; for policies to be given effect to and operated, policy instruments must be initiated and maintained, and employed by policy agents.8 us, goals, strategies, policies, policy instruments, and policy agents are all interrelated. is interrelationship can be brought out through a systems diagram (Figure 8.1) which reveals two important features: 1. the feedback loop that emphasizes the iterative character of the process, whereby energy planning and implementation make the energy subsystem drive the goal-seeking system towards its goal(s); and 2. the components of energy planning, which include goals, strategies, policies, policy instruments and policy agents, implementation, monitoring, and analysis. is model can be considered to be applicable at all system levels—the world, a country, a state within a country, a city or village, a farm or firm.
Figure 8.1: From Goals to Policy Implementation–the Feedback.
Reference Energy System (RES)
e starting point of energy planning activity at any system level has to be the structure of the energy system. e structure involving the parts of the energy system and their interactions is best represented by the reference energy system (RES), i.e., the energy system as it obtains at present or as it obtained in an immediate past for which data is available. e RES must include all the energy sources of nature that are exploited, all the intermediate forms or carriers into which these sources are transformed to enhance the convenience with which they are utilized, the sub-systems for transmission/transportation and distribution of these energy carriers, and the end-use devices that are used to obtain the services that energy provides—cooking, lighting, water, process and space heating, mobility, sha power, and information flow. Further, the RES must span both the qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the energy system.
e RES can have several possible structures in the sense that there are many equally valid ways in which the RES can be displayed. One possible structure results from the fuel-cycle approach—the RES can be structured to follow the flow of energy from sources to services. Such an approach would start from the primary energy provided by the sources as found in nature, then consider in sequence the secondary energy at the output of the facilities which convert the primary energy into carriers that are readily and conveniently usable by consumers, the final energy as received (aer transmission/transport and distribution) by the consumers, and the useful energy at the output of the consumer's end-use device, i.e., the energy conversion system, which provides the energy service sought by the consumer. Power plants, oil refineries and coal gasification plants are examples of facilities/utilities that convert primary into secondary energy. e highvoltage grid, gas pipelines, and petroleum transport, storage and distribution facilitates are examples of the energy transmission/transport and distribution sub-system. Stoves, furnaces, kilns, light-bulbs, engines and motors are examples of end-use devices.
Further, at every one of these stages of energy conversion, there are inevitable energy losses. In the transformation from primary energy into secondary-energy carriers, there are conversion losses at the facilities/utilities. Similarly, in delivering the energy carriers as final energy to the ultimate consumers, there are transmission/transport, storage, and distribution losses. Finally, when the consumers convert the final into useful energy, there are losses in the end-use devices. It appears that a simple and logical way of representing the RES is in terms of a nine-column structure (Figure 8.2). Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible, to find energy data in a form that can be incorporated directly into this structure. In the first place, it is much easier to get information on primary and secondary energy, particularly for the conventional commercial sources of energy, than on final and useful energy. at is, there is far more data on the supply aspects of the energy system than on the demand aspects.
Figure 8.2: The reference energy system.
Secondly, the available demand data is usually in a highly aggregated form. For example, energy consumption data invariably pertains to a few important sectors—industry, agriculture, transport, domestic, and commercial—rather than to types of services, consumers, and end-use devices. (Incidentally, this biased character of the database for energy represents the rapidly vanishing era when the bridging of the energy supply-demand gap could be achieved exclusively by augmenting energy supplies and without exploring the possibilities of demand management.) To develop an RES structure that would be appropriate for the available
energy data, it may be necessary to alter the specified columns. e resulting RES structure would permit the use of sectoral energy consumption data which cannot be further sub-divided at this stage of the study into consumption by consumers and by end-use devices. Where the data is available in a less aggregative form, it can be collated into sectorwise categories. e structure would also allow the energy carrier data to be seen alongside the sectoral consumption for conventional discussions.
Energy Future
Prediction, Forecast, Projection, Scenario, Target and Goal: Energy planning necessarily involves goals, and goals require discussion about the future. is involves various words related to the certainty, freedom of choice, degree of detail and the sharpness of focus of that future. In particular, six words are commonly used: prediction, forecast, projection, scenario, target and goal. Reference Energy System to Energy Planning: e first step in energy planning is to choose a time horizon for the planning exercise. e energy plan must then describe the evolution of the reference energy system from the base year up to the horizon year. at is, the dynamic changes in the energy system must be considered. For the horizon year, therefore, both the demand and supply sides of the energy system must be elaborated. us, an energy future consists of two parts—future energy demand and future energy supply to meet that demand. Two crucial questions arise. 1. How is future demand to be arrived at, given the present energy demand from the reference energy system? 2. How are future supplies to be ensured over and above the supplies described by the reference energy system?
On the demand side, the focus should ideally be on the useful energy that decides the energy services enjoyed by consumers, but in practice, attention is usually restricted to final energy. On the supply side, attention is restricted either to the primary energy or, in the case of electricity and petroleum derivatives, to secondary energy.
BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE DEFENDUS METHODOLOGY The DEFENDUS methodology has two main components: 1. a methodology for the construction of DEFENDUS (developmentfocused end-use-oriented service-directed) demand scenarios for an energy carrier/source, in which deliberate attention can be paid both to the equity (distributional) and the energy-efficiency dimensions of energy scenarios; and 2. a methodology for the determination of a least-cost supply mix (of saving, decentralized generation and centralized generation options) to meet future energy requirements.
Construction of DEFENDUS Demand Scenarios With regard to the prediction/forecast/projection/scenario of future demand, there are at least five conventional approaches: 1. the trend method, 2. the growth rate method, 3. the econometric method, 4. the techno-economic method, and 5. the input-output method.
However, these approaches are well-known and are therefore not elaborated upon here. In contrast, the DEFENDUS methodology makes use of the scenario approach, which, as pointed out above,is based on a set of energy measures that will transform the present into the future. us, scenarios are quite different from projections that relate the future to the present with the aid of mathematical relations. Scenarios are actually exercises that answer the question: 'If measures M 1, M2, M3,. . ., are implemented, what will the result be?' e particular measures that provide the basis for the scenarios have to be derived from the goals and strategies for the energy system prescribed by the scenario-builder as part of a normative exercise (Figure 8.3). Hence, scenarios cannot be constructed without specification of measures; measures must follow from strategies; and strategies have to be derived from goals. Initially, the emphasis has to be on scenarios for specific energy sources/carriers—electricity, coal, petroleum derivatives, biomass, etc. These source/carrier-specific scenarios can then be linked together.
Figure 8.3: Construction of Scenarios
As the term DEFENDUS suggests, there are two important aspects to be considered when constructing a scenario for the future demand of an energy source/carrier—the development focus and the end-use orientation. e development focus presumes a view of development, but the methodology does not in any way constrain this view. If, for instance, development is considered to be a process of economic growth directed
towards the satisfaction of basic needs, starting from the needs of the neediest, a strengthening of self-reliance, and harmony with the environment, then the development focus must reflect a determination to reduce poverty and inequality, and to increase self-reliance in an environmentally sound way. Such a focus would determine the rates of growth of particular sectors (or categories of consumers) in an economy; for instance, one of the requirements for need-oriented development of a region could be the provision of electric lighting in every home, which would necessitate an enhanced rate of growth of electricity connections in the domestic category. If, however, development is simply equated with economic growth measured by the GDP, irrespective of the distribution of its benefits, then current growth rates of various categories of consumers can be made to persist throughout the scenario. e end-use orientation concentrates on the end-uses of energy and the services to be derived from energy, rather than the quantity of energy used. What is pertinent is the attainment of a certain amount of heating, lighting or motive power, and not necessarily an increased energy usage, because technological improvements can lower the need for energy while retaining the same level of energy-derived services. us, the end-use orientation is based on an understanding of the technological opportunities in the utilization of energy. In this case too, the DEFENDUS methodology does not constrain the planner to pursue an efficient future —present (in)efficiencies can be made to prevail.
The development focus and end-use factors imply that in order to estimate the requirement of a particular source/carrier of energy, one must take into account: the number of energy users (or energy-using entities, such as pieces of equipment or devices) of that source of energy; and the average amount of energy required per user per period, i.e., the existing energy consumption 'norm' of that user.
e total energy demand is then equal to the aggregate demand of all the categories of users (or types of energy-using devices) for every enduse.
e estimation of demand for a particular energy source/carrier in a particular year is therefore dependent on two variables—the number of users and their actual energy requirement in any base year, as well as the expected (or policy-driven) changes in these two variables in subsequent years. on the basis of this relationship, one can calculate any variant of the general case. For instance, by maintaining the status quo in the average energy usage and the current trend of growth of users, one can develop a business-as-usual scenario. Another alternative would be to alter only the growth rates of the number of users, keeping the energy usage constant. This frozen-efficiency scenario would assume that although the number of users changes, the level of energy usage per user remains constant as the technical efficiencies of energy-using processes/devices are 'frozen' at the base-year level and no substitution between energy carriers takes place.9 e other type of scenario would involve changes in both the categorywise growth rates of users (for development or equity reasons) as well as the energy usage of these consumers (possibly with efficiency improvements and carrier substitution).
Comparative Costing once the total energy demand has been estimated, the question of how this demand should be met must be addressed. e sources of energy available to a region may be of different types— whether from large-scale centralized plants (such as petroleum refineries, coal-mines, and thermal and hydro-electricity generating plants, etc.) or small-scale decentralized (local) plants. Further, conservation of energy
(through the improved efficiency of processes and devices) can also be considered as an option for meeting the energy needs, in so far as the demand for a certain amount of energy is reduced and supply can therefore be diverted to other uses.
A choice between different options—generation and conservation— must depend, in the first instance, on their comparative costs. However, while computing the costs per unit of energy from various technologies, it has been found (Reddy et al. 1990) that great care must be taken to ensure that the comparison occurs on equal terms. In particular, the following requirements must be ensured. 1. All the costs—fixed or variable—should be expressed with respect to a particular (reference) year, so that a dollar of one year is not equated with that of another. 2. Discounted cash flow techniques must be used to take into account the time value of money. us, although the cash flows of the plants would differ, the comparison would be made between the present value (PV)10 at the same reference date of each stream of flows. 3. The same discount factor must be used for all the calculations; further; either nominal or real discount rates should be used, but not both. 4. The gestation period (the time-lag between the commencement of construction of the plant and its commissioning) varies greatly between technologies. is must be taken into account in one of two ways. Either the value of the physical output (energy generated/saved) must be discounted from the different commissioning dates to the commencement date at which point comparison can be made. or, the costs must be appropriately inflated to compensate for the time lags between the commencement of construction and the commissioning of each plant. is is economically justifiable, as the longer the gestation period, the
greater will be the imputed cost per unit of energy; conversely, the sooner the return can be obtained, the lower the imputed cost. 5. When comparing centralized technologies (which have to transmit energy over long distances to the end-use devices of consumers) with decentralized (local) technologies, storage, transmission, and distribution losses should be taken into account so that the actual energy delivered is quantified. en, the comparison can be made at the consumption end—but it is not permissible to take one technology at the generation end and the other at the consumption end. Further, the additional costs of delivering energy via the grid (setting up transmission and distribution facilities) should be added to the cost of generation. Once the cost per unit of energy generated/saved from each technology has been calculated with the above precautions, a comparison of technologies on equal terms is possible and available. One can even rank technological options on purely economic terms. All this is essential to facilitate the task of determining a least-cost mix of generation/saving technologies.
Least-cost Supply Mix e purpose of selecting a 'least-cost' mix of energy-supply options is to attain the energy-demand goal at the minimum cost. In terms of a linear programming (LP) problem, the objective function would be the total cost of the supply of energy and one would have to minimize this, subject to the constraints that the total energy obtainable would be at least as much as the forecast requirement and that the contribution that each technology can make towards meeting the demand does not exceed its viable potential. The LP formulation would be: Minimize Z = Σ Ci.Ei, subject to:
Σ Ei 3 Et and E1 ≤ P1 E2 ≤ P2 … … Em ≤ Pm where each Ci represents the cost per unit of the source of energy Ei (i = 1, 2, . . ., m), Et is the total requirement of energy in the year t for which plans are being made, and Pi is the limit of the potential of the source pertaining to that region. is implies that the total cost of energy supply (equivalent to the sum of the costs of the various sources) must be minimized, while meeting the total energy demand and simultaneously not exceeding the available potential of each source in the region.
An alternative to such an LP calculation is to construct a least-cost supply curve showing the cheapest mix of energy generation/saving options that will meet the energy requirement. In fact, it can be shown that this least-cost mix is automatically the mix that would be obtained from a solution to the LP cost-minimization problem. To construct a leastcost supply curve, the technologies must be ranked in increasing order of the costs per unit of energy (or unit energy cost). Options must then be chosen in this order,11 adding the contribution of each towards the fulfillment of energy requirements. is procedure can be diagrammatically represented in the form of a staircase, on a grid where energy is measured on the horizontal axis and cost per unit of energy on the vertical axis (Figure 8.4). en the width of each stair indicates the energy potential of a particular option and the height refers to its cost per unit of energy, so that the rectangle representing each step of the stairway corresponds to the total cost incurred on that option. One must consider the least expensive technology as the first element of the supply mix and,
aer the potential of that option is exhausted, the next costlier option (corresponding to the next higher step), and so on, up the cost-supply staircase until the energy goal is reached. It must be observed that the same energy-efficiency improvement measures cannot be considered on both the demand and the supply sides; they can be counted only once. Hence, if efficiency measures are to be included as candidates among the supply options (in terms of supply avoided), then the estimation of the demand goal should obviously not include efficiency improvement, that is, a frozen-efficiency scenario must be used for the corresponding demand forecast. e approach thus described does not favour any particular type of technology; an option will be chosen if and only if its unit cost and energy contribution find a place on the cost-supply staircase before the frozenefficiency demand goal is reached.
Figure 8.4: Least-cost Planning—Construction of a Cost-supply Staircase
A DEFENDUS scenario for an energy carrier/source is unaware of the spatial domain under its consideration—whether it is a village, city, state, or country. On the demand side, it only considers the categories of
consumers and their energy usage; on the supply side, it has the flexibility of considering imports. us, the validity of the DEFENDUS methodology is invariant with respect to the size and nature of the domain; it is either valid for all domains or none.
Environmental Impacts e DEFENDUS methodology can capture the environmental impacts of the supply mix at two stages. During the determination of the least-cost supply mix: is requires a consideration of the costs of the option with and without the costs of environmental protection. For instance, the cost of hydroelectric energy (or power) can be estimated with and without the costs of compensatory afforestation and rehabilitation of displaced persons; the DEFENDUS Electricity Scenario of Karnataka has done this for the costing of hydroelectricity. Like the costs of an energy technology, the costs of the environmental impact of that technology and the mitigation costs have to be analysed separately from the energy planning exercise, but once these costs are determined, they can be incorporated into the procedure for determining supply mixes. Aer determining the least-cost supply mix: e environmental impacts per unit of energy saved/generated, for each option in the least-cost supply mix, can be estimated separately (for example, carbon emissions per kWh) and compared with other supply mixes; this has also been done in the paper on the DEFENDUS Electricity Scenario for Karnataka. us, the DEFENDUS methodology has the capacity to handle environmental impacts and their mitigation costs once these are determined.
Economic Implications
e area under the least-cost supply curve represents the annualized financial cost of that particular mix, and this cost can be compared with the corresponding cost for any other mix. (e DEFENDUS electricity scenario for Karnataka was compared with the costs of the LRPPP projection for Karnataka in this manner.) If the cost-supply curve were to be constructed with economic costs,12 then a comparison of economic costs would also be possible. us, financial and economic impacts are within the scope of the DEFENDUS methodology. ough DEFENDUS scenarios have hitherto not elaborated on their macro-economic implications, there are simple approaches to assessing these impacts. e empirical relationship between the production and the energy usage of a sector can be easily obtained. e regression of sectoral energy usage (for example, industrial electricity usage in a state) on the sectoral production (say, industrial contribution to state domestic product) yields an estimate of the energy-product coefficient. 13 Substituting this coefficient and the estimated energy requirement in a DEFENDUS scenario for a particular year, in the same equation, one can obtain an estimate for sectoral output in that year. However, this will be a lower bound estimate of the sectoral product because it uses a constant productenergy coefficient obtained from past data along with an efficiencyinduced (i.e., relatively low) future energy requirement. If, instead of the DEFENDUS scenario energy estimate, the frozenefficiency scenario estimate of energy requirement is used, along with the same energy-product coefficient, then the result will be an upper bound estimate of sectoral product. Efficiency improvements will put the estimate of sectoral production somewhere between these lower and upper bounds. However, as the energy-service levels achieved in both the DEFENDUS scenario (with efficiency improvement) and the frozen-efficiency scenario (without efficiency improvement) are the same, the sectoral product estimate corresponding to the latter can be considered for the former as
well. Taking this estimate of production and the corresponding DEFENDUS scenario energy demand, one can calculate a new energyproduct coefficient. e difference between the two coefficients indicates the effect of efficiency improvement.
Spreadsheets for DEFENDUS Scenarios Spreadsheets have been found to be very useful for the construction of DEFENDUS energy scenarios as they have certain inherent advantages for the computational procedure described above.
In actual practice, the spreadsheet is arranged so that the columns denote the various consumer or end-use device categories which comprise the usage of the particular energy source/carrier. With regard to the rows, an initial block is assigned to specify the characteristics of the energy usage in the base year. ereaer, one block of rows is assigned for each year of the plan until the horizon year. Each of these blocks is used to carry out the estimation of the number of consumers/end-use devices in that category and their corresponding energy usage. e computation requires the growth in the total number of consumers or end-use devices, the fractions of old consumers/ end-use devices that retain the previous year's average energy usage and those that have a different average energy usage. us, the spreadsheet is based on a year-by-year estimation advancing from the base year to the horizon year. e advantages of constructing DEFENDUS scenarios using spreadsheets are many. Firstly, the energy planner has the freedom to specify the parameters and the formulae on the basis of which the values of the variables are calculated. Depending on the scenario envisaged, these can be easily modified. us, the energy planner has complete freedom to change at will (or not to change at all!) the growth rates of consumers/end-use devices and their average energy usage throughout the planning period. e structure also enables one to determine the
pattern of implementation of efficiency improvements and new devices, for example, according to a logistic curve. Secondly, within a spreadsheet, a formula applied to a particular cell can be easily replicated for the remaining cells of the row or column, so that the calculation for any category of consumers/suppliers can be used for other categories of consumers/suppliers. Further, formulae can be entered in terms of the cell addresses, instead of the absolute values of the variable —this links various sections of the spreadsheet, enabling one to estimate the sensitivity of results to changes in any particular value. e results of iterative calculation are obtained almost instantaneously.
Thirdly, it is convenient to utilize the framework already constructed for any new but analogous calculation. For instance, similar spreadsheets were used for the estimation of electricity demand in Karnataka and various other states, the requirement of biomass and of petroleum products in Karnataka and of petroleum products in India. Obviously, the actual sectors, categories of users, and other such parameters would determine the final framework of the spreadsheet. However, the method of analysing demand by type of consumer (or uses or devices) and quantifying each category of demand through the product of the number of consumers/uses/devices and their average energy requirement is applicable to different analyses. Separate spreadsheets can also be linked to each other—a facility particularly necessary for any study of more than one sector and for linking the energy sector with the rest of the economy.
REFERENCES Banerjee, R. 1991. 'DEFENDUS: towards Evolving a Rational Energy Policy'. In Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXVI, No. 44, November 2, pp. 2539–2540. Buehring, W.H., B.P. Hamilton, K.A. Guziel and R.R. Cirillo. 1991. 'ENPEP (Energy and Power Evaluation Program), An Integrated Approach for Modelling National Energy Systems'. Argonne National Laboratory.
Central Power Research Institute (CPRI). 1987. Energy Requirement up to 2001 A.D. Central Electricity Authority (CEA). 1985. Twelfth Electric Power Survey of India. New Delhi. Central Electricity Authority (CEA). 1987. Thirteenth Electric Power Survey of India. New Delhi. Committee, headed by S.G. Ramachandra, for the Long-Range Planning for Power Projects, Government of Karnataka (LRPPP-GOK). 1987. A Report on Long-Range Plan for Power Project in Karnataka 1987-2000 A.D. Enerdata, S.A. 1993. Study of an Energy Demand Projection Model for African Countries. Dra Final Report, 2 Avenue de Vignate, 38610 Gieres, France. Goldemberg, J., T.B. Johansson, A.K.N. Reddy and R.H. Williams. 1988. Energy for a Sustainable World. Wiley Eastern Ltd. Goldstein, G.A. and L.D. Hamilton. 1990. 'PC-MARKAL and the MARKAL User Support System (MUSS): User's Guide, BNL-46319'. Brookhaven National Laboratory Associated Universities Inc. Government of Karnataka (GOK). 1982. 'Power: Prospects and Policies'. Background paper presented to the Economic and Planning Council. LEAP. 1990. LEAP—A Computerized Energy Planning System—Vol. 1: Overview, Vol. II: User Guide, Vol. III: Technical Description, Version 90.01. Stockholm Environment Institute, Boston Center, Tellus Institute for Resource and Environmental Strategies (earlier the Energy Systems Research Group), Boston. MEDEE-S. 1995. MEDEE-S—Sectoral Energy Demand Analysis and Forecast, Version 1.2. e Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP). e United Nations Development Programme and the Government of France in collaboration with Asian Institute of Technology (EPCCT/AIT), Programme for Asian Cooperation on Energy and the Environment (PACE- E), RAS/92/071, February. (is is the latest version of the soware; the first PC version MEDEE-S 1.0 was developed by B. Lapillonne, IEPE, France in 1985). Meier, P. 1985. 'Energy Planning in Developing Countries: e Role of Microcomputers'. In Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 9, No. 1. United Nations, New York. Pachauri, R.K. and L. Srivastava. 1988. 'Integrated Energy Planning in India: A Modelling Approach'. The Energy Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4. Pachauri, R.K., H.V. Dayal and K. Ravishankar. 1980. Administrative Staff College of India. 'Report on the Development of a Forecasting Model and Demand Projections for Power Development in Karnataka'. Submitted to the Power and Energy Division. Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi. Parikh, J. 1991. 'From "DEFENDUS" to consensus'. In Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXVI, No. 25, June 22, pp. 1566-68. Perspective Planning Division (PPD), Planning Dept., Government of Karnataka (GOK). 1981. 'Demand Pattern of Energy in Karnataka: Present and Projected'.
Planning Department, Government of Karnataka (PD-GOK). 1989. 'Report of the Working Group on Energy for the Eighth Five-Year Plan 1990–95'. Presented at the Seminar on 'Karnataka's Eighth Five-Year Plan Perspective'. Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore 560072, November 16–17. Public Works and Electricity Department, Government of Karnataka (PWED-GOK). 1983. 'Report of the Committee Constituted by the Economic and Planning Council for the Forecast of Energy Requirement and Availability to 1989–90'. Reddy, A.K.N., D.G. Sumithra, P. Balachandra and A. D'sa. 1990. 'Comparative Costs of Electricity Conservation, Centralized and Decentralized Electricity Generation'. Published as a Special Article in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXV, No. 22, June 2, pp. 1201–1216. —. 1991. 'A Development-focused end-use-oriented Scenario for Karnataka'. Special Article in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXVI, Nos. 14 and 15, April 6 and 13, pp. 891–910 and 983–1001. Reuder, A. 1990. 'MESAP—Micro-computer based energy Sector Analysis and Planning System— Overview Brochure'. University of Stuttgart. Shah, J.C. 1991. 'DEFENDUS—How?'. In Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXVI, No. 42, October 19, pp. 2435–2440. Working Group, Government of Karnataka (WG-GOK). 1982. 'Report of the Working Group Constituted for Advance Planning for Utilization of Power in Karnataka'.
9
Goals, Strategies and Policies for Rural Energy
Aer a spurt of activity in the 1970s and 1980s, rural energy has become an abandoned priority. If rural energy strategies are oriented towards sustainable rural development, they will help improve the quality of life through a positive impact on many socio-economic variables. is article examines the current situation with regard to rural energy systems, technological options and their financial requirements and time horizons and sets out the outline of a policy for implementation of rural energy strategies.
RURAL ENERGY Abandoned Priority Rural energy systems are an abandoned priority. ere was an upsurge of interest in them in the 1970s, triggered by the appropriate technology movement and the enthusiasm for the application of science and technology to rural areas. Very soon, however, the emphasis shied to renewable energy. ere is suspicion that this shi was in response to industrialized country concerns over the global environment and the ensuing promises of funding. Unfortunately, though rural energy invariably implies renewable energy, the converse is not true—renewable energy does not necessarily imply a concern for rural energy systems.
e primary focus in the rural energy work of the 1970s was on cooking. Research, development and dissemination were devoted to stoves, and particularly, fuelwood stoves. With some initial success in improving the efficiency of fuel wood stoves, and even greater success with making them less smoky, the emphasis turned to large-scale dissemination particularly through government programmes. Success in this dissemination drive was only partial in India. Improved cookstoves penetrated only 15 per cent of India's homes between early 1980s and 1992 (Parikh et al. 1999: 539–44). ere was, however, a reduction of the intensity of efforts toward woodstove research and development.In this process, there was little concern for the fact that restricting efforts to improve fuelwood stoves implied the acceptance of a 'dual-fuel' society, i.e., a society in which the poor cooked with messy solid fuels on relatively inefficient stoves and the rich enjoyed clean gaseous fuels like LPG in efficient stoves. ere was also little consciousness of the strong gender bias against women in this shi of priorities. By and large, the cooking challenge was soon forgotten by donors, activists and technologists. In the real world, however, the overwhelming majority of rural households and particularly their women had no option other than pursuing the arduous task of fuelwood gathering and cooking in an unhealthy environment. e other focus in rural energy work was on rural electrification, which was equated with village electrification. Even one electric pole near a village qualified it as an electrified village. Further, agricultural consumers dominated the priority list of electricity end-users with their demand for energising irrigation pumpsets. Home electrification was not taken up as a challenge by the electricity boards and the political parties (even the le parties). Gandhi's dream that electricity would be a boon to every home was abandoned in the land of his birth. Interestingly, the African National Congress in South Africa highlighted 'electricity for all' as a goal for the power sector.
On the supply side, rural electrification was understood as grid electrification following centralized generation from mega projects. e whole challenge of off-grid decentralized generation from local sources was not included in the agenda. is process was in tune with the general usurping of governance powers by centralized authorities and the underemphasis of local sources observed in other sectors such as minor irrigation and forestry. e crucial importance of rural energy as the necessary foundation for rural self-reliance was ignored.
Fortunately, in many parts of the country, the drive for decentralized planning at the panchayat level is gathering momentum. Energy is on the verge of entering the agenda for this decentralized planning and implementation. It is being realized that decentralization of political power has to be buttressed with decentralization of electrical power in particular and of rural energy in general. Yet another factor is the widespread urbanization in developing countries. e growing politically powerful urban population is generating an escalating urban energy demand that is eclipsing rural needs. Rural energy is not getting the importance it deserves. e realization that 'half ' the population will be urban is blinding recognition of the fact that the other 'half ' of the population of the world lives in rural areas. And in the poorest regions of the world, the rural fraction is even greater. In India, for example, the percentage of the rural population is decreasing, but it was still 74.3 per cent in 1991. is translates to an enormous population of 627 million in the villages. So, rural energy needs must not be swept aside by urban energy demands. Above all, with the growing trend to leave implementation to market forces, the rural poor (constituting a large fraction of the rural population) do not have the purchasing power to articulate their needs through market demand. Attention, therefore, gets turned to those sections of the population and those areas of the country that can provide a market with purchasing power. us, urban concentrations get priority while rural
populations requiring special attention get sidelined.
Against this backdrop, the World Bank (1996) has 'discovered' that there are about 2 billion people1 in the world who cook with traditional biomass/ fuelwood and that about 1.7 billion people are without electricity. Most of these people without access to modern energy carriers live in rural areas. What they need above all is a major improvement in the services that energy can provide, particularly the energy services of efficient, safe and clean cooking and electric lighting. e World Bank emphasis, however, is on improving energy supplies. is supply bias opens the doors to a flood of devices and gadgets and to a stream of industrialized country technology vendors. Whilst waxing eloquent about the energy-deprived two billion and talking of providing access to modern energy, the real agenda appears to be the selling of solar photovoltaic systems primarily for domestic lighting. ere is an on-going global solar photovoltaic (SPV) sales drive. But the market for such systems is largely restricted to a smaller upper crust of the rural population. us, the challenge of improving energy services to rural areas and the poor looms large as ever.
Why Rural Energy ere are many reasons why rural energy deserves special attention, distinct from energy in general. First and foremost, if rural energy is not treated separately, it is bound to be deprived of appropriate and deserved emphasis and will 'fall between the cracks'. Second, the demography of rural areas differs fundamentally from that of towns, cities and metropolises. Rural areas consist of dispersed populations in contrast to the population concentrations of urban conglomerations. Actually, rural settlements are of two main types—the compact villages of India and China and other countries with similar rural settlements, and the 'homestead' type settlements of the state of Kerala in
India, Sri Lanka and many parts of Africa. is fundamental distinction leads to a third reason for treating rural energy differently. Centralized generation/production of energy followed by its transmission/transport makes eminent sense for the dense populations of urban conglomerations. But, this urban approach may prove prohibitively costly and inefficient for dispersed populations presenting remote, scattered and low loads leading inevitably to greater transmission and distribution losses. Beyond certain breakeven distances from the grids/transport systems associated with centralized generation/production, it may be more cost- effective to implement decentralized village-scale generation/production coupled to local minigrids. And when the settlements consist of scattered homesteads, it may even be better to install household energy systems.
The Current Situation Any discussion of rural energy requires an appreciation of current energy consumption patterns at the village level. Since the mid-1970s, there have been several studies of the patterns of energy consumption in villages. Among the earliest of the studies was that of six villages in the Ungra region of Tumkur district, Karnataka state, south India, carried out in the late 1970s (ASTRA 1982: 255–80).
Note: Data for 100 developed and developing countries. Source: Calculation by Carlos Sunrez based on data in United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report, 1992, 1993, 1994 editions Oxford University Press, New York. Figure 9.1a: Relationship between HDI and Per Capita Energy Consumption (1960–65)
Note: Data for 100 developed and developing countries. Source: Calculation by Carlos Sunrez based on data in United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report, 1992, 1993, 1994 editions Oxford University Press, New York. Figure 9.1b: Relationship between HDI and Per Capita Energy Consumption (1991–92)
e energy-utilizing activities, at the time of the survey, consisted of: agricultural operations, domestic activities—gathering fuelwood, fetching water for domestic use particularly drinking, cooking and grasing of livestock, lighting, and industry (pottery, flour mills, etc.).2 ese activities were achieved with human beings, bullocks, fuelwood, kerosene and electricity as direct3 sources of energy. e ranking of sources (in order of percentage of annual requirement) was as follows: (1) fuelwood, (2) human energy, (3) kerosene, (4) bullock energy, and (5) electricity. e ranking of activities was as follows: (1) domestic activities, (2) industry, (3) agriculture, and (4) lighting.
Human energy was distributed between domestic activities (grazing livestock, cooking, gathering fuelwood, fetching water), agriculture, and industry. Bullock energy was used wholly for agriculture, including transport. Fuelwood was used for cooking and heating bath water in the domestic sector, and to a small extent in industry. Kerosene was used predominantly for lighting, and to a small extent in industry. Electricity flowed to agriculture, lighting, and industry. ere are several features of the patterns of energy consumption that must be highlighted. 1. In the case of Pura, what is conventionally referred to as commercial energy, i.e., kerosene and electricity, accounts for a trivial fraction of the inanimate energy used in the village. e overwhelming portion comes from fuelwood. 4 Further, fuelwood must be viewed as a noncommercial source since only a small amount of the total fuelwood requirement was purchased as a commodity, the remainder being gathered at zero private cost. 2. Animate sources, viz., human beings and bullocks, only account for a small percentage of the total energy, but the real significance of this contribution is revealed by the fact that these animate sources represent most of the energy used in agriculture. 3. Virtually all of the village's energy consumption comes from traditional renewable sources—thus, agriculture was largely based on human beings and bullocks, and domestic cooking (which utilizes an overwhelming portion of the total inanimate energy) was based entirely on fuelwood.5 4. However, the environmental soundness of this pattern of dependence on renewable resources was achieved at the exorbitant price of very low productivity especially in agriculture. And large amounts of human energy are spent on fuelwood gathering (on an average, several hours per day per family and several kilometres of
walking to collect a headload of about 10 kg of fuelwood). 5. Fetching water for domestic consumption also utilizes a great deal of human energy (a typical value is 1.5 hr and 1.6 km per day per household) to achieve an extremely low per capita water consumption of less than 20 litres per day. 6. A great deal of human energy is spent on grazing livestock that are a crucial source of supplementary household income. 7. Only a fraction of the houses in typical 'electrified' Indian villages have acquired domestic connections for electric lighting; the remaining houses depend on kerosene lamps. us, village electrification does not mean home electrification. It is obvious that the inhabitants of Indian villages, particularly its women and children, suffer burdens that have been largely eliminated in urban settings by the deployment of inanimate energy. For example, gathering fuelwood and fetching water have been eliminated in most cities by the supply of cooking fuel and piped water, respectively. e serious gender and health implications of rural energy consumption patterns, have been brought out in several studies (Batliwala 1982, 1984, 1987; Aggarwal 1986; Singh and Burra 1994). Since the 1970s, there have been innumerable other studies (e.g., Barnett et al. 1982) of rural energy consumption patterns. e actual numbers show differences depending upon the country, the region of the country, the agro- climatic zone, the proximity to forests, the availability of crop residues, prevalent cropping pattern, etc., but the broad features of the patterns of energy consumption highlighted above have been generally validated. us, the almost universal features of current rural energy consumption patterns all over the developing world are:
the major contribution of arduous human labour (especially the labour of women) for domestic activities and agriculture; the dominance of biomass (in the form of fuelwood, crop residues and/or animal wastes) as a traditional energy source in traditional devices; the overwhelming importance of cooking as an end-use; the dependence in many places on unsafe sources of surface water for domestic requirements; and the darkness between sundown and sunrise because of the lack of electricity and satisfactory illumination.
GOAL FOR RURAL ENERGY SYSTEMS If the goal (objective to be achieved) for all energy systems is sustainable development, then the goal for rural energy systems is that they must be instruments of sustainable rural development. Rural energy systems, therefore, must advance rural economic growth, that is, they must be economically efficient, need-oriented and equitable, self-reliant and empowering, and environmentally sound.
e stress on equity means that rural energy systems must above all promote poverty alleviation involving improvement of the living conditions of the poor. Betterment of the life of the rural poor requires an improvement of the physical quality of life (PQOL) or the human development index (HDI). is improvement of HDI has three crucial dimensions: equity based on a marked increase in access of poor to energy services, empowerment based on strengthening of endogenous selfreliance, and environmental soundness. For an energy system to be in the interests of the rural poor, it must qualify from three points of view. It must increase the access of the rural
poor to affordable, reliable, safe and high quality energy. It must strengthen their self-reliance and empower them. It must improve the quality of their environment (starting with their immediate environment in their households).
HDI and Energy For rural energy systems to help advance sustainable rural development, the emphasis must be on energy services—and not merely on energy consumption (or supply) as an end in itself. e focus has to be on energy services that improve the human development index (HDI) directly (cooking, safe water, lighting, transportation, etc.) as well as indirectly via employment and income generation (motors, process heat, etc.).
e impact of energy on the HDI depends on the end-uses of energy and on the tasks that energy performs. e direct impact of energy is associated inter alia with, and is produced by, cooking, supply of safe water, and lighting. The indirect impact of energy is associated with, and is produced by, electric drives (motors, pumps, compressors) and process heat (processing industries). e role that energy can play in improving the HDI is not just a matter of hope or conjecture. ere is an empirical basis to the relationship between HDI and energy (See Figs. 9.1a and 9.1b). Strictly speaking, the relationship must be between energy services and HDI. If, however, enduse efficiency is virtually a constant, energy consumption can be taken as a proxy for energy services and the Figures 9.1a and 9.1b display the dependence of HDI on energy.
Figure 9.2: 'Elastic' and 'Inelastic' Regions of HDI vs Energy Consumption
e relationship between HDI and energy has several important implications. Firstly, the relationship can be considered to consist of two regimes (Figure 9.2). Secondly, in Regime I, the slope (HDI)/dE of the HDI vs E curve is high, and in Regime II, it is small. Hence, in the 'elastic region' of Regime I, large improvements in HDI can be achieved with small inputs of energy (small improvements of energy services). us, in this regime, the HDIenergy (benefit-cost) ratio is very high. In contrast, in the 'inelastic region' of Regime II, even large inputs of energy (large improvements of energy services) result only in marginal improvements in HDI, i.e., in this regime, the HDI- energy (benefit-cost) ratio is very low.
Another important implication is that, in the 'elastic' Regime I, enhanced energy services lead directly to the improvement of HDI, i.e., energy services → HDI. But, the impact of energy on HDI can also be indirect. Improvements of energy services can yield increased income that can be used to 'purchase' HDI improvements. us, in the inelastic
Regime II, enhanced energy services can lead indirectly to the improvement of HDI via income generation, i.e. energy services → increased income → HDI increase. In the 'elastic' regime, the coupling between HDI and income (used for defraying the operating costs of energy devices) can be reduced. In fact, HDI can even get decoupled from income so that HDI increases can be achieved without income increases. A shi from kerosene lamps to electric lights is an example of the improvement of energy services at operating costs that are the same, or even less than, the costs of using kerosene lamps. In the 'inelastic' Regime II, HDI is coupled to income. But incomecoupled improvement of HDI depends on important conditions being satisfied. e improvement of HDI via income-generation depends on what the income is used for—HDI improvement or drink or gambling or conspicuous consumption. ese conditions in turn oen depend on which gender gets the income—women tend to make expenditures that improve the HDI of their families, particularly their children, i.e., they use a much lower discount rate than men use. us, the implication of the 'elastic' and 'inelastic' regions is that the elastic region guarantees direct improvement of HDI whereas improvement of HDI via income depends on what the income is used for. e direct improvement of HDI is therefore a necessary condition for launching an indirect improvement via income.
Poverty Alleviation e relationship between energy and HDI has profound implications for the strategy for alleviating poverty. In the 1970s, the emphasis in poverty alleviation was on direct satisfaction of basic human needs. However, these concerns were swept aside by the wave of liberalization. It was believed that income generation was the magic wand that would make
poverty vanish. Macro-economic growth became the standard approach to poverty alleviation. Even this did not do the trick, for the benefits of economic growth are absorbed far too slowly by the poor. Attention was then turned to human capital investment, but even this is a slow process. Poverty alleviation directly, rather than indirectly via income generation and human capital formation, is a much surer method of improving the HDI, instead of hoping that income generation will lead to a trickling down of poverty alleviation to the poor. e direct improvement of HDI is therefore a necessary condition for launching an indirect improvement via income.
e 'elastic' Regime I of the energy-HDI relationship shows that dramatic improvements of the HDI can be achieved with very small investments of energy. In fact, it is possible to get a very rough estimate of the energy cost of an 'elastic' improvement of energy services for the poor. Assume that this necessary improvement of energy services for the poor in tropical countries consists of (1) safe, clean and efficient cooking with LPG or LPG-like fuel, and (2) home electrification for lighting, space comfort, food preservation and entertainment. e energy required for cooking would be about 2.3 GJ/capita/year or about 73 watts/capita (abbreviation for watt years/capita year). e electricity for lighting, fans, etc., at twice the consumption of 33 kWh/HH/month of the ordinary connections in Karnataka, would be about 18 watts/capita. is leads to a total of about 91 watts/capita, that can be approximated to 100 watts/capita. 6 us, only about 100 watts/ capita is adequate to achieve dramatic improvement in the quality of life corresponding to safe, clean and efficient cooking with LPG-like fuel and home electrification for lighting, fans, a small refrigerator and a TV. It is worth noting that this 100 watts/capita is only about one-tenth of the level required to support a western Europe living standard with modern energy carriers and energy-efficient technology (Goldemberg et al. 1985: 190–200).
STRATEGIES FOR RURAL ENERGY e strategies for rural energy systems follow from the features of such systems as spelt out above. e specific strategies that would advance the goal of sustainable rural development are: the reduction of arduous human labour (especially the labour of women) for domestic activities and agriculture; the modernization of biomass as an energy source through the use of efficient devices; the transformation of cooking into a safe, healthy and less unpleasant end-use activity; the provision of safe water for domestic requirements; the electrification of all homes (not merely villages); and the provision of energy for income-generating activities in households, farms and village industries. e strategies listed above pertain to what rural energy systems should achieve. But, there should also be strategies that pertain to the process that should be followed. e standard approach to the establishment of new infrastructures (for example, rural energy systems based on new technologies) is for the government to take the initiative. is approach ends up with the emergence of new government agencies and their bureaucracies. With the growing experience and awareness of the defects of government efforts such as red tape, delays and even corruption, the liberalization trend has entered the picture. e market is claimed to be the best solution to the problem of establishing and running economic activities such as the infrastructure.
Hence, the slogan, 'Leave it to the market'. e market may indeed be an excellent allocator of men, materials and resources, but it does not have a very successful record at looking aer equity, the environment, the longterm, and research, development and dissemination of new technologies. us, the market is an inadequate instrument in tasks warranting a low discount rate. ere is, however, a third option of encouraging individual initiative subject to local community control. It has been shown that it is possible to realize 'Blessing of the Commons' situations (Reddy 1995)—the converse of the well-known 'Tragedy of the Commons'—an example of which is the Pura Community Biogas Plant in Tumkur district, Karnataka state. ere, the price that an individual/household pays for not preserving the commons far outweighed whatever benefits there might be in ignoring the collective interest. In other words, there is a confluence of self and collective interest, so that the well-being of the commons is automatically advanced when individuals pursue their private interests. us, individual initiative plus local community control is a third option that can be more effective that either the government or the market acting alone.
Figure 9.3: Selling Price of Photovoltaic (PV) Modules, 1976–92.
This third option suggests three process strategies for rural energy
individual initiative as far as possible through the market; village community monitoring and control; and government facilitation and enabling support.
Choice of Sources and Devices Attention must be focused not only on the supply aspects of the energy system but also on the demand aspects. Rural energy systems must be considered to consist therefore of whole 'fuel' cycles from energy sources through energy carriers to end-users. us, there must be an emphasis on energy sources and efficient end-use devices. e primary sources of energy are fuels and electricity—fuels for cooking (stoves), for process heat (boilers/furnaces/kilns), electricity for lighting (lamps) and for electric drives (motors, pumps and compressors). ere are also opportunities for cogeneration, i.e., the combined production of heat and power. e thrust must be on energy sources and devices that are renewable, biomass-based, universally accessible, affordable, reliable, high quality and safe. Special attention must be devoted to sources that are locally available, small-scale, decentralized and renewable, and systems that are amenable to local control.. e choice of energy sources (fuels and/or electricity) must be guided by preferences for sources that facilitate access by the entire rural population, particularly the rural poor, through micro-utilities and community-scale systems, for compact settlements (high housing density) and home/household systems for isolated homesteads (settlements with low housing
density); are compatible with high-efficiency end-use devices; lend themselves via cogeneration to the production of combined heat and power; are decentralized/locally available to strengthen self-reliance and to empower people/communities; are renewable to promote environmental soundness. Access to (and penetration by) home systems is determined by the affordability of the energy source. Costly sources restrict access to the affluent few and cheap sources facilitate 'universal' generation. Household systems commandeer capital, energy resources and entrepreneurship, and may even pre-empt the establishment and operation of micro-utilities (which increase access by the rural poor). e following questions are important in the choice of end-use devices. Do they directly improve the HDI and/or generate income that (used constructively) improves HDI? Are they accessible to the rural poor? Do the devices have a low enough first cost and operating cost, or do they have the same/lower operating cost as traditional devices (aer innovative financing to convert unacceptable initial costs into affordable operating costs)? Do they benefit women? Are they environmentally sound?
Elitist or Egalitarian If rural energy systems have to be instruments of sustainable rural development, the distribution of the benefits of a rural energy technology has to be scrutinized. Equity impact assessment (EqIA) statements are important. is obligation to anticipate and examine the distributional or equity implications of a technology is mandatory for those who implement technologies for sustainable development. But those who pursue
technologies, particularly renewable energy technologies (RETs) as endsin-themselves to advance global environmental objectives, do not have this obligation to consider distributional or equity implications. Consider the current drive to disseminate photovoltaic solar home systems (PVSHS) in rural India. India's population, according to the 1991 census, was 846 million. e rural population was 74.34 per cent or 623 million, which at 5.5 persons per household, corresponds to 114 million households. 69 per cent of these households, i.e., 78.6 million households, were not electrified. The current initial cost of a SELCO four-light 37 watts PVSHS is Rs 18,500, for which financing from a grameen-type bank can be obtained at 12 per cent interest over a five-year period aer a down payment of 15 per cent (Rs 2,775).7 is corresponds to a household expenditure of Rs 4,362 per year or Rs 364 per month. On average, a household spends about 7.5 per cent of its expenditure on energy. If, to be liberal, this is doubled, it means that 15 per cent of its monthly expenditure is the upper limit of what a household can spend on energy. e monthly expenditure on a PVSHS of Rs 364 per month translates at 15 per cent to a household income of Rs 2,423 per month. e income distribution pattern in India is such that only about 7 per cent of the households have the income required to afford PVSHS. Assuming that only half of those households can afford PVSHS, it appears that much less than 5 per cent of the richest rural households constitute the market for such systems. e potential penetration is greater with the smaller systems. e twolight 20 watts SHS costs Rs 11,500 and can be obtained on the same financing terms as the four-light system. is cheaper system implies Rs 1,725 down payment and Rs 226 per month, requiring an income of Rs 1,506 per month available to about 17 per cent of the households. e one-light 10 watts SHS costs Rs 5,500 and implies (on the same financing terms) Rs 825 down payment and Rs 108 per month, requiring an income of Rs 720 per month available to about 75 per cent of the households.
It follows that the two- and four-light systems can only be afforded by the richest rural sections, constituting 17 and 7 per cent, respectively of the population.8 Even the cheapest one-light PVSHS is beyond the means of the poorest 25 per cent of the rural population. Since PVSHS are inaccessible to the rural poor, the question arises: are they elitist energy sources/devices? If the purpose of PVSHS is not merely to improve the quality of life of the household, but to illuminate activities that augment income, then the elitist characterization may not be applicable. To illustrate, suppose that a one-light PVSHS permits a tribal household to weave two extra baskets per evening to earn Rs 5 per basket and therefore (aer paying for materials) about Rs 250 per month. en the income generated by the PVSHS more than pays for the investment on the light. A similar case is that of a mobile vegetable vendor who can have two extra hours of sales. us, there are non-elitist niche markets for PVSHS.9 Another reason for caution derives from the well known fact that technological advances and organizational learning can bring about major cost reductions in the case of emerging non-yet-mature technologies. e point is well illustrated by the declining trend in the cost of PV modules (See Fig. 9.3). is means that decisions must be made on the basis of future, rather than present costs, that are bound to decline. e implication is that declining costs can erode the elitist character of sources and end-use devices and strengthen their egalitarian character. If, however, sources and end-used devices are elitist, then they will bypass the rural poor, fail to alleviate poverty, make a negligible contribution to energy system, and hardly mitigate negative environmental impacts. ey can, however, offer a small high-profit market for profitmaking enterprises. e skewed distribution of the benefits of some technologies leads to some important questions such as the following. Do elitist sources/devices
pre-empt the possibility of dissemination of affordable sources/devices for rural poor? Do they hijack capital that would otherwise be used for poverty alleviation? Do they divert resources that would otherwise be used for the rural poor, for example, do household-size biogas plants use up the dung that could be used by more cost-effective community-scale plant? Is there a level playing field for elitist sources/devices and devices for rural poor? Are banks and financial institutions biased towards elitist sources/devices?
Figure 9.4: Rural Energy, Biomass Energy and Renewable Energy Technologies
RURAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Financing
A widely held, but erroneous, belief is that the poor cannot afford priced basic services without subsidies.10 e fact of the matter is that the poor are currently paying for these services—food, water, lighting, etc.—either with money or with their labour time. So the question is whether the poor will decide to opt for an alternative way of obtaining the service in preference to their current option. Even when they are getting a service 'free', i.e., without financial cost, they devote their labour time for which there may be other more pleasant and/or lucrative options. us, they may even choose to pay for a service that they normally get 'free'. For example, rural households have preferred to pay for priced safe water in preference to 'free' water from unsafe sources.
e implication is that, for most services, even the poorest rural households can afford to make some payments commensurate with what they are currently spending. And if they are currently getting something 'free', there are opportunity costs associated with the time they spend to obtain the service. e real or opportunity costs of traditional practices are therefore an important benchmark because they invariably define the maximum amount that the household is willing to spend. us, the operating costs of traditional devices (e.g., kerosene lamps) are a sort of upper bound for the costs of an alternative technology. From this point of view, it appears that the problem arises more with the capital costs of new technological options than with their operating costs. Hence, innovative financing can play a major role. Loans (not necessarily so loans), leasing, etc. can convert unacceptably high initial capital costs into manageable affordable operating costs.
In the case of energy, the window of technological opportunity is upperbounded by the maximum possible household expenditure on energy (say 15 per cent). But (aer a favourable financing scheme), the operating costs of proposed (improved) devices (e.g., electric fluorescent lights) can be even lower than the operating costs of traditional devices (kerosene lamps). Technology, therefore, can widen the window of opportunity.
e conversion of capital costs into affordable operating costs requires investments from financial institutions. Fortunately, there are financial institutions/banks/donors that have the capacity to provide the financial inputs for innovative financing. With their backing, rural banks must provide loans for purchase of energy efficient devices (stoves, lamps, drives, boilers/ furnaces/kilns, etc.) to improve HDI directly and indirectly via income generation. ey must also implement schemes for the leasing/financing of energy-efficient devices so that unacceptably high first-costs become acceptable operating costs. However, many of the new tasks are ones to which they are not accustomed and therefore they have to go through a learning process. New energy enterprise(s) may also have to be established if existing institutions such as local-level bodies cannot discharge the new responsibilities. e new energy enterprise(s) must tackle the challenges of marketing of non-conventional energy sources and/or energy efficient devices. New institutional arrangements may also be required. For example, concessions may have to be allotted to enterprises to deliver services to households in a specific region with an obligation to serve even the poorest households. Joint ventures may have to be established to set up decentralized/renewable energy systems compatible with highefficiency devices accessible to the rural poor. It may also be necessary to establish and develop micro-utilities (particularly those run by women) and to commercialize decentralized/ renewable energy sources and energy efficient devices.
Time Horizon e identification of technological options for sources/devices depends very much on the time horizon. Unfortunately, two extreme trends can be observed. Grass roots rural development workers are preoccupied with the immediate problems of the people with whom they work directly. As a
result, they tend to choose technological options that are available straightaway off the shelf. Being totally preoccupied with the present, they use a very high discount rate for their technological decisions. In contrast, technical experts are excited by technological possibilities. ey talk of futuristic solutions as if they are already valid. Being totally preoccupied with the distant future, they use a very low discount rate for their technological decisions. us, the grass roots rural development workers are moved by real human beings and restrict themselves to 'Band-Aid' or quick-fix remedies forgetting about long-term sustainable solutions. In contrast, technologists are sometimes enamoured with technological innovations although these will take quite considerable time to become realities. ey are little concerned with the fact that, while waiting for the pie in the sky, people are condemned to remain in their present misery. Obviously, an either-or approach must be avoided. Starting from the present technology (the initial condition), there is a necessity of three types of technology for each energy-utilizing task. A near-term technology should lead to immediate improvement compared to the present situation. A medium- term technology to achieve a dramatic advance should be available in five to ten years. And a long-term technology should prevail aer say twenty to thirty years and provide an ideal sustainable solution. Ideally, the technologies for the near, medium- and long-terms should be forward compatible so that the technology at any one stage should be upgradable to the better version. And in planning efforts, it is wise to have a balanced portfolio with a combination of near-, medium- and long-term technologies. Guarantees of near-term improvements before the next election will win over political decision-makers and ensure that they support long-term technologies. It is implicit that the technologies for the near-, medium- and longterms are the most appropriate or 'best' technologies for each period, selected by a 'natural selection' process of competition discussed later. In other words, one is thinking of a transition from the most appropriate
technology for the near-term, to the 'best' technology for the mediumterm, and then to the 'best' technology for the long-term. Implicit in this approach is the concept of technological leapfrogging, according to which the historical path of technological evolution is replaced by the 'best' technology for the next period. is technological leap-frogging approach is fundamentally different from the so-called 'energy ladder' approach according to which there is a climb from the technology corresponding to one step of the ladder to that corresponding to the next higher step. For example, in the case of cooking, the climb (with increasing income) is from fuelwood to charcoal to kerosene to LPG/electricity. But the energy ladder is a description of the past and present behaviour of consumers. In contrast, technological leapfrogging is a normative prescription of future behaviour. So, the recommendation is that rural areas do not replicate the energy ladder behaviour of the past and present but adopt a technological leap-frogging approach.
Technological Options
e present emphasis with regard to electricity as a convenient energy carrier is on grid electricity. However, due to the problems of supplying grid electricity to small and scattered loads, the attraction of decentralized generation of electricity is increasing. Where appropriate, decentralized generation from the intermittent sources of wind and/or small hydel, solar photovoltaics and solar-thermal, have roles to play. e exciting development is the availability of ~100 kW micro-turbines and ~10 mW biomass integrated gasifier combined cycle (IGCC) turbines. Biomassbased generation of fuels to run fuel cells is an attractive long-term option, particularly because there are possibilities of generating surplus base-load power that can be exported from rural areas to urban metropolises. At present, the predominant fuel in rural areas is biomass, particularly fuelwood and agricultural crop residues. A switch to stoves and furnaces
fuelled with biogas, producer gas, natural gas and LPG is an obvious next step. But modern LPG-like fuels derived from biomass, so-called biofuels syngas in general and dimethyl ether (DME) in particular, may be the medium- and long-term answer. It is important not to be locked into thinking separately about electricity generation and heating. e co-generation of electricity and process heat is an attractive proposition that is well known particularly, when the utilization of the heat can be achieved close to the device generating electricity. Decentralized electricity generation facilitates this combined production of heat and power. It is even possible to go one step further with so-called 'tri- generation' systems that combine the production of heat, power and liquid fuels (synthetic LPG) in Fischer-Tropsch reactors and biomass integrated gasifier (~10 MW) combined cycle (IGCC) turbines (Larson and Halming 1999).
In the case of cooking, the perspective should be to go from the present inefficient, unhealthy stoves using arduously gathered fuelwood, through improved woodstoves to gaseous-fuelled stoves to clean, efficient and convenient stoves operating on electricity or on gaseous biomass-based biofuels. Catalytic burners may also have a place. e provision of safe water is a crucial task that yields an enormous payoff in terms of improved health. But, it invariably requires inputs of energy to go from surface water (oen contaminated) to 'safe' ground water lied from tubewells, to filtered or UV filtrated or treated water to safe piped water. With roughly 60 to 70 per cent of rural households being without electricity connections and therefore forced to depend on lamps burning plant oils or kerosene, the way forward is electric incandescent bulbs that are replaced as rapidly as possible with fluorescent tubelights and compact fluorescent lamps. Radical improvements in the quality of life oen depend on replacing
human and animal power with motive power based on electric motors and engines driven by the combustion of fuels. Today, fossil fuels are conventional sources for engines but prime movers running on biomassderived fuels and hydrogen are the future. In parallel, motors with much greater efficiency should be implemented. e plight of women is very much connected to their being forced to put in enormous amounts of arduous physical labour performing various household chores. A key objective of rural energy must therefore involve the reduction of this manual labour with appliances. e advance can then be from simple electrical appliances to efficient appliances and superefficient appliances. Rural industries such as pottery and metalworking are currently based on process heat derived from fuelwood and/or other biomass sources such as sugarcane bagasse. Future developments have to be based on electric furnaces, cogenerated heat, producer gas and natural gas fuelled furnaces, and solar thermal and induction furnaces. e long-term future will perhaps belong to furnaces based on biomass-derived fuels. Table 9.1: Sources and Devices for the Near-, Medium- and Long-Term
Rural transport particularly within villages and from house to farm and vice versa is today based overwhelmingly on animal-drawn vehicles and human-powered bicycles. Mechanization, however, is making inroads with vehicles fuelled with petroleum products gasoline/motor spirit and diesel. Natural-gas-fuelled vehicles are bound to play a part. Over the medium- term, however, vehicles can be run on biomass-derived fuels such as producer gas and/or methanol and/or ethanol and over the long-
term, fuel-cell-driven vehicles are the option. e technological sources and devices for the near-, medium- and longterm are summarized in Table 9.1. Real costs are of course the fundamental criterion for identifying technologies. But it is also necessary to consider other sustainable development implications of the near- and long-term technological options. In particular, their efficiency, accessibility, employment generation potential, their relationship to urban areas and environmental sustainability have to be considered. A broad characterization of the nearand long-term technological options from these points of view is given in Table 9.2.
Implementation However well craed the rural energy strategies, they will not succeed unless the barriers that they face are identified and specific policies designed to overcome them. ere is a market sub-set of barriers to new, rural energy options. ese include subsidies to conventional rural energy options (open and hidden), limited access to information and first-cost sensitivity (where household decisions are based on initial, rather than life-cycle, costs). But there is also the barrier of indifference to energy costs, particularly when these costs are not in terms of money, but in terms of the labour of women leading to limited attention to alternative energy options. Table 9.2: Developmental Implications of Near- and Long-Term Options
Another sub-set of barriers consists of non-market barriers, including the supply-biased paradigm, vested interests (in the private and public sector), institutional obstacles, and lack of institutions. e vested interests benefit from business-as-usual approaches and practices and, therefore, resist change. e institutional obstacles include the monopoly position of utilities and the lack of appropriate rules for interaction between relevant organizations. ere may not even be appropriate institutions to address new challenges. Policies are specific courses of action to implement strategies (the broad plans) to reach the goal. To implement the rural energy strategies listed earlier, it is necessary to have policies that implement the strategies whilst overcoming the barriers. e more obvious of these policies are indicated below. A fundamentally important issue concerns the choice of technology. In a command-and-control set-up, technologies are chosen in a top-down manner by government. In effect, this means that the choice is made by bureaucrats. Unfortunately, such choices are oen notoriously defective. One has only to recall the breeder reactor programmes of the US, France and Japan, or the super sonic transport (SST) plane. e other option is to allow the market to make the choice through a process of competition. ough the market option is attractive, the problem is that it is effective only when there is a level playing field for the various contending
technologies. is means that there should be deliberate policies to ensure that there is a level playing field for centralized supply and decentralized village-level supply and for supply expansions and end-use efficiency improvement. e problem is that yet-to-mature emerging rural energy technologies must not be compared on the basis of their current costs with mature conventional technologies. e place of emerging technologies must be determined on the basis of their future costs resulting from technological advances and organizational learning. Policies must promote household-level supply when the cost of household- level system is less than the per household cost of a community system plus the distribution cost. ey must advance community-based supply of energy sources when the cost of sources for N households (i.e., cost of generation) plus the cost of the distribution network is less (i.e., more cost-effective) than the cost of N householdlevel sources. But there should also be policies to encourage 'centralized' multi-community supply of sources if the generation plus distribution is more cost-effective than community-level sources. Policies are required to promote integrated resource planning in order to identify least-cost mixes of sources associated devices. Notwithstanding the importance of the cost criterion for the choice of technology, there are other sustainable development criteria that are crucial. In particular, a technology has to be accepted by society for it to be socially sustainable. is means that there has to be social participation in the choice of technology. Special policies are required to ensure that the process of technology choice is transparent and democratic. In this process, whatever criteria can be quantified must be quantified. And criteria that cannot be quantified today should, as an interim measure, be represented with traffic lights colours—green for 'acceptable', red for 'not acceptable' and amber for 'uncertain'—while setting in motion a discovery of the method of quantification (Reddy 1979). Policies are necessary for the development and dissemination of
technologies for direct HDI improvement (cooking, safe water, home electrification for lighting, space conditioning for comfort, etc.), as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition, and for indirect HDI improvement, via income generation (stationary and mobile motive power, process heating, etc.), ensuring that the resulting income does indeed go to HDI improvement. Policies are necessary for immediate-term, medium-term and long-term time-horizons for technology development and dissemination, noting that what is urgently required is immediate improvement of energy services to better the quality of life of the rural poor. Most rural energy technologies (stoves, windmills, biogas plants, wood gasifiers, etc.) have evolved through several generations. e first generation of unsuccessful devices was oen the result of the enthusiasm of unqualified amateurs. e second generation of successful prototypes emerged from the creative efforts of competent technologists. e third challenge involved the conversion of prototypes into products in the economy, i.e., commercialization for large-scale dissemination. is third generation required management inputs. Hence, for each rural energy system, for example, producer gas-based electricity generation, it is vital to have an entire hardware plus 'soware' 11 implementation package. Such packages must consist of the technology, economics, financing, management, training, institutions, etc., necessary for the dissemination of that system. Unfortunately, far too oen, crucial elements (for example, institutional requirements) are missing in the dissemination programmes, leading to failures. Hence, policies to encourage the preparation of implementation packages are imperative. Unlike conventional energy sources/end-use technologies, most new rural energy technologies are in the process of maturing. In particular, their costs are declining because of technological advances and organizational learning. Hence, it is important to have policies that actively promote technological advances and organizational learning.
If subsidies are used as a policy instrument, they must be time-bound with a sunset clause, and they must be justified on the basis that they are definitely promoting technological advances and organizational learning. Above all, subsidies must not be a permanent crutch inhibiting the advancement of the technology.12 e establishment and operation of rural energy systems should lead to local capacity building in the matter of hardware (technology) and 'soware' (particularly management). Policies must be put in place to promote the building up of this capacity at the rural level. Special attention must be given to operation and maintenance know-how as distinct from construction and design know-how. It is vital that policies include a key role for women as users, operators and entrepreneurs in rural energy systems.
Policies that enable and ensure people's participation (in particular for the supply of resources and payment for services) as households and/or as a community are imperative. Policies are crucial to arrange/enable financing (through leasing, loans, etc.) for households and communities, so that unacceptably high initial capital costs are converted into manageable operating costs. It is important to have democratic and transparent institutional arrangements at the rural level to monitor rural energy systems. Clear transparent records, and accounts and regular functioning of such institutions are crucial. Consequently, policies for encouraging and supporting these rural institutions are important. In view of the shortcomings of government implementation, the strengths of entrepreneurship and the market mechanism as well as the advantage of local community action have to be exploited for operations independent of the government. Nevertheless, government involvement in rural energy system is essential to provide an enabling environment. Above all, parallel operations by government must not compete with rural
energy systems.13 us, policies for ensuring synergistic government support for individual and/or community operation of rural energy systems are vital. Policies are required to promote new energy enterprise(s) to be established if existing institutions such as local-level bodies cannot discharge the new responsibilities. Policies must also encourage financial institutions/banks/ donors to take on new tasks.
RURAL BIOMASS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY
In articulating the rural energy strategies outlined above and in implementing the associated rural energy policies, it is important to prevent rural energy from getting mixed up with biomass energy and renewable energy. The distinctions are elaborated in the following. e inter-relationships between rural energy, biomass energy, renewable energy and sustainable development are brought out in Figure 4. e set of renewable energy technologies (RETs) at the bottom of the figure consists of both decentralized and centralized RETs. It is the decentralized RETs that are appropriate for rural areas. e decentralized rural RETs are of two types: biomass-based and those that are not biomass-based. Together, they are the basis of sustainable rural energy, i.e., the energy for sustainable rural development. On the other hand, the centralized RETs that are appropriate for urban areas, the urban RETs, are also of two types: biomass-based and those that are not biomass-based. Together, they are the basis of sustainable urban energy, i.e., energy for sustainable urban development. It is important to ensure a synergy between sustainable rural energy and between sustainable rural development and sustainable urban development. is delineation of the distinctions and scope of rural energy, biomass energy, renewable energy and sustainable development is particularly
important because all the categories do not enjoy the same political standing. Sustainable development is given lip-service at international conferences but, with the country, there are no political and economic instruments for its implementation. Worse still, following some industrialized country interpretations, sustainable development is equated with environmentally sound development, ignoring its equity and empowerment (self-reliance) dimensions. Specialized agencies responsible for biomass energy and rural energy are absent in India. Only renewable energy has been given political approval through the formation of a ministry of non-conventional energy sources. But, it is easy to see that, particularly when the efforts are guided by market forces, an emphasis on renewable energy can be restricted to technologies that cater to urban energy demands and/or centralized biomass energy. e rural poor are too weak economically to articulate their needs as market demand. us, it appears that the ministry of nonconventional energy sources cannot give rural energy the special attention and emphasis that it deserves. Rural energy requires the co-ordinated effort of several ministries including rural development, power, petroleum, etc., in addition to the ministry of non-conventional energy sources. New institutional arrangements are required such as an inter-ministerial task force. If rural energy strategies and policies are oriented towards the goal of sustainable rural development in the manner outlined above, they will have implications for other pressing social problems. Above all, they will result in a betterment of the quality of life and the HDI. They will advance poverty alleviation in a direct way. In addition, they will dramatically improve the position of women. e life of children will also be improved. e rural environment and the health of rural inhabitants will take a turn for the better. In the long run, there will be a positive impact on population growth. us, a focus on rural energy will have a synergistic effect on an array of major social problems.
REFERENCES Aggarwal, Bina. 1986. Cold Hearths and Barren Slopes: e Woodfuel Crisis in the ird World, Allied Publishers, New Delhi and Zed Books, London. ASTRA. 1982. 'Rural Energy Consumption Patterns—A Field Study', Biomass, Vol. 2, No. 4, September. Barnett, A., M. Bell and K. Hoffman. 1982. Rural Energy and the ird World, Pergamon Press, Oxford. Batliwala, Srilatha. 1982. 'Rural Energy Scarcity and Nutrition: A New Perspective', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 17, No. 9, February 27. ——. 1984. 'Rural Energy Situation: Consequences for Women's Health', Socialist Health Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, September, pp. 75. ——. 1987. 'Women's Access to Food', e Indian Journal of Social Work, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, October, pp. 255–71. Goldemberg, J., T.B. Johansson, A.K.N. Reddy and R.H. Williams. 1985. 'Basic Needs and much more with 1 kW per capita', Ambio, Vol. 14, No. 4–5. Larson, E.D. and Jin Halming. 1999. 'A Preliminary Assessment of Biomass Conversion to FischerTropsch Cooking Fuels for Rural China', Proceedings of the Fourth Biomass Conference of the Americas, Oakland, C.A., August 29– September 2. Parikh, Jyoti, Kirk Smith and Vijay Laxmi. 1999. 'Indoor Air Pollution: A Reflection on Gender Bias', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 9, February 27–March 5. Reddy, A.K.N. 1995. 'Blessing of the Commons', Energy for Sustainable Development, Vol. 2, No. 1, May, pp. 48–50. ——. 1997. Technology, Development and the Environment: A Reappraisal, United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi. Singh, A.M. and N. Burra (eds.). 1994. Women and Waste and Development, Sage, New Delhi. e World Bank. 1996. 'Rural Energy and Development: Improving Energy Supplies for Two Billion People'.
10
The Design of Rural Energy Centres
INTRODUCTION
The
growing realization that the benefits of growth in developing countries have not 'trickled down' to the rural poor has stimulated global interest in technologies for rural development. In particular, problems of rural energy have attracted widespread attention. is attention has focused on descriptions of the rural energy 'crisis' (Eckholm 1976), guesstimates of rural consumption patterns (Prasad et al. 1974; Makhijani 1976; Revelle 1976; Reddy and Prasad 1977, Reddy 1978), the formation of centres/groups for village energy studies,1 the organization of seminars/symposia on the subject,2 and the design of technological packages for rural energy centers (Anon 1976). e centre for the Application of Science and Technology to Rural Areas (ASTRA) has been compelled, from its very inception, to interest itself in rural energy by the constant complaint of the villagers with whom it was in contact that 'fuel' was one of their most pressing problems. Several difficulties, however, came to the fore immediately. Firstly, there was hardly any information at all on energy consumption patterns now prevalent in villages. Data was available on U.K. or U.S.A., but not on villages a few kilometres from the institute. Secondly, even if the information had been available, a proven methodology for rural energy planning was lacking.
us, in the villages in which it is working, ASTRA had to start from 'zero', develop an energy data base and then formulate an energy strategy for implementation. ough ASTRA's work is just entering the implementation phase, its preliminary methodology for rural energy planning is being reported here to provoke scrutiny and refinement.
BASIC APPROACH All attempts at external intervention in rural life are inspired, consciously or unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly, by a viewpoint on rural development. ASTRA's perspective (Reddy 1979) has been a rural development which is: need-oriented ('starting from the needs of the neediest'), self-reliant, and environmentally sound. Such a perspective demands that rural energy planning be based on an approach consisting of the following steps: 1. elucidation of current rural energy consumption patterns; 2. translation of these patterns into a set of energy needs arranged according to priority; 3. consideration of the feasible technological options, including the traditional ones, of satisfying these energy needs with the available resources; 4. selection of the 'best' option for satisfying each category of need; 5. integration of the selected options into a system. is approach has been used for the design of a rural energy centre for Pura village, 3 and will therefore be described with reference to this concrete case.
PURA'S ENERGY CONSUMPTION PATTERN
With no precedent to follow, the methodology for ASTRA's survey of rural energy consumption patterns was evolved through a 'trial run' in four villages, the lessons of which were used to make a detailed study of six villages including Pura. Whereas the 'trial run' was based wholly on verbal responses to questions from a questionnaire, the detailed study was based, in addition, on observations and measurements. Since Pura's energy consumption pattern is described in detail elsewhere (Ravindranath et al. 1979), only those features essential for the design of a rural energy centre for the village are outlined below. e energy-utilizing activities in Pura are: 4 agricultural operations (with ragi and rice as the main crops), domestic activities, such as the grazing of livestock, cooking, gathering firewood and fetching water for domestic use including drinking, lighting and industry (pottery, flour mill and coffee shop). ese activities are achieved with the following direct sources of energy: human beings, bullocks, firewood, kerosene and electricity. An aggregated matrix showing how the various energy sources are distributed over the various energy-utilizing activities is presented in Table 1 in the units appropriate to the sources. Notwithstanding the methodological and conceptual problems in converting the various sources to a common energy unit (e.g., kilocalories), there are three advantages in doing so: (i) an idea can be obtained of the relative contributions of the various sources to the total energy consumption (ii) a summation over all sources contributing to a particular activity leads to the total magnitude of energy it now utilizes (iii) the total magnitudes of energy for the various activities facilitates a ranking of these magnitudes. Using the following conversion factors: 250 kcal/man hour, 200 kcal/woman hour, 120 kcal/child hour, 2300 kcal/bullock hour, 3800 kcal/kg firewood,5 860.4 kcal/kWh electricity, and 8980 kcal/litre kerosene, a source-activity matrix for Pura village has been obtained (Table 10.2).
Table 10.1: Energy Sources and Activities in Pura
Table 10.2: Pura Energy Sources-Activities Matrix ('106 kcals/year)
e matrix yields the following ranking of sources (in order of percentage of annual requirement): fire wood 89 per cent, human energy 7 per cent, kerosene 2 per cent, bullock energy 1 per cent, electricity 1 per cent. e ranking of activities is as follows: domestic activities 91 per cent, industry 4 per cent, agriculture 3 per cent, lighting 2 per cent.
Human energy is distributed thus: domestic activities 80 per cent (grazing livestock 37 per cent, cooking 19 per cent, gathering firewood 14 per cent, fetching water 10 per cent), agriculture 12 per cent, and industry 8 per cent. Bullock energy is used wholly for agriculture including transport. Firewood is used to the extent of 96 per cent (cooking 82 per cent and heating bath water 14 per cent) in the domestic sector, and 4 per cent in industry. Kerosene is used predominantly for lighting (93 per cent), and to a small extent in industry (7 per cent). Electricity flows to
agriculture (65 per cent), lighting (28 per cent) and industry (7 per cent). ere are several features of the pattern of energy consumption in Pura which must be highlighted.
1. What is conventionally referred to as commercial energy, i.e., kerosene and electricity in the case of Pura, accounts for a mere 3 per cent of the inanimate energy used in the village, the remaining 97 per cent coming from firewood. 6 Further, notwithstanding recent doubts (Rudolph and Lenth 1978), firewood must be viewed as a noncommercial source since only about 4 per cent of the total firewood requirement of Pura is purchased as a commodity, the remainder being gathered at zero private cost.
2. Animate sources, like human beings and bullocks, only account for about 8 per cent of the total energy, but the real significance of this contribution is revealed by the fact that these animate sources represent 77 per cent of the energy used in Pura's agriculture. In fact, this percentage would have been much higher were it not for the operation of four electrical pumpsets in Pura which account for 23 per cent of the total agricultural energy. 3. Virtually all of Pura's energy consumption comes from traditional renewable sources—thus agriculture is largely based on human beings and bullocks, and domestic cooking (which utilizes about 80 per cent of the total inanimate energy) is based entirely on firewood.7 4. However, the environmental soundness of this pattern of dependence on renewable resources is achieved at an exhorbitant price: levels of agricultural productivity are very low, and large amounts of human energy are spent on firewood gathering (on the average, about 2.6 hr and 4.8 km per day per family to collect about 10 kg of firewood). 5. Fetching water for domestic consumption also utilizes a great deal of
human energy (an average of 1.5 hr and 1.6 km per day per household) to achieve an extremely low per capita water consumption of 17 litres per day. 6. 46 per cent of the human energy is spent on grazing livestock (5.8 hr/ day/household), which is a crucial source of supplementary household income. 7. Children contribute a crucial 30 per cent, 20 per cent and 34 per cent of the labour for gathering firewood, fetching water and grazing livestock respectively. eir labour contributions are vital to the survival of families, a point oen ignored by population and education planners. 8. Only 25 per cent of the houses in the 'electrified' village of Pura have acquired domestic connections for electric lighting, the remaining 75 per cent of the houses depend on kerosene lamps, and of these lamps, 78 per cent are of the open-wick type. 9. A very small amount of electricity, 30 kWh/day, flows into Pura, and even this is distributed in a highly inegalitarian way—65 per cent of this electricity goes to the 4 irrigation pumpsets of 3 landowners, 28 per cent to illuminate 14 out of 56 houses, and the remaining 7 per cent for one flour-mill owner.
PURA'S ENERGY NEEDS e above pattern of energy consumption constitutes the data base for formulating an energy plan for Pura. is objective is facilitated by representing energy consumption in terms of end-uses or tasks classified with a physics perspective, rather than on the basis of socio-economic significance. It is also convenient to separate the end-uses of inanimate and animal energy from those of human energy—whereas the former permit the selection of sources and devices appropriate to the energy-
utilizing tasks, the latter enable a consideration of alternative systems that will improve the quality of life by alleviating or eliminating drudgery. Such an end-use analysis for Pura is shown in Table 10.3, which also contains the output energies taking into account the efficiencies of energy utilization. Table 10.3: End-uses of Energy in Pura Inanimate and Animal Energy
In the first part of the table, the end-uses of inanimate and animal energy (along with indicative temperatures corresponding to these tasks) are ranked in order of decreasing magnitude of energy utilized. is ranking according to magnitude may be considered to provide an initial list of priorities for energy planning. For the list to promote development,
end-uses which involve satisfaction of the needs of the neediest or the majority can be given an extra weight, e.g., lighting, which all homes require, can be given a higher weight than power for private pumpsets. Such an approach leads to the identification of the energy requirement of cooking, i.e., medium-temperature heating (95–250°C), as the first priority in rural energy planning. Unfortunately, this is one requirement which is totally ignored in virtually all current thinking—for example, rural electrification, which is being promoted as the answer to rural energy problems does not envisage meeting cooking energy needs even in a remote future. once important urgent priorities are met, other items must move up the list. at is, the priority list must change with time. In such a dynamic perspective, end-uses relating to crop production, e.g., water liing and mobile power for ploughing, to post-harvest operations, and to village industries, should quickly take high priority. e second part of Table 10.3 represents the end-uses of human energy in Pura. It is obvious that the inhabitants of Pura suffer burdens which have been largely eliminated in urban settings by the deployment of inanimate energy. For example, gathering firewood and fetching water can be eliminated by the supply of cooking fuel and water respectively. us, energy planning for Pura must scrutinize the expenditures of human energy to see whether they involve necessary employment, meaningful work or avoidable drudgery. is exercise will lead to important additional priorities in an energy plan for Pura. ese priorities must include the supply of cooking fuel to Pura's homes, the provision of a convenient water supply, and the production of fodder and feed for livestock. Unfortunately, improvements in the quality of life through an alteration in the pattern of expenditure of human energy rarely form part of the agenda of rural energy planning. However, great caution must be exercised with regard to human energy in agriculture and industry to ensure that inanimate energy inputs do not aggravate the human
condition, for example, by increasing total unemployment.
PURA'S ENERGY RESOURCES
Pura's energy resource position must next be examined. Pura, like most Indian villages, has no fossil fuel resources. Even if it had, the use of irreplaceable fossil fuels for energy is debatable. Pura's only internal energy sources are those arising directly, or indirectly, from photosynthesis. ough, in principle, all biomass can be harnessed for energy purposes (if necessary, aer suitable processing), the materials which are immediately usable in Pura are firewood, crop wastes (e.g., rice husk) and animal wastes.
e present pattern of firewood usage is unsustainable for more than a few years—firewood is a rapidly dwindling resource. For firewood to become a dependable resource (instead of a liability), it must be harvested from efficiently managed 'energy forests' where fast-growing trees are grown specifically for their firewood output. In such an alternative pattern of firewood usage, the resource position depends upon the particular species that are grown, and of course on the land made available for the energy forest. A yield of about 50 tonnes of dry wood per hectare per year can be assumed for species such as Casuarina or Leucaena leucocephala (Seshadri 1978). us, about 5 hectares will yield Pura's present firewood consumption of 217 tonnes per year. e firewood from an energy forest can either be used directly or aer conversion to charcoal or methanol. Notwithstanding these attractive features, energy forests are associated with long gestation times of 3–5 years, and cannot therefore be part of an immediate solution. In perhaps the same category is ethanol production which can be established in a few years. One hectare of land annually yields about 100 tonnes of sugarcane and therefore 4.4 tonnes of molasses, from which about 870 litres of ethyl alcohol fuel can be obtained (Prasad et al. 1979).
one important difference between fuel-wood forests and ethanol from sugarcane plantations is that the latter requires 'good' agricultural land suitable for foodgrain production, in contrast to the former, which can make do with non-arable land. us, the development of these two types of fuel resources must be part of an optimum land-use planning. In so far as the land under forest cover is far below the 30 per cent declared as optimum, the development of energy forests should perhaps be preferred. In contrast to the relatively long gestation times associated with the growth of energy forests and the development of ethanol production, animal wastes are a major resource which can be tapped within a year. e energy survey indicated that Pura's cattle population of 143 yields about 1.02 tonnes of wet dung per day from overnight droppings alone. 8 is minimum of 370 tonnes of wet dung per year is basically a cellulosic material which can be anaerobically fermented in a biogas plant to yield at least9 35 m3 per day or 12,775 m3 per year of biogas (60–70 per cent) per cent CH4 and 30–40 per cent CO2) with a calorific value of 5340–6230 kcal/m3.9 e two renewable energy inputs flowing into Pura spontaneously are solar and wind energy. Measurements of solar insolation at Pura have not been made, but the data from Bangalore indicates an average solar power of about 0.8 kW/m 2. Of course, the diffuse character of solar energy, and its restriction to about one-third of a day are well-known. Wind data have been obtained at the ASTRA Extension Centre, about 2 km from Pura. ough the average wind speed is about 15 km/hour, it can go as high as 30–40 km/hour for 1–2 hr intervals. But, there is a marked seasonality in the wind, with about 80 per cent of the annual wind energy of about 6000 kWh/hectare being available in about four months of the year (Shrinivasa et al. 1978).
Electricity and kerosene are both energy sources which are imported into Pura. At present, Pura consumes an average of 30 kWh/day of
electricity. is low figure is primarily because the present demand is from the relatively rich of Pura who are very few in number—only 25 per cent of the homes have electric lights and a mere 5 per cent own irrigation pumpsets. But, even if this demand were to increase markedly, there are major difficulties in making the supply from the grid keep pace. Firstly, the growth of electricity generation has fallen far short of the rise of nationwide demand, even though the rural share is less than 20 per cent. Secondly, increasing the capacity of lines to villages implies increased transmission and distribution costs, which are already above Rs 3000/kW. ese constraints on generation and transmission mean that grid electricity must be viewed as a limited resource even if the generation is from renewable sources, e.g., hydel generation. e situation is quite similar with kerosene. 40 per cent of the country's 3.4 million tonnes consumption in 1977-78 was imported from abroad, and domestic lighting accounts for almost 60 per cent of the total consumption (Shah 1979). With jet aircra being strong competitors for the supply, it is clear that Pura cannot count on imported kerosene as an energy resource for long, i.e., Pura must find a substitute for kerosene as rapidly as possible.
SELECTION OF SOURCES AND TECHNOLOGIES TO MEET PURA'S ENERGY NEEDS e fundamental problem of rural energy planning, and of the design of rural energy centres, can be stated thus: given the energy resources and requirements, what is the optimum way of harnessing i energy sources with the aid of j devices to achieve k energy-requiring tasks subject to l constraints? In other words, if ijk is designated as an energy path by which a source i is utilized with the aid of a device j to fulfill an energy task k, what is the optimum set of energy paths, and the optimum energy flow along each one of this set, to meet the energy needs with the available resources? An immediate solution is required to meet present needs, but it
is also essential to anticipate change, and to develop solutions which cater to the contours of future needs. A rigorous methodology for solving the fundamental problem posed above has yet to be developed. Pending such an achievement, a heuristic approach has been adopted for Pura's energy needs.
In the case of Pura, the energy-requiring tasks have been listed in Table 3, from which it may be seen that k = 6, viz., medium-temperature heating (95–250°C), low temperature heating (~55°C), lighting (~2000°C), stationary power, mobile power and high-temperature heating (~800°C). e inanimate energy sources available in Pura now or in the very near future are: energy forests, ethanol, biogas, solar energy, wind energy, grid electricity and kerosene; i.e., I = 7. Despite the limited number of tasks and of sources, a very large number of energy paths can be considered while going from sources to tasks. Even excluding multiple paths between particular sources and particular tasks (e.g., biogas → mantle lamp, and biogas engine → generator → electric bulb), the number of conceivable paths can be as many as 42 in the Pura case. In this context, guidance can be sought from the second law of thermodynamics, and in particular, the concept of second law efficiencies. is concept has been elaborately discussed in a report sponsored by the American Physical Society (Anon 1975), and therefore, only its important implications will be cited here:
1. Every energy source must be associated with a grade or quality, which may be determined by its temperature or the temperature it can produce. Low temperature heat is the lowest grade (or quality) energy, electrical and mechanical energy (which correspond to infinite temperatures) are the highest quality energy, and chemical fuels (coal, oil, biogas) come in between. 2. e second law efficiency is the ratio of the actual useful work/heat transferred with a given source and device to the maximum possible
work/heat transferable by any source and device for the same task. us, the second-law efficiency sets up an ideal or norm for a particular task k. It permits a screening of various energy paths ijk for the achievement of that task k, and the selection of the path with the highest second-law efficiency. Whereas the first-law efficiency, which is the ratio of the actual useful work/heat output of a given source and device in the performance of the task to the energy input, reveals how well the given source and device is performing, the second law efficiency shows which (of a number of alternative sources and devices) is the best source and device for achieving the task. 3. For a given task, it is the maximization of second law efficiencies that determines the minimization of fuel consumption in the case of consumable fuels, and of capital costs in the case of renewable sources. 4. e maximization of second law efficiencies implies that sources and devices must be matched to the task. is matching is facilitated by two thumb-rules: (a) 'Do not use a higher quality source than the task deserves!', and (b) 'For the matched source, choose the device which transfers the most useful work/heat!' us, second law efficiencies are a powerful heuristic for selecting the technically 'best' energy technologies (sources and devices) for the various tasks that need to be performed. Unfortunately, the values of second-law efficiencies have not been tabulated for all paths ijk to various tasks k. In the case of paths for which second-law efficiencies are not available, a programme of determining them must be launched. 10 Pending the establishment of a complete table of second-law efficiencies, the thumb rules can be used. Table 10.4: Selection of Sources and Devices for Pura
e second additional constraint concerns the development criterion of self-reliance. Imports of energy into the village can be ruled out in the first iteration, and permitted only when it is found that internal energy sources and those coming into the system 'free' (solar, wind, flowing water) cannot meet the energy needs. In other words, local resources must be chosen, unless they are inadequate to satisfy the needs. e third additional constraint arises from the development criterion of environmental soundness. To sustain development over the long run, renewable sources of energy must be chosen. Hence, depletable sources (fossil fuels) must be excluded. e fourth additional constraint is that of power. e constraint becomes relevant whenever a task k must be completed within a certain time tk, e.g., ploughing or harvesting or grain drying. en, if the task
requires the expenditure of energy Ek, its power requirement is Pk = Ek/tk. is means that all paths involving sources i and devices j which deliver less power than is required for the task, Pijk ≪ Pk, are unacceptable; only those which satisfy the condition11 Pijk =≫ Pk, can fulfil the task.12 e fih additional constraint is that of availability of the technologies. Some energy paths (sources and devices for tasks) may be very attractive, but unavailable right now. Hence, immediate choices must be tentative, and when attractive options appear 'on the shelf ', they can be incorporated into the solution later. e additional constraints described above narrow down the choice drastically. In the case of Pura,13 the choice gets restricted to: biogas and biogas burners for medium-temperature heating, electricity and incandescent lamps (or fluorescent tubes) for lighting, wind (whenever available) and windmills for stationary power (particularly water-liing), biogas and biogas engines for stationary power (including water-liing at sites close to biogas plant). In the case of low-temperature heating, mobile power, high-temperature heating and water-liing for agriculture at sites which are not convenient either for wind or biogas energy, further technology development and/or analysis is required before definite choices are made to replace or supplement currently used sources and devices. With regard to those energy-utilizing tasks in Pura which now involve expenditures of human energy (Table 10.3), gathering firewood and fetching water are directly related to cooking fuel and water supply respectively. Hence, by meeting the energy needs of medium-temperature heating and stationary power for domestic water-liing, the expenditure of human energy on gathering firewood and fetching water can be wholly or partly reduced. The activity of free grazing of livestock is associated with the problem of fodder, which must be solved in association with the fuel problem through two-tier fodder-cum-fuel forests. The question of human energy in agriculture and industry is part of the larger issue of
employment generation and productivity increase and involves major socio-economic considerations which will not be dealt with here. e use of the thumb rules leads in the case of Pura to the selection of a very limited set of energy paths, i.e., sources and devices to achieve the tasks corresponding to the energy needs of Pura (Table 10.4). To restrict the alternatives further, additional constraints must be imposed. e first additional constraint is the necessity of matching the timedependence of the energy-utilizing task (the local curve for the task) with the time-variation, if any, of the supply of energy from the chosen source. If energy from this source is not available when it is needed, then storage of energy becomes imperative. But, storage implies a new path ij'k different from ijk in the absence of storage, and therefore a new secondlaw efficiency which may not be as high.
Figure 10.1: Cooking Hours in Pura
Cooking with solar energy is an excellent illustration of the point under discussion. Figure 10.1 shows clearly that Pura families cook during those hours when the sun is not shining strongly. Hence, for solar cookers to be useful, either these families must change their cooking hours, and therefore living patterns, or solar energy must be stored. e former option may result in women losing employment, and the latter requires expensive storage systems. Wind energy must also be examined from the point of view of whether the water-liing needs of agriculture occur during the months of May to September when the winds are strongest. Superficial observation indicates that maximum water-liing needs are during these pre-monsoon windy months, but much more in-depth study is required of both cropping and wind patterns.
A RURAL ENERGY CENTRE FOR PURA Notwithstanding the technical attractiveness of establishing a complete rural energy centre as a 'one-shot affair', there is an important sociological reason why technological innovations must be introduced a few at a time and not all at once. Each innovation constitutes a perturbation imposed upon the village system which is forced to go into a transient response before settling down to a new state of equilibrium. It is the finite relaxation time of the village system which demands that new innovations be introduced only aer the system has recovered from the previous ones. In other words, because the technology sub-system must fit into the larger socio-economic and cultural system of the village, it follows that a rural energy centre must grow in a phased manner; it must not be externally imposed as one massive perturbation which throws the village system into an instability from which it can save itself only by rejecting altogether the technological 'fix'. e phased growth of a rural energy centre also facilitates the mid-phase and inter-phase modifications of total system
design which are certain to become necessary because of inadequate a priori understanding of villages and/or complex energy systems. With this perspective, a community biogas system is envisaged as Phase I of the proposed rural energy centre for Pura. Biogas has been the first choice because it addresses itself to the first priority energy task in Pura, viz., medium-temperature heating (95–250°C) for cooking. Further, individual family-size plants have been rejected for three reasons: (a) Only about 71 per cent of Pura's families own cattle and therefore have the raw material for biogas plants. (2) Even if all the families have cattle, only a few can afford biogas plants—roughly the same number (i.e., three) as now own pumpsets, because family-size biogas plants are about 60–80 per cent of the cost of pumpsets. (3) Biogas plants show clear-cut economies of scale—a community-size plant for 56 families is only 6.3 times the cost of a plant for one family. e utilization of the output of the community biogas plant is shown in Figure 10.2. e design of the system has been guided by the fact that, even assuming a minimum yield of 0.034 m3/kg fresh dung, a 42.5 m 3/day plant can provide a surplus of 11 m3/day of biogas aer meeting all the cooking energy needs of all the households in Pura. is means that the surplus gas must be utilized to yield economic returns, which can completely subsidize the 'free supply' of non-metered piped biogas to all the houses between fixed hours determined from present cooking patterns (See Figure 10.1). It is proposed that the excess gas will be used to run a 5 HP biogas engine, and that the 5 1/3 hr engine time will pump the daily water requirements of the biogas plant, and thereafter, the domestic needs of the village—20 min; drive a generator to supply electricity between fixed hours —3 hr/day—to illuminate the non-electrified houses;14 provide motive power for a ball mill to grind for 2 hr/day rice husk ash (a waste product) and lime and produce saleable cement.
Figure 10.2: Community Plant for Pura Village
In addition, the plant will yield 1960 kg of liquid slurry every day which dries out with a nitrogen content of 1.9 per cent -double the nitrogen content of fresh dung dried in the open air. us, in the first phase, it is proposed to: (a) pipe cooking fuel to all the homes in Pura, (b) provide electric lighting to the presently non-electrified homes and (c) pump the domestic water requirements of the village to an overhead storage tank. In this process, the drudgery of firewood gathering for cooking fuel needs will be eliminated completely, and that of obtaining water will be alleviated. e feasibility report (Reddy et al. 1979) discusses in detail the commercial viability and social costs and benefits of this first phase of the rural energy centre for Pura. In brief, the capital cost of the entire Phase I system, i.e., biogas plant, gas distribution, biogas engine, generator, electricity distribution, pumpset, overhead water storage tank, ball mill for cement production, building and miscellaneous items, will be about Rs
70,000. On this investment, the revenues on electricity and cement are envisaged to bring a return of 22 per cent corresponding to an undiscounted pay-back period of 4.5 years. e subsequent phase of the rural energy centre for Pura are being considered. Phase II may attempt to meet the total energy needs for lowtemperature heating (of water for bathing) and partial needs of water liing with windmills. In addition, the initiation of an energy forest will be considered. Phase III will seek to address itself to motive power needs perhaps through biogas, producer-gas and/or ethanol engines. However, far more analysis and hardware development is necessary before the designs of the subsequent phases are 'frozen'.
INTEGRATION OF SOURCES AND DEVICES INTO A SYSTEM e heuristic design of a rural energy centre for Pura has revealed a few general principles for the integration of energy sources and devices into a system for achieving the required tasks. Since such principles have not been stated hitherto, a brief attempt is made here to indicate them. e maximization of second-law efficiencies requires the deployment of low-grade energy sources for low-grade tasks, and high-grade sources for high-grade tasks. So, as long as there are several grades of tasks to be performed, it follows that energy sources of different grades should be used. Hence, system integration must involve the principle of mixing sources to match tasks—in general,15 an optimized rural energy system should be based on a mix of energy sources i, where the i refers to the sources energizing the set of devices that accomplish the required tasks. ese sources i may be primary in the sense that they are inputs to the system (e.g., solar or wind energy), or they may be intermediate sources which are produced inside the system from primary sources (e.g., electricity from wind energy) or from other intermediate sources (e.g., exhaust heat from an engine driven by producer gas obtained from
firewood). One possibility is a mix in which all the energy sources i are primary sources. If, in addition, all the devices are of the single-source single-task category, then the result is a system with virtually no element of integration. e system is simply a juxtaposition of separate sources, devices and tasks. Such a system can be represented by the network in Figure 10.3(a), from which it can be seen that the paths from sources through devices to tasks are quite separate and unconnected.
But, there are other possibilities. For instance, during the course of performing a task, a device can produce as 'waste' a lower grade of energy than that which drives the device. e use of this waste energy to drive another device which performs a lower-grade task (Figure 10.3(b)) illustrates the principle of cascading, according to which, 'as energy passes from a high- quality form to its important final form as ambienttemperature heat' (Anon 1975), it performs a series of tasks of lower and lower grade. For example, one can think of a series of heat engines each one running on the waste heat from the previous one. A common example is where the waste heat from an engine is used to carry out a heating task, e.g., heating water. Another approach to integration involves the principle of combining energy sources, according to which two or more energy sources act in conjunction to perform a task (Figure 10.3(c)). us, two energy sources can supplement each other's contribution in heating a fluid, e.g., solar preheated water can be used for cooking rice with biogas fuel. e merit of this principle of integration is that the higher grade energy only needs to complete the task which is partially accomplished by the lower grade energy. e two principles of cascading and of combining energy sources can be used simultaneously. is requires the 'waste' energy from one device, i.e., an intermediate source, being used to supplement the efforts of another energy source in another device, or even the same device (Figure 10.3(d)).
For example, exhaust heat from an engine can be used as a supplementary heat source along with a fuel; or the waste heat from a sugar-cane juice evaporator using bagasse fuel can be used to pre-heat the juice. Instead of introducing integration at the source-end of devices, the integration can also be carried at the task-end. This principle of spatial task integration is displayed by hybrid devices which perform more than one task (Figure 10.3(e)). For example, when the roof of a biogas plant gas holder is made to serve as the absorber of a solar water-heater, the result is a hybrid multi-task device, viz., biogas plant-cum-solar water-heater. In fact, the integral nature of the design can be extended one step further by providing a slope to the transparent greenhouse roof of the solar water heater 'riding piggy-back' on the biogas plant and by collecting the solar-distilled water from a gutter built into the side of solar water-heater (Reddy et al. 1979). Spatial integration of tasks in hybrid devices is not the only possibility; the principle of time-sharing of devices also represents a form of integration (Figure 10.3(f)). For example, an engine or motor can be shared between tasks which are required to be performed at different times, or a supply pipeline can be time-shared between biogas for cooking and water for domestic consumption (Reddy 1976).
Figure 10.3: Principles of Integration
ese principles of assembling sources and devices into an energy system may prove useful in preventing current attempts to impose upon the village scene packages of hardware items which are not really integrated in the sense described above. e caution is against juxtaposing gadgets which have not been specifically designed for integration into the system, but instead the gadgets have a system deliberately designed for their promotion (Anon 1979). Another caution is against systems which convert all the primary sources into electricity which is then used to perform the required tasks. is all-electric type of rural energy system violates the principle of a mix of sources to match tasks, and the penalty for this disregard of second-law efficiencies is in the form of extremely high capital costs for the system (Anon 1976).
ACCEPTABILITY OF RURAL ENERGY CENTRES
However technically perfect the design of a rural energy centre may be, there is no guarantee that the system is consistent with development objectives. To ensure this consistency, additional criteria must be used, e.g., whether the rural energy center satisfies the energy component of basic needs, particularly the needs of the neediest, and fulfils the desire for local self-reliance. e problem of assessing designs for rural energy systems from the standpoint of the wider social perspective is far more complex, and the methodologies are in the embryonic stage (Reddy 1979). But, these are matters which go beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, one conclusion is clear: for a 'technological solution' to be accepted into the matrix of society, it has to satisfy vital non-technical social criteria. Rural energy systems, therefore, must be society-specific and culture- specific. ere cannot be standardized designs and packages for universal application. Rural energy centres cannot be mass-produced.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
e authors would like to thank Shri N.H. Ravindranath and his band of young men (H.I. Somashekar, R. Ramesh, D. Lingamanthu, A.G. Kulkarni, B.N. Ramanuja, Vasudev Jagirdar and C.S. Somanatha Iyer) who carried out the energy survey under very difficult conditions. without this data base and the computational work of Amulya Reddy and K. Venkatram, the work in this paper would have been impossible. anks must also go to the Indian Council for Social Science Research for its progressive attitude in funding the energy survey, to the Tata Energy Research Institute for sponsoring at the Indian Institute of Science the studies in biogas technology which have provided the crucial information on the performance of biogas plants, to the Environmental Research Committee of the Department of Science and Technology, Government of India, for financing the development of the infrastructural facilities at the Ungra Extension Centre (about 2 km from Pura) which became the 'base
camp' for the understanding of the rural scene, and finally to the Karnataka State Council for Science and Technology which supported the feasibility study of a community biogas plant for Pura. But, above all, the authors express their gratitude to the people of Pura who cooperated unreservedly during and aer the survey and generously condoned the intrusion into their lives.
REFERENCES Anon. 1975. Efficient Use of Energy: A Physics Perspective (American Physical Society, USA). ——. 1976. An Energy Centre in Sri Lanka, UN Environmental Programme, Report No. ER-76-R-8 of the Engg. Energy Laboratory, Oklahoma State University, USA. ——. 1979. Rural Energy Project (Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm GMBH/BRD in co-operation with Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, India). Eckholm, E. 1976. Losing Ground: Environmental Stress and World Food Prospects (New York: Norton). Makhijani, A. 1976. Energy for the Rural ird World (London: Int. Inst. For Environment and Development). Prasad, C.R., Kisan Bhat and A.G. Bhat. 1979. Prospect for Ethanol as Automobile Fuel in India (Bangalore: Int. Conf. On Energy and Environment for Developing Countries, Indian Institute of Management). Prasad, C.R., K. Krishna Prasad and A.K.N. Reddy. 1974. Econ. Pol. Weekly 9 1347. Rajabapaiah, P., K.V. Ramanayya, S.R. Mohan and A.K.N. Reddy. 1979. Proc. Indian Acad. Sci. C 2 357. Ravindranath, N.H., H.I. Somashekar, R. Ramesh, A. Reddy, K. Venkatram and A.K.N. Reddy. 1979 (under preparation). Reddy. A.K.N. 1976. Ceres 9 43. ——. 1978. Bull. At. Sci. 34 28. ——. 1979a. In Contributions of Science and Technology to National Development (Delhi: Indian National Science Academy). ——. 1979b. Technology, Development and the Environment: A Re-appraisal (Nairobi: U.N. Environment Programme). Reddy, A.K.N. and K. Krishna Prasad. 1977. Econ. Pol. Weekly 12 465. Reddy A.K.N., D.K. Rajaraman Indira Subramanian and P. Rajabapaiah. 1979. A Community Biogas
Plant System for Pura Village—A Feasibility Study and Proposal (Bangalore: Karnataka State Council for Science and Technology). Reddy, A.K.N., C.R. Prasad, P. Rajabapaiah and S.R.C. Sathyanarayan. 1979. Proc. Indian Acad. Sci. C2 387. Revelle, R. 1976. Science 192 969. Budolph, L.I. and C.S. Lenth. 1978. Bull. At. Sci. 34 6. Seshadri, C.V., G. Venkataramani and V. Vasanth. 1978. Energy Plantation—A Case Study for the Coromandel Littoral (Madras: A.M.M. Murugappa Chettiar Res. Centre). Shah, N. 1979. Power, Coal and Oil: Review of 1978—79 and Prospects (Bombay: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy). Shrinivasa, U., R. Narasimha and S.P. Govinda Raju. 1978. e Prospects for Exploiting Wind Energy in Karnataka State (Report 78 FM 8) (Bangalore: Indian Institure of Science, Department of Aero. Engg.)
11
The California Energy Crisis and its Lessons for Power Sector Reform in India
The imperative problems need to restructure the electricity sector in India
to overcome the financial reform and technical shortcomings of the electricity boards is being reiterated ad nauseum, particularly by the multilateral donors and their acolytes in government and academia. To justify the recommendations, there are hand waving references to the successes of reform in the industrialized countries. Just when the reform appeared to be unstoppable and unquestionable, the 'consensus' has been shattered by the unbelievable news of the California energy crisis. In a state at the forefront of the IT revolution, there have been unscheduled interruptions of power and rolling blackouts covering hundreds of thousands of consumers. Suddenly, the situation there appears no different from cities in backward developing countries. One is reminded of Hans Christian Andersen's story where the 'the emperor has no clothes'. Clearly, there is a need to understand the California energy crisis and draw lessons for India and other developing countries. is paper is addressed to the task of understanding the California energy crisis through a factual description of the crisis and a discussion of the causal factors responsible for it. It concludes with drawing lessons from the California energy crisis particularly with regard to power sector reform in India.
BACKGROUND
California is the third largest state in the United States. With a population of about 34 million in 2000, it extends over an area of 4,24,002 sq km, which is roughly one-eighth the size of India. If California were a separate country, its economy would be the sixth largest in the world. To serve its approximately 34 million electricity consumers with a peak demand of about 30,000 MW, its power system had a capacity of 52,349 MW in 1998. is consisted of 21,686 MW from non-utility sources including cogeneration and of 30,663 MW from utilities—hydroelectric plants (25.8 per cent), petroleum, gas- and dual-fired thermal plants (21.6 per cent), nuclear plants (8.2 per cent) and renewable sources (2.9 per cent). 82 per cent of the electricity was generated within the state and 18 per cent was generated from out-of-state. 53 per cent of the oil was produced within the state, 32 per cent from Alaska and 15 per cent imported from foreign sources. Only 16 per cent of the natural gas was produced within the state, 56 per cent came from other parts of the country and 28 per cent from Canada. In 1994, when California was just emerging from a strong, persistent recession, its electricity system came under scrutiny. California's electricity prices were relatively high in comparison with other states in the United States. e main reason for the high prices was that its consumers were burdened with the cost overruns of nuclear power1 and the costs of highpriced alternative electricity (green power)2—adding up to stranded investments of about $28 billion. e century-old system of regulators setting rates and guaranteeing an investment on return to the stockholders gave utilities little incentive to trim costs since most of these costs would in any case be passed on to customers. Free-market proponents argued that prices would drop if electricity providers had to compete for users. In December 1995, the Public Utilities Commission of California voted to open the state's electricity industry to competition. Following a debate in the state capital, the then governor Wilson signed the 'deregulation' bill on September 23, 1996. On March 31, 1998, the California Power
Exchange, the largest electricity market in the world, was set up to determine wholesale electricity prices.
OBJECTIVES Strictly speaking, the term deregulation should be used only when the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity—involving both wholesale and retail electricity—are determined by market forces without any intervention of the state in decision-making. is complete withdrawal of the state from all aspects of the electricity system is not found anywhere. Different countries and regions reveal differing extents of deregulation. e Californian pattern of deregulation is a particular brand and will be referred to throughout this paper in quotes as 'deregulation'. e Californian 'deregulation' process had many objectives, amongst which the following are prominent. 1. e large vertically integrated utilities—Southern California Edison and Pacific Gas and Electric—would be compensated for their 'stranded costs' arising from uneconomic power-generating capacity acquired in pre-'deregulation' days and for excessive payments for alternative energy. 2. ese utilities would be relieved of their responsibility for generation so that they could focus primarily on transmission and distribution. 3. The construction of cleaner fossil-fuel plants would be promoted. 4. Greater use of renewable energy sources would be encouraged. 5. Electricity trading would be subject to market forces. 6. Customers would be given a choice of electricity suppliers. 7. Electricity retail prices would be lowered.
CALIFORNIA'S 'DEREGULATION' California's 'deregulation' consisted of several measures. e state's utilities were compensated for their 'stranded costs,' with the burden being passed on to new entrants to the generation scheme and to consumers. is compensation to the utilities has been considered by some to be excessive compared to the book value of the assets. e utilities were also compelled to sell their gas- and oil-fired (non-nuclear) power plants in California to other companies. e intention was to allow a sufficient number of new power plant owners to enter the generation scene so that none could single- handedly influence the price of electricity in California's new marketplace for electricity.
Stripped of most of their generation capacity, utilities had to buy all their electricity requirements in a transparent manner. is had to be done one day in advance from the California Power Exchange, the staterun wholesale electricity market set up for the purpose. Any shortfalls had to be made up on the last day by a second organization, California's Independent Service Operator (Cal-ISO). Consumer prices were capped or frozen until utilities paid off their debts 3 or until 2002. To win widespread popular support, the 'deregulation' was started with a 10 per cent reduction in consumer rates. Participation by utilities in the 'deregulation' was voluntary and it is important to note that many cities with publicly owned utilities including Los Angeles, Burbank, Riverside, Glendale and Anaheim, did not join the experiment.
CHAMPIONS OF 'DEREGULATION' e 'deregulation' scheme attracted a number of champions. e California Public Utilities Commission and the California legislature were the architects of the plan to open electricity prices to market forces. Investor-owned utilities, eager to be unburdened of their stranded assets,
spent $5.3 million on lobbying and donations to bring in 'deregulation'. e utilities wholeheartedly supported the idea of market-determined wholesale prices and frozen consumer rates because they anticipated that the trend of falling wholesale prices would continue and that they would reap windfall profits from the difference between the frozen retail prices and the falling wholesale prices. Independent power producers supported the move to get a piece of the 'cake'. Manufacturers lobbied for the ability to buy their electricity cheaper from companies other than Pacific Gas and Electric, Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric. Environmentalists wanted to preserve the half-billion-dollar annual subsidy for renewable energy technologies. Labour hoped to win money to retrain utility workers. Consumers wanted implicit subsidies to continue but interestingly, they were shut out of the negotiations.
THE YEAR BEFORE THE CRISIS e new millennium brought with it many indications of the looming electricity crisis. e electricity demand was far greater than expected. In fact, it grew three times more quickly than anticipated. e heat wave in May 2000 aggravated the peak summer demand. From June 2000 onwards, the wholesale price of electricity rose alarmingly—there was a tenfold increase from about$0.050/kWh to about $0.522/kWh. e rise in wholesale electricity prices was much greater than could be accounted for by the rise in natural gas prices. e state's major utilities (Pacific Gas and Electric and Southern California Edison) were paying far more to buy power than they were allowed by 'deregulation' to charge consumers. us, contrary to expectations, the wholesale price of electricity was much greater than the retail price and the difference represented a loss to the utilities. In places where there was no cap on consumer prices (for example, San Diego), businesses and homes paid more in the summer of 2000 compared to the previous year (for instance, they paid$10.9 billion more in San Diego). e power system reserve ratio (defined as the ratio
of excess capacity to peak demand) started falling to dangerous levels. ere was a Bay Area blackout in summer and there were shortages on 22 days. e state even declared an emergency when there was a stage 3 Alert because the power system reserve ratio had fallen below 1.5 per cent. Seeing the precarious financial situation of the utilities, suppliers were increasingly reluctant to supply them with electricity. Towards the end of 2000, the Clinton administration exercised emergency power to compel sales of electricity and natural gas to California and this federal ruling was renewed six times.
THE ENERGY CRISIS OF 2001
e development of the current California energy crisis and its 'resolution' with short-term measures and a rescue plan can be described with a chronology of the important events for a crucial one-month period. January 7, 2001: A major storm resulted in-near shut down of the Diablo Canyon 2,200 MW nuclear power plant because waves, nearly twenty a feet high forced kelp into the pipes that suck in sea water for cooling the plant. e loss of power adversely affected the supply-demand gap January 8, 2001: California's governor Davis in his State of the State Address said, 'California's deregulation scheme is a colossal and dangerous failure' and proposed steps to reassert the state's control over its power market. It was felt that out-of-state companies selling power to California were charging exorbitant prices for electricity on the spot market for immediate delivery. In fact, power producers were accused of price gouging. January 9, 2001: President Clinton called a meeting of federal and state officials to resolve the California energy crisis. e governors of California, Oregon and Washington argued that the federal government should put a price cap on wholesale power. Clinton's Energy Secretary agreed, but not
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. January 11, 2001: Following the biggest storm in three years, Governor Davis ordered a wide-ranging energy conservation crash programme involving the replacement of bulbs in traffic lights with more efficient versions, redirection of power from state-owned aqueducts to the grid, rebates on energy-efficient equipment, etc. January 15, 2001: Electricity suppliers threatened the paymentdefaulting utilities to take them to bankruptcy court. January 16, 2001: A Stage 3 Alert was declared. e California Independent Service Operator, which manages the grid, declared an emergency. e utilities asked for a one-week deferment of payments. Southern California Edison announced that it would not pay $596 million due to creditors to 'preserve cash'. is undermined the ability of the utilities to buy power on credit. Credit rating companies reduced the rating of utilities to that of junk bonds below investment grade. e utilities moved towards bankruptcy. Out-of-state generators were reluctant to sell power to California for fear that they would not be paid. e state assembly passed a bill for the state to buy power from generators at long-term rates and sell it to utilities, thus emphasizing a key role for the state in the electricity market. January 17, 2001: Several factors—short-falls in generation, transmission bottlenecks and the financial ill health of the utilities— brought California's power system to the brink. But, the system was pushed over the edge by the sudden decline in hydroelectric generation arising from inadequate rainfall in the reservoir catchment areas. Rotating power cuts for up to one- hour duration affecting half a million consumers at a time were implemented. Enron, an out-of-state supplier, stated that it would limit sales to utilities that were not credit-worthy. Governor Davis declared an Emergency and ordered California's department of water sources to become the principal purchaser of power from generators. It
also became the seller of power to financially strapped utilities.
January 18, 2001: is was the second day of rotating blackouts affecting several million customers. Industry responded with temporary lay-offs of workers. Some production units were moved to other states. e state's energy crisis threatened everything from milk supplies to gasoline deliveries. Traffic lights went out in the Bay Area, computer screens went dark, heaters and bank machines were silent, and lights went out in classrooms. With a 50,000 MW capacity, California should have had no trouble meeting a 31,000 MW peak but 11,500 MW became unavailable due to unscheduled plant shutdowns. California law makers passed a $400 million rescue plan to buy electricity on the expensive spot market. Southern California Edison was suspended from the California Power Exchange. January 23, 2001: e new president, George Bush, extended by two weeks federal orders that require power producers to sell surplus electricity and natural gas to California, but said that aer February 7, California would have to resolve its crisis on its own. January 31, 2001: e California Senate approved a $10 billion plan to make the state a major power buyer to rescue utilities from bankruptcy. State purchases were expected to account for one-third of the total requirement compared to the two-thirds from generation in the plants that the utilities were allowed to keep aer 'deregulation' and cogenerators and decentralized generators (wind and solar power). e state was expected to sign long-term contracts to buy power and sell it to the customers of the financially strapped utilities. For this purpose, the state would spend $500 million more (over and above the previous $400 million) buying electricity on the expensive market while making cheaper long-term deals with wholesalers. In order to encourage conservation, there would be a rate increase for residential customers using 30 per cent more than a baseline that varied with climate and end-uses. Governor Davis announced emergency conservation measures (for example,
curtailing outdoor lighting) intended to reduce demand by up to 20 per cent. February 1, 2001: Aer an initial hiccup, the Legislature also approved the Senate plan. With a new approach in place to purchase electricity, the California Power Exchange that was set up for these purchases was shut down.
February 2, 2001: Since the impacts of the California energy crisis were felt all over the western part of the country, the governors of nine western states organized an Energy Policy Roundtable at Portland, Oregon. e purpose of the meeting was to plan their energy future based on shortterm solutions to their energy shortages as well as a long-term plan for coping with increasing energy demand. To coincide with the start of the Roundtable on February 2, Governor Locke of Washington state published an op-ed article in the New York Times in which he said: 'is is not a "normal" market where the integrity of price signals needs to be protected. is is a highly distorted market where intervention is needed. And because interstate commerce is involved, only the federal government can supply this intervention.' e energy secretary Abraham from the new Bush administration attended the Roundtable and praised California's energy bill. However, he rejected requests from eight of the governors for price caps arguing that they were disincentives against reducing demand.
CAUSAL FACTORS Supply shortage with respect to demand: ere was a gross underestimation of California's electricity demand, which grew 25 per cent in the 1990s. is was partly because computer-based businesses in particular, and the IT sector in general, increased demand (for stable and reliable power) and consumed electricity at rates unheard of in the old economy. But there was also a serious slackening of conservation efforts even when wholesale prices skyrocketed. is slackening was not helped
by the rate freeze for consumers, which insulated them from wholesale prices. ere were also problems on the supply side because polluting plants were idled and old power plants (55 per cent of California's plants were more than thirty years old) operated less efficiently. In the tight supply situation, some generators were shut down because of untimely unscheduled power-plant maintenance—for instance, on March 19, 12,367 MW went out of action when the 7 p.m. demand reached 29,270 MW. ough California imports 18 per cent of its electricity, no new major power plants had been built in California in the 1990s. is lack of new capacity has been blamed on the citizens' 'not in my backyard!' (NIMBY) attitude to new plants. Finally, just when California depended most on importing power from out-of-state, there was increased demand in states exporting power to California. Transmission bottlenecks: Trading in power resulted in greater distances between generators and consumers as a result of which the transmission grid was overtaxed. In particular, there was a transmission bottleneck at Path 15 when electricity flowed from California's south to its north. Unfortunately, 'deregulation' and unbundling resulted in a situation where there was little incentive to invest in a transmission grid that was accessible to all generators. Natural factors: e weather did not help the situation. Storms led to the shut down of the 2,200 MW Diablo Canyon nuclear plant. And, late runoff on the rivers of the Pacific north-west reduced hydroelectric generation. Defects in 'deregulation': A sweeping divestiture (involving old generators being forced to sell off most of their plants) was implemented without ensuring that new owners would sell electricity at a reasonable price for a long number of years. ere was widespread failure on the part of utilities to anticipate that energy supply companies could easily exploit the mechanism and earn very much more than the going rate by holding back electricity and selling it when the system was desperate for electricity.
ere was inadequate regulation of wholesalers. 'Deregulation' did not prompt more competition right away. 'Deregulation' also resulted in disincentives not only for new capacity but also for the improvement/expansion of transmission and for R and D relevant to transmission. Imperfect Market On November 1, 2000, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission commissioners called the California market 'seriously flawed' and said that they found clear evidence of market power based on rising natural gas prices, higher loads and supply disruptions. Cal-ISO also became an easy way of bypassing the market—all that suppliers had to do was to withhold electricity until the last day and, in order 'to keep the lights on', Cal-ISO would have to buy at whatever exorbitant prices were quoted. Financial Concerns: As the debts of utilities accumulated to staggering proportions ($13 billion in debts), credit rating agencies started rating California utilities as junk bonds less than investment grade. As investorowned utilities approached bankruptcy, they could not purchase electricity for distribution.
MYTHS REGARDING THE ROOTS OF THE CALIFORNIA ENERGY CRISIS Before proceeding, it is important to dispel some of the myths regarding the roots of the California energy crisis. Myth 1 is that the crisis arose because retail rates were frozen whereas wholesale electricity prices were allowed to be determined by the market. e implication is that the 'deregulation' did not go far enough and was restricted only to wholesale and not retail prices. The deregulation loyalists argue that all is well with deregulation (the real thing); it is the Californian pattern (the unreal thing) that is at fault. us, e Economist subtitled its January 20, 2000, article: "Don't blame deregulation for the chaos in California's electricity supply industry. Blame 'deregulation'." e problem
with this logic is that if wholesale electricity prices had become increasingly lower than frozen consumer rates—this was the 'deregulation' scenario expected by the utilities—the utilities would have made windfall profits and there would have been no crisis. In reality, volatile wholesale electricity prices became increasingly greater than capped retail prices resulting in the accumulation of huge utility debts.
Myth 2 is that the crisis arose from the fact that the consumer rates were frozen and if they were allowed to rise, the utilities would not have suffered losses. e fact is that where retail prices were not frozen, the resulting rise in prices led to a revolt among consumers and to a political crisis. Hence, uncapping retail prices is a non-solution when wholesale prices are as volatile as they were in California. Myth 3 is that the crisis stems from the 'stranded costs' of the utilities arising from uneconomic power-generating capacity acquired in pre'deregulation' days and over payments for alternative energy. If, however, according to the expectation of utilities from 'deregulation', the proceeds from the sales of generation plants plus the gains from the difference between frozen consumer rates and lower wholesale electricity prices had been used as compensation, the stranded assets problem would have disappeared.
ASSESSMENTS OF CALIFORNIA'S 'DEREGULATION' ere have been several negative assessments regarding California's 'deregulation'. For instance, it has been said, "California was hailed as a model for the rest of the nation. And it has been a model—of how not to do it". It has also been asserted that deregulation has been "one of the most expensive public policy miscalculations in California history." e fundamental objective of 'deregulation'—that consumers should exercise choice of suppliers—was not realized. In fact, consumers by and
large persisted with their old suppliers—less than 2 per cent of homes switched to a new supplier compared to 25 per cent in the U.K. In the California pattern of 'deregulation', a new marketplace in which prices fluctuated violently replaced a monopoly in which government set stable rates. 'Deregulation' resulted in enormous spikes in wholesale prices. Increased revenues from price hikes flowed to out-of-state energy firms (for example, the Houston-based Reliant Energy). Power producers are now being investigated for jacking up wholesale prices because of power shortages and financial troubles of utilities. California regulators estimated that generators charged $6.2 billion above competitive levels over ten months. Investor- owned utilities were pushed to bankruptcy (having run up about $13 billion in debts) because wholesale prices (reaching $1.40/kWh) went far above retail prices (capped at $0.066/kWh). At the same time, utilities transferred billions to their parent companies—Edison transferred $4.8 billion and Pacific Gas and Electric $4.7 billion between 1996 and November 2000—in transactions that are now the subject of audit and investigation. Generators became reluctant to sell power to utilities because their credit ratings plummeted. Cogenerators (accounting for 20 per cent of supplies) had not been paid as much as $500 million. To survive, utilities say they need a release from 'deregulation'. 'Deregulation' has capped earnings from transmission. 'Deregulation' has made the electrical system less technically reliable. Cities like Los Angeles with publicly owned utilities that opted not to be deregulated have been unaffected. It was said: 'You look at where the lights are on in California, and you look at the municipal utilities!" California's 'deregulation' is now deemed a failure. e California energy crisis has scared the other states in the United States that were rushing along into deregulation—they are now applying the brakes on deregulation. It appears that deregulation is dead!
CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S RESCUE PLAN AND ITS SEQUEL
To tackle the energy crisis, California's governor announced a strategy on February 15, 2000, . is strategy aimed at stopping the financial hemorrhage of the utilities and rescuing them from bankruptcy. It involved the following components: re-regulation of the electricity sector involving massive intervention of the state, rescuing the utilities with financial inputs, improving the electricity supply position so that the system has enough reserve capacity to cope with nature's vagaries, unscheduled maintenance of plants, etc., stabilizing wholesale electricity prices, and protecting consumers from excessive rate increases. It was proposed that the state intervenes in the electricity sector by buying the transmission system of the utilities with cash from a bonds issue, promoting the establishment of new capacity, stabilizing wholesale electricity prices at affordable value, and permitting some increase in customer rates. With regard to wholesale electricity prices, apart from spot purchases on behalf of utilities to circumvent their loss of credit rating, the state would also enter into long-term purchase contracts with suppliers and with the utilities for the generation still under their control, and reduce the rate at which alternative energy is purchased. Five sources of fresh cash infusion for utilities are envisaged: the sale to the state of their transmission (not distribution!) systems with about 32,000 miles of wires for about $7 billion, sale of fresh bonds to the public, dedicated rate increases for customers in lieu of transmission charges, fees for operating the transmission systems and transfer of funds to utilities from their parent companies. With these cash receipts, it was hoped that the utilities could unburden themselves of the massive debts arising from wholesale electricity prices being increasingly larger than the frozen consumer rates. The measures planned by California suggest that there are several shortterm steps that can be taken to tackle a California-type energy crisis. e state (with its good credit rating) can purchase power and sell it to the utilities. e utilities can be kept solvent while arranging long-term
supplies of power to address the shortages. e state can buy power on long-term contracts and insulate the distribution utilities from spot market pressures. A price can be imposed on wholesale power. Power plants can be bought and built so that the state becomes more self-reliant with respect to external suppliers. Crash conservation measures can be implemented on a war footing. Aer securing approvals from the state congress and senate and 'successful' negotiations with the main utilities, Governor Davis addressed the state on April 5 regarding his energy plan. e very next day, PG&E made a move that took even the governor by surprise—PG&E filed for bankruptcy. is meant that while it could continue to conduct its business, all decisions regarding its assets, debt payments, etc., would have to be decided by a bankruptcy court. us, another crucial actor—the bankruptcy judge—has entered the California energy scene perhaps setting back the governor's plans to procure PG&E's transmission system. e governor soon announced that SCE, in contrast to PG&E, had agreed to sell its transmission system to the state. At the moment of writing (April 15, 2001) it is not clear how the state and the bankruptcy court will proceed with the governor's plan.
ISSUES THROWN UP BY CALIFORNIA ENERGY CRISIS e California Energy crisis has thrown up several crucial issues that need to be addressed. Was California's 'deregulation' just badly implemented and can its electricity market be made to work for example by long-term contracts for wholesale electricity and/or uncapping consumer prices? If the retail prices were unfrozen, would the inevitable rise in consumer prices be politically viable? Or was California's 'deregulation' 'botched' so thoroughly by the two-step purchase of wholesale electricity that it could not possibly work especially amid shortages?
When 'deregulation' in California is compared with deregulation in Europe, can the difference in outcomes be explained by the capacity excess, system reliability and the rate unfreeze in Europe compared to the capacity shortage, system unreliability and retail rate freeze in California? Is the California crisis simply the result of utilities competing for increasingly scarce wholesale power in contrast to the expectation that, after 'deregulation', wholesalers would be competing to supply utilities? Should there be a cap on wholesale electricity prices based on cost-plus pricing or should there be a vibrant and robust market for wholesale power? Should stranded costs be passed on to consumers or should they be borne by shareholders because they are the result of bad decisions by utilities, for example, with regard to choice of generation technology? Should utilities be allowed to go bankrupt or should they be saved by re-regulating the system with a major state presence in electrical power? Should the state concern itself with self-reliance in energy (and in the words of Governor Davis 'take control over our energy destiny') or should it allow intra-country globalization to take its course even at the risk of out- of-state profiteers.
FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS ere are also fundamental considerations. For instance, can the power sector (or for that matter, education, health, water, roads, communication, transport, and all other infrastructural services) be le completely to the market along with a total withdrawal of the state? Markets (with vibrant competition) foster efficiency but they also have limits. In general, with their preoccupation with the bottom line (of balance sheets), they have grave shortcomings. ey do not safeguard equity and distributional justice. ey are not bothered about the environment (unless
environmental externalities are internalized). ey are unconcerned about the strengthening of self- reliance and the empowerment of people and their communities. And they pay no heed to the long-term, particularly research and development. In short, markets do not protect public benefits. In the case of the power sector, however, such market-driven efficiency may lead to profit maximization at the level of utilities, the balanced development of the whole sector is likely to be neglected. A profitoriented electricity body would focus on servicing profit-yielding customers. It would have no incentive to connect and serve un-connected consumers unless the resulting revenues justified the additional investment. e protection of the environment through an emphasis on end-use effect devices and renewable sources would also be sidelined. e empowerment of consumers would receive little emphasis. And long-term R and D would get scant attention. It is because of these limitations of the market and the virtual certainty of public benefits being neglected that regulation of the market becomes imperative. us, marketization and regulation are two sides of the coin of restructuring. If there is marketization without regulation, public benefits will be under-emphasized and perhaps even jettisoned. Already evidence is pouring in from 'successfully' reformed utilities in developing and industrialized countries that equity programmes, end-use efficiency measures, renewable sources and energy research and development are shrinking.4
Quite apart from these general considerations, it must be noted that electricity has several unique characteristics that distinguish it from other commodities such as oil or natural gas and make marketization of electricity a different proposition. For all practical purposes, electricity 'cannot' be stored economically except to a limited extent. Hence, continuous supply- demand matching is required. If supply falls short of demand, the frequency falls below the value for which generating and
utilization equipment is designed. And, if supply exceeds demand, frequency rises above the frequency that is healthy for generating and utilization equipment. Demand varies hourly, daily and seasonally with the peaks in demand being well above the 'average' demand. Electricity has become so essential that demand is relatively price-inelastic. Electricity is very easy to control in the sense that a supplier can easily turn the supply on or off. An integrated system of generation-transmission-distribution can handle the above unique characteristics of electricity by load dispatch centres that keep the supply and demand in balance. Unbundling of the system into separate generation, transmission and distribution entities raises the problem of the integrated operation of the whole system. If all the units resulting from unbundling are driven by profit maximization (all players pursuing their self-interest), there must be an authority that will coordinate their operation for supply-demand matching. e absence of such an authority aggravates the problem of grid discipline and management. In principle, however, it is possible for an unbundled system to establish the agencies and the regulatory practices to tackle the problem of the integrated operation of the whole system. But, the challenge requires special attention. In the past, electricity generation also displayed strong economies of scale of generation (~ 1,000 MW plants) and of regional/national transmission grids (sketching hundreds and thousands of kilometers). An alternative approach is to emphasize decentralized and distributed generation and localized distribution. Indeed this was the norm in the early days of electrical systems but gradually the grid started hooking together the local systems because large-scale generation coupled to extensive grids became more cost- effective. However, new technologies of distributed generation (for example, through micro-turbines of ~ 1 MW) are becoming increasingly viable. Today it can be argued that electricity is no more a natural monopoly, as it was in the past.
Assuming that the classical vertically integrated electricity monopolies are inefficient and pass on the associated costs (of inefficiency) to their customers, and also assuming that competition is the key to efficiency, there should be an emphasis on introducing competition into the system. is thrust has inspired reform of the electricity sector. But, it has invariably, but not always, been coupled to privatisation with the faith that efficiency requires privatization. e experience, however, is not uniform. Norway, which is reputed to have one of the most efficient electricity systems, has introduced competition in generation whilst overwhelmingly retaining public ownership, i.e., it has competition without privatization. e question therefore is: what should be the objective function— privatization or competition? And if competition is the objective, it must be accepted that privatization is not essential. Privatization is a separate agenda.
But, is economic efficiency the sole criterion in power sector reform? Or must one go beyond that to achieve public benefits such as equity/access, self-reliance, environmental soundness and the long-term through R&D. If so, sustainability should be the real objective in power sector reform.
LESSONS OF CALIFORNIA ENERGY CRISIS FOR INDIA
Before identifying what lessons the Californian energy crisis has for India, it is important to start with a brief analysis of the power sector in India. In particular, following the American adage: 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it!', it is vital to decide whether the power sector in India is broke and whether it can be fixed. ere are three responses to this question: 'it ain't broke and it does not need to be fixed', 'it is broke but it is fixable and therefore it should be fixed' and 'it is broke but it is unfixable and therefore it should be scrapped and replaced'. e diehard command-and-control votary articulates the first response insisting that all is well with the vertically integrated electricity boards and
nothing needs to be done. However, the consumers, the state and the balance sheets, tell a different story.
From a detailed diagnostic case study of Karnataka's power sector,5 the International Energy Initiative came to the conclusion that its power sector is 'broke but fixable' and that it should be fixed. IEI's bottom-up cure for the sickness of Karnataka's Electricity Board includes, apart from internal generation of revenues by eliminating power the, institutional changes consisting of liberation from direct government management control through corporatization, and establishment of an Electricity Regulatory Commission. Further, as long as there is no net subsidy to the power sector, subsidies to particular consumer categories and cross-subsidies depend upon whether they are politically necessary and acceptable. ere is only partial overlap between IEI's bottom-up cure for the sickness of SEBs and the World Bank's top-down reform process. e World Bank's cure goes beyond corporatization and the establishment of an Electricity Regulatory commission. In addition, the WB also insists on the unbundling of the vertically integrated system into separate generation, transmission and distribution entities, and removal of all subsidies and cross- subsidies. Further, the WB is insistent on the privatization of generation, transmission and distribution. us, the WB approach is based on the view that the power sector 'is broke and unfixable and therefore it should be scrapped and replaced'. e WB acolyte wants a complete dismantling of the old system and its replacement with a totally unbundled privatized generation-transmissiondistribution system. Whereas the IEI approach is much more cautious and incremental, the WB cure involves major surgery with little record of proven success to justify the recommendation. Despite this, the WB approach is being forced on the various states of India. e objections and opposition are being steam-rolled and brushed aside with the leverage of conditionalities imposed by lending agencies.
In this context, it should be noted that the California 'deregulation' bears strong similarity to the WB approach, particularly with regard to unbundling the electricity sector and privatizing its components. Hence, it is important to draw crucial lessons from the California energy crisis to safeguard the Indian power sector. Lesson 1: It is not enough to point to specific shortcomings of the regulated electricity system, and therefore assume that a market-driven system will be ipso facto more successful and advantageous to society. e establishment of a market-driven system is associated with transaction costs and gestation times. Hence, a careful comparison of the costs and benefits of the old regulated system and the new deregulated system is essential before dismantling the old and ushering in the new. Lesson 2: If it is decided to replace a cost-plus price regime with marketdriven prices, then it must be realized that a market alone is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated (not merely argued!) that the market does not permit the exercise of power, price gouging and gaming. In addition, the extent of competition must be monitored and it must be shown that there is indeed effective competition.
Lesson 3: e case for unbundling the power sector must not be made merely on economic grounds (such as separate profit centres, etc.); the restructuring must also be justified convincingly on technical grounds. us, apart from economists and bureaucrats, power system engineers must also be involved. In particular, a technically stable and institutionally sustainable integrated operation of supply-demand matching must be ensured before unbundling is implemented and the vertically integrated system is dismantled into separate generation, transmission and distribution entities. ere must be a clear understanding of which agency will command the supply-demand fine-tuning and whether its writ runs over the generators, transmission grid and the consumers. And the sensitivity of the process to electricity shortages and surpluses must also be clarified. e quantitative indicators of the success of supply-demand
matching are the frequency of the system, the voltage supplied to consumers and the continuity of the supply, and all these must be within specifications.
Lesson 4: Whereas a vertically integrated system has to cope with sudden peaks in demand with reserve (capacity) margins of 15–20 per cent, an unbundled system involving a large number of wholesale generators may have no incentive to maintain such reserves. In fact, when reserves fall below precarious levels, profitable price increases may be facilitated. So, the policy, technical and institutional measures to ensure safe reserve margins are extremely important.
Lesson 5: e affordability of retail electricity prices to consumers is a necessary condition for the success of restructuring, but it is not a sufficient condition. Whether the consumer prices are frozen or not, if wholesale electricity prices rise above the retail prices, and the difference is borne by the utilities, then the utilities go increasingly into debt—a process that is not financially sustainable. Hence, the impact of restructuring on prices must be anticipated before rushing into restructuring particularly unbundling and privatization. In fact, the success of restructuring must be judged by the behaviour of wholesale and retail electricity prices. If there are any doubts about the reliability of the forecasting of prices, it is advisable to test the assumption underlying restructuring in experimental areas. Lesson 6: Notwithstanding any general considerations and expressions of faith regarding the wisdom of leaving the development of the infrastructure to the market, the unique character of electricity is such that a strong role for the state and for regulation is essential. e market alone cannot take care of the integrated functioning of the electricity system, and therefore the requisite regulatory arrangements must be in place. For example, it is important to have mechanism in place to ensure that there are adequate reserve margins to cope with sudden peaks of demand and shortfalls of supply. ese mechanisms may well involve supplementary
markets for capacity for instance. In case the process derails—as happened in California—there must be emergency procedures for the state to come to the rescue. Lesson 7: e behaviour of the actors involved in the electricity system is radically different under conditions of supply shortages compared to that under conditions of surpluses. Further, it appears that the experience of restructuring has come by and large from countries and systems with surplus capacity. us, deregulation under conditions of shortage is not the proven success that is being touted; it is very much an unproven experiment with California yielding the first disastrous results. Lesson 8: Compared to increasing capacity by building new power plants, energy conservation measures provide the quickest way out of the crisis.
Lesson 9: It is unwise to go ahead with restructuring/reform without specifying the criteria by which the success/failure of the restructuring/ reform process will be judged. Lesson 10: Notwithstanding all the hype about the economic efficiency of globalization, there are major advantages of state electricity systems being self-reliant in the sense of not allowing control to be assumed by forces external to the state. is means that dependence on external power must be a strategy of the last resort.
Quite apart from these basic lessons that the California energy crisis has thrown up for power sector reform in India and other developing countries, there are interesting comparisons between the short-term measures being pursued in California and the difficult predicament faced by Maharashtra state and the central government over the horrendous bills from the Enron power project in Dabhol. But, these comparisons are reserved for a separate treatment.
POSTSCRIPT
e 20 February 2001 (first) dra of this paper received a number of useful comments that were taken into account in finalizing the paper on 28 March 2001. Just aer that, the author received an emailed version of the March 2001 paper 'e California Experience with Power Sector Reforms' by John E. Besant-Jones and Bernard Tenenbaum from the Energy and Water Department, Private Sector Development and Infrastructure of the World Bank. Since the Besant-Jones-Tenenbaum (BJT) paper deals with the same topic and also draws lessons for power sector reform for developing countries, it is useful to make some comparisons with the present paper.
Whereas the present paper is based virtually entirely on internet sources in general, and reports of the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times newspapers in particular, the BJT paper has more diverse and academic sources. Despite this difference in sources, there is considerable similarity in the papers—the facts characterizing the California energy crisis are identical and list of causal factors cited are almost the same. Perhaps, one difference is that the BJT paper attributes a greater role to the rise in natural gas prices, whereas this paper tends to view gas prices as not having a dominant explanatory role in the rise of wholesale electricity prices. What is surprising is the similarity in some of the lessons for developing countries that have been drawn by the two papers. Whereas the BJT paper has given a far more elaborate treatment of what can go wrong with regard to wholesale competition and retail competition, the general validity of Murphy's Law—if something can go wrong, it will!—is implicitly upheld in both the papers. Unfortunately, the BJT checklist of what to ensure before embarking on reform has come with hindsight aer the California crisis, and not before the reform was undertaken. Foremost among the dangers are the possibility of market power undermining the effectiveness of the market. Also, competition requires adequate installed capacity and the short-term market does not encourage investment in new
capacity and the maintenance of adequate reserve margins. e BJT paper lists the large number of conditions that must be satisfied for success and underlines the importance of insurance against market flaws. Its crucial recommendation is a guarded experimental approach involving testing proposed structures. e problem with the big-bang approach to reform tried in California—to quote the BJT paper—is that it 'is open to the risks of unexpected market conditions, as well as the unexpected ability of players to "game" the market. A structured transition strategy is needed that is planning for steps that might be taken if crucial assumption, such as continuation of surplus power capacity and low natural gas prices, proved to be wrong.' All this is in tune with this paper's approach to restructuring/reform that it is better to make small reversible mistakes than large irreversible mistakes based on theory and ideology. It is unfortunate that the BJT paper has not provided checklists to insure against failures with regard to the basic reforms of unbundling and privatization being advocated for India. It has, however, stressed the importance of the system operator and the vital function of supplydemand balancing.
ere is however a fundamental difference in the attitude to reform/ restructuring supported by this paper and that revealed in the BJT paper. is paper would like a detailed diagnosis of the problems of the power sector to pinpoint the essential elements of reform/restructuring leaving measures such as unbundling and privatization—that have more ideological than empirical justification—to be approached cautiously and incrementally, if at all. e BJT paper maintains its faith in reform/restructuring which, it believes, is a must and will succeed if there is sufficient caution, testing and insurance against design errors.
12
Nuclear Power: Is it Necessary or Economical?
In this article I will concentrate on two important aspects of nuclear power: is the power that is likely to be generated by nuclear plants necessary for development? Is that power economical? Nuclear power is part of a conventional approach to energy planning that is rapidly becoming obsolete. In this approach, energy is treated as an end in itself and the focus is on increasing energy consumption. e chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) echoed this approach when he said regarding electricity: "—its consumption rate is a prime indicator of the quality of life of the people."1 e main preoccupation is to make projections of energy demand into the future, invariably using simplistic extrapolations of past and present trends. Business, they believe or hope, will continue as usual. Such projections oen forecast large gaps between demand and supply. us, the central question in the conventional approach is how to increase energy supplies in order to bridge the demand-supply gaps. And in this search for supplies, nuclear power, which comes in large reactor-size blocs, claims a justification." Let us illustrate this approach with the case of Karnataka. A forecast of future demand for electrical energy was made in September 1983 by the so-called ree-Man Committee. 2 When these forecasts for energy demand were converted into projections for power, it appeared that there would be a deficit from the base year of 1982-83 up to the forecasting
horizon. e appearance of these deficits triggered off reflex-like responses: "Kaiga, way out of power crunch," said Dr Srinivasan.3 It was claimed that nuclear power is safe, cheap, appropriate and modern for which, incidentally, the acronym is SCAM which according to the Oxford American Dictionary is slang for "a fraudulent scheme". e demands for a nuclear power plant at Kaiga to bridge the supposed demand-supply gap were made on the grounds that "there is no other option," 4 nuclear power, only hope,5 and "nuclear power, unavoidable".6 But are these assertions warranted? To explore this question, it is necessary to understand how the ree-Man Committee arrived at its projection. Various categories of electricity consumers were considered separately. e consumption of the All-Electric Homes (AEH) category was forecast by assuming a consumption norm of 2,375 kWh/year and an increase of 6000 connections per year over and above the previous year's increase. e projection for the non-AEH (domestic lighting) and irrigation pumpsets categories was based on a constant annual increase of 60 GWh (which are referred to in Indian discussions as MUs for million units/kWh) and 83 MUs respectively. e consumption of the commercial lighting low-tension and public lighting categories was assumed to increase with growth rates of 12 per cent, 11 per cent and 10 per cent per year. e projection for the hightension category was based on the actual demands of the five major power-intensive units (which accounted for 50 per cent of the HT consumption) and the industrial policy of the government of Karnataka, which required a growth of employment-generating industries. e demands of energy on the consumption side were then aggregated and transformed on the basis of assumed values of T&D losses into an energy demand on the generation side. And from this energy demand a projection was made for the requirement of power. A scrutiny of the ree-Man Committee's projection shows that it is sober and rigorous, but its computations are riddled with questionable
assumptions. ere at least 16 explicit assumptions regarding the growth rates of energy consumption of different categories of consumers. In addition, there are a number of implicit assumptions: 1. that the T&D losses will not fall below 20 per cent in 1989–90 (compared to 22 per cent in 1982–83); 2. that the conversion of installed capacity into energy availability will not increase to a value greater than 4604 kWh/kW in 1989–90 (compared to the 1982–83 value of 3681 kWh/kW), that is, the system load factor will not improve beyond 52 per cent from the present 42 per cent; 3. that the energy consumption norms of all categories of consumers will remain at the 1982–83 values, that is, there will be no improvement in the efficiencies with which various categories of consumers utilize energy. ese assumptions are surprising because the projected demand is very sensitive to changes in some of these assumptions. New options can easily be generated by departing from the values corresponding to these assumptions. For instance, if there is a weighted average reduction of about 6 per cent in the overall energy consumption norms, the 1989–90 deficit becomes a surplus. Some of these other options have been made concrete in the recent Perspective Plan for Karnataka submitted by an expert group appointed by the government of Karnataka.7 is Perspective Plan showed that if the five conservation measures, viz., modernization of Karnataka's power-intensive industries from an energy-efficiency point of view, incorporation of frictionless foot-valves and HDPE piping in irrigation pumpsets,
replacement of inefficient incandescent bulbs with modern compact fluorescent lamps, replacement of electric water heaters in homes with solar water heaters, and use of LPG instead of electricity for cooking had been implemented, the 1986-87 deficit would have become a surplus of 458 MW, that is, an installed capacity equivalent to about two Kaiga-type 235 MW reactors. us, the claim that there is no other option than Kaiga (Phase I) for closing the demand-supply gap is completely baseless—there are options other than the 470 MW of Kaiga (Phase I) for overcoming the apparent deficit and the argument for a nuclear power plant for Karnataka is based on a projection that ignores these other options. e ree-Man Committee's projection for Karnataka is not the most recent one. A committee constituted by the government of Karnataka for preparing a "Long-Range Plan for Power Projects in Karnataka 1987–2000 A.D." (the S.G. Ramachandra Committee) submitted a report in May 1987.8 From an academic point of view, the projection methodology of the SGR Committee was primitive and retrograde compared to the "rigorous" approach of the earlier ree-Man Committee. In contrast to an actual consumption of 7,554 MU in 1986–87, it argued that the real demand must have been much higher. e estimation of true demand is trivial when there are no power cuts—the demand can be equated to, and measured by, the actual consumption. e problem, however, is more complicated when there are power cuts. e true demand has to be estimated—it cannot be measured—from what the consumption would have been in the absence of power cuts. e SGR Committee therefore computed the demand for HT industries—the largest consumer of electricity—from their contract entitlement. is approach led to an estimate of 15,500 MW for the true 1986–87 demand.
With this as the base, the SGR Committee simplistically used an overall growth rate of 9 per cent to project the demand into the future. e result was a projection of 47,520 MU for the year 1999–2000 corresponding to an installed capacity of 9,379 MW. In order to achieve this projected demand, the SGR Committee argued for an expansion of Kaiga (Phase I) by an additional 940 MW corresponding to an extra four 235 MW reactors. Two serious criticisms of the SGR Committee's methodology have been put forward:9 1. ere are factors other than power—the availability of finance, raw materials, labour and markets—that determine the capacity utilization of an industry. As a result, even in periods when there was no power cut, the consumption was much lower (by as much as 20 per cent) than the contract entitlement. Hence, the use of 100 per cent of the contract entitlement exaggerates the true base year demand of HT industries. 2. e SGR projection also does not take into account the possibilities of reducing energy consumption norms through energy conservation by means of efficiency improvements, fuel substitution, etc. e SGR committee claimed that its projection was very conservative. Despite this claim, the astronomical investments it asked for apparently forced the government of Karnataka to slash down its projection to 35,000 MU and the installed capacity to 7,200 MW—by implication, the government has rejected the SGR projection. e Expert Group's Perspective Plan for Karnataka has shown that by implementing the five conservation measures listed earlier, the 1999–2000 demand can be brought down to a figure as low as 20,147 MU corresponding to an installed capacity of 4,375 MW. In such a scenario, the case for Karnataka and its expansion by an additional 940 MW
disappears. e lesson is that, if opportunities for efficiency improvements are systematically identified and exploited wherever cost-effective, the magnitude of energy demand can come down sharply. In that context, energy supplies need not become a constraint on growth. As Gandhiji said, "e world has enough for every man's need, but not enough for everyone's greed!" And the lower the demand, the wider the choice between energy options. When future demands are exaggerated, the choice gets restricted or even disappears. e breeding ground for nuclear power is inflated demand projections. In actual fact, our energy future is more a matter of choice than of destiny. us, the case for nuclear power depends upon our attitude towards the demand projections that are used to justify this energy source. If we treat these projections as sacred "black boxes", then we will hesitate to open up the boxes in order to reveal and scrutinize their contents of assumptions—we will look upon projections in the same way that some people treat astrological predictions—as unalterable destiny. en, it will appear that there is no other option except that of constructing massive power supplies such as nuclear plants. When, however, the projections are made "transparent", it becomes clear that there are so many assumptions to manipulate that we can arrive at projections to justify any option or set of options. at being the situation, it is better that we stop believing these projections. Just as present trends of energy consumption are the outcome of past policies, we can choose new outcomes and specify what policies will bring them about. at is, we can construct scenarios or intended sequences of events and leave it to the people and their representatives to decide whether they want to implement these scenarios or not. Table 12.1: Parameters Used to Calculate Unit Energy Costs of Electricity Generated from Coalbased Pit-head Thermal Power Plants and Nuclear Power Plants
In particular, it is possible—as the Expert Group's Perspective Plan for Karnataka has done—to develop scenarios based on an integration of conservation and the exploitation of decentralized renewable sources, with conventional centralized sources providing the needful aer these measures. Such an integration has to be based on an evaluation of the economic, environmental and self-reliance implications of conservation, decentralized renewable supplies and conventional centralized supplies. Here, I will focus on the economic evaluation of nuclear power in comparison with other supply and conservation options. e Atomic Energy Commission has worked out the costs of nuclear power plants and coal-based thermal power plants.10 Apart from
computing the costs of heavy water and decommissioning in the case of nuclear plants, it has separately calculated—initially using the oldfashioned return-on- investment method—the per kWh costs of fuel consumption, operation and maintenance, depreciation and return on capital (including interest during construction and working capital) for both nuclear and (pit-head) coal plants. When these component costs are added, the unit costs in one of the various calculations work out to be 98.98 paise/kWh for nuclear power and 107.17 paise/kWh for coal-based thermal power (Table 12.2). Despite this marginal difference, the AECproclaimed that nuclear power is cheaper than coal-based electricity.11, 12 Table 12.2: Comparison of Unit Energy Cost (in paise/kWh) of Electricity Generated from Coalbased Pit-head Thermal Power Plants and Nuclear Power Plants
There are, however, several problems with the AEC calculation: 1. by treating the heavy water as an input that is leased rather than purchased, a front-end capital cost on which there would have to be a return of 12 per cent has been converted into a running cost at 8 per cent; 2. there are no charges for waste disposal even though such charges are standard practice in nuclear power accounting in many countries— Swedish utilities are obliged to set apart 5.30 paise/kWh for this
purpose;13 3. no money has been set aside for the handling of emergencies arising from reactor accidents—"e Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the elimination of its consequences has so far cost the Soviet Union a stupendous eight billion roubles," 14 that is, Rs 17,500 crores. When the AEC's calculations are altered to take note of the above points, it turns out that nuclear power may well be costlier than coal (Table 1). Recently, the AEC has also made computations from a modern financial management point of view, according to which attention should be paid to both the magnitude and the timing of cash inflows and outflows associated with the investment. We have relied completely on modern techniques of discounted cash flow used both in India and abroad for investment planning purposes in general and nuclear economics in particular. (It has been argued that discounted cash flow techniques may well be appropriate for projects in which both the benefits and the costs are experienced by the same generation. But, these techniques have been criticised as inappropriate for nuclear power because it is the present generation that derives the benefits whereas future generations have to bear the costs of guarding the wastes and decommissioning the plants.) ese techniques are based on the fact that money has a time value because one rupee received aer say ten years is equivalent to receiving Re 0.32 today when the interest rate is 12 per cent and conversely one rupee invested today at that same interest rate is worth Rs 3.11 after 10 years. e procedure that we have used consists of finding the so-called "present" value at a particular reference date, that is, the date of commissioning of the plant, of the stream of net costs that arise over the entire lifetime of the power project. To this present value of net costs, we have added the value of the capital cost (including interest during construction) at the same reference date. e resulting sum is what is
called the life cycle cost of the power plant, that is, the total of all the costs over the whole life-cycle of the power plant where all the costs are discounted at a particular interest rate to a single point of time, that is, the date of commissioning of the plant.
We have computed the life-cycle cost per kW of generation capacity of nuclear and coal-based pit-head thermal power plants using exactly the same values as the AEC of parameters such as capital cost, years of construction, capacity factor (kWh/kW installed), auxiliary power consumption, life of the plant, operation and maintenance expenses, fuel consumption and in the case of the nuclear plants the inventory and annual make-up of heavy water. We have found that the results are very sensitive to the interest (or discount) rate that is used. Hence, we have computed and plotted the lifecycle cost per kW as a function of the interest rate. e plots of the lifecycle cost per kW of nuclear and coal-based thermal electricity show that there are two regimes of interest rate (Figure 12.1)—above an interest rate of about 5–7.5 per cent nuclear power is cheaper than coal-based electricity. But, the regime that is advantageous to nuclear power shis to lower values of interest rate (Figure 12.2).
Figure 12.1: Nuclear vs Coal Life-Cycle Costs at Commissioning
Figure 12.2: Coal vs Various Nuclear Life-Cycle Costs at Commissioning
If the construction time of a nuclear plant is assumed to be ten years to reflect AEC's past performance (15 years) instead of its present intention (8 years)—life-cycle costs shoot up with delays in construction time; and If the Comptroller and Auditor General's estimate 15 of the 1983 price of Rs 13,800/kg is used for heavy water costs instead of the AEC's 1983 price of Rs 3,875/kg. It is clear, therefore, that AEC's conclusion that nuclear power is cheaper than coal-based electricity is the result—we hope accidental and not deliberate—of choosing favourable values for several parameters particularly plant construction time and heavy water cost. When the lifecycle costs per kW of hydroelectric power plants are also plotted against interest rate, it turns out that both coal and hydel are always lower than nuclear power plants (Figure 11.3). What have been considered thus far are nuclear, coal-based thermal and hydroelectric power plants. If the search is not merely for least cost centralized plants, but for least cost supplies, then the decentralized supply options (small hydroelectric, biogas and producer gas plants, etc.) must
also be considered (cf. Figure 12.3). At this stage, we must introduce the central idea of the new pattern of thinking about energy. What matters to a consumer of energy is not energy per se, but the services that energy provides—cooking, lighting, heating, stationary and motive power, and so on. Hence, the true indicator of development is not the magnitude of energy used, but the level of energy services provided. In the domestic sector, the indicators are the amount of light in the home, the quantity of heat received by the food being cooked, etc. In the agricultural sector, the indicators are the volume of water taken up by the crops, the area of land that is ploughed, etc. And in the industrial sector, the indicators are the rotation of shas, the movement of conveyors, the running of machines, the heating of materials in furnaces, and so on.
Figure 12.3: Life-Cycle Costs Generation vs Conservation
It is the level of services provided by energy that determines the quality of life and the extent to which basic needs (such as employment) are being satisfied. ese energy services, in turn, depend upon end-use devices (stoves, lamps, furnaces, motors, engines) to convert energy inputs into the
useful energy required to provide energy services. Useful energy is simply given by the product of the efficiency of the end-use device and the energy input: Useful Energy = Efficiency of end-use device x Energy input e.g., Lumens of light = Efficiency of Lamp x Energy input to lamp e goal of development requires a sustainable increase in the level of energy services and the amount of useful energy. ere are four options for achieving such increases: 1. Increasing the magnitude of the energy inputs through increased supplies from conventional centralized sources (hydroelectric, coal and nuclear power plants) and keeping the efficiencies of the end-use devices at present levels. 2. Increasing the magnitude of the energy inputs through increased supplies from non-conventional decentralized sources (mini- and micro- hydroelectric, biogas and producer power plants, etc.) and keeping the efficiencies of the end-use devices at present levels. 3. Increasing the efficiencies of the end-use devices and keeping the magnitude of energy inputs constant. 4. Increasing both the efficiencies of end-use devices as well as the magnitude of the energy inputs through the improvement of present supplies, development of renewable sources and increase of conventional supplies. e conventional approach to energy restricts itself to Option 1 with its exclusive emphasis on centralized supplies of hydroelectric, coal-based and nuclear electricity. However the centralized supply options are becoming increasingly unaffordable because their marginal costs are continuously increasing—it is more expensive to produce the next kilowatt than the previous one! eir environmental impacts are also escalating. Precisely at
a time when the populace is rising in protest against their environmental degradation, they are demanding impossibly large investments. To avoid the environmental degradation of the centralized supplies, Option 2 has an exclusive emphasis on renewable sources. But this option is only an environmentally benign version of Option 1—it is just as supplybiased. Option 3 has an exclusive emphasis on conservation, but it implies that efficiency improvements alone will do the trick. Option 4 is the new paradigm for energy planning. It involves a rejection of all the three extreme positions represented by Options 1, 2 and 3. e new approach insists on an assessment of whether supply increases or efficiency improvements are more effective from the point of view of economics, environment and self-reliance. In other words, the question must be asked, and an answer obtained, regarding whether it is cheaper, more environmentally benign and more conducive to selfreliance to save a kilowatt or generate a kilowatt. us, we must go beyond the generation options to allow for the fact that a given increment of energy services and useful energy can be achieved either by generating a kilowatt or by saving a kilowatt. With this motivation, the life-cycle costs per kW saved have been computed for three of the specific conservation measures considered by the Expert Group's Perspective Plan for Karnataka: 1. Replacement of electric water heaters in homes with solar water heaters. 2. Replacement of inefficient incandescent bulbs with modern compact fluorescent lamps, 3. Incorporation of frictionless foot-valves and HDPE piping in irrigation pumpsets. e savings for all these measures takes place at the consumption end of the electricity system, and therefore must be adjusted for the T&D
losses and the capacity factor to make comparisons on the same footing as the generation options. In Karnataka, saving a kilowatt on the consumption side is equivalent to producing 2.03 kW at the sites of centralized generation. We are now in a position to compare the life-cycle costs per kW saved through compact fluorescent lamps, solar water heaters and frictionless foot- valves and HDPE piping with the life-cycle costs per kW generated for nuclear, coal-based and hydro electricity (Figure 12.3 and 12.4). is comparison leads to several important conclusions: 1. e curves for centralized generation rise with interest rate because the higher the interest rate, the greater the impact of the larger frontend capital costs of generation projects. In contrast, the conservation curves fall with interest rate. is difference is because the smaller doses of capital investments for conservation are spread out over time and therefore the farther into the future these investments are made, the smaller are their present values. In the case of decentralized generation, biogas, producer gas and diesel gensets (with higher running costs relative to capital costs) fall with interest rate, but small hydel shows a small increase. 2. e difference between centralized generation and conservation lifecycle costs increases with interest rate. Since scarcity of capital must be reflected in the use of high interest rates, it means that the less the availability of capital, the more should conservation be preferred, and therefore, in capital-starved developing countries, there should be a greater—and not lesser—emphasis on conservation.
Figure 12.4: Generation vs Conservation Life-Cycle Costs
3. Savings are associated with much lower life-cycle costs than generation. is result is in agreement with the experience in many countries (both industrialized and developing) that conservation alternatives are one-third to one-half cheaper than centralized options. (Incidentally, conservation is also quicker and more environmentally benign.) e comparison between conservation, decentralized and centralized supplies can be seen more clearly by considering the life-cycle costs at one value of interest rate as, for example, 12 per cent. 4. Among the various centralized supply options, it appears that nuclear power has the largest life-cycle costs—this result too is in accordance with recent findings in the U.K. and U.S.A. It is also possible to compare the cost (in paise/kWh) of saving or generating energy (See Figure 12.5). e comparison shows that even if the projections and scenarios indicate large demand-supply gaps in the future, the most expensive way of bridging these gaps is through nuclear power plants. Hence, if we adopt the principle of least cost planning, then we must take up the various options for bridging the demand-supply gap in the order of increasing costs—conservation first, decentralized
renewable sources next, then coal-based power plants and hydroelectric plants and, finally, nuclear plants. Of course, economics alone cannot be the sole criterion for the choice of options. It is also necessary to consider environmental impacts. When this is done, it turns out that these environmental impacts can be considered to increase in the following order: Conservation → decentralized/renewable sources → centralized sources, (hydroelectric/coal-based thermal/nuclear plants).
Figure 12.5: Unit Energy Costs of Generation/Saving
us, the ranking of environmental impacts and of economic costs is roughly the same. However, it is not easy to provide a relative ranking of the environmental impacts of the centralized sources, though the relative ranking of their economic costs can be achieved reasonably unambiguously.
Strictly speaking, the costs of improving the efficiency of current supplies, that is, efficiency improvement (conservation) on the generation side, should also be included in the sequence. Assuming that these costs will come between conservation and decentralized renewable sources, we
suggest that the demand-supply matching process should be carried out in four steps: 1. Determine how much of the un-met demand can be satisfied with least-cost conservation measures on the consumption side and with improvements of the efficiencies of the present supplies through the improvement of plant load factors and the reduction of transmission and distribution losses. 2. Deploy decentralized renewables to meet as much of the remaining demand as possible. 3. If there is still un-met demand, then choose between macrohydroelectric and coal-based thermal plants on the basis of environmental considerations. 4. Put nuclear plants last on the agenda for discussion. is sequence, in which saving generation should be placed on the agenda for discussion, is the economic rationale for the viewpoint that my co-authors and I have advanced in our book Energy for a Sustainable World, 16 which is that "nuclear power should be the energy source of the last resort!" If this approach is followed, depending on the actual magnitudes of demand, saving and supplies, nuclear power may or may not find a place on the agenda. In the case of Karnataka, our numbers seem to indicate that there is no case either for Kaiga (Phase I) or for the expansion of Kaiga (Phase II). At the same time, our numbers and conclusions there from are not the last word. Just as we found the AEC's numbers to be fortuitous, there may be weaknesses in our computations. I plead therefore for the well-established scientific practice of open publication, transparent computations and peer review. Opaque arguments are the enemy of truth and the subterfuge of vested interests. My plea is crucial because, for other states and for the country at large, energy analysts may
come out with different cost comparisons. ere is much research to be done. Hopefully, they will follow the sequence: Analysis → Advocacy → Action It is also hoped that academics and academia will encourage the scientific enquiry required for the analysis. I hope that my analysis will stimulate the nuclear establishment to alter their belief that "nuclear power should be the energy source of the first resort!" I hope also that the AEC will reverse the sequence that it has followed thus far: Action → Advocacy → Analysis To summarize, I have tried to show that there is no sanctity at all in the projections that have been used in Karnataka to justify the construction of Kaiga (Phase I) or its expansion through Phase II. Furthermore, there is no need for the power that these plants are likely to produce a decade or so hence. I have also tried to show by quantitative comparisons that nuclear power is the most expensive option for bridging a demand-supply gap, even if such a gap arises. I have, however, dealt with only two aspects of nuclear power. ere are at least ten other issues arising from nuclear power programmes and I sincerely hope that they will not be ignored: 1. the hazards associated with the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, that is, with the mining and extraction of uranium, fabrication of fuel rods, etc.; 2. the siting of reactors; 3. the environmental impacts of reactors on people, flora, fauna, atmosphere and water resources in their vicinity; 4. the safety of reactors;
5. the handling of emergencies in the event of reactor accidents; 6. the disposal of low-, medium- and high-level radio-active wastes; 7. the decommissioning of reactors; 8. the way in which nuclear power programmes in developing countries degenerate from initial objectives of self-reliance to dependence on reactor imports from countries which have saturated their internal markets with reactors—as in the decision to import reactors from the Soviet Union and France; 9. the power-bomb nexus, that is, the intimate, inexorable and inevitable link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons either directly through the use of power generation as a spring-board for weapons production or indirectly through the the of weapons-grade material—(remember the purchase by "unknown" parties in West Germany of such material with a sum of 2 million Deutsche Marks);
10. the question that has been raised in the 1988 book: Collapse of an Industry: Nuclear Power, that nuclear power can only flourish in societies that restrict discussion of the subject, that is, nuclear power is incompatible with liberal democracy.
Amulya Reddy: A Select Bibliography 1. The Widening Internal Technological Gap. The Hindu, 10 September 1971. 2. e Nature of Western Technology: Why Does it Inevitably Produce Alienation, Unemployment and Environmental Damage? Mazingira 5 1972, pp. 20–26. 3. Basis of e Japanese 'Miracle': Lessons For India. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. VII, No. 26, 24 June 1972, pp. 1241–1245. 4. Choice of Alternative Technologies. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. VIII 1973, No. 25, June 23, 1973, pp. 1109–1114. 5. e eory and Design of Electric Smelting Furnaces. e Journal of the Electrochemical Society of India Vol. 22–24, 1973, pp. 275–289. 6. Towards an Indian Science and Technology. Journal of Scientific & Industrial Research Vol. 32, 1973, No. 5, May pp. 207–215. 7. Asian Science to Combat Asian Poverty. Mainstream 1973, pp. 15– 18. 8. e Brain Drain. e Higher Learning in India, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. 1974, pp. 373–394. 9. Is Indian Science Truly Indian? Science Today, Vol. 1, No. 8, 1974, pp. 13–24. 10. Biogas Plants: Prospects, Problems and Tasks. [with C.R. Prasad, K. Krishna Prasad]. Economic & Political Weekly Vol. IX, Nos. 32–34, Special Number August 1974, pp. 1347–1361. 11. Alternative Technology: A Viewpoint From India. Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1975, pp. 331–42.
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Sources of Energy, Nairobi, Kenya, (6–12 August 1981). Published in URJA, Vol. 29, No. 6, June 1991, pp. 36–39. Published in e Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 38, No. 4, April 1982, pp. 47– 49. 59. Animal Energy Utilization in Ungra I. For Ploughing During the Premonsoon Season. [with N.H. Ravindranath, S.M. Nagaraju, H.I. Somashekar]. Lecture to QIP Course on "Rural Technology" 20 March 3 April 1981. 60. Appropriate Technology for Rural Development. Cell for the Application of Science and Technology to Rural Areas, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore Appropriate Technology for Primary Health Care, 1981, pp. 15–18. 61. Villages as Ecosystems. Lecture to QIP Course on "Rural Technology" 20 March 3 April 1981. 62. Community Biogas Plant System. Lecture to QIP Course on "Rural Technology" 20 March 3 April 1981. 63. Principles of Environmentally Sound Development. In the QIP Course on "Rural Technology" 20 March 3 April 1981. 64. Generation of Rural Technology. In the QIP Course on "Rural Technology" 20 March 3 April 1981. 65. Selection of Appropriate Rural Technologies. In the QIP Course on "Rural Technology" 20 March 3 April 1981. 66. Appropriate Rural Technology. In the QIP Course on "Rural Technology" 20 March 3 April 1981. 67. Rural Development. In the QIP Course on "Rural Technology" 20 March 3 April 1981. 68. Technology and Society. In the QIP Course on "Rural Technology" 20 March 3 April 1981.
69. e Shaping of Science and Technology. Presented at Programmes of e University of Pennsylvania's on "Saturday at the University" and "Social Imperatives and the Development of Science, Technology and Medicine", Philadelphia, PA, USA, 30 May 1981. Published in Madras Development Seminar Series, Vol. XVI, No. 12 (Special Section) on Science, Technology and Society 1986, pp. 253–274. 70. Energy in e Ldc's: e Role of e United States. [with Jose Goldemberg]. Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, Vol. 35, No. 1, January, 1982, pp. 4 5. 71. Energy for Rural Development in India. Keynote address to Conference on "New & Renewable Sources of Energy for the Developing Countries", Enschede, Netherlands, 25–26 November 1981. 72. A Critique of Energy Planning in Developing Countries: Blunt Axe in A Forest of Problems? (R. Hosier, P. O'Keefe, B. Wisner, D. Weiner and D. Shakow, [with Jose Goldemberg] AMBIO-1982, Vol. 11, pp. 180–187. 73. Economics of Wind Pumps. Lecture to Short Term Course on "Wind Energy Systems", 17–22 January 1982. 74. Principles of Integrated Energy Systems. eme lecture to e Inaugural Session of the "6th National Solar Energy Convention" held at the Indian Institute of Science, 22–24 January 1982. 75. Energy for Development in India. Presented at the Workshop on "End use Focussed Global Energy Strategy", Princeton, USA, 21–29 April 1982. 76. Rural Fuelwood: Significant Relationships. Prepared for the meeting organized by Forestry Department, FAO, New York, USA, 30 June–2 July 1981. Published in "Wood Fuel Surveys", FAO, Rome 1983, 29– 52. Reprinted in KSCST's "Essays on Bangalore" Vol. 3 eds. Vinod
Vyasulu & Amulya Kumar N.Reddy, November 1985, pp. 59–81. 77. What Sort of Information: Ecological and Resources. [with D. Brokensha, David, A.P. Castro, W.B.Morgan]. Prepared for the meeting organized by the Forestry Department, FAO, New York (30 June-2 July 1981). Published in "Wood Fuel Surveys", Forestry for Local Community Development Programme-GCP/INT/365/SWE, FAO, Rome, 1983, pp. 97–124. 78. Chemistry of Reactive Silica from Rice Husk. [with Jose James, M. Subba Rao]. In the Proceedings of the ASTRA Seminar, (ed. K.S. Jagadish) Bangalore: INSDOC Regional Centre 1983, pp. 74–82. 79. Draught Power Availability and Requirement for Double Cropping in Dry Land Agriculture. [with Ravindranath N.H., Ravindranath R. and Somashekar H.I.]. In the Proceedings of the ASTRA Seminar, (ed. K.S. Jagadish) Bangalore: INSDOC Regional Centre, 1983, pp. 56–58. 80. e Energy Sector of e Metropolis of Bangalore. Part II: Charcoal [with B. Sudhakar Reddy]. Presented at the KSCST Seminar on "Bangalore as an Urban Ecosystem," (27 June 1983). Reprinted in KSCST's Essays on Bangalore Vol. 3 eds. Vinod Vyasulu & Amulya Kumar N. Reddy, November 1985, pp. 83–137. 81. Some Guidelines for Development Oriented Energy Strategies for Developing Countries. Presented at the Seminar on "Energy Research Priorities" at the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada 8–10 August 1983. 82. e Rural Energy Scene in India. Presented at the "India Aernoon," of the 12th Congress of the World Energy Conference, New Delhi 18–23 September 1983. 83. Energy in a Stratified Society: A Case Study of Firewood in Bangalore [with B. Sudhakar Reddy]. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.
XVIII, Number 41, 8 October, 1983, pp. 1757–1768. 84. e Energy and Economic Implications of Agricultural Technologies: An Approach Based on the Technical Options for e Operations of Crop Production. Centre for Energy & Environmental Studies (Princeton University) Working Paper No. 182: (1985) pp. 1–64. ILO World Employment Programme Research Working Paper WP 2– 22/WP No. 149, ILO, Geneva, 1985. 85. Energy: Issues and Opportunities. e Global Possible: Published in: Resources, Development and the New Century World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C., USA, 2–5 May 1984. Yale University Press, New Haven, USA, Chapter 12 1985, pp. 363–396. 86. Biomass in India's Future. Lecture delivered at the Yale School of Forestry, Environmental Studies. Published by Yale University Press, New Haven, USA, 15 January 1985. 87. Energy Strategies for Developing Countries. (with Jose Goldemberg) Centre for Energy & Environmental Studies (Princeton University) Working Paper No. 71, February 1985. 88. Energy for Biomass and Biomass for Energy-A Development-oriented View. Aer-dinner Talk at Workshop on "Biomass Energy Systems", Airlie House (Virginia) USA, 29 January 1985. Centre for Energy & Environmental Studies (Princeton University) Working Papers No. W-72, February 1985. 89. Energy for a Sustainable World: An end use Strategy in a Global Context. [with J. Goldemberg, T.B. Johansson and R.H. Williams]. Centre for Energy & Environmental Studies (Princeton University), Report No. 178, February-1985. 90. An end use Oriented Global Energy Strategy (with J. Goldemberg, T.B. Johansson and R.H. Williams]. Centre for Energy & Environmental Studies (Princeton University) Report No. 179,
February 1985. Revised in 13 March 1985. Published in the Annual Review of Energy, Vol. 10 1985, pp. 613 688. 91. An End Use Methodology for Development Oriented Energy Planning in Developing Countries With India as A Case Study. Centre for Energy & Environmental Studies (Princeton University) Report No. 181, February-1985. 92. Fuelwood Use in the Cities of e Developing World: Case Studies From India. (with Alam, Manzoor, Joy Dunkerley), April 1985. 93. Basic Needs and Much More with 1 Km Per Capita. (with J. Goldemberg, T.B. Johansson and R.H. Williams) Centre for Energy & Environmental Studies (Princeton University) Report No. 199, (September 1985). AMBIO- Vol. 14, No. 4–5, 1985 pp. 190–200. 94. e Dissemination and Evaluation of e Astra Stove in e Ungra Region. Comments, 5 November 1985. 95. Toward an Energy Strategy for A Sustainable World. (with Jose Goldemberg, omas B. Johansson, Robert H. Williams). e Annual Report of the World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C., USA, 1986, pp. 41–52. 96. Directions and Issues for Developing Countries. [with Desai, A.V., D. Fall, J. Goldemberg, J.F. Isaza, A. Kettani, H.T. Kim, M. Munasinghe, F. Owino, C.E. Suarez and Z. Yajie]. Energy Research Group ,Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre and United Nations University, Ottawa, Canada, 1986. 97. Biomass and Rural Development. "Professor B.D. Tilak Lecture for 1985". Proceedings Indian National Science Academy, B52, No. 5, 13 January 1986, pp. 695–702. 98. Scientific Advisory Council Brainstorming Session. 17 March 1986, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 99. Decoupling Global Energy and Economic Growth. (with Jose
Goldemberg, omas B. Johansson, Robert H. Williams) 30 June 1986. 100. Appropriate Technology for e ird World: An Assessment. Seminar on "e Crisis in Modern Science", at Penang, Malaysia, 21– 26 November 1986. 101. Energy for Development. (with J. Goldemberg, T.B. Johansson and R.H. Williams), World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C., USA, September 1987. 102. Development, Field Testing and Impact of Wood Stoves (with S.S. Lokras, U. Shrinivasa, K.S. Jagadish and R. Kumar) Final Report of the DST Project for the period 1983–'85, ASTRA, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, Energy Studies Series-2, 1987. 103. Biomass, Village Energy, and Rural Development (with N.H. Ravindranath). Biomass-Regenerable Energy, (ed. D.O. Hall and R.P. Overend), John Wiley & Sons, New York, USA, Chapter V-19, 1987. 104. On the Loss and Degradation of Tropical Forests. Paper prepared for the International Conference on "Tropical Forestry", Bellagio (Italy) sponsored by the World Bank, UNDP, FAO, e World Resources Institute and The Rockefeller Foundation, 1–2 July 1987. 105. Planning for Power in Karnataka. (PARTS I & II), Deccan Herald, 16 and 17 September 1987, page 6. 106. Supply-side Approach to Energy in Crisis. (PART I), Times of India, 25 December 1987,page 8. 107. Alternative Approach to Energy Planning. (PART II), Times of India, 28 December 1987, page 8. 108. Energy Requirements in Bangalore Metropolitan Region- 2000 AD. (with Gladys Sumithra and B S Reddy), 1987. 109. Science, Technology, Society and Innovation. Lecture 1. R&D
Management Course of the Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore,6 January 1988. 110. Technology and Society in Stratified Countries. Lecture 2. R & D Management Course of the Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 11 January 1988. 111. Innovation Chain Under the Impact of Technology Imports. Lecture 3 (A). R&D Management Course of the Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore,22 February 1988. 112. Some Historical Features of Science and Technology in India. Lecture 3(B). R&D Management Course of the Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore,18 March 1988. 113. Technology and Development. Lecture 4. R&D Management Course of the Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 19 March 1988. 114. Science in India. Lecture 5. R&D Management Course of the Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore,19 March 1988. 115. An Overview of R&D in India. Lecture 6. R&D Management Course of the Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 20 March 1988. 116. Technological Change: The Impact of Innovations on Society. Lecture 7. R&D Management Course of the Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 31 March 1988. 117. Strategic Aspects of R&D Management. Lecture 8. R&D Management Course of the Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Science,Bangalore, 25 March 1988. 118. Energy for a Sustainable World. (with J. Goldenberg, T.B. Johansson, R.H. Williams), PU/CEES Report No. 194A, 194B, Vol. No. 2, July 1985.
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294. Dialectics of Electrical Power. Keynote address to National Seminar of Secularism, Power Reforms, Industrial & Agricultural Crisis, November 9–10, 2002, Senate Hall, Central College Campus, Bangalore 560 001, organised by Save India Committee. 21 November 2002
Notes Editor's Preface 1. Ashis Nandy. Alternative Sciences: Creativity and Authenticity in Two Indian Scientists . Delhi 1995.
Amulya Reddy: An Autobiography 1. C.G.K. Reddy (1921–94) was a social and human rights activist and writer of renown. [ed.]. 2. Reddy A.K.N. 1993. Reflections of a Maverick. Seminar, 409: 16–24. 4. Reddy A.K.N., Bockris JO'M 1964. Ellipsometry in Electrochemical Studies. In Proceedings of the Symposium on the Ellipsometer and its use in the Measurement of Surface Films Publication No. 256. Washington DC: National Bureau of Standards. 5. Bockris JO'M, Reddy A.K.N. 1970. Modern Electrochemistry. New York: Plenum Press. Volume 1, pp. 622, Volume 2, pp. 1432. 6. Reddy A.K.N. 1973. Asian science to combat Asian Poverty. Mainstream, 15–18. 8. Reddy A.K.N. 1977. Problems in the generation and diffusion of appropriate technologies: a conceptual analysis. In Science and Technology for Integrated Rural Development, ed. S. Radhakrishna, pp. 121–146. Madras: COSTED. 9. Reddy A.K.N., Krishna Prasad K., Jagadish K.S. Problems in the generation and diffusion of appropriate technologies: ASTRA–an institutional approach. In Science and Technology for Integrated Rural Development, ed. S. Radhakrishna, pp. 147–164. Madras: COSTED. 10. Rural Technology. 1980. Ed. A.K.N. Reddy. Bangalore: Indian Academy of Sciences, pp. 330. 11. Reddy A.K.N. 1979. Technology, Development and the Environment: A Re-Appraisal. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, pp. 52.
12. ASTRA. 1982. Rural Energy Consumption Patterns - A Field Study. Biomass, 2: 255–280. 13. Reddy A.K.N. 1981. Strategy for Resolving India's Oil Crisis. Current Science, 50(2): 50-53, Reprinted as India - A Good Life Without Oil. New Scientist, 91(1261): 93–95. 14. Ravindranath N.H., Nagaraju S.M., Somashekar H.I., Channeswarappa A., Balakrishna M., Balachandran B.N. and Reddy A.K.N. 1981. An Indian Village Agricultural Ecosystem–Case Study of Ungra Village: Part I: Main Observations. Biomass 1: 61–76. 15. Reddy A.K.N. 1981. An Indian Village Agricultural Ecosystem - Case Study of Ungra Village Part II: Discussion. Biomass 1: 77–88. 16. Reddy A.K.N., Subramanian D.K. 1979. e Design of Rural Energy Centres. Proceedings of the Indian Academy of Sciences C2-Part 3: 395–416. 17. Ravindranath N.H., Nagaraju S.M., Somashekar H.I., Reddy A.K.N. 1981. Animal Energy Utilization in Ungra for Ploughing during the Premonsoon Season. Presented as a Lecture to QIP Course on Rural Technology. 18. 19. Prasad C.R., Krishna Prasad, Reddy A.K.N. 1974. Biogas plants: prospects, problems and tasks. Economic and Political Weekly, IX (32–34): 1347–1361. 20. Rajabapaiah P., Jayakumar S., Reddy A.K.N. 1993. Biogas Electricity-the Pura Village Case Study, pp. 787–815 in Renewable Energy: Sources for Fuels and Electricity, eds. T.B. Johansson, H. Kelly, A.K.N. Reddy, R.H. Williams. Washington DC: Island Press. 21. Reddy A.K.N. 1995. e Blessings of the Commons or How Pura Village dealt with e Tragedy of the Commons. Energy for Sustainable Development II(1): 48–50. 22. Reddy A.K.N. 1989. Lessons from Astra's Experience of Technologies for Rural Development. Lokayan Bulletin 7(1): 27–36. 23. Somasekhar H.I., Ravindranath N.H., Reddy A.K.N. 1984. An Indian Village Agricultural Ecosystem - Case Study of Ungra Village: Part III: Animal Drawn Carts and Transport, pp. 36–55. In ASTRA Seminar Proceedings ed. K.S. Jagadish. Bangalore: INSDOC Regional Centre. 24. Goldenberg J., Johansson T.B., Reddy A.K.N., Williams R.H. 1989. Energy for a Sustainable World. Delhi: Wiley Eastern, pp. 517. 25. World Commission on Environment and Development (e "Brundtland Report") 1987. Our Common Future. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 400.
26. Reddy A.K.N., Goldemberg J. 1990. Energy for the developing world. Scientific American, 262(9): 65–74. 27. Reddy A.K.N., Reddy B.S. 1983. Energy in a Stratified Society: A Case Study of Firewood in Bangalore. Economic and Political Weekly, XVIII(41): 1757–1768. 28. Reddy B.S., Reddy A.K.N. 1985. e Energy Sector of the Metropolis of Bangalore. Part II: Charcoal, pp. 83–137. In Essays in Bangalore (Volume 3) eds. V. Vyasulu and A.K.N. Reddy. Bangalore: Karnataka State Council for Science and Technology. 29. Reddy A.K.N., Reddy B.S. 1994. Substitution of Energy Carriers for Cooking in the Metropolis of Bangalore. Energy, 19: 561–571. 30. Krishnaswamy K.N., Reddy A.K.N. 1989. Study of the Factors determining the "Success" and "Failure" of Generation and Dissemination of Rural Technologies. Report of International Research Development Centre, New Delhi, pp. 225. 31. Bhalla A.S., Reddy A.K.N. eds. 1994 e Technological Transformation of Rural India, London: Intermediate Technology Publications, pp. 240. 32. Ramani K.V., Reddy A.K.N., Nurul Islam M., eds. 1995. Rural Energy Planning: A Government Enabled Market-Based Approach. Kuala Lumpur: APDC and GTZ, pp. 590. 33. Reddy A.K.N. 1991. Barriers to Improvements in Energy Efficiency, Energy Policy, 19(10): 953– 961. 34. Reddy A.K.N., Sumithra G.D., Balachandra P., D'Sa A 1991. A Development- Focused End-UseOriented Electricity Scenario for Karnataka. Part I. Economic and Political Weekly, XXVI(14): 891– 910. Part II. Economic and Political Weekly, XXVI (15): 983–1002. 35. Reddy A.K.N. 1990. Development, Energy and Environment - A Case Study of Electricity Planning in Karnataka. Parisar Annual Lecture Pune: S.J. Patwardhan, Parisar, Yamuna, I.C.S. Colony, Ganeshkhind Road, Pune, pp. 51. 36. Reddy A.K.N., Sumithra G.D., Balachandra P., D'Sa A 1990. e Comparative Costs of Electricity Conservation and Centralised and Decentralised Electricity Generation Economic and Political Weekly, XXV(22): 1201–1216. 37. Reddy A.K.N. 1990. Is Power from Nuclear Plants Necessary? Is it Economical? Seminar, 370: 18– 26. 38. International Energy Initiative Brochure.
39. Reddy A.K.N., Sumithra G.D., Balachandra P., D'Sa A 1995. Integrated Energy Planning: Part 1. e Defendus Methodology, Energy for Sustainable Development, II(3): 15–26. Part II. Examples of Defendus Scenarios, Energy for Sustainable Development, II(4): 12–26. 40. Reddy A.K.N., Sumithra G.D. 1997. Karnataka's Power Sector-Some Revelations. Economic and Political Weekly, XXXII(12): 585–600. 41. Reddy A.K.N. 1997. I.E.I.'s Intervention in Karnataka's Power Sector-A Case Study of Analysis leading to Advocacy and Action. 42. Reddy A.K.N., Williams R.H., Johanson T.B. eds. 1997. Energy aer Rio: Prospects and Challenges. New York: United Nations Development Programme (with International Energy Initiative and Stockholm Environment Institute), pp. 176. 43. J. Goldemberg Chairman (Editorial Board) 2000. World Enertgy Assessment: Energy and the Challenge of Sustainability New York: United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Energy Council, pp. 508. 44. Reddy A.K.N. 1999. Rural Energy: Goals, Strategies and Policies, Economic and Political Weekly, XXXIV(49): 3435–3445. 45. Reddy A.K.N. 1999. India's Nuclear Tests: Should they have been carried out and what next? Presented at meeting 19 May 1998, Centre for Education and Documentation & People's Union of Civil Liberties. Bangalore. 46. Reddy A.K.N. 1999. From Auschwitz to Indian Science. Current Science, 77(9): 1134–1136. 47. Reddy A.K.N. 1999. e Immorality of Nuclear Weapons presented at National Convention on Disarmament and Peace, 11 November, 2000. New Delhi. Biblio VI (3&4): 7–8. 48. T.B. Johansson, B. Bodlund, R.H. Williams eds 1989. Electricity: Efficient End-use and New Generation Technologies, and Their Planning Implications Lund: Lund University Press, pp. 960. 49. T.B. Johansson, H. Kelly, A.K.N. Reddy, R.H. Williams. eds. 1993. Renewable Energy: Sources for Fuels and Electricity. Washington DC: Island Press, pp. 1160. 50. J. Goldemberg, T.B. Johansson eds 1995. Energy as an Instrument for Socio-economic Development. New York: United Nations Development Programme, pp. 112. 51. T.B. Johansson J. Goldemberg (eds) 2002 Energy for Sustainable Development: A Policy Agenda United Nations Development Programme, International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics and International Energy Initiative.
52. Reddy A.K.N. 2002 e New Paradigm for Energy. Current Science, 82(3): 10 February 2002, 258– 259. 53. Batliwala S., Reddy A.K.N. 1996. Energy for Women and Women for Energy: Engendering Energy and Empowering Women presented at the Energia meeting June 4–5 1996. Energia 1997, pp, 11–13. 54. Declaration on Self-reliant Energy Analysis and Planning, Sao Paulo, June 7, 1984. 55. Reddy A.K.N. 2001. California Energy Crisis and its Lessons for Power Sector Reform in India. Economic and Political Weekly, XXXVI(18): 1533–1540. 56. Reddy A.K.N. 2001. Indian Power Sector Reform for Sustainable Development: e Public Benefits Imperative. Energy for Sustainable Development, V (2): 74–81. 57. V.M. Dandekar and N. Rath. "Poverty in India: Dimensions and Trends." Economic and Political Weekly. January 2–9, 1977. pp. 25–46. 58. Heyman Levy. The Universe of Science. London 1932. 59. Hayman Levy. Social Thinking. London 1945. 60. J.D. Bernal. Freedom of Necessity. London 1949. 61. J.D. Bernal. Science and History. London 1954. 62. J.D. Bernal. The Social Function of Science. London 1939. 63. Aneurin Bevan was a Welsh labour politician. [ed.] 64. J.C. Kumarappa was a Gandhian economist and thinker. One eminent example of his writings that resonates with the work of Amulya Reddy is his book, Economy of Permanence: A quest for Social Order Based on Nonviolence, C.P.: All India Village Industries Association, 1946. [ed.] * V.M. Dandekar and N. Rath were among the first to provide an absolute definition of poverty, which they based on the food-energy-initiative (FEI) method. e book referred to is: Dandekar, V.M. and Rath, N. Poverty in India. The Ford Foundation, New Delhi, 1970. [ed.].
Chapter 2 1. At this stage, the neutral word "wants" has been used quite deliberately. e conversion of "wants"
into "demand", and the distinction between "demands" and "needs" is discussed later. 2. Amilcar O. Herrera: Scientific and Traditional Technologies in Developing Countries , Chapter 13; Martin Robertson, The Art of Anticipation, London, 1975. 3. And according to the technology-society scheme (Figure 2.), this implies similarity in the social wants in the societies of these countries. 4. The Indian scientific system is an exception in that its history goes back to more than a century.
Chapter 3 1. See UNEP Report No. 3, "Environmentally Sound and Appropriate Technology", Nairobi 1979. 2. Res. 29(III) 9.b. Report of the GC at the work of its Third Session. 3. Man's Home, prepared with the co-operation of the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972, "Pollutants: Poisons around the World", p. 19. 4. Ibid. 5. UNEP/UNCTAD Symposium, Cocoyoc, Mexico, 1974. (e symposium, chaired by Barbara Ward, and organized by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), identified the economic and social factors underlying environmental deterioration.–Ed.) 6. Resolutions (3200 (S-VI)-3202 (S-VI) adopted by United Nations General Assembly during its Sixth Special Session. 7. Man's Home series. "e Art of Progress: Development and the Environment", p. 11, ". . .all developed countries include distinctly underdeveloped geographic areas, social classes, or economic sectors—often under developed in absolute and relative terms". 8. Barbara Ward. 9. "Exploding Cities Conference", Oxford, 1974. 10. E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful. 11. UNEP/UNCTAD Symposium, Cocoyoc, Mexico, 1974. 12. Mother Teresa of Calcutta, quoted in "Study and Action Pack for World Development".
13. Erik Damman, Future in Our Hands. 14. Sigmund Freud, quoted in "Study and Action Pack for World Development". 15. Man's Home Series, "The Art of Progress: Development and Environment", p. 7. 16. Ibid., p. 8. 17. Ibid., p. 8. 18. Maurice Strong. 19. "Only One Earth".
Chapter 4 1. Reddy, Amulya Kumar N. (1977). "Problems in the generation and diffusion of appropriate technologies: A conceptual analysis", In this publication.
Chapter 6 1. 'World Bank Vows to Weigh Environmental Effect of Projects', says the headline in a New York Times report (21 Sept. 1992, A13) on the annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 2. e word 'greening' will be used in the rest of this paper to refer to a process of acquiring environmental concerns and promoting their implementation. e word 'green(s)' will also be used without quotes to indicate a person or persons with environmental concerns who promote these concerns. 3. Bruce Rich, "e Emperor's New Clothes: e World Bank and Environmental Reform", World Policy Journal (Sprint), 1990, pp. 305–29. 4. World Bank (1991), e World Bank and the Environmental: Fiscal Year 1991 (World Bank, Washington, DC), 2. 5. World Bank (1991), (see no. 4, above), 3.
6. World Bank (1990), e World Bank and the Environment: Fiscal Year 1990 (World Bank, Washington, DC),72. 7. World Bank (1992a), e World Bank and the Environmental Report: Fiscal Year 1991 (World Bank, Washington, DC), 127. 8. World Bank 1991. 9. Rich 1990: 310. 10. According to e World Bank and the Environment Report: Fiscal Year 1992 (World Bank, Washington, DC), a project is considered to be primarily environmental or free-standing if either the costs of environmental protection measures or the environmental benefits accruing from the project exceed 50 per cent of total project costs or benefits. e project is deemed to have a significant environmental component if the environmental protection costs or environmental benefits are in excess of total project costs or benefits. 11. Rich (1990). Bruce Rich (1991), Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Committee on Appropriations, US Senate, 25 June. Letter dated 25 June 1991, of Robert Kasten and Patrick Leahy of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, US Senate Committee on Appropriations, to Secretary of the Treasury, US Treasury Department, with copy to World Bank President (1992), Global Environment Facility Information Packet, Environment Defense Fund. 12. Rich 1990: 305. 13. Rich 1990: 305. 14. Rich 1990: 309. 15. Rich 1990: 310. 16. Rich 1990: 311. 17. World Bank Support for the Environment: A Progress Report, Development Committee Pamphlet 22 (World Bank, Washington, DC) (1989). 18. Rich 1990: 313. 19. Rich 1990: 313. 20. Sardar Sarovar: Report of the Independent Review (1992), Chairman—Bradford Morse. 21. Rich 1990.
22. World Bank 1991: 110. 23. Rich 1990: 308. 24. Rich 1990: 316. 25. Rich 1990: 316. 26. World Bank (1992b) Energy Efficiency and Conservation in the Developing World: e World Bank's Role, (World Bank, Industry and Energy Department, OSP, Washington, DC) (18 March). 27. Statement by James Scheuer, Chairman of the House Sub-committee on Agriculture Research, Environment, and Natural Resources quoted in Rich (1990) (see no. 3, above), 306. 28. Statement by Camdessus, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Geneva, 11 July 1990, quoted in Rich 1991. 29. Rich 1990: 324. 30. Rich 1990: 324. 31. Rich 1990: 321. 32. Rich 1990: 319. 33. World Bank 1990: 89. 34. Olay Kjørven, Facing the Challenge of Change: e World Bank and the Global Environment Facility (EED Report 1992: 3, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker), 1992. 35. Rich 1990: 317. 36. As was done by the Finance Minister of India apropos criticisms of the Sardar Sarovar Dam project in India during his visit to Washington during the week of 21 September 1992, for the Annual World Bank-IMF meeting. 37. Rich 1990: 320. 38. Rich 1990: 320. Some sources in India argue, however, that the Sardar Sarovar construction will go on, albeit at a slower pace, even without Bank funding, particularly because there is virtually universal support for the project from the people of Gujarat state where the dam is located, and because the Bank contribution is minor. 39. Rich 1990: 327.
Chapter 7 1. A.K.N. Reddy, "Energy-efficient futures in Developing Countries and Global Climate", Proceedings of the International Conference on Global Warming and Climate Change— Perspectives from Developing Countries, Tata Energy Research Institute, New Delhi. e conference (21–23 February 1989) was organized by the Tata Energy Research Institute in collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme, the Woods Hole Research Centre and the World Resources Institute. 2. Dilip R. Ahuja, "Estimation of India's Current Contributions to Anthropogenic Emissions of Greenhouse Gases", (forthcoming). 3. Karnataka—Forest Statistics (1984), Forest Department, Government of Karnataka. 4. J. Goldemberg, T.B. Johansson, A.K.N. Reddy and R.H. Williams, Energy for a Sustainable World , Wiley Eastern, Delhi (1988). 5. A.K.N. Reddy, G. Sumithra, P. Balachandra and Antonette d'SA, "A Development-focused Enduse-oriented Energy Scenario for Karnataka" (forth coming) have recently estimated that about half of Karnataka's population benefits directly from Karnataka's electricity. 6. e dramatic reduction in energy requirements that would ensue from an approach that emphasizes energy services and exploits efficiency improvements and other conservation measures is brought out clearly in the alternative energy scenario that has been proposed for Karnataka—cf. Chapter 5 of Expert Group Report (September 1988) entitled Karnataka: Perspective Plan 2001 and A.K.N. Reddy, Gladys Sumithra, P. Balachandra and A. d'Sa, "A development-focused, end-useoriented energy plan for Karnataka', (in preparation) op cit. is alternative scenario is based on three efficiency improvements (compact fluorescent lamps, improved irrigation pumpsets and efficient motors) and two carrier substitution measures (replacement of electric water-heating and cooking with solar water-heaters and LPG stoves). 7. Peter Miller, Environmental Defence Fund, Washington (DC), USA, claims in his paper "e Electricity Conservation Alternative to the Sardar Sarovar Dam", October 1989, that through three conservation measures—compact fluorescent lamps, improved irrigation pumpsets and efficient motors—it is possible to achieve savings of 5,142 GWh/year in electricity generation and 2,194 MW in avoided capcity at a total cost of $1,448 million. In comparison, the Sardar Sarovar Dam of the Narmada project would yield 1,700 GWh/ year of energy and 300 MW of capacity for a cost of $1,500 million. us, conservation would result in a threefold increase in energy, a sevenfold increase in capacity for a slightly smaller investment. 8. J. Goldemberg, T.B. Johansson, A.K.N. Reddy and R.H. Williams, "Basic needs and much more with one kilowatt per capita', Ambio, Vol. 14, No. 4–5, 190–200 (1985).
9. A.A. Churchill and R.J. Saunders, 'Financing of the energy sector of developing countries', 14 th Congress of the World Energy Conference, Montreal, 17–22 September 1989. 10. A.K.N. Reddy, "Energy for sustainable development" in Renewable Energy for Rural Development. Proceedings of the National Solar Energy Convention, Hyderabad, 1–3 December 1988, V.V.N. Kishore and N.K. Bansal, (eds.), e Solar Energy Society of India and Tata Mc-GrawHill Publishing Company Limited, (1989), New Delhi.
Chapter 8 1. "Examples of DEFENDUS Scenarios" in Energy for Sustainable Development , Vol. II, No.4, November 1995. pp. 12–26, the authors develop and elaborate upon concrete examples of DEFENDUS scenarios.] 2. MARKAL was developed by the Brookhaven National Laboratory (USA) and Kernforschungsanlage Jülich (Germany) originally for IEA countries, but later used for Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico. 3. BESOM (Brookhaven Energy Systems Optimization Model) was developed by the Brookhaven National Laboratory for the USA, but also applied to Yugoslavia, South Korea and Greece. 4. Developed by the DFI (USA), the Argonne Energy Model was used initially in the USA and later applied to Portugal, South Korea and Argentina. 5. A 'scenario' is an intended or imagined sequence of events. 6. is project at the Department of Management Studies of the Indian Institute of Science (January 1988–July 1991) was funded by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). 7. Personal communication (1994)—Arshad Khan, K.V. Ramani and Peter Hills. 8. At the national and state levels, typical policy instruments include the market (with its price mechanism) as a resource allocator or technology selector, administrative allocation (including rationing) of energy, capital and technology, subsidies, taxes, regulations and standards, information, research and development, and institution-building. At the firm level, the policy instruments may include awareness-creation as well as monetary and other incentives. Policy agents at the national, state and local levels would include governments, autonomous bodies and agencies, energy suppliers, and energy consumers. 9. is implies that the 'utility' derived by each user from energy usage is fixed at the base-year level, but the total number of users increases.
10. Spreadsheet-based soware (LOTUS 1-2-3, Supercalc, Quattro Pro, Excel, etc.) and financial calculators give instantaneous results for PVs and amortization; even iterative calculations for rates of return are accomplished quickly, eliminating the need for specifying algorithms. 11. e order in which the various technologies appear in the mix does not imply a chronological sequence. In fact, all the options that are needed to reach the energy requirement should be started simultaneously. 12. ese are calculated to reflect the actual economic value of the inputs, rather than the administered prices (which could include additional subsidies or duties). 13. This is equivalent to the elasticity of energy requirement with respect to production.
Chapter 9 1. e rural population in developing countries was 2.52 billion (63 per cent of their total population of 4 billion). If 80 per cent of this rural population did not have access to modern energy carriers for cooking, then about 2 billion people in the world depended on biomass/fuelwood for cooking. And if 67 per cent of the rural population had no access to electricity, it meant that 1.7 billion people were without electricity. 2. Transport has been included in agriculture because the only vehicles were bullock carts and these were used almost solely for agriculture-related activities such as carrying manure from backyard compost pits to the farms and produce from farms to households. 3. Direct energy is distinguished from indirect energy which refers to the embodied energy used in the manufacture of materials and equipment. 4. Pura used about 217 tonnes of firewood per year, i.e., about 0.6 tonnes/ day for the village, or 0.6 tonnes/year/capital. 5. Unlike some rural areas of India, dung cakes were not used as cooking fuel in the Pura region. In situations where agro-wastes (e.g., coconut husk) are abundant and/or where firewood is available within some convenient range (determined by the capacity of headload transportation), dung-cakes are never burnt as fuel; instead dung is used as manure. 6. is number is in broad agreement with the estimate of Robert Williams (in his personal communication to Gary Nakarado of the UN Foundation) of slightly more than 100 watts/capita consisting of 87 watts/capita for five CFLs for lighting, 3.13 watts/capita for a colour TV and 13.65 watts/capita for a refrigerator.
7. e SELCO four-light 37 watts SHS costs Rs 18,500 and aer 15 per cent down payment can be financed with a Grameen-type bank loan of 12 per cent for five years. 8. e restriction of penetration to the richest sections of the rural population is observed even in the case of the Grameen Shakti programme of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh which is world famous for its success in microcredit to the poor. Bangladesh's projected population for 1996 was 123.6 million. e rural population was 79.9 per cent or 98.76 million which at 5.6 persons per household corresponds to 17.64 million households. 86 per cent of these households, i.e., 15.17 million households, were unelectrified. e initial cost of a PVSHS is Taka 9,200 (Taka 45.5 (–$ 1US) for which Grameen intends to provide financing at 8 per cent interest over a two-year period aer a 25 per cent down payment. is corresponds to a household expenditure of Taka 3,867 per year or Taka 323 per month. On an average, a household spends about 5.47 per cent of its expenditure on energy. If, to be liberal, this is doubled, it means that 10.94 per cent of its monthly expenditure is the upper limit to what a household can spend on energy. The monthly expenditure on a PVSHS of Taka 323 per month translates at 10.94 to a household income of Taka 2,952 per month. e income distribution pattern in Bangladesh is such that about 46.8 per cent of the households have this income required to afford PVSHS. Assuming that only half of those households that can afford PVSHS are prepared to switch to PVSHS, it appears that only 23.4 per cent of the richest rural households constitute the market for such systems in Bangladesh. 9. Thanks are due to Harish Hande, SELCO, for these real-life examples. 10. Actually, subsidies granted in the name of the poor oen end up going to the better off. For example, free electricity to rural areas goes primarily to farmers rich enough to own an electric pump for pumping irrigation water. 11. 'Software' = the instructions, procedures, knowledge, etc. necessary to utilize the hardware. 12. e consensus particularly among solar water heater manufacturers is that the subsidies of the ministry of non-conventional energy sources hindered the development of solar water heaters and in particular came in the way of cost reduction. Fortunately, these subsidies have been withdrawn. 13. Just when rural energy and water supply utilities (REWSUs) are establishing and operating drinking water schemes based on household paying for piped water to homes, Karnataka government is implementing a World Bank financed rural water supply scheme to supply 'free' water in an obviously unsustainable manner.
Chapter 10 1. For example at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex.
2. For example, the Royal Institution Forum, London, 20–22 June 1979. 3. Pura (latitude: 12 049¢492 N, longitude: 76 057¢492 E, height above sea level: 670.6 m, average annual rainfall: 50 cm/year, population (in September 1977): 357, households: 56) is one of the villages in a cluster in Kunigal Taluk, Tumkur District, Karnataka State, South India, amidst which ASTRA has established an Extension Centre to generate a grass-roots understanding of rural problems through direct interaction with the people and to elicit their response to technological alternatives. 4. Transport has been included in agriculture because the only vehicles in Pura are bullock carts and these are used almost solely for agriculture-related activities such as carrying manure from backyard compost pits to the farms and produce from farms to households. 5. Based on specimen collection by H.I. Somashekar and bomb-calorimetry by P. Rajabapaiah. 6. Pura uses about 217 tonnes of firewood per year, i.e., about 0.6 tonnes/day for the village, or 0.6 tonnes/year/capital. 7. Unlike some rural areas of India, dung cakes are not used as cooking fuel in the Pura region. In situations where agro-wastes (e.g., coconut husk) are not abundant, it appears that, if firewood is available within some convenient range (determined by the capacity of head-load transportation), dung cakes are never burnt as fuel; instead dung is used as manure. 8. Based on weight measurements made in the houses at dawn. 9. e figures are based on the performance of the unheated biogas plant at the Institute (Rajabapaiah et al. 1979). 10. For example, it can be shown that the second law efficiency for raising water from room temperature up to boiling point (a process which accounts for about two-thirds of Pura's energy requirement for cooking rice) by burning biogas fuel is double the second-law efficiency when an electrical immersion heater is used. This factor of 2 is for thermally produced electricity. 11. In fact, P may be a range of values. Further, the choice may not be a yesno matter, and if P < k ijk Pk, the path ijk may still be used, but penalties will be paid, e.g., by way of decreased efficiency or output. 12. is distinction between energy and power is oen completely ignored in discussion on animal energy. 13. Detailed consideration of the choice of technologies for each of the energyutilizing tasks in Pura is contained in a report of the Karnataka State Council for Science and Technology (Reddy et al. 1979).
14. is electricity will be charged for at the usual electricity board rates. Despite this, the households will have to spend only about 60 per cent of what they now spend on kerosene lamps. 15. The special case is the rare type of system which has only one task to perform.
Chapter 11 1. PG&E's Diablo Canyon Plant ended up costing $5.8 billion compared to the 1965 estimate of $400 million and the Onofre plant, $4.3 billion compared to the budget of $1.3 billion. 2. e high prices for alternative power originated from overestimates of the future prices of oil and natural gas. 3. e underlying expectation was that the pre-'deregulation' trend of falling wholesale prices would continue and therefore the utilities would realize greater and greater profits from retail prices being increasingly higher than wholesale prices and recoup their stranded investments by 2002. 4. In California, 'deregulation' has not resulted in disincentives for R and D relevant to the electricity system. Although such R and D activity has indeed declined sharply at the big utilities, public interest energy R and D is being carried out with funding from the System Benefits Fund (SBF) created under 'deregulation' with revenues from a non-bypassable wires charge on all generators. An SBF appropriately craed and managed, can be used to support a wide range of public benefit activities—and in fact the California SBF does support many such activities. California is one of the few places around the world where public benefits protection was provided for as a key provision of electric sector restructuring legislation. 5. Reddy, A.K.N. and D. Gladys Sumithra, 1997, 'Karnataka's Power Sector— Some Revelations', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXII, No. 12, pp. 585–600, March 22–28.
Chapter 12 1. Chairman, AEC, quoted by S.L. Katti, Managing Director, Nuclear Power Corporation, at the seminar organized by the Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore on 30 March 1988. 2. Report of the Committee constituted by the Government of Karnataka for the Forecast of Energy Requirement and Availability upto 1989–90 (popularly known as the ree-Man Committee), September 1983.
3. M.R. Srinivasan as quoted by the Deccan Herald, p. 1, 26 October 1985. 4. D.P. Sen Gupta, as quoted by the Deccan Herald, p. 8, 20 October 1985 (cf. also Bulletin of Sciences, August/September, 1988). 5. R. Ramanna, as quoted by the Deccan Herald, p. 4, 31 March 1985. 6. R. Ramanna, as quoted by the Deccan Herald, p. 13, 29 December 1985. 7. Karnataka: Perspective Plan 2001 , Report of the Expert Group appointed by the government of Karnataka to prepare a perspective plan for Karnataka, October 1988. 8. A Report on Long Range Plan for Power Projects in Karnataka 1987–2000 AD . Prepared by the S.G. Ramachandra Committee constituted by the government of Karnataka, May 1987. 9. A.K.N. Reddy, "Planning for Power in Karnataka" Deccan Herald, 16 and 29 September 1987. 10. General Data on Indian Nuclear Power Stations , Atomic Energy Commission, mimeo, 6 May 1987. 11. M.R. Srinivasan, Economic Case for Small and Medium Reactors in India , Presentation at the Scientific Afternoon, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1985. 12. M.R. Srinivasan and K.V. Mahadeva Rao, e Comparative Investment and Financing Requirements for Nuclear and Coalbased Energy Systems , Paper IAEA-CN-48/26, International Conference on Nuclear Power Performance and Safety, Vienna, Austria, 28 September to 2 October 1987. 13. The Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, A Report by an Expert Group, Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 1985. 14. The Hindu, p. 10, 28 October 1988. 15. Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India for the year ended March 31, 1987, Number 7 of 1988, Union Government (Scientific Departments) Chapter III, Department of Atomic Energy. 16. J. Goldemberg, T.B. Johansson, A.K.N. Reddy and R.H. Williams, Energy for a Sustainable World, Wiley Eastern Ltd., New Delhi, 1988.
