Argumentation: The Mixed Game - Springer Link

Argumentation (2006) 20:59–87 DOI 10.1007/s10503-006-9000-4

Springer 2006

Original Paper

Argumentation: The Mixed Game Edda Weigand Arbeitsbereich Sprachwissenschaft Universita¨t Mu¨nster Fachbereich 9, Bispinghof 2B Mu¨nster, D-48143 Germany E-mail: [email protected]

ABSTRACT: The paper introduces a new model of argumentation, the Mixed Game Model, that no longer separates rule-governed competence from actual performance but starts from human beings and their ability of competence-in-performance. Human beings are able to orientate themselves in ever-changing surroundings and to negotiate diverging views in argumentative action games. Argumentation is thus described as a mixed game played by human beings according to principles of probability. These principles include constitutive, regulative and executive principles. Constitutive Principles focus on the basic components of the game, that is, action, dialogue, and coherence as the interplay of different communicative means. Regulative Principles mediate between correlated human abilities and interests. Executive Principles guide the sequencing of action according to cognitive strategies. The mixed game no longer rests on pre-established harmony but describes performance as a non-equilibrial process of negotiation that mediates between order and disorder and is based on the integration of various parameters such as rationality, reason, persuasion and emotion. How the model works is exemplified by an analysis of part of a debate in the European Parliament. KEY WORDS: argumentation, competence-in-performance, dialogue, action games, speech act theory, rationality, reason, emotion, persuasion, rhetoric

1. THE STATE OF THE ART

In the field of argumentation research, the object-of-study ‘argumentation’ is either reduced to the lines of rationality and reason or it is claimed to be a process of persuasion. In recent years, such a separation of rational thinking and persuasion has been unmasked as ‘Descartes’ error’ by experimental neurological results (e.g., Damasio 2000). However, we do not even need neurology to recognize this truth about human abilities. An unprejudiced look at human behaviour demonstrates that rationality and reason cannot be separated from persuasion. Such an open look, not biased by tradition, requires

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us to say good-bye to classical models and to face the challenge of integration in modern theorizing which is issued to science in general, from cosmology to biology and the humanities, i.e. the challenge of mediating between order and disorder, between general rules and individual particularities. According to Prigogine (1997, p. 7), ‘science is no longer identified with certitude and probability with ignorance... We are observing the birth of a science that is no longer limited to idealized and simplified situations but reflects the complexity of the real world’. The type of rational rhetoric based on argumentative logic is essentially influenced by Toulmin’s book on ‘The uses of argument’ (1958) even if Toulmin emphasises that it is not logical but practical reason that counts in human life. In his recent book ‘Return to reason’, he draws our attention to the turning point of modern theorizing with the issue of ‘living with uncertainty’ (Toulmin 2001, p. 204): ‘The price of living in the world of the pragmatists and the skeptics is the need to acknowledge that our best-founded beliefs are still uncertain.’ However, his concept of ‘practical reason’ or ‘balance of reason’ does not reach real life but is limited by the norm of ‘a Reasonableness that combines intellectual force in content with a moderation of manner’ (p. 21f.). Moreover, it needs to be more closely linked to verbal interaction. The persuasive type of New Rhetoric, mainly put forth by Perelman (e.g., 1977), brings us a bit nearer to dialogue although it is again put in syllogistic form. The claims and their arguments are not interactively combined. Even if we stress the point of persuasion and the adherence of the audience, we are still a long way from real dialogues. The concept of the audience’s adherence remains within the scope of the speaker who aims at adherence. Dialogue however means interaction between speaker and interlocutor. Acting and reacting are the minimal constituents of the dialogic action game. New Rhetoric therefore has to be freed from its monologic standpoint and be transformed into a proper dialogic approach (cf. Weigand 1999). In recent decades, the claim that ‘argument is a form of communication’ has been emphasised (Willard 1989, p. 12). There seem to be two lines of approach to argumentation as dialogue, a more empirical, conversational one, directed to performance, and a more theoretical, rule-guided one, directed to competence. Kallmeyer’s ‘Gespra¨chsrhetorik’ (1996) belongs to the empirical type insofar as it takes its methodological basis from Conversational Analysis which requires us to start with recording and transcribing authentic dialogues (p. 10). Kallmeyer’s ‘Gespra¨chsrhetorik’ represents more a programme, exemplified by a series of studies, than an elaborated theory. As a programme it includes interesting guidelines that go beyond an exclusively formal approach. The same is true of the ‘discourse analytic approach’ by

ARGUMENTATION: THE MIXED GAME

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Jacobs and Jackson (1982) who also start from a collection ‘of a set of naturally occurring arguments’ and proceed to constructing fruitful hypotheses. The theoretical type of approach, on the other hand, gives priority to rules and structures (cf., e.g., Moeschler 1985; Plantin 1996; Cattani 2001; Stati 2002). An outstanding model in this regard is the pragmadialectic approach by van Eemeren and his group (e.g., van Eemeren 2001; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). Pragma-Dialectics combines Aristotelian logic with categories of speech act theory. ‘Fundamental to a pragma-dialectical analysis is that it is based on a ‘mariage de raison’ between normative insights and descriptive insights in the argumentative use of language’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 110). Even in analysing everyday conversation, the focus lies on the reconstruction of a normative level, an underlying competence of ‘critical discussion’. Rhetoric as strategic manoevring is included (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999). The technique of reconstruction can be considered as an attempt at reconciling the level of competence with that of performance. Dascal and Gross (1999) make another attempt at ‘reconciliation’ between competence and performance by combining Aristotelian rhetoric and Gricean pragmatics in an approach called ‘The marriage of pragmatics and rhetoric’. It remains an exclusively theoretical approach that is not exemplified by naturally occurring examples. On the other hand, successful performance is the object-of-study within the tradition of practical philosophy. The sophists, for instance, were aware of the fact that in performance ‘anything goes’, that the inferior case can be made the superior one by using the right means and strategies. Rhetoric of this type is still alive and proliferates in numerous publications dealing with popular rhetoric which provide recipes for all contingencies beyond any ethical restriction. This short sketch of the state of the art in argumentation theory highlights the basic question of how to bridge the gap between competence and performance, theory and practice, rationality and persuasion. Competence and performance are terms in theory, and we have to ask ourselves whether the separation they imply is useful in order to come to grips with the issue of modern theorizing, namely ‘living with uncertainty’. I will address this issue from two perspectives, the descriptive perspective of the Mixed Game Model (MGM) and the normative perspective of Pragma-Dialectics (PD).

2. THE DESCRIPTIVE VERSUS THE NORMATIVE VIEW

Living with uncertainty does not mean that we are the victims of the complex. On the contrary we are able to orientate ourselves in

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ever-changing surroundings. We use rules as far as they go, and we orientate ourselves by means of principles of probability when rules come to an end. There is no simple as such nor complex as such. The central reference point are human beings and their abilities. It is our competence-in-performance that enables us to master the complex. In this respect I would like to recall what Martinet (1975, p. 10) told us about the relationship between object and methodology, namely ‘not to sacrifice the object’s integrity to methodological exigencies’. If the object of the theory is human competence-in-performance, the methodology has to guarantee its integrity, i.e. not to separate what is integrated by human nature and learned or acquired capacities. A key premise for a descriptive theory of the Mixed Game therefore is: • MGM Describing actual behaviour must not contradict human nature and learned or acquired capacities. In contrast to the MGM, Pragma-Dialectics leaves competence and performance separate at two levels and tries to ‘reconcile’ them by ‘reconstruction’. This key term, as I see it, has a double sense. On the one hand, it is used for ‘reconstructing the implicit argumentation that one needs to understand in order to grasp the message conveyed’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 114f.). In this sense it aims at understanding and implies a separation of what is explicitly said and of what is to be inferred. What is separated here, however, is integrated by human nature. Speaking and implying are integrated abilities used as communicative means, verbal and cognitive ones, in the mixed game. We simply mean more than we say. On the other hand, if it is not ‘possible to reconstruct the communicative act in question as an implicit or indirect speech act, adhering to the Communicative Principle and the rules of language use’, reconstruction is meant as ‘a transformation in the interest of reasonableness’ based on the ‘normative background of a pragma-dialectical analysis’. In this sense, reconstruction ‘converts what is empirically possible into what is normatively desirable for the sake of reasonableness’. The term ‘reconstruction’ thus has a descriptive and a normative face. It is meant as an ‘effort to describe argumentation as it is, but with respect to an image of how it should be’ (van Eemeren et al. 1993, p. xi): • PD Describing actual behaviour includes the reconstruction of norms of reasonableness. In my view, however, a theory cannot make descriptive and normative claims at the same time. It is basically this normative claim that distinguishes PD from the MGM. Reconstruction of norms is to be considered a technique of theory not of life. In life we know norms, we do not have to reconstruct them. They can however not be


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conceived of as an innate part of human nature. Whether we keep to them is up to us. In contrast to the descriptive view, which is based on human nature, the normative view claims a specific way of behaviour as it should be, the way of what is called ‘critical discussion’. Even if ‘norms of critical discussion’ in PD are meant to be instrumental, not ethical norms, they are not only formal conventions but rely on a specific ideological background. In this respect we also have to tackle the issue of ethical norms. Much as I agree with claims for a human civilized behaviour, ethical claims are beyond the reach of a descriptive theory and can only be added as an appeal or recommendation. It is true that we can assume that human beings have an awareness of such norms – and that makes up the framework of a normative theory – but it is equally true that their actions do not always comply with these norms – and that makes up the framework of the mixed game. A normative theory is legitimate as such, i.e. as a theory that serves as a benchmark for evaluating practice or performance. Such a benchmark cannot be gained by empirical analyses of performance. It has to be set up either by norms justified by some underlying ideology or by collective acceptance. It is these norms we refer to, for instance, in speech acts of reproaching such as you are always very late. In the same way ‘reasonable’ or ‘civilized’ behaviour can be called upon in institutional settings. A different benchmark is set up by the criterion of ‘effective’ action in everyday life or in institutions. Over and above norms, it is personal or institutional interests that determine what is considered to be ‘effective performance’. The descriptive model does not set up norms of ‘good’ or ‘reasonable’ behaviour. It distinguishes between different ways of behaviour, among them what could be called civilized behaviour which can be expected and even demanded by everyday and institutional conventions. Conventions however are not yet norms. A descriptive model describes human action and behaviour. Insofar as human beings consider conventions to be norms and feel obliged to keep to them, the theory has to include this technique of accepting norms as a technique of orientation. Here we have arrived at the point where PD and the MGM meet: norms become guidelines of behaviour that have to be included in the MGM by describing them, i.e. not by claiming them to be fulfilled. Techniques of orientation in general are thus to be described as principles of probability that are based on rules, conventions, norms and individual inferences as well. Ethics as a normative discipline is however excluded. To sum up: It is mainly two issues that have to be focused on in descriptive research on argumentation, the dialogic issue of a consistent speech act theory of dialogue and the integrational issue of a new way of theorizing that goes beyond separating levels and starts with the complex of the ‘mixed game’ from the very outset.

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3. SPEECH ACTS AND DIALOGUE

Searle’s philosophical speech act theory (e.g., 1979) has undergone a lot of criticism because of its monologic basis. There have been various attempts at adapting speech act theory to dialogue, for instance, by complementing traditional speech act theory with techniques of conversational analysis (e.g., van Rees 1992) or Gricean principles (e.g., Dascal 1994). The crucial issue however relates to the core of speech act theory. It is not single acts of one type, the illocutionary one, that constitute dialogue but action and reaction, two different interrelated types of action, the initiative and the reactive one. What is needed is a radical change in the fundamentals of traditional speech act theory. Even in this respect PD and the MGM come very close insofar as van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, p. 23) were already well aware of the necessity to take account of the dialogical nature of speech acts. They distinguished speech acts in reaction to (e.g., challenging) versus in anticipation of (e.g., advancing a standpoint) speech acts performed or to be performed by the other party. In addition, the model includes collaborative speech acts such as agreeing. Like Weigand (2003b) they critically remark that ‘Searle’s basic theory [...] applies only to illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts being disregarded’. According to a dialogic speech act theory every speech act is either action or reaction (Weigand 2003b); every reaction in the middle of a sequence can secondarily be initiative. It is this basic Dialogical Principle proper, the interdependence between action and reaction, which constitutes dialogue. We need not know the position in the sequence in order to know that an utterance such as You are right. can only be used as reaction. And we know even more: it is a reaction to a preceding representative speech act. ‘Initiative’ and ‘reactive’ therefore are functional qualities: an action makes a claim, the reaction fulfils this very claim, either in a positive or negative sense or in postponing the decision. A representative speech act makes a claim to truth, e.g., Communication is always dialogic., which is fulfilled by a positive or negative reactive speech act of acceptance: You are right. or No, I don’t agree. The claim itself – in our example the claim that communication is dialogic – is the same for action and reaction and thus constitutes their mutual interdependence: Dialogic Principle proper action making a claim FIGURE 1.

↔

reaction fulfilling this very claim


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It is not only a few adjacency pairs – such as question and answer or greetings – that keep to this principle as assumed in Conversational Analysis (e.g., Sacks et al. 1978) or by Searle (1992). The Dialogic Principle proper is a functional principle that affects every speech act. Action and reaction define each other by rational correspondence. It is the functional structure of the initiative act that predicts what reactive speech act is expected. Jacobs and Jackson’s ‘theoretical integration of the adjacency-pair relationship with the underlying rational organization of speech acts’ seems to come close to what is grasped by the Dialogic Principle proper (Jacobs and Jackson 1982, p. 223). Actually, however, a combination of traditional speech act theory and conversational analysis is meant. The combination operates by means of the channelizing effect of felicity conditions on the formal sequential organization in pre-, post- or embedded sequences. This way of dealing with dialogic speech act sequences does not bear upon the crucial fact that ‘being initiative’ and ‘being reactive’ are not only formal sequential features but basically functional features that have to be justified by different types of action. All speech act types can be derived from the Dialogic Principle proper, first by differentiating the claim, and second by introducing propositional criteria. I have dealt with this issue of a dialogic speech act taxonomy in detail in my book ‘Sprache als Dialog’ (2003b) and can be very brief here. According to the premises of an open theory, the arrow in Figure (1) between action and reaction can no longer be read as indicating a convention or rule but has to be conceived of as expectation based on probability. Interesting remarks in this connection have already been made by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, p. 74) who modified the term ‘convention’ in the sense of ‘expectation’. By differentiating the general pragmatic claim to a claim to truth and a claim to volition, which correspond to the basic mental states of belief and desire, four fundamental dialogic action games can be derived: claim to truth

REPRESENTATIVE

↔

ACCEPTANCE

claim to volitionpractical action

DIRECTIVE

↔

CONSENT

claim to volitionknowledge

EXPLORATIVE

↔

RESPONSE

claim to volitionmade and fulfilled

DECLARATIVE

↔

(CONFIRMATION)

FIGURE 2.

These four basic dialogic action games can be further differentiated into various sub-types. I will only refer to a few distinctions which are

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specifically relevant for argumentation, i.e. the representative distinction between an assertion and a statement and a directive distinction which seems relevant for persuasion. Representatives are defined by the speaker’s claim to truth, not by absolute truth. Various representative sub-types can be derived by differentiating the claim to truth. The truth can be obvious, self-evident. In this case it is expressed by a statement. On the other hand the truth can be hidden and has to be justified by reasoning. In this case it is expressed by assertions. Within directive speech acts sub-types are derived by differentiating the claim to volition, among them the sub-type of an ORDER which is constituted by a criterion of sanction. There is the opinion, e.g. by Piattelli Palmarini (1995), that orders are beyond the reach of persuasion. This is right to a certain extent insofar as orders do not need persuasion, they work on the basis of sanctions. In performance however even orders are often seemingly mitigated by persuasion. In this way, a theory of argumentation needs a consistent speech act theoretical basis.

4. TYPES OF ARGUMENTATION

Now let us focus on the basic structure of an action game of argumentation and start with the fundamental notions of ‘argument’ and ‘argumentation’. In my view, an argument is not simply a reason but a justification for an action. A reason might be a causal reason. A causal reason however is different from a justification. For instance, we might say: The tree has to be cut down because it has grown too high. The height of the tree is causally dependent on the feature of growing. The action of cutting down however depends on other ‘reasons’: the tree, if it is high, disturbs the view, becomes a danger in a storm, etc. What counts as justification is dependent on the speaker, on their purposes and individual evaluation, and is expressed by a claim to truth in a representative speech act. Representative speech acts aim at a speech act of acceptance. We can thus define an argument as a representative speech act which is carried out to justify another action. An argument therefore is always sequence-dependent. action

↑ justified by an ARGUMENT REPRESENTATIVE making a claim to truth FIGURE 3.

↔

ACCEPTANCE

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The next fundamental issue to be clarified refers to the question of the superordinate action that is supported or justified by an argument. This brings in the issue of argumentation. In principle every action, be it practical, verbal or mental, can be justified by arguments. With respect to verbal interaction it is not only theses, representative speech acts, but also other types of speech acts, e.g. directives, which are supported by arguments: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

The tree is too high. It disturbs. The tree has to be cut down. It disturbs. This medicine is the best. It kills bacteria 100%. This medicine is good for you. It kills bacteria 100%. Drink it (even if it is bitter). It makes you strong.

One might reflect upon what precisely is justified in directive argumentation. In my view, it is not the claim to volition itself, rather preconditions underlying the claim. It is mainly arguments of practicability, usefulness and motivation which are used to reject a directive claim. Preconditions are again representative speech acts, in this case at a subordinate level. We thus achieve the following schema of two types of argumentation: ARGUMENTATION

REPRESENTATIVE/claim to truth

↑ARGUMENTS

DIRECTIVE/claim to volition preconditionsrepresentative – practicable

– worthwhile ↑ARGUMENTS

– desired

FIGURE 4.

It is not only representatives and directives but in principle every type of speech act that can be justified by arguments. Exploratives are defined by a claim to volition which refers to knowledge (see Figure 2). As is the case with directives, it is not just the claim to knowledge but preconditions which the argument refers to, in the case of an explorative speech act, e.g., its legitimacy as can be seen by the following example: ð6Þ

A

Where were you yesterday? I phoned you but no one answered.

B Why should I tell you? A I am your brother and have some right to know where you go.

The utterance I phoned you but no one answered indicates the causal reason for the explorative act but does not count as argument.

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However, the alleged right of the brother is put forward as argument to justify the legitimacy of the explorative act. Even declaratives can be justified by arguments as we know from verdicts which become justified by the court’s evaluation of the sequence of events. Up to now we dealt with argumentation in the monologic sense of backing claims to truth and volition or its preconditions by arguments. Argumentative sequences of this type however are not yet communicatively autonomous, not yet genuinely dialogic. Let us see what can happen with them in dialogue. Having backed one’s claim or its preconditions by arguments one might immediately be successful and receive a positive reply: representative

↔

↑arguments

directive

You are right.

↔

↑arguments

explorative ↑arguments

+acceptance

+consent O.k., I’ll do it.

↔

+answer O.k., I’ll tell you.

FIGURE 5.

Though we have an argumentative sequence in this case it is not yet the genuine, full-blown dialogic action game of argumentation. For terminological clarity I would therefore prefer to call action games based on sequences of this type representative, directive or explorative action games. The action game of argumentation presupposes diverging views backed by different argumentative sequences which have to be negotiated. To be more precise: genuine argumentation does not start from a positive reply but from total or partial rejection of the initiative claim or at least from doubts about it. In order to elaborate the dialogic structure more precisely, let us start from authentic examples. As an example of the representative type of argumentation we can take the TV debate between Ru¨ttgers and Scheer on the topic ‘Solar energy – vision or madness?’ which I analysed in detail elsewhere (Weigand 1999). The basic lines of the debate are the following: There is an initiative speech act, the thesis: solar energy is madness, which is rejected by the interlocutor. Genuine dialogic argumentation arises by introducing an opposite claim to truth, in our case: solar energy is vision, or by calling the thesis into question by expressing doubts. The dialogic process of


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argumentation emerges as a process of negotiation between diverging views on the subject matter. Rhetorical Principles or principles of effective action play a crucial role in this process of defending and attacking the mutual positions. The end of argumentation is predestined: either the initial diverging positions remain the same, or one interlocutor changes position and agrees with the position of their opponent, or both interlocutors join a compromise.

REPRESENTATIVE type of ARGUMENTATION

↔

thesis

− acceptance, anti-thesis

↑ARGUMENTS

↑ARGUMENTS ↓ ARGUMENTATION ↓

thesis, anti-thesis, compromise example

Solar energy is madness

↔

Solar energy is vision.

↓ ARGUMENTATION ↓ All types of energy have to be supported. FIGURE 6.

Now let us consider how directive action games rely on arguments by referring to the following authentic example: A girl tries to persuade her mother to allow her to take part in a very attractive but also expensive school exchange programme with America. The mother has not yet decided and is more prone to decide for a cheaper programme. (7) Girl

Mother

We have to talk about America. I thought I could save, I could earn money by giving lessons and I would contribute the money which I have in my account. Well, I’ll think about it. Be quiet, I tend to agree.

As just mentioned, there are in principle three ways of rejecting a claim to volition which refer to the practicability and usefulness of the action and to the interlocutor’s motivation. The problem in our case is practicability; usefulness and motivation can be presupposed. The girl therefore makes arguments by means of representative speech acts in

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order to demonstrate the practicability of the desired action. In this way, argumentation in a directive action game strictly occurs once again at a representative, in this case subordinate level. As we can see in our authentic example, dispelling problems of practicability is the right way to achieve consent.

DIRECTIVE type of ARGUMENTATION

↔

DIRECTIVE

−CONSENT

↑ARGUMENTS → problems of practicability → problems of usefulness → problems of motivation → dispelling the problems of practicability

↑ARGUMENTS

→ demonstrating usefulness → motivating the interlocutor ↓ ARGUMENTATIONrepresentative

↓ consent, refusal, postponing

example

↔

request for permission Please give me permission …

hesitating in doubt of practicability

↑ARGUMENTS dispelling the problems of practicability I could save I could earn money I could contribute …

↓ ARGUMENTATIONrepresentative

↓ consent I tend to agree. FIGURE 7.


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Argumentation can thus be considered as a principle of structure for the interlocutors in order to be successful in the process of negotiation. Principles of structure belong to the type of Executive Principles in terms of the MGM (see below). For the directive type there are other well-known principles of structure beside argumentation by which the pressure on the interlocutor can be increased. These are mainly the principles of making offers or promises and threats: (8.1) If you give me permission to attend a private school I promise you... (8.2) Give me permission and I promise you ... (9.1) Give me permission or I will stop attending school completely. (9.2) If you don’t give me permission I will stop attending school completely.

Whereas argumentation works at the underlying representative level of preconditions, promises and threats directly affect the level of the directive claim by introducing a conditional level. Under the condition of consent a promise will be carried out, under the condition of a refusal a threat will be carried out. The claim thus becomes a multi-layered claim. To sum up: The term argumentation can be used in a narrow sense for sequences which justify a speech act by arguments in different action games. Putting forward an argument represents a subordinate representative speech act. In a broad sense, argumentation means the full-blown dialogic structure of negotiation which results on the basis of diverging views. Also dialogic argumentation is always carried out at a representative level. Strictly speaking, argumentation is not a type of action but a type of structure as exemplified in Figures 5 and 6. The structure basically implies – in the sense of playing the game effectively – that the interlocutors choose arguments that are useful either to support their own position or to weaken the position of the opponent. Representative and directive action games are closely connected: on the one hand, conclusions can be indirectly drawn from representative speech acts to directive claims: All types of energy have to be supported., and on the other hand, directives are backed by representatives: I could save, could earn money .... This connection of different claims can be taken as a further feature of the ‘mixed’ game. At the end of certainty there are no absolute beliefs but negotiation of differing individual views which emerge from the integration of reason, emotion, evaluation, and persuasion. 5. ARGUMENTATION AND RHETORIC: THE MIXED GAME

According to Searle (1972, p. 16), there are in principle two ways of carrying out scientific research: ‘Throughout the history of the study of man there has been a fundamental opposition between those who

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believe that progress is to be made by a rigorous observation of man’s actual behavior and those who believe that such observations are interesting only in so far as they reveal to us hidden and possibly fairly mysterious underlying laws that only partially and in distorted form reveal themselves to us in behavior.’ Why in principle should there only be these two extremes in science? Modern theorizing has demonstrated that there is an approach in the middle, an approach which addresses the complex and attempts to come to terms with the integrated whole. There is no place for eternal rules; instead, human beings are the central reference point. It is their abilities, partly innate, partly culturally and socially shaped, that determine their view of the world and their behaviour in general. Orientation in performance is necessarily based on adaptation and negotiation and proceeds by means of principles, not in the sense of axioms or ideal principles but in the sense of ‘real’ principles whose validity is restricted to a certain probability. Rules, conventions and regularities are used as far as they go. Where regularities come to an end, other techniques such as individual inferences have to be applied. What has been strictly excluded in classical theorizing, probability and chance, becomes a constitutive component in modern theorizing at the level of performance. A theory which gets involved in the adventures in the complex of human dialogic interaction, such as the Theory of Dialogic Action Games (e.g., Weigand 2000a, 2002), has to tackle two fundamental issues: having a grasp of the whole, i.e. knowing the whole in which the components work, and searching for a key to open it up. Knowing the whole in human dialogic interaction means knowing the unit in which dialogic interaction is possible, i.e. the minimal communicatively autonomous unit. Searching for this unit we passed from the speech act to the sequence of action and reaction, from action and reaction to human beings as actors and to all the parameters human beings’ interaction is dependent on. We thus arrive at the cultural unit of the dialogic action game as the minimal communicatively autonomous unit. The authentic text is only a component in the action game. Culture in this context is meant in a broad sense as a complex of cognitive and social variables that influence human dialogic interaction. The action game is not a strictly defined, rule-governed system like a chess game but an open and variable unit of mediation between order and disorder, a constructive and creative play that not only takes account of generalizations and regularities but also allows freedom of individual choice. Searching for a key to open up this complex integrated network inevitably leads to what can be called its destination or purpose. It is the directedness of the components which goes beyond arbitrariness, chance and pure chaos and gives us the key to open up the complexity of human behaviour. This directedness is rooted in the nature of human beings


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which is a double nature, determined on the one hand by the basic instinct of self-assertion of the individual ego and on the other hand by dialogically oriented purposes of the ego as social being. It is thus the dialogic structure of human beings’ action and reaction that in the end fashions the key to the complex unit of the action game. For a descriptive theory of human behaviour, the basic driving force is human nature. Assumptions about human nature can be justified by survival needs. Describing actual behaviour does not mean relying exclusively on authentic texts. Action and behaviour is more than speaking. Nor does it mean that the point of effective behaviour is excluded. On the contrary, trying to be effective is innate to human beings and thus becomes an integrated part of the theory, part of Rhetorical Principles. Being effective in this sense however is not equivalent to acting ‘reasonably’ in the sense of norms nor with being an expert in the field. Experts need special knowledge in their field and the capacity to apply it to particular circumstances and contingencies. Toulmin (2001, p. 106) referring to economics gives a very good example that can elucidate what being an expert means. In economics it is numbers that qualify an organization as well-functioning versus malfunctioning. These numbers do not make up a separate field besides argumentation but enter argumentation in business everywhere. If we want to evaluate communicative performance or practice in business and to give advice to organizations in trouble, we need a benchmark that cannot be gained by analysing any random authentic business dialogues. We would have to study the differences between dialogues in well-functioning and in malfunctioning organizations and to focus on the relation between economic numbers and rhetoric in dialogic negotiations. In this way we can describe what competitive, successful interaction means by describing dialogues in wellfunctioning organizations and could derive from it guidelines and advice for malfunctioning organizations in their attempt at improving business performance. It is however quite another question how we evaluate this benchmark with respect to ethical norms. Beside the double nature of human beings as social individuals, we have to include another basic premise for human behaviour: human abilities are not only capabilities but restrictions as well. They are the filter for everything human beings are able to perceive and think. Human beings’ view of the world will always be their view of the world. Evaluation comes in from the very beginning. Evaluation again is dependent on various parameters such as ideology, religion, culture in general and personal experiences. There is no simple at the beginning; the simple we might be searching for as our starting point of analysis turns out to be complex from the very outset: a mix of self-assertion, social orientation, personal interests, evaluation and ideology. Meaning inevitably becomes persuasive meaning. It is the eye of the observer which cannot be abstracted from

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and which separates human beings’ cognition from knowledge as such. There are no arguments as such except in artificially constructed systems. Persuasion in this broad sense qualifies the distinction between ‘convincing’ and ‘persuading’ without making it superfluous. The general concept of ‘meaning as persuasion’ applies to every speech act. There is however a difference between a speech act based on a claim to truth that aims at the perlocutionary effect of convincing and a speech act based on a claim to volition that aims at the perlocutionary effect of persuading: meaning is persuasion

REPRESENTATIVE

ASSERTION

↔

ACCEPTANCE

DIRECTIVE

REQUEST

↔

CONSENT

ill.claim to truth

ill.claim to volition

perl.effect of convincing

perl.effect of persuading

FIGURE 8.

The notion persuasion is often referred to in the literature but mostly in a rather vague and approximate manner. In a broad sense, it represents a feature of meaning in general, rooted in human beings’ basic instinct of self-assertion, which finds its dialogic expression in the attempt ‘to reinforce or change beliefs, attitudes or actions’ of other fellow beings (Dascal and Gross 1999, p. 112; cf. also Piattelli Palmarini 1995). The dialogic directedness of human nature necessitates the development of communicative means that can be used in order to come to an understanding in dialogic interaction. Basically, it is the conditions of human nature as well as of culture that determine how these means will work in the ‘mixed’ game: human nature - integration of abilities - self-assertion

human communicative behaviour

- dialogic directedness

- integration of means (verbal, perceptual, cognitive)

culture

- effective use of means

- ideology, religion, etc. the mixed game FIGURE 9.

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As a consequence, communicative means are integrated means for effective use in the mixed game which is not stable but an ever-changing mixed game. We not only need to abandon the myth of abstraction and separation but the myth of stability as well (Harris 1981, 1998, Toulmin 2001, p. 214). The term ‘mixed game’ goes back to an interesting discussion at a meeting of the ‘Consiglio Nazionale Forense’ in Rome 2002 on the topic ‘Teoria e tecnica dell’argomentazione giuridica’ (Weigand 2003a). An Italian advocate summarized my view by commenting: ‘Yes, you are right, we know, it is a mixed game. Unfortunately, science offers only abstract, idealized models which are of little relevance for practice.’ It is remarkable that this criticism comes from jurists, i.e. from professionals of law and paragraphs. We should take it seriously in rethinking the orthodox separation of theory and practice. Even if the action game represents a mixed game, it is not at all without structure. Persuasion on the meaning side of language corresponds to rhetoric as the art of effective language use on the side of the communicative means: meaning

↔

persuasion

means rhetoric

FIGURE 10.

Rhetoric can no longer be considered a separate area of decorative figures but is permanently integrated in the attempt at effectively playing the game. The methodology of the Theory of Dialogic Action Games takes account of it by specific Rhetorical Principles. For a model of the mixed game it is not enough to represent the meaning of a speech act with Searle’s formula F(p) abstracting from the speaker’s interest behind manifest purposes (Searle 1979). Interests can be individual, e.g. ‘to please’ or ‘fare una bella figura’, or the interests of institutions such as ‘to win’ or ‘to have power’. Speech act theory therefore has to be given a superordinate level over and above purposes or communicative functions:

INTEREST [

FUNCTION

(PROPOSITION)

DIALOGIC PURPOSE

(STATE OF AFFAIRS)

]

FIGURE 11.

At a basic level we thus achieve at least four fundamental types of meaning: interests, communicative purposes, and the propositional functions of referring and predicating. Persuasion or the speaker’s view enters every type.

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Let me finally make a few remarks on the methods or on the communicative techniques human beings use in the attempt to maintain their position in the action game. I distinguish between Constitutive Principles, Regulative Principles and Executive Principles. Constitutive principles – these are the Action Principle, the Dialogic Principle proper and the Coherence Principle – operate at the level of speech act categories such as representatives, directives, exploratives and declaratives and focus on basic premises of the concepts of action, dialogue and coherence. The Action Principle is based on what makes up action, namely the correlation between purposes and means. Practical actions have a practical purpose that is pursued by practical means, communicative actions have a communicative purpose pursued by communicative means. The Dialogic Principle proper bears on the fact that every communicative action is dialogically oriented and is not autonomous. It is the very functional structure of the initiative act that indicates what reactive act can be expected. The Coherence Principle is based on the integration of different communicative means, verbal, cognitive, and perceptual. It is human beings who therefore establish coherence in their minds in trying to understand the interplay of different types of communicative means (Weigand 2000b). Regulative Principles describe how specific components of the game regulate each other, for instance, emotion and reason, or the individual’s interest in self-assertion and the interlocutor’s interest in being respected. It is precisely this principle of regulation between self-interest and respect or politeness towards the other human being on which Principles of Rhetoric are based. Both components of this Regulative Principle, trying to defend effectively one’s own interests and respecting the interests of our fellow beings, are necessarily connected as a result of the double nature of human beings: EFFECTIVENESS

↔

self-interest

RESPECT/POLITENESS interest of the other

Principles of Rhetoric FIGURE 12.

Rhetorical principles vary in multiple ways insofar as they are, on the one hand, dependent on individuals and the particular situation, and on the other hand, on background ideology and culture which determine the image of the human being. It is in the end the individual human being who decides what politeness means for him/her in the particular case, either real respect or an empty conventional routine used to strengthen the own position.


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Executive Principles in general are principles that influence in one way or another the action sequence of dialogue. They open up the vast field of complex action games which needs to be investigated theoretically in a more profound way and with reference to authentic action games. Insofar as interlocutors can use them as deliberate strategies to achieve their interests and purposes, executive principles represent a sub-part of Rhetorical Principles in general. In any case, they are principles of sequential structure, either dependent on speech act categories such as explorative sequences of clarifying or independent of specific speech act categories such as strategies of evading or insisting (Weigand 2001). The issue of argumentation is basically an issue of specific executive principles in negotiating diverging views, mainly of defending and attacking mutual positions by choosing the right arguments and of trying to come to an understanding. To sum up: As a consequence of the nature of human beings, every action game is a mixed game. The mixed game is based on integration of various kinds, mainly the integration of human nature and culture and the integration of different means. In order to understand what is going on in the mixed game one needs to grasp the whole and to have a key to open it up. What has been called truth or even absolute truth changes to truth in the eye of the observer. Persuasion and rhetoric thus become a constitutive part of every action game.

6. REASON AND EMOTION: A SAMPLE ANALYSIS

Let us now focus on an authentic example which highlights how regulative and executive principles work. Recently, we were witnesses to a public debate which escalated into a serious conflict because one of its participants did not manage to use reason to control his emotions: the debate after the statement by the then new President-in-Office of the European Parliament Silvio Berlusconi in which he introduced the programme of the Italian presidency to the House, on 2 July 2003 (see appendix). I have to leave out various interesting points in this debate and will only focus on the conflict between Berlusconi and the German Social Democratic member Schulz who took the floor and heavily criticised Berlusconi. In speech act theoretical terms Schulz’s move marks the starting conditions of an argumentative game: statementBerlusconi

↔

–acceptanceSchulz criticism

FIGURE 13.

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Schulz justifies his criticism by the following arguments: – The comments made by Mr Bossi, Berlusconi’s Minister for Immigration Policy, are totally incompatible with the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. – The conflict of interest weighs heavily on Berlusconi. – Berlusconi did not address the points of a European Public Prosecutor’s office, of a European arrest warrant and of mutual recognition of documents.

The last argument is expressed with a clearly disparaging attitude – alluding to the fact that Berlusconi’s own country would need ‘a little reform’ in this respect – and is followed by biting irony: ð10Þ Nevertheless, I am delighted that you are with us today and that I can have this debate with you.

Schulz’s destructive criticism reaches its peak with his next utterance: ð11Þ We owe that not least to Mrs Nicole Fontaine, because if she had not made such a good job of dragging out the Berlusconi and Dell’Utri immunity procedures . . . you would no longer have the immunity that you need.

In clear words, Schulz asserts that Berlusconi was only able to become the new President-in-Office because the immunity procedures have been dragged out. The use of the verb to drag out can in principle not be justified by facts. It is simply an insinuation based on Schulz’s personal and deliberate evaluation. Persuasive political texts are full of words of this type. Schulz however presents the insinuation as objective argument: ð12Þ That is another truth that needs to be spoken here today:

In my view, this argument and especially the use of the word drag out reveal that Schulz is acting on the basis of a clearly calculated executive principle, the strategy of provoking and possibly even offending. He knows Berlusconi and can expect that he will not remain cool. In my view, this is exactly what he intends to bring about. He plays the game of provoking and is successful. As for himself, he is clever enough not to go beyond certain limits. It is above all Schulz’s perfect use of rhetorical means, of biting irony, disparaging evaluation and concealed insinuation which cause Berlusconi to lose composure:


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ð13Þ I would of course also like to thank the other Members who have spoken - Mr Graham Watson Mrs Monica Frassoni Mr Francis Wurtz - for wishing me success in my work. I must however reply to them and to all those who have given an utterly distorted view of Italy that is far from the truth. I invite them to come and enjoy something that the Berlusconi government has clearly not succeeded in eliminating which is Italy’s sunshine its beauty its 100000 monuments and churches our 3500 museums our 2500 archaeological sites the 40000 historical houses in Italy which we have not managed to destroy over the last two years. Mr Schultz I know there is a producer in Italy who is making a film about Nazi concentration camps. I will suggest you for the role of guard. You would be perfect!

(Laughter, protests from the left) I shall conclude this diatribe by saying that my Social Democrat friends and colleagues should probably expand their acquaintances beyond the Italian Members they find here in Parliament and they should perhaps extend their reading beyond the far left newspapers, which have evidently shaped these convictions of theirs.

What has started as an argumentative game mainly based on reason, now changes to a personal and emotional conflict, a quarrel, leading to great offence. The break can be clearly marked between Berlusconi’s use of sarcastic irony ð14Þ . . . that the Berlusconi government has clearly not succeeded in eliminating . . . . . . which we have not managed to destroy . . .

and his losing control and massively offending Schulz: ð15Þ

I will suggest you for the role of guard:

Whereas sarcastic irony remains within parliamentary and argumentative rules, the reference to a guard of a concentration camp breaks certain limits of ordinary civilized behaviour. Berlusconi even goes one step further: ð16Þ

You would be perfect:

Whereas Berlusconi is unable to control his emotions by reason, Schulz in his turn even proves able to deal with Berlusconi’s great insult without losing control:

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ð17Þ . . . my respect for the victims of fascism prevents me from saying a single word about this. However, I am quite clear in my mind that it is very difficult to accept a situation in which a President-in-Office of the Council, when he comes up against the slightest contradiction during a debate, loses his composure in this way:

Even if we can never be sure about what goes on in another person’s mind, we can assume that Schulz could to a certain degree expect and calculate Berlusconi’s reaction and this enables him to take it without comment. This game between keeping and losing composure is a game on the verge between reason and emotion. It can be planned by Executive Principles. An essential question remains: how can speech acts of provocation be distinguished from speech acts of INSULT? In this respect the utterance of the President of the European Parliament Cox is illuminating: ð18Þ

Berlusconi perhaps allowed himself to go beyond the ordinary rules of engagement:

Reason tells the interlocutors to behave within ‘the ordinary rules of engagement’. The individual may go beyond these ordinary rules, he will however be called back by others who consider these rules as norms that do not allow emotions to dominate in public speech nor to express comments which are ‘out of respect for the values we all share as Europeans’ as another member of the European Parliament calls it. But where are the limits? In my view, a provocation is a calculated attempt to challenge the opponent, an insult however tries to hurt. It mostly happens unexpectedly, is not strategically planned, it is induced by emotions, and hits an opponent’s sore point. The difference between provocation and insult is not clearly marked because, as we have known since Austin’s times, whether an utterance actually offends comes out as a perlocutionary effect. What we consider to be provocation is taken as a personal insult by Berlusconi. Whereas Berlusconi refuses to withdraw his comments, which according to him were ‘said ironically’, Cox, the President, closes the debate with an expression of personal regret about the insult caused to Schulz. A last question remains to be tackled which refers to the structure of the whole debate and especially to the change from an argumentative debate to an argument in the sense of a quarrel. Very interestingly, the English language uses the term ‘argument’ not only in the sense of justification for an action. In specific collocations, the word is also used for a quarrel, e.g.: Berlusconi and Schulz now have an argument, demonstrating the close connection between both. Normally, a


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quarrel happens, one gets involved in it without intending to. An argument changes to a quarrel when emotions begin to dominate and cause the actors to leave the ‘ordinary rules of engagement’. The quarrel is there when both actors have left the ordinary rules (Weigand 1988). In our case it is Schulz who deliberately provokes. Berlusconi might have simply rejected Schulz’s remarks by keeping his emotions under control. No quarrel would have emerged. Instead, he loses his composure and massively insults Schulz. His insult marks the potential starting point of a quarrel. It does however not lead to an open quarrel because Schulz is able to control his emotions and refrains from hitting back. The sequence of actions can thus be structured according to the following schema:

statementBerlusconi ↔ –acceptanceSchulz provocation

↔

ironic rejectionBerlusconi insult

↔

dialogue breakSchulz

FIGURE 14.

The sequence seems to consist of representative speech acts if one does not take into account a fundamental sequencing principle: every reaction which is not the final reaction can secondarily be taken as initiative. The sequence thus becomes a double-layered sequence. The reactive speech acts in the debate therefore have a primary reactive function, e.g. non-acceptance or ironic rejection, and a secondary initiative function, the representative functions of provocation and insult. To sum up: Dialogic interaction is guided by Principles of Probability, among them Executive Principles and Principles of Emotion. Berlusconi was unable to use reason to control his emotions and thus disqualified himself as a politician, whereas Schulz presented himself as someone who was very cool, able to take criticism, even the grave insult by Berlusconi. The whole debate is an institutional debate, on the level of the European Parliament, not between two individuals. Schulz’s provocation is to be considered as provocation by the left party, and not his own personal provocation. He plays the game of personal vulnerability, which is an open game, and wins because Berlusconi indeed takes it personally and feels insulted. Schulz was able to calculate this course of the dialogue with a high degree of probability on the basis of Executive Principles which take account of the way Berlusconi is inclined to behave.

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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE INTEGRATED WHOLE

One of the basic traditions of Western thought is the belief in certainty, in a presupposition that science is about causes not chance. In the same spirit of certainty, modern linguistics has added arbitrary fixed conventions and codes. In contrast to that, action theory has introduced intention and with it the problem of how to reconcile causes and codes with the constructive and adaptive role of human beings. Addressing the integrated whole inevitably presupposes that we are prepared to leave classical deterministic orthodoxy behind us and to get involved in the ‘mixed’ game. This is precisely the issue in physics and biology, too, where Prigogine (1997) speaks of the ‘constructive role of the arrow of time’ and states that we have reached ‘the end of certainty’. It is time to accept the end of certainty and with it a challenging turning point in the history of science not only in cosmology but also in the humanities and social sciences. Consequently, for argumentation theory the game has changed from a rule-governed game like chess to an open game along the lines of our competencein-performance.

8. APPENDIX

Debates of the European Parliament (http://www.europarl.eu.int/ home/default_en.htm) Sitting of Wednesday 2 July 2003 The programme of the Italian Presidency [...] SCHULZ (PSE). – (DE) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I would first like to reply to Mr Poettering, who was waxing positively lyrical about the Presidency representatives who have travelled from Italy today: Berlusconi, Fini, Frattini, Buttiglione – I was even worried that he was going to move on to Maldini, Del Piero, Garibaldi and Cavour! But there is one person he forgot, and that is Mr Bossi. He is also a member of the Italian Government, and the least utterance from this man is far worse than anything that inspired this House to censure Austria and oppose the Freedom Party’s inclusion in the Austrian Government. We ought to talk about him as well! (Applause) I realise that you are not responsible for your ministers’ IQs, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, but you are responsible for what they say. The comments made by Mr Bossi, your Minister for Immigration Policy, which you mentioned in your speech, are totally incompatible with the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. As President-in-Office of the


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Council, it falls to you to defend those values, so I call on you to defend those values against your own minister! I would like to pick up on a point made here by Mr Di Pietro. He said that we should not allow conflict of interest to infect Europe. Yes, he is quite right, and we have now found ourselves in a difficult situation for some days in this House whenever we talk about the Italian Presidency, because we keep being told, ‘now you must be careful not to criticise Berlusconi because of what he is doing in Italy, because the European Parliament is not the right place for that’. Why should that be? Is Italy not a member of the European Union? (Applause) Of course the European Parliament is the right place, and I shall tell you why. The members of Italy’s Parliament are elected to concern themselves with your actions as the Prime Minister of Italy, and we are elected to debate what you do as President of the European Council; that is our responsibility. You talked about the area of freedom, security and justice, and about the Tampere process. You used a single term, Europol, but you did not use those three terms. I wanted to remind you about that and ask if you could say a few words about those three concepts. What do you intend to do to speed up the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s office? (Applause) What do you intend to do to speed up the introduction of the European arrest warrant? What are you planning to do about the mutual recognition of documents in cross-border criminal proceedings? I think you could do with a little reform in your own country when it comes to the authenticity of documents. If you were to implement that reform in your own country, the European arrest warrant could then come into force much more quickly. Nevertheless, I am delighted that you are with us today and that I can have this debate with you. We owe that not least to Mrs Nicole Fontaine, because if she had not made such a good job of dragging out the Berlusconi and Dell’Utri immunity procedures – Mr Dell’Utri being your righthand man, who by way of exception is here today for once – if she had not done that, you would no longer have the immunity that you need. That is another truth that needs to be spoken here today! (Heckling)

[...] 23 contributions by members of the parliament BERLUSCONI, President-in-Office of the Council. – (IT) [...]

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I would, of course, also like to thank the other Members who have spoken – Mr Graham Watson, Mrs Monica Frassoni, Mr Francis Wurtz – for wishing me success in my work. I must, however, reply to them and to all those who have given an utterly distorted view of Italy that is far from the truth. I invite them to come and enjoy something that the Berlusconi government has clearly not succeeded in eliminating, which is Italy’s sunshine, its beauty, its 100,000 monuments and churches, our 3,500 museums, our 2,500 archaeological sites, the 40,000 historical houses in Italy, which we have not managed to destroy over the last two years. Mr Schultz, I know there is a producer in Italy who is making a film about Nazi concentration camps. I will suggest you for the role of guard. You would be perfect! (Laughter, protests from the left) I shall conclude this diatribe by saying that my Social Democrat friends and colleagues should probably expand their acquaintances beyond the Italian Members they find here in Parliament and they should perhaps extend their reading beyond the far left newspapers, which have evidently shaped these convictions of theirs. [...] PRESIDENT. In the course of Mr Berlusconi’s vigorous and colourful response to the debate, a remark was made in respect of one of our colleagues, Mr Schulz, who, under the Rules of Procedure, is entitled to make a statement to the House if he so wishes. I would like to make that quite clear before I invite President Prodi to speak. What I will do first, following procedure, is hear President Prodi and then, if he wishes, I will invite Mr Schulz to make a personal statement at the end of the debate, as provided for under Rule 122. (Protests) BAROŃ CRESPO (PSE). – (ES) I am speaking to ask you, as President, to protect the rights of the Members, in particular the honour of Mr Schulz. (Applause) You have made a proposal. I would ask you, as well as giving the floor to Mr Schulz, to call on Mr Berlusconi, the President-in-Office of the Council, to withdraw those comments, out of respect for the values we all share as Europeans. (Applause) PRESIDENT. It is perhaps better that we should deal with this matter directly. I do not want to open up a whole debate. There is considerable emotion in the House regarding this. It is very clear that a Member is entitled to make a contribution in a debate and to have it responded to with some serenity. In this case, in the vigour and flow of


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his response, Mr Berlusconi perhaps allowed himself to go beyond the ordinary rules of engagement. (Mixed reactions) I will first hear Mr Schulz, who is entitled to speak, and then I shall return to the President-in-Office of the Council, if he wishes to respond. We will close the debate after hearing Mr Prodi. SCHULZ (PSE). – (DE) Mr President, thank you for giving me the floor. I do not need three minutes. I will be very brief. During his statement, if the translation was correct, Mr Berlusconi said that a director is currently shooting a film in Italy about the concentration camps, and was inviting me to take the role of the Kapo ... (Heckling) ... that is to say, the role of the SS henchman. I have only one thing to say to you in response: my respect for the victims of fascism prevents me from saying a single word about this. However, I am quite clear in my mind that it is very difficult to accept a situation in which a President-in-Office of the Council, when he comes up against the slightest contradiction during a debate, loses his composure in this way. (Loud and sustained applause from the left and centre left) (Standing ovation) BERLUSCONI, President-in-Office of the Council. – (IT) Mr President, who was not in the Chamber to hear Mr Schulz’s speech? That he should insult me seriously on a personal level, gesticulating and in a tone of voice that really is unacceptable in a Parliament like this. I said what I said ironically. If you are all unable to understand irony, I am sorry. But I will not withdraw what I said ironically unless Mr Schulz withdraws the personal insults he made. I said it ironically; he did that maliciously! (Applause from the right, uproar on the left) PRESIDENT. Colleagues! Please, could we have some calm! There are many colleagues who wish to make points of order and to speak. We are running very late. I will not take those points. I wish to say, as President of the House, that I personally regret the tone that the latter part of this morning’s debate has taken. It is unfortunate. It is a distraction from the European business we have in hand. It is regrettable. I should now like to invite the President of the European Commission to close this debate in some serenity and then to proceed to the vote. (Sustained applause)

[...] contribution by Romano Prodi PRESIDENT. I know that many colleagues wish to speak, but we have considerably run over our time.

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