Armed Forces & Society - Daphna Canetti

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I versus We : Collective and Individual Factors of Reserve Service Motivation during War and Peace Gabriel Ben-Dor, Ami Pedahzur, Daphna Canetti-Nisim, Eran Zaidise, Arie Perliger and Shai Bermanis Armed Forces & Society 2008 34: 565 originally published online 15 October 2007 DOI: 10.1177/0095327X07303609 The online version of this article can be found at: http://afs.sagepub.com/content/34/4/565

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I versus We Collective and Individual Factors of Reserve Service Motivation during War and Peace

Armed Forces & Society Volume 34 Number 4 July 2008 565-592 © 2008 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. All rights reserved. 10.1177/0095327X07303609 http://afs.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com

Gabriel Ben-Dor University of Haifa

Ami Pedahzur University of Texas at Austin

Daphna Canetti-Nisim Eran Zaidise Arie Perliger Shai Bermanis University of Haifa

This study examines conditions of peace and war to find whether the “rally ‘round the flag” effect is indeed attributed to rising levels of social collectivism. Reserve service motivation in peacetime and wartime was compared among 1,004 Israeli reservists. Levels of motivation and the factors that affect them were examined during the optimism of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (February 2000) and about a year and a half into the second Intifada (October 2000). Findings suggest that motivation to serve in wartime is indeed higher than in peacetime. However, they also suggest that similar factors predict motivation in both times, although their relative impact is altered by the situation. Reservists were more likely to be motivated by individual rather than collective incentives (in both peacetime and wartime situations), thus suggesting that “rally ‘round the flag” occurrences are not necessarily reflective of the social cohesion and collective reasoning. Keywords: social cohesion; collectivism; individualism; service motivation; state of belligerency; wartime; peacetime; Israel; military

F

ollowing the attacks of 9/11, the American public underwent a popular reaction that closely resembled a classic wartime response. This was marked by a public outpouring of solidarity, heightened expressions of patriotism, and a somewhat collective change of heart within the previously individualistic American society.1 The emerging

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566 Armed Forces & Society

mode of the immediate post-9/11 era reflected a strong emphasis on unity, togetherness, community, and tolerance, and in the face of adversity, Americans were coming together to convey a message of “united we stand.”2 Commonly known as the “rally ’round the flag” effect, it is believed that in times of crisis, when important political, economic, or strategic interests of the nation are at stake, the public sets aside its differences to represent a united front.3 Even so, can countries truly depend on their citizens to in effect mobilize for a common cause when the situation arises? This question is perhaps best successfully tested in terms of military reserve service. In a state of security crisis, reservists, more than any other sector of society, are required to set aside all civilian and personal commitments and enlist for military service. Although legal and organizational constraints exist to ensure this enlistment, reservists’ own motivation remains a key factor in enlistment portraying adherence to collective national needs. Questions relating to the notion of communal consciousness—where individual desires give way to the needs of the collective—have always been taken for granted in Israeli society. Collective elements have accompanied Israeli culture from the first days of the state’s establishment. As a result, Israel has been generally depicted as a society where a strong emphasis on group membership ultimately prioritizes the goals of the collective over those of the individual.4 When it came to depending on its citizens to mobilize in the face of a national crisis, the individual’s motivation to serve, namely, in the army, was hardly ever questioned. Israel’s mandatory conscription and reserve duty became not only an informal criterion for citizenship5 but also a collective experience shaping and characterizing the individual conscience and his or her personal identity. Consequently, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has customarily been conceived as an integral part of Israeli society,6 so much so that Israeli society has been often described as a “nation in arms.”7 Although most nation-states have distanced themselves from the nation in arms model, research suggests that Israel does not fit the postmodern army type in which the army transforms from an institution with a national mission into an occupation in which service is simply “just another job.”8 At the same time, although it has not completely shed itself of such nation-in-arms attributes, Israeli culture nonetheless has undergone a comprehensive change that certainly puts into question previously incontestable values.9 One of these values has been the citizens’ motivation to serve in the army in general and in the reserves in particular. Based on the widely accepted assumption in which external conflict promotes internal cohesion, the following study aims at establishing whether the upsurge in reserve service motivation in Israeli society during wartime as opposed to peacetime can be explained by an increase in collectivism.

Authors’ Note: Please address correspondence to Daphna Canetti-Nisim, School of Political Sciences— 405, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, 31905, Haifa, Israel; e-mail: [email protected].


Ben-Dor et al. / Factors of Reserve Service Motivation 567

From One for All to All for One The unique relationship between Israel’s army and the state has received broad literary attention and has been the focus of ample research.10 For years—in fact, decades—sociologists have highlighted two central aspects of this relationship. First, the army and the country’s security forces are conceived as integral parts of Israeli society. Mandatory conscription in Israel followed by reserve service becomes a collective experience and ultimately an integral characteristic of the individual conscience and his or her personal identity.11 Such traits of a nation-state in arms first emerged in Israel in the early 1950s12 with the appearance of mechanisms that blurred the differences between the military and society or, conversely, mechanisms that bound the two together. In this way, the material and mental preparation for war was everyone’s concern. This included mandatory conscription, a large reserve force, a significant involvement—whether direct or indirect—of all sectors of society during wartime and in the preparations for war, warfare industries and economics, and of course a national culture that sanctifies military solutions for political problems and positions the army and its soldiers at its center.13 Second, the state of war and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict that has accompanied the state since its founding have made a considerable contribution to the crystallization and solidarity of Israeli society.14 Viewed through the prism of a functional perspective, an important component in social conflict theories is the hypothesis in which external conflict promotes internal cohesion. A state of conflict with an outgroup or the identification of “a common enemy” becomes a powerful factor not only in generating cohesion but also in setting up boundaries, clarifying objectives, and establishing norms. The heightened consciousness of purpose that naturally accompanies conflicts in general and wars in particular can produce group identity and ultimately collective behavior.15 All told, both its status as a nation in arms and the complementary state of belligerence that has accompanied Israel since its establishment have played a major role in creating and maintaining an ethos of collectivism in Israeli culture. In fact, Israel has generally been depicted as a collectivist society in which the profound emphasis on group membership ultimately prioritized the goals of the collective over those of the individual.16 The roots of the collectivist ethos in Israeli society not only may be traced back to Jewish communal life, which was traditionally organized around a voluntary commitment and close networking in the face of persecution, but may also be found in the nature of the first wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine, which reinforced such trends with a socialist ethos. The basic image of the early settlers, the halutzim (pioneers), was that of individuals willing to contribute to the collective well-being without the notion of compensation—even at the cost of personal sacrifice. These pioneers played an important role in the crystallization of the new sociocultural order. “During the period of pioneer endeavor, collective objectives and individual efforts were conceived as intimately interwoven and expected to be so. According to prevailing conceptions of the self, identity had to be integrally embedded



within the limits of the collectivity.”17 During the first decades of Israeli statehood, Zionism, socialism, and Jewish tradition had converged into an ethos, in which the group was of primary importance.18 Today, however, Israel is a very different polity than what the pioneers had first envisioned. Over the decades, changes have accelerated and few earlier manifestations remain valid. Perhaps the most dramatic change is the withering of the image of a united Israeli society.19 Largely, as a consequence of the war in 1967 and the subsequent controversial occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, cracks began to appear in the Israeli consensus and public discourse. The former unreserved support of national policy was gradually being replaced by a culture of criticism and political polarization.20 By the late 1960s, a sense of dissonance between key symbolic imagery and national reality began to permeate. This was especially evident in the political system, in which electoral support moved away from traditional patterns of political control in the coalitions led by the Labor party toward parties that provided alternative versions to the desired Israeli society and the role played by the individual within it.21 This process was further intensified with the outbreak of the Lebanon War, the first Intifada, the initiation of the Oslo Accords, and finally the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. Along with these political processes, economic and social changes took place during the 1980s and 1990s, and the socialist orientation more prevalent during Israel’s early years gave way to capitalism and a market economy.22 The decline in the collective orientation of the population was related to structural changes, such as bureaucratization, urbanization, privatization, and the evolution of an overall neoliberal economy.23 As elsewhere in the Western world, this period was marked by a “ratings” culture of personal choice, marketing, commercialization, competition, and personal consumption, combined with postmaterial values that centralized the individual and his or her needs and wants. From a society that claimed to have blurred its cultural differences in the name of the melting pot ethos, Israel’s social solidarity seemed to be eroding. The vision of the pioneer was shattered, and with it the economic models of the self gained dominance. The golden years of the collective effort yielded to the pursuit of the self and the legitimation of individualistic values and self-reliance.24 Inevitably, such demonstrations of postmodernism poured doubt on the nation’s symbols of collectivity, namely, the army,25 but most relevantly these developments chipped away at the public’s perception of the military service as an “individualistic rite of passage.”26

Even Good Things Come to an End: Israeli Public Consensus toward the IDF It would be somewhat misguided to proclaim that Israel has joined other nations in their shift to postmodernist armies, as presumed by Moskos.27 According to such conceptions, and in contrast to the modern-type military that was wholly associated



with a nation at risk, the postmodern type underwent a loosening of ties with the nationstate.28 Moskos’s renowned thesis submits that the army is turning from an institution into an occupation, from a national calling to “just another job.” But this is only partially the case with the Israeli army. Where the IDF is concerned, a new perception is forming, but it is far from being postmodern. In the wake of the Lebanon War (1982), a certain rupture had indeed taken place between the army and society. For the first time, voices of objection to the war, its goals, and its means were being heard, and the term “war of choice” had been coined to signify that the IDF was not solely defending the country’s citizens but perhaps fighting a political war. Especially after what came to be known as “the Sabra and Shatilla massacre,” the prestige of the army had without doubt been compromised.29 When the first Intifada (1987) broke out just a few years later, the IDF seemed powerless in suppressing the popular insurgence of the Palestinian struggle for national liberation.30 Demonstrations of helplessness continued through the Gulf War (1991), in which the IDF sat idly by while others (mainly the United States) did the job. To many Israelis, the Gulf War was the first clear indication that Israel and the IDF alike were losing their deterrence in the face of adversity.31 But most important, the Gulf War, which because of Israel’s noninvolvement has been often described as the “war that never was,” proved to the Israeli public that it is possible for a country to reach political and security accomplishments without actual military involvement. Consequently, Israel’s fate no longer depended solely on its armed forces.32 The status of the IDF as well as its heroic persona as a just and moral army was deteriorating, and civil-military relations had reached an unprecedented critical state that encompassed both a crisis of the IDF’s purpose and identity as well as the collapse of the metanarrative of Israeli society as a nation in arms.33 The military, which had previously represented the pinnacle of the former collectivist ethos, was now facing rival values that began to surface in the late 1980s. Such manifestations included the refusal of soldiers, particularly reservists, to participate in what they perceived as organized violence. Although such cases were relatively rare, these conscientious objectors nonetheless challenged the Israeli axiom in which the call for duty is an unconditioned civic obligation. Subsequently, bereaved parents urged for outside bodies, rather than internal military committees, to investigate training and combat accidents and also objected to the uniform style of their children’s headstones. The establishment of peace movements that organized protests against the IDF’s involvement in what they termed as unnecessary wars proved to be yet an additional indication of the crisis of faith. Eventually, public discontent with the army appeared in the press, which had traditionally cooperated with the hegemonic state conception and viewed itself as its mouthpiece.34 The willingness to sacrifice oneself for one’s country and the image of the pioneering soldier and the military in general as a civil virtue were fading. At the same time, the belief that the individual was to serve the establishment and its ideology became transformed into the view that the role of the ideology and the establishment was to serve the individual.35



Against the backdrop of socialist decline on one hand and the growing economic prosperity of the 1980s on the other, the military held less of an attraction than ever before. Militarism no longer yielded material well-being but rather hindered its advance.36 Consequently, when materialism and militarism were no longer complementary values,37 an increasing emphasis on material remuneration rather than symbolic awards developed.38 In an effort to retain its high-quality personnel, the IDF attempted to roughly match its salaries to the standard of living in the civilian sector.39 In addition, benefits such as housing, higher education, recreation allowances, transportation, tax rebates, and generous pension plans were all provided to officers.40 “What was once an essentially altruistic affirmation of citizenship seemed to be set to be transformed into an essentially economic transaction.”41 Moreover, demographic growth, the increase in the size of the age group available for service, and the large Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union, which began in 1989 and in which 20 percent were of military age, all not only made it easier to obtain a discharge from army service, but exemption itself was much less frowned on and less stigmatized than it once was.42 In the hope of remedying the decline in the motivation to serve, the IDF adopted a neoliberal business ideology and began marketing itself on the basis of the new values of the young generation, which believed in self-fulfillment and personal success. “By emphasizing the individual and his ability to succeed in the army, the IDF adjusted itself to the non-collectivistic new Israeli culture.”43 According to many, this trend signified a crisis for the IDF, eroding not only its personnel base but also the key social values necessary for the mobilization of a “peoples army.”44 However, the real crisis was not to be found among potential draftees but among the reserve forces.45

Reserve Service Motivation on an IndividualistCollective Continuum When the period of compulsory army service in Israel is over, most conscripts are discharged and automatically enlisted in the reserves. The reserve army does not constitute a separate organization and is not simply a general pool of available manpower. Soldiers are organized in companies, battalions, brigades, and entire divisions that are regularly called up for training as well as operational service.46 The rationale behind such a large and active reserve force lies within Israel’s national security doctrine, which presumes that since wartime force ratios among adversaries do not merely reflect population ratios, a high degree of manpower mobilization can make up for the quantitative demographic inferiority of a small nation. In this context, a sizable, well trained, combat-ready, militia type reserve force is integral to the wartime order of battle. This reserve force thus bridges the gap between peacetime and wartime manpower requirements of the armed forces,



minimizing the redundancy in the peacetime strength of the military without reducing the size of its effective wartime strength.47

And still, despite its mandatory nature, the Israeli reserve force in recent years has assumed an increasingly voluntary nature.48 According to a survey conducted by the IDF in the year 2000, 40 percent of Israeli males manage to obtain a formal discharge from the reserves. Of the remaining 60 percent, only about 23 percent actually show up for service when called up at any given time.49 An independent survey carried out by Peri put the figures even lower, with the finding that two out of every eleven soldiers called up for service actually reported for duty.50 This “motivational crisis” not only reflects grievances by those who serve against those who do not but also a grievance against the establishment, which is accused of undercompensating those who actually do carry the burden of reserve military service.51 Consequently, the Braverman Committee was commissioned to reassess and redirect a new Reserve Force model to improve as well as ease the burden of service. Approved by the government in March 2005, this new model is scheduled to go into full effect by 2008 and will include, among other socioeconomic and structural changes, shorter terms of service both in terms of age, with the discharge age to be set at forty, and duration of service, which during the course of any three-year period will not exceed fortytwo days for servicemen and seventy days for officers.52 And yet, despite this reform, the Israeli reserve system—in which the Jewish adult male (and a small percentage of females as well as Druze) is still liable to be called up for one month’s annual military duty until the age of forty-five53—still implies a dual status. The armyserving Israeli citizen is both a civilian and a part-time soldier. From another angle, the civilian can even be viewed as a soldier on an eleven months’ annual leave. Of course, this would depend on whether the reserves are considered a contribution to the collective or a cost to the individual.54 In a certain sense, the motivation to serve can be understood as a reference point within a collectivist-individual continuum. To the best of our knowledge, previous research has not investigated motivation for military service in terms of the collectivist-individual continuum. Motivation has been classically defined as the “conscious or unconscious stimulus for action towards a desired goal.”55 However, for the purpose of this particular study, motivation is seen as consisting of attitudes (e.g., satisfaction in the reserve service, preference for combat over administrative service), intentions (willingness to devote extra time and effort, desire to continue serving, or conversely, readiness to apply for exemption and the inclination not to report for reserve duty), and behavior (reports of asking for service deferral).56 We define motivation in the above manner to measure it by what we believe are its key manifestations in the literature and in the Israeli army. Although previous research has not examined factors of motivation from a collectivist-individual perspective, questions pertaining to military service motivation have been researched from a psychological perspective. Such research focuses primarily on specific clusters of variables, the association between them, and various



indices of motivation. Subsequently, such studies suggest four distinct, though not exclusive, factors that may have an impact on the motivation to serve. Although this was not their original intention, the following factors can be viewed as either individualist or collectivist reasons for motivation, with sociodemographic factors and competing commitments pertaining more to the individualist side of the continuum and organizational characteristics and most obviously ideological characteristics pertaining to the collectivist side of the continuum.

Sociodemographic Factors Numerous writings suggest that an individual’s sociodemographic characteristics explain his or her service motivation. However, except for level of education, which at its lower levels was found to be a strong predictor of soldiers dropping out before completing their term of enlistment,57 findings on other sociodemographic indicators are inconsistent. With regard to age, older soldiers are more likely to complete their tour of service than younger ones, but they also exhibit lower levels of motivation.58 Findings are also inconsistent regarding marital status. On one hand, unmarried soldiers were more likely to drop out before completion of service,59 but on the other hand, the motivation of the married men decreased when service was prolonged.60 As for income level, although some research has found income entirely insignificant,61 other studies have found that among young soldiers who enlisted for economic reasons, low income was positively associated with motivation.62

Competing Commitments Research conducted on American reserve personnel has previously shown that pressures from civilian employers combined with family and/or spousal pressures are dominant factors that influence soldiers to discontinue their reserve military service.63 Other studies emphasize the competing economic rewards of military and civilian work. Lakhani’s “moonlighting theory”64 maintains that the extra income provided by reserve service is a source of motivation. However, reserve soldiers will compare their potential income from reserves duty against potential income in the civil market. Subsequently, soldiers who believe that work conditions are better in civilian life are more likely to leave the reserves.65

Organizational Factors Organizational practices and policies have also been known to directly affect soldiers’ motivation to participate in both compulsory and voluntary service.66 Soldiers who maintain healthy and trusting relations with their commanders exhibit higher levels of motivation than those who feel their grievances are left unheeded.67 Moreover, studies have reported a positive impact on the motivation of soldiers who are satisfied with their job



assignment and comrades in their unit.68 Along similar lines, findings show that soldiers who belong to organic units, in which relations with both peers and commanders tend to be close, exhibit higher motivation than soldiers belonging to inorganic units.69

Ideological Variables There seems to be a significant paucity in the study of ideological factors affecting the individual’s motivation to serve in the reserves. Lakhani and Fugita, however, maintain that reserve soldiers are motivated by patriotism, defined by the researchers as the desire to contribute to state and society. 70 Similarly, the motivation of potential conscripts in Israel has been previously associated with a collectivist orientation.71 Although patriotism has still been found to have a positive effect on service motivation in this day and age, current research also surprisingly indicates that strong nationalism, defined by an opposition to territorial concessions and a view of the Palestinian citizens of Israel as a security danger, lowered the motivation to serve.72

Motivation during Wartime As previously mentioned, all else being equal, motivation is expected to be higher during wartime. However, there seems to be very little empirical evidence of this. Most of the previously cited studies were not only conducted outside of the Israeli context but were also carried out during peacetime. There has been very little systematic study of the impact of a state of belligerency on soldiers’ motivation. The term state of belligerency here refers to a variety of situations of threat and/or combat. These include both actual and anticipated war and attacks on home or foreign soil. The two studies that come closest to addressing this question have conflicting results. The first, dubbed the “Nifty Nugget” experiment, was carried out by the U.S. Defense Department in 1978, following President Gerald Ford’s freeze on conscription three years earlier.73 The aim of that experiment was to find out whether reserves could be counted on to show up in the case of an emergency. To this end, reserves were mobilized in a simulated war, but virtually nobody came. Although the conclusion drawn by military and government officials was that the mobilization mission could not be fulfilled, the experiment does not really tell us about reservist motivation during a real war. The second study is Faris’s examination of motivation among American military personnel; it was found that motivation decreased with the end of the Cold War, when tensions with Russia eased. 74 In other words, this study suggests that motivation declines as the sense of threat decreases. A number of other studies, which relate to this question indirectly, likewise suggest that soldiers are motivated by the prospect of fighting. Thus, Kirby and Naftel found that among soldiers whose units were most likely to be called up for service in the near future, motivation levels were up to three times higher than among soldiers



whose prospects of being summoned were low.75 Moreover, soldiers who had been mustered for combat service in the past showed greater motivation for future deployment than soldiers who had not been previously called up.76 These studies lend credence to the contention that soldiers are more motivated when summoned for missions of “national defense” than for routine or peacekeeping assignments.77 Other studies, however, found motivation in combat situations to be lower than expected. Soldier motivation was found to be weakened by factors such as prolonged absence from home and work.78 More specifically, the motivation of married soldiers was negatively affected by separation anxiety followed by feelings of guilt concerning the extent of their absence and its effect on family relationships.79 Service under stressful deployment such as in wars and battles can thus have a negative effect on motivation.80 None of these studies, however, actually examines either motivation or the predictors of motivation under different states of belligerency. This comparison is important, chiefly because militaries are most essential during conflict but do most of their training in between these. Although motivation must be maintained throughout, it would seem most vital under belligerent conflict. Furthermore, because reservists could be said to have “one foot in the military” and the other in civilian society, they could very well be a microcosm through which general social trends could be examined—namely, the people’s willingness to adhere to national needs when crisis arises. The role played by collectivism in explaining the differences in wartime and peacetime motivation raises the following questions: Does the state of belligerency affect reservists’ motivation to serve? Do the same factors explain motivation in both wartime and peacetime? And does the relative influence of factors contributing to motivation differ when measured in peacetime and in times of military conflict?

The Present Study The present study compares the findings of two surveys on the motivation to serve in the reserves in Israel under different levels of belligerency. The first survey was conducted in February 2000, during a period of optimism in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.81 Although Israel has been subject to terrorism throughout its short history, the rate of attacks at this specific time was relatively low: There had been an average of between four and eight suicide attacks per year since 1993, when the Oslo Accords were signed. The second survey, whose findings are presented for the first time in this article, was carried out in March 2002, almost a year and a half into the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which erupted in October 2000. The number of attacks against Israelis had risen to some fifty suicide attacks per year and seemed to be climbing steadily. Casualties included men, women, and children, of all ages and from all walks of life. They were attacked on buses and at bus stops, in restaurants and cafes, shopping malls, discotheques, wedding halls, and anywhere else Israelis congregated. Overall, there was a pervasive sense of danger and uncertainty. Based on the literature reviewed earlier, we hypothesize the following:



Hypothesis 1: Reservists’ motivation is affected by the level of belligerence in the country, such that motivation in wartime is generally higher than in peacetime. Hypothesis 2: Factors that are associated with soldiers’ motivation in peacetime— namely, sociodemographic features, competing commitments, and organizational factors—will be replaced by ideological factors during wartime. Hypothesis 3: The impact of these factors may differ in wartime and peacetime. Hypothesis 4: Individualist factors are expected to be more dominant than collectivist determinants.

Method Sample and Procedure Surveys were conducted during a two-week period in February 2000 (T1) and during a similar period in March 2002 (T2). Both surveys were carried out by independent survey companies: Al-Midan-Machshov (public opinion studies) in 2000 and the Survey Center of the Statistics Consulting Unit at the University of Haifa in 2002. In both surveys, random telephone sampling was employed using Computerized Assisted Telephone Interviewing, with similar protocols.82 Telephone numbers were randomly sampled from Bezeq’s phone service subscribers’ database.83 Interviewers introduced themselves as calling from the University of Haifa and conducting a general survey on “current issues” in Israeli society. The interviewers asked to speak with a male Israeli citizen between the ages of twenty-five and fifty. Screening questions included respondents’ age, whether they had served in the IDF, and whether they were career-army personnel. The interview was terminated for those who were not in the age group, had not done compulsory service, and were enlisted as career-army personnel. Refusal rate was around 30 percent84 in both the 2000 and 2002 surveys. Interviews yielded 1,004 Jewish male respondents of military reserve duty age (twenty-five to fifty), consisting of 501 participants in 2000 (T1) and 503 participants in 2002 (T2), who were either currently in the reserve forces or had served in the past.85 In the absence of obtainable data on the composition of the reserve forces in Israel, it is nearly impossible to know exactly how representative the sample is. Still, some clues are available. Some 12 percent of the respondents in T1 and 9.7 percent in T2 stated they were either religious or very religious; approximately 26 percent stated they were somewhat religious (traditional), while the remainder identified themselves as secular. This percentage of religious respondents is lower then the national average but seems consistent with estimations of the military makeup.86 Distribution of respondents’ selfreported income was also found to be relatively consistent, with expectations. With regard to the combatant versus noncombatant respondents, approximately 31.8 percent in both surveys combined indicated having served in a combat unit, whereas 53.3 percent stated they had served in noncombat units (the remainder, 14.9 percent, could not answer this question or refused to do so).



Our surveys show a slight increase in service at T2 in comparison to T1. At T1, 89 percent of respondents stated that they had served fewer than thirty days a year, whereas 11 percent stated they had served more. At T2, 81 percent stated that they had served fewer than thirty days and 19 percent that they had served more. The difference is consistent with the change in the state of belligerency from peace to war, resulting in increased call-ups of reserves beginning in September 2000, when the Al-Aqsa Intifada started.

Measures Table 1 lists the motivational factors, items queried, and their reliability. Ten independent variables (education, income, affinity for the civil market, tension between military and civilian duties, administrative versus combat position, commitment to unit, responsiveness of organization, patriotism, nationalism, and state of belligerency) and one dependent variable (motivation to serve in the reserves) were measured. Multi-item measures were tested and found reasonably reliable (α = .61 to α = .80). Pearson’s correlations were used to evaluate the reliabilities of two-item scales, as these typically produce low alphas.87 Two variables, nationalism and administrative versus combat posting, have not been explored in the literature but were included in the study because of their relevance to Israel. Nationalism is a key concern in Israeli politics, specifically when dealing with security issues. This variable was included in the analysis because of its prevalence in the public debate regarding military service in Israel. Administrative versus combat position is of interest because of the difference in the reserve duty of the two groups. This is portrayed not only in the different time and energy demands of reserve service but also in the living conditions, distance from home, nature of leaves and furloughs, and so on.

Overview of Analysis Statistical analyses were carried out in three stages. First, we compared levels of motivation in peacetime and wartime samples by means of a series of ANOVAs. A correlation matrix was then constructed to examine the relationship between motivation in peacetime and wartime and each of the theoretical explanations. Last, linear multiple regression analyses were calculated to examine the main and interaction effects of the state of belligerency and the other four factors.88

Results Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of overall motivation scores on each item in the peacetime and wartime samples.



Table 1 Composition of Research Variables Variables (α (T1); α (T2); α (T1+ T2))

Theoretical Factors 1. Individual-level approach96 (Gorman 1991; Griffith and Perry 1993; Siebold and Lindsay 1999)

1a. Education

1 = primary; 2 = secondary; 3 = professional; 4 = academic

1b. Income

1 = far below average; 2 = below average; 3 = average; 4 = above average; 5 = high above average “Reserve service is too long, in regards to both number of days of service per year and the age of release.” “Reserve duty harmfully affects my civilian life, work, studies, and family.”

2. Competing commitments 2a. Tension between military approach97 (Kirby and Naftel and civilian duties (rs = 2000; Lakhani 1995; Lakhani .23***; .39***; .30***) and Abod 1997; Schumm, Bell and Resnick 2001; Stone, Vice Wiggins, Turner-Holland, and Looper 1998) 2b. Affinity for civil market (rs = .20*; .21***; .21***)

3. Organizational approach98 (Hom, Kateberg, and Hulin 1978; Kelley et al. 2001; Lakhani 1995: 24; Meir and Green-Eppel 1999; Oliver, Harman, Hoover, Hayes, and Pandhi 1999; Perry, Griffith, and White 1991; Siebold and Lindsay 1999)

Items/Categoriesa

3a. Military posting 3b. Commitment to the unit (αs = .61; .67; .64)

3c. Responsiveness to reservist’s personal needs (rs = .51***; .60***; .55***)

“Success in the civilian market impresses me more than high commissioned ranks in the military.” “At the end of the day, receiving a high salary is more important to me than my contribution to the workplace.” 1 = administrative; 2 = combat “My reserve unit is like an extended family for me.” “Beyond periods of reserve duty, I continue to stay in touch with my friends from the unit.” “When on reserve duty, I’ll waive a Sabbath leave if a friend from the unit needs it more than I do.” “In my view, reserve duty with my friends is a positive change from life’s routine.” “My reserve duty liaison officer takes my personal needs into account.” “I feel that my commanders are sympathetic when I have a personal problem which prevents me from reporting for reserve duty.” (continued)



Table 1 (continued) Variables (α (T1); α (T2); α (T1+ T2))

Theoretical Factors 4. Ideological approach99 (Ben-Eliezer 1998; Lakhani and Fugita 1993)

5. State of belligerency100 (Faris 1995; Kelley et al. 2001; Kirby and Naftal 2000; Lakhani and Abod 1997; Mileham 2001; Pierce 1998; Wolfe, Brown, and Kelley 1993) 6. Motivation101

Items/Categoriesa

4a. Patriotism

“I define myself as Zionist.”

4b. Nationalism (αs = .75; .75; .75)

“I believe that, despite the peace process, there is still an existential danger to the State of Israel.” “I oppose full withdrawal from the Golan Heights in return for peace with Syria.” “Israeli Arabs are a danger to state security.” “The Israeli government should encourage emigration of Arabs from Israel.” “I oppose the evacuation of settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza in the framework of the peace process with the Palestinians.” 1 = peacetime; 2 = wartime

5a. State of belligerency

6a. Motivation to serve in the reserve army (αs = .71; .80; .77)

“I feel much personal satisfaction in reserve service.” “I am willing to devote more time or effort than that demanded of me.” “I prefer combat service to administrative service.” “I am even willing to approach the mental health officer or the ‘incompatibility committee’ in order to be discharged from reserve duty or to do an easier service.”* “When I get a call-up, I usually approach the liaison officer with a request to cancel or postpone it.”* “I would like to continue to serve in the reserves.” “If there were no risk of imprisonment, I would not report for reserve duty.”*

Note: In two-item scales, we calculated the Pearson’s r (*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001). a. All multi-item scales were based on a ten-point scale, with 1 = strongly disagree and 10 = strongly agree.



Table 2 Motivation Items at T1 and T2: Means, Standard Deviations, and F Values

Statements of Motivation to Serve 1. “I feel much personal satisfaction during reserve service.” 2. “I am willing to devote more time or effort than that demanded of me.” 3. “I prefer combat service to administrative service.” 4. “I am ready to approach the mental health officer or the ‘incompatibility committee’ in order to be discharged from reserve duty or to do easier service.”* 5. “When I get a call-up, I usually approach the liaison officer with a a request to cancel or postpone it.” 6. “I would like to continue to serve in the reserves.” 7. “If there were no risk of imprisonment, I would not report for reserve duty.”*

T1 (Peacetime)

T2 (Wartime)

M

SD

M

SD

4.95

3.56

5.32

3.42

2.92*

4.89

3.82

5.94

3.47

19.77**

6.13

3.76

6.82

3.41

8.56**

2.52

3.51

1.51

2.74

23.33***

2.82

3.36

2.11

2.94

11.66**

5.55

3.75

7.02

2.66

35.717***

3.46

3.81

1.49

3.45

80.66***

ANOVA F

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

As can be seen, the mean scores on all the items indicate higher motivation in the wartime sample in comparison to the peacetime one. ANOVAs showed significant differences both overall (F = 43.575, p < .0001) and for each of the items comprising motivation. As the table shows, the greatest increases were in “readiness to devote more time and effort than required” and in the “readiness to continue serving.” Correlations were calculated between the level of overall motivation at each of the two times and the variables comprising each of the four explanatory factors. Correlations are presented in Table 3.89 These figures indicate that all the independent variables correlated significantly with motivation to serve in peacetime and most of them correlated in wartime as well. With one exception (combat versus administrative position), however, the strength of the correlations differed in the two samples. Although both sociodemographic variables, education and income, correlated positively with motivation at T1 (r = .12, p < .01 and r = .18, p < .01, respectively), at T2, education lost its significance, whereas income’s effect declined in strength (r = .10, p < .05). In other words, although more years of schooling and higher income



Table 3 Pearson’s Correlations between Level of Motivation and the Independent Variables at T1 and T2 Pearson’s Correlations Variable 1. Sociodemographic factors 1a. Education 1b. Income 2. Competing commitments 2a. Tension between military and civilian duties 2b. Affinity for civil market 3. Organizational factors 3a. Military posting 3b. Commitment to unit 3c. Responsiveness of organization 4. Ideological approach 4a. Patriotism 4b. Nationalism

T1 (Peacetime)

T2 (Wartime)

.18** .12**

.02 .10*

–.21** –.25**

–.42** –.39**

.23** .26** .23**

.21** .59** .41**

.15** –.15**

.23** .08

increased motivation during peacetime, education no longer affected motivation in wartime, and the impact of income was weakened. Both variables concerning soldiers’ competing commitments—tension between military and civil duties and affinity for the civil market—correlated negatively with motivation at both times. For both variables, the correlation was stronger at T2 than T1 (tension at T2, r = –.42, p < .01; at T1, r = –.21, p < .01; affinity at T2, r = –.39, p < .01; at T1, r = –.25, p < .01). That is, wartime further increased the negative association between competing commitments and soldiers’ motivation to serve in peacetime. Similarly, all three organizational variables correlated significantly with motivation. With respect to type of service, combat service showed higher positive correlations with motivation than administrative service in both surveys, with no substantial difference between the surveys. The correlations between motivation and commitment to one’s unit and the perception of the organization’s responsiveness, however, were both stronger at T2 than at T1 (commitment T1: r = .26, p < .01, T2: r = .59, p < .01; perceived responsiveness T1: r = .23, p < .01, T2: r = .41, p < .01). The two ideological variables worked differently from one another. First, the correlation between motivation and patriotism was positive; the correlation between motivation and nationalism was negative. The more patriotic the soldier (that is, the more he identified himself as a Zionist), the higher his motivation, but the more nationalistic the participant, the lower his motivation. Moreover, the correlation between motivation and patriotism was stronger at T2 (r = .23, p < .01) than at T1 (r = .15, p < .01), meaning that patriotism was more important to motivation in wartime



than in peacetime. The correlation between motivation and nationalism, on the other hand, was significant only at T1 (r = –.15, p < .01) and not at T2 (r = –.08). In other words, nationalism was associated with low motivation in peacetime but seems to have had no bearing on motivation during wartime. Finally, to investigate the interaction between the state of belligerency and the other nine predictors of motivation, we carried out a three-step multiple regression analysis. In Step 1, we regressed motivation on the nine independent variables, excluding state of belligerency, at T1, T2, and for the two surveys together. In Step 2, we added state of belligerency to the list and regressed motivation on the combined sample. In Step 3, we examined the contribution of the interactions between state of belligerency and the other nine independent variables to motivation (see Table 4). The nine independent variables examined in Step 1 explained 32 percent of the variance of the motivation to serve in peacetime, almost 50 percent of the variance in the motivation in wartime, and 41 percent of the variance when the surveys were combined. The addition of the state of belligerency in Step 2 added another 5 percent, bringing the explained variance up to 46 percent. The interaction of the state of belligerency with the other variables examined in Step 3 added another 2 percent, bringing the explained variance up to 48 percent. Comparison of the explained variance of Steps 1 and 2 (R2 = .41, R2 = .46, respectively) supports the claim that the state of belligerency plays a role in the explanation of reserve soldiers’ motivation. We can also see from Step 1 that most of the variables expected to influence motivation were found to be significant in both equations and that the relative importance of the variables differed in wartime and peacetime. The variable that had the strongest impact at T1 was tension between military and civilian duties (r = –.30, p < .001), which lowered motivation, whereas the variable that had the strongest impact at T2 was commitment to the unit (r = .37, p < .001), which raised motivation. Education, which strongly contributed to motivation at T1 (r = .37, p < .001), ceased to make a significant contribution at T2. Conversely, military posting (r = .10, p < .05) and responsiveness of the organization (r = .15, p < .01), which made no significant contribution to motivation at T1, both contributed significantly at T2. Step 3 shows a slight increase in the explained variance in motivation when the interactions are added to the equation (R2 = .48). The contribution of two variables— level of education and commitment to the unit—is strengthened in interaction with state of belligerency. The direction of the relationship between level of education and motivation is reversed in the interaction. Although education contributed positively to the variance in motivation in the main effect, it contributed negatively in the interactive effect. In other words, the less educated became more motivated to serve in wartime than the more educated. The contribution of commitment to the unit was strengthened in the same direction. That is, during wartime, commitment to the unit contributed even more to the variance in motivation than during peacetime. Although the contribution of only two variables seems to be directly affected by the interaction with state of belligerency, the combination of these findings with the


582


.18* (2.18) .06 (0.84) .16* (2.04) –.15** (–2.00)

.37*** (6.93) .15** (3.09) .14** (3.28) –.10* (–2.31)

.30*** (6.59) .10* (2.37) .14** (3.65) –.11** (–2.91)

.29*** (6.69) .11** (2.80) .14*** (3.82) –.12*** (–3.08) .22*** (6.07)

(continued)

.36* (1.90)

–.02 (–0.04)

–.24 (–1.14)

–.18 (–1.10)

.01 (0.53)

.00 (0.04) –.00 (–0.05) .16 (1.16) .18 (1.36) .21 (0.29) –.44* (–2.13)

–.13*** (–3.27) –.11*** (–2.93) .08 (0.58) .12** (3.13) .10** (2.70) .09 (0.75)

–.16* (–3.54) .10* (2.06)

–.04 (–5.42) .10 (1.35)

.42** (2.89)

Step 3 T1 + T2

.03 (0.82) .02 (0.55) .03 (0.81) .01 (0.82) –.22*** (–4.92) –.26*** (–6.72) –.26*** (6.92) –.39** (2.86)

.12** (2.95)

Step 2 T1 + T2

.02 (0.29) –.30*** (–4.15)

.16*** (3.78)

Step 1 T1 + T2

1b. Income 2a. Tension between military and civilian duties 2b. Affinity for civil market 3a. Military posting

.07 (1.52)

Step 1 T2

.23*** (2.99)

Step 1 T1

1a. Education

Variables

3b. Commitment to unit 3c. Responsiveness of organization 4. Ideological approach 4a. Patriotism 4b. Nationalism 5. State of belligerency 5a. State of belligerency 1a X 5a. Education X State of Belligerency 1b X 5a. Income X State of Belligerency 2a X 5a.Tension between Military and Civilian Duties X State of Belligerency 2b X 5a. Affinity for Civil Market X State of Belligerency 3a X 5a. Military Posting X State of Belligerency 3b X 5a. Commitment to Unit X State of Belligerency

3. Organizational factors

2. Competing commitments

1. Sociodemographic factors

Theoretical Approach

Table 4 Multiple Regression Analysis (Standardized Coefficients) of the Contribution of the Independent Variables to Motivation to Serve (t Tests in Parentheses)

583


Variables

3c X 5a. Responsiveness of Organization x State of Belligerency 4a X 5a. Patriotism X State of Belligerency 4b X 5a. Nationalism X State of Belligerency

Note: N = 1,004. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

R2 (adjusted) F

Theoretical Approach

.32 (0.28) 7.239***

Step 1 T1

Step 1 T2

.49 (0.47) 30.670***

Table 4 (continued)

.41 (0.40) 39.00***

Step 1 T1 + T2

.46 (0.44) 39.99***

Step 2 T1 + T2

.48 (0.46) 23.50***

.01 (0.54)

–.02 (–0.11)

–.14 (0.80)

Step 3 T1 + T2


total strength of the model indicate that state of belligerency is indeed a factor in explaining motivation to serve.

Discussion The popular upsurge of solidarity following the atrocities of 9/11 encouraged observers to speculate that America’s War on Terrorism would spur civic revitalization. However, although Americans did display new and inspiring attitudes of social solidarity, they rarely changed their patterns of civic behavior.90 Hence, although wartime crisis, external conflict, or a state of belligerency—as we have chosen to classify the Intifada Al-Aqsa—may certainly evoke attitudes of civic solidarity, they do not necessarily signify a rise in collectivism. There seems to be ample evidence to support the claim that military personnel are more motivated in wartime than in times of peace. This seems true for both conscript and reserve soldiers. As hypothesized (H1), our findings show an increase in overall motivation as well as in individual aspects of the motivation examined. In particular, reservists reported that they were substantially more inclined to devote time and effort to service when queried in wartime as opposed to peacetime. Whereas, like many other attitudinal findings, these too might potentially reflect socially desirable responses, there is good reason to believe that they do not. Our findings are consistent with reports in the Israeli media that many men who avoided reserve duty during the years of relative peace preceding the Al-Aqsa Intifada showed up promptly and even eagerly for the large-scale call-ups that began after a year and a half of suicide attacks.91 However, this should worry military planners to the same degree that it probably encourages them. Reservists who show up after years of absence are likely to be poorly prepared for the demands of service. Their lack of combat fitness and inexperience with advanced technological equipment as well as contemporary battle scenarios could constitute more of a liability than an asset. Furthermore, although motivation levels are higher in wartime, they need not be seen as a rise in collectivism. Much of the study previously conducted on soldiers’ motivation has shown personal interest to be the strongest determinant of service motivation. And still, many believe that war makes a difference. Thus, a comparative study of the two seemed (noticeably) lacking. This lacuna was the main incentive for our current study, and perhaps it is a principal contribution. As opposed to what we conjectured in our second hypothesis (H2), our findings show that with the exception of two variables—education and nationalism—the factors that were associated with reservists’ motivation in peacetime were also associated with motivation in wartime. In both war and peace, the higher the reservist’s income, the more committed he was to his unit, the more responsive he felt his commander and liaison officer to be, and the greater his patriotism, the higher his motivation. In addition, during wartime, as in peacetime, reservists in combat roles showed higher motivation than those in



administrative positions. Conversely, competing commitments, both the pressure of work and family and affinity for the civil market, were associated with lower motivation in wartime just as they were in peacetime. These findings initially suggest that motivational factors do not differ between wartime and peacetime. That is, factors that raise motivation in peacetime do so in wartime as well, just as factors that lower motivation in peacetime are also responsible for its decrease during wartime. This may further suggest that although wartime motivation among most solders is still high, the decreasing levels of peacetime motivation are an early warning, which if ignored in the hope that “all will be better” in wartime might eventually result in insufficient military preparedness. The finding that nationalism reduced motivation may seem a bit strange on first consideration. Nationalism was defined in this study in the perception of Palestinians as a threat to the state, in the support for measures that reduced their number in Israel, and in opposition to Israeli concessions in the context of the current peace process. One might expect these attitudes to foster motivation to serve in the reserves, whether in peacetime or wartime, much as patriotism did. The explanation, we believe, may lie in the different identifications entailed in nationalism and patriotism in Israel. Patriotism, defined here is the self-definition as a Zionist, involves identification with the mainstream values of the country. Nationalism, as defined here, involves a departure from the Israeli mainstream (the mainstream orientation is less hostile toward Palestinians and more ready to make concessions for peace). Thus, nationalism in the Israeli context may paradoxically indicate a distance (rather than proximity) to mainstream political attitudes and perceptions. In view of earlier studies in Israel showing that the greater a soldier’s identification with the collective and its norms, the greater his motivation for military service,92 we suggest that it is this distance from mainstream collectivism that results in lower motivation for those supporting “nationalistic” believes. This explanation seems to fit low motivational levels among “nationalists” in both wartime and peacetime. Our assumption that motivational factors effective in peacetime might differ in wartime (H3) was supported by our findings. But the manner in which this was supported requires further examination. The interaction of motivational factors and the state of belligerency examined in the final analysis showed that nearly all motivational factors retained their direction of influence (either strengthening motivation or making it weaker) when peacetime and wartime were compared. It also showed, however, that the strengths of these factors, regardless of their direction, increased during war. This strengthens our belief that peacetime motivation may, and should, be considered as a crucial indicator of wartime motivations. If we were to consider reserve duty motivation as a contribution to the collective endeavor, then participation in the national security effort may reflect the implicit assumption that reserve duty is rewarding, as it involves attachment to the collective through actual participation. Participation as a reward hence facilitates the mobilization of individual commitment to the community for the attainment of collective



goals. On the other hand, if we were to understand reserve duty as a cost to the individual, participation necessarily involves an infringement on autonomous civilian life. The burden of this duty involves the renouncement of personal autonomy, which subsequently results in a negative input for membership in the Israeli collectivity.93 Neither of these considerations—reserve duty as a contribution to the collective and reserve duty as a cost to the individual—are necessarily exclusive. It would be fair to assume that the act of participation involves both individualist and collectivist elements. Consequently, the factors motivating participation in the reserves can also be placed on this axiom. Four factors were found to affect motivation: sociodemographic factors, competing commitments, organizational factors, and ideological factors. With the exclusion of sociodemographic factors, these sets of factors are attitudinal measures that may be placed across the individual-collectivist continuum. When we speak of individualism, or of an individualist society, the emphasis is on the “I” (as opposed to the “we”), on autonomy, independence, individual initiative, the right to privacy, and the pursuit of happiness and financial security.94 Certainly, both the competing commitment approach and the organizational approach emphasize individualist values. Conversely, the ideological approach corresponds with collectivism, which prioritizes the common good over individual interests. Individuals are bound by relationships that emphasize a common fate and are encouraged to place the group’s interest before their own.95 If the Intifada Al-Aqsa were to bring about a rise in collectivism, then we would have expected the variables of both nationalism and patriotism to have a positive and strong effect on service motivation and even a negative effect on both the competing commitments and organizational factors. However, this was not the case; on the contrary, although nationalism was insignificant, all individualist factors were strengthened. It seems that despite erroneous expectations of genuine cohesion during times of crises, Israel and perhaps other nations seemed to have benefited from the “rally ’round the flag” effect. However, this reactionary behavior among reservists does not indicate an upsurge in collectivism but rather signifies the importance of individual motivation. Social cohesion, in and of itself, has often been perceived as a common good, thus ascribing a lesser value to individual needs and considerations. This should not be the case. If individualism represents the accepted ideology in most Western countries today, then governments as well as militaries should embrace it by investing in such individualist motivations. Reliance on perhaps nostalgic collectivist perceptions may not present us with the same results in the future as it has in the past. Finally, a note of caution is in order. Despite our belief that many trends representative of Israel’s civil-military relations could very well exist elsewhere, Israel’s circumstances are somewhat unique. Beyond Israel’s delicate security situation, reserve service for Jewish Israeli males continues to be mandatory under the law, and although reinforcement of this law has declined, Israeli reserves are far from voluntary in nature. Finally, the near absence of studies comparing peacetime motivation with wartime motivation requires careful consideration before decisive conclusions can be drawn. Despite the methodological difficulties involved in conducting such



studies, we hope that future research will further our understanding of society and military alike.

Notes 1. Theda Skocpol, “Will 9/11 and the War on Terror Revitalize American Civic Democracy?” PS: Political Science & Politics 35, 3 (2002): 537–40. 2. Stanley B. Greenberg, “‘We’—Not ‘Me’: Public Opinion and the Return of Government,” The American Prospect December 17 (2002): 25–7. 3. William D. Baker and John R. Oneal, “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership? The Nature and Origins of the ‘Rally ’Round the Flag’ Effect,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, 5 (2001): 661–87. 4. Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli, “Between Individualism and Collectivism: The Case of a Middle Class Neighborhood in Israel,” International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 21, 11/12 (2001): 1–25. 5. Uri Ben-Eliezer, “Post Modern Armies and the Question of Peace and War: The Israeli Defense Forces in the ‘New Times,’” International Journal Middle East Studies 36, 1 (2004): 49–70. 6. Alek D. Epstein, “On the Collapse of the Normative Framework of Citizens’ Commitment to the Army in the 1990s,” in In the Name of Security: The Sociological of Peace and War in Israel in Changing Times, ed. Majid Al-Haj and Uri Ben-Eliezer (Haifa, Israel: Haifa University Press, 2003), 215–40. 7. The roots of this term, nation in arms, go deep into the writings of military experts, academics, and statesmen. Here, it is used mainly to imply a simple notion of codependency between the military and society. This codependency includes, but is not limited to, almost full national conscription of men and women of service age, harnessing the nation’s economy to the countries war efforts, and even conscription of personal property (such as personal possessions, vehicles, and land) at times of war. 8. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, eds., The Military: More Than Just a Job? (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1988). 9. Gal Reuven and Stuart A. Cohen, “Israel: Still Waiting in the Wings,” in The Post Modern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War, ed. C. C. Moskos, J. A. Williams, and D. R. Segal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 224–41. 10. Epstein, “On the Collapse of the Normative Framework of Citizens’ Commitment to the Army in the 1990s.” 11. Ibid. 12. Ben-Eliezer, “Post Modern Armies and the Question of Peace and War.” 13. Uri Ben-Eliezer, “From a Nation in Arms to a Post-Modern Army: Military Politics in Israel in ‘New Times,’” Democratic Culture 4-5 (2001): 55–97 (Hebrew). 14. Baruch Kimmerling, “Anomie and Integration in Israeli Society and the Salience of the Israeli-Arab Conflict,” Studies in Comparative International Development 9, 3 (1974): 64–89. 15. Simmel George, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1955); Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, “The Analysis of Social Conflict—Toward an Overview and Synthesis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 1, 2 (1957): 212–48; Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper, 1962); Robert A. Levine and Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism (New York: Doubleday, 1972); Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1964); Jonathan H. Turner, “A Strategy for Reformulating the Dialectical and Functional Theories of Conflict,” Social Forces 53, 3 (1975): 433–44; Kyriacos C. Markides and Steven F. Cohen, “External Conflict/Internal Cohesion: A Reevaluation of an Old Theory,” American Sociological Review 47, 1 (1975): 88–9; Arthur Stein, “Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, 1 (1976): 143–72; Arthur Stein, The Nation at War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); Dimitris Monos, “The ‘Common Enemy’ Factor and Gemeinschaft in a Multi-Ethnic Community,” International Review of History and Political Science 19, 1 (1982): 68–82; Yinon Cohen, “War and Social Integration: The Effects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict on Jewish Emigration from Israel,” American Sociological Review 53, 6 (1988): 908–18; Gad Barzilai and Bruce M. Russet, “The Political Economy of Israeli Military



Action,” in The Elections in Israel, ed. A. Arian and M. Shamir (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 13–35; Birger Heldt, “The Dependent Variable of Domestic-External Conflict Relationship: Anecdotes, Theories and Systematic Studies,” Journal of Peace Research 34, 1 (1997): 101–6; Clifton T. Morgan and Christopher J. Anderson, “Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950-1992,” The Journal of Politics 61, 3 (1999): 799–814. 16. Birenbaum-Carmeli, “Between Individualism and Collectivism.” 17. Luis Roniger and Michael Feige, “From Pioneer to Freier: The Changing Models of Generalized Exchange in Israel,” European Journal of Sociology 33, 2 (1992): 286. 18. Johnathan Shapira, Democracy in Israel (Ramat Gan, Israel: Massada Press, 1977) (Hebrew). 19. Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society, and the Military (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 20. Birenbaum-Carmeli, “Between Individualism and Collectivism.” 21. Roniger and Feige, “From Pioneer to Freier.” 22. Birenbaum-Carmeli, “Between Individualism and Collectivism.” 23. Roniger and Feige, “From Pioneer to Freier.” 24. Roniger and Feige, “From Pioneer to Freier”; Ben-Eliezer, “From a Nation in Arms to a Post-Modern Army”; Ben-Eliezer, “Post Modern Armies and the Question of Peace and War.” 25. Eyal Ben-Ari, Zeev Rosenhek, and Danial Maman, “Military State and Society in Israel: An Introductory Essay,” in Military State and Society in Israel: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. D. Maman, E. Ben-Ari, and Z. Rosenhek (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 1–43. 26. Gal and Cohen, “Israel: Still Waiting in the Wings,” 225. For more on this subject, see Eyal Ben-Ari, “Tests of Soldierhood, Trials of Manhood: Military Service and Male Ideals in Israel,” in Military State and Society in Israel: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. D. Maman, E. Ben-Ari, and Z. Rosenhek (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 239–67. 27. Ibid. 28. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, The Post Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 29. Ben-Eliezer, “From a Nation in Arms to a Post-Modern Army.” 30. Ben-Eliezer, “Post Modern Armies and the Question of Peace and War.” 31. Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: Public Affairs, 1988). 32. Ben-Eliezer, “Post Modern Armies and the Question of Peace and War.” 33. Yoram Peri, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in Crisis,” in Military, State, and Society in Israel: Theoretical & Comparative Perspectives, ed. D. Maman, E. Ben-Ari, and Z. Rosenhek (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 107–36. 34. Ben-Eliezer, “Post Modern Armies and the Question of Peace and War.” 35. Peri, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in Crisis.” 36. Yagil Levy, Trial and Error: Israel’s Route from War to De-Escalation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997). 37. Yagil Levy, A Different Kind of Army for Israel: Materialist Militarism (Tel-Aviv, Israel: Yediot Aharonot, 2003); Yagil Levy, “Social Convertibility and Militarism: Evaluations of the Development of Military-Society Relations in Israel in the Early 2000s,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 31, 1 (2003): 71–96. 38. Gal and Cohen, “Israel: Still Waiting in the Wings.” 39. Popular opinion in past decades held that a military career was, among other things, beneficial in terms of income and status. Beginning in the early 1980s and most evident during the “high-tech” and “dotcom” boom of the late 1990s, the military’s image as a high-paying profession began to erode. Today, it is clear that although salaries in the IDF still range far above the national average, they cannot compete with those offered by private companies in highly valued professions. See, for example, Ofer Shelach, The Tray and the Money (Or-Yehuda, Israel: Kinneret, Zmora-Beitan, 2003) (Hebrew).



40. Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive. 41. Stuart A. Cohen, “Military Service in Israel: No Longer a Cohesive Force?” The Jewish Journal of Sociology 39, 1-2 (1997): 12. 42. Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive. 43. Ben-Eliezer, “Post Modern Armies and the Question of Peace and War,” 57. 44. Ofer Shelach, The Tray and the Money. 45. Peri, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in Crisis.” 46. Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive. 47. Dan Horowitz, “Strategic Limitations of ‘A Nation in Arms,’” Armed Forces & Society 13, 2 (1987): 277. 48. Gabriel Ben-Dor, Ami Pedahzur, and Badi Hasisi, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine under Strain: The Crisis of the Reserve Army,” Armed Forces & Society 28, 2 (2002): 233–55. 49. Alex Fishman, “Miluyim Be’mil” [Retired Reserves], Yediot Aharonot (Hebrew daily paper), 8 October, 2000. 50. Yoram Peri, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in a Crisis,” Megamot 39, 4 (1999): 375–99 (Hebrew). 51. Harel Amos, “Growing Concern in the IDF of a Crisis in the Reserves,” Haaretz (Hebrew daily paper), 6 April, 2001; Harel Amos, “IDF Survey: 41% of Reserve Personnel Feel Like ‘Freierim’ (Suckers),” Haaretz, 9 July, 2001; Harel Amos, “Served in the Reserves 100 days within 9 Months,” Haaretz, 10 May, 2002. 52. KAMLAR (Chief Reserves Officer) Web site (Hebrew), http://www.aka.idf.il/sites/klali/default .asp?siteId=43314&catId=47784&docId= (accessed June 7, 2006). 53. The age of discharge from the reserves is not entirely universal. There are some positions as well as ranks that are discharged at a later age (doctors, high-ranking commissioned officers). 54. Dan Horwitz, “The Israel Defense Forces: A Civilized Military in a Partially Militarized Society,” in Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies, ed. R. Kolkowicz and A. Korbonski (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), 77–186. 55. Bruce Newsome, “The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 26, 4 (2003): 24. 56. Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine under Strain.” 57. David W. Grissmer and Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Changing Patterns of Nonprior Service Attrition in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1988). 58. Ibid. 59. Shelley Perry, James Griffith, and Terry White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers in the AllVolunteer Army Reserve,” Armed Forces & Society 18, 1 (1991): 111–31. 60. Sheila N. Kirby and Scott Naftel, “The Impact of Deployment on the Retention of Military Reservists,” Armed Forces & Society 26, 2 (2000): 259–84. 61. Perry, Griffith, and White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers in the All-Volunteer Army Reserve.” 62. Hyder Lakhani and Stephen S. Fugita, “Reserve Guard Retention: Moonlighting or Patriotism,” Military Psychology 5, 2 (1993): 113–25. 63. Perry, Griffith, and White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers in the All-Volunteer Army Reserve”; Kirby and Naftel, “The Impact of Deployment on the Retention of Military Reservists”; Walter R. Schumm, Bruce D. Bell, Rose E. Rice, and Diane Sanders, “Trends in Dual Military Couples in the U.S. Army,” Psychological Report 78, 3 (1996): 1287–98; Linda Gorman, “Enlistment Motivations of Army Reservists: Money, Self Improvement or Patriotism,” Armed Forces & Society 17, 4 (1991): 589–99; Walter R. Schumm, Bruce D. Bell, and Gary Resnick, “Implications for Military Leaders,” Psychological Reports 89, 1 (2001): 153–65. 64. Hyder Lakhani, “Reenlistment Intentions of Citizen Soldiers in the U.S. Army,” Armed Forces & Society 22, 1 (1995): 117–30.



65. Penny F. Pierce, “Retention of Air Force Women Serving during Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” Military Psychology 10, 3 (1998): 195–213. 66. Ann C. Smith, Dennis W. Organ, and Janet P. Near, “Organizational Citizenship Behavior: Its Nature and Antecedents,” Journal of Applied Psychology 68, 4 (1983): 653–63. 67. Perry, Griffith, and White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers in the All-Volunteer Army Reserve.” 68. Peter W. Hom, Ralph G. Katerberg, and Charles L. Hulin, The Prediction of Employee Turnover in a Part-Time Military Organization (Arlington, VA: Organizational Effectiveness Research Program, Office of Naval Research, 1978); Lakhani, “Reenlistment Intentions of Citizen Soldiers in the U.S. Army”; Elchanan I. Meir and Tal Green-Eppel, “Congruence, Skill Utilization and Group Importance as Predictors of Well-Being in Army Reserve Units,” Journal of Career Assessment 7, 4 (1999): 429–38; Ruth Linn, “Patterns of Crisis among Israeli Reserve Soldiers,” The Jewish Journal of Sociology 39, 1-2 (1997): 24–45; David K. Vaughan and William A. Schum, “Motivation in U.S. Narrative Accounts of the Ground War in Vietnam,” Armed Forces & Society 28, 1 (2001): 7–31. 69. Guy L. Siebold and Lindsay, J. Twila, “The Relation between Demographic Descriptors and SoldierPerceived Cohesion and Motivation,” Military Psychology 11, 1 (1991): 109–28. 70. Lakhani and Fugita, “Reserve Guard Retention.” 71. Gal Reuven, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986). 72. Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine under Strain.” 73. David R. Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989). 74. John H. Faris, “The Looking-Glass Army: Patriotism in the Post-Cold War Era,” Armed Forces & Society 21, 3 (1995): 411–34. 75. Kirby and Naftel, “The Impact of Deployment on the Retention of Military Reservists.” 76. Michelle L. Kelley, Ellen Hock, Jennifer F. Bonney, Melinda S. Jarvis, Kathleen M. Smith, and Monica A. Gaffney, “Navy Others Experiencing and Not Experiencing Deployment: Reasons for Staying in or Leaving the Military,” Military Psychology 13, 1 (2001): 55–71; Hyder Lakhani and Elissa T. Abod, “The Effectiveness of Economic Incentives for Career Commitment of Peacekeepers in the Sinai,” Armed Forces & Society 23, 3 (1997): 391–414. 77. Patrick Mileham, “But Will They Fight and Will They Die?” International Affairs 77, 3 (2001): 621–29. 78. Douglas R. Bey and Jean Lange, “Waiting Wives: Women under Stress,” American Journal of Psychiatry 131, 3 (1974): 283–86. 79. Kelley et al., “Navy Others Experiencing and Not Experiencing Deployment.” 80. Robert H. Stretch, “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder among United-States-Army Reserve Vietnam and Vietnam-Era Veterans,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 53, 6 (1985): 935–36. 81. Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine under Strain.” 82. Survey protocol was consistent with standard protocol employed by the Haifa Survey Center. Dialing was preformed automatically via the computer software; callbacks to busy lines, no replies, and facsimile replies were conducted at consistent intervals. Interviews are preformed by university students specifically trained for this purpose. Interviews were supervised by Survey Center staff and the authors. Responses are coded directly into a computerized database and then produced as an SPSS data file. A more detailed description of the protocol can be obtained from either the Survey Center or the authors. 83. During the years 2000 and 2002, Bezeq was Israel’s sole land-line telephone provider for private home consumers. Dialing was preformed by the computerized software using random digit dialing, employing sampling according to population density, to maximize the representative quality of the sample. 84. This compares very favorably with studies in the United States, especially since the dialing methods in Israel, unlike in the United States, include business phones (approximately 10 percent), which must then be treated as a failed attempt. 85. In Israel, a sample of five hundred respondents represents the Israeli-Jewish population, which stood in 1998 at 4,883,300, with a statistical error of 4 percent. In this study, which focused only on Jewish men (2,302,500), the sample error was reduced to less than 3 percent.



86. Ultra-orthodox Jews are often exempt from service, whereas secular and traditional Jews are found in greater numbers among military service personnel. 87. Jon A Krosnick and Leandre R. Fabrigar, Designing Good Questionnaires: Insights from Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 88. A similar analysis was used by Brice Stone, Vince Wiggins, Kathryn Turner-Holland, and Larry T. Looper, “Air Force Pilot Retention: Evaluating the Results of Alternative Models,” Armed Forces & Society 25, 1 (1998): 121–35. 89. Correlations calculated among the independent variables did not exceed .45 at either T1 or T2, thereby reducing the likelihood of multicollinearity or concept redundancy; J. Cohen and P. Cohen. Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences, 2nd ed. (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1983). 90. Skocpol, “Will 9/11 and the War on Terror Revitalize American Civic Democracy?” 91. Jacob Erez, “This is a ‘Rolling’ Military Operation, Slowly Advancing Step by Step, City by City,” Ma’ariv (Hebrew daily paper), 2 April, 2002. 92. Dan Horowitz and Baruch Kimmerling, “Some Social Implications of Military Service and the Reserves System in Israel,” European Journal of Sociology 15, 2 (1974): 271–2; Linn, “Patterns of Crisis among Israeli Reserve Soldiers”; Horwitz, “The Israel Defense Forces.” 93. Horwitz, “The Israel Defense Forces.” 94. Kim Uichol, Harry C. Triandis, Cigdem Kagitcibasi, San-Chin Choi, and Gene Yoon, eds., Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994). 95. Ibid. 96. Gorman, “Enlistment Motivations of Army Reservists”; Siebold and Twila, “The Relation between Demographic Descriptors and Soldier-Perceived Cohesion and Motivation”; James Griffith and Shelly Perry, “Wanting to Soldier: Enlistment Motivations of Army Reserve Recruits before and after Operation Desert Storm,” Military Psychology 5, 2 (1993): 127–39. 97. Lakhani, “Reenlistment Intentions of Citizen Soldiers in the U.S. Army”; Lakhani and Abod, “The Effectiveness of Economic Incentives for Career Commitment of Peacekeepers in the Sinai”; Stone et al., “Air Force Pilot Retention”; Kirby and Naftel, “The Impact of Deployment on the Retention of Military Reservists”; Schumm, Bell, and Resnick, “Implications for Military Leaders.” 98. Hom, Katerberg, and Hulin, The Prediction of Employee Turnover in a Part-Time Military Organization; Perry, Griffith, and White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers in the All-Volunteer Army Reserve”; Lakhani, “Reenlistment Intentions of Citizen Soldiers in the U.S. Army”; Meir and Green-Eppel, “Congruence, Skill Utilization and Group Importance as Predictors of Well-being in Army Reserve Units”; Laurel W. Oliver, Joan Harman, Elizabeth Hoover, Stephanie M. Hayes, and Nancy A. Pandhi, “A Quantitative Integration of the Military Cohesion Literature,” Military Psychology 11, 1 (1999): 57–83; Siebold and Lindsay, “The Relation between Demographic Descriptors and Soldier-Perceived Cohesion and Motivation”; Kelley et al., “Navy Others Experiencing and Not Experiencing Deployment.” 99. Lakhani and Fugita, “Reserve Guard Retention”; Uri Ben-Eliezer, The Making of Israeli Militarism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998). 100. Jessica Wolfe, Pamela J. Brown, and John M. Kelley, “Reassessing War Stress: Exposure and the Persian Gulf War,” Journal of Social Issues 49, 4 (1993): 15–31; Lakhani and Abod, “The Effectiveness of Economic Incentives for Career Commitment of Peacekeepers in the Sinai”; Pierce, “Retention of Air Force Women Serving during Desert Shield and Desert Storm”; Kirby and Naftel, “The Impact of Deployment on the Retention of Military Reservists”; Kelley et al., “Navy Others Experiencing and Not Experiencing Deployment: Reasons for Staying in or Leaving the Military”; Mileham, “But Will They Fight and Will They Die?” 101. Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine under Strain.”

Gabriel Ben-Dor is Director of the School of Political Sciences and head of the National Security Studies program at the University of Haifa, Israel. He has published seven books and over one hundred twenty articles on Middle East politics, strategic affairs, national security, ethnic politics, and political culture.



Ami Pedahzur is an associate professor at the Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin. His latest book, Suicide Terrorism, was published by Polity Press in 2005. E-mail: [email protected]. Daphna Canetti-Nisim is the Rice Family Foundation Visiting Professor Council on Middle East Studies, The MacMillan Center and Department of Political Science, Yale University, and an assistant professor at the School of Political Science, University of Haifa. She specializes in mass political attitudes and behavior, survey research, and the psycho-politics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Address for correspondence: Daphna Canetti-Nisim, School of Political Sciences - 405, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, 31905, Haifa, Israel; e-mail: [email protected]. Eran Zaidise is a PhD candidate and adjunct faculty at the School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa, Israel. His principal research interests revolve around the influence of social and political attributes, state conduct, and civil society on health and health-related behavior. E-mail: [email protected]. Arie Perliger is a Lady Davis post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and a fellow at the National Security Studies Center (NSSC) at the University of Haifa. During the past five years he has been working in the fields of terrorism, political violence and extremism, and the principal ways democratic states respond to these challenges. E-mail: [email protected]. Shai Bermanis is a recent graduate of the master’s program at the School of Political Science, University of Haifa. Her field of interest lies within the realm of political psychology. Her dissertation examines the psychological determinants of political xenophobia. E-mail: [email protected].
