Armed Forces & Society

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Managing Diversity in Context : Unit Level Dynamics in the Israel Defense Forces Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari Armed Forces & Society 2013 39: 193 originally published online 19 April 2012 DOI: 10.1177/0095327X12439385 The online version of this article can be found at: http://afs.sagepub.com/content/39/2/193

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Article

Managing Diversity in Context: Unit Level Dynamics in the Israel Defense Forces

Armed Forces & Society 39(2) 193-212 ª The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0095327X12439385 afs.sagepub.com

Edna Lomsky-Feder1 and Eyal Ben-Ari2

Abstract This article is an exploratory study of the factors influencing the management of diversity at the unit level. This management is carried out through ongoing negotiations between troops and commanders and is heavily influenced by the character of the unit within which bargaining takes place and involves the active role of both sides. The most important factors are the unit’s structural characteristic (dominant military roles or social composition) and ethos of action (a combat or service orientation). Diversity is thus simultaneously managed as formal policy (intentionally organized) and is self-organized as phenomena emerging at the local level through agreements between the military and individuals and groups serving within it. The analysis is based on qualitative research carried out within the Israel Defense Forces within combat, white-collar, and service units. Keywords diversity, management, unit level, contract, unit ethos, Israel Defense forces

1 2

School of Education, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

Corresponding Author: Eyal Ben-Ari, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. Email: [email protected]


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Armed Forces & Society 39(2)

Introduction The management of social and cultural diversity is an issue that is central to discussions about contemporary militaries because it touches upon civil–military relations, the social role of the armed forces, and the politics of identity. Yet, most previous studies neglect two key points: processes of emergent negotiations by which diversity is managed at the local level and the multiplicity of contexts within the military as they impact this management. In this article, we examine precisely these unstudied dimensions. Our theoretical frame examines the contextualized management of diversity, as it emerges out of local level negotiations between troops and commanders. Concretely, we examine how the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) manages social and cultural diversity at the unit level. By the management of diversity we refer to the rhetoric and formal and informal practices for dealing with the needs and demands of groups that are socially defined as distinct. We thus use the case of the IDF to suggest a change of focus to ask how the management of diversity emerges and is managed from ‘‘below’’ at the unit level. We ask how local-level agreements related to social and cultural diversity form out of negotiations within units marked by different structural characteristics (their dominant military roles or social composition) and ethoses of action. Our contention is that diversity is simultaneously managed as formal policy—that is intentionally organized—and is self-organized as a set of phenomena emerging out of local level agreements reached between the military and individuals and groups that serve within it. After outlining the methods we have used to gather empirical material, we deal with the particular context of Israel and the IDF. Against this background, we examine the management of diversity at the unit level and end by showing the relevance of our work for understanding how diversity is managed in other armed forces.

Methodology At the initiative and with permission from the IDF, between 2007 and 2008 we organized university research teams that entered five units to carry out week-long observations and interviews with commanders and soldiers. The interviews were semistructured with a common bank of questions asked in all of the units. These questions covered such issues as military career, expectations of service, relations with superiors or subordinate, the formal and informal arrangements instituted at units for dealing with the special needs of soldiers and groups, or expressive culture (songs, jokes, or witticism, for instance). In addition, in order to get a more routine understanding of the units, members of our teams often slept in military camps, ate in mess halls, visited canteens, and carried out numerous informal conversations (that often led back to the management of diversity). The rationale for choosing the units was to explicitly seek a variety of arenas that, following Sasson-Levy,1 have different military status and power, contain a variety


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of roles, and are marked by diverse local cultures. Our reasoning was that by choosing a diversity of local contexts we could explore in a systematic manner the differences in terms of the way social and cultural diversity plays out in specific circumstances. The units selected were an infantry battalion, an ordnance facility servicing vehicles and weapons, a transport camp, a high-tech communications unit, and a training facility of the military police (about which we do not report here). In addition, we visited and intensively interviewed troops in an artillery and another infantry unit so as to provide us with a picture of variety among combat units.

The Scholarly Field: Diversity and the Uniqueness of the Military In order to situate our analysis, let us sketch out previous research. Although differing in theoretical outlook, these works have focused overwhelmingly on gender2 with a significant proportion also concentrated on ethnicity,3 race,4 and sexual orientation.5 Less attention has been devoted to language6 or religion.7 In almost all of these works, the main emphasis has been on the macro level of policy making, promulgation of regulations, and wider social backdrop of diversity.8 Theoretically, this research focuses on the management of diversity as a problem for the smooth functioning of the military. In other words, its theoretical anchor is functionalism where diversity is a potential obstacle to the efficient running of the military. This is the kind of emphasis at base of many of the studies published in the volume edited by Van der Meulen and Soeters.9 A more recent development within this broad school sees diversity as providing organizational advantages.10 One example is Miller and Moskos’11 contentions about the advantages of black and female soldiers in peace-keeping missions. A parallel theoretical thrust at base of much of the scholarly literature involves multiculturalism with its emphasis on the importance of recruiting diverse groups enhancing the armed forces’ representativeness or creating opportunities for mobility through military service. These kinds of theoretical assumptions can be seen, for instance, in Charles Moskos’12 work on the integration of blacks into the US military or Winslow’s,13 observations that the explicit aim of the policy of promoting diversity in the Canadian Forces has been to ‘‘reflect the multicultural identity of Canada.’’ Yet such general comments may well be applicable to any organization. We may rightly ask as to the unique characteristics of the military as a social institution. Soeters and van der Meulen14 provide useful suggestions: To gain sufficient legitimacy, it is traditionally accepted that the work force in the army, navy and air force should mirror more or less the composition of the population at large, at least—in the case of conscription—of the male population at large. Through more or less equal representation with respect to socio-economic class, political conviction, religion and region, the armed forces of most western countries were able to become a national institute par excellance. The general belief was that the control of


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the armed forces was more or less guaranteed as long as all parts of the population were represented.

Notice the main elements in this passage: the unique control of the military (implying its association with violence), representativeness related to legitimacy, and a national institution with a symbolic role. Each poses different problems for managing social and cultural diversity. To begin with, while many social scientific models may be apt for the management of diversity in any organization, the uniqueness of the military lies in its expertise in managing and affecting the legitimate means of organized violence. It is ‘‘the’’ organization that endangers its members’ lives.15 It is this characteristic that lies at the base of a plethora of studies devoted to the importance of small unit cohesion for successful performance under the extreme conditions of combat. Concretely, these kinds of assumptions lie as the base of a very strong contention—found the world over—about the potential of social heterogeneity or diversity to harm or hurt the social solidarity and cohesion necessitated for effective functioning.16 Rosen, Knudson, and Fancher17 state this argument via the example of gender, when observing that ‘‘one of the arguments against gender integration in the military centers around the premise that male bonding is the cornerstone of small unit cohesion, and that the presence of women undermines this bonding, thus decreasing cohesion and ultimately readiness.’’ Such arguments have also been at the core of debates about the integration of homosexuals into the armed forces of the industrial democracies.18 But the military is also unique in that it is also ‘‘the’’ organization most strongly identified with the state. Especially in cases where there is still a system of compulsory conscription there are strong assumptions that this institution is assumed to replicate the social diversity of the general population or reflect central ideals of nationhood. This emphasis, however, contradicts the weight given to the homogeneity and cohesion necessitated in military units thus posing problems for the integration of various minorities into the armed forces. What is evident from this review is that such analyses are not sensitive to the different ways in which diversity is managed within the armed forces: for example, by focusing on the broad organization they overlook the unit level, and by putting an overwhelming emphasis on combat units no attention is devoted to other kinds of military units such as service elements or white-collar ones. We now turn to the units level in order to examine the differing local dynamics through which the management and self-organization of diversity takes place.

Dynamics at the Unit Level At the level of units, commanders are overwhelmingly preoccupied with how to manage soldiers so that they accomplish assigned tasks. In other words, commanders principally manage social heterogeneity out of the wish to get troops to perform their roles effectively. In everyday military reality, commanders understood that moving



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soldiers to perform their roles could not be achieved through force alone but necessitated creating commitment and motivation. Accordingly, negotiations at the unit level are based on two elements: unit ethos and local contracts. Unit ethos. Unit ethos refers to perceptions and attitudes characterizing a unit in terms of images of ideal soldiers, desired unit performance, and behaviors to be emulated. An ethos provides a model of desired social reality. We follow Geertz19 who distinguishes between systems of meaning that explain the world as it is and systems of meaning that dictate how the world should be (the ethos). These systems are interrelated in the sense that the way people understand the world is influenced by the ideal and the ideal, in turn, is colored by the everyday. Ethoses link the cognitive and the emotional: systems of meaning turn the ethos into logical or coherent visions that are persuasive intellectually in a way that represents a worldview and at the same time, turn these worldviews into emotionally persuasive ones by presenting them as desired images for proper life. Theoretically, the concept of unit ethos derives from the internal complexity of the military (which, of course, is not a unitary or uniform institution). Some research has been done on different identities and traditions within the military such as between the combat arms (say armor and infantry) or services and such differences have been linked to issues as the embracement of technology or soldierly ideals. The emphasis on different identities, in turn, is often related to competition between units over prestige, budgets, or relative power within military hierarchies. An examination of ethos allows us to apply understandings about internal differentiation within the military to the question of diversity because ethos is linked to ideal behavior.

Contracts in Context Three kinds of contractual agreements are relevant for our analysis of the military: macro-level covenants, mezzo-level compacts, and micro contracts. The social covenant20 relates to the macro-level agreement between the state and its citizens in and around the duties and rights of each side. This covenant (such as republican or liberal ones) includes expectations about the military and military service as they are related to security, morality and war, citizens’ rights, and social mobility.21 These covenants are a central element in the definition of citizenship22 and are anchored in specific in changing social–historical circumstances.23 The psychological24 or individual contract emerges at the micro level between persons and small groups and commanders. This agreement, like similar contracts between employers and employees, governs mutual expectations about conditions at the workplace, informal beliefs about work and work rate, and the kind of effort that workers must make in their soldierly roles. The third kind of agreement, what we call the compact, lies at the mezzo-sociological level between the macro covenant and the micro contract. It is negotiated between the military as an agent of the state and different social groups. At times, this kind of agreement arises out of formal military policy (as is


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often the case in regard to women and minorities) but is adapted differently to diverse units. Other times, this group compact may emerge at the local level out of ad hoc unit arrangements. If we understand the permeable boundaries between the military and civilian sectors as zones of negotiation, friction, and fluidity, then it becomes clear how representatives of groups such as women or ethnic and religious minorities bargain with the military based on their access to various symbolic, social, political, and economic resources. Local negotiations emerge when broad formal policy is implemented and involve the power of individuals and groups to influence the ways in which they are treated by an organization. Solutions (often innovative ones) for managing potential or actual tensions and conflict emerge within the broad contours of formal policy. The social covenant and social compacts govern the broad contours of rights and duties of troops within which local contracts emerge. These latter kinds of microagreements, however, concretely materialize on the base of the interactions between wider agreements and the particular conditions of specific units. Before examining three types of units, we briefly chart out the main relevant features of the IDF.

The IDF, Israeli Society, and Managing Diversity The Israeli military is marked by a particular ideology of social diversity and a conscript system. In previous work,25 we argued that the management of diversity in the IDF is part of an ongoing debate about its continued role in defining Israeli ‘‘nation-hood’’ (the people’s army) and its evolution into a small, compact force based on full-time professionals (a professional army). This debate centers on a tension between the military meeting social expectations about its composition mirroring the demographics of society (as the institution symbolizing the nationstate) and prerequisites for its optimal operation as an effective fighting force (its links to organized violence). It is within this wider debate that the administration of diverse groups and demands should be seen. As a People’s Army, the macrosocial covenant in Israel stipulates that the IDF has both to include a wide variety of groups and to carry out its security missions. Accordingly, the IDF has struck a variety of mezzo-level social compacts so that it can meet these twin demands. These agreements are expressed through a complex array of policies and practices to meet the demands and needs of groups such as women, homosexuals, religious soldiers, national minorities, or immigrants.26 One such compact is what is called ‘‘proper integration’’ between men and women and to which we return presently. The array of arrangements and rules allows the IDF to manage diversity and the potential expression (within the military) of external tensions and conflicts. Yet, in contrast to many other militaries of the industrial democracies, there is almost no ideological debate within the IDF about pluralism or multiculturalism. Indeed, in the interviews we have conducted, social diversity is often presented as a ‘‘nonissue’’ for



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commanders. In other words, we found almost no emphasis on managing diversity in terms of sensitivity to the special needs of diverse groups. In fact, commanders are often wary of talking in terms of cultural diversity because of potentially labeling soldiers or groups in negative terms. In effect, what can be categorized as the management of diversity actually comes to serve what we call ‘‘the management of the (Jewish) people.’’ In this sense, what appears at first sight to be the management of diversity may proceed from different assumptions in different situations: if in the United States and Canada, the key assumption is the need to cultivate a pluralistic society in Israel recognizing the uniqueness of social groups entails their integration into the Jewish people (and excluding others like Arabs). Thus, by taking into account the needs of different groups within the military, the IDF demonstrates solidarity and social responsibility (for immigrants, for instance). In other words, the management of diversity is aimed at regulating and controlling the multiplicity of groups within it. Accordingly, the IDF does not put at the center of its policies values of multiculturalism such as tolerance and understanding of the ‘‘other’’ but deals with the many cultures with the aim of creating the Jewish people in the classic Zionist sense. Finally, the IDF manages diversity not only on the basis of the image of a people’s army but also in terms of its constraints as an armed force involved in ongoing and long-term conflicts. This situation implies, in contrast to Canada, Sweden, or the Netherlands for instance, that policies and actions that may harm the IDF’s ability to manage armed conflict will receive a lower priority. As a result, we can talk about circles around the core of the military: the combat forces. The closer one gets to the core, tolerance toward elements that may harm fighting capability—such as answering the demands of diverse groups—is lower. Thus, units that are placed further away from the core are arenas where experimentation can take place. A case in point is the integration of women into the ‘‘light’’ as opposed to the ‘‘heavy’’ infantry. This insight is important for it leads us to the local context of units where the actual management takes place. We now turn to the units in order to examine the differing local dynamics through which the management and self-organization of diversity takes place.

Combat Units: Inclusion of Differences around Cohesion The first kind of unit we investigate is an infantry battalion established in 2000 to specialize in the occupied territories of the West Bank. Its troops—almost invariably as squads or platoons—carry out patrols, provide guard duty at checkpoints, or apprehend armed Palestinians. It is structured like similar combat battalions in the IDF with four rifle, one support and one headquarters companies. Our research focused on one company in training and two during operational deployment. The battalion has a lower prestige than that of the older infantry brigades (such as the Paratroopers) and its deployment exclusively in the occupied territories is considered very often to be repetitive and difficult.


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Despite changes in wider society that affect the IDF,27 combat service actualizing the ethos of the warrior is still seen as the ultimate expression of the republican contract with the state. Indeed, maintaining the warrior ethos is the governing principle in managing diversity in combat units. This ethos is based on social cohesion, loyalty, and male camaraderie that are said to be a precondition for, even a cause of, effective military performance. Ideally, troops are motivated individuals who want to be together in tightly knit units characterized by solidarity and strong boundaries. Hence, the threat of social heterogeneity is that it may be divisive for unit cohesion. The fact that combat units are diverse in terms of ethnicity and class intensifies the sense of potential threat. This contention is supported indirectly through research on the US military in the Vietnam War. In that war, rotation of troops was individual and not unit based. This situation led to units that tended not to cohere and ethnic and racial tensions as well as strains between the ranks emerged.28 Hence, in the combat arms one finds two strong assumptions necessitating constant efforts to create a common and cohesive base for the heterogeneous body of soldiers. The first assumption—and one to be found around the world in regard to combat troops—is that the best basis for a militarily effective unit is one that is marked by similarity and coherence. In other words, efforts are made to deemphasize differences and create a sense of likeness and unity. The second one—unique to Israel and derived from the macro-social level of the social covenant—is of the military in general any specific unit act as a melting pot to a ‘‘proper imagined Israeliness.’’ Concretely, the idea is that the small group of a unit act like Israeli society in general in integrating varied soldiers. Accordingly, the main challenge for commanders of combat units is managing cohesion (gibush) rather than diversity. This emphasis is intensified by the fact that the basic organizational unit is the small group (for instance, squads or tank crews) and the reason why soldiers belonging to different social groups ideally intermingle under the umbrella of unit cohesion and the image of the unit as a melting pot. Indeed, another image that underscores cohesion and that is also found in most other armed forces is that of the family. In the infantry training center, we found (comparatively speaking) a heavy emphasis on metaphors of kinship as when troops referred to their platoon as a family. In practical terms, the requirement to manage cohesion is also the reason that commanders avoid placing too many soldiers from one ethnic group in any subunit. Despite this emphasis, at times certain ‘‘ethnic’’ enclaves are created in units: for instance, in the infantry unit the snipers platoon has a concentration of ‘‘Russian’’ soldiers (i.e., immigrants from the former Soviet Union). The assignation of soldiers from certain groups to specific military roles is often accompanied by an ethnopsychological discourse that creates and justified a link between personality characteristics and ethnic belonging.29 Thus, the link between ‘‘Russian’’ traits as calm and ability to focus are seen as especially suitable for the role of sniper. In the infantry unit, while ‘‘Russian’’ snipers express resistance to Israeli hegemony by speaking Russian or sometimes wearing earplugs when entering the dining hall (so as not



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to hear comments from their peers), their placement in a separate platoon allows them an enclave for expressing their uniqueness. Indeed, the sniper platoon was labeled ‘‘Russupport’’ (linking the marker Russian with support—company to which the platoon belongs) and within which Russian was spoken, Russian music played and Christian holidays celebrated. Here, ethnicity creates solidarity among subunits but in a manner that separates possible tensions from the outside. Managing cohesion implies, moreover, that in the combat units, in contrast to the service units (as we shall see), individual contracts are not a central practice: apart from rare examples, we hardly found local, informal arrangements with individual soldiers. The lack of such contracts is linked, we believe, to the fact that their visibility may harm the ethos and its accompanying sentiments of unit cohesion. A special case is gender. In contrast to a lack of legitimacy for personal contracts in combat units, we found a salience of arrangements derived from the formal policy of ‘‘proper integration’’ (shiluv ra’ooi) ordering the relations between female soldiers and religiously observant male troops.30 Indeed, this policy is a typical example of a mezzo-level compact that is designated from above and that was enacted out of the power of the national–religious camp in civil society. In the conditions of field units, relations between men and women are especially sensitive to social control. Concretely, because the erotic potential of women is perceived by some religious soldiers as threatening, control demands that units constantly adapt formal rules to everyday activities such as dress during off-hours, mixed gender training, or prayer hours. In other armed forces, we would conjecture, the erotic potential of women is also strictly controlled through severe rules governing fraternization. Small-group cohesion then is the principle around which members of units cohered and through which differences in ethnicity, class, or religiosity were blurred and gender highly controlled. Furthermore, the concrete arrangements, derived from this Israeli social compact, indicate that women are external to male cohesion. To get back to our argument, while intergroup tensions exist, they are regulated at the unit level in different ways. By far, the most common practices for dealing with ethnic tension involve expressive culture. Jokes, quips, or songs appear in the different units and allow the dissolution of ethnic tensions that are often undercurrents to ongoing life. As Coser31 and Sion and Ben-Ari32 argue, humor often centers on taboo subjects such as conflict or social tensions but allows a cathartic release of emotions through dramatizing what is normative. In a complementary manner, humor is important for creating a common world of meaning and strengthening solidarity. Ethnic jokes and pranks create a common language that actually blurs differences.33 Participating in jokes is a way of saying that ‘‘We all belong to the same group.’’ Thus, for example, in a website devoted to military folkloric songs34 we found a humorous song from an infantry combat battalion entitled ‘‘I had many Russians in my company.’’ Another kind of regulation of tension is the ethnic labeling of units like companies in one infantry brigade who were called ‘‘The Arabs’’ or ‘‘The Blonds.’’ Members of the former company characterized themselves and were characterized


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by others, as ‘‘barbaric’’ implying high motivation and morale (being poisoned). These features included uncontrolled emotionality that is identified along Orientalistic lines with Arab characteristics. However, this label did not imply that all of the company’s soldiers are of Mizrachi origin (i.e., originally from Arab-speaking countries). In this same manner, the company labeled as ‘‘Blond’’ was typified as bearing characteristics identified with Ashkenazim (Jewish–Israeli groups originating in Euro-America), namely order, professionalism, and discipline (and here again the label did not imply that the majority of soldiers were of Ashkenazi origin). On one hand, these labels raise an Orientalist discourse to the surface but on the other they undermine this discourse in that soldiers of different actual ethnic origin are identified with purportedly Oriental or European characteristics.35 All of these practices work to soften ethnic tensions. But while the management of diversity in combat units is focused on cohesion based on the ethos of the warrior in technological units, it is managed through the ethos of knowledge.

White-Collar Units—Neutralizing Differences in Communities of Knowledge The technological or high-tech unit is located in central Israel in a base alongside similar units. The soldiers of the unit undergo a short period of basic training and then courses where they learn either programming or (communications) network management. The two main work teams of the unit are located on different floors of a common building and are served by a small administrative arm and a larger logistics unit serving the whole base. The work teams receive tasks and are expected to carry them out according to deadlines dictated by more senior officers. The prestige of the unit is high in the informal hierarchy of the IDF given its high-tech character. In this white-collar unit, the governing ethos is centered on developing knowledge (like the civilian model of high tech). The dominant emphases are on individual challenge, professional attractiveness, and personal capital (promotion according to personal abilities). A related factor is the accumulation of resources that may be used to find work in the high-tech industry. This ethos creates a ‘‘knowledge community,’’ within which social and cultural differences between members are seen as irrelevant. The fact that class gaps within the unit are small to begin with (in comparison with combat units) strengthens these sentiments. At the same time, this unit is far from homogeneous. While it is populated by a large percentage of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, ethnoclass differences are neutralized through sharing in the ethos of knowledge. Another expression of the process of homogenization around a community of knowledge is explicitly integrating women into every role. Indeed, the centrality of high-tech knowledge that does not carry an explicit male-military marking (such as combat) weakens gender hierarchies.



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Compared with the infantry battalion, the work group (the smallest component in the unit) is based less on emotions such as loyalty and comradeship. To follow Durkheim,36 while in combat units social heterogeneity threatens mechanical solidarity, in white-collar units it is less threatening to the organic solidarity of a community of knowledge of individuals with a common interest. Thus, soldiers in the communications unit characterized it as being a different or ‘‘another’’ military (i.e., different from combat arms), a place full of ‘‘technological heads’’ that have a common attraction to computers. This common concern, the unit’s high status and the ability to convert resources garnered during conscription into civilian ones neutralize social and cultural differences. The compact (the informal agreement between the military and the group of high-tech employees) in these units is based on the assumption that expertise gathered during military service can be easily converted into advantages in the civilian labor force. In return for this expertise, soldiers are expected not only to carry out their roles effectively but to contribute their abilities and imagination and devote themselves to the unit’s missions beyond formal demands. This agreement is bolstered first by the idea constantly transmitted to the soldiers that the unit is directly contributing to the security of the state. While the soldiers are aware of the fact that their contribution is different from that of combat soldiers, they constantly emphasize the extent to which their contribution is central and unique in the IDF (one expression of this idea is their self-labeling as cyber-warriors). Second, motivation is managed around personal challenges because many tasks are perceived to be similar to ones found in high-tech companies. This kind of work creates a feeling of commonality and cooperation between soldiers. Third, there is a strong emphasis placed on belonging to an elite, select unit. In other words, the importance of work relations takes precedence over all other kinds of ties. As a consequence of this situation, commanders find little need to manage or regulate heterogeneity and this may explain why so few personal contracts related to diversity are found in the unit. Role flexibility is interpreted as part of the organizational demands of ‘‘another military’’ and not as a set of individual contracts agreed upon to meet special needs. Ethnic tensions that do rarely arise are easily channeled into joking behavior among soldiers. These humorous exchanges should be seen alongside the unifying ethos because they allow the expression and the dissipation of ethnic tensions that are part of everyday life in wider society. Where ethnic and class tensions do arise but are not neutralized through humor involve conflicts between the unit’s soldiers and members of the service unit in the camp where both are situated.

Service Units: Industrial Peace and Personal Contracts Located near a city in the country’s south, the relatively low-tech ordnance unit is charged with maintaining and repairing munitions, armored and light vehicles, and optical and communications equipment. Work is carried out either by individuals or


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small groups in the unit’s nine companies. This is an open base meaning that soldiers come in the morning and leave when they have finished work (like civilian workplaces). The social composition of the unit is diverse in terms of ethnicity (with troops from Arabic-speaking background mixing with immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia); although, in general, soldiers belong to lower socioeconomic strata and Israel’s geographical periphery. Many receive welfare benefits from the military and several asked to serve near home so they can help families. The transport or trucking unit is located in its own large base in the center of the country and the work is based on individual drivers dispatched for daily or weekly periods around the country. Like the ordnance unit service is not voluntary, although many of the large minority of Soviet immigrants chose to be drivers seeing it a worthwhile investment for civilian life. Here too, many soldiers receive welfare benefits and again, like the ordnance unit, so the transport camp is at the periphery of the military hierarchy and has a negative label. In both contexts, the main challenge for commanders is managing human resources defined as ‘‘low quality’’ and maintaining industrial peace so that units carry out tasks effectively. In the units, social heterogeneity is perceived as a constraint commanders must take into account in managing individuals. Solidarity and cohesion are not a central issue and the concrete problem is the low motivation of soldiers who perceive the camps as places of work. Like many industrial workers, they perceive work as ‘‘dirty’’ and themselves as exploited laborers. The unit ethos here is technical professionalism aimed at providing service that is of high quality and meeting assigned quotas. But one of the central problems in both camps is that while troops are from a low-income background, most are actually not entitled to military welfare benefits. Such troops make up a significant portion of the populations and feel exploited since despite working very hard they do not receive symbolic acknowledgment or economic benefits in exchange for their service. It is this situation that opens up a large leeway for individual contracts that emerge to compensate between the demands and the rewards of the soldiers. The goals of the units are achieved through negotiations about individual contracts. Indeed, because the basic organizational unit is individuals, commanders have great possibility to reach local, ad hoc agreements with soldiers (in contrast to combat units based on small group camaraderie where commanders have less leeway for such contracts). In the service units, we found an explicit exchange in terms of what is given and received. Individual contracts are struck between a commander and a soldier and negotiations center on an exchange of better conditions of service for disciplined and professional work. Commanders seek a situation in which troops perform their work without problems (industrial peace) and with minimal loyalty to the unit. In return, they acknowledge soldiers’ individual difficulties (such as familial or economic ones or difficulties in adapting to Israel). We were, indeed, surprised at the amount of efforts commanders at all levels and welfare clerks invest in personal meetings with soldiers. Moreover, in a small number of



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cases we heard about commanders contravening army regulations such as providing food for soldiers going on leave and who did not have any family in Israel. More widely, in both units the governing exchange centers on desired citizenship, on turning soldiers into good and productive citizens that are disciplined, committed to work, and useful (i.e., fully employed). Hence, there is very little talk about Israeli identity and loyalty to the nation derived from the republican discourse and that can be found in combat units. Talk in service units fits to a greater extent the liberal discourse in the macro social covenant in that military service is seen as a precondition for participation in the civilian arena and the reception of citizen rights. Lack of military service is seen as leading to continued social and political marginalization in civilian life. The agreement in these units is thus based on the exchange of labor for full citizenship in civilian life (based on completing military service). Because this wider exchange is not immediate, it needs maintaining through ad hoc contracts in routine life. Hence, these agreements are defined anew in regard to each individual and commanders told us that they make serious efforts to persuade problematic soldiers not to leave the IDF. We even heard about a number of cases in which families asked commanders to keep soldiers in the units so that they would not take up criminal activities. Structural dissimilarities between the service units influence exchanges. The main difference is that while commanders in the ordnance unit have daily links to their subordinates, drivers in in the transport camp are away from the base most of the week. In addition, while some of the work in the former is done is small groups, drivers are alone and have limited contacts with peers. Drivers’ most important link is with their direct commanders (often through cell phones) and one of the expressions of this connection is the image of commander as ‘‘father’’ to individual soldiers. In contrast to the combat units, however, this parental image is directed at individuals and not at small groups such as squads or platoons. Fatherly caring is expressed, for example, in commanders phoning the units to which drivers are seconded to assure that they receive appropriate conditions; looking for soldiers who have gone away without leave (AWOL) without notifying the military police; opendoor policies toward troops; and sometimes turning a blind eye to tardiness in returning to camp. All these actions are undertaken to create trusting relations in the dyadic ties between commanders and soldiers. In contrast, in the ordnance camp contracts are much more instrumental with soldiers providing labor and commanders providing such arrangements as shorter work hours or special leaves so that they help their families or assistance with food. In this way, industrial peace is maintained. In addition, because of the social and organizational distance from combat units we found much weaker assumptions about the unit as a melting pot. Indeed, in interviews and conversations commanders and soldiers never spontaneously talked about this image. The lack of a melting pot discourse liberates commanders from having to ‘‘integrate’’ soldiers from different backgrounds and further allows a host of local-level contracts. One implication is a greater scope to maintain unique characteristics such as using languages other than Hebrew (especially Russian). Another


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expression is recognition of ‘‘Russian Holidays’’ like New Year in planning rotations. Finally, there is a greater freedom for groupings of soldiers from a similar background to band together: dining together, playing Russian music, sleeping in separate quarters (humorously called in one unit, the Caucasian tent), or working together in small groups (as technicians). Another mechanism for preventing ethnic tensions is social mediators. In the transport camp, we found individuals acting as cultural bridges to soldiers who were seen as problematic (usually immigrants from Russia or Ethiopia). The mediators were usually from the same ethnic group, usually lower-level commanders (not necessarily their direct superiors) and who could converse in their language thus allowing them to talk about personal stress, ventilate anger, and create communication channels to higher-level commanders. From time to time, there are unforeseen consequences of such ethnic enclaves. For example, in the transport camp, we found a few Israeli-born soldiers beginning to understand Russian and to express positive attitudes toward Russian culture. To a degree, one can cautiously contend that in this social arena there are seeds of a more pluralistic environment.

Conclusion Rather than focusing only on macro policies and arrangements as previous studies have, we suggest also examining how macro stipulations are actively adapted to local contexts. In contrast to previous analyses, our analysis thus adds a more dynamic and variegated view of military reality: namely, looking at military life in general as much more diverse and negotiable (like all social life). Of course, formal policy limits local agreements but the management of diversity turns out to be much more dynamic than expected. In other words, differences between groups in the military are both deliberately managed and contain elements of self-organization that emerge at the level of unit. Beyond formal policy, ethoses dictate the boundaries of what can legitimately be negotiated at the local level and shape the contours within which local dynamics take place. For instance, when the warrior ethos is strongest (as in the combat units) so the leeway for individual contracts is the narrowest. In these units, it is group compacts such as the ‘‘proper integration’’ that are more prominent. Moreover, the tools available to commanders at the local level differ precisely because of the ethoses, structural characteristics, and place in the military hierarchy of their units. Accordingly, an analysis placed at the local level reveals that contracts comprise the array of agreements reached between commanders and soldiers belonging to different groups based on the resources at their disposal. In the service units, the contract was cultivated through an exchange of physical labor and conformity to military rules (the soldiers’ resources) for long-term achievement of normative citizenship. In whitecollar units, the exchange is very similar to the high-tech industry: soldiers bring their mental labor (creativity and analytical skills) in a swap for personal challenges,



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professional advancement, and the long-term ability to convert the resources garnered in the military to civilian lives. In this respect, we should distinguish between the management and the regulation of diversity. The management of diversity (at the local level) allows the creation of cultural enclaves and other forms to preserve a unique lifestyle within the ranks. Regulation—as in joke telling to mitigate tensions, for instance—is based on the idea that troops are expected to create a shared life style without allowing (or allowing only limited) expressions of cultural uniqueness. One of our important conclusions therefore is that practices related to local diversity include both neutralizing and regulating differences and managing and cultivating them. Alongside control and supervision (for instance, through allowing limited visibility of differences) is found management (as in actively taking into account special needs). Along these lines, there is a link between a unit’s status in the power hierarchy of the military and its ability to regulate—through the ethos of cohesion—issues related to heterogeneity and diversity. In other words, the higher the status of the unit, the stronger the ethos of cohesion that can regulate (at times even silence) open expression of ethnic conflict. Alternatively, in units with lower status, ethnic conflict will be nearer the surface. Building on our analysis, we hypothesize that in other militaries as in the IDF, the closer the ethos of a unit is to the combat core so civilian sources of diversity are more threatening and therefore seen as in need of more regulation; and conversely the more there is an ethos closer to civilian ones and there is a possibility of converting military resources into civilian ones there is less of a perceived threat. In a complementary conceptualization, we hypothesize that in units based on the warrior ethos, we would most likely find the regulation of diversity while in those based on other ethoses there would be a greater management of diversity. In this sense, looking at the tie between the ethos and status of a unit and regulation or management of diversity goes beyond previous analyses because it takes us from presenting diversity management as a managerial tool to deal with intercultural tensions to a resource that can ‘‘compensate’’ for the perceived threat of external diversity and resources that recruits (not only conscripts) import from outside the military. Put differently, the less the resources are available to commanders and the less they can compensate for this lack by placing soldiers in prestigious units, the more diversity management in and of itself is a resource that commanders can trade at the local level. Accordingly, and more widely, we argue that our analysis bears import for other armed forces. To be sure, the Israeli case differs from cases where multiculturalism is part of the national ethos (Canada is a prime example). In the IDF, there is no explicit ideological goal to meet and promote special demands, needs, and identities of social groups. The lack of a multicultural ideology is an expression of the selfperception of commanders that the IDF is a people’s army: its role is to integrate different groups and construct Israeli hegemony. The wider point here is that multiculturalism—as a national and military ethos—should be seen itself as a variable


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that interacts in various ways with local contexts and the personnel requirements of different units. For that reason, we would conjecture that in some contexts special arrangements would be put in place not only to tolerate but to actively cultivate unique social and cultural diversity. Indeed, the efforts made to make even voluntary forces representative of wider populations is indicative of this kind of ideological goal. Yet, our analysis bears further implications for other armed forces. We suggest that many of the processes found in the socialization of combat soldiers should be understood not only as preparing them for performance in small, cohesive units. The emergence of cohesion and sentiments of common fate and identity is also an outcome of active regulation of, and limitation on, external threats of diversity.37 This point can be seen in that while Israel is unique in terms of conscription, the similarity to all-volunteer forces can be seen in the infantry. The case of Israel’s infantry brigades is very similar to the cases of armed forces where conscription has ended because in both we find self- and organizational-selection and voluntarism (in Israel within the bounds of conscription). Thus, for example, in the Dutch armed forces the threat that women and gay soldiers pose for combat soldiers is very similar to what we found in Israel.38 Clearly, the contemporary Dutch military is not a people’s army but the threat to operational performance in combat units posed by external identities is still strong. Thus, it is not surprising that Dandeker and Mason and Boene39 argue that making use of diversity is difficult for an organization whose culture typically stresses homogeneity and cohesion and where difference is seen as a problem. Acknowledgments The authors wish to thank Smadar Chaouat, Yuval Lati, Yelena Lerman, Maya Lichtman, and Sveta Roberman for excellent research assistance. They would also like to thank Yagil Levy, Yehudit Sher, and three anonymous reviewers for comments about their project and article. A major part of the research on which this article is based was funded by the Behavioral Sciences Department of the Israel Defense Forces.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes 1. Orna Sasson-Levy, Identities in Uniform (Jerusalem: Magness, 2006). (Hebrew). 2. Cynthia Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? (London: Pluto Press, 1983); Gerhard Kummel, ‘‘When Boy Meets Girl: The Feminization of the Military—An Introduction and also a Postscript,’’ Current Sociology 50, 5 (2002): 615-39; Levy Yagil, ‘‘The Clash between Feminism and Religion in the Israeli Military: A Multi-Layered Analysis,’’ Social



3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

8.

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Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 17, 2 (2010): 185-209; Charles C. Moskos, ‘‘Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm,’’ in The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 14-31; Snyder, R. Claire, ‘‘The Citizen-Soldier Tradition and Gender Integration of the U.S. Military,’’ Armed Forces & Society 29, 2 (2003): 185-204; Rachel Woodward and Patricia Winter, ‘‘Discourses of Gender in the Contemporary British Army,’’ Armed Forces & Society 30, 2 (2004): 279-301. Christopher Dandeker and David Mason, ‘‘Diversity in the UK Armed Forces: The Debate about the Representation of Women and Minority Ethnic Groups,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 55-72; Rivka A. Eisekovits, ‘‘Intercultural Learning among Russian Immigrant Recruits in the Israeli Army,’’ Armed Forces & Society 32, 2 (2006): 292-306; Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Atlanta: Georgia University Press, 1980); David L. Leal, ‘‘The Multicultural Military: Military Service and the Acculturation of Latinos and Anglos,’’ Armed Forces & Society 29, 2 (2003): 205-26; Alon Peled, ‘‘The Politics of Language in Multiethnic Militaries: The Case of Oriental Jews in the Israel Defense Forces, 195-1959,’’ Armed Forces & Society 26, 4 (2000): 587-605; Alon Peled, A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler, All that We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration in the Army Way (New York: Basic Books, 1996). Aaron Belkin and Melissa Levitt, ‘‘Homosexuality and the Israeli Defense Forces: Did Lifting the Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance,’’ Armed Forces & Society 27, 4 (2001): 541-65; Gregory M. Herek, Jared B. Jobe, and Ralph M. Carney, Out in Force: Sexual Orientation and the Military (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996); Levy Yagil, ‘‘The Right to Fight,’’ Armed Forces & Society 33, 2 (2007): 186-202; Wilbur J. Scott and Sandra Carson Stanley, Gays and Lesbians in the Military: Issues, Concerns and Contrasts (New York: De Gruyter, 1994). Philippe Manigart, ‘‘ Managing Diversity: Women and Ethnic Minorities in the Belgium Armed Forces,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 104-26; Donna Winslow, ‘‘Diversity in the Canadian Forces’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 33-53. A. Stuart Cohen, ‘‘From Integration to Segregation: The Role of Religion in the IDF,’’ Armed Forces & Society 25, 3 (1999): 387-405; Paul Klein, ‘‘Managing Diversity in the German Armed Forces,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 73-84. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters, ‘‘Introduction: The Diversity of Diversity,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 1-11.


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9. Ibid. 10. Christopher Dandeker and David Mason, ‘‘Diversity in the UK Armed Forces: The Debate about the Representation of Women and Minority Ethnic Groups,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 55-72; Philippe Manigart, ‘‘Managing Diversity: Women and Ethnic Minorities in the Belgium Armed Forces,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 104-26; Donna Winslow, ‘‘Diversity in the Canadian Forces,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 33-53. 11. Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, ‘‘Humanitarians or Warriors? Race Gender and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope,’’ Armed Forces & Society 21, 4 (1995): 616. 12. Charles Moskos, ‘‘Diversity in the Armed Forces of the United States,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 13-32. 13. Donna Winslow, ‘‘Diversity in the Canadian Forces,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 33. 14. Jan Van Der Meulen and Joseph Soeters, ‘‘Introduction: The Diversity of Diversity,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 212. 15. Bernard Boene, ‘‘How Unique Should the Military Be? A Review of Representative Literature and Outline of Synthetic Formulation,’’ European Journal of Sociology 31, 1 (1990): 3-59. 16. Bernard Boene, ‘‘Diversity in the French Armed Forces: Trends and Prospects,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 96. 17. L. N. Rosen, K. H. Knudson, A. Moore Parmley, and P. Fancher, ‘‘Cohesion and the Culture of Hypermasculinity in U.S. Army units: Relationship to Gender Integration and Family Support,’’ Armed Forces & Society 29 (2003): 325-51. 18. Aaron Belkin and Melissa Levitt, ‘‘Homosexuality and the Israeli Defence Forces: Did Lifting the Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance,’’ Armed Forces & Society 27, 4 (2001): 541-65; Charles Moskos, ‘‘From Citizens’ Army to Social Laboratory,’’ Wilson Quarterly 17, 4 (1993): 94. 19. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 20. Guy Ankerl, Towards a Social Contract on a World-wide Scale: Solidarity Contracts (Geneva: Research series/International Institute for Labour Studies, 1980). 21. Anthony Forster, ‘‘Breaking the Covenant: Governance of the British Army in the Twenty-First Century,’’ International Affairs 82, 6 (2006): 1043-57. 22. Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).



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23. Levy Yagil, Lomsky-Feder Edna, and Harel Noa, ‘‘From ‘obligatory militarism’ to ‘contractual militarism’—The changing face of militarism in Israel,’’ Israel Studies 12, 1 (2007): 127-48. 24. Chris Argyris, Understanding Organizational Behavior (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1960). 25. Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari, ‘‘The People in Uniform’’ to ‘‘Different Uniforms for the People’’: Professionalism, Diversity and the Israel Defence Forces,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 157-86; Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari, ‘‘Diversity in the Israel Defense Forces,’’ in Cultural Diversity in the Armed Forces: An International Comparison, ed. Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen (London: Routledge, 2007), 125-39. 26. Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari, 1999; A. Stuart Cohen, ‘‘From Integration to Segregation: The Role of Religion in the IDF,’’ Armed Forces & Society 25, 3 (1999): 387-405; Danny Kaplan, Brothers and Others in Arms: The Making of Love and War in Israeli Combat Units (New York: Haworth Press, 2003); Levy Yagil, ‘‘The Clash between Feminism and Religion in the Israeli Military: A Multi-Layered Analysis,’’ Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 17, 2 (2010): 185-209; Orna Sasson-Levy, Identities in Uniform (Jerusalem: Magness, 2006) (Hebrew). 27. Yagil Levy, Another Army for Israel: Materialist Militarism in Israel (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2003) (Hebrew). 28. Larry Ingraham and Fredrick Manning. ‘‘Cohesion: Who Needs it?’’ Military Review, June, 1981. 29. Nissim Mizrahi, ‘‘‘From Badness to Sickness’: The Role of Ethnopsychology in Shaping Ethnic Hierarchies in Israel,’’ Social Identities 10, 2 (2004): 219-43. 30. Yagil Levy and Zev Lehrer, Competition and Exclusion: Why is an Anti-female Rhetoric Developing in the Israeli Military? Manuscript (Raanana: The Open University of Israel). 31. Rose Laub Coser, ‘‘Laughter among Colleagues: A Study of the Social Function of Humor among the Staff of a Mental Hospital,’’ Psychiatry 23 (1960): 81-95. 32. Liora Sion and Eyal Ben-Ari, ‘‘Hungry, Weary and Horny’’: Joking and Jesting Among Israel’s Combat Reserves,’’ Israel Affairs 11, 4 (2005): 656-72. 33. Michael Feige and Eyal Ben-ari, ‘‘Card Games and an Israeli Army Unit: An Interpretive Case Study,’’ Armed Forces & Society 17, 4 (1990): 429-48. 34. Accessed at http://music.haifa.ac.il/zemer/. 35. Dana Kakhtan, 2011. 36. Durkheim Emile, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1964). 37. Charles Kirke, Red Coat Green Machine: Continuity in Change in the British Army 1700-2000 (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2009). 38. Liora Sion, ‘‘‘Too Innocent and Sweet for War’: Dutch Peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo,’’ Armed Forces & Society 32, 1 (2006): 454-74. 39. Christopher Dandeker and David Mason, ‘‘Diversity in the UK Armed Forces: The Debate about the Representation of Women and Minority Ethnic Groups,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters


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(Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 55-72; Bernard Boene, ‘‘Diversity in the French Armed Forces: Trends and Prospects,’’ in The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces, ed. Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999), 96.

Author Biographies Edna Lomsky-Feder is an associate professor in the School of Education at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her research interests include war and military from a culture perspective and education and nationalism. Eyal Ben-Ari is a Professor Emeritus at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has carried out research on social and cultural aspects of the militaries of the industrial democracies and Japanese early childhood education.
