Asia and the Gulf The Singapore Middle East Papers - MEI-NUS

Asia and the Gulf The Singapore Middle East Papers

Volume 1 Spring 2012

SINGAPORE MIDDLE EAST Papers, Volume 1


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Table of Contents BIOS

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Tim Niblock, “Southeast Asia and the Gulf: Convergence and Competition in the Wider Asian Context”

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Jacqueline M. Armijo and Lina M. Kassen, “Turning East: The Social and Cultural Implications of the Gulf’s Increasingly Strong Economic and Strategic Relations with China”

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Ismail Fajrie Alatas, “Between Abu Dhabi and Java: A Transnational Ḥaḍramī Family in an Era of Nation States”

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Tim Niblock is Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern Politics at the University of Exeter. He also serves as Vice President of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, Vice President of the European Association for Middle Eastern Studies, and Vice Chair of the UK Council for Area Studies Associations. He began his academic career at the University of Khartoum in Sudan (1969-77), where he served as an associate professor on secondment from the University of Reading. He has since worked at the Universities of Exeter and Durham. Between 1978 and 1993 he was at Exeter, establishing the Middle East Politics Programme there. In 1993 he was appointed Director of the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham. In 1999 he returned to the University of Exeter and served as Director of the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies there from 1999 to 2005. He has written widely on the politics, political economy, and international relations of the Arab world. Among his books are: The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (2007), Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival (2006), “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya and Sudan (2001), Muslim Communities in the New Europe (edited, with Gerd Nonneman and Bogdan Szajkowski, 1997), Economic and Political Liberalisation in the Middle East (edited, with Emma Murphy, 1993), Class and Power in Sudan (1987), Iraq: the Contemporary State (edited, 1982), State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia (edited, 1981), and Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf (edited, 1980). Jacqueline M. Armijo (Ph.D., Harvard University) is an associate professor in the Department of International Affairs at Qatar University. Her research focuses on Islam in China, both the early history and the recent challenges faced by China’s diverse Muslim population. She has published numerous articles and chapters on Muslims in China that focus on a range of issues, including the recent revival of Islamic education in China; the impact of growing numbers of Chinese Muslims pursuing Islamic higher education abroad; the role of Muslim women in insuring the survival of their communities during periods of mass violence; and the active role played by Chinese Muslim women today in reviving Islamic knowledge. Her current research focuses on the growing importance of China-Gulf relations. She has also taught at Zayed (UAE), Stanford, and Cornell Universities. She has lived in the Gulf region for nine years and in China for seven years.

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Lina M. Kassem (Ph.D., University of Cincinnati) is an assistant professor in the Department of International Affairs at Qatar University. Her primary research interests are gender and law, human rights, and Middle East politics with a special focus on issues of subnational identities. She has recently published a chapter on nationalism in Introducing Global Issues. She has also taught at Zayed University in the UAE and Wilmington College in the United States. Ismail Fajrie Alatas is a doctoral candidate in anthropology and history at the University of Michigan. He received his M.A. in history from the National University of Singapore and his B.A. (Hons) in history from the University of Melbourne. His current research is on the history of the BāʿAlawī (the descendants of the Prophet who trace their origin from the Ḥaḍramawt, Yemen) in postcolonial Indonesia and their Sufi order the Tariqa Alawiya, as well as the connection between Indonesia and the Ḥaḍramawt after the Second World War. He is currently doing fieldwork in Java as an IDRF fellow of the Social Science Research Council. He is also a visiting fellow at the Center for the Study of Global Civil Society (PACIVIS) and a visiting lecturer in the University of Indonesia’s Department of Anthropology. He has published two monographs in Indonesian: Renungan ditengah Kemurungan (Terajumizan 2005), which focuses on identity and border crossing, and Sungai tak Bermuara (Diwan 2006), which examines Sufi epistemology. He is a founding coordinator of the Interdisciplinary Seminar for Islamic Studies (ISIS) at the University of Michigan.


Southeast Asia and the Gulf: Convergence and Competition in the Wider Asian Context Tim Niblock

PERSPECTIVE The shift in the balance of the global economic order has become increasingly apparent over the past five years. A steady move of industrial capacity from West to East has occurred; the rates of economic growth of key Asian countries have outstripped (many by a high margin) those of advanced Western economies; the financial crisis that the Western world has experienced since 2008 has severely weakened Western economies while barely denting the rates of growth of some Asian countries; and a range of Asian countries have come to play a central role in global investment, whether through their sovereign wealth funds or private/ public corporations and companies. Lucrative construction contracts, oil concessions, and development projects – which Western companies dominated in the past – are now being won by Asian companies. The role of the Gulf region is of particular significance in the current shifts in the global economy. In some respects the Gulf, itself part of Asia, constitutes one dimension of the shift in power. Despite the problems faced by Dubai, Gulf economies have continued a rapid rate of expansion through the financial crisis; their sovereign wealth funds and major corporations have gained a central role in global investment flows, and they have acquired a key stake in a significant sector of global industrial production: petrochemicals. In another respect, the Gulf states are at the fulcrum of shifts in the global economic balance. The economies of the Gulf have traditionally been closely linked to those of the Western world, yet non-Middle Eastern Asia has become increasingly active and involved there. Most oil now flows East, not West, and the development of the petrochemical industry (the cornerstone of the Gulf economies’ hope for a future as industrial powers) is also now more dependent on Asian than Western markets. How the Gulf countries balance and manage their relationships with East/South Asia and the West is, therefore, an important issue for the future for all of the parties involved (the Gulf countries, the West, and non-Middle Eastern Asia). Yet, the picture of Western decline and Asian growth in Gulf economic involvement, as normally conveyed, is oversimplified to the extent of being inaccurate. While an overall shift has indeed taken place, the shift is not simply from West to East. Asian countries themselves are divided between winners and losers. The key factor, at least with regard to trade, is that the

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share of Gulf trade accounted for by industrialized and newly-industrialized countries (whether Western or Asian) has declined relative to that of particular industrializing countries. As will be shown in the paper, the share accounted for by Japan has declined as much (and perhaps more so) than have the shares of the major Western trading nations and blocs. The key industrializing countries that have gained substantially in market share are China and India. To some extent, contrary to widespread perceptions, India’s growing share is more notable than China’s. Yet, despite the growing shares taken by particular industrializing countries, it is important to remember that the European Union and Japan remain the Gulf region’s largest trading partners, just as they have been for the past three decades. It is within this context that Southeast Asia’s connectivity with the Gulf will be considered. In order to understand the nature of the relationship, Southeast Asia’s position has to be placed within the wider regional and global context. What are the key elements in the strengthening Gulf-Asia economic relationship, and how does Southeast Asia relate to these? What are the dynamics underpinning the growth of trade and investment for Asia as a whole and Southeast Asia in particular? How has the balance between different Gulf countries, in terms of their economic engagement with Asia, changed over time? The central measure used here to assess changing economic relations is trade. Economic relations, of course, comprise a whole range of activities and undertakings, such as investment, construction contracts, coproduction arrangements, and franchising agreements. These activities and undertakings, however, are difficult to quantify comparatively. Crossnational year-by-year comparisons are complicated by the irregular flows or resources required for particular projects, and sometimes by the unreality of attributing “national origin” to investments due to the transnational nature of many companies. The strength and extent of “other activities and undertakings” in a bilateral relationship are, in any case, usually reflected in the size of the trading relationship. Trade, therefore, necessarily constitutes the key measure. Once the changing balance of economic relations has been covered, the article will go on to briefly discuss some of the political and strategic dimensions of Asia-Gulf relationships. Analyzing Asia-Gulf Trade The tables and charts in the appendices to this paper have been developed on the basis of the IMF’s direction of trade statistics. The countries whose trading relations with the Gulf are covered have been chosen with a view to laying bare the key shifts in trading “weight”: China, India, Japan, and Korea are the countries that account for the largest portion of Asian Gulf trade; the EU and the United States are the two major non-Asian global 4


trading nations/blocs with substantial trading interests in the Gulf; and Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are the four Southeast Asian countries with the largest stakes in Gulf trade. On the Gulf side, all of the eight Gulf states are covered. In the view of the writer it is important to show the whole picture, rather than select one part of the Gulf (the GCC states are sometimes taken by themselves, as if they represent the overall Gulf position). Including Iraq and Iran enables a more balanced analysis of how Asian engagement in the Gulf will be developed. Similarly, some accounts of Asia-Gulf trade focus on a narrower range of Asian states, with a tendency to give particular attention to China. Yet the significance of China’s involvement can only be properly understood within a wider Asian (and Western) comparative context. The years presented here are intended to show how trading weight has changed over time: 1990 represents the period before China’s (and to some extent India’s) trading relationship with the Gulf states developed in any substantive way; 2000 marks the beginning of the period of substantial growth in Asia-Gulf trade; 2005 sees a new stage of growth, fostered in part by the rising price of oil and in part by the impact of World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, which by then covered most of the states involved in Gulf trade, at both ends (Saudi Arabia, the last of the GCC states to accede to the WTO, did so in 2005; Iraq and Iran remain outside); 2008 marks the high point of the rise in oil prices (at least in the first half of the year), with all its implications for Gulf trade. The figures for 2009 show the impact of the global financial crisis, with the consequent drop in the value of world (and Gulf) trade, and those for 2010 show the developing trends once the global economy began to show signs of recovery. As each of these three years was, for different reasons, idiosyncratic, it was deemed important to cover the data for all three. An assessment of the overall trends needs to show how boom conditions, retrenchment, and recovery all affect the balance. The terms “industrialized,” “newly-industrialized,” and “industrializing” are used here to characterize the level of development of different economies. How states should be classified in this regard can be problematic, especially as the character of economies during rapid growth changes very quickly. For the purpose of this paper, the EU, United States, and Japan are classified as industrialized; South Korea and Singapore are classified as newly-industrialized; and China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are classified as industrializing. It should be borne in mind that the research covers the 1990-2010 period, over which time there has been substantial development.

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The Changing Economic Balance: Asia-Gulf Trade (Regional and Global Comparisons) The key trends in Gulf trade that emerge from the statistics will be presented under three headings: The Share of Gulf Trade Accounted for by the Different Gulf States; The Share of Gulf Trade Conducted with Each of the Gulf’s Major Trading Partners (China, India, Japan, South Korea, the EU, and the United States); and Southeast Asian Countries’ Gulf Trade in Comparative Perspective (relative to each other and relative to the Gulf’s major trading partners). The first of these sections, although not related directly to Asian trade, is necessary so as to give perspective on which Gulf states have the potential to provide major markets for it. a. The Share of Overall Gulf Trade Accounted for by Different Gulf States The data reveals the following trends and realities on the shares that Gulf states have in global trade overall: i. From 1990 up to 2008, Saudi Arabia had the largest external trade of all the Gulf states. Over this period, however, the United Arab Emirates was gradually catching up to Saudi Arabia, and in 2009 the UAE’s external trade total overtook that of Saudi Arabia (Tables 1-5). In 2010 (Table 6) Saudi Arabia regained the leading position, mainly due to the substantial benefit accrued from higher oil prices and demand. The continuing strength of the UAE’s external trade, however, is reflected in the substantial rise in UAE imports: some 22% higher than in 2009. ii.

In 2009, Saudi Arabia and the UAE jointly accounted for 58% of the total external trade of Gulf states. Over all of the years since 1990, the two countries have accounted for more than half of Gulf trade, and at times the figure has been above 60% (Tables 1-6).

iii. Iran’s share of Gulf trade with the outside world has slowly declined over the period since 1990. Whereas in 1990 Iran accounted for more than 20% of all Gulf trade, in 2009 and 2010 it accounted for only 15%. It ranked second to Saudi Arabia in 1990, but soon after was overtaken by the UAE. Nonetheless, it retains the third ranking, well ahead of those next in line: Kuwait and Qatar (Tables 1-6). iv.

Iraq’s share of Gulf trade with the outside world remains substantially below the level it had reached prior to the 1990 occupation of Kuwait. Surprisingly, given the size of its population and infrastructural needs, Iraq’s trade in 2010 still fell well short of Kuwaiti and Qatari external trade (Table 6).

v. A substantial change in the import/export balance of the UAE versus Saudi Arabia has taken place since 2000. The UAE has emerged as 6


by far the biggest importer in the Gulf region. Up to 2000, Saudi Arabia held this position. Since then, the UAE has been taking an ever increasing portion of imports coming into the Gulf region. In 2009, 43% of all imports into the Gulf came to the UAE (Table 8). Saudi Arabia’s external trade, therefore, involves more exports than imports, while the UAE’s imports now constitute a larger portion of external trade than exports. Given that the major portion of Saudi exports are hydrocarbons, the Saudi trade total is affected greatly by rises and falls in the prices of oil and gas. vi. While the UAE has had an increasing need for imports to supply its domestic market, a significant part of this increase appears to be accounted for by goods destined for re-export (mainly for Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia). The UAE, therefore, now serves as a trading emporium for wider Gulf trade. b. The Share of Gulf Trade Conducted with Each of the Gulf’s Main Trading Partners (China, India, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and the United States) The following trends and realities emerge from the data: i. Throughout the past two decades (and longer) the European Union has had the largest share of Gulf trade, followed by Japan. The European Union continues to have a long lead on its closest competitor (Japan), with EU trade with the Gulf at about 50% more than Japanese trade in 2009, and 29% more in 2010 (Tables 5 and 6). The importance of EU trade is increased by its composition: 65% of this trade in 2009 consisted of EU exports to the Gulf and not imports from the Gulf. The comparative imports-to-exports figures for the United States, Japan, and South Korea were 49%, 25%, and 25%, respectively (Table 9). Whereas a large part of Japanese and South Korean trade with the Gulf has taken the form of those countries importing large quantities of oil, the EU and the United States have been more successful in creating balanced economic relationships in which the Gulf states constitute important markets for EU/U.S. goods. ii.

The growth of EU, Japanese, U.S. and (to a lesser extent) South Korean trade with the Gulf since 2000 has all been below the overall average of growth in world trade with the Gulf. This comes across most clearly in the figures for the percentage increases in trade between 2005 and 2009 (Table 10, first column). The percentage increases for the latter period were: EU 9%, Japan 0%, the United States 8%, and South Korea 36%, while the average increase in global Gulf trade was 38%. Notable here is the 0% increase registered by Japan. It can be noted that over the 2000-2008 period, the increase in Japanese trade with the Gulf looked more positive (Table 10, third column). This, however, is 7


misleading. In 2008 Japan imported a larger-than-usual quantity of oil from the Gulf at a time when the prices were very high. The latter phenomenon can be appreciated by contrasting the figure for Japanese trade in 2008 with those for 2005 and 2009 (Table 7). The 2010 figures show a significant increase in Japanese trade with the Gulf, but it remains to be seen whether this will be sustained (Table 6).

iii. China and India (as of 2009) are now the Gulf’s third and fourth largest trade partners, displacing the United States and South Korea from these positions. In 2009, the United States stood sixth in the ranking (Table 7). In 2010 it moved up to fifth, overtaking South Korea, but the long- term trend has been for South Korean trade with the Gulf to increase more rapidly than U.S. trade. iv.

The growth in China’s and India’s trade with the Gulf since 2000 has been phenomenal. The remarkable percentage increase over the 2000- 2008 period (Table 10, column 3) is partly attributable to the relatively low levels of trade the two countries had with the Gulf before 2000, but the high increase after 2005 is more reflective of future trends. In both cases, the increases have been manyfold greater than the increases in EU, U.S., Japanese, or South Korean trade with the Gulf.

v. The growth in India’s Gulf trade has been even more substantial than China’s. This runs counter to the common perception in which attention is usually focused on China’s growing share of the market. Over the critical 2005-2009 period, India’s Gulf trade rose by 314%, while China’s rose by 107% (Table 10, column 1). The overall increase in the Gulf’s global trade over this period was 38%. Both India and China, therefore, recorded huge increases, but that of India was significantly greater. In 2010 India’s Gulf trade, for the first time since the 1990s, overtook that of China – although only by a narrow margin (Table 6). vi. China and India are now substantial exporters to the Gulf as well as importers from it (Table 8). As with the EU and the United States, they (especially China) have established substantial markets for their own goods in the Gulf states. The economic relationships, therefore, are not shaped solely around their need for oil but involve a more symbiotic set of exchanges. This, indeed, is part of the economic strategy the Chinese government has been pursuing in the Gulf region since the 1990s. Such relationships are likely to have dynamics that sustain them in the long term, which may be lacking in relationships based on the export/import of a single commodity. vii. India is the only one of the six Gulf trading partners covered here to have a more substantial trading relationship with the UAE than with Saudi Arabia. The size of India-UAE trade in 2009 was more than twice that with Saudi Arabia (Table 5). In view of the rapid rise of the UAE’s 8


share in Gulf trade, this has significance for the future. The 2010 statistics show that the EU has for the first time been displaced as the UAE’s largest trading partner, with India now occupying that position. The margin by which India leads the field, moreover, is substantial. c. Southeast Asian Countries’ Gulf Trade in Comparative Perspective (relative to each other and relative to the Gulf’s major trading partners). The following trends and realities emerge from the data: i.

The four Southeast Asian countries that account for the major part of Southeast Asia’s trade with the Gulf collectively make up a relatively limited share of Gulf trade. This share, at about 7%, has remained fairly constant over the period since 2005. The share was a bit higher in 2000, but had been lower in 1990 (Tables 1-6).

ii. Throughout the period since 1990, Singapore has had the biggest share of the Gulf trade. Up to 2000, in fact, Singapore accounted for more Gulf trade than all of the three other countries put together (Tables 1-6). iii. Singapore’s lead over the other Southeast Asian states, however, has been steadily weakening in the period since 2000. The percentage increases in Singaporean trade with the Gulf have all been below the global average increases in Gulf trade, through all three of the time periods covered in Table 10. The other Southeast Asian states have all exceeded the global average increases. Over the critical 2005 2009 period the percentage increase in Singapore’s Gulf trade came to 13%, whereas those for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand stood at 33%, 67%, and 50%, respectively (Table 10). Singaporean trade with the Gulf in 2009 came to $26.1 billion, while Thai trade with the Gulf came to $21.1 billion. In 2010 there was significant growth in both Malaysian and Thai trade with the Gulf (Table 10). If recent trends continue, it seems likely that Thailand-Gulf trade will overtake Singapore-Gulf trade in the next few years. iv. Most of Singapore’s trade with the Gulf consists of oil imports. In fact, only 23% of the trade consists of Singaporean exports to the Gulf, whereas the comparative percentages for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are 38%, 67%, and 33%, respectively (Table 9). This is, perhaps, not surprising, given that Singapore has no oil production of its own – unlike Malaysia, Indonesia, and to a small extent Thailand – and therefore relies on substantial oil imports. Nonetheless, both Thailand and (less so) Malaysia are now more substantial exporters to the Gulf than is Singapore. v. Singapore fits into the pattern of the other industrial and newly- industrialized countries covered in the previous section: still occupying a leading position in the (in this case Southeast Asian) grouping, but 9


gradually losing share to the industrializing countries in the same grouping.

vi. Indonesia’s Gulf trade may now be set for rapid expansion. It is clear from the statistics that Indonesia’s Gulf trade has lagged behind that of the other four Southeast Asian states covered here. There is reason to believe, however, that this could soon change. The 2010 statistics show a substantial rise in Indonesian trade with Saudi Arabia and a significant rise in trade with the UAE. This reflects the potential of, and changes in, the Indonesian economy: a growth rate of close to 6% per annum over the past five years; a large population to underpin a broadly-based industrialization; and a growing need for imported oil (with Indonesia’s oil demand now significantly exceeding its domestic oil supply). The latter characteristics are reminiscent (but not identical) to those that applied to China and India when their Gulf trades first began to expand rapidly. What emerges from the analysis in a, b, and c is that while there is a shift in the balance of the Gulf’s global trade, with the Asian side of the balance strengthening against the Western, the most significant trend lies outside the scope of a West/Asia dichotomy. This trend involves industrialized countries, whether Western or Asian, suffering losses in their share of Gulf trade, while industrializing countries (most significantly China and India) gain a rapidly expanding proportion of it. The industrialized Asian countries have found themselves in a similar position to that of the EU and the United States, though the EU, despite its declining share, remains the Gulf’s strongest trading partner overall. The Strategic Base: Oil The interest and involvement of most external powers in the Gulf region is, of course, closely tied to oil needs. While it would be wrong to neglect other economic, political, and strategic considerations, the latter would be different in character if the Gulf possessed no oil. It is, therefore, worth comparing and contrasting the present and future oil requirements of the various Asian countries. China’s need for increased supplies of oil has been given considerable attention by outside observers. This need is substantial and is likely to become more so. China is itself a major producer of oil – in 2008 it ranked as the fifth largest in the world. Nonetheless, its demand for oil first exceeded supply in 1993, and its dependence on imported oil has increased steadily since then. In 2009, oil imports for the first time exceeded local production, accounting for 52% of the oil consumed in the country, and the percentage accounted for by imports is expected to rise to 54% in 2010.1 1

China Briefing, 13 February 2010. Available at at http://www.china-briefing.com.


Chinese oil production is expected to begin to decline after 2020, at which time oil imports are expected to account for about 64% of consumption. Between 2010 and 2030 China will need, according to International Energy Agency estimates, to import an extra seven million barrels-a-day (b/d) on top of the 3.8 million it was importing in 2009.2 There are many reasons why obtaining the extra seven million may be problematic. Other rapidly industrializing countries will also be looking to increase their oil imports, and some analysts believe that global oil production has little potential to increase significantly above the approximately 86 million b/d produced at the time of writing. Levels of investment in the oil industry may also be insufficient to support increased production (in part because with higher prices, oil producers have less incentive or need to accelerate the depletion of their oil reserves). Of course, the Gulf is not the only area from which China will be able to draw supplies. At present (2011) Angola is the second largest supplier of oil to China, and that supply is likely to increase in the future. There is also potential in other parts of Africa, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and in new areas where oil exploration has recently appeared promising, such as off the coast of Brazil. In some regions China may be able to access oil supplies that Western countries are unable to access for political, geographical, or environmental reasons. Nonetheless, the reality is that most of China’s additional oil supply will have to come from the Gulf. This is not only because almost two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves are located there (with depletion dates outstripping those of all other producers), but also because the gap between local consumption needs and production capacity are greater in the Gulf than elsewhere – despite the fact that consumption is rising quickly in Gulf countries. The Gulf producers, then, will have more oil to sell on international markets than other producers. The dependence on Gulf oil also applies to India. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) statistics, India was consuming some three million b/d of oil in 2009, compared to the eight million consumed by China. Whereas China was itself producing 3.9 million b/d, however, India was only producing 880,000 b/d, such that imports accounted for 70% of India’s oil supply as opposed to 52% of China’s. The 2009 EIA International Energy Outlook estimates that India will be consuming an extra two million b/d of oil by 2030, while China will be consuming an extra seven million. Both countries are therefore in need of substantially increased quantities of oil, and it seems likely that a significant amount will need to come from the Gulf. The extent to which world oil production will be able to expand to meet such substantial increases in demand is a contentious issue. Specialists, oil companies, and international energy organizations have conflicting views about the stage at which the world will encounter “peak oil.” 2

Similar figures are produced by the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA). See EIA, “Short-

term Energy Outlook,” Washington, D.C.: U.S.-EIA, March 2009, Section 3a. 10

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While it may seem that China and India are destined to be in severe competition over Gulf oil, in fact the situation is little different from that which affects many other countries (in Asia as elsewhere). Japan has very limited domestic reserves of oil and a high (although falling) demand for it; South Korea has no domestic reserves at all. The economies of many other countries are, and will for long remain, dependent on Gulf oil, and the global community has a collective interest in ensuring that Gulf oil is accessible to all who need it. As far as Southeast Asia is concerned, each of the countries has a different balance between demand for, and domestic supply of, oil. Figures for 2009 will be given here. Only Singapore relies entirely on imports to cover its oil consumption (927 million b/d); only Malaysia produces more oil than it consumes (578 million b/d, as against 554 million); Indonesia has relatively small oil import needs at present (with production at 946 million b/d and consumption at 1,268 million); and Thailand relies mainly on imports (with production at 238 million b/d and consumption at 940 million). EIA projections for the growth of oil consumption in the region are that by 2035 oil consumption will have doubled while oil production will have declined. The quantities of oil concerned, however, are relatively limited, giving these countries more flexibility over sourcing their oil supplies than India and China have. The Political Dimension: Southeast Asia in Comparative Context The writer has covered elsewhere the political and strategic implications of China’s growing economic involvement in the Gulf.3 This writing has shown that, although China possesses a number of apparent advantages over the major Western powers when developing relations with Gulf states, each of these apparent advantages is shadowed by possible disadvantages inherent within it. First, China lacks the “historical baggage” carried by the major Western powers. There is no significant overhang of sensitivities inherited from the imperial past. On the other hand, China’s lack of historical baggage leaves Gulf countries without the cultural and human links to China that characterize their relations with Western countries. Second, China carries no “political baggage.” It projects its primary concern as mutually beneficial commercial interactions. Whereas the Gulf states’ relations with Western countries can be bedeviled by the interlacing of strategic, political, and economic interests, Gulf relations with China appear straightforward and transparent. On the other hand, Western strategic and political involvement in the Gulf region has arisen, in formal terms, by invitation and not by imposition. Gulf rulers have themselves asked for it, usually to ensure the


security of their regimes. Moreover, the “commerce only” approach may be unattractive to popular groupings pursuing civil rights agendas in the region. It could be taken to imply that China’s concern is narrowly focused on its own self-interest, showing disregard for the rights and interests of local populations. Third, China projects “mutual dependence” in its external relations, emphasizing therewith the sovereign equality of the states concerned. The phrase “mutual dependence” is found in most of the major agreements signed between China and the Gulf states. Western powers, in contrast, have tended to perceive dependence as weakness. To maintain their global leadership, they deem it necessary to downplay dependence. Policies of energy diversification are projected as a means to dilute feared dependence on Gulf oil. The Chinese approach is more attractive to Gulf governments. The degree to which this approach can remain credible, however, is questionable. As China’s role on the global stage expands, the notion of mutual dependence is likely to become less credible.4 There is a considerable overlap in the factors shaping and underpinning China’s engagement in the Gulf region with that of India and Southeast Asia. The dimensions covered above will now be discussed with specific reference to India and Southeast Asia. The “no historical baggage” factor is, in some respects, even more beneficial to India and Southeast Asia than it is to China. India and Southeast Asia benefit from the same perceived lack of complicity in the imperial oppression of the region, being seen to varying extents as victims of imperialism. The image of India as a fellow victim that emerged successfully from past travails was strengthened by India’s leading role in creating and shaping the nonaligned movement of the 1950s and 1960s – fostering the values and ambitions of the rising generations of the Gulf at that time. At the same time India has a prolonged history of cultural, economic, and population contact with the region. Its culture and mores are not alien in the way that China’s may seem. The same applies, to different extents, to the countries of Southeast Asia. The links between the Gulf states and Malaysia and Indonesia, in particular, are buttressed by their shared Islamic culture and by the historical contacts through which Islam was carried to that part of Asia. The “no political baggage” factor, as it relates to India, is rather more complex. In comparison with the Western powers, there is no doubt that Indian engagement in the region is less problematic. India has not been 4

For some of the literature that feeds into this analysis, see Jon B. Alterman and John W.

Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States and the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2008); Ben Simpfendorfer, The New Silk Road: How a Rising Arab World is Turning

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See, in particular, Tim Niblock, “China’s Growing Involvement in the Gulf: The Geopolitical

Away from the West and Rediscovering China (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009);

Significance,” in Simon Shen and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, eds., Multidimensional

and Geoffrey Kemp, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the

Diplomacy of Contemporary China (New York: Lexington Books, 2010), 207-231.

Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

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complicit in supporting one Gulf country against another nor in using its military strength to protect its interests in the region. At the same time, there is a stronger short-term and medium-term potential for India to pursue a political agenda in the Gulf, and this has both advantages and disadvantages. India is a regional power in the Gulf/Indian Ocean in a sense that China is not (although a close collaborative relationship with Pakistan could no doubt enhance its Indian Ocean presence). The rapid development of India’s naval capacity in the Indian Ocean, with the addition of the aircraft carriers, frigates, destroyers, submarines and corvettes that are due to come into service in the early and middle part of this decade, give India a potential role in the “defense of the sea-lanes” to and from the Gulf – which China will not have (nor, given China’s primary security concerns in East Asia and the Western Pacific, would it want to). By 2030, India’s naval presence in and near the Gulf may well exceed that of Western nations. For Gulf governments, the prospective of an Indian role in maintaining the security of the region has some attraction. There is less likelihood that it will be seen by Western powers (especially the United States) as potentially conflictual, so Gulf governments could probably develop strategic links with India without the Western world deeming this threatening or controversial. There are, however, three dimensions that might complicate such a policy being pursued. First, the combination of external strategic dependence on India with the very substantial domestic presence of an Indian population in the Gulf (with Indians currently composing around 40% of the population in the UAE and significant proportions elsewhere) would raise concerns within the Gulf about future sovereignty. Second, a stronger strategic presence would involve India in inter-state rivalries in the Gulf, with the danger that India would find itself forced to take sides (with all the complications this has raised for Western powers). India’s interests seem, at present, to be well served by seeking good relations with all (as are China’s). Third, Pakistan’s involvement in the Gulf states (with a strong presence in some of the armed forces, longstanding religious/cultural links, military cooperation agreements, and a large migrant labor community) could create destructive competitive dynamics. Gulf states would be reluctant to become involved in these. As with China, India’s major political gains, therefore, may be most substantial when not allied too closely to a possible strategic role.


CONCLUSION What emerges from this paper is that the Gulf is linked to other parts of Asia by many dimensions of connectivity. The Gulf states are now, without doubt, becoming more integrated into an Asian framework than they have been in the past. To see this as a move toward the eclipse of Western interests in the region, however, would be misleading. The most fundamental change is represented by the reduced share of trade taken by industrialized countries and the increased share taken by two industrializing countries: India and China. Rather than focusing on the West to East shift, it is more useful to focus on the manner in which the different Asian countries relate to the Gulf and how this may impinge on the position of established interests there. Politically and strategically, the interests of all Asian states may be best served by broadening the security frameworks that guarantee access to Gulf oil. A Gulf environment in which the region’s security is handled by the Gulf states themselves, rather than by the engagement of external powers, would be in the interests of all. Anything that non-Middle Eastern Asian countries can do to promote the development of regional security structures in the Gulf would be beneficial.

For Southeast Asia, the “no political baggage” argument is much more clear-cut, in so far as there is little if any basis on which devious political objectives could be suspected. On “mutual dependence” and “credibility,” much the same can be said about India and Southeast Asia as has been said above about China. These factors are, however, of less significance relating to Southeast Asia, as the prospect of a political role is not likely.

14

15



TABLE 1: 1990 GULF TRADE (GENERAL) Bahrain Saudi UAE Arabia

$ billion

Qatar Oman Kuwait

Iraq

Iran

TOTAL

Bahrain Saudi UAE Arabia

$ billion

Qatar Oman Kuwait

Iraq

Iran

TOTAL

China

0.0

0.5

0.6

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.2

1.3

China

0.3

15.6

11.5

0.9

4.5

1.6

1.8

8.5

44.9

India

0.1

1.3

1.3

0.1

0.1

0.5

0.4

0.6

4.4

India

0.4

3.2

13.1

1.2

0.8

0.9

0.2

1.6

21.4

Japan

0.3

12.1

9.9

2.2

0.6

2.4

1.1

5.9

33.5

Japan

0.7

40.3

28.2

11.5

3.8

8.2

0.5

10.5

103.8

South Korea

0.1

2.4

1.5

0.2

0.2

0.6

0.0

1.1

6.1

South Korea

0.4

16.8

12.1

8.1

4.1

5.9

0.7

5.3

53.4

EU

0.7

17.3

5.8

0.8

1.3

3.5

5.9

24.6

59.9

EU

2.2

44.2

44.2

3.9

2.5

8.9

7.5

29.1

142.5

US

0.3

11.2

1.9

0.2

0.4

1.0

3.7

0.4

19.1

US

0.8

35.1

10.7

1.5

0.9

6.1

10.3

0.3

66.0

Indonesia

0.0

0.4

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.9

Indonesia

0.1

3.0

1.3

0.1

0.2

1.3

0.1

0.3

6.4

Malaysia

0.0

0.2

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.1

0.6

Malaysia

0.1

1.9

2.7

0.1

0.4

0.4

0.1

0.6

6.3

Singapore

0.0

2.5

1.6

0.1

0.2

0.5

0.0

0.3

5.1

Singapore

0.4

8.4

6.3

2.2

0.5

3.5

0.0

1.7

23.0

Thailand

0.0

0.6

0.6

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.1

0.2

1.8

Thailand

0.2

4.7

6.4

0.7

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.3

13.6

World

4.5

68.5

33.4

4.9

6.8

12.6

16.8

38.0

185.5

22.1

214.3

197.7

35.4

27.3

51.1

30.5

94.1

672.5

Compiled by the writer from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics


World


TABLE 2: 2000 GULF TRADE (GENERAL)

$ billion

Qatar Oman Kuwait

Iraq

Iran

TOTAL


$ billion

Qatar Oman Kuwait

Iraq

Iran

TOTAL

China

0.1

2.0

2.4

0.4

3.2

0.6

0.9

2.2

11.8

China

0.8

40.1

30.1

2.6

12.2

6.5

2.6

26.5

121.4

India

0.3

1.9

2.5

0.2

0.2

0.7

0.1

0.7

6.6

India

1.9

27.1

49.1

3.8

2.0

10.9

9.2

15.3

119.3

Japan

0.4

16.0

15.9

5.6

2.8

5.2

0.6

5.5

52.0

Japan

1.4

54.9

54.5

21.5

7.4

16.1

1.6

18.7

176.1

South Korea

0.3

9.8

5.5

2.1

1.6

2.7

0.7

2.9

25.6

South Korea

0.8

36.5

23.8

13.5

6.9

11.8

4.2

12.2

109.7

EU

1.3

23.3

11.6

1.3

1.1

5.0

5.0

13.1

66.7

EU

3.6

64.1

58.7

12.4

4.4

14.5

15.1

39.2

212.0

US

0.8

18.8

3.6

0.7

0.4

3.5

5.8

0.3

33.9

US

1.4

65.5

18.5

2.6

2.0

9.7

23.3

0.8

124.8

Indonesia

0.0

1.9

0.7

0.0

0.0

0.8

0.1

0.2

3.7

Indonesia

0.3

5.7

2.3

0.2

0.1

1.8

0.3

1.0

10.7

Malaysia

0.0

0.9

0.6

0.1

0.4

0.1

0.0

0.2

2.3

Malaysia

0.2

3.2

6.4

0.5

1.0

0.9

0.2

1.5

13.9

Singapore

0.0

4.1

1.9

0.9

0.3

1.4

0.0

1.4

10.0

Singapore

0.3

14.3

10.3

6.9

1.0

6.2

0.0

1.9

40.9

Thailand

0.0

1.3

2.1

0.3

1.0

0.4

0.3

0.5

5.9

Thailand

0.3

8.7

12.8

2.4

2.9

0.6

0.5

0.9

29.1

11.3

105.4

66.3

14.8

15.7

26.1

18.3

41.3

299.2

41.1

419.4

395.1

83.6

58.1

104.3

78.0

189.5

1370.0

World


16

TABLE 3: 2005 GULF TRADE (GENERAL)

World


17




$ billion

Qatar Oman Kuwait

Iraq

Iran

TOTAL

TABLE 7: 1990-2009 GULF TRADE TOTALS

1990

$ billion

2000

2005

2008

2009

China

0.7

31.3

22.9

2.2

5.7

4.9

5.0

20.7

93.4

China

1.3

11.8

44.9

121.4

93.4

India

0.8

17.4

36.7

4.4

3.4

7.6

5.8

11.8

87.9

India

4.4

6.6

21.4

119.3

87.9

Japan

1.0

31.5

27.9

16.2

5.7

9.5

1.6

10.3

103.7

Japan

33.5

52.0

103.8

South Korea

0.6

22.2

13.9

9.0

4.3

8.0

4.3

9.6

71.9

6.1

25.6

53.4

EU

3.1

44.7

43.1

12.2

3.7

9.3

12.1

27.8

156.0

EU

59.9

66.7

142.5

US

1.2

33.0

14.7

3.4

2.0

5.7

10.8

0.4

71.2

US

19.1

33.9

66.0

124.8

71.2

Indonesia

0.1

3.9

1.6

0.3

0.1

1.4

0.0

0.9

8.3

Indonesia

0.9

3.7

6.4

10.7

8.3

Malaysia

0.2

1.9

4.7

0.9

0.6

0.4

0.2

1.0

9.9

Malaysia

0.6

2.3

6.3

13.9

9.9

Singapore

0.4

8.2

7.9

4.4

0.7

2.6

0.0

1.9

26.1

Singapore

5.1

10.0

23.0

40.9

26.1

Thailand

0.2

5.7

8.8

1.9

2.3

0.7

0.3

1.2

21.1

Thailand

1.8

5.9

13.6

29.1

21.1

32.3

265.5

269.8

69.0

42.0

66.0

59.1

134.7

938.4

World

South Korea

176.1 103.7 109.7

71.9

212.0 156.0




$ billion

Qatar Oman Kuwait

Iran

TOTAL

$ billion


Qatar Oman Kuwait

Iraq

Iran

TOTAL

China

1.1

41.3

27.3

3.2

9.9

8.1

9.7

18.8

119.4

China

0.5

9.2

20.5

1.0

0.9

1.7

2.0

8.7

44.5

India

0.9

23.7

50.3

5.8

5.1

10.2

8.4

15.2

119.6

India

0.3

4.1

22.7

0.6

1.1

0.8

0.5

2.1

32.2

Japan

1.2

39.7

34.7

21.0

7.5

10.9

3.5

12.4

130.9

Japan

0.5

5.9

7.1

1.8

2.7

1.4

0.3

1.8

21.5

South Korea

0.6

24.3

15.0

10.0

4.8

9.0

4.3

10.3

78.3

South Korea

0.3

4.2

5.5

1.4

0.6

0.8

0.9

4.4

18.1

EU

2.7

48.7

42.1

16.0

4.3

9.3

11.8

32.6

167.5

EU

2.6

30.1

38.4

8.1

3.1

5.7

4.1

16.0

108.1

US

1.8

42.4

13.9

3.9

1.9

8.1

13.3

0.3

85.6

US

0.7

11.9

13.3

3.0

1.2

2.1

2.0

0.3

34.5

Indonesia

0.2

5.2

2.1

0.6

0.3

1.3

0.1

1.2

11.0

Indonesia

0.0

1.1

1.4

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.6

3.4

Malaysia

0.3

2.4

5.7

1.1

0.7

0.5

0.2

1.3

12.2

Malaysia

0.1

0.9

3.1

0.6

0.5

0.2

0.2

0.8

6.4

Singapore

0.3

11.1

10.0

5.2

0.9

2.6

0.0

2.4

32.5

Singapore

0.1

0.8

4.1

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.0

0.7

6.3

Thailand

0.3

7.5

11.1

2.2

2.8

0.8

0.5

0.8

26.0

Thailand

0.2

2.0

2.7

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.9

7.3

40.7

330.7

321.3

87.6

55.9

81.7

74.7

World

9.2

92.8

152.0

22.8

17.9

19.1

23.7

60.0

397.5

World


18

Iraq

TABLE 8: 2009 GULF IMPORTS

172.6 1165.2


19



TABLE 9: 2009 PERCENTAGE OF IMPORTS IN GULF TRADE, BY TRADING PARTNER

TABLE 10: PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN GULF TRADE, BY TRADING PARTNERS

2009

China

48%

China

107%

166%

908%

India

38%

India

314%

462%

1600%

Japan

25%

South Korea

25%

EU

65%

US

49%

Indonesia Malaysia Singapore

23%

Thailand

33%

World

43%

2005-9

2005-10

2000-8

Japan

0%

26%

238%

South Korea

36%

47%

323%

EU

9%

17%

217%

US

8%

29%

213%

38%

Indonesia

33%

72%

173%

67%

Malaysia

67%

91%

600%

Singapore

13%

41%

310%

Thailand

50%

91%

383%

World

38%

73%

359%


CHART 1: 2009 GULF IMPORTS, BY TRADING PARTNER

GRAPH 1: 1990-2009 GULF TRADE BY PARTNER COUNTRIES

120

250

$ Billion

$ Billion


100

200 80

80

50 60 100 40 50

20

0

0 China

20

India

Japan

South Korea

EU

US

Indonesia

Malaysia

Singapore

Thailand

1990

2000

2005

2008

2009

China

India

Japan

South Korea

EU

US

Indonesia

Malaysia

Singapore

Thai

21


Turning East: The Social and Cultural Implications of the Gulf’s Increasingly Strong Economic and Strategic Relations with China Jacqueline M. Armijo and Lina M. Kassem1

Although scholars had long believed that trade between the port cities of the Gulf and the southeast coast of China had flourished from the early days of Islam, it was not until 1998 that evidence appeared not only documenting this early trade, but also revealing the extent of the trade. The shipwrecked remains of a traditional Gulf dhow was discovered off the Indonesian island of Belitung. The small ship had made its way to China, and was on its way back to the Gulf fully stocked with goods when it went down. In 2011, a selection of the 60,000 surviving artifacts from the dhow went on display at the ArtScience Museum in Singapore.2 As one walked through the display of Chinese ceramics, porcelain, and finely crafted gold and silver works, one couldn’t help but be amazed by the beauty of the objects, the range of aesthetic sensibilities they represent, and the extraordinary fact of their very existence. These objects, which date from the early 820s, had survived over a millennium submerged in the waters of the Java Sea. These pieces were destined for the major entrepôts of the Gulf in the ninth century: Siraf and Basra. The mass produced ceramic bowls were probably bound for the souqs of Baghdad and Shiraz, whereas the exquisitely fine carved silver and gold pieces may have been intended for the royal courts of the Abbasid empire. When the captain of the hand-sewn dhow3 set off for China, he must have been well aware of the goods available for manufacture there, as many of them appear to have been commissioned with certain regional tastes in mind. The small boat, only 60 feet in length, held over 70,000 objects carefully stored in large earthenware jugs that were tightly packed in layers of rows along the bottom of the boat. 1

This research is based on fieldwork carried out by Armijo in the UAE (2003-2010) and Qatar

(2009-2012), and by Armijo and Kassem in Yiwu, China (November 2010). 2

The exhibit, entitled “Shipwrecked: Tang Treasures and Monsoon Winds,” was jointly

curated by the Smithsonian’s Freer-Sackler Gallery and the Asian Civilizations Museum of Singapore. 3

The dhow is believed to have been built in one of the seaports of the Gulf. Like other

traditional dhows, this one was constructed without the use of nails.

22


Today, after almost 1,200 years, ships (though of a much larger size) are once again setting off from the port cities of China, stacked with layers of rows of containers packed with goods custom-made in China for the markets of the Gulf. This redux of the maritime Silk Route is just one of the dimensions of the rapidly expanding economic, strategic, political, and cultural ties between the countries of the Gulf and China. Over the past five years, ties between these countries have grown exponentially. And although trade relations were initially based on China’s need to secure long-term sources of energy, other financial opportunities have flourished. China has not only found a vast marketplace for its consumer and manufactured goods, but the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have found a source of engineering expertise, investment funding, and a massive labor force supply for their extensive construction, transportation infrastructure, and energy development projects. More recently, the Gulf has sought to diversify its investments by shifting away from the United States and Europe and toward Asia in general and China in particular. At the same time, the Chinese state has also sought to diversify its investment strategy to include funding increasing numbers of major projects in the Gulf. In May 2011, China-GCC economic trade was estimated to have reached $100 billion, a ten-fold increase from a decade earlier. UAE Foreign Minister Shaykh Abdullah bin Zayed predicted that – given the range and scale of current investments and projects – over the next decade the total amount of trade could increase ten-fold again, reaching a trillion dollars. What are the potential social and cultural implications of this major development in economic ties? Will these societies have any impact on each other, as growing numbers of investors, traders, workers, educators, and tourists travel back and forth? And what will be the long-term impacts of the major efforts by each region to promote a broader understanding of each other’s culture? At present, at least a quarter of a million Chinese are working in the countries of the Gulf in a wide range of fields. The majority are construction workers, but there are increasing numbers of businesspeople, service industry workers, factory workers, retail workers, engineers, teachers, investors, pirated DVD door-to-door saleswomen, and other entrepreneurs. The largest community is in Dubai, home of DragonMart, the largest retail center of Chinese manufactured goods outside of China. This community is large enough to support several Chinese language newspapers. These days, Chinese can be overheard throughout the UAE (where over 200,000 Chinese live), and increasingly throughout the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iraq. At the same time, Gulf trade officials and businessmen are traveling to China to set up massive industrial and real estate projects and source vast 23


quantities of manufactured goods. In addition, increasing numbers of students, especially from Saudi Arabia, are pursuing language studies and advanced degrees in China to facilitate even closer ties between industries. These increasing economic ties have recently been accompanied by the investment of billions of dollars by both China and the Gulf countries to promote closer cultural ties between their respective populations. These efforts are especially noteworthy as they involve tackling one of the most challenging language barriers in the world: that between Chinese and Arabic. Perhaps not the most successful, but clearly the most ambitious, is China’s development of CCTV-Arabic. Inaugurated in July 2009 at an estimated cost of over $8 billion, this television network carries around-theclock Arabic language programming. The programs are mostly news and culture oriented, with either Chinese anchors speaking Arabic or Chinese programs with Arabic subtitles. Qatar-based Al Jazeera (both the Arabic and English stations) has also done its part to inform the Arab world about China by establishing a bureau office in Beijing and providing extensive coverage of China to its viewers. Some of the other major recent cultural exchanges include the establishment of a Chinese language immersion primary school in Abu Dhabi in 2006; the setting of up of two Confucius Institutes in the UAE; and the expansion of the recently renamed Shaykh Zayed Center for Islamic and Arabic Studies at the Beijing Foreign Studies University. Before examining several of the most important dimensions of the rapidly expanding ties between the major countries of the Gulf and China, it is important to remember that the origins of their relations date back over 2,000 years. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The earliest documented contacts between China and the peoples of Central Asia and the Middle East occurred during the reign of Emperor Han Wudi (B.C.E. 140-87), when Chinese general Zhang Qian returned from a tenyear mission to Central Asia. He brought back with him information about that part of the world, including Parthia and the Seleucid Empire. As a result of these new contacts, China began to send envoys to Parthia on a regular basis and at least one return envoy was sent from Parthia to China. Growing diplomatic ties between these imperial powers at opposite ends of Asia facilitated their efforts to promote trade by improving the quality of the roads and protecting travelers along the rapidly developing Silk Road routes. Although it was the Chinese who opened the land route across Asia, the first significant progress on the sea route between east and west Asia was made by the Roman Empire. Hippalus, a navigator from Alexandria living 24


in the first century C.E., is credited with having discovered how to use the regularity of the monsoon winds to sail to India. Other navigators soon figured out how to use the monsoon winds to sail farther, past India and on toward the islands of Southeast Asia, and then north along the South China Sea to the flourishing Chinese seaport of Guangzhou (Canton). As the Persian Sassanian Dynasty (226-651 C.E.) expanded, its influence spread along both land and sea routes, and with their increasing navigation skills, the Persians dominated the sea trade to the Indian Ocean and beyond. Their frequent tribute/trade missions to the Chinese court have been well documented in Chinese sources. These envoys were expected to present their credentials, together with a token amount of valuable goods from their homelands. In return for acknowledging China’s preeminent role in world, the envoys were given large quantities of Chinese goods to take back with them, both as gifts to their rulers as well as for trade. These trade/diplomatic exchanges were highly profitable for all parties involved. As the Chinese Tang Empire (618-907) expanded west toward Central Asia, trade across Asia was greatly facilitated, and the capital city Chang’an (present day Xi’an) flourished as no other place on earth had up to that time. The population rose to one million and included people from all over China as well as the rest of Asia. As both the main departure and arrival point of the Silk Road, Chang’an became a place of constant movement and a myriad of influences, with a continuous stream of humanity passing through on a daily basis. Culinary, artistic, musical, clothing, and hairstyle tastes mingled and evolved and then spread outward again. Chang’an also became a meeting point of religions, with followers of Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Nestorian Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, and other traditions setting up communities and places of worship. The hundreds of thousands of merchants who passed through over the centuries acted as a conduit for not only goods, but also ideas, technologies, tastes, and perhaps a view on the benefits of a cosmopolitan society. There were two major markets in Chang’an during this period: the West Market and the East Market. The West Market was huge, covering an area of over 200 acres, and it included thousands of businesses. It was famous for being the center of international trade, with many stores specializing in foreign items that were popular among China’s rapidly growing middle classes. In addition, this market was the focal point of Chang’an’s large foreign population, and many of its establishments were geared toward them. There was even a famous section known as the Persian bazaar. Not only were there small shops selling a range of goods, there were also eateries, wine shops, and teahouses catering to foreign residents and travelers. Despite the early strength of the Tang Dynasty, by the latter half of the dynasty growing unrest on the empire’s western borders increasingly 25


disrupted trade. As a result, traders began to shift away from the overland Silk Road to the maritime Silk Routes. The advantages of the maritime Silk Routes soon became evident. Not only were these routes safer, but ships could transport much larger quantities of goods more quickly than the slow and cumbersome camel caravans. Meanwhile, at the other end of the Silk Routes, al-Mansur (r. 754-775), the second caliph of the Abbasid Dynasty (750-1258/61), decided to build his new capital along the banks of the Tigris River. Among the many advantages of this location was its access to the Gulf, thus facilitating trade. According to al-Tabari, al-Mansur is said to have proclaimed about his choice of location for the new capital, “This is the Tigris. There is no obstacle between us and China. Everything in the sea can come to us from it.”4 Clearly trade between these two regions had already become quite developed, but it was not until the discovery of the shipwrecked dhow and its cargo off the coast of Indonesia that the extent of early Gulf-China trade was revealed. The collection of ceramics includes items from several major centers of ceramic production in different regions of China. Among the surviving ceramic items are a few blue and white pieces that predate the more famous blue and white Chinese porcelain that became famous five centuries later. In both cases the source of the blue was cobalt from Iran, which means that the cobalt must have first made its way to China and then been incorporated into local ceramic production. It wasn’t only silks, ceramics, and luxury goods that were imported from China during this period. It is widely believed that in 751, when the Arab Muslim army defeated Tang Chinese forces at the Battle of Talas (in presentday Kyrgyzstan), among the Chinese prisoners brought to Samarqand were ones who knew how to make paper. Papermaking techniques quickly spread throughout the rest of the Muslim world. The introduction of this technology greatly facilitated the production of manuscripts and books, as paper was both sturdier than papyrus and less costly than parchment/ vellum. During this period major translation projects involving classical scientific and philosophical manuscripts were taking place at centers of learning throughout the Muslim world, and the introduction of paper had a major impact on ensuring the transmission and further development of earlier knowledge. Trade along the maritime routes continued over the next several centuries, but it was during the Mongol rule of China (1260-1368) that a significant increase in all manner of exchange between the western and eastern ends of Asia took place. The rapid rise of the Mongolian Empire resulted in a 4

George F. Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 63.

26


period of unprecedented trade and the transfer of peoples, ideas, technologies, and goods from the Gulf and Eastern Europe across Central Asia into China and back. Although most of the trade was voluntary, much of the initial mass migration of people from western to eastern Asia was the result of the forced migration of skilled people by the Mongols to assist in the development of their growing empire. Thus, the establishment of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty in China resulted in tens of thousands of Muslims from across Asia being relocated to China. The new emperor Qubilai recruited Muslim architects to design the new capital (later known as Beijing), as well as Muslim hydraulic engineers, military munitions experts, physicians, astronomers, military officials, and civilian officials. In 1271, Qubilai established the Islamic Astronomical Bureau and had an observatory built to meet the specifications required of the Muslim astronomers. Muslim physicians were also appointed to the newly created Medical and Pharmaceutical Bureau. In order to translate the growing number of scientific and medical texts being brought into China, the Muslim Imperial College was established. Arabic and Persian texts were translated into Chinese, and both languages were taught. Qubilai also hired thousands of Arabs, Persians, and Central Asians to help govern the empire. As a result, tens of thousands of Muslims settled in every region of China, with some holding administrative positions and others holding military posts. Today China has a Muslim population of over 20 million, spread out over the entire country, and most of them are the descendants of the Yuan period immigrants. The Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) marked the end of Mongol rule in China and the return to power of the Chinese. The new imperial administration lost no time in reaffirming traditional Chinese culture and the supremacy of Han Chinese. Although the huge foreign resident population was not forced to leave, they were forced to adopt Chinese names, speak Chinese, dress in traditional Chinese clothes, and assimilate as much as possible. The dynasty quickly grew in terms of military strength and economic power, and the Yongle emperor (r. 1402-1424) was persuaded to sponsor an unprecedented commercial and diplomatic naval campaign. These campaigns, led by the legendary Chinese Muslim eunuch Admiral Zheng He (1371-1435), proved so successful they increased in number and size. There were seven expeditions, with the first one departing Nanjing in 1405 and the last one in 1430. China sought to dominate trade in the region, establish a presence, control pirates, and show the might and wealth of its empire to the world. Each expedition lasted between two and three years and involved a fleet of hundreds of ships of varying size. The largest ships were massive (over 400 feet long and 150 feet wide, with up to four decks), with the capacity to transport up to 1,500 tons. According to one estimate, “All the ships of 27


Columbus and da Gama combined could have been stored on a single deck of a single vessel in the fleet that set sail under Zheng He.”5 The early expeditions sailed throughout Southeast Asia, while later expeditions traveled farther across the Indian Ocean to India and Sri Lanka, and then onto the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the east coast of Africa. In addition to bringing back traded goods and exotic animals, these campaigns also often brought back envoys from foreign countries to personally pay tribute to the Chinese emperors in Beijing. As a Muslim, Zheng He was in an excellent position to foster close ties with many of the officials they encountered. According to some accounts he also took the opportunity to make the hajj to Mecca during one of his voyages. Despite the success of the campaigns, with the death of the Yongle emperor in 1424 any interest in sponsoring these massive expeditions also died, and China turned inward and focused on domestic issues for the next two centuries. INTO THE MODERN ERA A cursory survey of trade from the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (1949-present) sees an economy dominated by foreign powers, both Western and Japanese. The defeat of China in the Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860) saw a forced legalization of the sale of opium by foreigners in China, the forcible opening of ports and cities throughout the country for trade, and the establishment of extraterritorial rights for foreign powers and the loss of Hong Kong. Left with little, if any, power to regulate imports or their sale, many local industries collapsed and foreign powers earned millions in profits from the sale of goods in China.


YIWU – ARABS SETTLING IN CHINA AGAIN6 In the 1980s, as China introduced market reform policies, one of the first regions in the country to take advantage of the relaxed restrictions on private enterprise was Yiwu. For centuries Yiwu had developed local industries, as the soil in the area was not very productive. Yiwu wasted no time in reviving its manufacturing traditions and took advantage of its location, situated 150 miles southwest of Shanghai and 100 miles west of the major port city of Ningbo, to quickly build small factories. However, it was not until foreign traders started arriving in the late 1990s that business began to flourish. At present, although Yiwu (with a population of almost two million7) may be known to only a small number of Western scholars of China, it is a household name among homes throughout the Middle East. Yiwu boasts the largest small commodities wholesale market in the world, with 62,000 booths that sell more than a million different products.8 According to recent Chinese government statistics, in 2010 the annual market turnover in Yiwu reached $9.6 billion.9 Over the past few years, Yiwu has become the most important source of manufactured goods for small businessmen from the Middle East. The trickle of Arab and other foreign businessmen and traders who travel to Yiwu to supply their stores back home has grown into a veritable flood. Over 200,000 Arab traders now visit Yiwu each year, and it is estimated that over 20,000 of them have settled there – making Arabs the largest group that Yiwu attracts. 6

In Yiwu, the interviews in Arabic with Arab residents were carried out by Kassem, and the

interviews in Chinese with local Han, Hui, and Uighur residents were carried out by Armijo. 7

Not unlike the situation in the major Gulf countries, in Yiwu more than half of the residents

are not local, but are rather from other regions of China. According to a report in the South

The People’s Republic of China was quick to build up local industry, beginning with light industry and then moving on to various heavy industries. By the late 1970s China was able to begin producing a limited range of simple electronic goods for sale within the country, such as electric fans, small refrigerators, and televisions. And as the reforms implemented by Deng Xiaoping proved effective, China was soon producing increasingly varied and sophisticated electronic goods for export. At the same time, an untold number of inexpensive Chinese manufactured goods were appearing in markets across Asia and parts of Africa.

China Morning Post (Hong Kong), “More than a million migrants outnumber the city’s 716,000 permanent residents, making it one of the mainland’s most cosmopolitan cities.” Will Clem and Chow Chung-yun, “Muslim Enclave in Security Spotlight; As Expo Looms, Eyes Turn to Trading Hub of Yiwu and Its Islamic Population,” South China Morning Post, 27 February 2010. 8

The far-reaching economic benefits of this type of concentrated retail and wholesale market

center have been noticed by others, including the state of Arizona in the United States. In July 2011, a plan to build a similar trade center was announced: “Phoenix Mart is part of a project designed to help the United States benefit from the same business model that

5

Frank Viviano, “China’s Great Armada: Zheng He,” National Geographic – Interactive

Edition, July 2005.

Dragon Mart and ‘YiWu’ represented as economic drivers in Dubai and China.” “International Commerce Center Coming to Casa Grande,” San Tan Valley Today, 15 July 2011. 9

Bi Mingxin, ed., “Yiwu’s Transformation to International Trade Market,” Xinhua, 21

December 2011. Retrieved from the Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 20 March 2012. Available at http://english.gov.cn/2011-12/21/content_2026085.htm.

28

29


How is it that so many small businessmen from the Arab world came to even hear of Yiwu, let alone decide to travel there? One common explanation is that after 9/11 businessmen from the Middle East found it increasingly difficult to obtain visas to travel to the United States and began to look for alternative places to conduct business. At the same time, China had just entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) and was in a much better position to expand its exports around the world. A more likely explanation, however, is the intensification of efforts on the part of the Chinese government to facilitate trade and business transactions for foreign businessmen, with special attention directed toward those from the Arab world. Broad-based Chinese governmental support, combined with a vast supply of inexpensive products and the growing demand for consumer goods from the people of the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular, has created an ideal environment for trade to flourish. The presence of several Arab businessmen in Yiwu who graduated from China’s top universities and who are completely fluent in Chinese has also facilitated the efficient development of trade relations. The first Arab traders to settle in Yiwu were Yemeni, followed by Iraqi and Palestinian traders. Many of these merchants were likely looking for a more stable environment in which to conduct business, but through them the rest of the Middle East soon learned of the opportunities available there. Meanwhile, local merchants were constantly adapting their production to match the needs of the growing demand from the Middle Eastern market. To accommodate the growing Arab population in Yiwu, the local government provided land and resources for preschools, elementary schools, and a community mosque. The city has a large enough Muslim population that two mosques are currently in use. According to the imam of the main mosque, a Hui (Chinese Muslim), most of the Muslims are from the Arab world (particularly the Gulf) and Africa. At present they are using a mosque that was set up in 2004 in a former warehouse. However, a huge new mosque, built entirely with donations from Muslim communities abroad and from within China, is scheduled to be completed in 2012. Since the number of worshipers currently exceeds the capacity of the existing mosque and worshipers have to pray on the sidewalk and street near the building, every Friday the local police help direct traffic in the area. In addition to the foreign Muslims who come from neighboring cities to pray in the mosque, there is a growing number of Chinese Muslims who come and set up tables outside to sell halal meat products and other foods. During Eid prayers, people mingle outside the mosque exchanging “Eid Mubaraks,” and the smell of grilled meat wafts from the stalls nearby. One feels as if one could be anywhere in the Arab world. Further reinforcing the identity of Yiwu as an Arab city, the metropolis plays host to a myriad of Arab restaurants and shisha cafes. Most, however, 30


are centered in the section of town known locally as “Al Maeda,” a name recognizable to not only all the Arab residents, but also to the city’s Chinese taxi drivers. In this neighborhood one hears the rattle of backgammon pieces and traditional Arabic music, as well as the ubiquitous sound of Al Jazeera’s Arabic news channel playing in the background. In addition to these restaurants and cafes, there are also money changers, phone card sellers, travel agents, shipping agents, and bakeries and other shops where Arabs can buy anything they need – from Arabic newspapers to cans of hummus, kanafi and other traditional pastries, shawarma, shisha tobacco, Arabic bread, and more. Ali, an Arab restaurant owner, reflected on all the changes that have happened in Yiwu: “It used to be to very difficult to get Arabic spices. We had to bring them back from Syria with us when we traveled, but now you can find anything you need in Yiwu, from all the spices to halal meat that you can buy from Muslim butchers.”10 All these services and conveniences provided for the comfort of the Arab residents of Yiwu have led to many of them making the decision to settle there. Life has become sufficiently comfortable for Arab businessmen and their families that, as one Palestinian restaurant owner put it, “Yiwu is a beautiful city, and I consider it an Arab city and not a Chinese one. It is really very different than any other place in China… I have lived here for seven and a half years. My wife is Chinese, and our sons were born here. I consider this my home, and I plan to live here for the rest of my life.”11 Of the 20,000 Arabs who have settled in Yiwu many have brought wives from their home country, but many have also married local women. At present, although Gulf Arabs are well represented among the businesspeople who travel to Yiwu for short stays, very few have settled there. Among those companies hoping to attract even more Gulf visitors is American hotel conglomerate Marriott, which in 2010 announced that it would build what will be the most luxurious hotel to date in the city. In its announcement it singled out the UAE as one of its target sources of guests. In addition to attracting Arab residents, Yiwu has also attracted tens of thousands of Chinese Muslims. While in Yiwu in November 2010, I interviewed Uighurs from Xinjiang as well as Hui from virtually every region of China. They had traveled there to take advantage of the range of business opportunities created by the presence of Gulf and Middle Eastern traders. Some worked as translators and negotiators, while others worked as money changers, halal butchers, waitresses, and shisha boys. Arabic schools in Muslim regions of China that once focused on preparing Chinese 10

Personal interview, Yiwu, November 2010.

11

Ibid.

31


Muslims to further their Islamic education have now become a major source of interpreters for Arab businesses. One school in Ningxia (one of the most impoverished regions of China) has decided to focus on providing specialized Arabic instruction for those planning to work in business and tourism.


is much higher. China imports almost one quarter of its oil from the Gulf region, with the largest amounts coming from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran. In 2009, China officially overtook the United States as the largest importer of crude oil from Saudi Arabia (one million barrels a day), and in 2010 China signed an agreement with Qatar that would make it the largest importer of its liquefied natural gas (LNG).

CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN THE GULF Once local entrepreneurs in Yiwu had developed a wide range of products that met the needs of the growing number of traders from the Middle East, the Chinese government decided to further facilitate trade by establishing DragonMart in Dubai. Opened in 2004, this massive 1.2 km long structure houses almost 4,000 stores selling a vast range of goods produced in China, from stationery to electronics, toys, furniture, home and office appliances, and construction tools. As the largest trading center for Chinese goods located outside of China, DragonMart serves the needs of not only buyers and shop owners in the Gulf, but it has also proved popular among traders from the rest of the Middle East as well as Africa and the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries. Following up on the success of DragonMart, in October 2010 “China Mall,” another retail center, opened in Ajman (one of the small emirates of the UAE). Later that same month, “China Mart” opened in Riyadh, with plans for two more to open in Dammam and Jeddah. TRADE, ENERGY SUPPLIES, INVESTMENTS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENTS In the Gulf, one hears almost daily of new developments in the strategic and economic ties linking China to the region. In the construction field China has gone from being an important player in multimillion dollar real estate development projects to being involved in major multibillion dollar infrastructure projects, such as the light rail between Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia and Dubai’s expanding metro system. And China has won contracts to build billions of dollars worth of projects in the Gulf. At the same time Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar have all invested billions of dollars in major development projects in China. Trade between the GCC countries and China has tripled in the past few years to an estimated $107 billion in 2010. And with China-GCC free trade talks currently underway, by 2020 trade could more than triple to $350 billion.12 Not to be forgotten in all of this is oil. At present China is the second largest consumer of oil in the world, and although it is well behind the United States in current consumption, its annual rate of increase of consumption 12

Yazad Darasha, “Dragon Breathes Fire Again: China Uses Three-pronged Strategy to

Become Mideast’s Top Investment Partner,” Gulf News (UAE), 8 August 2010.

32

What follows is a description of a few of the major recent China-GCC projects. KUWAIT – CHINA (DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHED IN 1971) Over the years Kuwait and China have developed a wide range of economic and development ties. Between 1982 and the end of 2001, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development provided China with $620 million of favorable loans.13 In December 2005, the Kuwait China Investment Company was incorporated with an initial fund of $80 million dollars. In September of the following year, the Kuwait Investment Authority announced it had bought $720 million worth of shares in the initial public offering of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. The most recent and most ambitious project so far is the $9 billion dollar Kuwait Petroleum-Sinopec refinery and petrochemical complex in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province. This joint venture includes a 300,000 barrel-a-day refinery, a one million ton-a-year ethylene plant, and related utilities and support facilities. Final approval was received in March of 2011, and construction is expected to start in the first quarter of 2012.14 UAE – CHINA (DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHED IN 1984) Perhaps more so than the other countries of the Gulf, the UAE has developed a range of strategic economic ties with China. As of 2011 there were 3,000 Chinese companies registered in the UAE (compared to about 20 in Saudi Arabia). One of the more important joint ventures includes Dubai Port terminals in China’s main port cities of Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, and Hong Kong. Bilateral trade between the two countries has increased so rapidly over the past few years that it is commonly believed that by 2015 it will reach $100 billion. In 2010, it was estimated to be $25 billion. One of the most important and strategic projects between China and Abu Dhabi is the Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline. Built by the Chinese at a cost of 13

Julian Madsen, “China’s Policy in the Gulf: From Neglect to Necessity,” PINR, 27 October

2006. 14

“Kuwait-China Oil Refinery Project to Start 2012 Q1,” KUNA (Kuwait News Agency),

21 May 2011.

33



$3.3 billion, the pipeline links the Habshan oil field on Abu Dhabi’s coast with the port of Fujairah. Scheduled to be completed by the middle of 2012, the pipeline will travel 250 miles across the UAE from the waters of the Gulf to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the vulnerable Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline will be able to transport 1.5 million barrels of crude oil a day to Fujairah, where it can be loaded onto tankers. There are also plans for a refinery to be built in Fujairah.15

In addition to energy and construction projects, Qatar has also proved to be a major investor in Chinese banking. In 2010, when the initial public offering of shares in the Agricultural Bank of China was made, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) purchased shares presently estimated to be worth $3.5 billion, making it the largest non-state investor in China’s third largest bank.

In an interesting twist, the country with the world’s largest per capita carbon footprint is funding clean technology projects in the country with the world’s highest CO2 emissions. In December 2010, Masdar (Abu Dhabi’s experimental carbon-neutral city and graduate research university project) announced it had a total $540 million to invest in different renewable energy and clean technology projects around the world. Its first major investment was $60 million in a Chinese company specializing in the wind industry. Established in 2006, Masdar represents a huge commitment on the part of Abu Dhabi to invest in renewable energy and clean technology. Meanwhile, China is now the world’s largest investor in clean technology and produces more solar panels and wind turbines than any other country.

Although Saudi Arabia was the last of the major GCC countries to establish relations with China, recently it has become its largest trading partner in the region. Bilateral trade between the two countries was estimated at $43 billion in 2010. One of the main reasons for the strong ties between the two countries is the active role played by King Abdullah in promoting his “Look East” policy. In 2006, in his first official trip overseas as the new ruler of Saudi Arabia, the king chose to make a state visit to China. Since then China and Saudi Arabia have developed a range of joint projects.

The number and range of investments between the UAE and China is such that it is difficult to keep track of them. In July 2011, it was mentioned in the Chinese press that Abu Dhabi had just purchased 17 low-flying seaplanes produced by China at a cost of several billion dollars. Although the manufacturer is known, additional details of the sale could not be found.

SAUDI ARABIA – CHINA (DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHED IN 1990)

Two of the largest Saudi projects in China thus far have been a $5.86 billion joint venture oil refining and petrochemical plant in Quanzhou, Fujian Province, and a $1 billion polycarbonate plastics plant in Tianjin. The complex in Quanzhou, which is 25 percent owned by Saudi Aramco, began operations in November 2009. It processes mostly Saudi crude oil and is able to produce $10 billion worth of refined oil, plastics, and other petrochemical products a year.17 The agreement to develop the plastic plant in Tianjin was signed by Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and Sinopec in May 2011.18

QATAR – CHINA (DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHED IN 1988) Qatar-China joint projects have only recently begun to take off. In April 2008 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a 25-year agreement with Qatargas and Shell for an annual supply of three million tons of LNG. The following year, Qatar signed a 25-year contract with China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to explore for oil and gas off the coast of Qatar. According to reports, CNOOC is planning to spend $100 million over the next five years drilling exploratory wells in Qatari waters.16 China is also hoping to play an important role in the huge number of construction projects planned in Qatar, in part in anticipation of the 2022 World Cup. In March 2011, Qatar signed an $879 million contract with China Harbor Engineering for the construction of the first phase of Qatar’s $7 billion New Doha Port. 15

Himendra Moah Kumar, “Fujairah Poised to Become Oil Export Hub,” Gulf News (UAE), 12

China is also investing in Saudi projects. One of the earliest large investments was finalized in 2008 and involves China’s major aluminum producer, Chalco, investing over $1 billion in an aluminum smelter in Jazan Economic City.19 The most recent large investment was finalized in March 2011 and involves China stepping in to take the place of U.S. oil giant ConocoPhillips after it withdrew from a $10 billion oil refinery in Yanbu, Saudi Arabia. China’s Sinopec has agreed to a 37.5 percent stake in the project that when completed will process 400,000 barrels a day of Saudi crude oil.20 One of the most interesting developments in Chinese-Saudi relations took place during the hajj of 2010 (mid-November), when the Chinese completed 17

Wan Zhihong, “Sinopec’s Fujian Plant, Up and Running,” China Daily, 12 November 2009.

18

Alison Leung, “SABIC Says Plans $1 Billion China Plant With Sinopec,” Reuters, 17 May 2011.

19

“Chalco Takes Stake in Saudi Aluminum Venture,” Saudi Gazette, 11 May 2008.

20

Owen Fletcher, “Sinopec to Hold 37.5% Stake in Yanbu Project,” Dow Jones Newswires,

June 2011. 16

Tamsin Carlisle, “China Awarded First Abu Dhabi Oil Rig Deal,” The National (UAE), 24

September 2009.

16 March 2011. 34

35


the 11-mile Mashair railway project transporting pilgrims between Mina, Arafat, and Muzdalifa. The railway was designed to decrease the congestion caused by the tens of thousands of buses, vans, and cars that regularly back up for miles between these holy sites during the hajj. Not only are millions of pilgrims delayed for hours, a significant amount of pollution is caused by the thousands of vehicles stalled in traffic. For its inaugural run, the train was limited to Saudi and GCC citizens. They marveled at the convenience and comfort of the trip, which normally takes five hours but now only takes five minutes. According to one journalist who rode the train, “The state-of-the-art rail system is changing peoples’ perceptions about China almost as fast as it is whisking passengers around Mina.” Another passenger proclaimed, “China has overnight become a nation to respect and emulate.”21 With a maximum capacity of 70,000 passengers an hour, over the next few years the railway will be expanded and made available to all pilgrims. In addition, the rail line will enter Mecca and link it to Medina.22 Given the overall success of the project, it is likely that China will play an increasing role in the construction of the over $385 billion in infrastructure projects (including highways and railways) the Saudis announced in 2009 as part of their five-year plan. Almost daily the business sections of newspapers in the Gulf carry stories of new and yet larger joint venture projects and investments with China. There are many reasons why economic relations between these two regions have grown so quickly, and many have argued it is not simply because of the financial gains involved. In fact, the leaders of these two regions have seen the benefits of a shifting away from the U.S.-centered approach to investments and the advantages of working together to create a new economic dynamic. As one retired American diplomatic put it frankly in a speech entitled “The Arabs Take a Chinese Wife”:

The Arabs see a partner who will buy their oil without demanding that they accept a foreign ideology, abandon their way of life, or make other choices they’d rather avoid. They see a country that is far away and has no imperial agenda in their region but which is internationally influential and likely in time to be militarily powerful… They see a country that unreservedly welcomes their investments and is grateful for the jobs


these create. They see a major civilization that seems determined to build a partnership with them, does not insult their religion or their way of life, values its reputation as a reliable supplier too much to engage in the promiscuous application of sanctions or other coercive measures, and has no habit of bombing or invading other countries to whose policies it objects.23

Up until now China has been willing to concede to the United States the role of protector of the sea lanes in the region, but it is not clear how much longer this will last. In late March of 2010, a student of China-Gulf strategic studies presented a paper at an academic conference documenting China’s role in the region and the importance of guaranteeing safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. She ended her paper by pointing out that up until now, China had shown no intent to enter the Gulf with war ships.24 Within two days of her presentation, reports surfaced that for the first time in half a millennium and since the voyages of Zheng He, Chinese naval ships had entered the Gulf, docking in Abu Dhabi to refuel and pick up supplies. The naval vessels (frigate Ma’anshan and supply ship Qiandaohu) were returning to China after completing a three-month patrol in the region protecting ships from Somali pirates. TRANSPORTATION LINKS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE GULF Over the past five years there has been a significant increase in nonstop flights between the major cities of the Gulf to China. At present there are three Gulf-based carriers with direct flights to China and three China-based carriers with direct flights to the Gulf.25 In July 2011, Etihad (Abu Dhabi’s official carrier) announced that Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province in western China, would be its second destination in China (after Beijing), with flights commencing by the end of the year. The following month, Qatar Airways announced it would begin direct flights to Chongqing in November. At first glance these destinations 23

Chas W. Freeman, “The Arabs Take a Chinese Wife: Sino-Arab Relations in the Decades to

Come,” Remarks to the World Affairs Council of Northern California at Asilomar, Middle East Policy Council, 7 May 2006.

21

Siraj Wahab, “China Earns Newfound Respect with Mashair,” Arab News, 20 November 2010.

22

Imran Garda, “Red Workers, Green Trains Make Hajj Easier – For Some,” Al Jazeera, 13

24

November 2010. Although the rail system proved to be an unequivocal success, the use

Shuang Wen, “The Strait of Hormuz: A Barometer in the Emerging U.S.-Gulf-China

Triangular Relations,” Paper presented at the Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, 28 March 2010.

of Chinese workers to construct it caused two interesting twists. There were reports that

36

between 600 and 8,000 workers were hastily converted to Islam before beginning work

25

within Mecca, and that 16 were arrested and deported for organizing a riot demanding better

Shanghai, and Guangzhou; and Etihad has flights to Beijing and Chengdu, with flights to

pay and working conditions. The mass conversions were apparently an effort to quell rising

Shanghai that began in March 2012. China’s largest airline, Air China, has regular flights

local complaints about the large number of non-Muslim workers entering Mecca. The strikes

from Beijing to Dubai and flights to Kuwait via Karachi. China Southern has flights from

were a rare case of workers violently lashing out against bad conditions. UPI, “Chinese

Guangzhou to Dubai, and China Eastern recently inaugurated direct flights from Yinchuan to

Railway Workers Arrested,” 14 October 2010.

Dubai, via Kunming.

Qatar Airways has flights to Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou; Emirates flies to Beijing,

37


might seem like odd choices. However, on closer examination the selection of Chengdu and Chongqing, the two largest cities in western China, appear well-thought-out. In a recent article in the Wall Street Journal entitled “Cities of the Sky,” Greg Lindsay argues that “from Dubai to Chongqing to Honduras, the Silk Road of the future is taking shape in urban developments based on airport hubs.” According to Lindsay these new cities, known as “aerotropolises,” are built with airports as their center for the transport of people and goods to distant places. China, more than any other country, is at the forefront of this movement, with 100 new airports scheduled to be completed by 2020. One of the largest and most important of these airports is presently being built in Chongqing, approximately 200 miles away from Chengdu. Chengdu, as mentioned, is the capital of Sichuan Province, and Chongqing, which was formerly part of the province, is now its own province. These two regions have historically been the main source of the hundreds of millions of peasants who leave the countryside in search of work in factories in cities along China’s eastern coast. As part of China’s “Look West” policy, corporations are encouraged to develop industries in western China, and according to Lindsay, In the western city of Chongqing, huge swaths of countryside have been paved in preparation for the arrival of China’s electronics manufacturers, which are pulling up stakes along the coast. Led by Hewlett-Packard and Foxconn, the maker of Apple’s iPhones and iPads, Chongqing aspires to produce nearly half the world’s laptops by 2015, all of which will leave the city by air. In addition to the huge amount of cargo expected to leave this region of China, there will most likely be large numbers of laborers headed for the construction sites throughout the Gulf.26 Another interesting development connecting western China and the Gulf took place in March 2011, when China Eastern, China’s second largest airline, inaugurated direct flights from Dubai to Yinchuan (with a stopover in Kunming). In this case, the choice of a relatively unknown city in China’s far northwest becomes clearer more quickly. Yinchuan is the capital of Ningxia Province and has the largest Chinese Muslim population in the country. For several years the province has built up a range of businesses geared toward markets in the Middle East and in the Muslim countries of Southeast Asia. Most of the industry revolves around the production of halal foods. In order to encourage trade the province has organized large annual trade shows that cater to the needs of Middle East and Southeast Asian markets. 26

38


To further promote products from Ningxia, in 2009 the Chinese government announced it would be investing $27 million dollars in a sales complex and trade office in Dubai.27 CHINESE IN THE GULF: A CASE STUDY – THE UAE Having lived in China for seven years and now in the Gulf for nine years, what I have found most interesting is the slow but steady arrival of so many Chinese in the region for so many different reasons. At present, there are over 200,000 Chinese living in the UAE. Upon first arriving in 2003, the two most obvious large groups were construction workers and prostitutes. Although housed primarily in desert work camps, the construction workers could be seen at their work sites, and the prostitutes, while hidden away during the day, could be seen at night, especially in Dubai, though in certain spots in Abu Dhabi as well.28 The next group of workers to arrive were service workers, the most visible being the appearance of Chinese cashiers at Carrefour stores throughout the UAE (given the major presence of France’s international hypermarkets throughout China, perhaps it should not have been a surprise to see Chinese cashiers working at them in the UAE29). I then started noticing tourists, first in small groups and later in more organized tours, as well as increasing numbers of Chinese who had clearly settled in Abu Dhabi and were business owners or entrepreneurs. Shortly thereafter, around 2006-2007, I was surprised to find myself being served afternoon tea at the world-famous Burj Al Arab Hotel by a young Chinese woman. The Burj prides itself in providing outstanding service, and I had assumed there would be some prejudice against having Chinese women work there. The tea was just as extraordinary as one might expect and the service impeccable, which made me wonder who was training these women so well, including in English. 27

Yazad Darasha, “Dragon Breathes Fire Again: China Uses Three-Pronged Strategy to

Become Mideast’s Top Investment Partner,” op. cit. 28

Prostitution, together with the trafficking of women, represents multibillion dollar

industries in the UAE involving a wide range of nationalities. In general, it is tolerated as long as it is kept out of sight during the day. However, there is evidence of increasingly violent conflicts between gangs from different countries involved in the sex trade. 29

Although Carrefour entered both China and the UAE quite early and at the same time, in

1995, China now has 160 stores, while the UAE has 14.

Greg Lindsay, “Cities of the Sky,” The Wall Street Journal, 26 February 2011.

39


Ironically at almost the same time, I noticed an entirely different, yet equally surprising, development. One evening a knock on my apartment door revealed a middle-aged Chinese woman carrying a duffle bag full of hundreds of pirated DVDs. I’m not sure who was more surprised, me to find her at my door, or her to find someone who spoke Chinese. Over the next few years several different women came regularly to my door. The first time I met them I would always ask how they happened to end up doing this kind of work and whether or not they felt safe, but their answers were always vague, so I didn’t press them. And although they complained about the heat, other than that they seemed relatively satisfied and intent on staying for a while. From what I could tell from friends and my Emirati students, these women sold DVDs door-to-door in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai (and presumably the other larger cities in the UAE). In early 2011, Chinese women selling DVDs began appearing in Doha. Doha, however, is less conducive to this type of door-to-door trade, as most people live in gated compounds spread around the city, rather than high-rise apartment buildings concentrated in certain areas. A much smaller but potentially more influential group of Chinese women to migrate to the UAE has been a number of schoolteachers who arrived in 2006 to establish the Abu Dhabi Model Chinese School. Unlike most Chinese, if not most foreign residents of the UAE, these women interact very closely with Emirati students and their families. And since the school has attracted a great deal of interest from many local parents, including members of the royal family, these women have had the opportunity to learn much more about local society than most. In addition, they are undoubtedly having a major impact on their students and their students’ futures. Recently, significant numbers of workers have been seen in local malls and along the Corniche in both Abu Dhabi and recently in Doha. They are most likely not construction workers, who tend to have limited access to the downtown areas, so are thus more likely workers who have been brought to work in factories set up by Chinese investors. The fastest growing group of Chinese traveling to the Gulf these days is tourists. In September 2009, the Chinese government officially granted the UAE “approved destination status.” Because of this designation, not only is it easier for Chinese to travel to the UAE, it also allows the UAE to advertise itself as a tourist destination in China. In 2010, approximately 150,000 Chinese were guests in Dubai, and it is estimated that in 2011 that number rose to 300,000.30 Chinese tourists have proven to be among the biggest shoppers at the designer stores that abound in Dubai’s malls. In addition, the Chinese have quickly acquired a taste for Dubai’s most luxurious indulgence: the Burj Al Arab. According to Gerald Lawless,


executive chairman of the Jumeirah Group, in 2011 “during the Chinese New Year at one stage 80 percent of our occupancy at the Burj Al Arab was Chinese.” Luxury hotels and stores throughout the UAE are hiring Chinesespeaking staff to meet the needs of this growing clientele.31 CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND SURMOUNTING THE CHINESE/ARABIC LANGUAGE DIVIDE As language barriers go, it is difficult to imagine one more daunting than that between Chinese and Arabic. Other than the word for tea, cha in Chinese and shai in Arabic, there are no common words, and both the structure and grammar of each language are completely different. Yet in recent years, both China and the countries of the Gulf have made increasing efforts to learn each other’s languages, and governments are making major investments to facilitate a growing knowledge of one another’s culture. In the Gulf, the UAE has been the most active proponent of cultural exchanges and knowledge building. On the other hand, China, with the establishment of CCTV-Arabic in July 2009, has allocated the largest amount of funding to the endeavor. Other projects have included Qatar’s Al Jazeera English and Arabic television bureaus in Beijing, a Chinese immersion elementary school in Abu Dhabi, a UAE-funded Arabic language center in Beijing, a Saudi Aramco initiative to send Saudi students to Chinese universities, and the opening of two Confucius Institutes at universities in the UAE. Of all of these efforts, one of the earliest was the 1994 establishment of the UAE Center for the Study of Islamic Culture and Arabic Language at the Beijing Foreign Studies University. Originally intended to assist Chinese diplomats being posted to the Middle East, the program now attracts students interested in all aspects of China’s growing political and economic ties with the region. In 2010, the Emirati government spent $2.8 million to refurbish and expand the center, which has been renamed the Shaykh Zayed Center for Islamic and Arabic Studies. Arabic language programs are growing at universities throughout the country, and, according to one estimate, whereas a decade ago seven universities in China offered Arabic, today close to 30 do.32 Recall that these recent efforts have a historical precedent dating back to the Yuan Dynasty, when Qubilai established the Imperial College of the Muslims. The role of the college was to provide Arabic and Persian instruction, train translators, and provide translations of some of the hundreds of scholarly texts transported to China from centers of learning in the Middle East. Among the texts that were translated were those 31

Aya Lowe, “Hospitality Firms Target Newly Affluent China,” Gulf News (UAE), 25 May

2011. In addition, the Jumeirah Hotel Group has recently opened a luxury hotel in Shanghai, in part as a strategy to introduce more Chinese to its brand.

30

Vicky Kapur, “Dubai Among Top 10 Tourist Destinations,” Emirates 24/7, 2 June 2011. 32

40

Daniel Bardsley, “A Two-Way Trade in Languages.” The National (UAE), 1 September 2010. 41



specializing in astronomy, medicine, mathematics, chemistry, geography, literature, philosophy, and history.33

Arabic translators from Ningxia are working in foreign trade and commerce in Yiwu City.35

Another important source of Arabic language instruction is the hundreds of mosque schools established throughout China (with the exception of Xinjiang, where all aspects of religion are tightly controlled). Beginning in the early 1990s I began to document the revival of Islamic studies programs at mosques and independent schools in China. Focusing on Arabic and Islamic studies, these schools sought to revive Chinese Muslims’ knowledge and understanding of their Muslim heritage.34 Although in the past most graduates planned to work as teachers themselves or imams in mosques, a few years ago I started hearing of more and more male students using their language skills to look for jobs in companies doing business with the Middle East. In addition, among those Chinese Muslim students continuing their Islamic studies abroad at international centers of Islamic learning in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia, and other countries, there are also increasing numbers who either stay on overseas to work for foreign companies or take up jobs with Middle East companies based in China after returning home.

Meanwhile, in the Gulf, major efforts are underway to teach the Chinese language. This is especially true in Abu Dhabi, where in 2006 the government made the plan to establish a Chinese immersion kindergarten and elementary school. Each year the Chinese Model School of Abu Dhabi has added a grade, and by the fall of 2011 it was teaching over 200 students from kindergarten to grade four. As mentioned, the school has proved quite popular. In July 2011, during the visit of a high level Chinese official to the UAE, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayed mentioned that he saw the school “as a bridge of cultural communication and civilizational interaction” between the two countries.36 To the best of my knowledge the Chinese Model School is the only one of its kind in the Middle East.37

While most mosque schools and Islamic studies schools in China still teach Arabic with the goal of furthering understanding of Islam, at least one school has focused for several years on training Chinese Muslims in Arabic to obtain commercial jobs. According to a recent report in People’s Daily, the Tongxin School of Arabic Language in Tongxin, Ningxia (est. 1985) now has three specialties, namely Arabic language, commerce Arabic, and tourism Arabic. Ninety percent of its students are of China’s Hui ethnic group, and the graduates’ employment rate always stands at more than 95 percent. Most of the graduates work as translators in cities like Yiwu, east China’s Zhejiang Province, and Guangzhou, capital of south China’s Guangdong Province, which are prosperous in foreign trade and commerce. Taking advantage of the growing demand for people proficient in the Arabic language at home and abroad, Ningxia has been exerting efforts to cultivate Arabic translators, a new source of the region’s labor export, which makes it China’s largest exporter of Arabic translators. Nowadays, more than 3,000

For older students there are growing numbers of opportunities to study Chinese at universities. In September 2011, the first Confucius Institute in the region was established at Dubai University. Public interest in the Chinese languages courses being offered has been high.38 A second Confucius Institute opened in March 2012 at the Zayed University campus in Abu Dhabi.39 35

36

Ding Jun (translated by Christine Sun), “Civilian-operated Arabic Language Schools and

“UAE Gives Full Attention to Ties With China,” WAM (Emirates News Agency), 13 July

2011. 37

In April 2011, in an effort to strengthen communication and cooperation between the

Chinese teachers and the students’ mothers, the school initiated a part-time English language course. The class focuses on improving the mothers’ understanding of the curriculum and goals of the school, and also includes time spent sitting in on their child’s class. Additional classes in the evening for working mothers and fathers are planned. 38

33

Qin Haishi, “China’s Largest Hui Community Strives to Cultivate Arabic Translators,”

Xinhua (English.news.cn), 18 September 2010.

Rania Moussly, “Chinese Language, Culture Classes on Offer in Dubai,” Gulf News (UAE),

22 August 2010.

the Development of Muslim Society: A Historical and Contemporary View,” Muslims and a Harmonious Society: Selected Papers from a Three-Conference Series on Muslim Minorities

39

in Northwest China (Beijing: Ethnic Minority Group Development Research Institute, 2011).

a one-woman initiative at DragonMart in Dubai. According to a documentary that appeared

In addition to these officially organized and sanctioned language programs, there is also

on Dubai TV during Ramadan, in 2010 a Chinese Muslim woman named Khadija organized 34

42

Farish Noor, “Muslim Education in China: Chinese Madrasas and Linkages to Islamic

daily Arabic classes there. The convenience of the location, combined with her fluency in

Schools Abroad,” The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkages, Farish

Arabic and Chinese, made her classes popular. She also uses the opportunity to introduce

Noor, Yoginder Sikand, and Martin van Bruinessen, eds. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University

the basic principles of Islam to her students. “Choosing Islam: Episode 5,” Dubai Media, Inc.,

Press, October 2008).

broadcast 18 August 2010.

43


While the UAE has focused on a long-term initiative to foster China-UAE academic ties that begins with elementary education, Saudi Arabia has been focusing on developing ties with China’s top universities. Beginning in 1986, Saudi Arabia began to send students to China. However, it was approximately 10 years ago that more systematic efforts began. Among the most important of these was Saudi Aramco’s program of sending its employees and Saudi students to study at several universities in China. There are now over 1,100 Saudi students studying in universities throughout the country.40 After spending a year completing an intensive Chinese language program, these students then begin their studies in a range of fields. Although petrochemical engineering is one of the most common majors, students major in other degree programs as well. Saudi universities have signed numerous research and exchange agreements with different universities in China, and even before the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) opened its doors in 2010, research agreements and student exchanges with China had already been developed. Although interest in Chinese language, culture, and traditional medicine has been high in the Gulf for years, one recent major attempt to educate the Arab world about China has thus far not proven very successful. In July 2009, China Central Television (CCTV) inaugurated its first Arabic language channel. With start-up costs estimated at over $8 billion and a target audience of 300 million Arabic speakers in 22 countries, it is without a doubt the most substantive project on cross-cultural communication taken on by the government. However, its daily lineup of news show with Chinese anchors and presenters speaking excellent Arabic, as well as a variety of education and entertainment shows either in Arabic or with Arabic subtitles, has yet to build a strong following. Although over the past year the programming has improved somewhat, I have yet to meet anyone in the Gulf who watches it on a regular basis. Even my efforts to enlist the Emirati students in my courses on China failed to convince any of them to watch it over an extended period of time.


Al Jazeera quickly gained a huge following throughout the Middle East. Its popularity grew, both in the region and internationally (except for in the United States, where it is close to impossible to access it over cable), and in 2006 it inaugurated an English language network. As mentioned, Al Jazeera set up a bureau in Beijing, and its coverage of China has been both extensive and excellent.41 CONCLUSION Given the pace of the growth of ties between the Gulf and China, it is hard to predict what new major developments may arise over the next few weeks, let alone the next few years. The question is not whether major new developments will take place, but how many. This chapter represents an outline of some of the more important dimensions of the growing strategic alliances between China and the GCC countries. As we learn more about the multifaceted dimensions of this relationship, it is important to also document the potentially negative impacts. For example, to what extent has the flood of cheap manufactured goods into the Gulf undermined local manufacturers; to what extent are Chinese women becoming even more vulnerable to being trafficked into the Gulf; have the promises made to Chinese construction workers been kept; and will the hundreds of Arab traders continue to be welcomed in China or will Chinese xenophobia raise its ugly head. What is needed is more scholars interested in documenting this moment in time, as the geopolitical and economic focus of the world shifts toward Asia in general and the economies of the Gulf and China in particular. 41

Perhaps one of the reasons for the success of Al Jazeera’s China initiative is the presence

of Ezzat Shahrour, the Beijing Bureau Chief, a Palestinian who has lived in China for 30 years and is fluent in Chinese. Shahrour arrived in Beijing in 1981, where after a one-year intensive Chinese language program he was sent to complete his medical training at Shenyang Medical School. After graduating he remained in China, working for several different organizations before being recruited by Al Jazeera to help set up its bureau.

Part of the failure is undoubtedly due to the ubiquitous television satellites in the region and their literally thousands of channels to choose from, including American shows such as “Desperate Housewives,” “CSI,” “Grey’s Anatomy,” and “Friends,” as well as increasingly provocative Arabic music videos, MTV, and dozens of Arabic stations showing Arabic, Turkish, and, most recently, South Korean soap operas. Competition for audience is immense. But perhaps more importantly, for those in the region who are interested in learning more about China, they need only to turn to the programming provided by Qatar’s Al Jazeera Network. Established in 1996 as an alternative to more closely controlled state-owned networks, 40

44

Shahid Ali Khan, “More Saudis Seek to Study In China,” Saudi Gazette, 24 April 2011.

45


Between Abu Dhabi and Java: A Transnational ḤAḌRAMĪ1 Family in an Era of Nation States

Globalization, an idea that enjoyed its heyday in the 1990s, seems today to be seen as an increasingly problematic concept. The assumption that a single system of connection, notably through capital and commodities markets as well as information flows, has penetrated the globe is no longer considered in a very positive light. Frederick Cooper, for one, notes how in the debates on globalization, the crucial questions do not get asked. What, he inquires, “are the limits of interconnection? What are the specificities necessary to make connections work?”2 The absence of these crucial questions in works on globalization reflects the dearth of contemporary social science dealing with processes that are large-scale but not universal and that address “crucial linkages that cut across state borders and lines of cultural differences but which nonetheless are based on specific mechanisms within certain boundaries.”3 For Cooper, historians and social scientists need to closely examine the mechanisms and limitations of spatial imaginations and connections that were “built out of specific lines of connection and posited regional, continental, and transcontinental affinities.”4


between human action and the world in which the action takes place.5 The task for social scientists is precisely to examine the interrelation at concrete levels between various economic relations and other relations, actors, and materialities not informed by logics of the economy. As Zygmunt Bauman once argued, capitalism has sought to melt all that are solids in order to smooth its circulation. This, however, does not mean that “all that is solid melts into air.” Capitalism has constructed a new solid, with an ambition to be more solid than the order it replaced so as to be immune to challenges from non-economic actions.6 However, in its expansion, the capitalist modes of production have always been suffused with remainders of prior modes of production in which economic relations are moored in non-economic relations such as kinship ties and religious networks. While capitalist modes of production posit a purified and independent category known as “the economy” – believed to be unaffected by non-economic relations – non-capitalist modes of production consist of contextualized and embedded relations in which economic, religious, kinship, and other ties cannot really be separated. In non-capitalist modes of production, then, “the economy” is not a positive and independent category. Rather, it is embedded in non-economic relations and is thus highly contextualized, producing what Dipesh Chakrabarty terms historical difference.7 Hence, the uneven development of capitalist production allows for the coexistence of a dominant mode of production and surviving prior modes that often appear, in Marx’s words, “in stunted form, or even travestied.”8 5

Part of the problem lies in the insistence on a particular category known as “the economy,” which is thought of as a real and positive entity distinct from other relations that make up the world. Timothy Mitchell argues that this invention of “the economy” is dependent on a fundamental separation 1

2

Ḥaḍramīs are Arabs from the Ḥaḍramawt area of central/east Yemen. Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, CA:

University of California Press, 2005), 91. 3

Ibid., 93.

4

Ibid., 109.

Mitchell writes:

The politics of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries attempted to organize a

world whose complexities were resolved into the simple dualities of real and

representation, objects and ideas, nature and techno-science, land and the abstraction

of law, the country and the map. The social sciences emerged in the same period

to confirm and reproduce this binary world. The role of economics was to produce

the economy, not as a work of imagination but as a practical project. The economy

is an artifactual body – a fabrication, yes, but as solid as other fabricated objects, and

as incomplete. Thus economic discourse works very hard to help format and reproduce

the exclusions that make the economy possible.

Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 301. 6

Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2000), 3-4.

7

Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 8

Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, translated by

Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1973), 105. 46

47


Capital’s desire to reduce the plurality of connections and networks into a singular space of experience (such as the economy) undermines itself because the space already bears the mark of difference and engenders its own historicity. This paper attempts to examine the history of a transnational Ḥaḍramī family – the Mawladawila family – in the era of nation states. It seeks to understand the various linkages that have cut across national borders but at the same time are enabled by mechanisms within specific boundaries. It also tries to chart the temporal and spatial dimension of the family by highlighting the entanglements between “the economy” and various other non-economic relations and connections, such as kinship. My argument is that the history of the Mawladawila family can only be written by taking into account kinship dynamics as well as economic and political structures such as capitalism and nation states.9 In following the history of the family from Java to Aden to Abu Dhabi, this paper looks at the interwoven histories that made possible new connections between regions as well as the contemporary developments, problems, and frictional convergences that characterize this family across the Indian Ocean.10 THE ḤAḌRAMĪS IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES


Ḥaḍramīs formed the creole cultural nexus of the Archipelago.11 They acted as advisors, religious teachers, merchants, pirates, and even sultans.12 The mid-nineteenth century, however, witnessed a general shift in the Indian Ocean. The expansion of colonial capitalism marked the integration of Asia into the world market.13 Then, in the late nineteenth century the Indian Ocean experienced a temporal break with the past when steamships overcame elements that had formerly dictated movement in the region, such as monsoons and currents.14 The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 further adjoined the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago with the capitalist world system. The flourishing of colonial capitalism attracted a large number of Ḥaḍramīs to the Dutch East Indies. The unstable political condition in Ḥaḍramawt and the decrease in transport costs following the opening of the Suez Canal brought about this migration pattern. L.W.C. Van den Berg reported that in Java alone, the Ḥaḍramī population rose from 4,992 in 1859 to 10,888 in 1885, while in other parts of the Archipelago, the number rose from 2,776 in 1859 to 9,613 in 1885.15 The flood of migration alarmed the Dutch authorities, exacerbating colonial paranoia of anti-European, anti-Christian, 11

A 2001 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies has a number of articles focusing on the issue

of Malayness. Two articles in particular discuss the “creolized” nature of the Malay cultural

By the late eighteenth century, the Ḥaḍramīs, mainly those acknowledged as the direct descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad (sādā), otherwise known collectively as the BāʿAlawī, had been integrated into the local kinship networks of Java. Together with the Malays, Bugis, and the Minangkabau,

complex, allowing the possibility of people who were not of Malay parentage to adopt, mix, and become Malay. See Anthony Reid, “Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities” and Shamsul A.B., “A History of Identity, an Identity of History: The Idea and Practice of ‘Malayness’ in Malaysia Reconsidered,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2001): 295-313 and 355-366, respectively. Also, L.W.C. Van

9

The Mawladawila family is a sayyid (sādā) family of Ḥaḍramawt. They are part of the larger

sādā tribe known as the BāʿAlawī. The name Mawladawila (mawla al-dawīla) originated

den Berg, who wrote a government-commissioned report on the Arabs in the Dutch East Indies in 1886, noticed the Ḥaḍramīs’ tendency to assimilate into the indigenous population.

when the eponym of the family, Muḥammad b.ʿAlī, redeveloped an ancient settlement in

See L.W.C. Van den Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di Nusantara, translated by Rahayu

the eastern part of the Ḥaḍramawt Valley called Yabhar. In Ḥaḍramī parlance, dawīla means

Hidayat (Jakarta: INIS, 1989), 72; Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility

ancient (ʿatīqa) and for that reason Yabhar is also known as Yabhar al-Dawīla. Muḥammad

across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

and his descendants who redeveloped the land and settled there were thus known as the The idea of Ḥaḍramīs forming the creole cultural nexus has been suggested by Engseng

masters of al-dawīla (mawla al-dāwila). See Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, Al-Muʿjam

12

al-laṭīf li asbāb al-alqāb wa al-kunyā fī al-nasab al-sharīf (Jeddah:ʿĀlam al-Maʿrifa, 1986),

Ho and Michael Feener. While Ho proposes to use the concept “creole,” Feener offers the

Ḥaḍramawt),” Encyclopaedia of Islam Three, Gudrun Krämer et al., eds. (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

Southeast Asia. See Engseng Ho, “Before Parochialization: Diasporic Arabs Cast in Creole

91. For a general overview of the BāʿAlawī, see Ismail Fajrie Alatas, “[al-]ʿAlawiyya (in

Available at: http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=ei3_SIM-22844.

term “hybrid” as a category of analysis in observing the Ḥaḍramī diaspora in precolonial Waters,” in Transcending Borders: Arabs, Politics, Trade and Islam in Southeast Asia, Huub De Jonge and Nico Kaptein, eds. (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002) and R. Michael Feener,

10

This paper is based on oral interviews with living members of the Mawladawila family.

Throughout 2010-2011, I interviewed several members of the family, among them Abū Bakr

“Hybridity and the ‘Hadhrami Diaspora’ in the Indian Ocean Muslim Networks,” Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2004).

al-Menhali (Al-Ain, September 2010), Wasilah Mawladawila (Malang, East Java, December 2010), Shaugi Mawladawila (Ann Arbor, Michigan, February and March 2011), and Asmaa

13

Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875 (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1975).

14

Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire (Cambridge,

al-Menhali (Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 2011). MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 272-3. 15

48

L.W.C. Van den Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di Nusantara, op. cit., 69-70. 49


and pan-Islamic sentiments. The economic success of Ḥaḍrami migrants and their intimacy with local nobilities further aggravated the authorities. As early as 1835, the Dutch had begun to observe the tendency of groups in Java to mix (laten amalgameren).16 Under the rubric of “protecting the economic interests of the indigenous population,” the colonial authorities divided the population into three legal categories: Europeans, foreign Orientals (vreemde osterlingen), and natives (inlanders).17 In 1866, the Dutch enforced the quarter and pass systems (wijkenstelsel and passenstelsel), which meant that foreign Orientals such as Ḥaḍramīs had to live in separate quarters from the indigenous population and were required to carry passes if they wanted to travel off the island.18 Such a parochial policy interrupted the integration process between Ḥaḍramīs and the indigenous population and motivated endogamous marriage. By the end of the nineteenth century the Ḥaḍramīs had become isolated in the newly racialized colonial society. While the Ḥaḍramīs were thus separated in terms of both ethnic identity and quarters, another blow to their prestige came as a result of the changing economy. In the third decade of the nineteenth century, GovernorGeneral Van den Bosch enacted what became known as the “cultivation system,” which led to the commodification of Javanese agricultural production. Javanese peasants were forced to plant cash crops to provide for the monopoly profits of the state. This monetary expansion brought about new avenues through which the Chinese and the Ḥaḍramīs could profitably move, enabling the Ḥaḍramīs to act as intermediary traders between the peasants and the city. As the cultivation system was meant to keep monetary exchange out of the hands and control of the peasants, many became ensnared in debt and Ḥaḍramīs itinerant peddlers became providers of credit.19 16

Ong Hok Ham, Riwayat Tionghoa Peranakan di Jawa (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2005), 13.

17

Although foreign Orientals were officially equals of the natives, they were subjected to

different laws, jurisdiction, education, quarters, and dress. See Huub de Jonge, “Dutch Colonial Policy Pertaining to Hadhrami Immigrants,” in Hadrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s-1960s, Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-Smith, eds. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 96.


This change from a once wealthy maritime-based community into itinerant peddlers providing credit brought about immense damage to the Ḥaḍrāmīs’ reputation. The invention of the new Arab identity that resulted from colonial racial and economic policies helped solidify the idea of “Arabs” as “exploitative opportunists” and “foreign exploiters.”20 The Dutch authority then radically constrained the Ḥaḍramī community’s movements and their economic activities. Nevertheless, the East Indies still provided opportunities for the Ḥaḍrāmīs. AYYĀM JĀWĀ It was after this shift in the mode of Ḥaḍramī livelihood in the Dutch East Indies that the first member of the Mawladawila family arrived in Java.21 Ṣāliḥ b.ʿAwaḍ Mawladawila embarked in Java in the mid-1920s. The economic hardship in the homeland, together with the need to sustain his extensive family, compelled Ṣāliḥ to seek opportunities there. Scholars since Van den Berg have noted how upon arriving in the hostland, Ḥaḍramī migrants have tended to settle in cities where members of their clan or people from their localities in Ḥaḍramawt are to be found. Such a practice helped the new migrant to adjust and to find opportunities, especially when he or she was not familiar with the local language and culture. Following this trend, Ṣāliḥ settled in Malang, East Java, where many members of the Mawladawila clan were living. Not long after, he married a local woman by the name of Kasin, a widow ofʿAlī Mawladawila, a fellow clan member. Kasin had inherited wealth from her deceased husband with whom she had three daughters. Ṣāliḥ thus enjoyed access to this wealth, albeit with the responsibility of taking care of Kasin’s children. Ṣāliḥ used his wife’s money to buy a shop adjacent to the main market in Malang. He also invested the money in several rental properties in the same city. The shop, called Toko Baru, sold goods such as sarongs, shirts, caps, and perfumes. As the store became busier, Ṣāliḥ asked his two younger brothers in Ḥaḍramawt to join him in Java. The brothers, Shaykh and Sālim, migrated to Malang and began to assist Ṣāliḥ in running Toko Baru. When his brothers arrived in Java, it is said that Ṣāliḥ concealed their passports to ensure that they would not return to Ḥaḍramawt.

18

Ibid., 97-101.

20

Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim, op. cit., 184.

19

Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim, op. cit., 184. See also William G. Clarence-Smith,

21

While the Mawladawila clan consists of extensive kinship ties, this paper only examines

“Entrepreneurial Strategies of Hadhrami Arabs in Southeast Asia, c. 1750s-1950s,” in The Hadhrami Diaspora in Southeast Asia: Identity Maintenance or Assimilation? Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk and Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, eds. (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 148-9.

one particular branch of the family, that of the children of Awaḍ Mawladawila, especially Ṣāliḥ, Sālim, and Shaykh and their descendants. For the purpose of this paper and for clarity’s sake, all reference to the Mawladawila family refers to this particular branch and not to the extended family.

50

51


As a stepfather to Kasin’s daughters, Ṣāliḥ took responsibility for finding them acceptable spouses. Thus he married two of them to fellow Ḥaḍramīs, while instructing his brother Shaykh to marry the eldest, Salmah. Not long thereafter, Kasin passed away and Ṣāliḥ returned to Ḥaḍramawt a few years before the 1942 Japanese invasion. The wealth he accumulated during his sojourn in Java enabled him to retire comfortably and respectably in the homeland. The remaining two brothers expanded Ṣāliḥ’s business. After marrying Salmah, Shaykh opened his own store inside the main market of Malang. Similar to Toko Baru, he sold caps, sarongs, rosaries, hijabs, and other everyday goods. Shaykh had seven offspring, among them Abū Bakr, Muḥammad, andʿAlī. The first two were sent to Ḥaḍramawt for their education, whileʿAlī stayed in Java to help his father run the shop. Later, Abū Bakr and Muḥammad migrated to Saudi Arabia, where they remained for the rest of their lives. Ṣāliḥ’s other brother, Sālim (b. 1906), married a woman from Gresik, East Java by the name of Aʿishah. After moving to Gresik, he and a fellow Ḥaḍramī opened a tenun, or handwoven textile factory that produces sarongs. The factory was a success to the extent that he imported cotton thread in large quantities from China. Sālim also married another woman in Jakarta by the name of Hikmah al-ʿAṭṭās, and from that marriage he had one daughter, Wasilah (b. 1946). Shortly after Wasilah was born, Sālim, who did not get along with Hikmah’s family, divorced her. Ulrike Freitag has demonstrated how much of the social and political order that emerged in the Ḥaḍramawt during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was “the direct or indirect result of the close relations between Hadhramis and their diaspora.”22 The interruption of remittances from the diaspora to Ḥaḍramawt due to the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies illustrates the importance of these relations.23 As Ḥaḍramawt had been largely dependent on these remittances, such an interruption resulted in a catastrophe in the homeland, with many becoming poverty-stricken. The Indonesian struggle for independence until 1949 further disrupted the flow of remittances. Many Ḥaḍramī landowners in Indonesia lost their land to Japanese confiscation, while others sold their land cheaply in the 1950s 22


due to land reforms. In addition, the new nationalist government in Indonesia imposed a ban on foreign remittances.24 Yet Indonesian independence did not mean the end of the Ḥaḍramī existence in the country. Before independence, several young Dutch East Indies-born Ḥaḍramīs decided to become Indonesian nationalists. Led by the charismatic young Abdul Rahman Baswedan (d. 1968), they called for a group of Indonesian-born Ḥaḍramīs to take on the cause of independence.25 Baswedan’s appeals led to the formation of the Persatuan Arab Indonesia (PAI, Indonesian-Arab Union) in 1934, which became a political party in 1940.26 Members of the PAI aimed to assimilate completely into the indigenous culture, and they actively took part in nationalist struggles.27 Owing to the PAI’s efforts, the status of the Ḥaḍramīs was not questioned following independence. They were welcome to remain in Indonesia and were implicitly acknowledged as citizens, save those who refused to take citizenship.28 Legally, however, the status of the Ḥaḍramīs remained ambiguous. 24

Christian Lekon, “Economic Crisis and State-Building in Hadhramaut, 1941-1949: The

Impact of the Decline of Southeast Asian Remittances,” in The Hadhrami Diaspora in Southeast Asia: Identity Maintenance or Assimilation? op. cit., 81-108. In February 1950, the Kathīrī sultan of Ḥaḍramawt even urgently requested President Sukarno to allow Ḥaḍramī funds in Indonesia to be remitted. The request was rejected as “the economic situation in Indonesia would not yet allow for the withdrawal of this regulation.” Ulrike Freitag, Indian Ocean Migrants, op. cit., 456. 25

Suratmin, Abdul Rahman Baswedan: Karya dan Pengabdiannya (Jakarta: Departemen

Pendidikan & Kebudayaan, 1989). 26

Hamid Algadri, Politik Belanda Terhadap Islam dan Keturunan Arab di Indonesia (Jakarta:

Haji Masagung, 1988), 116-119. 27

Ibid., 129.

28

Ibid., 132.

Ulrike Freitag, Indian Ocean Migrants and State Formation in Hadhramaut: Reforming the

Homeland (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 453. 23

Christian Lekon, “The Impact of Remittances on the Economy of Hadhramaut, 1914-1967,”

in Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s-1960s, op. cit., 264-280.

52

53


In 1955 Sālim decided to move to Aden with his family. He took with him his tenun machinery as well as 20 of his Javanese workers, leaving behind his daughter Wasilah, who was in the custody of her mother.29 Most of the family does not know the precise reason for Sālim’s departure. However, it is possible that it was motivated by three related reasons. First, as mentioned the PAI’s efforts enabled Ḥaḍramīs to stay permanently in Indonesia following independence, provided that they acquire citizenship. It seems that Sālim refused to do so, as he never had Indonesian citizenship. Secondly, the Indonesian government’s policy of banning remittances to Ḥaḍramawt placed Sālim in a difficult position. He was responsible for sustaining his extended family back in the homeland, but his wealth in Java could no longer be utilized for that purpose. At the same time, the nationalist land reform agenda must have caused Sālim to worry that his wealth could be taken away or at best dramatically devalued.


Sālim had a total of 16 children, half of who were born in Java, and half of who were born in Aden. His brother Shaykh stayed in Malang to continue the business. The connection between Shaykh and Sālim, however, did not cease. As Shaykh sent his two sons, Abū Bakr and Muḥammad, to Ḥaḍramawt to study, both lived with Sālim in Aden before migrating to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

ʿAwad

Aʿishah

Sālim

Sālih

Hikmah

Shaykh

Finally, Aden must have exerted a strong pull on Sālim, as the Second World War had produced an economic boom there. Attracted by the opportunities in the thriving entrepôt, British multinational trading, shipping, engineering, and oil firms set up offices in Aden. Merchants and retailers from the Subcontinent, as well as the North Yemenis and Somalis who constituted the labor force, benefited from this development.30 The flux of foreigners to Aden can be seen in the 72 percent increase in population from 47,533 in the 1931 census to 82,359 in the 1946 census, only one-third of which can be considered as “Aden-born Arabs.”31 The opportunity opened by the development of the cotton industry in the area around Aden also provided a strong enticement for Sālim, who could develop his tenun factory there.32 It is no wonder that he took his machinery and workers with him. 29

Wasilah conveyed how after her father left for Aden with the rest of the family, he returned

once again to Java to take Wasilah along. Her mother, however, refused to consent. So Sālim kidnapped his daughter and placed her under the safekeeping of his brother Shaykh in Malang. However, Sālim was caught upon trying to leave the country with his daughter. A court case ensued, and the judge ruled that Wasilah be returned to her mother. Before leaving the country, Sālim brought Wasilah to the shrine of the Ḥaḍramī saint Ḥusayn b. Abī Bakr al-ʿAydarūs in Luar Batang, Jakarta, and he asked God to make her a pious and good

Hāshim

Wasilah

(al-ʿAin)

(Malang, East Java)

ʿAlī

(Malang)

ʿAlī Mawladawilah

Kasin

Salmah

Abū Bakr

Muhammad

(Jeddah)

(Jeddah)

Abū Bakr (al-ʿAin)

NUSF LUNDŪN Since at least the eleventh century, Aden has been a flourishing center of commerce marked by its cosmopolitanism.33 The port stood as a maritime gateway, serving as the conduit of an increasingly integrated global trade system linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea. The British occupation of Aden in 1839 further developed the entrepôt, and Aden became an important coaling station for the British Empire. The city thrived as traders and merchants from different parts of the Empire frequented it. It is no wonder that among the Ḥaḍramīs, Aden was known as nusf Lundūn – half London.34

woman, despite what he saw as the “corrupting tendency” of Java. The father and daughter were only reunited in 1977 when Sālim visited Indonesia. Upon seeing that his daughter had become a good and pious woman, Sālim once again took her to the shrine and thanked God for His help. 30

The availability of cotton in the area ensured a steady supply of raw materials for Sālim for his tenun factory. His Javanese workers began to train Yemeni workers in the proper way of manufacturing sarongs. As a popular clothing item in South Arabian and Indian communities, sarong

Robert W. Stookey, South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia (Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 1982), 92.

33

Roxani Eleni Margariti, Aden and the Indian Ocean Trade: 150 Years in the Life of a

Medieval Arabian Port (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 211. 31

Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 58.

32

In 1943, the British took direct control of the town of Khanfār and encouraged cotton industry

34

there. By 1947, the amount of land set aside for growing cotton in the area had increased from

Janet Ewald and William G. Clarence-Smith, “The Economic Role of the Hadhrami

Diaspora in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, 1820s to 1930s,” in Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s-1960s, op. cit., 281-296.

the original 600 acres to 5,000 acres. In 1954, this figure stood at 45,000 acres. Ibid., 63. 54

55


production was a lucrative business with sustained demand. Sālim was able to support his extended family in Ḥaḍramawt. The wealth concentrated in Aden did not automatically trickle down to the hinterland.35 Indeed, Aden’s firm orientation toward the world of international commerce and British imperial strategy meant that the port city’s link with its hinterland was kept to a minimum. In other parts of South Yemen, only minor progress had been achieved. The British failed “to knit the scattered pockets of wealth-producing enterprise into a single integrated economy.”36 The new nationalist groups, who themselves came from disadvantaged backgrounds, were thus able to mobilize mass support for loosening the country’s link with world commerce, as well as for restructuring the economy. Following the revolution in North Yemen in 1962, several nationalist leaders founded the National Liberation Front of South Yemen (NLF) in June 1963. Guerilla warfare ensued and by June 1967, the British began withdrawing from the hinterland. Not long thereafter, on November 30, the British handed over control to the NLF. With the independence of South Yemen, gone was the British budget support in Aden, which had amounted to an annual £14 million. At the same time, the modern economic sector, mostly owned by foreigners, became acutely depressed due to civil unrest as well as the closure of the Suez Canal in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.37 It was reported that with the British withdrawal, the number of those unemployed in Aden reached 30,000, while simultaneously 80-100,000 people left the port city.38 In June 1969, Qaḥṭān al-Shaʿabī, the first president of the People’s Republic of South Yemen (PRSY), was ousted by a left faction of the National Liberation Front in what became known as the “Corrective Move,” and Sālim RubiyyaʿʿAlī became the new ruler. Soon thereafter diplomatic relations with the United States were cut, and in November 1970 the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was proclaimed. By the mid-1970s, the PDRY’s economic aim became clear: the concentration of the means of production and distribution in the hands of the state. The new government sought to shift the basis of the economy from service to production and to ensure an equitable distribution of income.39 As such, the


traditional productive sectors were restructured. Agricultural land was confiscated from its owners. By 1972, arable lands were organized into state farms and cooperatives. Such collectivization attempts were also applied to traditional handicrafts and retail trade.40 Also, during the first two development plan periods (1971-1979), major projects included a textile factory of 7.2 million yards annual capacity prepared by the People’s Republic of China.41 Private sectors were encouraged to join in mixed ventures with the state. The rapid restructuring of the economy proved fatal to Sālim’s business venture. Now under the state’s auspices, cotton became difficult to obtain and buying capacity diminished dramatically. At the same time, the government confiscated all Sālim’s properties with the exception of his home. The economic condition in South Yemen compelled a large number of people to migrate to other Arab countries with more opportunities. Already in the 1960s, many Ḥaḍramīs settled in Saudi Arabia, where they became successful businessmen and established large corporations. Most notable among these families are the Bin Lādins and the al-ʿAmūdīs.42 In 1976, up to 125,000 South Yemenis were working abroad. Remittances from these expatriates were estimated at around US$57 million in 1969, reaching US$180 million in 1977. While such an exodus resulted in a labor shortage in South Yemen, the government could not stop emigration as the remittances greatly enhanced the PDRY’s ability to import the commodities it needed.43 In the early 1980s, remittances accounted for 40 percent of the GDP. As the condition for Sālim and his family became unbearable, the prospect of jobs and economic advancement in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) proved to be a driving force for many of Sālim’s sons. Uthmān and his brother Ḥusayn left Aden and settled in Dubai, and another brother, Abū Bakr, moved to Abu Dhabi. Yet another brother, Hāshim, migrated to Kuwait for 15 years before joining the rest of the family in the UAE. While Sālim’s sons migrated to small Gulf countries, Shaykh’s two sons who were living with Sālim in Aden, Abū Bakr and Muḥammad, left for Saudi Arabia. Abū Bakr was able to work for the government in Jeddah and operated his own

35

Robert W. Stookey, South Yemen, op. cit., 92.

36

Ibid., 80.

40

Ibid.

37

Ibid., 80.

41

Ibid., 84.

38

Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, op. cit., 118.

42

Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, op. cit., 112

39

Under the Economic Organization Law of 1969, the country’s eight banks were taken

43

Robert W. Stookey, South Yemen, op. cit., 90.

over and amalgamated into the National Bank of Yemen. The major trading concerns were expropriated and organized into the National Corporation for Foreign Trade and the National Home Trade Company. Robert W. Stookey, South Yemen, op. cit., 81. 56

57



shop, called Toko Sarinah, which sold Indonesian products.44 Sālim himself and his wife left Aden in 1976 and settled in the UAE.45

reason, the UAE is commonly described by Ḥaḍramīs as the “New Java,” alluding to the golden age of the diaspora in Southeast Asia.48

THE NEW JAVA

When Abū Bakr, the son of Sālim, arrived in Abu Dhabi in 1974, he joined his brothers and several other Ḥaḍramis already settled there. As the UAE was in need of foreign workers in those early days, Abū Bakr found employment easily working for the newly established Al-Ittihad cement factory in Ras Al Khaimah. The creation of the factory was part of the UAE development plan of import-substitution industrialization. This approach was designed to build up domestic industrial infrastructure to produce goods that would have otherwise been costly to import.49

The founding of oil in the Trucial States altered the history of the region forever. Oil, in commercial quantity, was first discovered in Bahrain in 1932. In today’s UAE, oil in large quantities was found in the 1960s.46 The independence of the Trucial States and the formation of the United Arab Emirates in 1971 marked the opening of a new economic opportunity for countless numbers of foreign workers, including Ḥaḍramīs.47 For that 44

It is unfortunate that most research considering Indonesians in Saudi Arabia only deals with

pilgrims and domestic workers. Examining the role of entrepreneurs and those who worked for government agencies would be of value. See Mathias Diederich, “Indonesians in Saudi Arabia: Religious and Economic Connections,” in Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf, Madawi al-Rasheed, ed. (London: Routledge, 2005). 45

The movement of Sālim’s sons from Aden to the UAE was enabled by the relaxation of the

relationship between the PDRY and the Gulf states. While the PDRY government began as a fierce opponent of the creation of what it saw as the “spurious federation” of the UAE, by the end of 1974 it made some concessions in the hope of establishing relations with the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait. The UAE, from 1975, provided economic aid to the PDRY, and in March 1977, Shaykh Zayed visited Aden. See Fred Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of

Abū Bakr was also fortunate to have the chance to become a citizen of the UAE. A few years before his family fortune in Aden dissipated, Sālim had financially assisted a merchant from the al-Menhali tribe, an indigenous tribe from Abu Dhabi. Upon learning that Sālim’s son was living in the UAE, the merchant decided to repay Sālim’s kindness by helping Abū Bakr to obtain citizenship. As a condition, Abū Bakr changed his surname from Mawladawila to al-Menhali. While working, Abū Bakr studied to complete high school. He then enrolled in the newly established United Arab Emirates University in Al-Ain. In its effort to educate citizens, the government supplied incentives to study at the university, including generous financial support during enrollment and a monetary award upon graduation.50 Abū Bakr graduated in 1983 with a law degree.

South Yemen 1967-1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 168. 46

Frauke Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates (London: Longman, 1996), 307.

47

Political scientists have dubbed the UAE as a rentier economy with different economic behavior

from that which is based on work-reward causation. In a rentier economy, citizens are hardly expected to do anything productive, except to rely on the government’s allocation of revenues. This results in an extensive welfare state characterized by a dependence on foreign labor. State welfare, including free education, health services, social security, subsidies for water and electricity, and almost guaranteed employment in the state bureaucracy for nationals, means that foreign workers are needed to man labor sectors unattractive to the nationals. In order to safeguard the rights of the nationals, the UAE restricts the possibility of obtaining citizenship for foreigners. Article 4A1 in the Nationality Act states that “any person who has preserved his/her normal residence-ship in the State since 1925 is to be registered in the register of Nationality according to a statistical declaration of such a person’s family. The children of such persons, and children of their male children resident in the State since birth, shall also be registered.” This Article shows the restrictive character of UAE citizenship, limiting the right to citizenship to those who have been residents since the early part of the twentieth century. See Anne Louise Aartun, “The Political Economy of the United Arab Emirates: An Analysis of the UAE as an Oil Rentier State” (Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, 2002), 28. See also Anh Nga Longva, “Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualization and Practice,” in Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications, Nils A Butenschøn, Uri Davis, and Manuel Hassassian, eds. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 183; Ali Tawfik al-Sadik, “Evolution and Performance of the UAE Economy,” in United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective, Ibrahim Al Abed and Peter Hellyer, eds. (London: Trident Press 2001), 202-230. 58

Before Abū Bakr completed his studies, Sālim wanted him to marry. Thus the father and son went to Mecca to meet another Ḥaḍramī from Indonesia, Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Ḥaddād. Al-Ḥaddād had ten children from his marriage in Indonesia. Sālim asked al-Ḥaddād for the hand of his eldest daughter, Sakīna, for Abū Bakr. Abū Bakr married her in Mecca and brought her back to the UAE soon after. After graduation, Abū Bakr worked in the UAE’s justice department and opened a part-time private practice. He gradually became a well-known lawyer in Abu Dhabi and handled various cases, including family and 48

While the UAE used to depend on foreign workers from Arab countries, this is no longer

the case. In 1975, the share of Arabs in the expatriate population was 26 percent. In 1985 it was reduced to 19 percent, and in 1996 it had declined to 10 percent. See Andrzej Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States (London: Ithaca Press, 2001), 62. 49

Christopher M. Davidson, The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival (Boulder, CO:

Lynne Rienner, 2005), 124-125. 50

Malcolm C. Peck, The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity (Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 1986), 75.

59


criminal suits. As his fortune grew, Abū Bakr was able to secure citizenship for all of his siblings, with the exception of his half-sister Wasilah who had stayed behind in Indonesia. In 1977, the aging Sālim finally had the chance to visit Indonesia. The improving financial condition of the family enabled him and his wife as well as the children to visit and reestablish connections with the family left behind. His first visit in 1977 was to see his daughter Wasilah. In the late 1960s, Wasilah had married her cousinʿAlī, the son of Sālim’s brother Shaykh. As mentioned,ʿAlī was the only of Shaykh’s sons to remain in Malang; his two brothers moved to Aden and Saudi Arabia. In Malang,ʿAlī opened his own shop and established a joint venture with his brother Abū Bakr in Jeddah in which Abū Bakr would sendʿAlī secondhand goods to sell in Java. At the same time,ʿAlī established a general trading company, P.T. Jabarindo, which specialized in exporting Indonesian products to Saudi Arabia, with Abū Bakr serving as the distributor in Jeddah. Sālim’s visit was an emotional event for him and his daughter. Sālim was pleased that his daughter married his nephew, and he met his grandchildren for the first time. The 1977 visit became the first of what came to be frequent trips to Indonesia. Following the visit, Sālim’s other children began to spend their summer vacations in Indonesia, and Wasilah was able to meet many siblings she had never known. Thus, with the change in the family fortune following migration to the UAE, Sālim’s family was able to reestablish links with members of the family in Indonesia, and the connection between Java and Abu Dhabi was cemented. FAMILIAR YET FOREIGN In 1994, Sālim invited Wasilah to come to the UAE, and she stayed for three months. During her visit, Wasilah got to know those brothers and cousins she had formerly known only through correspondence. In 1997, Wasilah traveled to the UAE once again and brought her son Shaykh, whom she wanted to attend the newly founded Sharjah University. Following Shaykh’s studies there, Abū Bakr asked his nephew to work in the law firm, which he did for several years before joining the staff of the Indonesian Embassy in Abu Dhabi. Ḥusayn, another son of Sālim, also visited Java in the late 1990s. During his visit, he forged an alliance with Wasilah’s husbandʿAlī (also his cousin). Ḥusayn was interested in working with P.T. Jabarindo,ʿAlī’s company that specialized in sending Indonesian products to Saudi Arabia, to send the same products to the UAE. Following the venture,ʿAlī became a frequent visitor to Abu Dhabi. His son Shaykh also acted as his representative there. However, the business did not last long, as apparently the Emirati market was not as lucrative as the Saudi one.

60


During his frequent trips to Abu Dhabi,ʿAlī also became more acquainted with his cousin’s son (and his wife’s brother’s son)ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥāshim b. Sālim, who at the time was involved in the pet business.ʿAbd Allāh askedʿAlī to supply him with parrots, cockatoos, and graculas that can be trained to say “salāmʿalaykum” or “Allāh akbar” (these birds are in high demand in the UAE). ThusʿAlī, assisted by his son Shaugi (b. 1977), began to train birds in Java and liaise with the Ministry of Forestry and the quarantine authority to obtain the necessary permits in order to ship the birds to the UAE.ʿAlī would travel to Abu Dhabi with each shipment of birds, usually consisting of 12 to 14 of them. In 2000,ʿAlī died and Shaugi’s siblings asked him to continue their father’s business. He began to frequent Abu Dhabi, carrying birds with him and using his time there to visit shops in Al-Ain that received goods from his father’s other endeavors, such as the sale of shrimp crackers. Shaugi concluded that the bird exporting business was not worth his time and energy, and as a result he switched to exporting musical instruments from the UAE to Indonesia – a business that continues to be profitable. Shaugi’s business trips have also served as a chance to reconnect with his cousins and other family members in Abu Dhabi, some of who frequent Indonesia during the summer months. One of his cousins, Asmaa (b. 1981), the daughter of the lawyer Abū Bakr al-Menhali, grew up in Al-Ain and was educated at the United Arab Emirates University there, majoring in biology. She has visited Indonesia since she was young, and can understand Indonesian and Javanese, as her mother Sakīna al-Ḥaddād and her paternal grandmother Aʿishah grew up in Indonesia and speak Indonesian and Javanese at home. For Asmaa as an Emirati, Indonesia has always been a familiar yet foreign country. After graduation, Asmaa became a teaching assistant at the university and received a scholarship to study for her doctorate in the United States. At the same time, her father Abū Bakr and her aunt Wasilah wanted her to marry her Indonesian cousin Shaugi. At first Asmaa rejected the proposal. For her, marrying an Indonesian cousin was not an option due to the difficulties she foresaw in communication problems as well as cultural differences. While her family kept pushing her to marry Shaugi, the university pressured her to pursue her graduate studies. Asmaa finally conceded to the proposal on the condition that Shaugi would accompany her abroad, and he agreed. The arrangements for the wedding took a considerable amount of time, as Emirati women are not supposed to marry someone from outside of the Gulf states. But because Shaugi is a relative, the marriage became possible. Yet upon learning of Shaugi’s intention to get married in the UAE, the embassy in Jakarta initially refused to grant him a visa. But in the end, the wedding took place, and by August of 2005, the couple had arrived in Michigan, where Asmaa began her Ph.D. in physiology.

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Every time Asmaa and Shaugi visit the UAE, they face immigration obstacles. As a bearer of a special visa, Shaugi is not supposed to leave the UAE for more than six months – but as the husband of an Emirati student abroad, he has special permission. Nevertheless, Shaugi faces two hours of immigration clearance every time he visits the country. For Shaugi, living and doing business in the UAE after living in the United States is not a viable option. The best he can do is buy goods in the UAE and sell them in Indonesia. As a foreigner without strong connections in the country, Shaugi feels that it is almost impossible to operate a business there.

ʿAwad

Aʿishah

Sālim

Sālih

Hikmah

Shaykh

Wasilah (Malang, East Java)

Hāshim

Husayn

(al-ʿAin)

(al-ʿAin)

Abū Bakr

Sakīna

(al-ʿAin)

al-Haddād

ʿAlī

(Malang)

ʿAlī Mawladawilah

Kasin

Salmah

Abū Bakr

Muhammad

(Jeddah)

(Jeddah)

Asmaa

Shaugi

Shaykh

(al-ʿAin and USA)

(Malang & USA)

(Java, & Abu Dhabi)

ʿAbū Allah (al-ʿAin)

Ali

Tayba

(USA)

(USA)

Straight Line: Kinship ties Dotted Line: Mercantile ties

Despite these current roadblocks, Shaugi has benefitted considerably from his kinship network. Through it, he was able to conduct business in the UAE as well as marry his Emirati cousin. Yet he has said that the conflation of kinship and mercantile networks can have its pitfalls. When one is dealing with a difficult relative, sorting out business problems can be a huge challenge. After all, for Shaugi, his Emirati cousins are relatives he only met after they became adults. “It is not the same as the relatives you grow up with,” Shaugi said. Sometimes, he added, it is difficult to communicate: “There are character differences between my relatives in Indonesia and those in the UAE.” When I asked him why this is the case, he replied, “Because they are Arabs. So what they like and what we like are different. Our lifestyles are different.”

Paul Dresch has noted the old distinction between qarīb (kinsmen/ neighbors) and gharīb (strangers/foreigners) in Emirati society.51 In the contemporary context, this distinction has become less fixed as foreigners could well be one’s close neighbors. The ambiguity of such a distinction also operates between the Emirati Mawladawila and their kinsmen in Java. Hence the kinship network that now connects the Mawladawila family between Java and Abu Dhabi is one that opens opportunities but also involves difficulties for family members. It is fair to say that the Indonesian and the Emirati members of the Mawladawila family are simultaneously qarīb by virtue of their blood ties and gharīb by way of different nationality, language, and culture. A TRANSNATIONAL KINSHIP IN THE ERA OF NATION STATES The history of the Mawladawila family across the Indian Ocean has demonstrated the intimate links between a particular family and broader historical developments. The kinship network has been amenable to and has had the capacity to foster mercantile ties. This mercantile network in turn strengthened the kinship network. In the case of Shaugi and Asmaa, the kinship network turned into a mercantile connection and then reverted to an even closer kinship alliance. Kinship is the mechanism that has secured the longevity of Ḥaḍramī identity and culture among the Mawladawila family in Java and in the UAE. For instance, through marrying other Ḥaḍramīs, members of the Mawladawila family have been able to become local members of the community in which they live while at the same time remaining part of a broader network of Ḥaḍramī culture. Kinship became – and continues to be – a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world, and has served as a means to track the family’s history and movement. It has also served as a guide to action and has structured familial ethics, insofar as it has sometimes affected family members’ business relations. Such a crucial role of kinship is indeed one of the hallmarks of the Ḥaḍramī diaspora to the extent that kinship and marriage form the diaspora as an ethnic group.52 Furthermore, the case of the Mawladawila family demonstrates the dynamics in which the economic field is embedded in various regional and local sociocultural contexts that can be easily traversed through the kinship network. Kinship relations have the ability to re-embed the economy in 51

Paul Dresch, “Foreign Matter: The Place of Strangers in Gulf Society,” in Globalization and

the Gulf, John W. Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed al-Mutawa, eds. (London: Routledge, 2006), 204. 52

Leif Manger, The Hadrami Diaspora: Community-Building on the Indian Ocean Rim (New

York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 9.

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different contexts and associations, thereby exposing the dependency of economic relations on other non-economic relations.53 In other words, by examining the intermingling of economic and other relations, one is in a position to interrogate the limitation of a purified and independent conception of “the economy.” Consequently, what emerges is not a form of mercantilism that somehow unfolds in its own space, but one that cannot be divorced from social relations and is intricately linked to kinship, cultural meanings, moralities, ethics, and affective bonds, thereby producing not a singular trajectory of capitalist history but that of historical difference.54 Rather than passively submitting to macro forces, members of the Mawladawila family have attempted to engage, evade, resist, and transform the opportunities and obstacles they have faced and continue to face. It should also be noted how in the twentieth century, the Ḥaḍramī diaspora has had to deal with an actor that it did not confront before, the modern nation state. Indeed, the nation state is extremely important whether as the provider of opportunities or as the disrupter of family fortune. Just as Dutch colonial state-sponsored capitalism enabled the family to come to Java, the PDRY government destroyed Sālim’s business. The Emirati government sought to prevent Shaugi from marrying his cousin – the same Emirati government that provided Abū Bakr with free education, employment, and a scholarship for his daughter to study in the United States. Hence, to understand the history of a Ḥaḍramī family, one has to consider the role of the nation state, despite the transnational character of economics and culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The euphoria of globalization studies – with the belief in the disappearance of the nation state as a crucial actor that marked the 1990s – is long gone.55 Instead,


different nation states have made a considerable effort to adapt to the globalized world.56 The task is therefore to understand how the nation state intersects in concrete ways and creates frictional relations with transnational actors – such as the Mawladawila family.57 This paper has shown how the history of the transnational Mawladawila family in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is intricately linked to the nation states of Indonesia and the UAE (as well as others in the Gulf). The family has not been a passive actor in an era dominated by such states, but has rather shown degrees of flexibility in evading, resisting, and complying with different state actors. The family has also demonstrated the ability to reconfigure itself to fit changing sociopolitical contexts. Such are the qualities that made this family a surviving actor in the recent history of the Indian Ocean region that has witnessed the rise and fall of various colonial and nation states. 56

For example, the anthropologist Aihwa Ong discusses various strategies of negotiation

undertaken by the post-Mao Chinese state with global capitalism as “a particular combination of the developmentalist state [wherein the state facilitates quick growth], the disciplining of labor forces, the careful cultivation of transnational capital, the repression of human rights, and economic competition with the West.” Ong also examines the state’s strategic revival of a discourse of Confucianism as a moral force that links Chinese modernity to overseas Chinese in the United States and Southeast Asia: “After being vilified by mainlanders, overseas Chinese are stereotyped as the embodiment of traditional Chinese familialism, business acumen, and talent for wealth making – the old Chinese folk values that are now being officially valorized for building a bridge to China’s modern future.” Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 38, 43-4.

53

Ibid., 172

54

Indeed, the UAE itself can be seen as a polity that is an interrelated kin group that shares

57

Using the term “friction,” Anna Tsing attempts to understand globalization by examining

various engagements, often messy and conflictual, between different actors, places, and

in corporate means of production, with the rulers as the tribal leaders who ought to

things that constitute global connection. These frictional engagements – usually taking place

redistribute wealth to members of the tribe. As John W. Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and

in specific contexts – foreground the dynamic interplay between the local and the global, the

Mohammed al-Mutawa write:

universal and the particular. In Tsing’s use of the term, friction refers to productive sites of encounter between different forces of change and histories that come together and generate

In a redistributive economy of a kinship society, the monetary surplus is stored for

diverse articulations. By looking at specific frictional encounters, one can evade viewing

safekeeping by the leading household. In the case of the Gulf, the ruler would be the

globalization as an essentialized and all-encompassing reality. See Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing,

sheikh, emir, or sultan as the apex of the kinship web. What motivates social interaction,

Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

thus, is not so much maximizing profit but keeping the structure of mutual relations and

obligations intact so that revenues may be allocated.

John W. Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed al-Mutawa, “The Arab Gulf Region: Traditionalism Globalized or Globalization Traditionalized?” in Globalization and the Gulf, op. cit., 11. 55

Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis,

MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

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