Urban Studies, Vol. 43, No. 10, 1779– 1802, September 2006
Associationalism from Above: Explaining Failure through France’s Politique de la Ville Walter J. Nicholls [Paper first received, May 2005; in final form, November 2005]
Summary. Over the past 20 years, states have attempted to develop partnerships with third-sector associations in a variety of policy areas. Advocates argued that these types of partnership would increase the state’s capacities to target the needs of niche populations, strengthen associational sectors and democratise state bureaucracies. However, several studies have shown that stateinitiated partnerships often fall well short of their desired objectives and often cause more harm than good for the associational sectors of cities. This paper assesses the problems of the associationalist project through France’s politique de la ville. The paper suggests that the outcomes of ‘associationalism from above’ in France have largely been unintended. State officials operating in good faith sought to foster partnerships that would generate benefits for the state and the associational sector. However, as state officials, they were obliged to impose a bureaucratic infrastructure to co-ordinate complex partnerships and ensure a degree of uniformity across France. Associations found that they not only had to conform to new bureaucratic requirements but also they had to respond to an increasingly political funding system. Thus, bureaucratisation triggered the politicisation of the associational sector, compelling associations to professionalise, politicise, and individualise their practices.
Introduction The concept of ‘associationalism’ has gained wide acceptance in policy and academic circles over the past 20 years. In the area of welfare, supporters of the concept believed that better partnerships with voluntary associations would increase the state’s capacities to provide more appropriate services to socially excluded groups, strengthen associational sectors and democratise state bureaucracies. Moreover, with associations providing and delivering welfare services, the public sector could satisfy welfare obligations at a reduced cost and with greater flexibility. In spite of these laudable goals, the findings of
several researchers indicate that associationalism has not lived up to its promises (Este`be, 1999; Mayer, 2000; Sintomer and Maillard, forthcoming; Uitemark, 2004; Beaumont, 2006). There seems to have been an explosion in partnerships initiated by public officials, but rarely have these partnerships resulted in the outcomes described above. More often than not, associationalism has tended to achieve little more than providing states with an inexpensive and flexible method to provide and deliver welfare services. This has come at the cost of professionalising and fragmenting the associational sectors of cities. Thus, the central question of this paper is, why has
Walter J. Nicholls is in the Department of Sociology, California State University, 1250 Bellflower Bvd, Long Beach, California, CA 90840-0906, USA, and the Department of Geography, Queen Mary, University of London. Fax: 562 985 2090. E-mail:
[email protected]. The research for the paper was performed as a visiting doctoral researcher at the Laboratoire d’Etudes et de Recherche sur l’Economie, les Politiques et les Syste`mes (LEREPS) in Toulouse, France. The author would like to thank Professor Jean Pierre Gilly for this opportunity and would also like to thank Hicks Marlowe, Gary Hytrek and Julie-Anne Boudreau for commenting on earlier versions of ths paper. All responsibility remains that of the author. 0042-0980 Print=1360-063X Online=06=101779 –24 # 2006 The Editors of Urban Studies DOI: 10.1080=00420980600838135
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this particular policy framework not delivered on its more far-reaching promises in France? The paper answers this question by examining how ‘associationalism’ was applied to the particular urban anti-poverty programme known as the politique de la ville. The paper draws on a ‘state institutionalist’ approach to explain how this framework failed to generate the results expected by its advocates in the state (Skocpol, 1985; Mann, 1986, 1993). As the French state was increasingly pressed to find ways to treat new socioeconomic problems in the 1970s, associationalism provided a viable alternative. In applying an associationalist framework to its national-level strategy to treat social exclusion, officials in France were required to develop a bureaucratic infrastructure to co-ordinate broad and complex partnerships and ensure a degree of uniformity across project sites. Partnerships with associations were mediated and regulated by this infrastructure, introducing a division of labour which placed associations in a subordinate position to public-sector partners and required associations to comply with new rules and expectations in order to receive financial compensation. Moreover, this state infrastructure provided resources and instruments for political parties to extend and deepen patronage networks amongst associations. Thus, the bureaucratic infrastructure of the state intersected with party competition to create an institutional space that constrained the activities of associations. This institutional cage compelled individual associations to professionalise, politicise, and individualise their actions. The collective effect of these individual practices has been the utter transformation of the associational sector. As a consequence, the associational sectors of many deprived neighbourhoods have ceased being a medium for articulating the grievances of residents and expressing those grievances to the state. In the absence of such a medium, dissent and discontent are often expressed in more destabilising ways such as riots and support for extremist causes. The irony of the programme is that, in its attempt to strengthen the link between the Republic and residents in deprived neighbourhoods, this initiative actually contributed to
severing a link which had been furnished by a relatively autonomous and vibrant civil society. Associationalist approaches to governance have become increasingly widespread across countries and across policy areas, including education, neighbourhood governance, security and municipal budgeting (Fung and Wright, 2003a; Blanc and Beaumont, 2005). The embrace of this approach by regimes as different as the US and the European Union warrants a careful examination of the potentially negative impacts such approaches can have on local civil societies. However, the intent here is not to suggest that all such approaches are doomed to fail, but to highlight the specific institutional mechanisms that have produced a negative outcome in the French case. As other case studies have shown, associationalist projects have a greater likelihood of producing mutually beneficial outcomes between state and civil society when institutions provide a greater role for associations to participate in decision-making processes (as opposed to a strictly implementation role), funding mechanisms are transparent and depoliticised, and civil society constitutes a countervailing power (Fung and Wright, 2003b; Sintomer and Maillard, 2004; Somerville, 2004). Thus, by recognising the importance of associationalist governance internationally, this paper asserts that scholarly attention must be placed on the specific institutional mechanisms and processes involved in implementing this approach. Partnerships alone are not sufficient to achieve the more interesting promises of associationalism. Public officials must be sensitive to the fact that their specific practices may, intentionally or not, introduce distinct constraints that threaten the viability of civil society. Thus, the paper does not call into question partnerships with the state, but the ways in which these partnerships are pursued. A Note on the Method This case study analyses associationalism as it has been implemented in the policy programme known as the politique de la ville. The politique de la ville is the longest-ever
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national-level programme to use an associationalist approach in France, which has resulted in a mature set of institutions, instruments and practices (Este`be, 1999; Sintomer and Maillard, 2004). This makes the programme a particularly strategic one for assessing the effects of this type of approach on third-sector associations. Also, in the European context, France’s politique de la ville is often cited as model for associationalist approaches in Europe’s anti-poverty efforts (Blanc and Beaumont, 2005). A careful assessment of this ‘model’ of good governance could prove helpful to those political regimes seeking to replicate its practices. While the programme continues to exist to the present day, two stages are highlighted: 1981– 88 and 1988–95. This historical sequence spans the politique de la ville’s evolution from a largely experimental programme to a highly institutionalised one. It is during this period that its principal institutional features came into being. More recent changes in the programme have been aimed at its remit and policy issues covered rather than at its institutional configuration. Because this paper’s focus is on the institutional features of the programme, there is no need to provide a detailed examination of more recent changes. Toulouse proved to be a good city to perform this study because of its long and active engagement in the programme and its long-held status as a ‘good student’ of the politique de la ville (Este`be, 1999; personal interview, M. C. Jaillet, Director, Centre Interdisciplinaire des Etudes Urbaines, 2002). In addition, the high degree of political competition amongst the principal public partners makes this city an interesting case for understanding the ‘political’ effects of the programme on the associational sectors of cities. Detailed information on the relation between the public sector and associations in Toulouse has been provided through a number of semi-structured interviews performed with key stakeholders (administrative, political, associational, etc.). To develop a list of informants, a snowball technique was employed, with each new informant providing
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names of others whom they considered to be important stakeholders. The final list of informants was cross-checked with Professor Marie Christine Jaillet and Dr Philipe Este`be, two long-time observers of Toulouse’s politique de la ville and researchers at the Centre Interdisciplinaire des Etudes Urbaines (CIEU). A total of 41 interviews were performed with administrators and politicians from departmental, regional and municipal councils; administrators in local agencies; and several neighbourhood associations. Informants were asked a standard set of open-ended questions grouped into five theme areas: objectives of the programme, who participates and their roles, rationale for participating in the programme, organisational structure of the programme, and points of conflict and co-operation. For informants with a long history with the particular politique de la ville (about a third of my informants), a historical theme was added to the basic format. 1. Associationalism from Above: Explaining Failure in France The following discussion briefly describes the emergence of associationalism as a viable policy concept in France and identifies some of the institutional constraints that undermined its abilities to fulfil the objectives of its supporters. 1.1 Associationalism from Above in France The rising prominence of an associationalist framework in France is the result of several different trends. From the late 1960s onwards, top –down, hierarchical policy frameworks (dirigisme) became ineffective in a number of policy areas. In the area of welfare, a state apparatus designed to allocate standardised entitlements to a homogeneous population was unable to treat new problems such as long-term unemployment, social exclusion, homelessness, economic and ethnic segregation (Castel, 1995; Ullman, 1998; Donzelot, 2001a). Growing sectors of the population simply did not fit existing
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criteria for receiving aid and services. Partnerships with third-sector associations were seen as a means of improving the state’s capacities to meet these new demands. As Ullman explains Pushed into new and unfamiliar roles by a variety of social trends, and simultaneously burdened by ever more complex regulations, the welfare state found itself unable to accomplish the tasks assigned to it. Public agencies and programs, it was discovered, were not suited for the new tasks. Policymakers turned to nonprofit organizations for help, appropriating the organizations’ skills, flexibility, and access to marginalized populations for the state’s own purposes (Ullman, 1998, p. 5) Parallel trends were occurring in the policy area of economic development (Storper and Salais, 1997; Levy, 1999; Hancke´, 2002). In this area, top– down policy frameworks (dirigisme) were very effective for what might be considered ‘big projects’ (highspeed rail, steel, aeronautics) but very ineffective for ‘smaller projects’ (software development, microelectronics, craft industry) (Storper and Salais, 1997; Levy, 1999). The diminished capacity of traditional policy frameworks to treat new social and economic issues reflects what Ullman has called the ‘institutional crisis of the state’ (Ullman, 1998). Such a crisis spawned the search for alternative frameworks that would enable the state to respond to its changing environment. Beginning in the 1970s, there was a surge in policy and social science literature on associationalism as an alternative to top– down frameworks for treating new social and economic problems (Ullman, 1998; Levy, 1999). This research supported the claim that strong partnerships with civil society increased the state’s capacities to address these challenges. In particular, it was argued that these partnerships increased the state’s abilities to target and service hard-to-reach populations while providing the state with new skills and tactics to distribute services. In addition, many expected that such partnerships would
yield important benefits for associations by providing needed infrastructure and financial resources. Normative arguments were also made that associationalism presented opportunities to create more inclusive and less alienating forms of governance (Friedmann, 1992; Hirst, 1994; Cohen and Rogers, 1995). As Hirst notes Associations empower those for whom services are provided in diverse ways. Voluntary association is an alternative to top – down bureaucracy in the competent provision of services (Hirst, 1994, p. 6). As the ‘institutional crisis’ weakened traditional policy frameworks and new discourses provided ideas for conceptualising alternative frameworks, French politics pushed ‘associationalism’ into the centre stage as the principal alternative. A faction of ‘neo-proudhounists’ has long played a role in the French Socialist Party (Este`be, 1999). This faction has criticised top– down and centralised forms of governance, arguing that localised and participatory forms were both more effective and less alienating (Keating and Hainsworth, 1986). The political fortunes of this faction increased dramatically following the uprisings of 1968, the rise of the ‘new left’ and the growing popularity of regionalist social movements throughout Europe (Keating and Hainsworth, 1986; Wakeman, 1997). As the socialists came to power in 1980, several of their ideas were pursued but it was only after traditional top – down approaches fell out of favour with party leaders in the mid 1980s that ‘associationalism’ and its cousins ‘regionalism’ and ‘participatory democracy’ became the favoured alternative (Levy, 1999). Associationalism reached its apex as a concept when the leader of this faction, Michel Rocard, became prime minister in 1988. Thus, the e´nstitutional crisis of the state (ineffectiveness of top– down approaches), an emergent associationalist discourse and politics all contributed to the prominence of this policy framework amongst leading state officials.
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1.2 Explaining Failure: State E´litist and NeoMarxist Approaches How might one explain the inability of ‘associationalism from above’ to enhance state capacities, reinforce civil society, democratise the public sector and create a new sense of citizenship? Two prominent theoretical approaches could be used to explain the failure of the top–down associationalist project in France. The first may be called a ‘state e´litist’ approach. This approach is based on the assumption that state e´lites are perpetually threatened by countervailing forces in civil society, requiring them to use the state’s infrastructure to maintain their power over civil society (Mosca, 1939; Oppenheimer, 1975; Scott, 1998). The essential rationality of state officials is derived from an interest in maintaining a monopoly on the distribution of political power. Using this theoretical approach to explain the French case, advocates would argue that, as immigration and associations flourished in places only weakly controlled by the central state in the 1970s and 1980s, French officials mobilised to reassert control over these areas of society. In this context, associationalism would be viewed as a vehicle through which state e´lites have sought to reassert their power over civil society. The weakening of the associational sector discussed above, according to this approach, is consistent with the real intent of state officials. However, Ullman (1998) and Levy (1999) both provide convincing evidence that the key state officials charged with designing the associationalist framework in France were motivated by ‘good’ intentions. These were officials and career politicians who were long-time advocates of participatory and deliberative democracy. In this instance, the motives that the state e´litist approach typically ascribes to state actors are inconsistent with those of the architects of the associationalist strategy. The second possible theoretical approach is what may be called a neo-Marxist approach. This approach applied to the French case would suggest that the outcome described above is consistent with one of the state’s
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essential functions: to regulate class and social relations. Associationalism from above reflects an effort to create new forms of social regulation for a neo-liberal regime of accumulation (‘roll-out neo-liberalism’; see, Jessop, 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002). In particular, states have sought ways to replace expensive (universal) means for treating risks and inequalities with inexpensive (partial) means. The aim has been to respect fiscal limits while providing institutional supports for regulating social relations. Also, engagement with associations has allowed the state to subjugate the onceautonomous associational sector by buying it off through subsidies and/or through divideand-conquer techniques. As attractive as this argument may be, several problems beset it. According to its advocates, state officials are compelled by an abstract logic of capital to create new modes of social regulation (like associationalism) that are compatible with an emergent regime of accumulation. NeoMarxists fail to provide guidance on how individual officials are compelled by this abstract logic, or how officials know that the institutions they create are actually going to be functional for the new regime of accumulation (Elster, 1985, 1986). Also, much of the explanatory power of neo-Marxism is aimed at identifying the origins of state institutions, inferring the ultimate effects of these institutions from their causal origins. However, state institutions can produce effects that are independent of their origins, generating patterns of behaviour that were not the original intent of their architects (Skocpol, 1985; Katznelson, 1993). Thus, the neo-Marxist position has difficulty explaining how the practices of state actors originate in macro structures without resorting to functionalist and mechanical reasoning, and it underestimates the independent effects of state institutions on the practices of public and private actors. 1.3 The State Institutionalist Approach and Caging Civil Society Because state e´litist and neo-Marxist approaches seem to be insufficient for
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explaining the failure of a top –down associationalist project in France, the paper adopts what some have called a ‘state institutionalist’ approach (Skocpol, 1985; Mann, 1986, 1993; Levy, 1999; Lascoumes and Le Gale`s, 2004). This approach stresses that, although modern states depend upon the involvement and consent of civil society to achieve many objectives, states generate institutions that penetrate and (re)order civil society when implementing collective decisions (Mann, 1993, p. 59). The institutions and instruments used to achieve collective decisions often produce effects independently of their original intent. This approach often focuses on two institutional mechanisms through which state– civil society relations are mediated: bureaucracy and party competition. According to Weber, for modern states to exercise collective power in complex, territorially bounded societies, they require a massive organisational infrastructure (i.e. bureaucracy) (Weber, 1958, 1978, 1994). Such an infrastructure functions to co-ordinate the work of all those involved in state activities and to ensure a degree of uniformity in the implementation of collective decisions. State infrastructures necessarily result in divisions of labour in which certain participants are placed in supervisory roles while others are in implementation roles (Mann, 1986, p. 6). Thus, in co-ordinating and rationalising collective action, states rank actors by function and ensure (through persuasive and coercive means) universal compliance with rules and regulations. This system of orders claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens . . . but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis (Weber, quoted in Mann, 1993, p. 56). The bureaucratic infrastructure of the state is a key mechanism for structuring civil society by institutionalising power hierarchies and imposing rules and regulations that rationalise associational life. The more powerful a state is in achieving the collective goals of a society,
the more important are its institutions and rules for governing the everyday activities in civil society. As Mann suggests Infrastructurally more powerful states cage more social relations within their ‘national’ boundaries and along the radial lines of control between centre and territories (Mann, 1993, p. 59). Although the form of this infrastructure has undergone important changes since Weber’s time (i.e. flexibilisation, partnerships) (Pierre, 2000; Le Gale`s, 2002), formal changes do not by necessity diminish the centre’s (state) power to penetrate and shape the periphery (civil society) (Jessop, 2002; Fung and Wright, 2003a; Somerville, 2004). However, the modern state is not simply a series of bureaucratic mechanisms that ensure the uniform application of decisions throughout a delimited territory. The state is also penetrated by parties and interest-groups that compete with one another over the distribution of political power (Mann, 1993; Weber, 1994, p. 332). Competition for political power depends on the abilities of parties to increase their support bases in civil society. Support for a party can be gained for ideological reasons but, in most instances, parties gain support through their abilities to secure state resources and patronage for particular interest-groups. Parties are therefore the lynchpin between society and state: they provide citizens with a window to penetrate and shape states in ways that are consistent with their particular interests, but in gaining access to state power, citizens are required to abide by the rules and conventions that regulate the political game. To assess how ‘associationalism from above’ has affected the local associational sector in France, I examine how these two state mechanisms, bureaucracy and party competition, have intersected to transform the institutional spaces through which these organisations operate. State bureaucracy. In developing partnerships with associations to combat neighbourhood poverty and social exclusion, state
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officials in France have been required to create an infrastructure to co-ordinate complex partnerships and to ensure a degree of uniformity across the country. The development of a bureaucratic infrastructure has produced a division of labour, with public ‘partners’ assuming oversight and decision-making functions and associations assuming implementation functions. Placed as a subordinate partner within this apparatus, associations have been required to respond to rules and regulations used by the state to ensure national uniformity. These include standardised measures to evaluate performance, sectoral definitions that are inconsistent with their operating practice, and professional norms and standards. State officials who have advocated associationalism have therefore faced an important contradiction. On the one hand, they wish to realise all the advantages of associationalism and, on the other hand, they believe a large infrastructure is necessary to co-ordinate these efforts, an infrastructure that requires transformative changes in the associational sector itself. Party competition. The extension of the state’s infrastructure and resources into neighbourhoods provides an opportunity for political parties to extend patronage networks into these places. When political parties are given the authority of distributing public resources to associations (as was the case with the politique de la ville), they are provided with an even greater opportunity to develop patronage networks. As vertical relations between patrons and clients have strengthened, the horizontal ties between associations have weakened because associations are rewarded for their loyalty to political patrons and not for their friendships with other associations (especially if the associations are allied with competing political camps). Parties are caught in a similar contradiction to the one highlighted above. Although party officials often view the promises of associationalism as desirable, they are bound by the logic of party competition which compels them to engage in practices that undermine the associational sector.
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Nobody wants to be a ‘moral hero’ if it comes at the cost of losing political power. Thus, the extension of the state bureaucracy functions as a trigger for the politicisation of the associational sector. When partnerships are formed between the state and associations, bureaucracy and party competition are the primary mechanisms through which these relations are mediated. These mechanisms have intersected to create an institutional space that ‘cages’ neighbourhood associations in France. In order to survive, associations operating within this cage have been compelled to change their practices, becoming more professional, more political and more individualised. The individual responses of associations to this institutional space have added up to a change in the function of the associational sector itself. Whereas the sector once served as a relatively autonomous site for social bonding and the articulation of citizen concerns, it has now become a cluster of semi-professionalised and politically dominated set of service providers. In sum, during the 1970s, state officials were unable to respond to new socioeconomic problems through the existing policy frameworks of top– down dirigisme. The ‘bottom– up’ wing of the Socialist Party argued that associationalism could address these problems while providing a means to democratise the provision of welfare services. However, in applying this framework to treat social exclusion, a vast bureaucratic infrastructure was constructed to co-ordinate partnerships and to ensure a degree of uniformity across many different project sites. Associations were placed as subordinate partners within an emergent division of labour, obliged to follow new rules and regulations produced by public officials. Moreover, the expansion of the state’s infrastructure and resources in certain neighbourhoods made it possible for rival political parties to seek out new bases of support amongst local associations. Thus, this new state infrastructure plus party competition have created new institutional spaces that require associations operating within them to professionalise, engage in clientelistic
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relations with political officials and reduce their co-operation with neighbouring associations. 2. The Politique de la Ville: The Infrastructure of Associationalism from Above The associationalist framework was a central component of the urban anti-poverty policy known as the politique de la ville. This policy has undergone two distinct phases. The first phase was largely experimental, limited to a select number of neighbourhoods, and involved less state oversight (1981– 88). The associational sector faced fewer institutional constraints which permitted favourable partnerships between public officials and neighbourhood associations. The second phase reflects an effort to expand this experimental programme to a national policy. However, in going from a small to a large programme, state officials created a cumbersome bureaucratic infrastructure to co-ordinate partnerships and oversee the implementation of its goals. In addition, as the resources of the programme expanded and came under control of committees of local politicians, the politique de la ville presented competing politicians with new opportunities to use public resources to expand their bases of support in these neighbourhoods. 2.1 Early Responses to the Urban Crisis: Neighbourhood Development from Below, 1981– 88 Jacques Donzelot has argued that the most pressing issue in France has ceased being the ‘social question’ and has become the ‘urban question’ (Donzelot and Jaillet, 1997; Donzelot, 2001a). Whereas the ‘social question’ was concerned with the issue of integrating the industrial proletariat into society (Castel, 1995), the ‘urban question’ is now concerned with the issue of integrating impoverished neighbourhoods (banlieue) into the urban system (Este`be, 1999; Jaillet, 2000; Donzelot, 2001a). Such neighbourhoods have strong concentrations of
unemployed and ethnic minorities and frayed social institutions and, consequently, are sources of deep social unrest (Donzelot, 2001a). Using data provided by the Minister of Justice, Dikec¸ (2006) notes that 5 major riots in the 1980s and 48 similar disturbances in the 1990s originated in these neighbourhoods. The riots in November 2005 are the most recent expression of the long-standing discontent of the residents of these neighbourhoods. Existing research attributes responsibility for the creation of these types of neighbourhood to two factors (Chaline, 1997; Este`be, 1999; Body-Gendrot, 2000; Jaillet, 2000). First, historically, these neighbourhoods were the homes for blue-collar manufacturing workers. The economic crisis of the 1970s disproportionately affected this segment of the population. In absolute terms, unskilled bluecollar occupations declined from 3.8 to 2.5 million between 1975 and 1995 (Lipietz, 1996, p. 56). Secondly, there was a change in national housing policy which made it easier for middle-income residents to leave these neighbourhoods. French national housing policy in the post-war years provided affordable housing through public housing (‘aide a` la pierre’). Access to public housing was based on universal rather than means-tested criteria, providing young middle-income families an opportunity to save for private homes later in their work lives. Although blue-collar residents dominated public housing estates, universal access ensured a degree of class heterogeneity. In 1977, a programme was initiated to subsidise homeownership loans which provided higherincome-households a means to by-pass public housing estates (Preˆt pour l’Accession a` la Proprı´ete´). Also, the introduction of rent subsidies provided more mobile residents with the financial means to exit public housing estates for private rental markets (Aide Personnalise´e au Logement). The concentration of socially excluded residents in these places rose in the 1980s with the continued flight of the middle class, the introduction of means-tested criteria for public housing and high unemployment rates (Chaline, 1997, p. 16).
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In the early 1980s, the French state responded to the ‘urban question’ through the development of a set of innovative measures designed to redevelop these neighbourhoods. These measures were underlain by two essential principles: ‘territorial affirmative action’ (discrimination positive) aimed to provide additional resources and services to overcome the specific handicaps of neighbourhoods; and ‘partnerships’ between local actors (local authorities, state functionaries, neighbourhood associations) aimed to enhance the state’s capacities to respond to neighbourhood problems. Four reports outlined the measures involved (Aute`s, 1999; Este`be, 1999; Dikec¸, 2004). The most influential of these reports was Herbert Dubedout’s Ensemble Refaire la Ville. Its author was the mayor of Grenoble and a militant of the bottom–up faction (autogestion) of the Socialist Party. The report advocated a twopronged approach consisting of mobilising more resources to neighbourhoods in need (discrimination positive) and increased collaboration between residents, public officials and neighbourhood associations to find solutions to neighbourhood problems. Also, the report outlined the principal framework for conducting the politique de la ville—‘neighborhood social development’ (De´veloppement Social des Quartiers DSQ). The DSQ programme encouraged new partnerships of locally embedded stakeholders (local elected leaders, functionaries of several state agencies) to identify problems, outline solutions and mobilise collective resources. A formal organisation was created through DSQ to co-ordinate these partnerships. At the level of the neighbourhoods, the DSQ was organised primarily through the ‘local commission of neighbourhood social development’. Each priority neighbourhood had its own commission, which was accountable to the mayor of the municipality. The commissions were charged with the task of encouraging the participation of associations and co-ordinating local development efforts. The project manager (Chef de Projet) of a commission was responsible for everyday task management in specific
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neighbourhoods. At the national level, the National Commission of neighbourhood Social Developments (CNDSQ) provided loose oversight of local efforts. By 1984, 24 ‘priority neighbourhoods’ had come under the jurisdiction of this programme. While a bureaucratic infrastructure had been created to co-ordinate the programme, it was still very much in its infant stages. The rules governing partnerships were highly localised and depended on the negotiated interactions of actors in the different neighbourhoods (Donzelot and Este`be, 1993). Also, the lack of substantial resources and their control by the mayor of the neighbourhood provided few patronage opportunities for political parties in these neighbourhoods. Unencumbered by formal rules and regulations and competitive political actors, this institutional space favoured good relations between associations and public officials and between the neighbourhood associations themselves (Donzelot and Este`be, 1993; Este`be, 1999). 2.2 Expanding and Institutionalising the Politique de la Ville (1988 –95) Although the institutional context described above favoured ‘deliberative’ partnerships between associations and public officials, such partnerships nevertheless failed to redevelop a single neighbourhood. In 1988, the Socialist Party regained control of the national assembly after a two-year hiatus. The Rocard government (1988 –91) was under pressure to demonstrate its effectiveness to contend with the ‘urban question’ (Le Gale`s, 1995). As the standard-bearer of the bottom– up faction in the Socialist Party, Rocard viewed this as an opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness an associationalist framework (Ullman, 1998; Levy, 1999). Although Rocard’s version of associationalism lacked many of its most radical and anarchistic elements, it was nevertheless seen as an effective instrument to address emergent issues that had escaped the reach of the top– down dirigisme. It was in this context that the politique de la ville transitioned from
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being an experimental programme into a national programme applied to almost every French metropolis. There were 24 priority neighbourhoods in 1984, 148 in 1988, 546 in 1993 and more than 1300 in 1998. In moving from a small experimental programme to a large national one, the Rocard government needed to introduce a bureaucratic infrastructure that would perform two essential functions: provide a system to coordinate and divide tasks amongst all the different participants (national and local) in the policy; and, ensure that the goals of the central state were uniformly transmitted and implemented in the many localities throughout the country. The principal organisation responsible for co-ordinating national efforts in the first stage (1981– 88) was the National Commission of Neighbourhood Social Development (CNDSQ). In the context of an expanded programme, the CNDSQ lacked the logistical capabilities to co-ordinate partnerships and guarantee a degree of uniformity. The Rocard government responded by introducing a series of new mechanisms to achieve these functions. At the national level, the government created several bodies that assumed control over key decision-making functions. The Interministerial Delegation to the City (De´le´gation Interministe´rielle a` la Ville, DIV) was created in 1989 to encourage and co-ordinate the involvement of different state agencies in neighbourhood development programmes. In the same year, the Rocard government also created the National Council of Cities (Conseil National des Villes, CNV). The CNV was conceived largely as a consultative body made up of mayors and presided over by the Prime Minister. These efforts culminated in the creation of a ministerial post in 1991. The Minister of the City was responsible for establishing the basic objectives for neighbourhood redevelopment and co-ordinating activities amongst the state ministries. As the first Minister of the City explained I am not an administrator. My mission is to co-ordinate government policy for everything that touches the city. It is to make
things move in 15 ministerial departments (Delebarre, quoted in Este`be, 1999, p. 43; translation by author). The Rocard government also introduced several mechanisms to strengthen centre– local ties. The Minister of the City transmitted the different themes and objectives through the contrat de ville. This is a five-year nonbinding contract signed by local officials participating in this programme. Such themes have included the built environment, social services, insertion (economic development/ employment) and crime prevention/security. Within the framework of the contrat, local partners generate the specific strategies and tactics to address the themes. In addition, the sub-prefect of the city (sous-pre´fet de la ville) oversees negotiations between the principal stakeholders, ensures that local stakeholders do not veer from the principal themes handed down by the state and persuades and compels them to continue cooperating in the policy.1 Originally, the subprefect provided a direct link between the local partners and the Minister of the City. Thus, the contrat de ville and the sub-prefect have been the two principal mechanisms to ensure local compliance with state mandates and objectives. At the metropolitan level, provisions were also made to consolidate, co-ordinate and rationalise activities. The previous phase of the politique de la ville treated neighbourhood problems in an ad hoc way, endowing mayors and neighbourhood actors with the power to identify and solve problems as they saw fit. According to many critics, this framework deprived neighbourhoods of metropolitan-level resources (financial, technical, employment, infrastructure) that could have contributed to the development of these places. As a response to these criticisms, the government called for a new framework to connect priority neighbourhoods to the resources and opportunities of their metropolitan areas. This prompted a change in the name from Neighbourhood Social Development (DSQ) to Urban Social Development (DSU). More important than the change in name
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was the change in local partners and the functions assigned to each. With the emphasis now on metropolitan-level solutions, partnerships were broadened to include all the municipalities of the metropolitan area, and department and regional officials. Whereas the partnerships in DSQ centred on associations and public agencies and the division of labour remained loosely defined, partnerships in this new phase came to centre on public– public relations at the metropolitan level and the division of labour became institutionally fixed through a set of organisations that were charged with governing the redevelopment of targeted neighbourhoods. This local infrastructure was organised in the following way. Piloting committee (Comite´ de Pilotage). The signatories of the contrat de ville form a piloting committee (Comite´ de Pilotage) which is charged with overseeing the contract’s implementation. The committee is composed of the ‘official partners’ of the politique de la ville—i.e. central-city and suburban municipalities, the departmental council and the regional council. More concretely, the piloting committee determines whether contract objectives are being met, approves financing for projects, determines how to evaluate projects, reports to and negotiates with the subprefect of the city and negotiates over the next contrat de ville. This committee does not design or implement projects in the neighbourhoods, but it authorises and supervises those who do. Directors of urban and social projects (Maıˆtre d’Oeuvre Urbaine et Sociale, MOUS). Who actually implements the projects within priority neighbourhoods? Different actors (public officials, para-public agencies, associations) operating in priority neighbourhoods present project proposals to the piloting committee, alone or in partnerships. If the piloting committee believes that a project addresses one or more of the themes highlighted in the contrat de ville, it is likely that it will finance the project for a period of one year. At the end of the year, the directors of the project are required to resubmit a new
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proposal for funding. For a medium to large city, the piloting committee is likely to accept 50 or more different projects for each theme-area of the contrat de ville. These projects range in size from after-school activities offered by neighbourhood associations to large redevelopment projects initiated by the city, the Ministry of Infrastructure and parapublic organisations. However, the majority are small association-led projects.
Project manager (Chef de Projet). In each of the priority neighbourhoods, the piloting committee maintains a technical administration charged with overseeing the implementation of the contrat de ville. This administration is managed by a single project manager (chef de projet). The project manager is responsible for a wide variety of tasks including: encouraging local service providers to respond to the contrat de ville, animating local stakeholders to devise collective projects that address neighbourhood problems, evaluating and assisting the various projects being undertaken in the neighbourhoods, evaluating the general effects of the contrat de ville on their neighbourhoods and playing a mediating role between residents, public services and elected officials. Large cities with multiple priority neighbourhoods have umbrella organisations that co-ordinate the activities of project managers working in different neighbourhoods. This organisational infrastructure has functioned to provide a formal division of labour to co-ordinate the work and resources of all the local stakeholders involved in this policy. The effects of this structure have been two-fold. First, it has institutionalised a division of labour between public and associational partners, with public and political officials assigned to key decision-making tasks and associations relegated to playing an implementation role. Secondly, this infrastructure provides effective institutional means to oversee and ensure that all participants, from local officials to associations, comply with the rules and regulations elaborated by the central state.
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Thus, in 1988, the Rocard government saw the still experimental politique de la ville as a model for treating urban poverty at the national level. In generalising this ‘bottom– up’ approach, the government believed it necessary to introduce an infrastructure to co-ordinate the work of national and local stake-holders and to ensure a degree of uniformity across project sites. As a consequence, a new bureaucratic chain of command was formed that linked centre to periphery and provided discrete functions for each of the participating actors. At the top of this hierarchy stood the central state charged with designing the policy objectives; in the middle stood local public officials charged with devising local strategies and tactics to address state objectives; and at the very bottom stood the neighbourhood associations relegated to implementing the politique de la ville. As the infrastructure of this policy grew, the field within which neighbourhood associations operated became increasingly circumscribed by state power, regulations and norms. To reiterate a central point: the tightening of state constraints on the associational sector of these specific neighbourhoods did not result from an attempt to increase the ‘despotic’ power of state e´lites (power over countervailing forces in civil society), but to increase the state’s ‘infrastructural’ power (‘power to’ achieve a policy goal) to reverse neighbourhood poverty. 3. Tightening the Iron Cage in Toulouse: New Constraints on the Associational Sector This section of the paper examines how the mechanisms of bureaucracy and party competition constrain the operating logic of associations. The analysis of these general trends is supported by empirical evidence drawn from the case of Toulouse. Public officials in Toulouse had strong reasons to participate in the politique de la ville. By 1990, four large districts were classified as ‘priority’ areas’ and came under the jurisdiction of this programme2. These areas contained 49 879 of (municipal) Toulouse’s residents—that is, 14
per cent of its total population. While the official unemployment rate of the city stood at 11 per cent, it stood at approximately 22 per cent within these areas. Unemployment for youths between ages 15 and 24 stood at 31.7 per cent. Sixty-two per cent of residents depended on welfare in the form of housing subsidies, aid to families, income support and/or social minimum benefits (RMI and other allocations). As might be expected, immigrants were largely overrepresented within these areas, accounting for 19.5 per cent of the residents compared with 6.1 per cent for the city. 3.1 Co-ordination and Hierarchy: Institutionalising a Division of Labour and Regulatory Norms Donzelot observes that From the late 1980s onwards, the emphasis [of the politique de la ville] is displaced from civil society to the state. It is not that the resources of civil society are no longer being called upon to treat problems but, these efforts are now inscribed within a context increasingly defined by the state (Donzelot, 2001b, p. 39; author’s translation). One of the most important implications of this change was the designation of a new division of labour and its institutionalisation through a new bureaucratic infrastructure. The largely informal and still experimental framework in the early days of the politique de la ville did not sharply differentiate the functions and contributions of each of the partners, which provided an opportunity for all the participants (public, political and associational actors) to share in oversight, decisionmaking and implementation responsibilities. By contrast, this second stage of the politique de la ville clearly differentiated the roles, responsibilities and functions of each of the actors and institutionally fixed these differences through the bureaucratic apparatus described above. The central state reasserted its control over the programme by creating several new agencies and administrations (Minister of the City, De´le´gation
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Interministe´rielle a` la Ville, Conseil National des Villes, sous-pre´fet de la ville, etc.). At the metropolitan level, a ‘piloting committee’ was created to co-ordinate public–public partnerships. This committee was endowed with the authority to decide how state priorities and objectives should be fulfilled in local neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood associations had no authority to participate on this decisive committee. The new arrangements formally excluded neighbourhood associations from participating in deliberations, fixing their role to implementing projects with objectives that had been defined by the public partners. In this context, many of the policy instruments that had been used for the purposes of eliciting and co-ordinating neighbourhood participation in the first phase have now been redeployed for the purposes of monitoring, evaluating and measuring the output of the ‘associational partners’. The task of enforcing rules and evaluating output has been assumed by the project manager (Chef de Projet); the neighbourhood-level supervisors of the piloting committee. Project managers regularly evaluate and audit each association in the neighbourhood on behalf of the piloting committee. The reports provided by project managers help to inform the funding decisions of the piloting committee. Changes at the national level had an important impact in Toulouse. Throughout the 1980s, the core partnership centred on municipal agents of Toulouse and neighbourhood associations in two priority neighbourhoods (Bagatelle and Reynerie). These were relations developed within the framework of the DSQ. Local commentators note that this was a period of informal undertakings pursued by activist municipal agents and their associational partners in targeted neighbourhoods. Changes in 1988 broadened partnerships to include public officials throughout the metropolis, shifted the emphasis from public –associational partnerships to public– public ones and spurred a formal division of labour to co-ordinate the activities and contributions of all the stakeholders. The first contrat de ville for Toulouse (1989) called upon 28 different municipalities (including
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Toulouse), the department of Haute-Garonne and the state prefect to participate in planning and implementing the programme. One of the first documents binding these partners together, the Contrat de Ville de l’Agglome´ration Toulousaine (CVAT) states that The objective of the partnership embodied by this contrat de ville is the struggle against social exclusion in the neighbourhood, that is, it is the struggle against uneven urban development (double vitesse)3 (AUAT, 1988, p. 2; translation by author). Local actors organised their ‘struggle against social exclusion’ according to specific themes designated by the central state. The contrat furnished a division of labour for those involved in the politique de la ville. The piloting committee was made up of public and political officials and was delegated the authority to develop strategies and plans to address state-designated themes. The piloting committee has sought to realise the objectives of the contrat by contracting projects out to neighbourhood associations. Associations have become the primary vehicles for carrying out most of the projects of the politique de la ville; however, they bear no authority to participate in the decision-making process. Associations participate through largely symbolic consultative sessions with the public partners. Commenting on this, the director of Urban Planning for the Department of Haute Garonne notes We have public consultations with the associations and the residents. Madame de Verinyas (city), Madame Touchefou (department) and other partners are present. It is always the same system: the tribune with the public leaders placed above and the people who participate below. For us, that is participatory democracy (personal interview, L. Delthil, 2002). Public partners ensure that associations are responding to policy objectives through two principal mechanisms: a yearly funding process and day-to-day supervision by the project manager (Chef du Projet).
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Associations must reapply for project funding on a yearly basis to the piloting committee. Proposals are drafted in co-ordination with the project manager. The project manager encourages associations to design projects that are consistent with the needs of the neighbourhood and the objectives outlined by the piloting committee. Individual officials evaluate the projects before they arrive at the piloting committee for formal deliberations, assessing whether projects cohere with their particular institutional and political needs. Although project managers play an important oversight role in the yearly funding cycle, they also play a pivotal supervisory role in regulating the daily activities of associations. The project manager of Bellefontaine/Reynerie remarks We supervise all activities of the associations. We still need to improve our supervising capabilities over hard functions such as the analysis of objectives, marketing and the quality of services provided by associations. To better monitor these areas, we will contract a consulting firm that specialises in these types of activities for private businesses (personal interview, B. Isaac, 2002). Project managers monitor associations by maintaining close contact and by holding frequent meetings based on the themes of the contrat de ville (Commissions The´matiques). If they discover that associations are not meeting the expectations of the public partners, they can make recommendations to discontinue funding. Thus, a system of checks has formed to ensure that associations are in compliance with the rules, regulations and norms of local and national public/political officials. 3.2 Politicising Partnerships and Institutional Fragmentation Institutional changes were not limited to the creation of a new bureaucratic chain of command, but they also introduced new forms of political competition. In particular, by delegating local political officials with authority over the decision-making process
and the distribution of financial resources, local political officials were provided an important opportunity to use their newly acquired powers to expand their bases of support in these neighbourhoods. The programme increased the total amount of resources going into these neighbourhoods and it charged political officials with the task of funding different projects.4 Funding decisions are no longer made by the mayor of the municipality in which the neighbourhoods are located. They are made through a deliberation process of public functionaries and local political officials sitting on the piloting committee. This has created opportunities for rival politicians to use the distribution of state resources to compete for new bases of support in these neighbourhoods. The expansion of the programme has also resulted in the incorporation of many public and political officials with a range of different competencies and areas of specialisation as ‘partners’. In spite of efforts to achieve a degree of coherency and cohesion through the bureaucratic infrastructure described above, the politique de la ville is beset by internal fragmentation, which has given rise to a high degree of complexity and interagency competition (‘turf battles’). The French administrative court (Cour des Comptes) has cited fragmentation as barrier to achieving the goal of neighbourhood development. The energy required to make this system function in a satisfying manner (meetings, information exchanges, consultations and negotiations) is diverted from implementing concrete and effective operations (Cour des Comptes, 2002, p. 7, translation by author). Associations must often comply not only with regulations and requirements of the principal steering agency of the politique de la ville (piloting committee), but they must also comply with the regulations of each of the agencies they encounter. When rival political parties control different public agencies and those parties are required to co-operate on a common project, battles over bureaucratic turf and political power merge to form
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challenging fields within which associations must operate. In Toulouse, 28 different municipalities (including Toulouse), the department of Haute-Garonne, the region of Midi–Pyre´ne´es and several public and para-public agencies are all members of the piloting committee. Each of these actors is supposed to contribute institutional expertise and resources to the collective effort of redeveloping neighbourhoods. The city has competencies in the realm of the built environment, the department in social services and the region in economic development. However, whether actors bring their resources and expertise to the table and combine them in effective development packages has depended largely on the quality of relations between them. In Toulouse, such relations have been weakened by political rivalries between a department that has long been controlled by the left and a city that has long been controlled by the right. The second phase of the politique de la ville called upon the department to contribute its resources and expertise in the area of social services to the enterprise of redeveloping neighbourhoods. Department officials saw this as a political opportunity to participate in the governance of neighbourhoods where residents reflected the traditional constituents of the left (working-class minorities) but remained under the political control of the right. Gaining a foothold in these sizeable areas (accounting for 14 per cent of the population) could provide the window needed for the Socialist Party to reestablish its political hegemony over the metropolis. In such a context, Toulouse officials were not receptive to the prospect of sharing control of these neighbourhoods with their principal political rival. Franc¸ois Simon, leader of the Socialist opposition in the Toulouse city council, remarked All of a sudden, the city was told that it was going to have to develop a partnership with the Socialist department to manage a number of their neighbourhoods. These were neighbourhoods only weakly controlled by the city. Of course, this was not embraced by Dominique Baudis (the mayor) and
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Madame de Verinyas (the mayor’s first adjunct) (personal interview, F. Simon, 2002). Making matters worse, the decentralisation laws of 1982 reinforced the power of council executives and mayors which had the effect of personalising these political and institutional rivalries. These conflicts have presented important barriers to effective cooperation amongst these public bodies. There is a double conflict here: one over territorial power and the other over politics. They work off one another, inflaming the relations, making it difficult for any form of co-operation to be achieved (personal interview, F. Simon, 2002). The combination of political competition and institutional fragmentation has meant that the principal public partners of the politique de la ville (city and department) have spent much of their time either trying to protect their ‘fiefs’ (the city) or trying to gain new grounds (department). As one local observer notes The left and the right have been heavily involved in the politique de la ville. Their partisans try to recuperate the politique de la ville for electoral gains. The city and the departmental council both use it for electoral purposes, to say they do good things in the neighbourhoods, to gain new bases of support. Everybody tries to use it for their own political ends (personal interview, N. Boukais, Director, Politique de la Ville, Midi-Pyre´ne´es, 2002).5 As a consequence of these political manoeuvrings, the public–public partnerships that are at the heart of this policy are weak. This is not a good partnership. It is based on very thin interests of trying to receive state financing, avoid sanctions, and increase political power (personal interview, M. de Nardi, Director, Politique de la Ville, for the Ministry of Equipment, 2002). Simon adds, The weakness of the system is that, for it to function well, each of the partners has to
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work together. If there is a situation in which each of the actors plays a game for self-interest, the system will have a hard time working (personal interview, F. Simon, 2002). Because the effectiveness of the politique de la ville largely depends on the quality of public– public partnerships, the conflictual relations here described have limited their abilities to achieve the goal of neighbourhood redevelopment. One long-time observer provides a concrete example of how power conflicts have undermined efforts All the competent actors are in place, they all know their publics well, they all know what needs to be done, they all know the financing needed to get the project done and then, bam, one actor feels that their participation will augment the power of the partner and based on that, refuses all participation in the project (personal interview, L. Delthil, 2002). Another public official observes The political relations between actors have turned the piloting committee into a battleground. Lose some votes in the last election, voila`, we’re going to rescind the agreement we just signed at the last meeting. Many things in the piloting committee work like that (personal interview, F. Thiveaud, Director, Politique de la Ville, for the Department of HauteGaronne, 2002). Because a low sense of trust between public partners makes large projects difficult, the politique de la ville has largely consisted of a series of micro projects carried out by individual neighbourhood associations. Commenting on this situation, a departmental councillor notes I am all for small projects because they get things moving on the ground. But these small projects, when lacking proper articulation, do not resolve the problems. Such actions reflect acts of charity rather than real resolutions (personal interview, C. Touchefou, 2002).
Unable to accomplish most of the state’s objectives through these micro projects, the public partners resort to ‘pretending’. Pretending refers to gestures and actions made by public partners to be in full compliance with central-state mandates, allowing them to reap the rewards of the programme, avoid state sanctions and give the impression of being a ‘good student’ of the national urban policy. “Partners often play the game of ‘pretending’ for the sake of receiving the funds offered by the state” (personal interview, N. Boukais, 2002). The collective practice of ‘pretending’ tends to manifest itself in costly reflections, studies and reports. We often produce reports to analyse why suggestions made in the last report were not pursued. Reports on these reports are then written. This produces a web of words and ideas for why actions are certainly justifiable in the city. In a very mysterious way, these words are then presented as proof of action (personal interview, L. Delthil, 2002). When asked about the achievements of this programme, most public officials respond with counterfactual reasoning, “How would these neighbourhoods be today without the politique de la ville?” (personal interview, C. Touchefou, 2002). Rather than measuring outcomes in terms of the ability to achieve the official objectives of development and integration, outcomes are now measured in terms of the ability to stop the further decline of neighbourhoods. In more than two decades of existence in Toulouse, the politique de la ville has yet to ‘redevelop’ or ‘reintegrate’ a single neighbourhood under its jurisdiction. 3.3 Caging Neighbourhood Associations: Professionalisation, Clientelism, Individualisation If this new institutional space presents associations with new bureaucratic and political constraints, why do associations engage? For most small neighbourhood associations in areas covered by the politique de la ville, the public sector provides the primary means of financing. In these neighbourhoods, a substantial portion
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of public-sector funding is channelled through the highly politicised, bureaucratic and fragmented piloting committee. In seeking out this financial support, associations are required to submit to the specific institutional constraints already outlined. Only associations that can find alternative sources of funding can escape this cage. Because this institutional environment is particular to the geographical areas under the jurisdiction of the politique de la ville, associations operating outside them do not experience the same constraints. Of the 23 interviews performed with associations in the neighbourhood of Reynerie, only 3 received less than 25 per cent of their financing from the piloting committee.6 In exchange for a subsidy, associations are required to perform many of the tasks outlined in the contrat de ville, from providing after-school programmes to job-training services. Associations must also comply with the formal and informal rules that govern the allocation of public resources. Those that do not comply risk losing funding. Explaining the weight of this risk for associations, one veteran of the associational sector comments, “If the public partners do not want to fund the association, the association has to lay off its workers and it begins a slow death” (personal interview, H. Alawi, Maison du Quartier Bagatelle, 2002). The material dependency of associations on public partners has reinforced their dominated position within this system. Contending with these institutional constraints has led to new patterns of behaviour including professionalism, clientelism and individualisation. Professionalisation refers to the systematic rationalisation of the discourses, methods and actions of associations according to the standards and norms established by public partners. Professionalisation occurs because funding criteria require associations to reflect professional qualities and complex funding procedures require qualified salaried employees (rather than volunteers) to manage finances and write proposals. One veteran of Toulouse’s associational sector remarks You are obliged to have salary workers to get funding. In order to have salary
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workers you have to have money. To have money you have to fill out grant applications. To fill out grant applications you have to have somebody who knows something about them. The small associations can no longer survive if they don’t have professionals, people who can fill out the applications, know accounting, know how the funding system works (personal interview, A. N’Gondy, Association Hasure, 2001). The project manager is charged with supervising whether associations comply with publicsector expectations. Many observers note that these constraints have spurred major changes in the associational sectors of these neighbourhoods. There were professional associations 20 years ago but there were far more citizen-type associations. Now the balance has tipped far in the other direction (personal interview, A. Chafa, Association Reflet, 2002). The effects of these changes are not limited to what these associations do on a day-to-day level; they have also transformed the role associations traditionally played in forming neighbourhood-level political consciousness. This was a neighbourhood that was always difficult to pacify. The associations were composed primarily of volunteers and militants. When the public sector started financing them in the late 1980s, there began to be fewer volunteers and more salary workers and then as a result, more need of money. Therefore, one normalised the associative tissue and in the process, much of the militantism that existed before was lost (personal interview, S. Sarducci, Ge´ne´ration Solidaires, 2002). Thus, in extending the institutions of the politique de la ville over neighbourhood associations, state managers have precipitated a process of professionalisation whereby associations function as professional service providers rather than as formative sites of an autonomous and politically engaged citizenry. Political competition has aggravated the uncertainty of the funding process. Not only
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are associations funded on a short-term yearly cycle, public partners often use the threat of suspending funding as a negotiating lever. One associational veteran recounts The department council began to threaten the suspension of funds. It is a negotiating tactic like any other. Blocking funding to associations functions as a double leverage, in one direction it disciplines associations and in the other direction it forces the mayor’s representatives to capitulate (personal interview, S. Sarducci, 2002).7 Others note that suspending funding can also result from associational resistance to political partners. The representative of the sub-prefect notes There is an example of an association in the Reynerie-Bellefontaine neighbourhood that was not funded for reasons that we believed to be strictly political. We stepped in and funded them because it was clear to us that this association was doing very good work with respect to the objectives of the politique de la ville. That happens enough to say that it is a common practice (personal interview, E. La Coste, Associate Director, Politique de la Ville, for the Regional Prefect of Midi– Pyre´ne´es 2002).8 The uncertainty of the funding system combines with the competitive political relations between the public partners to encourage clientelistic relations. Competing political actors are in search of new bases of support in the neighbourhoods and associations are in search of powerful public patrons (often called ‘interlocutors’ by the associations) to minimise the uncertainties of the funding process. Clientelistic relations are formed through a number of informal and formal exchanges between associations and public officials sitting directly on funding commissions. These relations are considered as crucial for associations seeking to reduce the risks associated with the funding process. In exchange for consistent funding, associations are expected to reciprocate in a variety of ways, from offering a particular programme to posting electoral literature. The director of
one association recalls how a supportive public official called upon his association to reciprocate We received a letter from an elected official saying to us that they supported our project. This was not an official notification. He said, ‘OK, I helped you, so . . . ’. This is common not just with the departmental council but with members of the city council as well. They say, ‘we helped you, thus . . . ’. Nothing is ever said directly but a repayment is what is expressed (personal interview, D. Firmiez, Association Vivre Ensemble, 2002). An opaque funding process and clientelism tend to generate strong levels of distrust among associations. Competition (real and perceived) between associations has reduced incentives for co-operation. As one commentator notes There is a ‘phantasm of competition’ that results from how things are financed. Things aren’t clear so there is a belief that each association is competing with each other for funds and that the institutions are manipulating us. Whether these things are real or not, the phantasm of competition is real which has strong effects upon the relations between the associations (personal interview, D. Firmiez, 2002). The ‘phantasm of competition’ captures an atmosphere of distrust in the associational sector but many commentators note that real competition is alive and well. The director of one association explains that he chooses not to work with other associations because he fears losing clients to them. I might get along with those people but I don’t want to work in partnerships with them. I don’t want my kids going to their centers because that jeopardises our funding (personal interview, Bonnet, 2002). A local politician directly links the existence of competition (real and perceived) to the funding criteria established by herself and her partners, “Many associations have been created in the past 10 years but our funding
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techniques have increased competition between them” (personal interview, C. Touchefou, 2002). The general level of distrust places significant limits on opportunities to build bridges with other associations in the same neighbourhood (Putnam, 2001). Many associations prefer to pursue activities individually, wishing to avoid any risk of losing funding opportunities to another association. Competition, insecurities, and the games they (public partners) play result in each association preferring to stay in its own corner. If you work closely with another association, you might be forced to say things, reveal things. This type of insecurity means that we talk to each other but only on very superficial matters (personal interview, D. Firmiez, 2002). Such relational barriers not only stifle the generation of social capital, but they also make it difficult for associations to mount collective projects. The absence of interassociational councils or collective projects reflects the distrustful associations. A 1999 evaluation of the politique de la ville in Toulouse found that only 1 in every 10 projects originates from more than a single stakeholder (Colle`ge Coope´ratif Provence, 1999, p. 33).9 A general perception held by most participants in the politique de la ville is that associations have largely adapted and internalised the new rules of the game. This has created the general impression that associations have lost control over their fates, becoming mere instruments of the public partners charged with running the politique de la ville. Occupying a subordinate position in an institutional field, possessing no legal authority to participate in the decision-making process, depending on this public-sector funding for their normal operating costs and facing a high degree of uncertainty, associations have few options but to operate according to the rules of the game. One public official observes There is a process of self-instrumentalisation. In order to respond to the demands of the public sector and receive financing,
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associations adopt the language and practices that satisfy the public partners (personal interview, J. Personnaz, project manager, for Empalot, Politique de la Ville, 2002). This concept of self-instrumentalisation is an indication that associations not only adapt to new codes and rules, but internalise them in the process of seeking to respond effectively to their new institutional field. In many of these neighbourhoods, associations once provided residents with a venue for articulating social and political concerns in relative isolation from the market and state. The loss of autonomy and control of associations (‘instrumentalisation’) has worked to undermine this function by requiring them to focus primarily on service provisions and discouraging them from taking any actions that may risk their funding. One regional councillor explains it in the following way One of the less positive results of the politique de la ville is that it has been put into place by associations, that is, civil society. As a result, the once-rich civil society in these neighbourhoods, one of their principal assets, has become almost totally dependent upon political actors for financing. Such a situation has limits in terms of the performance of the associations and in terms of their abilities to represent the interests of residents. The associations, which are becoming more and more institutionalised, are becoming less representative of resident interests (personal interview, C. Iborra, regional councilor, Midi– Pyre´ne´es, 2002). Thus, extending state infrastructure to achieve the goals of the politique de la ville has inadvertently led to the penetration, reordering and transformation of the associational sector. Competition for funding, clientelism and an atmosphere of distrust favour individualisation and increase the barriers to strong horizontal ties between associations. In addition, strong incentives to provide professional services and strong disincentives to engage in activities that risk funding close off the use of associations as places where residents
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might associate. As the associational sector has been more tightly integrated into this infrastructure, its functions have shifted dramatically: from facilitating the construction of collective identities, goals and action in these neighbourhoods, to providing services on behalf of the state. 4. Concluding Comments Associationalism was a method to enable partnerships between the public sector and thirdsector associations in the particular policy areas. Its advocates argued that the incorporation of associations into policy-making process would enhance the capacities of the state to respond to new types of social problem. In the case of France’s politique de la ville, this policy method has yet to fulfil its more far-reaching promises. Rather than fortifying the associational sector, it has contributed to its transformation by imposing bureaucratic and professional norms and by triggering the politicisation of the sector. Such effects have weakened the sector’s abilities to function as spaces of neighbourhood cohesion, contributing to the social disorganisation of problematic neighbourhoods. The capacity of the associational sector to articulate the interests of local residents and to express those interests to the state has been severely weakened, resulting in few organised and constructive alternatives to express dissent. In the absence of this, the deep-seated grievances found in these neighbourhoods are expressed through the form of the riot, as recent events in France have demonstrated. The interpretation of this paper has been informed by a ‘state-institutionalist’ approach (Skocpol, 1985; Mann, 1993; Levy, 1999). This perspective is well suited to assessing how formal institutional constraints found within the state influence the strategies of public officials and the impacts of such strategies on civil society. It is used here to explain both the rise of a constraining institutional edifice and the particular effects of this edifice on the operating logic of neighbourhood associations. First, state officials operating in good faith sought to foster
partnerships that would generate benefits for the state and the associational sector, and that would spark the regeneration of deprived neighbourhoods. However, as state officials, they were obliged to create and impose a bureaucratic infrastructure to co-ordinate complex partnerships and to ensure a degree of uniformity across the nation. This infrastructure formalised a division of labour, with associations placed in a subordinate position, and introduced new funding measures controlled by rival political parties. Secondly, associations found that they not only had to conform to new bureaucratic requirements but also they had to respond to an increasingly political funding system. Bureaucratisation triggered the politicisation of the associational sector, compelling associations to professionalise, politicise and individualise their practices. Thus, the state-institutionalist approach is well suited to understanding both the causes and effects of the institutional cage erected to govern la politique de la ville. As noted in the introduction, political regimes as varied as the European Union, the US, Brazil and Kerala in southern India have pursued associationalist approaches in varying policy areas including welfare, urban redevelopment, education and municipal budgets (Fung and Wright, 2003b). As this method has become more popular, it is increasingly important to identify the set of factors and processes that undermine intended goals. This paper attributed responsibility for the failure of the associational approach to the institutional mechanisms of bureaucracy and party competition. In looking at the French case within an international context, we are compelled to ask whether the mechanisms identified here are generalisable, or are they limited to the particular national context? The first part of the answer is that all public officials who introduce an associationalist framework must contend with certain institutional constraints. They must introduce bureaucratic mechanisms to co-ordinate complex partnerships, ensure compliance with state expectations in project sites throughout the country and assess the outcomes of
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these projects. The resulting bureaucratic infrastructure not only introduces new rules and regulations, but it also generates a division of labour that distributes power unequally to those involved. Because state officials come into these partnerships with more power than associations, they generally occupy dominant positions. Consequently, subordinate associations tend to experience a decline in their autonomy and are increasingly required to submit to their new institutional constraints. Also, party competition is a general feature of societies (see, Mann, 1993, pp. 52 –61). When states develop partnerships with associations, parties are presented with the opportunity to use state power and resources to create and solidify bases of support in civil society. Once parties begin to respond to this opportunity, it becomes very difficult for any single party to disengage from these practices. Parties are obliged to compete through the associational trenches of their cities. Thus, the first part of the answer to the general –particular question is that, generally, associationalism from above entails a degree of bureaucratisation and politicisation. The second part of the answer is that the degree to which bureaucracy and party competition constrain associations varies according to how power is distributed and the presence of ‘countervailing power’ in any single political regime (Fung and Wright, 2003b). France has long maintained a system of ‘top– down’ adversarial governance characterised by small communities of state and economic e´lites overseeing distinct policy sectors (Gre´mion, 1976; Wright, 1978, 1984; Keating and Hainsworth, 1986). In addition, the associational sector has long been weak and fragmented, presenting little in the way of countervailing power. In such a context, the effects of bureaucratisation and party competition have been magnified and, as a consequence, associations face severe institutional constraints. In a country with a more collaborative tradition of governance and with a stronger associational sector, we could expect the effects of bureaucratisation and party competition to be tempered. The associational sector would face some
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constraints associated with bureaucratisation and party competition, but these constraints would be mitigated by a collaborative governance tradition and the high degree of countervailing power. Thus, while ‘associationalism from above’ generates new constraints resulting from bureaucratisation and party competition, the degree of these constraints varies according to the traditions of governance and countervailing powers found in specific countries. Might there be a way to ‘fix’ the French version of associationalism to enable stronger, more equal and more participatory partnerships? There are certainly some short-term fixes that could be undertaken to address some of the more egregious problems. For example, partnerships could be depoliticised somewhat by transferring funding decisions from local politicians to the prefect. This simple fix would take away one of the more important levers of power exercised by politicians over neighbourhood associations. However, this and other short-term fixes can address some of the more egregious problems, but they alone will not result in more equal and participatory partnerships. For longerterm fixes, local associational sectors need to enhance their countervailing powers. This is a rather complicated process involving the development of strong horizontal ties between associations, the creation of new organisational infrastructures and the formation of political and mobilisation capacities. Institutional arrangements in France have blocked this process by atomising associations and raising the risks for engaging in politically contentious activities. Under such conditions, it seems unlikely that the local associational sector can develop the necessary levels of countervailing power to deepen the associational project in France.
Notes 1. 2.
There were 13 sub-prefects in 1991 and 31 in 1993. These zones are Empalot, Faorette-BagatelleBordelongue, Les Izards and ReynerieBellefontaine.
1800 3. 4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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The concept ‘double vitesse’ generally refers to processes of uneven development. State investment in the politique de la ville increased dramatically over this period of time: 3.2 billion francs in 1986, 3.8 billion in 1989, 7.2 billion in 1993 and 12 billion in 1996 (Chaline, 1997, p. 187). Echoing this sentiment, another commentator notes, “Each actor tries to have their names associated with this or that project to increase their chances of affecting electoral outcomes” (personal interview, B. Latge´r, Director,Grand Projet de Ville, Toulouse, 2002). In the Empalot neighbourhood, the project manager notes that 25 of the 30 neighbourhood associations receive more than 25 per cent of their funding from the politique de la ville. Another observer notes, “There are a lot of conflicts between the departmental council and the mayor’s office, the associations have been held hostage to this conflict, literally . . . It is not always like that but there is always that threat, from all sides” (personal interview, C. Quievreux, Association Salamandre, 2002). Another observer goes on to say, “The threat of suspending funding or not is a very important stick used by the partners to discipline the associations. Associations can do very little with respect to this” (personal interview, H. Alawi, 2002). Franc¸ois Simon remarks The associations have been subjected to the politics of the municipality. You are working with the municipality in a co-operative fashion then you get your money. If you dare not to co-operate, then you will be cut off or forced to wait. I have seen this happen over and over again. This is a normal practice (personal interview, F. Simon 2002). Another commentator notes Why don’t the associations contest, why don’t they make claims? They don’t contest anymore because they simply cannot afford to upset any of the funders. If they upset a funder, that could be the end of the association (personal interview, H. Alawi, 2002). The director of the MDS notes It is true that there is competition between associations. It is true that the politique de la ville has had the unintended consequence of reducing the global vision within the associational sector by encouraging competition within the same fields. We have to be very vigilant that there is more complementarity and co-operation and less competition between the associations (personal
interview, C. Soule´, Director, Social Development Mission, 2002).
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