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Desecuritization in protracted conflicts: audience-level peace promoting activities in Cyprus BISA Conference – Brighton, June 2017
Constantinos Adamides1 Protracted and intractable conflicts are more often than not characterized by an environment where securitization is deeply-rooted, and the securitizing acts are routinized and frequently institutionalized on an elite level. In such settings, political elite may have incentives to perpetuate the securitized environment or they may be unable to interrupt the conflict-perpetuating routines, even if they wished to do so; inevitably desecuritization attempts on an elite level are rare and to a large extend ineffective. As a result, most desecuritization attempts derive not from mainstream securitization actors, such as political elite, but rather from members of the ‘audience’ through peace-promoting and reconciliation activities. This paper, using the comfortable, albeit protracted and intractable, conflict in Cyprus, examines several forms of peace-promoting attempts. Specifically, the paper examines (a) why some members of the audience – on both sides of the Buffer Zone – stand out and manage to ‘escape’ the deeply securitized environment; (b) how they try to promote peace and desecuritization; (c) how they utilize local and international resources (e.g. media) and discourses – and in turn how they are utilized by international actors; and (d) why they have not yet managed to have a significant impact on changing the deeply securitized Cypriot status quo.
1 Dr. Constantinos Adamides is an Assistant Professor of International Relations and the Director of the Diplomatic Academy at the University of Nicosia. Contact info:
[email protected] and at www.unic.academia.edu/ConstantinosAdamides.
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The aim of this paper is aims to demonstrate how securitization in protracted conflicts could potentially have a different role than simply to provide actors with access to extraordinary measures. Specifically, it discusses how a deeply and routinized securitized environment hinders elite-level and audience-driven desecuritization attempts. The paper starts with a brief overview of the securitization/desecuritization theory, followed by how the latter could be understood in protracted conflicts. The third part provides a short introduction to the protracted Cyprus conflict and how the internalized securitized threats and routines are shaped by and shape the Cypriot environment. The final part focuses on top-level and audience-driven desecuritization attempts and how the aforementioned environment decreases, if not eliminates, the chances for success. It must be noted that this is a working paper and the focus is currently on the Greek Cypriot community. Securitization – a brief overview Securitization is about processing a threat through a specific security format; hence ‘a discussion of security is a discussion of threat’ (Wæver 2011: 472-3, emphasis in original). As Buzan (1997 and Buzan et al. (1998) point out the security focus should be widened and the discussion on threats should not be limited to a single sector, the military, but should rather be extended to other sectors as well, namely the political, societal, environmental and economic. This constructivist and widening approach was not unopposed. On the contrary, traditionalist security scholars argued that the broadening of the security agenda and the introduction of non-military issues undermines the field’s ‘intellectual coherence’, while others highlighted the danger of not being able to differentiate between existential and ordinary risks (Huysmans 1998; 2002). Wæver and the other so-called Copenhagen School scholars have rejected the criticism that within the framework of securitization everything could become an issue of security, arguing that securitization provides a very clear sense ‘of what security is’ (Wæver 1994). Specifically, within the framework threatarguments justifying the use of extraordinary measures must i) establish that there is indeed a threat, ii) that the threat is potentially existential and iii) establish the relative advantages of security handling as opposed to non-securitized handling (Wæver 2011: 473). Thus, securitization is the process where issues turn into matters of security through political intervention; these ‘security matters’ are then taken outside the boundaries of normal politics and the mainstream ‘rules of the game’ and are subsequently treated as special kinds of politics or beyond politics,
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therefore potentially justifying actions that fall out of the ordinary political procedures (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-4). At the core of securitization lies the idea that security is a speech act;2 thus, by labeling something as a security issue, something is done. In other words, ‘the utterance itself is the act’; ‘the word “security” is the act’ (Wæver 1995: 55, emphasis in original). The actual utterance of the word security, however, is not a necessary prerequisite for a security speech act, as security and the need for emergency measures (i.e. appeal for urgency) could be connoted or inferred with the use of other words or terms (Buzan et al. 1998). For an act to be considered successful the securitizing actor needs to convince a significant audience – one that would grant the actor the access and legitimacy it requests. There is in other words negotiation between the actors and the audiences, thus forming an intersubjective process (ibid). Subsequently, securitization success lies in the production of a ‘security label’ that will be supported or tolerated by an audience (Wæver 1995: 50) and not necessarily in the presence of a ‘real’ or actual threat. Similarly, the presence of a ‘real’ threat is not a guarantee for successful securitizing acts. As Wæver (2011: 472) notes, many real threats do not come with a ‘label’. Precisely because securitization is based on speech acts, security becomes a self-referential practice; it is the securitizing agents that define and give meaning to security, meaning that ‘security is what actors make of it’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 48). Subsequently, security has a fixed meaning for both the actor as well as the audience, ignoring the intentions of the actors as well as the context in which the process takes place. Huysmans (2002) warns us of this limitation pointing out that the theory ignores that security is entrenched in a symbolic and cultural order, which influences actors and audiences alike in the way security is practiced. Similarly, Stritzel (2007) argues that the Copenhagen School ignores the relational dynamics of social and political processes that generate meanings for actors and audiences, while Balzacq (2005: 171-72) explains that the context in which actors operate is just as important as the psycho-cultural predispositions of the audience.
2 For more on speech acts see J.L. Austin (1967)
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The second area that was at the epicenter of criticisms was the disproportionate attention given to the securitization process and actors compared to the role of the audience (Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008, Williams 2011). Specifically, there is a gap in the literature regarding the presence, or rather the absence, of ‘multiple audiences’ (Balzacq 2005; Huysmans 2006; Stritzel 2007; Salter 2008; Roe 2008), as mainstream theory essentially treats the audience as a single homogeneous actor. However, there are multiple audiences that could extend legitimization to the securitizing actors’ acts. Roe (2008) suggests that audiences could be split into formal and informal based on the kind of support they can provide the securitizing actor. Similarly, Huysmans (2006) separates the audiences into popular and technocratic, while Salter (2008; 2011) splits it further into elite, technocratic, scientific and popular, arguing that success in one or more setting (e.g. technocratic) does not necessarily mean success in others (e.g. popular). This problem is not unrelated to the aforementioned criticism as different audiences have diverse symbolic and cultural orders and they frequently operate in different social contexts. The social context and historical realities may also lead to the bifurcation of audiences within the same audience category; individuals adopt different historical and ideological identities meaning that that within each kind of audience (e.g. public / popular category) one may find different sets of groups predisposed to different perceptions of threats. Subsequently, even within the same category securitizing acts may be successful only for some sub-groups, but not for the entire category. The insufficient attention to the role of audiences becomes even more important in areas where securitization is routinized and the objectives of securitizing actors are not necessarily to upgrade an ‘ordinary’ political issue into one that should be treated as existential threat. The theory treats the audience as a group of individuals that need convincing for the presence of a threat. The aforementioned scholars improved the theory by arguing that there is no ‘single’ audience. That said, they too took for granted that any audience needs to be convinced. However, in some cases, especially if securitization is routinized and even institutionalized, the audience is already convinced of the threats and thus the securitization process differs (Adamides 2012). In these environments the audience(s) expects that the elite and other securitizing actors will continue to maintain the securitized environment. In these cases, the audiences will not necessarily grant access to additional extraordinary measures to these actors if they continue to securitize certain referent objects, but may ‘punish’ them in the event they fail to do so (ibid).
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Desecuritization It is worth noting that the Copenhagen School scholars do not always consider the process of securitization to be a positive development even if the goal of this process is to achieve more security. The aim, they argue, should be towards desecuritization, or ‘the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 4). That said, they also point out that desecuritization is not always better than securitization as the latter is preferable in the abstract, but some concrete situations may call for securitization instead (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 2011). Following the same securitization logic, desecuritization should be the responsibility of securitizing actors, albeit the goal is towards the opposite direction. It is, in other words, usually up to specific individuals with the necessary social – and more often than not political – capital to remove something from the sphere of the existential to that of the ‘normal politics’. As opposed to securitization however, most times approval by a given audience is not a necessary prerequisite, not least because desecuritization is usually considered to be a positive development. This is especially the case in conflicts where the default (theoretical) discourse and stated goal of the actors involved is the resolution or de-escalation of a conflict; a position that should, theoretically, meet no opposition by the relevant audience(s). However, this may not always be the case in protracted conflicts, as desecuritizing attempts could potentially be perceived as an existential threat and thus face severe opposition, direct or indirect. The opposition could derive on two levels, namely i) other elite and mainstream securitizing actors such as those who oppose a settlement of a conflict because the conflict-perpetuating routines are too convenient and beneficial, and ii) by some members of the audience (e.g. public) who might not be ready to accept a change of the status quo and the disruption of the routines that would potentially create anxiety. The role of the audience is under-examined in the descuritization literature; even more so compared to that of securitization. Specifically, there is no in-depth analysis of whether the audience could become an obstacle for desecuritization or a force of desecuritization and in what ways. This paper focuses on the latter.
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Protracted conflicts and routinized securitization Buzan et al. briefly mention in their work that ‘securitization can be either ad hoc or institutionalized. If a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized (1998: 27)’. They also acknowledge that issues that are already defined as security issues may not be dramatized or prioritized (ibid: 28). However, securitization in some cases may not simply evolve beyond an institutionalized sense of urgency. Under some circumstances the entire process of securitization, including the choice of referent objects, sources of threats and security grammar, may evolve into something diachronic, almost permanent, to the extent that it becomes part of the society’s political and social routines (Adamides, forthcoming). To use a business term, securitization may become a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), where actors and audiences know exactly what to do and how to react. There is in other words a form of routinized securitization where the ad hoc part of the process is almost non-existent; it is as if there are specific, albeit unwritten, rules that actors and audience alike follow (ibid). Routinized securitization is more likely to be observed in environments where threats to specific referent objects and the sources of threats are deeply internalized by the public, the media and political elite. Prime examples of such environments are conflict areas, especially protracted conflicts, with well-established perceptions of threats on specific referent objects and of enemyothers that cause those threats. In such areas the political discourses as well as the media coverage regarding the development of the conflict and any relevant security risks are frequently formed and reiterated in a securitization framework that remains relatively unchanged in terms of process, objectives and agents involved. Thus, while the security grammar maintains the same structure, the process is different primarily because there is no need for ‘negotiation’ between the actors and the audiences (ibid). More specifically, what is argued is the significant possibility of experiencing guaranteed securitization success, as the audiences are already convinced of the existential threat. More importantly however is the possibility that certain political conflict-related discourses must follow the established securitization approach even if that means perpetuating the conflict. Subsequently, the actors’ options of either desecuritizing or not securitizing certain referent objects or potential sources of threats may be limited. Securitizing acts are conscious political choices (see
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for example Williams 2007), which means that there is the choice to either engage in a securitizing act or not. However, in cases where securitization is institutionalized in the official discourses and routinized in terms of frequency this political choice no longer exists and the option of ‘nosecuritization’, (i.e. option not to securitize an issue) may thus not be available to the securitizing actors. In other words, political elite and media agents may engage in a form of involuntary securitization, as the cost of not securitizing an issue is particularly high (Adamides, forthcoming). At best, political elite or media agents who choose to deviate from the established securitizingsupporting discourses may be considered as ‘soft’ against the enemy and at worst as traitors. Similarly, the audiences may also engage in involuntary acceptance of a securitizing act or a constant securitization process simply because it is the norm to accept specific security risks as existential threats from specific sources of threat. Examples from protracted conflicts, violent or non-violent, such as the Arab-Israeli and the one in Cyprus respectively, elucidate the aforementioned argument. For instance, for the Greek Cypriot community - which is the focus of this paper - the source of threat is always Turkey and any referent object associated to the conflict and Turkey, such as the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and the physical security of Greek Cypriots, is automatically (and perhaps obligatorily) securitized by elite and accepted as a threat by the public. In such conflict areas the mode and direction of securitization may also deviate from the mainstream elite-driven top-down path. In cases where the threat is internalized and the expected policy responses well-established we might observe ‘horizontal securitization’, which, as the name suggests, takes place on a horizontal level making the process essentially ‘peer securitization’, challenging thus the mainstream top-down approach (ibid). This mode of securitization takes place on a micro-level, where the securitizing actors are individuals without any significant social capital and their aim is not to influence the masses (i.e. the wider audience), but rather their immediate periphery (peers, family, colleagues, etc.). The actors on a horizontal level do not necessarily benefit personally and they do not request access to emergency measures. Their aim is rather to transfer their own security perceptions to their peers, especially if the latter are contemplating the possibility of deviating from the established perceptions regarding the threats faced by the community. If these views echo the ones that are articulated by mainstream actors such as political elite, then the horizontal process influences the mainstream top-down securitization process by
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supporting other actors’ positions and acts. Thus, on a horizontal level, members of audiences that become actors themselves could potentially and inadvertently become ‘ambassadors’ of the mainstream securitization actors. The case of the Cyprus Conflict The so-called Cyprus Problem is one of the most contemporary protracted ethnic conflicts. There is abundant literature on the subject with conflicting views on what has caused it, on who is to be blamed for its perpetuation and on the structure of the ‘final settlement’. The conflict is viewed as ethno-national (Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz 2006), with disputes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as an issue of incompatible subject positions (Diez 2002), as the outcome of regional and superpower interests and interferences (Hitchens 1984), or as a combination of any of the above. It is not surprising therefore that Cypriots perceive the international community as biased and as a potential threat, rather than as a force for settlement (Adamides 2014). In Cyprus there exists a double minority environment where both Greek and Turkish Cypriots feel, and could be, considered a minority. The Turkish Cypriots constitute approximately 20% of island’s population and they are, therefore, a minority in Cyprus. However, if the two so-called motherlands, Greece and Turkey, are taken into account then Greek Cypriots are the minority. The close ties and partial dependence of the two communities with their respective motherlands - especially between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey - coupled with the historical and frequently violent inter-communal and inter-state relations have rendered Cyprus vulnerable to external influences (Richmond 2002) and contributed to the development of a climate of sustainable securitized relations between the two sides. One of the most challenging areas of contention is that of sovereignty, questioning the degree of local power distribution and whether sovereignty should be full or constricted, single or divided, de facto or de jure (Constantinou, 2008). Greek Cypriots, which also enjoy the international recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, argue for a right for full sovereignty over the entire island, including the northern part, which, since 1974 is not under the control of the government. Thus, Greek Cypriots view the problem as one of invasion and occupation as the territorial and political integrity of the island was violated by force in 1974 with the Turkish invasion (Stavrinides 1999).
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Turkish Cypriots on the other hand view the conflict as a domestic problem of persistent ethnic persecution and subsequently argue for a settlement that would take into account the realities of the post 1974 period, namely two distinct geographical regions, north and south of the Green Line (Constantinou and Papadakis 2002). Currently the conflict could be characterized as a ‘comfortable conflict’ without any violence - with minor exceptions since 1974 - albeit it is also in a state of illiberal peace (Adamides and Constantinou 2012). Top-Down Desecuritization attempts Both sides of the conflict continue to emphasize the importance of settlement and adopt a discourse that highlights the associate potential economic and security benefits. However, they always add a ‘tail’ to the discourse that stresses on one hand that it is not any settlement that would work, but rather a viable and fair solution – or as they say “with the right content” –and on the other that the ‘other side’ does not demonstrate the same truthful desire towards settlement. The problem with this two-sided ‘tail’ is that the ‘correct’ and ‘viable’ solution is perceived by each side in diametrically opposite ways. Similarly, the accusations for lack of truthful efforts by the ‘other’ not only destroys any desecuritizing attempts that focus on the benefits of a settlement, but also further confirms the solidified and internalized perceptions that the ‘other’ is untrustworthy and is after a win-lose outcome, rather than a win-win one that ‘our’ side seeks to achieve. Thus, the official desecuritizing discourses are self-destroyed by the same actors who propose them. This problematic strategy usually occurs because in the back of these elite minds is that a deadlock is indeed the most probable outcome and they do not want to be the ones to receive the blame. Thus, the practical default path is the safest one, which focuses on ensuring that their side will not take the blame for a failure. This means that much of the energy is consumed in blaming the other for being intransigent, untruthful, untrustworthy, etc. and less on the actual resolution efforts. The fear of the political cost for being too soft or too compromising, in the event that a leader may be willing to deviate from the established aforementioned path, is an additional obstacle that favors the perpetuation of the existing, but failing, negotiations routines. Thus, desecuritization would have been more possible if the aforementioned self-sabotaging behavior was the only concern, as there would always be the possibility that at some point in time
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there would be actors that would not add the ‘tail’ to their discourses. The problem with deeply securitized protracted conflicts, like the one in Cyprus, is that there is competition among the securitizing actors, whose political power largely depends on their ability to maintain a discourse that would render them important to the eyes of the society; that discourse, more often than not, revolves around the internalized threats of the conflict, which in turn revolve around the ‘enemy other’. This is an environment where when Actor “A” securitizes any referent object related to the conflict, there are essentially only three major options for actor(s) “B”: i) counter-securitization; ii) desecuritization attempt; or iii) out-bidding securitization. All three options aim to benefit Actor ‘B’ or at least diminish the gains of ‘A’. Counter-securitization refers to the securitization of the alternative option.3 In the second case, if ‘A’ attempts to securitize an issue, ‘B’ may attempt to desecuritize it, so that all or most audiences reject A’s acts. The aim may not be for ‘B’ to gain anything, but rather to prevent ‘A’ from benefiting. The last case, which is the most interesting scenario, takes place in environments where many issues are already securitized. In contexts where the audiences have internalized perceptions regarding specific threats and thus expect certain issues to remain securitized, actors cannot easily afford to either engage in counter-securitization or desecuritization, as they would run the risk of losing their political importance. Frequently, they engage in an outbidding process of constant securitization in an attempt not in order to convince the audiences that something is indeed an existential threat, but rather that they are the most suitable to handle the threat. In these cases, we see routinized securitization of the same issues by multiple actors, albeit with a slightly different ‘spin’. If this outbidding takes place for a long time it also becomes institutionalized as it becomes ‘standard’ behavior even when there is no securitization ‘outbidding war’. Therefore, where one actor may stop at the ‘tail’ where a solution is necessary and beneficial but “only if…”, his/her political opponents will commence from the “only if” part and engage in securitization out-bidding, emphasizing on one hand how the first elite under-estimates the threat and on the other to demonstrate why he/she is more suitable to handle the problem. The outcome is that the descuritizing part proceeding the “only if” part is forgotten or destroyed, as the focus of all elite shifts solely on the second part. Overall, it is extremely difficult for any elite to focus on desecuritizing without an opponent emphasizing the (political) 3
For instance, during the Annan Plan period in Cyprus actors were securitizing either the rejection or the acceptance of the Plan, creating thus a situation with mutually exclusive positions. Both choices for the referendum (accept or reject the Plan) were deeply securitized, creating therefore an environment where the same issues were securitized from different angles or essentially counter-securitized.
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cost of the concessions made to achieve the goal. To make things worse, even if an opponent from ‘your’ side does not emphasize the cost, the elite from the ‘other side’ who was part of a tit-for-tat deal will emphasize them, albeit as a political victory for his/her ‘side’ in order to justify why he/she had to make the concessions he/she did. Needless to say that any gain by the one side – especially if publically advocated – will immediately receive a negative spin by the other. Indicative of how difficult top-level or even externally-driven desecuritization attempts are, is the fact that not even the so-called peace dividend benefit could create a significant incentive for desecuritization. Indeed, despite the fact a settlement will most likely lead to major economic benefits (see for instance Mulen, Apostolides, Besim 2014), the peacedividend was never a real incentive for Cypriots to vote in favor of a settlement at the expense of political costs. With the abovementioned in mind, essentially all tangible elite-level desecuritizing attempts in the Cyprus conflict are carried out through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Some are more meaningful and impactful than others, as is for instance every additional crossing point opening, which has an actual impact on the daily lives of the citizens in both communities. Other attempts are more symbolic, as is for example the common presence of the two leaders at concerts in both sides of the buffer zone. The usefulness of a piecemeal process through the promotion of a number of ‘major’ CBMs has been examined elsewhere (Adamides et al. 2014). Specifically, those CBMs – e.g. the opening of Varosia and and the use of the Turkish-Cypriot-controlled (and unrecognized by the RoC) airport “Ercan” – would be measures that would actually have a significant impact on the people’s lives, but also on the nature of the conflict and the resolution efforts. However, none of them were ever implemented, not least because they were securitized and perceived as an existential threat to the bargaining positions of the two sides and as too ‘disruptive’ of the status quo. There is little doubt that elite-level descuritization actions through CBMs or other activities were unsuccessful and unable to either desecuritize the deeply internalized threat-ridden environment, or to create a momentum for more ‘radical sacrifices’. In other words, those measures could not create a virtuous tit-for-tat situation that could lead to a positive escalation of increasingly more important activities that would enhance the trust between the two sides on an elite and public level.
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Fig. 1 Davos - Division
In early 2016, for the first time the Turkish Cypriot leader was invited to the World Economic Forum at Davos, with the support of the RoC President, Nicos Anastasiades. As expected those who fear the ‘upgrading’ of the ‘TRNC’ opposed this move. Specifically, they argued that the Turkish Cypriot side was upgraded, while the Greek Cypriot was downgraded; thus the RoC and the areas not controlled by the Republic were perceived to be equated, something that promotes the permanent division of the island.
Phileleftheros 21/1/2016
Audience-driven desecuritization Until 2003, almost 30 years after the forced 1974 division of the island, there was essentially nonexistence communication between the two sides as there were no options (with some very minor exceptions) for crossing to the ‘other side’. Thus, common Greek and Turkish Cypriot activities were not only rare, but more often than not unacceptable and inexcusable by the majority of the population. In the rare occasions that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could get together and engaged in any form of bi-communal activities, they were perceived as non-patriotic at best and as traitors worse, while their names would appear in “name and shame” lists in national newspapers. In 2003 a few crossing points were opened for the first since 1974, making interaction easier and more probable. While interaction inevitably increased, during the first years of the crossing points openings (2003-2010) individuals were reluctant to develop profound relationships with the other side and if they did they were somewhat reluctant to admit it, mostly because of peer-to-peer pressure. This was applicable even to academics who, theoretically, should be more open to such relations and less likely to be influenced by the deeply securitized environment. In 2009 the author conducted a survey inviting all the academics in the Greek Cypriot community to respond to questions pertinent to activities – or lack of them – with Turkish-Cypriot colleagues.
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The results were particularly interesting and they corroborated the hypothesis that the deeply securitized environment decreased the chances for disrupting the existing routines and status quo. Many Greek Cypriot academics were unwilling to cooperate with Turkish Cypriot colleagues out of fear of recognizing the “TRNC”, while at the same time some of them even engaged in horizontal securitization to stop other Greek Cypriot colleagues from cooperating with Turkish Cypriots.4 This is particularly interesting and indicative of how influential institutionalized securitization is. While it is impossible for individuals to recognize an entity or state (e.g. TRNC), the subject of recognition has been so routinely securitized that even the most highly educated part of the population has internalized the threat and thus accepts and reiterates the relevant securitizing acts. Even the academics that have cooperated with Turkish Cypriots were not comfortable with the issue of recognition. Only half of them (51%) cooperated in the areas not controlled by the Republic. Of the remaining half that did not engage in any cooperation activities in the areas north of the Buffer Zone, 53% of them said they would not do so in the future. This is an indication that even those academics who are willing to have a more open relationship with the ‘other’ are influenced by the routinized securitization of specific issues. The aforementioned environment is not surprising given that at the time there was little support either by (most of) the media or by political elite. However, over the past few years things have changed. There is much less criticism by most media and political elite for interaction with the ‘other’, thus allowing individuals from both sides of the buffer zone to interact more freely and, more importantly, show their interactions without concerns of being labeled as traitors. Similarly, there is much less horizontal securitization as it is generally accepted that some individuals will cooperate with Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively. This change could be attributed on a number of factors, the most important of which are: •
Growing fatigue of the lack of resolution of the conflict, and the growing acceptance of the notion that most politicians do not really try hard enough to resolve the conflict so as to maintain their political importance.
4 Specifically, 65% of the academics who did not cooperate with Turkish Cypriots rated the option (out of 8 possible options on why they did not cooperate with Turkish Cypriots) ‘I do not want to recognize the TRNC’ as very important. This was by far the most popular choice. It is worth noting that Greek Cypriots perceive recognition-related issues as part of the overall security issue. Horizontal securitization refers to peer-to-peer acts with the aim of convincing peers that a specific referent is under existential threat and thus he or she should either do or not do something to avoid that threat.
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More interaction with the ‘other’ and the collapse of the myth that the ‘other’ is an existential threat (on a personal level – not necessarily a political one). Similarly, there is also the debunking of the idea that through personal professional cooperation and/or social interactions the TRNC’s recognition status will change.
•
The support of some of the major newspapers on both sides for any form of bi-communal pro-reconciliation activities.
•
The growing number of NGOs that host common activities.
•
The growing low-level political activities and social interactions of Greek and Turkish Cypriot political elite, such as attending music concerns together on both sides.
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The growing use of social media, especially by the younger generation who has established links and friendships with the ‘other’.
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The decrease of horizontal, peer-to-peer securitization, but also because there is fatigue by those who oppose the pro-reconciliation groups –e.g. newspapers no longer care to “name and shame” individuals or organizations.
•
The development of a small critical mass. This is perhaps the most important factor; there is now a significant – albeit a rather small – number of individuals who are actively involved in bi-communal activities and can support each other. There is also the inherent perception that they have the moral high ground, as they are pro-settlement (the opposing view is that these people are naïve as political settlements cannot be reached and be maintained through such activities). However, as discussed later, this critical mass is big enough to allow these individuals to operate relatively hassle-free, but not big enough to have a significant impact. Fig. 2 Davos – not a real threat
Politis – 23-1-2016
Figure 2. is a response to those who try to securitize the developments at Davos. Specifically, this cartoon shows three political elite – and major securitizing actors who focus on the Cyprus problem – trying to convince the ‘average Cypriot’ that the meetings at Davos are major threat, when in reality they are not. Even though the cartoonist here tries to desecuritize the developments by debunking the elite who attempt to securitize them, he very clearly demonstrates the ‘tail’ of any attempt, namely the potential threat of any positive attempt (which is what the
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All of the aforementioned factors, with the exception of some media efforts (see for instance Fig. 2) which is a more mainstream actor-driven action, have contributed to a new style of desecuritization efforts, namely bottom-up or at least horizontal-level activities, where ordinary people attempt to contribute to the resolution of the conflict through their actions. This approach could be labeled as audience-driven descuritization. Obviously, this begs the question, of what is the ultimate goal, who is the recipient and have their efforts been successful? Before responding to this question it is worth examining the kind of activities that fall into this category. There are two broad categories; the first encompasses activities that are developed and operated by organizations – mostly bicommunal – such as the Cyprus Academic Dialogue (CAD) and the Association for Historical
Fig. 3. #UniteCyprusNow
Dialogue and Research (AHDR). Such organizations aim to approach various subjects of the conflict from a more academic perspective, but they are not necessarily comprised of just academics. Once a recommendation is developed it is usually presented to local political elite, as well as to external agents that have an active role in the negotiations, such as Turkish and Greek decision-makers, and to diplomats of important-for-Cyprus states such as the those from the US, UK and Russia. The second category are individuals who are not necessarily represented or represent a specific organization, who get together to demonstrate their desire for settlement. The latest example is the ongoing (May-June 2017) effort by several individuals from both sides who gather together every day at the Buffer Zone in Nicosia to ask for the reunification of the island. As expected, their efforts are also evident on social media, such as Facebook and Twitter with the hashtag #UniteCyprusNow. Indeed, three weeks after this effort commenced (by June 12th) over 3,500 Facebook users have change their profile photo into one that includes the hashtag “#UniteCyprusNow” (Sigmalive, 9/6/2017); Fig. 3 is an indicative example. Unlike the pre-2010 environment described above, since 2010, and for the factors mentioned above, individuals and some NGOs have managed to escape the deeply securitizing routines and openly engage in bi-communal activities. Not only they were ready to act outside the established
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routines, but they would also be willing to publicize their efforts and even criticize the ones who are not participating. This is indeed an interesting development that requires a more profound research in order to understand what drives these people towards this path, other than their willingness for settlement; a desire, which, theoretically, even the ones not participating in such activities, share and support. It is worth reiterating the support of at least one media outlet in each side of the Green Line that offers support, publicity and legitimacy to these efforts. Not only it supports them, but it also criticizes the political elite who present the settlement of the problem as an existential threat.
Fig. 4. “solution in “the cave allegory”
Figure 4, is an indicative example of how one newspaper criticizes the securitizing actors who present the settlement as an existential threat. The cartoon shows a frightening shadow accompanied by the word ‘ΛΥΣΗ’ [settlement/solution], with reference to Platos’ cave allegory. In this case, the connotation is that Cypriots do not know anything else other than the conflict, because (some) political elite present the settlement as a ‘monster’
Politis – 25-7-2015
(i.e. existential threat) and the Cypriots are thus accustomed to this image and are unwilling to
explore or even question whether there are other possibilities (i.e. “do not know what is outside the cave”). With the exception of the mainstream media-driven desecuritization attempts, do the other NGO and individual-based activities actually qualify as audience-driven desecuritizing acts? They do, in the sense that they attempt, on one hand to demonstrate that it is possible and desirable to live with the ‘other’ and on the other that neither the ‘other’ nor the settlement are actually an existential threat, and thus they should not be treated as such. Furthermore, they request that politicians treat the conflict as a solvable problem that can and should be handled within the realm of normal politics.
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The most important question is whether such activities actually have an impact and the answer is neither
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Fig. 5. Invitation for gatherings
straightforward not definitive and depends what is expected from such activities. In other words, for now the answer is yes and no; yes, they do have an impact on the society – albeit it is questionable to what extend – and no, they are unlikely to desecuritize the environment to a degree that the conflict-perpetuating routines will be disrupted to the extend that they will push the political settlement within reach. As mentioned there are over 3,500 individuals who have changed their social media photos to demonstrate their support for this new activity, and the invitations to participate at the daily gatherings in the Nicosia Buffer Zone are constant among ‘digital-friends’ on Facebook (e.g. Fig. 5.). Indeed, this particular action gained significant attention in the media as well, which essentially means that it would also gather the attention of political elite. So, in this respect, it has been successful. Indicative of this success was the participation of Nicos Tornaritis, one of the most important MPs of the biggest and governing party DISY, and the Secretary General, Andros Kyprianou, of the second largest party, the leftist AKEL (Figs. 6 & 7).5 While the presence of well-known and influential politicians is of utmost importance, there are two important issues that are worth considering, that could potentially be evidence of an inadvertent backlash. The first is that the presence of the political elite is essentially symbolic. Specifically, these individuals – and others like them – that have visited the rallies are unlikely to change their established political positions vis-à-vis the Cyprus problem, either on a party-level or during the negotiations with the ‘other’. They do, of course, demonstrate that theoretically they are in favor of a Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation (BBF) in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots should live together. This is of course important to note and
5 It should be reiterated that the focus of this paper is mostly on the Greek Cypriot side. Given the language
constraints I could not follow the Turkish Cypriot press closely. Thus, I am not aware which Turkish Cypriot political elite visited the rallies. In the final version of the paper, this and other similar relevant data from the Turkish-Cypriot side will be incorporated.
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emphasize, but this is not new in any way; it is part of the official discourses of almost all political parties. It is also important to note that the two Greek Cypriot parties who had presence in the rallies are ideologically opposed to the so-called Center Parties which, generally speaking, oppose such gatherings and activities. The fact that there are elections in less than a year should not be discounted as a potential incentive for the presence of these elite. Fig. 6. Nicos Tornaritis
Fig. 7. Andros Kyprianou
The second and most important issue has to do with the impact of these elite on the overall impact of the events and the aforementioned backlash. One should expect that if the leadership of the two biggest parties (with approximately “60% combined power” in the elections) was behind this rally, the presence of ordinary people would be much greater; yet it was not. Does this demonstrate that the political parties do not really care to promote them? In any official party rally of any of the two aforementioned parties the number of people would be many times bigger than the one at the Buffer Zone. Similarly, does this mean that the rest of the people who see their elite there do not believe that this is anything more than a gathering of the ‘usual suspects’ (the already “converted”), but it is not something that the rest of the population should be concerned with? Either way, failure to gather more people after three consecutive weeks, with the support of newspapers from both sides and that of some political elite, could inadvertently weaken both the efforts and the potential impact of such activities.
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It must be noted that all audience-driven desecuritization attempts since 2003 have never managed to develop a necessary sufficiently big enough critical mass that would create significant social pressure to the elite and to the rest of the population. The aforementioned and most recent example is witness to this weakness – and the small numbers despite the presence of the two biggest parties and the support of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot newspapers – only corroborates the hypothesis that audience-driven activities are unable to bring together many people. Thus, what we observe in all such activities, be it of academic or social nature, is a “recycling of the same people”; in simple words, the ones who organize it are essentially preaching to the converted. Such activities do not seem to have a major spillover impact in the society outside those who are active advocates of a settlement. This inability could be attributed to several factors such as: •
Dominant perception that these individuals cannot offer any concrete recommendations, or, in simple words, there is the perception that such gatherings are dominated by oversimplified political analyses and recommendations based on wishful thinking.
•
Many individuals who do not participate have not managed to escape the deeply securitized environment and still feel uncomfortable participating in such events. Therefore, several individuals who might have been willing to participate are skeptical, while the vast majority that does not think about the Cyprus problem on a daily basis simply chooses the ‘safe path’, namely the established routines that do not include such activities.
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The majority of the people are not optimistic about the outcome of the negotiations, while almost a quarter of the people do not want to reach a settlement (see Fig. 8.). Thus, they do not feel it is worth spending time in such activities. Fig. 8 – Hopes and desire for peace process. Source: SEED (2016)
•
Similarly, if 77% and 84% of Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively are unhopeful or unsure of the outcome of the process (Fig 8.), it is unlikely that they will be convinced that their presence on a (small-scale) rally will change things.
The aforementioned factors focus on the inability to generate a critical mass that could potentially create a significant impact. It is worth noting that there is no indication that even if the number of participants grew significantly the outcome would have been different. While this is a counterfactual hypothesis, I believe it is unlikely that any audience-driven activities would have a significant impact for a number of reasons, the most important of which are outlined below.
•
As desecuritization efforts grow (or the securitization of the lack of settlement depending of how one perceives it), so will the counter-securitization efforts, which will highlight the dangers of reaching an agreement that is not “appropriate” with the “other.” Similarly, we
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should expect intense efforts to re-highlight the lack of trust between the two sides and more importantly between Greek Cypriots and Turkey. Indeed, every negative positon from the ‘other’ side receives disproportionate attention in the media compared to any positive one (which almost never perceived as positive). Lastly, we should expect “attacks” – personal or collective – against the desecuritizing actors. Figures 9 and 10 are indicative. Politicians and individuals involved in such activities are still on the receiving end of heavy Fig 9. Altered images…
Fig. 10. Cultures of Peace and War
criticism and occasionally misinformation (i.e. fake news), albeit to a lesser degree compared to a few years ago. An indicative
Phileleftheros 29/11/2015
example, is a an altered image of the Fig. 6 mentioned above, where the sign that MP Tornaritis holds was changed into this one (Fig. 9), and reads “Girne – I don’t Forget [in Greek]”6, connoting of course that the specific individual is unpatriotic to say the least. The specific image was heavily disseminated on social media, which is also an indication that all audience-driven desecuritization activities will face opposition in the digital arena as much as in the real one. Similarly, some media outlets perceive such activities as actions that completely disregard the 1974 invasion; furthermore, they criticize the prorapprochement position that those ‘who still remember’ are promoting a culture of war 6 The expression “Δεν Ξεχνώ» (I do not forget [the occupied areas]) is an expression that has been used for
decades by the Greek Cypriot community, especially during school years. “Girne” is the Turkish name of “Kyrenia”, the most iconic city in the northern part of Cyprus. Thus, the expression would have been “Κερύνεια – Δεν Ξεχνώ» (Kyrenia – I don’t forget).
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(Fig. 10). In simple words we observe a division within the society that is likely to grow stronger if and when (a) the two sides are closer to a settlement or (b) the pro-reconciliation groups grow bigger in number and/or in influence.
•
There is no clear “requests” or “political positions” other than the ones along the arguments of “Unite Cyprus Now”, “leaders, show courage” and “we can/want to live together” by the groups and individuals engaged in the aforementioned activities. The problem with such demands is that no political elite will tell you that he or she is against a settlement or that he/she lacks the leadership skills or the necessary will for the settlement of the Problem; on the contrary they will support “your” claims, but will blame the “other side” for not doing enough. Unlike cases like the Middle East where people were advocating for true democracy, empowerment and human rights, in this case the demands are rather generic and lack the necessary clarity for specific changes in the way negotiations are conducted or on the positions the two sides should take. Furthermore, there are no clear suggestions on how to resolve zero-sum problems that most likely the participants of those audience-driven activities would be in disagreement amongst themselves. For instance, the issue of guarantees (i.e. whether or not Turkey should have the right of intervention in Cyprus in the post-settlement era) seems to be irreconcilable and a deal-breaker for both sides; the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots consider this to be of utmost importance and would reject any proposed plan if the guarantees were eliminated, and Greek Cypriots consider it inconceivable and would also reject a plan if the guarantees are not eliminated. Thus, the audience-driven desecuritizing activities cannot offer any solutions to such highpolitics issues, just like they cannot really apply pressure to any political elite to simply “unite Cyprus now” without first resolving/agreeing on those zero-sum problems.
•
The final and most important factor is based on the latter argument and more specifically on how the high-politics issues will always overshadow any audience-led requests for settlement. Specifically, the deeply securitized issues that, after all, are part of the people’s routines and identities, cannot be easily desecuritized through social/academic activities, but only through political actions. In simple terms, deeply securitized threats (such as the issue of guarantees) must be eliminated from the top-down, as individuals are unlikely to
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ignore them, irrespective of how much they want a solution or how much they believe that the average Greek or Turkish Cypriot is not a threat. Similarly, for as long as opinion polls demonstrate that any solution would be unacceptable if certain high-politics issues are not resolved, the less likely it is for political elite to actually feel pressure by audience-driven activities; on the contrary they will feel enabled to maintain the existing adamant positions on those important issues, they will not attempt to make concessions and, on the contrary, it is more likely to re-securitize the already deeply securitized issues, not least because that would provide them with more political support, while at the same time it would reduce the chances of facing too much opposition from their political opponents. This paper paid particular attention to the last audience-driven activity as it is the largest of its kind, the most recent one and the one that has received the most attention by the media, social media and even political elite. That said, it must be noted that every year there are dozens of activities that take place on both sides of, or within, the buffer zone. As things stand, while all audience-driven activities are very important in demonstrating the ability of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live together and their willingness to reunite Cyprus, it is unlikely that they will actually be able to either desecuritize the deeply securitized issues, or apply sufficient pressure to political elite in Cyprus or abroad – mostly in Turkey – to make the necessary political concessions that would satisfy the ‘other’ side. The deeply securitized zero-sum environment, the strong opposition forces and the inability to present clear suggestions on how to resolve the most important issues place the audience-driven desecuritizing actors at a disadvantage.
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