Balkan Islam and Malay Islam as Branches of Islamic ...

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Balkan Islam and Malay Islam as Branches of Islamic Civilisation An Introductory Discussion of Their Similarities and Differences Osman Bakar Introduction The main contention of this brief essay is that Balkan Islam and Malay Islam both deserve to be treated as veritable branches of the global Islamic civilisation and of the global Muslim ummah in particular. By Balkan Islam we mean Islam as understood and practiced in the Balkans throughout its historical presence in the region. We are speaking here of a religious and cultural presence that is traceable to as far back as the tenth century. Likewise, by Malay Islam we mean Islam that is understood and practiced in the Malay speaking world in Southeast Asia over the last ten centuries or so. Rather interestingly, we are speaking here of two branches of the global Muslim ummah that are more or less of the same age. The tenth-century scholar, Abu Raihan al-Biruni (9731051), who was also a noted geographer and considered by many historians of science as the greatest Muslim scientist to have ever lived, made the following observation about the simultaneous penetration of Islam to the Balkans and the Malay world in the tenth and eleventh centuries: Islam has already penetrated from the eastern countries of the earth to the western; it spreads westward to Spain (Andalusia), eastward to the borderland of China and to the middle of India, southward to Abyssinia and the countries of Zanj (i.e. South Africa, the Malay Archipelago and Java), northward to the countries of the Turks and Slavs. Thus the different peoples are brought together in mutual understanding, which only God’s own Art can bring to pass.1

Al-Biruni’s observation on the concurrent expansion of Islam to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia suggests an underlying globalising force that needs 1

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further investigation. Detailed studies of the historical origins of Balkan Islam and Malay Islam have been carried out by historians and scholars in various other fields of study, but these have been done for each branch on a separate basis. Usually, the historical origin and early development of each of these two branches of Islam has been treated in a regional rather than in a global context, meaning that it is studied primarily in relation to the immediate neighbouring presence of Islam. A comparative study of the historical origins and development of Balkan Islam and Malay Islam could prove to be more useful in yielding information about the underlying globalising forces and tendencies that help push and accelerate the expansion of Islam to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia. In several of our works we took up the theme of Islam and the three waves of globalisation, especially in relation to the Southeast Asian experience.2 We claim that in human history there have been three major waves of globalisation if we are to understand the term ‘globalisation’ in a broad sense as in fact adopted by quite a good number of students of globalisation. We claim it was Islam that generated the first major wave of globalisation. On the basis of historical facts we went to identify the beginning of this Islamic-generated global wave with the tenth century. On the testimony of al-Biruni, in his own century this wave originating from the centre of the Islamic world that appeared then to be gaining momentum had already reached the shores of the Balkans and the Malay world. We attempted to verify the theory of the three major waves of globalisation with a study of the historical origin and development of Islam in Southeast Asia over the centuries until the postcolonial period, particularly in the Malay world. We argue that the first wave of globalisation helps explain the global context in which the incoming Islam to the Malay world took firm roots and evolve into a true branch of the ummatic3 tree possessing a distinctive cultural identity while remaining linked to its trunk and roots as well as to its other branches. We refer to this identity as the MalayIslamic identity.4 We contend it would be a good idea indeed if a similar study of the impact of the Islamic wave of globalisation on the world were to be undertaken – if not yet already done – for the Balkans. One objective of such a study is, of course, to verify if the theory of the three major waves of globalisation would also be applicable to the Balkans. We suspect that the initial incoming of Islam to Southeast Europe and its evolving Islamic presence in the region is primarily as a result of the impact of the same wave of globalisation. A comparative study of the impact of the first wave of globalisation on the Islamic presence 2

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in the Balkans and the Malay world would be of great relevance not only to the understanding of the history of the development of the ummah over the centuries but also to the understanding of the antecedents of contemporary globalisation.

Intra-Islamic Comparative Cultural Study In undertaking an intra-Islamic comparative cultural study in general and one between Balkan Islam and Malay Islam in particular, we are motivated and guided by several more considerations of a general nature. The Islamic wave of globalisation perspective has just been discussed. We view this perspective as of great important to our quest for a deeper understanding of the ummatic history of Islam, especially its intra-ummatic relations, which unfortunately has not been given due attention by the Muslim scholars themselves up till now. Another important perspective is the ummatic and civilisational identity perspective, which is conceptually related to the theory of the marriage between religiosity and ethnicity serving as a fundamental explanatory factor for the formation of these two identities. We have explained in detail the philosophical basis of this theory in one of our works.5 We argue that, for example, the Malay-Islamic identity, both at the ummatic and civilisational levels, is productive of the marriage between the dominant form of Islam that arrived and took firm roots in the Malay world and Malay ethnicity. Theologically, the dominant form of Islam in the region that we have in mind was and still is Ash’arism, while the Shari’ah dimension of the form has been provided by the Shafie school of legal-ethical thought (fiqh). Ethnically, it was the Malay race with its numerous sub-ethnic groups that provide the human vessels for the reception of the newly arrived religion and its subsequent indigenous cultivation in the following centuries. In a sense, it was the marriage between Ash’arism and the Shafie school of thought that prevailed over the centuries till now that produced and sustained the MalayIslamic identity. This ummatic identity may be understood at various levels, right from the national to the regional and global levels. Thus we may speak of the Malay-Islamic identity within the Malaysian or the Bruneian context or within the context of the whole Malay-speaking world or even within Southeast Asia as a whole. We believe the theory of the ummatic identity6 and the philosophical theory of the marriage between religiosity and ethnicity on which it is based may serve as a good perspective for the understanding of the various branches of the ummah and of Islamic civilisation. In particular, we maintain that 3

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this perspective would help deepen our understanding of similarities and differences between the different branches of Islam. In this chapter our discussion of similarities and differences between Balkan Islam and Malay Islam is based on this perspective. However, in scope our discussion is rather limited. In this brief discussion we are basically interested only in providing new perspectives for intra-Islamic comparative cultural studies, particularly pertaining to issues of identity. Before proceeding to discuss similarities and differences between Balkan Islam and Malay Islam, albeit briefly, it is a pertinent point to emphasize here that comparing between them is very much akin to comparing and contrasting between Islam and the West, a contemporary intellectual concern with which we are so familiar. In the latter case, critics have pointed out that the comparison is not entirely appropriate, since Islam is essentially a religious entity whereas “the West” connotes primarily a geographical entity. We are thus in this case pursuing a comparison between two entities that are essentially different from each other. To a certain extent the criticism is justified. However, from the civilisational point of view, the comparison is not entirely inappropriate. In fact, comparing between Islam and the West at the civilisational level is epistemologically legitimate and quite appropriate in the context of our times. Moreover, it can also be a rewarding intellectual undertaking. Islam is not only a religion but also a civilisation. Although the West connotes a geographical entity, notwithstanding its ethnic and cultural plurality and diversity, it is meaningful to speak of Western civilisation in the singular. It is thus meaningful to make a comparison between Islam and the West when we understand both entities in civilisational terms. For then we would actually be comparing between Islamic civilisation and Western civilisation, which has been associated with Christianity for the last two millennia.

Balkan Islam and Malay Islam: Similarities and Differences We have earlier referred to certain similarities between Balkan Islam and Malay Islam with respect to the historical circumstances surrounding their origin and early development. However, the two branches of Islam did not undergo the same historical process of development and expansion. The expansion of Balkan Islam was partly due to the Ottoman conquest of the region. In contrast, military conquest has never been part of the expansion of Islam in the Malay world. The main factors that explain the expansion of Malay Islam were Sufi missionary work and trade. 4

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While the same theory of ummatic identity may account for the formation of the Balkan Islam and Malay Islam identities, we could also observe it as helping to explain the rationale of the ummah having branches with distinct identities.7 The two branches differ from each other first and foremost in respect of theological persuasion and ethical-legal school of thought or school of jurisprudence (fiqh). Like in Turkey with which it has close historical and cultural connections the dominant theological school in Balkan Islam is Maturidism, while the dominant school of fiqh is the Hanafi. In Malay Islam, as asserted earlier, the dominant schools in theology and jurisprudence are Ash’arism and the Shafie respectively. The two branches also differ from each other with respect to ethnic differentiation and distribution. If we consider language as the main defining element of ethnicity and the primary factor in ethnic differentiation as insisted in traditional Islamic anthropology, then we could make the assertion that Malay Islam is far more monolithic in cultural terms than Balkan Islam. It has been observed that Balkan Islam is without a lingua franca. In contrast, Malay Islam has the Malay language (bahasa Melayu) as its lingua franca. This lingua franca helps in the past to make the Malay-Islam ummatic identity at the regional level more cohesive. Balkan Islam is fundamentally more pluralistic in its ethnic make-up than Malay Islam. In linguistic terms we are speaking of its two main branches, namely Albanian and Bosnik. We are thus faced with a different challenge in dealing with the issue of the Balkan Islamic identity from the one we have when dealing with the Malay-Islamic identity. We are thus called upon to investigate the nature and characteristics of the Balkan Islamic identity not at the ethnic but rather at the religious level.

Concluding Remarks In conclusion, we wish to assert that viewing Islamic civilisation as a living tree with many branches could prove quite helpful in explaining the phenomenon of cultural unity in diversity that is so characteristic of this civilisation. The branches in view may be characterised as geo-cultural and ummatic in nature. Considerable benefits may be derived from intellectual undertakings aimed at comparing and contrasting between two or more branches of Islamic civilisation. We may arbitrarily select any two geo-cultural branches for this purpose and yet still producing a beneficial outcome, but it could well be the case that some of the branches when viewed together for comparison would prove to be better suited than many other branches for illustrating the idea of unity in diversity as a characteristic feature of Islamic civilisation. 5

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Both Balkan Islam and Malay Islam are veritable geo-cultural branches of Islamic civilisation and more particularly of the global Muslim ummah that created and sustained it. The kind of intra-Islamic comparative approach adopted in this essay in the study of the different branches of Islamic civilisation promises us a more enriching understanding of each particular branch of it than were we to study it in isolation from other branches.

Notes 1. Quoted from al-Biruni, The Book of the Demarcation of the Limits of Areas, by Nafis Ahmad, Muslim Contributions to Geography (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1947), p. 35. 2. For a detailed treatment of this theme, see Osman Bakar, “Islam and the three waves of globalization: The Southeast Asian experience,” Islam and Civilisational Review, vol. 1, no. 4 (July 2010), pp. 666 – 684. We have included this article in our recently published book Islamic Civilisation and the Modern World: Thematic Essays (Gadong, Brunei Darussalam: ubd press, 2014), chapter 11. 3. By ummatic we mean having the quality and characteristics that conform to the identity of the Muslim ummah. 4. For a detailed discussion of various aspects of Malay-Islamic identity, particularly its ummatic and civilisational dimension see our Islamic Civilisation and the Modern World; “Islam and the Malay civilizational identity: tension and harmony between ethnicity and religiosity,” John Donohue and John Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 480487; also Osman Bakar, “Islam dalam jati diri tamadun Melayu: konflik dan keharmonian antara tuntutan keetnikan dan keagamaan,” Kalthum Ibrahim, Farid Mat Zain, Nasruddin Yunos dan Ezad Azraai Jamsari, eds., Dunia Melayu dan Islam (Bangi: ATMA, UKM, 2009), pp. 389-398. 5. Osman Bakar, “Islam and the Malay civilizational identity: tension and harmony between ethnicity and religiosity,” John Donohue and John Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition. 6. See Osman Bakar, Islamic Civilisation and the Modern World, chapter two. 7. For a study of Balkan Islam that is of relevance to the idea of global ummatic identity, see Ina Merdjanova, Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans Between Nationalism and Transnationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

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Turkey’s Cultural Influence in EU at the Beginning of the 21st Century Muhamed Ali The end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century are considered as a period when the Turkey-EU relations, besides the positive trends, are also characterized with many challenges caused by numerous factors which played an important role in the process of development of mutual relations in the domains of politics and economy. Simultaneously, the cultural aspect of Turkish multidimensional diplomacy represents one of the most important segments of Turkey-EU relations in the recent period. Namely, Turkish cultural influence is consisted of governmental and nongovernmental sectors which simultaneously play a vital role in the factorization of Turkey’s position in the EU and wider. In this paper we will focus on Turkey’s governmental cultural influence in the EU which makes the main segment of the above mentioned.

Short Historic Review of the EU Establishment and their Relations with Turkey The dream of united Europe has deep roots in the history of European populations and the European continent. Although the realization of that dream began after the end of World War II, however the theoretic roots of this project can be found few centuries earlier. Namely, the theoretic foundation for unification of European populations can be found as early as the 16th century (Yıldız, 2006, 46; Dura, 2007, 40; Gözen, 2009, 378). Thinkers and philosophers like La Rochefoucauld, William Penn, Due de Sully, Emile de Girardin, Victor Hugo and Briand through their creative ideas and opinions gave enormous efforts for finding true mechanisms and models related to unification of European populations and countries, with an aim for decrease of misunderstandings and establishment of permanent peace on this continent. In this context, we can simultaneously mention the idea of Kant (17th century) who was advocating the establishment of United European Countries. Unlike theories of the above mentioned personalities who 7

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advocated for the unification of the European continent through usage of peaceful methods, there are some moments of European history when usage of force was a way for unification of European populations. In this context we can mention the efforts of Napoleon, who through usage of military power contributed more for disintegration of the European continent than for its integration (Hacıtahiroğlu, 2006, 3-4). Besides the newly introduced ideas and views for unification of European populations, an intensification of steps for integration of the European continent was noticed towards the end of 17th century, respectively during the period of the Industrial Revolution. Namely, there was a Trade Agreement signed between England and France in 1786, which besides other things had an aim to increase the trade of industrial products through lowering of mutual customs taxes. Besides the above mentioned, the steps of Prussia following the Vienna Conference (1815) in the domain of internal customs taxing, the establishment of German Customs Union (1834) with participation of 18 German states, the unsuccessful attempts for establishment of customs union between the Italian states, lowering of customs through the Trade Agreement between England and France (1860) and between France and Prussia (1862) can be considered as the most vital steps in the way of the economic integration of the European continent during the 18th century (Hacıtahiroğlu, 2006, 4). In the period between the first half of XX century until World War II, two new projects appeared which aimed the unification and integration of European continent states in one single country. The first project was the Kont Kalergi project, who was advocating for the establishment of the Pan-European Union. After Kalergi’s idea, in 1930, the French minister of foreign affairs Aritide Briand came to the European political scene with the idea for establishment of the Federal European Union, which aimed the integration of European countries along with conservation of their sovereignty (Hacıtahiroğlu, 2006, 5). This idea was supported by the German minister of foreign affairs of that time, Gustav Stresemann (Yılmaz, 2005, 23). Besides the mentioned interpretation for development of ideas and projects foe European unification until the first half of the 20th century, respectively until World War II, there is another version about the roots of the European movement. According to this version, the development of the idea for European integration and unification went through three phases. The first phase began in 1815 and lasted until the beginning of the 20th century. Globally observed, although this phase was characterized with harmony of European countries, nevertheless the crisis of the Ottoman Empire, Central and Eastern Europe, contributed towards 8

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postponement of the idea for integrated European continent. This phase was different because the European movement had political origins. As far as the second phase is concerned, it should be highlighted that it developed in accordance with the Versailles system. This phase was different because the ideas for European unification and European movement mainly originated from various ideologists and intellectuals. According to the above mentioned version of the development interpretation of theoretic base for European unification, the last phase of the European movement which advocated for unification of the European continent began with the appearance of Nazism, respectively with Adolf Hitler’s activities. This phase was characterized with application of military force which not only contributed against the integration of European countries, but on the contrary, it created new enmities between European countries themselves (Bashkurti, 2006a, 175-176). After World War II, bearing in mind the negative experiences of disintegration, the European continent had turned into a scene where ideas and steps for European population’s unification of values began to intensify and apply in real politics. Namely, Winston Churchill in 1946 in his speech held at Zurich University declared the idea for United Europe through establishment of the United European Countries. The European Federal Union was established in Paris in December of the same year. In 1947, Churchill appeared as the initiator of the Movement for Free Europe. In June of 1947, Rene Korte formed the French Council for United Europe. In this context, similarly, as one of the most prominent steps was the forming of the European movement of united socialistic countries and the application of customs agreement between Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. It should be highlighted that the year 1948 was also considered as vital in the field for application of ideas for integration and unification of European values and populations. Namely, during this year, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was formed which aimed coordination of Marshall’s Plan and at the same time Churchill lead the European congress which initiated the establishment of the most vital European institutions like the European Council, Human Rights Map and the European Court of Justice (Bashkurti, 2006a, 177; Hacıtahiroğlu, 2006, 5). Besides the above mentioned ideas and steps taken which had important contribution in the way for realization of the aim of united Europe, the year 1950 is considered as a turning point in the process of realization of the historic dream of European populations for their unification and mutual integration. The Agreement for establishment of European Coal and Steel Community – 9

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ECSC was signed in 1951. Along with the forming of the European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community as a result of the Rome Agreement in 1957 (it came to power in 1958) between the signatory countries of European Coal and Steel Community – ECSC, a new phase in the history of European integration and unification began. One of the most featured characteristics of this phase was the removal of trade barriers and the establishment of mutual market of the participating countries. The year of 1967 also represents a significant moment in the long way of European integration and unification. Namely, during this year (1st of June 1967) the three vital European communities: European Coal and Steel Community – ECSC, European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community united into a common community under the name European Community (See Bashkurti, 2006a, 178-180; Bashkurti, 2006b; www.sobranie. mk [Accessed 25 December 2011]; www.abgs.gov.tr [Accessed 12 December 2011]). Along with the end of the Cold War, deep changes took place on the international scene which had important reflections on the world order, so that the process of integration of European countries did not stay immune to these processes of international relations. As the most important happening that left a historical mark on the integration of European continent population was the signing of Maastricht Agreement (1992), which came to power in 1993. The European Union took over the previous name of European Community with this agreement. The Summit in Copenhagen (1993), the Agreement of Amsterdam (1997), introduction of the common European currency EURO (2002), the Summit in Thessaloniki (2003) and the Agreement in Lisbon (2009) are some of the most important segments of EU development in the period after the Cold War (Bashkurti, 2006a, 181-185, 189, 193-197, Yıldız, 2006, 4850). It should be highlighted that the global economic crisis, just like on other international relations factors, has also made and is still making deep negative reflections on the successful functioning of the EU. On the other hand, along with the beginning of implementation of the historical dream of European populations for their unification and integration into United Europe, Turkish foreign politics had made the first steps for integration of the Turkish state into united Europe. Turkey had made an application in 1959 for membership in the EEC (European Economic Community), a date which simultaneously symbolizes the beginning of the long path of the process of Turkey’s integration in the community of European populations. The Turkish request for membership in the EEC was denied, an act that was justified with the fact that Turkey was not developed 10

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enough yet in order to take over responsibilities which derived from the act of joining to this community. However, as an alternative to the membership, the EEC made an offer for partnership Agreement, which according to European authorities should have had a temporary character until the fulfilment of conditions for acceptance as a full member of the community. An Agreement between Turkey and EEC was signed in Ankara in 1963, better known as the Ankara Agreement, with the aim of opening the road for Turkey towards full membership into this community (Yiğit, 2006, 90; Ergin, 2006, 4‑5). According to this agreement, the process of developing relations between Turkey and EEC should have gone through three periods: preparatory period, transitional period and final period (Ergin, 2006, 6-7; Yiğit, 2006, 91‑92; www. abgs.com.tr [Accessed 12 December 2011]; Kramer, 1996, 203-233). However, besides the steps taken for intensifying relations between Turkey and EU, the 1970’s and the first half of the 1980’s are considered as a period of mutual relations demotion. Besides political and economic factors, at the same time the Turkish army military coup (1980) against the democratically elected government can be considered as the main factor that gave an additional pulse for deterioration of the mentioned relations. Along with the establishment of civil and democratic government, Turkey decided (1987) to apply for full membership in this community. The European Community declined Turkey’s application by justifying that act with the fact that there is a need for further development of Turkey in the economic, political and social fields. The Customs Union came to power in 1996, by which Turkey-EU relations entered a phase which can be considered as one of the most important moments in the history of Turkish integration in the European family (www.abgs.com.tr [Accessed 10 November 2011]; Ergin, 2006, 10-13; www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 10 November 2011]; Dura, 2007, 500).

Turkey-EU Relations at the beginning of 21st Century: Political, Integration and Economic Aspects

The end of the 1990’s and the beginning of the 2000’s are considered as a period when Turkey-EU relations, besides positive trends – like gaining the candidate status for joining into the EU (1999) and the recommendation for start of the negotiation process between both sides (2005) – is also characterized with numerous challenges caused by internal and external factors that played an important role in the process of development of mutual relations. In this context, we can mention the Cyprus issue, a litigation which besides it determined relations between Turkey and Greece for decades, 11

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through Cyprus’ entering into the EU, it also turned into a new challenge for the process of Turkey’s integration into the EU. Along with Erdogan’s party coming to power, for the first time in its history Turkey officially accepted the existence of the Cyprus issue and expressed political and diplomatic readiness for solving of the issue within Anan’s Plan. Although the Cyprus issue is not solved yet, it can be concluded that the new proactive politics of AKP towards this issue had great avails for growth of sympathies towards Turkey between European political elites and the beginning of admission negotiations (Gözen, 2009, 487; Nas, 2008, 139-173). Besides the Cyprus issue, the beginning of the 2000’s witnessed other numerous happenings that had important reflections on the euro integration process of the Republic of Turkey. Namely, as one of the most important challenges that determined relations between Turkey and EU in this period was the Iraqi War (2003). In this context, we should point out that Turkey’s attitude towards this war, which was in harmony with the attitudes of European leading countries, France and Germany, and opposed to the American policies and strategies, contributed towards strengthening of mutual relations between Turkey and the EU, having in mind the fact that the complete integration of Turkey in this institution, besides the fulfilment of political and economic criteria, it also depended on harmonization of its attitudes with the ones of EU in the domain of international politics (Gözen, 2009, 359‑360, 486‑ 487). However, it is a surprising fact that exactly the above mentioned two supporting countries (Germany and France), in the last period have turned into leaders and a symbol of European resistance against Turkish euro integration. Namely, just before the beginning of the new century, at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, besides the decision for official acceptance of Turkey’s candidature, the decision for preparation of a Document for assessment partnership with Turkey also took place, just like the case of all other member candidate countries for entrance into the EU (www.abgs.com.tr [Accessed 5 May 2012]; www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 10 November 2012]). It should be highlighted that following the Helsinki Summit, as a result of the newly created climate of Turkey-EU relations, the Turkish state began with vital reforms with the aim of speeding up its integration into the EU, so in 2001 the changes and reforms of the country Constitution had started and in January of 2002 the new civil Code came to power through which Turkish authorities made huge steps on the road of intensifying and democratizing of the country and society and their approach towards western standards (Dura, 2007, 560566, www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 15 Mаy 2012]). Besides these steps, Turkish 12

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authorities through the eight reform packages in the period between 2002 and 2004 took further steps for adjustment of Turkish regulations with European ones. The Recommendation for beginning of assessment negotiations (2005) represented a vital moment in the history of Turkey-EU relations. It should also be highlighted that in the context of Turkish regulations adjustment with the European legislative, the ninth reform package came to force on the 12th of April 2006, by which Turkey made another step on the road for its integration into the EU. Simultaneously, we can conclude that deepening of democratic and economic reforms by Erdogan’s government is an additional impulse for intensifying of Turkish integration in the EU. Opening of TV channels for other nationalities of Turkish society (like the opening of state television channel into Kurdish and Arabic language), strengthening of the function of General Secretariat for euro integrations and the positive trend of Turkish economy in global scale are some examples for the above-mentioned. Also, changing 20 articles of the Turkish Constitution, as a result of the positive attitude of Turkish population towards the Constitution Reform Packages, voted on the referendum in 2010 (www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 7 May 2012]), uncompromising fight of Erdogan’s government against underground structures (like Ergenekon) which through various segments and methods have traditionally played a vital role in the demotion process of democratic processes in Turkey and the new preparations of Turkish government for a new constitution in accordance with democratic principles of the developed countries are some of the most vital steps in the road of Turkey’s integration towards the EU. Relations between Turkey and EU countries, besides the political plan, are different in some significant economic relations. Along with Customs Union coming to power, the volume of trade exchange between the two countries was only 36.2 billion US dollars and only few years after the implementation in 2010 it increased up to 125 billion US dollars. There are some different critics in relation with Turkey’s entrance into the Customs Union. One of the most important critics for this integration is the fact that Turkey, although obliged for implementation of Customs Union legislation, is not involved in the deciding mechanisms of the EU, which many times had damaged the economic interests of the Turkish state (www.ab.org.tr [Accessed 15 June 2012]). The EU in the last period represents the greatest trade partner of Turkey. Turkey is considered as the 7th greatest exporter in the EU and the Turkish market is the fifth greatest market towards which EU export is directed. From 2008 until 2010, Turkish direct investments in EU countries were 2.1 billion US 13

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dollars. During the same period, direct investments of EU countries in Turkey reached 14.7 billion US dollars. In 2010, the greatest percentage of Turkish export was directed towards the EU (46,3 %) and on the other hand, during the same year Turkey imported mostly from the EU (39,3 %) (ec.europa.eu/ index_en.htm/ [Accessed 15 June 2012]).

Turkish Cultural Influence in EU at the beginning of the 21st Century as a Part of the New Concept of Turkish Foreign Policy

Along with implementation of Ahmet Davutoglu’s vision in Turkish foreign politics, a vision better known as the strategic depth doctrine, the factorization of Turkish diplomacy began in the region and on international scene as well. Before all, this new concept of Turkish diplomacy caused a chain of reactions within the expert public, which was advocating for interpreting and defining the new definition of Turkish foreign politics. This new concept of Turkish diplomacy, according to Graham Fuller, was defined as the most detailed and the most systemized vision about the Turkish strategic location. According to other experts, Davutoglu’s strategy over exceeded the boundaries of the former Ottoman Empire. According to Davutoglu, Turkey possesses a vital historical and geographical depth and just like we can’t imagine a state like Germany separated from Central Europe, at the same time we can’t imagine a country like Turkey separated from the Balkan, Caucasian and Middle Eastern regions, regions with whom it shares common history. He adds, Turkey also possesses geographical depth which is an inseparable part of the historical depth, exactly because of the fact that this country belongs to the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Balkan, the Caucasian and the Middle Eastern region at the same time. In this context, we also mustn’t forget Turkey’s civilization depth. The geo strategic position of this country, which is situated in the centre of ancient civilizations, like the Greek, Egyptian, Mediterranean, Persian and Mesopotamian, is an additional value that strengthens this country’s vitality in the international scene. All these three mentioned components (historical, geographical and civilization depths) are depicturing Turkey’s strategic depth which should create regional and also global strategies and politics. Simultaneously, the historical, geographical and civilization depths are playing a vital role in the determination of Turkey’s centrality in its hinterland and international scene, by which this country can turn into a regional factor and after a longer period into a global power (www. radikal.com.tr [Accessed 26 February 2011]; www.2023.gen.tr [Accessed 25 December 2011]; Davutogllu, 2005, 205‑206; Ali, 2010, 140-142; Atasoy, 14

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2005, 182). In this context, it should be highlighted that this new concept of Turkish foreign politics, besides other things, is also based on few principles. The principles of the new Turkish foreign politics based on the strategic depth doctrine besides other things id the principle of zero problems with neighbours and multidimensional diplomacy. Globally observed, prior Erdogan’s rule, Turkish relations with neighbours were not on the desired level. This fact influenced the deterioration of Turkish credibility and prestige on international scene. Along with the beginning of strategic depth doctrine implementation, a new era of Turkey’s relation with their neighbours began. According to this new vision, the slogan that Turkey is surrounded with enemies from all sides was changed with the slogan zero problems with neighbours. However, along with the beginning of Arab Spring, which significantly changed the strategic-politic balances in the Middle East region, it brought huge damages to the principle of zero problems with neighbouring countries. Namely, Syrian authorities attempt for repression of Syrian population protests as a result from the Arab Spring in the recent period (2011-2012), the Iranian position towards the Syrian crisis – an attitude which has a negative influence on the TurkishIranian relations – can be considered as an additional reason for the partial failure of the functionality of the principle mentioned. Simultaneously, it should be highlighted that Turkish foreign politics through its history has many times been characterized by creation of single-dimensional politics. Mainly, these politics had in mind the lack of absence of Turkish state from its pro-Western orientation. However, the single-dimensionality of Turkish diplomacy on many occasions had brought huge damages to the state interests. Although it was rarely, there were some periods where we witnessed implementation of multidimensional diplomacy. As an example of Turkish multidimensional foreign strategies we can take the period of Turgut Ozal who initially was a Prime Minister and then the President of Turkey (19831993). He managed through his long term vision to develop democracy and economy which turned Turkey into an important factor in the region. Through implementation of the strategic depth doctrine, the multidimensionality of Turkish foreign strategy was reborn. Although Turkish state in 2005, under Erdogan’s party leadership, had begun negotiations with the EU for full euro integration, according to the strategic depth doctrine, EU doesn’t represent the only alternative for the country. The traditional Turkish foreign politics names this doctrine as politics of isolation and suggests closeness with Russia and Iran (Walker, 2007, 6; Cagaptay, 2007). As a result of the implementation of this new politics, the Turkish state developed its relations with Russia. Mutual 15

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visits of Erdogan and Putin/Medvedev are best arguments for the mentioned. Multidimensionality of Turkish foreign politics is also applied through Turkish investments widespread all over the world, through intellectuals who can be met at most reputable educational institutions and through nongovernmental economical organizations like TUSIAD and TOBB, which play a historical role for the success of Turkish diplomacy (Sözen, 2008). The cultural aspect of Turkish multidimensional diplomacy represents one of the most important segments of Turkey-EU relations of the recent period. Namely, Turkish cultural influence is consisted of a governmental and a nongovernmental sector which simultaneously are playing a vital role in the factorization of Turkish position in EU and wider. In this work we will focus on Turkish governmental cultural influence in the EU that makes the main segment of the above mentioned. As the main carriers of cultural activities of the Turkish state, we will mention: • Ministry of Culture and Tourism One of the most important institutions of the Republic of Turkey during AKP rule which contributes towards widening of Turkish cultural influence and introduction of EU countries with Turkish culture and tradition is the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. This ministry, besides it aims the coordination of the cultural activities of various institutions, it simultaneously contributes towards affirmation of Turkish culture on global scale, especially in the EU countries. For achievement of its aims, in the recent period this ministry has opened cultural consultancies and attachés in numerous European cities. There consultancy offices play a vital role through numerous activities for affirmation of Turkish culture within the European public opinion as well (www.kultur.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]). Table 1: Turkish cultural consultancy and attaché offices in EU states and their cities England Denmark Bulgaria Spain Finland Italy Belgium

Sweden France Holland Poland Switzerland Germany Austria

London Copenhagen Sofia Madrid Helsinki Roma Brussels

Stockholm Paris Hague Warsaw Zurich Berlin & Frankfurt Vienna

Source: www.kultur.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]

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• Ministry of Foreign Affairs In the last period we are witnessing intensifying of cultural activities of the Turkish ministry of Foreign Affairs inside EU countries. Signing protocols for cultural cooperation and programs for cultural exchange represent a foundation for bilateral cultural cooperation. Organization of various historical artefacts exhibitions in European metropolises (like the Istanbul exhibition: City and Sultan in 2006, Amsterdam, Turkey: 7000 Years of History, organized in 2007 at the presidential palace in Italy for the occasion of 150 anniversary of bilateral relations and the Hadrian Exhibition: Empire and Conflict; organized in 2008 at the British Museum etc.), participation in the prestigious European festivals (like participation at the Festival Culturespaces in 2008 in Switzerland, participation at the Le Merce festival in 2009 in Spain etc.), anniversaries celebration of establishment of bilateral relations with some EU countries (like the celebration of 600 years anniversary of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Poland, celebration of 400 years anniversary of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Netherlands etc.), submission of offers towards prestigious European universities for opening Turkish Studies cathedras (like the example of LSE etc.) are only few examples of the cultural activities of republic of Turkey with the aim of Turkish culture promotion in the countries of EU. (www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]). • TIKA (Тurkish International Cooperation and Development Agency) In conditions of falling apart of the Soviet Union and the establishment of new Turkish republics in Middle Asia, Turkey decided in 1992 to establish the state agency TIKA, which during that period before all had the aim to offer technical assistance to the above mentioned countries in their development process. However, along with the application of the new concept of Turkish foreign politics after 2002 and the significant development of Turkish economy, a new situation was created where TIKA grew from an agency that was active only in one area into a Turkish state agency active in many areas and on global scale. Besides the social, educational and infrastructural activities, this agency is also active in the cultural area as well. Namely, the Turkish state through this agency is also active in few EU countries. Restoration of cultural monuments (like the restoration of the Kanuni Sultan Suleyman mosque in the Hungarian town of Zigetvar (Szigetvár) , restoration of cultural monuments in Romania etc.) which date from the Ottoman period, Turkish cultural activities in various cities of the EU (like the organization of cultural manifestations in Romania etc.) and technical, academic assistance of Turkology cathedras within many universities of EU countries (like the ones in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 17

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Slovakia etc.) are some of the many examples that depicture Turkish state cultural activities in EU countries at the beginning of the 21st century (www. tika.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]). • Coordinatorship for Public Diplomacy This public institution is established in 2010 through the decision of the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and it aims coordination of all activities of the public and non governmental institutions and organizations in the area of public diplomacy. One of the main aims of this institution is successful promotion of the developing potential of the Turkish state through the activities of public diplomacy in the domain of culture, education, economy etc. The most important activities of this institutions are organization of summer schools where students from the EU are also participating, financing various documentaries which promote Turkish culture in Eu countries, organization of various forums and conferences etc. (www.kdk.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]). • Prime Ministers Foundation for Promotion It represents an institution led by the Turkish Government vice president, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the National Turkish Radio and Television are also taking part. This institution is financing projects which are aiming promotion of Turkish culture and history throughout the world, including EU countries (www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]). • TRT (Turkish Radio and Television) The National Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) in the last period is considered as one of the most prominent public institutions which contribute for the affirmation of Turkish culture in the world and the EU countries. As one of this institution’s foremost successes is the success of this television’s representative Sertap Erener, who won the Eurovision song contest with the song “Every Way That I Can” and contributed towards affirmation and promotion of Turkish culture within European public opinion. The opening of TRT documentary channel through which Turkey is being promoted in English, German, French, Russian and Turkish languages, as well as the signing of agreement with one of the most influential world television stations Euronews, are some of the numerous projects through which Turkey pretends to promote its cultural values on the European continent as well (www.trt.net. tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]). 18

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• Turkish Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs) The General Directorate (Bureau) of Turkish Diyanet for Foreign Relations is the main sector which besides other things aims development of relations with other religious representatives from overseas, including EU, monitoring and analysis of numerous activities outside Turkey which are focused on Islam and other religions, establishment and development of relations with various religious and cultural institutions within EU countries, creating solutions for problems and litigations of cultural and social nature for EU citizens of Turkish origin (www2.diyanet.gov.tr. [Accessed 1 September 2013]). For reaching the above mentioned aims, the Turkish Diyanet has established the following consultancies/counselling and attachés in the EU:

Table 2: Turkish Diyanet Consultancy Offices in EU States 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Germany Belgium England Holland France

6. 7. 8. 9.

Sweden Denmark Austria Bulgaria

Source: www2.diyanet.gov.tr. [Accessed 1 September 2013]

Table 3: Turkish attaché offices in EU states and their cities Germany Cologne (Köln) Stuttgart Frankfurt Münster Hannover Nuremberg Mainz Berlin Munich Karlsruhe Essen Hamburg Düsseldorf

France Lyon Strasbourg Austria Salzburg Holland Deventer Rotterdam Romania Constanta

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• Yunus Emre Cultural Centre Yunus Emre cultural centres which are active in few European centres that function under the Yunus Emre Institute based in Ankara represent one of the most vital segments of the cultural influence of Turkish country in EU countries. Namely, the above mentioned cultural centres play a vital role in the cultural relations development between Turkey and the EU at the beginning of 21st century. The activities of Yunus Emre Institute in European centres are focused in introduction to European population and institutions with the Turkish language, culture, history and arts. For realization of this aim, the institute organizes various courses for Turkish language learning, initiates cultural activities, scientific conferences and publishes different editions that are focused on promotion of Turkish language, culture and history. It should be pointed out that the coordinative body for Turkology functions within the Yunus Emre Institute. Namely, through this Institute project for Turkology, in 35 different countries and 49 cathedras of Turkish language and literature/Turkology, recruitment of academic capacities from Turkey is being coordinated and simultaneously the educational and technical development of the mentioned capacities is being assisted. This project’s activities are focused on the cathedras of Turkish language and literature/Turkology in the following EU countries: Bulgaria, Italy, Belgium, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia (www.yee.org.tr [Accessed 10 September 2013]). From the EU countries, Yunus Emre cultural centres can be found in the following centres: Table 4: Yunus Emre Cultural Centres in EU Countries Belgium Brussels

England London

Romania Bucharest Constanta

Poland Warsaw

Hungary Budapest

Source: www.yee.org.tr [Accessed 10 September 2013]

• YTB (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities) One of the most important tools of Turkish cultural influence in EU countries is the newly established public institution Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (established in 2010) YTB. This institution, besides other things, aims to motivate, support and assist cultural and social activities of Turkish citizens, foreign citizens of Turkish origin or kin and 20

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related communities of Turks outside the country. The above mentioned institution through these activities affirms Turkish traditional and cultural values outside the country, including EU countries and also protects Turks from eventual cultural assimilation outside the Turkish borders. For realization of the aims, this institution supports various NGO’s outside the country and awards scholarships to international students for studying at some Turkish universities (www.ytb.gov.tr [Accessed 12 September 2013]).

Conclusion Along with the beginning of the 21st century and the new concept of Turkish foreign politics, the factorization of Turkish diplomacy in the region and the international stage began. According to this new vision, the historical, geographical and civilization depths are depicturing Turkey’s strategic depth, which should create regional and global strategies. Simultaneously, the above mentioned components are playing a vital role in the determination of Turkey’s centrality in its hinterland and on international stage, through which this country can turn into a regional factor and after a longer period into a global power. It should be highlighted that the Arab Spring, which changed the strategic and political balances of the Middle East to a great extent, made a great damage to the principle of zero problems with the neighbours. However, the cultural aspect of Turkish multidimensional politics still represents one of the most important segments of Turkish diplomacy at the beginning of 21st century, which has deep effects on the Turkey-EU relations in the recent period. Turkish state institutions like the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs) – which besides other things, have for an aim relations development with various religious and cultural institutions within the EU countries -, the Yunus Emre cultural institution – which is active in few European centres – and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, represent few of the most vital segments of the Turkish state cultural influence in EU countries and play a vital role in the development of cultural relations between Turkey and EU at the beginning of 21st century. The increase of Turkish cultural influence in the EU is a very significant process in a time when the Islamic world image/reputation suffered numerous damages. For further factorization of the Turkish state on international stage and development of Turkey-EU relations we can recommend increase of investments in the domain of Turkish culture affirmation outside the country, especially the EU countries. Bearing in mind the fact that Turkey with its successful democratic and secular system and the Muslim identity of its population, represents a 21

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model for many countries of the Islamic world and on the other hand is being considered as a vital ally of the West, I consider that through increase of cultural activities it can play a vital role for passivity of increasing active theories for the clash of civilizations.

References Alexander, Y. et. al (ed.). (2008). Turkey: Terrorism, civil rights, and the European Union. London & New York: Routledge. London & New York. Ali, M. (2009). Impaktet e Doktrinës së Thellësisë Strategjike në Politikën e Turqisë Ndaj Lindjes së Mesme (MA thesis). Tetovo: SEEU – Faculty of Public Administration and Political Sciences. Ali, M. (2010). “Stratejik Derinlik Doktrini Ve Bu Doktrinin Balkalara Yansımaları”. Bursa: The Journal Of Balkan Studies. v. 1. no. 2. Atasoy, Y. (2005) Turkey, Islamists and Democracy: Transition and Globalization in a Muslim State. London & New York: I. B. Tauris. Bashkurti, L. (2006a). Mbi Të Drejtën Ndërkombëtare Dhe Institucionet Ndërkombëtare. Tiranë: GEER. Bashkurti, L. (2006b). Evropa Ballkani dhe sfida e Kosovës. Tiranë: GEER. Cagaptay, S. (2007). Secularism and Foreign Policy in Turkey: New Elections, Troubling Trends. Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Davutoğlu, A. (2004). “Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı” [internet]. Available from: www. radikal.com.tr [Accessed 26 February 2011] Davutogllu, A. (2005). Kriza globale. Shkup: Logos-A. Dura, A. & et. al. (2007). Avrupa Birliği Gümrük Birliği Ve Türkiye. Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım. Ergin, K. (2006). Kopenhag Kriterleri Bağlamında Türkiye – AB İlşkileri 1993-2004 (master thesis). Afyonkarahisar: A.K.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. Gözen, R. (2009). İmparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe Türkiyenin Dış Politikası. Ankara: Palme Yayıncılık. Hacıtahiroğlu, K. (2006). Avrupa Birliği Genişleme Evrelerinde İzlenen Siyaset Ve Türkiye İlşkileri (магистерска теза). İstanbul: İ.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. Kramer, H. (1996). “Turkey And The European Union: A Multi – Dimensional Relationship With Hazy Perspectives” In: Mastny, Vojtech et.al. (ed.), Turkey Between East And west?: New Challenges For A Rising Regional Power. Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press. Lagro, E. et.al. (ed.). (2007). Turkey And The European Union: Prospects For A Difficult Encounter. Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Raudvere, C. et.al. (ed.). (2008). Religion, Politics And Turkey’s EU Accession. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Rubin, B. et.al. (ed.). (2003). Turkey And European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration And International Dynamics. London & Portland: Frank Cass & Co.Ltd. Sökmen, S. (2009). The European Union Energy Law And Policy And The Harmonization Of Turkish Legislation To Those Politics (master thesis). Istanbul: Bahçeşehir University. Sözen, A. (2008). “New Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy Making” CA, USA: Paper 22

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presented at the annual meeting of the ISA-s 49th Annual Convention Bridging Multipledivides,http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_ citation/2/5/2/2/0/pages252203/p252203-1.php/. Walker, J. (2007). “Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine: Insight Turkey”. Wahington D.C. & Ankara: SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research. V. 9, Issue 3. Yıldız, A. (2006). Türkiye’nin Balkanlarda Etkin Bir Politika İzlemesinin Avrupa Birliği Olan İlişkilere Etkileri (магистерска теза). Edirne: T.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. Yildiz, K. (2005). The Kurds In Turkey: EU Accession And Human Rights. London & Michigan: Pluto Press. Yiğit, D. (2006). Avrupa Birliği Genişleme Sürecinde Avrupa Birliği – Türkiye İlişkileri (master thesis). Diyarbakır: D.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. Yılmaz, T. (2005). Avrupa Birliği Sürecinde Kadın Örgütlenmelerinin Rolü ve Faaliyetleri: Kadın Adayları Destekleme Ve Eğitme Derneği (Kader) Örneği (master thesis). Isparta: S.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. www.sobranie.mk [Accessed 25 December 2011]. www.abgs.gov.tr [Accessed 12 December 2011]. www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 10 November 2011] www.ab.org.tr [Accessed 15 June 2012] www.2023.gen.tr [Accessed 25 December 2001] www2.diyanet.gov.tr. [Accessed 1 September 2013] ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm/ [Accessed 15 June 2012] www.radikal.com.tr [Accessed 26 February 2011] www.yee.org.tr [Accessed 10 September 2013] www.ytb.gov.tr [Accessed 12 September 2013] www.trt.net.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]. www.kdk.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013] www.tika.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013] www.kultur.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]

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Islam in Austria

More than a Century of Official Recognition Christoph Marcinkowski

Introduction When one thinks of Austria and its relations with Islam and Muslims, what comes first to the mind of most people will perhaps be the famous Ottoman Siege of Vienna in 1683 (although many tend to forget that the Turks had “visited” the Danube metropolis already in 1529, with a similar negative outcome for them). For Europeans, or at least for those among them who are still aware of their own history and culture, the year 1683 means something of a watershed: from that time onward “the Turk” was relentlessly driven back from Central and Southeast Europe (Marcinkowski, 1997). Also, to some more conservative-minded Europeans this event might also mean something like a revenge for the “lost” Crusades of the Middle Ages. At least it signified triumph over a centuries-old foe. Austria, or what was left of it after the First World War, features today a comparatively large immigrant community of Muslims with various ethnic backgrounds – among them Turks, Albanians of various nationality, and Bosnians, in short from countries that once were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the Habsburgs (Hauptmann, 1995, 2nd ed.). The circumstance of the presence of a large Muslim immigrant community in the country does not set apart the alpine republic from other industrialized societies in Western Europe. Especially Germany with its millions of Turks might come to mind. What does set Austria apart, however, is the manner in which it deals with “its” Muslims – and this already since 1912, the year when the Islamgesetze (lit. “Islamlegislation”) (Potz, 2010) came into force – i.e. at a time when the Balkan Wars created havoc and chaos in Southeast Europe, serving as a text case for the Great War of 1914-18. Here we see a country– although rather multi-religious but with a staunchly Catholic monarchy at the top – granting the Muslim minority within its borders clearly defined rights, rather than seeing in them something like a “fifth column” that cannot be trusted. In consequence, the Great War saw the Empire’s Muslims fighting loyally side by 25

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side with their Christian comrades-in-arms for the Monarchy. Even Austria’s various post-WWI political republican settings did not touch upon the 1912 legislation, and recently Austria could commemorate the first century of its coming into force. Today, Austria is unique among Western European countries insofar as it has granted Muslims the status of a recognized religious community. In the following, we shall have a glance at the presence of Islam in presentday Austria by providing some basic information as to historical background, structures and legal arrangements.

More than 100 Years of Official Recognition of Islam In the beginning were the Islamgesetze, already several weeks before the annexation in 1908 of formerly Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bauer 1971; Balic1995), representatives of the Muslims living in Vienna tried to find out from the Austrian authorities whether there would be any intention from their part to grant official recognition for the Muslim faith throughout the Habsburg Empire. Soon after, the building of a first mosque in Vienna was asked for, an idea which was also supported by the then mayor of Vienna – perhaps also after taking into consideration the economic advantages of such a move in the light of the capital city’s trade with visiting Muslim entrepreneurs and the foreign relations with the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, together with Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans would be allies during the Great War. As mentioned earlier, the Islamgesetze survived the Great War and were carried over into the First Republic. During the post-WWI period, several prominent Austrians even converted to Islam, and in 1932 some of them founded the Islamischer Kulturbund (Islamic Cultural Federation). The most famous among those converts was Leopold Weiss (1900-92), perhaps better known to some under his Muslim name Muhammad Asad of The Road to Mecca literary fame (Asad, 2002; Windhager, 2008, 3rd ed.). In 2008, the square in front of the main entrance to UNO City in Vienna was named “Muhammad Asad Square” in his memory. Here we shall not dwell much on historical details; suffice it to say that the Islamischer Kulturbund was ultimately dissolved in 1938 by the German Nazis when they occupied Austria to annex it to their “Third Reich” (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012:53). It should be added, however, that the Nazis tried to instrumentalize Muslims from the Balkans and elsewhere where the German held sway or had “strategic interests.” 26

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The year 1945 meant also for Austria’s surviving Muslims a new beginning. Conversions still happened from time to time, but it was the mass arrival of Muslim immigrant workers from then-Yugoslavia and Turkey which let to dramatic numerical, social and cultural changes, especially form the 1960s onward – with another influx as a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the following wars on the Balkans.

Issues and Challenges Today, the “Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich” (IGGiÖ, Islamic Religious Community in Austria) enjoys the official status of a statutory corporation (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts) as an acknowledged religious community (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012:55). With this, the organization belongs now firmly to the group of 14 communities which include religious communities and churches – from the large ones, like the Roman Catholic Church, to the smaller ones, among them the Evangelical-Methodist Church or Jehova’s Witnesses. However, there were ups and downs in terms of the application for official recognition – especially when considering the scope of recognition (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 55-56). In Austria, official legal recognition requires from the respective religious community that it accepts the democratic and constitutional order of the Republic. This includes, of course, also conformity with the basic social consensus and human rights. With regard to Islam, this seems to amount to the challenge to accept the role as a statutory corporation within a western pluralistic political order that is based on constitutional law. Therefore the often raised question as to the compatibility of Islam with such a state can be considered as answered affirmatively. Such a legal arrangement includes the offer by the Austrian state for a cooperation, which, however, also means that the religious communities must be ready to fulfil the constitutional expectations of the Republic. The state can therefore expect from those communities certain contributions toward the solution of ethical issues that might arise in society. This would include cooperation in the educational and charity sectors or in terms of pastoral work to the sick and imprisoned, as well as assistance to the handicapped and similar alike. The massive influx of international Muslim students, refugees, diplomats and workers, especially the national capital Vienna, from the middle of the 1960s onward led to increased efforts to achieve the longed for institutional recognition, a special characteristic of the Austrian legislation vis-à-vis religious 27

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communities. In January 1971 first application was made by a Muslim welfare organization in Vienna (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 56). After extensive negotiations an official application was finally made in 1979. During the eight years that led to the official application, several technical and legal problems had to be overcome. In the end, the settings that were used in Bosnia were taken over by Austria. Finally, in April 1979, the aforementioned IGGiÖ was founded and acknowledged by the Austrian state (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 56 and 270 n. 22). Quite surprisingly, in the course of the negotiations leading to the recognition the issue of polygamy was raised again as “bigamy” is punishable by law in Austria. The Austrian authorities even referred to Cairo’s Al-Azhar University, then the highest authority in the world of Sunni Islam. They also contacted Diyanet, the state-run office for religious affairs in Turkey. Those two authorities replied by stating that a Muslim would have no right to claim the “right” to polygamy in a non-Muslim state (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 56). Another issue which had to be solved was that the old Islamgesetz of the Austrian-Hungarian period acknowledged only the Sunni Hanafi rite (madhhab) which would cause problems with regard to Islam’s other “legal schools”. Again, Diyanet was asked what could be done. From Turkey came the reply that all “legal schools” of Islam should be acceptable, explicitly mentioning the remaining three Sunni ones, i.e. the Shafi’is, Malikis and Hanbalis, but not referring the Shi’ites. The Austrian authorities accepted this interpretation from Turkey. The applicants, however, had also asked to include Twelver Shi’ites, Zaydis and Ibadhis (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 56-57). In 1987, Austria’s Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) declared the previous focus on things Hanafi in the 1912 Islamgesetze as not conform to the Constitution of the Republic. The Court did so not only in order to preserve freedom of worship and religious confession, but also since the secular Austrian state should maintain neutrality in matters of religion, be it Christian, Muslim or otherwise. Since then IGGiÖ has changed its own constitution and recognizes now all Muslims living within the borders of the Republic. The IGGiÖ serves now as the umbrella organization of many Islamic associations in Austria, but not all Muslims in the country are members of those organizations. This is similar to the situation in neighbouring Germany and other European countries. Thus even if IGGiÖ acknowledges Austria’s constitutional order, his say nothing about the approaches of those who are not members. 28

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IGGiÖ is entitled to provide lessons of religious education in state schools (Khorchide, 2009; Potz, 2003; Kalb, Potz, and Schinkele, 2003). It is also allowed to collect “church tax” but so far it has not exercised this privilege and does not build, finance or administer mosques in Austria. In 2013, Austria has granted the status of a recognized religious community also to Alevism. Another issue is the somewhat restricted reach of the IGGiÖ as Muslims in Austria are not required to be members. As a matter of fact, among religions in Austria, Roman Catholic Christianity is predominant. According to the 2001 census, 73.6% of the country’s population adhered to this denomination. As of 2012, the most recent year for which figures are available, the number of Catholics has dropped to about 63.5% of the population. There is a much smaller group of Lutherans, totalling about 4.7% of the population in 2001, 3.8% in 2012. Since the 2001 census these two historically dominant religious groups in Austria recorded losses in the number of adherents. The Roman Catholic Church reported a drop of ~10%, the Lutheran Church of ~1%. In contrast, the number of Muslims in Austria has increased in recent years, and with 4.2% of the population calling themselves Muslim in 2001, up to around 5% to 6.2% in 2010. In 2010, it was estimated to be around 400,000 to 500,000 Muslims in Austria, or up to about 6% of the total population (Euro-Islam. Info 2013). However, the IGGiÖ has direct access only to 40-50,000 Muslims, as not all of Austria’s Muslims are members, as just mentioned (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012). There is also the issue of “identity and religion. It is a matter of fact that for many migrants – not only Muslims – religion and ethnic identity are often intermingled or even confused with each other. The same can be said about “traditions”, many of those, are actually in blatant contrast to the original teachings of Islam. Within this complicated context, one cannot estimate high enough the contributions made by the IGGiÖ in terms of integration of Muslims into Austrian majority society, whereby “integration” wouldn’t necessarily mean “assimilation”. Time will tell whether the Austrian model of participation will be crowned by success as the Austrian authorities would have to continue their support for this promising project also in the future.

Recent Developments The IGGiÖ did make some efforts to improve this situation, even on the European level. Upon the initiative of the IGGiÖ and with the support of the Austrian state, so-called “conferences of imams” (Imamkonferenzen) had been organized, the first one in 2003 with international participation in Graz 29

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(Austria), and the following ones in Vienna in 2006 and 2010. In between there had been an Austrian Imamkonferenz in Vienna in 2005. During those meetings a host of religiously and politically relevant topics had been discussed and several remarkable statements were published (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012). The 2003 conference in Graz addressed the situation of the Muslims in Europe and advocated an individual European identity. Other topics discussed had been democracy human rights and pluralism, all with recourse to classical Islamic theology and contemporary interpretations. Moreover, the issue of Islam’s relations with other religious communities was discussed. Very interesting was the debate on a special interpretation of Islamic law for Muslims living in a minority situation (fiqh al-aqalliyat) (Albrecht, 2010) as well as moderation and the “middle path” in Islamic religious practice (alwasatiyyah) (Kamali, 2008; 2010) and a distancing from any form of extremism and fanaticism. The 2006 Vienna meeting addressed issues regarding putting things into practice in order to increase the public acceptance by majority non-Muslims of Muslims living in Europe. Muslims had been asked to understand themselves as integral part of European societies, a very encouraging step forward to the mind of this writer. Even issues concerning the ecological environment had been discussed at the conference. Up to the 2006 meeting Shi’ites had not been invited. This changed in 2010 when Shiites were explicitly welcomed. On this meeting imams had been asked to engage also in social work for the wider good of society. They should also acquaint themselves with the cultures of their host countries. In the centre was a call for more active participation for the sake of the further development of European societies at large. In Austria, there exists now a variety of Islamic organizations, most of them members of the IGGiÖ, but some of them not. Common to all of them is, that most of them has somewhat lost contact to the second and third generations of immigrants. The decreased interest in religion as such seems to be a general feature especially of the third generation. Therefore, it is increasingly difficult to describe the present situation of Islam in Austria as we notice an increasing trend toward “individualized religiosity” among Muslims in Austria. The Turkish mosque associations in Austria are organized under the umbrella of ATIB, which in turn is a branch of the already mentioned official Turkish Office for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in Ankara. Its President is the 30

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attaché for religious affairs at the Turkish embassy in Vienna. Current around 60 associations are member in ATIB, whose main task consists in facilitating networking. ATIB is basically culturally and religiously oriented rather than politically. Within the IGGiÖ, ATIB has a leading position. Less organized are Austria’s Bosnian Muslims, who are already a long-time feature of the country, due to its Austrian-Hungarian past, as mentioned initially. All of them are financed by private donations and most of them are in line with the religious administration (Rijaset) of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its head then Grand Mufti Mustafa Ceric, who is often in Austria for visiting the Bosniak communities. The Bosnian Muslims understand themselves as truly European Muslims – rightly so – due to the location of their home country and their recent history. After the end of the Bosnian civil war, however, many of them emphasize now the importance of religious identity over the cultural background. Of special interest is the “Islamic Federation of Vienna” (IFW, Millî Görüş, lit. “National Vision”) (Schiffauer, 2004 and 2010; Amir-Moazami, 2010), one of the leading Turkish diaspora organizations in Europe, since the new IGGiÖ-president comes from their ranks. They differ from ATIB as they consider Islam as something which doesn’t end at the doors of the mosques but as a lifestyle to be observed in society. They have a strong focus on social work with the youth and women. Other Muslims, however, consider IFW as quite ethnocentrically closed up organization catering for the needs of ethnic Turks only. Within IGGiÖ, the IFW will surely continue to play an important role as the majority of Muslims living in Austria happen to be Turks and as Turkey itself is ruled by the religiously oriented AKP-government under Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdoğan. There are also several other Muslim associations in Austria which have a background Sufism (al-tasawwuf) or Islamic mysticism. Here shall be mentioned only the Süleymanci Movement (Wunn, 2007: 54 ff.), named after its founder Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959). They too are involved in social work with the youth and women. A special characteristic of the Süleymancis is their origins in the Naqshbandi movement of Sunni Sufism, the founder of which was Baha al-Din Naqshband (d. 1389 in Central Asia) (Kabbani, 2012). Like the Naqshbandi Sufi order (tariqah), the Süleymancis too practice in the religious assemblies the dhikr, literally “remembrance”, an Islamic devotional act, typically involving the recitation—mostly silently - of the Names of God, and of supplications taken from hadith texts and Qur’anic verses. 31

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Leaving for while Sunni Islam, Austria is also home to Twelver Shi’ites (Marcinkowski, 2010: 19-47), mostly from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, from Azerbaijan and the Indian subcontinent. The “Imam Ali Centre” in Vienna, headed by the Austrian convert Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Waldmann, caters mostly for Iranians and can be considered close to the Islamic Republic of Iran and its political direction. Shi’ite immigration to Austria increased especially after the 1979 revolution in Iran, the fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq and the various conflicts in Lebanon. As mentioned earlier, there had been certain tensions with the Sunni dominated IGGiÖ in terms of a lack of Shiite representation, but now both are involved in dialogue in order to clear the way of closer cooperation. It is quite remarkable with regard to the current state of integration the Shiites into Austrian society, that the official opening of Vienna Airport’s Terminal 3 Check-In on 21 June 2012, was not only attended by Vienna’s mayor and Christian and Jewish religious dignitaries, such as the Rabbi, and leading Catholic and Protestant personnel, but also by Mr. Waldmann, representing Vienna’s Muslims at large. All of them recited blessings according to their particular fashion. Around 200 invited guests had been present at the ceremony (Flughafen Wien 2012). Aside from those rather well integrated Sunni and Shi’ite organizations, however, there are also rather shadowy movements, some of them to be considered quite extremist in their ideology and political outlook. Here mentioned shall be only the Hizb al-Tahrir (lit. “Liberation Party”) (Taji-Farouki, 1996) and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egyptian as well as increasingly also Syrian “fame” (Rubin, 2010; Mitchell, 1993). Vienna is actually the main seat of Hizb al-Tahrir in the German-speaking countries. Their aim is the revival and re-establishing of a supra-national caliphate in the Islamic lands which is seen as the sole solution of the current problems faced by the Muslims worldwide. Most of the members are well-educated and many of them appear in mosques in order to recruit members to their organization. Austria’s security establishment is currently watching them closely. From among the non-extremist and rather reformist movements the Gülenis also active in Austria movement (Ebaugh, 2012; Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 78-79). Their focus is on a certain rapprochement between tradition Islam and Modernity and on a synthesis between Islam and Turkish-Ottoman heritage. In Austria they publish a German-language edition of their organ, the Zaman newspaper. Through the “Friede-Institute” (Peace Institutes) in Vienna and Innsbruck they are also involved in interreligious dialogue, which includes also contacts to Hinduism and Buddhism. 32

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Turning now our attention from “institutionalized Islam” in Austria and proceeding toward currents of faith and ideology, three phenomena should be considered that can be considered somewhat at the fringes (Sufism) or even outside mainstream Islam (Salafism and Jihadism) as practiced by the majority of Muslims in Austria. Salafism is a movement among Sunni Muslims named after the Salaf (lit.: “predecessors” or “ancestors”), the earliest Muslims, whom they consider the examples of Islamic practice. Salafism has become associated with literalist, strict and puritanical approaches to Islam. In neighbouring Germany, Salafism has been described as the fastest growing Islamic movement in a 2010 German domestic intelligence service annual report (Al Arabiya News, 12 April 2012). Although not all Salafis are prone to violence or even terrorism, at times the borders are often somewhat blurred. In Austria, some of them have tried to undermine the other Islamic organizations with their followers (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 95). Contrary to Salafism, however, Jihadism (from jihad, commonly translated as “Holy War”, but actually meaning “to struggle in the way of Allah”) refers to the renewed focus on armed jihad in Muslim fundamentalism since the later period of 20th century, but with a continuous history reaching back to the early 1800s. “Jihadism” in this sense covers both guerrilla warfare and Islamic terrorism with an international scope as it arose from the 1980s, since the 1990s substantially represented by the al-Qaeda network. It has its roots in the late 19th and early 20th century ideological developments of Islamic revivalism. Generally the term jihadism denotes Sunni Islamist armed struggle. In Austria, in 2007, the so-called “Globale Islamische Medienfront” (GIMF) published video messages against German and Austrian military participation in Afghanistan (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 98). Several activists, such as Mohamed Mahmoud, the former head of the “Islamische Jugend Österreich” (Austrian Muslim Youth), were arrested by Austrian authorities and later on sentenced to imprisonment (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 98). The problem of increasing jihadi tendencies among Muslims in Austria but also in the rest of Europe should perhaps seen not so much through the religious lens. Equally important is the social marginalization of Muslim youths in Western Europe, who often encounters prejudice from the part of the majority population. Many of them didn’t finish their education which causes problems for them to find a job, which in turn, serves as a further obstacle on the way toward full integration into European society. Identity problems add to the severity of the issue. That jihadism in Austria seems to a real problem 33

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and not an imagined one became obvious toward the end of 2010/beginning of 2011, when attacks by jihadists on Coptic churches in Egypt caused also preventive security measures from the part of the authorities in Austria as names of Austrian Copts had appeared on jihadi websites (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 100). Finally, Sufism, the peaceful and mystical branch of Islam. Classical Sufi scholars have defined it as a science whose objective is the reparation of the heart and turning it away from all else but God. Muslims and mainstream scholars of Islam define Sufism as simply the name for the inner or esoteric dimension of Islam (excellent coverage in Schimmel, 1975) which is supported and complemented by outward or exoteric practices of Islam, such as Islamic law. Of course, Islamic mysticism belongs now also to mainstream Islam in the sense that its intellectual spiritual tradition is certain part of Islamic tradition at large. What puts it at the fringes of contemporary mainstream Islam in contemporary Austria, as perhaps elsewhere in western Europe, is that the number of its followers today is comparatively smaller than that of, say, the ordinary visitor of a ATIB mosque, many of the latter being employed in “blue collar jobs”. There are currently no studies on Sufism in Austria, but apparently the Naqshbandi tradition seems to be the fasted growing branch (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 96-97). The membership in such a tradition, a tariqah or “order” offers to the members a coherent social network and a spiritual basis in an otherwise completely secularized society like Europe. This writer would even argue that such an “organized Sufism” would even further identity-finding or integration in western society as it focuses on social wellbeing, charity and support of the “Other” – non-Muslims included.

Conclusion: Austria as a Model for Europe? After this brief overview of a century of official recognition of Islam in Austria, the question arises whether we can speak of an “Austrian model” that should be emulated in other parts of Europe. This question is difficult to answer as it refers to a variety of levels. As a matter of fact, the Austrian approach has found several supporters, especially in neighbouring Germany, where there exist now even imam-training courses at university-level (in Münster and Osnabrück), and even official recognitions of the level of German federal states, such as Hamburg. It is certainly laudable that, for the first time, there exist now such training programs inside Europe, programs the curricula of which are officially approved by the state. This 34

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ensures that the syllabi of such courses are in line with Islamic tradition on the one hand and contemporary European society and its foundations on the other. However, as far as we can see, Muslims in Austria, the youth in particular, face still the issue of how to preserve religious but especially ethnic identity vis-à-vis the majority non-Muslim European majority population. Legal approaches toward integration are in order but they seem not to reach the grassroots, the ones that are supposed to be integrated. Moreover, the real meaning of “integration” has so far not been transmitted to the Muslims, perhaps since this meaning had not yet been clear to Austria and other western European nations for that matter themselves. Often it seems that “integration” is confused with “assimilation” where one has to give up his or her identity in order to be accepted by a host society. It appears to this writer that both sides have to make a step toward the “Other” in order to be credible. A problem for host populations in Europe when talking about “integration” is that many if not most Muslim countries do not grant full religious freedom – a human right after all – to their citizens, so the issue of a lack of reciprocity seems to be a main condition in heads of many in Europe. In addition, many in Europe do not consider their respective countries as immigrant society. International political issues, such as the various conflicts throughout the Middle East and the therewith connected worldview of “principally violent Muslims” or the indeed threatened status of Christians throughout the Muslim world do their part in insuring that Muslims are often not considered welcome in Europe. On the other hand, however, the steps taken by Austria, especially Islamic religious instruction in schools and the opportunity to study Islamic theology and practice at University level are surely steps into the right direction, steps that are perhaps one day leading toward a truly “European Islam” that is accepted – and accepts itself – as an integral part of this continent.

References Al Arabiya News (12 April 2012), Uproar in Germany Over Salafi Drive to Hand Out Millions of Qurans. Available online at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/04/12/207289. html (accessed on 26 September 2013). Albrecht, Sarah (2010), Islamisches Minderheitenrecht: Yusuf al-Qaradawis Konzept des fiqh al-aqalliyat. Würzburg: Ergon. Amir-Moazami, Schirin (2010), Die IslamischeGemeinschaft Milli Görusim Spannungsfeld von transnationaler Dynamik und deutscher Islampolitik,. In: Reetz, Dietrich (ed.), Islam in Europa: Religiöses Lebenheute. Munich: Waxmann, pp. 109-144. 35

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Asad, Muhammad (2002, 8th ed.), The Road to Mecca. Louisville KY: Fons Vitae. Balic, Smail (1995), Zur Geschichte der Muslime in Österreich. In: Heine, Susanne (ed.), Islam zwischenSelbstbild und Klischee: Eine Religion imösterreichischenSchulbuch. Vienna: Böhlau, pp. 23-35. Bauer, Ernest (1971), ZwischenHalbmond und Doppeladler. Vienna and Munich: Herold. Ebaugh, Helen Rose (2012), Die Gülen-Bewegung: EineempirischeStudie. Freiburg imBreisgau: Herder. Euro-Islam.Info (2013), How many Muslims live in Austria? Available online at http:// www.euro-islam.info/2010/02/09/how-many-muslims-live-in-austria/ (accessed on 27 September 2013). Flughafen Wien (2012), Flughafen Wien hat Check-in 3 heuteoffizielleröffnet. Available online at http://www.viennaairport.com/jart/prj3/va/main. jart?rel=de&reserve-mode=active&content-id=1351048408438&news_beitrag_ id=1340267005387&archiv=yes (accessed on 27 September 2013). Hauptmann, Ferdinand (1995, 2nd ed.) Die Mohammedaner in Bosnien-Hercegovina. In: Wandruszka, Adam, and Urbanitsch, Peter (eds.) Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Bd. IV: Die Konfessionen. Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp. 670-701. Heine, Susanne, Lohlker, Rüdiger, and Potz, Richard (2012), Muslime in Österreich: Geschichte, Lebenswelt, Religion, Grundlagenfür den Dialog Innsbruck: Tyrolia. Kabbani, Hisham (2012), Der Weg der Meister: Geschichte und Vermächtnis der erhabenenGroßscheichs des Naqshbandi-Ordens. Nicosia/Cyprus:Spohr Publishers Limited. Kalb, Herbert, Potz, Richard, and Schinkele, Brigitte (2003), Religionsrecht. Vienna: Facultas. Khorchide, Mouhanad (2009), Der islamischeReligionsunterricht in Österreich. Vienna: ÖsterreichischerIntegrationsfond (ÖIF-Dossier No. 5). Marcinkowski, Christoph (1997), Notes on the Ottoman-Habsburg Antagonism in South East Europe and its Climax During the 17th Century. In: Al-Shajarah (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) 2(1), pp. 103-138. Marcinkowski, Christoph (2010), Shi’ite Identities: Community and Culture in Changing Social Contexts. Berlin: LIT (Freiburg Studies in Social Anthropology 27). Mitchell, Richard P. (1993), The Society of the Muslim Brothers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Potz, Richard (2003), Der islamischeReligionsunterricht in Österreich. In: de Wall, Heinrich, and Germann, Michael (eds.), BürgerlicheFreiheit und christlicheVerantwortung. Tübingen: Mohr, pp. 345-369. Potz, Richard (2010), Das Islamgesetz 1912 und der religionsrechtlicheDiskurs in ÖsterreichzuBeginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. In: Olechowski, Thomas et al. (eds.), Grundlagen der österreichischenRechtskultur. Vienna: Böhlau. Rubin, Barry (ed.) (2010), The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Schiffauer, Werner (2004), Die IslamischeGemeinschaftMilliGörüs - einLehrstück zum verwickeltenZusammenhang von Migration, Religion und sozialer Integration. In: Bade, K.J., Bommes, M., and Münz, R. (eds.),Migrationsreport 2004. Fakten - Analysen Perspektiven. Frankfurt and New York:Campus Verlag, pp. 67-96 36

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Schiffauer, Werner (2010), NachdemIslamismus. Eine Ethnographie der Islamischen Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş. Berlin: Suhrkamp. Schimmel, Annemarie (1975), Mystical Dimensions of Islam. Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press. Taji-Farouki, S. (1996), A Fundamental Quest: Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate. London: Grey Seal Books. Windhager, Günther (2008, 3rd ed.). Leopold Weiss alias Muhammad Asad. Von GaliziennachArabien 1900–1927. Vienna: Böhlau. Wunn, Ina (2007), Muslimische Gruppierungen in Deutschland: Ein Handbuch. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Further Readings Bunzl, John, and Hafez, Farid (eds.) (2009), Islamophobie in Österreich. Innsbruck et al.: Studienverlag. Fassman, Heinz (ed.) (2007), 2. Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht: 20012006. Vienna and Klagenfurt: Drava. Fürlinger, Ernst (2010), The Politics of Non-recognition: Mosque Construction in Austria. In: Allievi, Stefano (ed.), Mosques in Europe: Why a Solution has become a Problem. London: Hobbs, pp. 183-216. Gingrich, Andre (1999), ÖsterreichischeIdentitäten und Orientbilder: Eineethnologische Kritik. In: Dostal, Walter et al. (eds.), Wir und die Anderen: Islam, Literatur und Migration. Vienna Facultas WUV, 29-35. Heine, Susanne (2005), Islam in Austria: Between Integration Politics and Persisting Prejudices. In: Bischof, Günther et al. (eds.) Religion in Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies vol. 13. New Brunswick (USA) and Innsbruck: Studienverlag, pp. 100-124. Hofbauer, Ernst (2009), Inschallah Österreich: Das unheimliche Paradies. Vienna: Universitas. Kamali, Mohammad Hashim (2008), The Middle Grounds of Islamic Civilisation: The Quranic Principle of Wasatiyyah. In: IAIS Malaysia Journal of Civilisation Studies 1(1), pp. 7-43. Kamali, Mohammad Hashim (2010), The Quranic Principle of Wasatiyyah. Kuala Lumpur: IAIS Malaysia. Marcinkowski, Christoph (ed.) (2009), The Islamic World and the West: Managing Religious and Cultural Identities in the Age of Globalisation. Berlin: LIT (Freiburg Studies in Social Anthropology 24). Marcinkowski, Christoph, and Eggen, Nora (2012), Islam in Europe: Present Trends and Future Challenges. Kuala Lumpur: IAIS Malaysia (IAIS Monograph Series 4). Marik-Lembeck, Stephan (2010) Die muslimischeBevölkerungÖsterreichs: Bestand und Veränderung 2001-2009. In: Janda, Alexander, and Vogl, Mathias (eds.) Islam in Österreich. Vienna: ÖsterreichischerIntegrationsfond, pp. 5-9. Ornig, Nikola (2006) Die zweite Generation und der Islam in Österreich: Eine Analyse von Chancen und Grenzen des Pluralismus von Religion und Ethnien. Graz: Leykam. Stricker, Maja (2008), SondermodellÖsterreich? Die IslamischeGlaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich. Klagenfurt: Drava.

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Islam in Slovenia The History of the Muslim Presence and Characteristics of the Muslim Population of Slovenia

Anja Zalta The History of the Muslim Presence

Islam in Slovenia cannot be studied separately from the events that occurred in the Balkans, as it is from the Balkan Peninsula that the Islamic population in Slovenia primarily originated, and is the region through which Islam penetrated furthest, and where Islamic peoples remained. Many believe that the Balkans first encountered Islam during the Turkish incursions, in the third quarter of the 14th century. In the period between that time and especially the end of the 15th century the Balkans met with the predecessors of today’s Turks, Muslim Albanians and Muslim Bosnians, (Bosniaks from here on); but the Balkan peoples and southern Slavs had come in contact with the Islamic world and Muslim peoples much earlier via Arab tradesmen. These earliest influences of the Arabs as well as the Turkmen peoples via war, trade and culture left a religious imprint on the territory of former Yugoslavia; there should be no doubt that a population of Islamic faith existed here even before the beginning of the Ottoman invasions of the Balkans. However, our main interest in the following section is the way Slovenia first met with Islam. According to available sources, the first encounter of the Islamic world with Slovene territory indeed occurred in the period of Turkish incursions. The first took place in 1409 in the southernmost part of our territory, in the town of Metlika, and was soon followed by many others. Historians, among them the most prominent expert on Turkish incursions in Slovenia, Ignacij Voje, divide them into three time periods: the Turkish incursions dating between 1408 and 1483, those occurring between 1491 and 1499, and the incursions taking place between 1511 and 1559 (Voje, 1996). These incursions definitely mark one of the darkest periods in Slovene 39

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history. Through folk poetry and prose the Slovene collective memory preserves the recollection of the horror upon the incursions of Ottoman mounted units that plundered, killed and hunted men for slavery. Though these invasions were of dubious representation of the Islamic faith, they still bear an influence on public opinion and the attitude towards Islam in Slovenia. The Turks and their religion have survived through the entire Slovene history as something completely “different,” alien and dangerous. The Slovene word for a Turk (“Turek”) became an expletive. Even in the 15th century, the word Turks was being replaced with epithets such as ‘hereditary enemies,’ ‘dreadful tyrants,’ ‘blood-thirsty and rabid dogs,’ ‘birds of prey,’ ‘bandits’ and ‘arsonists.’ Interestingly, the peasants at that time also used the expression ‘Christian Turks’ for aristocrats and gentlemen living in courts (Pašić, 2002, 97). In the middle of the 16th century, the Slovene Protestants paid the problem of Turks much attention. Jurij Dalmatin (1547-1589), author of the first Slovene translation of the Bible, referred to the Turks as “impious dogs,” while Primož Trubar (1508-1586), founder of the Slovene written language and author of the first two Slovene books (“Cathecismus” and “Abecedarium”), taking it upon himself to convert the Turks to Christianity and thus put a stop to the incursions, regularly visited Turkish prisoners incarcerated at Ljubljana Castle (Rajhman, 1986). The greatest Slovene poet, France Prešeren (1800-1849), was the first poet to touch on the topic of Islam. At that time there was little literature available on Islam and the majority of the population was unfamiliar with this religion. In his work “A Wreath of Sonnets” Prešeren refers to Muslims as ‘Muhammadans,’ while in the poem entitled “Turjaška Rozamunda,” he speaks of a Bosnian named Lejla, who abandoned the faith of ‘Mahoma’ and converted to Christianity. ‘Mahoma’ is actually Muhammad (in Slovene ‘Mohamed’), and this can be taken as some proof of how little the Muslim tradition was known during that period. However, among the Slovene poets we can also find a few men of letters who were better acquainted with the topic of Islam and were even well disposed towards it. One of these was Anton Aškerc (1856-1912), who after finishing his theology studies began exploring Islam and Buddhism. Of course, in his literary work he could not avoid the Turkish incursions and atrocities, but many of his poems were written as he travelled the Islamic countries and these consequently manifest a more positive attitude towards the Muslims. Aškerc spoke of the latter as of brothers (Slavs) of different religion, and one of the poems (“The Goblet of Immortality”) even begins with a surah from the Qur’an. 40

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One of the rather influential tales that really settled into the hearts of Slovene readers is the novel by Josip Jurčič (1844-1881) entitled “Jurij Kozjak, slovenski janičar” (“Jurij Kozjak, a Slovene Janissary”). Jurčič wrote very disapprovingly about Islam. In this book, a Slovene boy named Jurij is taken away to become a Janissary. The Muhammadans deracinate his Christianity, which teaches us to love our neighbours, and inculcate Muhammadanism in him, which preaches hate and elimination of the Christians and their religion. Jurčič’s novel is part of the Slovene compulsory primary school reading material and we can just imagine what kind of impression it makes on a young reader. Even today the Slovenes usually associate Turkish incursions with the “stealing” of Slovene boys who were raised by the Turks to become Janissaries and who returned several years afterwards to Slovene soil, amnesiac and oblivious of their origins, to rob and kill their own people. This is the reason why many Slovenes associate the word Islam first, in a very stereotypical way, with this stigma of the past and do not allow themselves to widen their knowledge towards more positive aspects of Islam.

Characteristics of the Muslim Population of Slovenia

One of the first great influxes of Muslims into Slovene territory occurred during the First World War, when Bosniaks fought on the Soča Front on the side of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.1 At that time there was a mosque in the village Log pod Mangartom, the first and only mosque in Slovenia, offering religious service to Bosniak fighters. After the war the mosque was allegedly a thorn in the side of the Italian administration, as the Italians feared the Bosniaks more than the devil himself.2 Most probably it was the Italians who tore the mosque down, although it is not impossible that the locals themselves destroyed it, as the mosque was made of wood and they needed wood for heating. The author who wrote most extensively about the Bosniaks on the Soča Front was Vasja Klavora in his work titled “Plavikriž” (“The Blue Cross,” 1993), which includes the only extant photograph of the Log pod Mangartom mosque. Migrations of larger Muslim populations to Slovene territory took place in the time of former Yugoslavia, in the 1960s, mostly due to the expansion of industry. It was during these years, on September 12, 1967, that the Islamic Community in Slovenia was founded. Since 1981 a masjid, a house of prayer, has been operative in Ljubljana, and there are similar places of worship in Koper, Celje, Maribor and Jesenice. 41

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According to the censuses presented by Mojca Piko in her dissertation entitled “Political-Geographical Problems of the Islamic Religious Community in Slovenia” (“Politično geografska problematika Islamske verske skupnosti v Sloveniji”), the share of Muslims in the population and territory of Slovenia in 1921 was 0.1%. Most of them lived in Ljubljana, Maribor and the environs of Murska Sobota. The 1931 Population Census showed no major changes, but it is interesting to observe the considerable differences between shares of male and female members of the Islamic community in both censuses, which was most probably due to a greater immigration of males from the Muslim areas of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, especially in the age group 20-24. Many years passed between the 1931 and the next population census (carried out in 1953) and many socio-political changes affecting the increase of population occurred in the interim. Among other things, the Slovene territory expanded with the incorporation of the Primorska region, Yugoslavia transformed from a kingdom into a federative people’s republic that separated church and state so that faith became a private matter. Despite the latter fact, the 1953 census recorded 1,617 people declaring themselves as followers of the Islamic religion in Slovenia, which represented 0.1% of the total Slovene population. Between the 1953 and the 1991 censuses the population in Slovenia increased by almost 30% (Piko, 2004, 44). In 1991, the census registered 29,361 Muslims representing 1.6% of the entire population. In the 1991 Population Census the question of national affiliation was answered by 87.5% of the 29,361 Muslims polled. As many as 20,435 (69.6%) declared themselves to be Muslims mainly from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2,481 (8.1%) as Albanian-nationality Muslims from Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, 1,196 (4.1%) stated regional affiliation, 1,121 (3.8%) declared themselves as Yugoslavs, and 818 (2.7%) as Slovenes. A total of 1,265 Muslims polled indicated Slovenian as their mother tongue (Piko, 2004, 51). According to the population data of the 2002 census there were 47,488 members of the Islamic Religious Community living in Slovenia (2.4% of the entire population), which means that the Islamic community is the second most numerous religious community, following the Catholic. The difference in the number of Muslims is considered to be a result of the fact that many believers had not declared themselves to be followers of the Muslim faith in the 1991 census. According to the estimates of the Islamic community there are Muslims who even in the 2002 census did not declare themselves to be Muslims; therefore an increase in the number of declared Muslims is to be expected in the next census as well. This means that the 42

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latter censuses did not actually record an increase in the share of Muslim population, but rather the movement towards the real number of Muslims in Slovenia. The Islamic community estimates that there are approximately 60,000 Muslims living in Slovenia at present. In their opinion the increase in the number of declared Muslims resulted from the more democratic atmosphere in which the 2002 census was conducted in comparison to that of 1991. This explanation is convincing, for the number of refugees in the interim would not account for such an increase.

The category ‘Muslim’ in census results

The category ‘Muslim’ was introduced in the 1961 Population Census and was at first intended primarily for those inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina who did not want to describe themselves either as Croats or Serbs and whose national identity was based on their religion; but it was soon adopted by the Muslims from Sandžak as well. The category ‘Muslim’ was abolished with the passing of the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as this states that its constituent peoples are Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Despite the introduction of the term Bosniak, the category ‘Muslim’ still appears in census results, but in an analysis the two categories should not be merged as the Muslims originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina now declare themselves as Bosniaks, while those from Sandžak still declare themselves as ‘Muslims.’ Their national identity is based primarily on religion, Islam, as they consider themselves neither Serbs nor Montenegrins. With the emergence of independent states in the territory of former Yugoslavia the classification of national affiliation of the population came to include the answer Bosniak, a term that was introduced in the constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation in 1994. The options regarding national affiliation still include the category ‘Muslim,’ but since the latter is used to denote ethnic and not religious affiliation, we should be very careful with this category when studying the national structure of Muslims in Slovenia.

The Legal situation of Muslims in Slovenia

The Islamic community in Slovenia has been active since 1967, when in Ljubljana the first local community (jama‘ah) was established. It was administratively connected with Zagreb, with its centre located in Sarajevo. Since 1991, when Slovenia attained its independence, these communities are no longer administratively connected with Zagreb and Sarajevo; instead, the 43

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whole community functions independently of the latter, according to the Slovene law. At present there are fourteen such communities operative in Slovenia. Agreement on the legal status of the Islamic community in the Republic of Slovenia was signed on 9th of July 2007 by Dr. Nedžad Grabus, Grand Mufti and President of the Meshihat of the Islamic community in the Republic of Slovenia, and Dr. Lovro Šturm, Chairman of the Committee of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Solving Open Issues of Religious Communities on the basis of Article 21 of Religious Freedom Act.3 The Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Islamic community have agreed on freedom of operation of the Islamic community, legal personality of the Islamic community, freedom of organisation and conduct of religious and educational activity, and jurisdiction, freedom of forming structures of the Islamic community and appointing persons in charge of them, freedom of establishing and maintaining contacts, freedom of access to public media and establishment of own media, freedom of creating associations, freedom of establishing educational institutions, preserving historical and cultural heritage; general rights and religious activities in hospitals, nursing homes, the armed forces, the police and special institutions; education of Islamic charity organisations with other charity organisations.

Conclusions

It is the fact that Muslims in Slovenia are Slovene citizens with all related rights and duties, yet the Slovene notions of Islam are more or less the same as the general “western” ones. The positive presentation of Slovene society as democratic, developed, free, and even tolerant, together with the negative presentation of Islamic society as the opposite (i.e., undemocratic, discriminatory against women, undeveloped, violent and intolerant) was distinctly evident in the Slovene public debate on the question of the construction of a mosque. As early as 1969, the Muslims living in Slovenia made a request for a mosque to be built in Ljubljana. The discussion on the mosque was extraordinarily burdened with contradictory views and principles on one side as well as very material and symbolic interests, prejudice and ignorance on the other side. In 2006, Ljubljana’s Islamic community gained a new mufti, Dr. Nedžad Grabus, who has worked with public intellectuals and activists to promote roundtable discussions, cultural events and other educational activities to replace stereotypically negative notions of Islam. The community has changed 44

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the streams of intolerance and after 45 years of petition from the Islamic community to build a mosque in Slovenia, the opening of the Slovenia’s first mosque is announced for 2016.

Notes 1. The War Office issued an order granting all Muslims a free day on Friday and three or four days off for Bayram. The Bosniak regiments had their own imams and the swearing in was even adapted to religious ceremonies (Pašić, 2002, 80). 2. Since the Italians were in such great fear of the Bosniaks, fezzes were distributed among numerous other units during the last, 12th battle, and even after the departure of these units the muezzins remained behind in order to remind the Italians five times a day that they were still there (Ovčak, 2002). 3. Offic.Gaz.Of the RS, no. 14/2007.

Bibliography Dragoš, Srečo (2003): Islam in suicidalno podalpsko pleme. Ljubljana, Skupina za spremljanje nestrpnosti, Mirovni inštitut. Grabus, Nedžad, Stiković. Denis (ed.) (2012): Z dialogom do medsebojnega spoštovanja, Ljubljana, Zavod Averroes: Sožitje I. Hukić, A., (ed.) (1977): Islam i muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini. Sarajevo, Starješinstvo islamske zajednice u SR Bosni i Hercegovini. Kerševan, Marko (2005): Svoboda za cerkev, svoboda od cerkve. Ljubljana, Založba Sophia. Klavora, Vasja (1993): Plavi križ: Soška fronta: Bovec 1915-1917. Ljubljana, Mladinska knjiga. Kržišnik-Bukić, Vera (1996): Bosanska identiteta med preteklostjo in prihodnostjo. Ljubljana, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja. Norris, H. T. (1993): Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World. Columbia, South Carolina, University of South Carolina Press. Ovčak, Tomaž (2002): Džamija v Logu pod Mangartom, www.soskafronta.com. Pašić, Ahmed (2002): Islam in muslimani v Sloveniji, Sarajevo, Emanet. Pašić, Ahmed (2006): Islam in moderni zahod: integracija islamskih skupnosti v moderne zahodne družbe, Kranj, Gorenjski glas. Piko, Mojca (2004):Politično geografska problematika Islamske verske skupnosti v Sloveniji, diplomska naloga. Ljubljana, Univerza v Ljubljani, Filozofska fakulteta. Rajhman, Jože (1986): Pisma Primoža Trubarja. Ljubljana, SAZU. Urh, Polona (2003): Podobe islama v časniku Delo, diplomska naloga. Ljubljana, Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za družbene vede. Verske skupnosti v Sloveniji (1994). Ljubljana, Urad Vlade Republike Slovenije za verske skupnosti. Voje, Ignacij (1996): Slovenci pod pritiskom turške ganasilja. Ljubljana, Znanstveni inštitut Filozofske fakultete.

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Muslims of Croatia: Social Recognition and Challenges Senad Nanić Basic Statistical Facts

According to censuses conducted in years of 1991, 2001 and 2011, Republic of Croatia records significant demographic losses continuously, both in total population number and in majority of census categories. Causes of demographic loss in 2001, when 4.437.460 inhabitants in total were recorded, making 7.27 percent decrease in relation to 1991 census when 4.785.265 of them were recorded, may well be attributed to immediate and long term effects of the war from the first half of the nineties. However, in conditions of stabile peace in the following decade, in years of political stability that may well be characterized in major part as period of economic growth, demographic loss in 2011, when 4.284.889 inhabitants in total were recorded, that is, 3.44 percent less than in 2001, points to a deep cultural and civilization problem of Croatian society in terms of so called transition. Particularly alarming is the fact that the biggest demographic “losers” are children, population category of age between 0 and 19 years, counting in 2011 decrease of 14.9 percent in relation to 2001 census. Consideration of prospects of any social community in Croatia is conditioned by these negative demographic indicators. Though small in number, Muslims are one of the rare categories that records continuous growth in the three censuses. According to the 2011 census, there are 62.977 Muslims in Croatia what makes only 1.47 percent of total population. However, this figure makes a growth of even 10.92 percent in relation to the 2001 census when their number was 56.777 what constituted then 1.28 percent of total Croatian population. Similarly, the 1991 census records 54.814 Muslims and that is 1.15 percent of the then total population of the Republic of Croatia. Muslims record intensive growth throughout the whole 20th century. In the 1919 census, 3.145 Muslims with continuous residence were recorded, while in the 1931 census, 4.750 of them were recorded. 47

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In terms of ethnicity, nearly 60 percent of Croatian Muslims are Bošniaks, the second largest national minority, i.e., ethnic group, in Croatia. The percentage includes those Bošniaks who declare themselves as ethnical Muslims or Bosnians. Somewhat more than 15 percent of Muslims declare themselves as Croat in terms of ethnicity. Only a bit less is the percentage of Albanian Muslims. The forth group in number are Roma, making 8 percent, while the other ethnic groups, such as Arabs, Turks, Iranians and others, participate insignificantly. Published results of the census prior to the last census did not relate ethnical to religious declaration. It is thus impossible to determine the cause of this significant increase of Muslim population in Croatia. One cannot attribute it to higher natural increase of Muslims since age distribution of Bošniak population essentially does not differ from general age distribution, as seen in Population distribution chart according to ethnicity and age from 2011. Significantly higher share of child age population is registered in Roma and Albanian ethnic groups, whose share in Muslim population, on the other hand, is less than a quarter. It is possible that number of Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens and those of other ex-Yugoslav countries who gained Croatian citizenship or residence permit within the last decade was in reality higher than generally expected. The fact is that the last Croatian census recorded even 6.733 Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens having no Croatian citizenship. Special attention is to be addressed to assimilation trends though, in two directions, firstly, Croatian majority assimilating Bošniak ethnical declaration by Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina origin in third generation or in ethnically mixed marriages and secondly, Muslim community gradually assimilating by analogy with Muslim communities in the West. Muslims today inhabit almost all cities of Croatia. The highest number of them is found in industrial and cultural centers such as Zagreb, Rijeka, Sisak, Dubrovnik, and Pula.

Causes of Social Recognition

Islam was recognized as a state religion in Croatia in 1916 by parliamentary confirmation of decision decreed by Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1912. Since then, Islamic Community in Croatia enjoys institutionalized continuous activity. Its oneness and identity has never been threatened by a parallel or an alternative Islamic institution. Islam in Croatia was recognized due to historic fact of Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 and later annexing in 1908 whereby Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina became first Islamic entity in modern Europe. Having state 48

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tradition of mono-confessional citizenship on one side and political decision of preserving administrative unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other, Austro-Hungarian state, Croatia then included, has institutionalized Islam making Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina its citizens. Newly established community continued to practice Hanafi religious law tradition of Ottoman Empire. Thereupon Bošniaks started to inhabit Croatia more intensively in pursue of university education and better business opportunities having thus renewed medieval multi-centennial presence of Muslims in Croatia, abruptly ended in 18th century. No other place in Western Europe, until second half of 20th century in Spain and Belgium, had institutionalized Islam as religion. Modern presence of Muslims in Croatia lasts much longer than the presence of Muslims in countries of Western Europe so that grade of social integration and institutionalization is much higher. Muslims of Croatia do not fall in category of work and education immigration for a long time now. Fact that Bošniaks are significantly more socially recognized than Albanians and particularly Romas is evident once having professional registers and encyclopaedic reference books scanned. Unlike other Muslim minority and majority peoples and communities in Europe, Bošniaks share exceptional cultural proximity with neighbouring peoples. The language is practically the same, the origin is mutual southern Slavic and historic multi-centennial experience of living together under foreign imperial rule of different cultural spheres, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian, is shared. Cultural phenomena of the two cultural spheres live more or less in both Bošniak and Croatian people. 18th and 19th century represent merely a violent break of Bošniak and Muslim presence in Croatia. Larger parts of present day eastern and southern Croatia were part of autonomous Bosnian governance, namely “pashaluk”, under Ottoman administration in 16th and 17th century. Eastern and western Christians had their religious rights and institutions protected. This has influenced significantly development of respective national institutions and their attachment to religious institutions in modern age. In terms of the stated cultural proximity, Islam becomes the most important component of Bošniak national identity, unlike other European Muslim nations, namely Turks and Albanians, since their languages and cultures differ significantly from the neighbouring. City of Zagreb, being industrial and university centre of Yugoslavia throughout 20th century, has continuously attracting large number of Bošniaks in pursue of high education and professional and social recognition until late after the Second World War when Sarajevo has definitely developed as a strong 49

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university and industrial centre. Therefore, urban, university educated and industrial population share in Bošniak minority in Croatia surpasses Croatian average population share. Muslims, though few, today inhabit all cities of Croatia. Interval between the two world wars is marked politically by struggle of southern Slavic peoples for the recognition in centralist Kingdom of Yugoslavia ruled by Serb dynasty. Bošniaks, especially those living in Croatia, supported Croatian struggle for national recognition and preferred Zagreb over Belgrade as a welcoming environment recognizing Bošniaks as cooperates in struggle for national recognition. Negation of separate nation of Bosnian Muslims and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Croatian political faction caused political fight against Muslims, that is, Bošniaks, reaching climax by establishment of Ustashi fascist regime in 1941 and the war conflict in 1993. Nevertheless, Bošniaks stayed for ever perceived by majority of Croatian people as a friendly separate national entity. This perception was enhanced by renewal of national states in form of federal republics in socialist Yugoslavia even though Bošniak nationality was not recognized before seventies of the 20th century under a compromise name “Muslim”. Intensive industrial development of socialism after the Second World War attracting a large number of Bošniaks into industrial centres of Croatia was enhanced by particular international position of socialist Yugoslavia in relation to eastern and western blocks. International policy of non-alignment movement headed by Yugoslavia intensified political, cultural and economic ties with numerous Muslim countries. Large number of Croats worked in Muslim countries. Large number of students from Muslim countries studied and continued to live their lives in Croatia. This has influenced in a positive way the perception of Islam and Muslims in Croatia and Yugoslavia. Muslims of Croatia were never a significant part of Croatian political elite in spite of their common ability in individual achievements. Not in one regime Muslims had a lobby to help them pass the filters of high rank political decision making. So they turn to what can provide for living; that is quality of individual work as the only guarantee of social survival. Even today employment rate in state administration of Muslims, especially of those who do not ethnically declare Croatianhood is far beneath respective population share. Far beyond average, Muslims of Croatia contributed defence of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina against aggression that lasted from 1991 till 1995. They perceived the aggression as an attack on both of their two homelands meant to physically exterminate their people. They participated over average in establishment of national institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and those 50

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of Bošniak people. During and after the war, they direct activities to further establishment of Islamic community and establishment of national minority Bošniak institutions. They struggle for complete recognition of Bošniak minority rights in Croatia and full integration in Croatian society.

Institutions

Islamic Community and Croatian Government have signed agreement whereby state financial support is determined as well. The agreement is drafted in line with the agreement which Croatian Government signed with majority Roman Catholic Church. The agreement defines state support for religious primary education, as having been executed successfully in numerous public schools and Islamic Community at local levels since Croatian independence. Number of pupils is counted in thousands. Religious service in army, police, hospitals and prisons is determined by the agreement, as well. Islamic Community has founded public Islamic High School. There are four mixed classes with some hundred students. Islamic Community founded Halal Certification Agency, Football Club “Nur”, Muslim Youth Club, Female Choir “Arabesque”, Council of Muslim Women and other organizations. Islamic Community hosts international competition of the Qur’an readers annually, traditional public presentations of Islamic topics weekly since 1962, occasional scientific symposiums, round tables, exhibitions, publishing etc. Apart of education, basic aims of Islamic Community today are construction of mosques and waqf centre. Establishment of Faculty of Islamic Sciences is in preparatory phase now. Locally, Islamic Community is organized in 15 majlises. Struggle for political recognition of Bošniaks in Croatia was started by Party of Democratic Action in Croatia, tied to Party of Democratic Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The party was founded in 1990 and has 19 branches now. At the beginning, political activities were directed at the beginning to criticism of Croatian state policy to Bosnia and Herzegovina and later to struggle for recognition of Bošniak nation and Bošniak minority rights. Mr. Šemso Tanković, then president of the party, was member of Croatian Parliament in two terms representing Albanian, Bošniak, Montenegrin, Macedonian and Slovene minorities. Bošniak Democratic Party in Croatia, founded in 2008, claims its political position as centre left. At the last parliamentary elections in 2011, Mr. Nedžad Hodžić, president of the party, becomes member of the Parliament representing five “ex-Yugoslav” minorities and president of Club of Minority Parliamentary Members. The party now counts 15 branches in Croatia. 51

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Founded in 1991, Cultural Society of Croatian Bošniaks “Preporod” promotes cultural creativity of Croatian Bošniaks as a separate and original phenomenon in Croatian and Bošniak culture. Renown by rewarded magazine for culture and social issues “Behar” and numerous publishing endeavours winning highest state and professional awards in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Preporod” gathers best Bošniak writers in Croatia and opens the door to numerous associates from Croatia and the region. “Preporod” also publishes magazines “Preporod›s Journal” and “Jasmin” and hosts female choir “Bulbul” and drama group “Orient Espresso” with children group “Zvrk”. Bošniak National Community in Croatia was founded in 1993 aiming to protect and promote Bošniak individual and collective rights in Croatia. 11 branches were founded. The community publishes books and magazines “Bošnjačka pismohrana” and “Bošnjački glas” and hosts choir “Bosana”. Croatian Homeland War Bošniak Association was founded in 2000 as the only minority veteran association. In memory of Bošniak soldiers who died in Homeland War, a war memorial was erected in 2012 next to Islamic Center in Zagreb. Assembly of Bošniak Associations in Croatia gathers 23 Bošniak associations and publishes monthly “Sabah” and hosts annual folklore reviews. Lot of independent Bošniak cultural amateurism associations are founded across Croatia. The most prominent is “Sevdah”. National minority councils advise local authorities. Bošniak Minority Councils are founded in most of Croatian regions and in many cities and municipalities. The most recognized is Bošniak Minority Council of Zagreb City through its popular programs of Srebrenica Convoy and Bosnia and Herzegovina Movies Review. The Council carried out noticeable sociological research on social and cultural status of Bosniaks in Zagreb City.

Challenges

Protection of historic unity and high level autonomy of Islamic Community in Croatia as a part of Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is challenged now. It is best illustrated by political struggles on new constitution of Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, few new interest realities have formed during last two decades. In the process of dissolution of Yugoslav republics, recognition and strengthening of their independence, different state policies on Muslims formed, varying from genocide to full recognition. Islamic Community in Yugoslavia, now in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reduced in war to territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Sanjak and 52

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Bošniak diaspora excluding Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, by decision that was understandable in war but proved disadvantages in the long term, perceives these various state policies as potential threat to its unity. It was to be expected then to hear voices of centralism from Sarajevo. On the other hand, Islamic Community in Croatia, being minor, continues to struggle to preserve existing level of autonomy aiming the best possible cooperation with the state and will keep trying to meet requirements of particularity of state policies. Consensus that has been reached on new constitution proves momentary capacity of political wisdom and patience by not having forced Islamic Community in Croatia in direction of full independence. This would prove fatal. Real strength range of Islamic Community in Croatia having no ties with Bosnian parent community would enable fast establishment of parallel Islamic communities. They would be formed by interests of state policies of ex Yugoslav countries following ethnic and other differences among Croatian Muslims. State policies of other countries would follow in line with interest for their citizens or export of their “own” Islam. Instead of exemplary regulation of Muslim question, Croatia would experience proverbial European dissolution of Muslim organizations. Already, in that sense, one could have heard among Zagreb diplomats a criticism of too loud public support of Islamic Community to realization of Croatian participation in NATO projects. On the other hand, one is glad to see ability of Islamic Community to renew and extend its regional institutional presence. Recent joining of Hungarian Muslims at their own request in Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina was done by their formal joining in Islamic Community in Croatia. So if other communities of Muslims in central and southeastern Europe recognize Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina as their cardinal institution of Islam, it is practical goal to promote new constitutional changes ordered to establish regional transnational Islamic Community which will in accordance with historic, cultural and civilizational realities meet multifold requirements and needs of Muslim communities in central and southeastern Europe. This is to be done by making structure of the Community both complex and open in order to assure ever expanding space for autonomy of communities acting in different states. Croatian Muslims will hopefully play inevitable role in sure attempt of Croatian business capacities return on markets of Muslim countries. This is corroborated by great interest of Croatian companies shown for program of halal certification carried out by Islamic Community. This is area of real 53

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political and economic struggle where proportionate employment of Muslims in state administration and respective institutions needs to be assured having in mind this employment rate was far beneath average by now, particularly for Muslims who did not declare ethnic Croatianhood. It is necessary to intensify activities on establishment of Faculty of Islamic Sciences and Arabic Language in Zagreb where education will be provided for successful activities of Islamic Community and special aspects of Croatian diplomacy and economy. Having respect for historic and social identity of Croatian Muslims in mind, institutionalization of basic Bošniak organizations in Croatia, that is, emancipation from level of civil associations to realm of continuously assured institutional activity, is prerequisite of survival and growth of comprehensive cultural and social identity of Muslims in Croatia. This is not possible without bilateral agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia which keeps away like any other continuous support of Sarajevo to cultural and social activities of Croatian Bošniaks. This is to be observed in context of ethnic and structural complexity of Bosnian state and lack of definition of diaspora of Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to its ethnic declaration. The consequences, hopefully not for good, are being endured by Bošniaks in Croatia, who are, together with Roma, the only national minority in Croatia with no institutional support by parent state.

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Socio-Cultural Diversity of Bosnia-Herzegovina Muhidin Mulalič

Historical and Socio-Cultural Background

The historical experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates that states, cultures, civilizations and religions respectively clash, meet and coexist; a process that is inevitable for historical progress and dynamism. As in the case of BosniaHerzegovina, whenever an exclusive socio-cultural model was presented as an alternative, requesting transformation and assimilation of existing socio-cultural models, the country experienced conflicts and wars. The historical continuity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state has been characterized by an inclusive sociocultural model, a model that embraces diversity. Actually Mahmutčehajić (2000) in his work Bosnia the Good: Tolerance and Tradition used the Tradition as a basis of tolerance, understanding and coexistence (pp. 183-190). The Latin sources indicate that the state of Bosnia was established as early as in the mid-tenth century. Then, according to documents from 1137, the first ruler, Ban Borić, is referred to as the first Ban or Viceroy of Bosnia from 1154 to 1164. After his reign Bosnia as an independent state continued to exist, this was also confirmed by Kulin Ban’s Charter, written in 1189. In 1376, after crowning of King Tvrtko I, Bosnia became a kingdom and kept such status until the conquest by the Ottoman Empire. During the medieval times Bosnia reached significant economic and socio-cultural development. Therefore, it is significant to mention that before the Ottoman arrival in 1463, Bosnia as an independent and sovereign state had historical and socio-cultural continuity (Imamovic, 2006, 44-48). Socio-cultural features of medieval Bosnia were especially characterized by the Bosnian Church, which formulated religious make-up independently from the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christianity. Indeed, the Bosnian Church represented the state of Bosnia and shaped common religious and cultural identity of the citizens who were not identifying themselves with neighbouring states. Thus, Bosnian national identity and sovereignty were derived from the Bosnian church (Mahmutčehajić, 2000, 31-33; Velikonja, 2003, 19; Malcom, 55

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1994, 27-42). According to Lovrenovic (2001) Medieval Bosnia was also characterized by unique heritage especially expressed in original Bosnian language [bosančica] and in the tombs [stećci] (pp. 65-69). In 1463 Bosnia was under Ottoman rule. Since the reign of Sultan Mehmet II, the Conqueror, the territories of Bosnia had been expanding, reaching its climax in the 16th century, a time during which Bosnia included parts of Croatia, Dalmatia and Serbia. Throughout the Ottoman period (1463-1878), territorial integrity of Bosnia had been preserved and—due to the Ottoman millet system—its distinctive socio-cultural values (Jelavich, 1983, 1:49-50; Vucinich, 1962, 605-606). For the sake of a more effective administrative structure of the state, Bosnia was established as ayalet in 1580 and was divided in sanjaks. The first Bosnian ayalet or socio-political, territorial and administrative unit was furthermore divided into sanjaks or provinces. Such socio-political and administrative organization indicates historical continuity of Bosnia and her significance within the Ottoman Empire (Ibrahimagic, 1998, 77-81). The socio-cultural mosaic of medieval Bosnia was furthermore enriched between the 15th and 19th century due to the interaction and the presence of the Ottomans. Such presence left a mark on the monuments, literature and poetry. Besides, Bosnia’s administrative, socio-cultural and economic structures were directly shaped by the Ottoman presence. For instance religious monuments built during the Ottoman period left great mark on Bosnia (Algar, 1971, 168-203). However, it is significant to mention that new economic, political, social, cultural and religious models were not imposed by the Ottomans (Kirmizialtin, 2007, 646–657). Rather, such new models were furthermore enriched by the medieval socio-cultural models as they continued to flourish under new empire. Socio-cultural values of Bosnia cannot be properly addressed without mentioning cultural and religious transformations as a result of Ottoman rule. Ottomans brought the religion of Islam to Bosnia and with it new cultural and spiritual opportunities. New civilization brought along a higher living standard and urban, architectural, administrative, economic and commercial development. The people of Bosnia, considering benefits provided by the new worldview, had integrated themselves without rejecting their past heritage of Western civilization. It is interesting to mention that during the reign of the Ottomans the term Bosniak was used to denote people of the region regardless of religious affiliation (Imamovic, 1998, 376). Mostly those affiliated with the Bosnian Church converted to new religion and took an active role in the political, religious, economic, administrative and cultural life of the 56

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Ottoman Empire (Enver Imamovic, 1995, 133-135). As Ottoman sources and archives indicate, the process of the conversion to the religion of Islam in Bosnia lasted for more than two centuries. This signifies a rather peaceful conversion to the religion of Islam (Zheliazkova, 1994, 187-208). Political, cultural and economic developments and circumstances during the Ottoman rule contributed tremendously towards gradual conversion to the religion of Islam. Tolerance and understanding, and not forced conversion, on behalf of the Ottoman Empire can be also inferred from Sultan Mehmed II’s pledge in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1463, which granted freedom, safety and security to the Bosnian Franciscans (Donia and Fine, 1994, 64-65; Gavran, 2001, 63-69). Due to gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire and power succession, Bosnia became an integral part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (18781918). Historically, Bosnia under Austro-Hungarian rule is divided into two periods: the first, from 1878, known as the interim rule; the second, from 1908, known as annexation or direct colonial rule. Both periods represent shifts from belonging to the Ottoman or Islamic cultural orbit to AustroHungarian or Western cultural orbit. During this time rapid political and socio-cultural transformation and modernization of the country began in terms of governance, law, economy, social structure, urbanization and cultural transformations (Karčić, 1999). Then the rise of nationalism gave birth to various Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian national organizations, each fostering different national projects. During this period Muslim, Serbian and Croatian national movements and organizations were established that would later be transformed into nationalist political parties (Banac, 1984, 340-368). Such diverse groups of people or nations developed from the religious communities that were defined previously according to the Ottoman millet system. Thus, Bosnia as a state began to be questioned and its future sovereignty would be very much a cause of various political and military disputes, the last culminating in the 1990s. According to Glenny’s work The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, (1804-1999) (pp. 256-266) the Serbian and Croatian nationalistic aspirations towards Bosnia were very disruptive and affected the balance of power in the Balkans. Such nationalistic aspirations would eventually lead the Balkan region and the whole world towards World War I. Since the Middle Ages, Bosnia had been preserving its distinctive national identity that was built upon diverse and inclusive historical, cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic features. As such, the state was envisioned distinctive from the neighbouring states such as that of Serbia and Croatia. Even during the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods, 57

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Bosnia exercised such distinctive features. However, as a result of the birth of Serbian and Croatian nationalism, the people of Bosnia were affected too. During the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods, Bosnia was prevented from articulating its distinctive socio-cultural features at the state level. Therefore, the need for such articulation emerged with the rise of Serbian and Croatian nationalism and as a result of the decline of multinational empires, especially that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Judah, 1997, 73-89). By 1890s Bosnian national identity was expressed in newspapers, magazines and by national movements that were emphasizing Bosnian national identity as distinctive from that of Serbia and Croatia. For instance, in 1891, the first newspaper Bosniak was published to foster national identity and national aspirations. An idea that the people of Bosnia were not Turks as perceived by Serbs and Croats, but the people of the soil who had converted to a new religion had to be explained and clarified (Bringa, 1995, 24-26). This was also the time of cultural upheavals and an attempt of the Bosniak community to position itself within the region and within the Western civilization. Political autonomy was sought by the Muslim National Organization to preserve Bosnian national identity and its unique cultural heritage (Banac, 1984, 368). Indeed, the task was difficult because it was a challenge to encompass Slavic ethnic identity, Western and Christian values, common national identity and the Islamic spiritual orientation of the Bosniak people who were stretched inbetween Serbian and Croatian nationalism. With the establishment of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, socio-cultural and political features of Bosnia were furthermore affected. As the name of newly established state suggests, Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks were entirely erased as constituent people of the state. Bosniaks were not considered as national group but as distinctive cultural-religious group. During this time in Bosnia the Muslim community and its leadership under Mehmet Spaho (1883-1939) was reduced to insignificant minority by Serbian and Croatian nationalists (Purivatra, 1974, 58-104). Lack of national aspirations and strong leadership had continued to affect socio-cultural and political position of Bosnia during World War II. The people of the country had failed to preserve their own sovereignty as they fell under heavy influence of Serbian, Croatian and Communist national ideologies. In this regard it is significant to mention that the Muslim community during this very critical period of time was sharply divided. Such selective siding of the Muslim community with at one time Serbian nationalists, Croatian nationalists and Communists suggest how little of national consciousness 58

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and independence was present in the Muslim community. On the other hand, Serbian and Croatian national consciousness was very strong and as such was articulated by the political and intellectual elites (Filandra, 1998, 49-50). For instance, Serbian national identity and aspirations were clearly envisioned by Ilija Garašanin in his “Načertanije” of 1844, Stevan Moljevic’s “Homogenous Serbia” from 1941 and the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) from 1986. Croatian national aspirations, on the other hand, were envisioned in well-known Cvetković-Maček agreement in 1939 (Judah, 1997, 56-61). Such widely-known historical documents positioned the Serbian and Croatian communities respectively as the successor powers. However, considering ethnic complexity and religious diversity, Bosnia could hardly belong to any regional power and as such could not be administered or organized according to ethnocentric principles. Bosnia as a state of different ethnic groups, cultures and religions was recognized by the communists as a country of ‘the peoples’ by the exclusion of specific national, ethnic or religious affiliations. Bosnia was reaffirmed as a federal republic as a result of the creation of Yugoslavia (1945-1991). In 1943, the Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of BiH (ZAVNOBiH) reaffirmed the statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina in small town of Mrkonjić Grad. Thus, state’s sovereignty was reaffirmed and creation of Yugoslavian national identity strengthened the bond between Bosnia-Herzegovina’s peoples such as Serbs, Croats and Muslims. Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina became the most diverse federal republic within former Yugoslavia. Positioning itself as a clear example of coexistence of the people who had accepted common Yugoslavian identity in a country that was equally Muslim, Serbian and Croatian, sometimes referred to as a miniature of Yugoslavia (Ibrahimagic, 1998, 95). Yet it is significant to mention that in former Yugoslavia Muslim national and religious identities were constitutionally subdued. Only by 1974, due to constitutional reform the Muslims became recognized as a nationality in their own right (Malcom, 1994, 197). Thus such misrepresentations prevented Bosniaks from articulating their own political, cultural, ethnic, linguistic and historical identities. On the contrary, Serbian and Croatian nationalists, especially since the 1980s, were working very hard to assimilate Bosniak community and to develop conditions as to join part of the country to Serbia and Croatia, respectively (Ramet, 1996, 7-49; Meier, 1999, 35-60). Nevertheless, Bosniak cultural and national identity was revived and articulated by intellectuals, as for instance, Adil Zulfikarpašić, Smail Balić, Selim Ćerić, Alija Isaković, Midhat Begić and Muhamed Hadžijahić (Imamovic, 1997, 562-569). 59

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The ethno-religious nationalism, revived from the past, led to the traumatic war of 1992-1995 and as such even in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina has been colouring every aspect of everyday life. There emerged a significant fusion of national and religious identity based on the distant and past historical and socio-cultural heritage of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, distinctively. National identity of Bosnia Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Bosniaks was based on ethnicity and religion (Bringa, 1995, 108). Therefore, the dissolution of former Yugoslavia has articulated again the question of national identity or the relationship between ethnicity, religion and the state. The right to selfdetermination, demand for national unification and the consequent redrawing of borders affected socio-cultural features of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In particular, Bosnia-Herzegovina posed the greatest challenge as Serbia and Croatia had historic and territorial pretensions due to great majorities of Serbs and Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, all national groups felt threatened, so the fear and resentment were used to develop imaginary fear of extinction felt across the ethnic and national groups. This had contributed towards tremendous co-ethnic mobilization by Serbia and Croatia in BosniaHerzegovina (Almond, 1994, 3-30). The above short historical and socio-cultural survey indicates that the period from 1992 to 1995 represents cyclic patterns of historical processes. In 1992, due to the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence. However, conflicting socio-cultural features of the state and troubled complex, historical processes again challenged multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-national diversity. The outcomes of the war in BosniaHerzegovina are obvious and need no further elaboration (Ramet, 1996, 243-268). However, the pre-war period and post-war periods had instigated questions that have been hunting this country since its emergence, particularly the question of national, religious and cultural identity. Ever since in postDayton Bosnia-Herzegovina there have been attempts to affirm and strengthen the state’s sovereignty and to envision a political and socio-cultural model acceptable to all people of Bosnia. As history has already indicated, exclusive hegemonic nationalism, as fostered in the past centuries and decades, has been destroying very foundations of multiethnic and multicultural BosniaHerzegovina (Imamovic, 1997, 489-532).

National, Religious and Cultural Diversity

Past and present ethnic, cultural and religious diversity of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be discussed in the wider historical and socio-cultural contexts. The 60

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author shall not focus on producing basic information about ethnic, national and religious groups but, on the contrary, an attempt shall be made at providing the readers with the interpretation of socio-cultural concepts by putting them in the historical, geopolitical and cultural frame of understanding. The statistical data from 1991 indicates that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s population is 4.2 million, a population consisting of Bosniaks, (42%), Serbs (33%) and Croats (18%) and about 8% of others. There is no doubt that culture is the way of life experienced and practiced distinctively by the people in one society and as such represents shared social norms and values. Thus, culture is often perceived as a social generator that leads the society towards social, political, economic, artistic and cultural creativity and dynamism (Newton, 2001, 201214; Said, 1993, xii). Like culture, history is also related to the socio-cultural features of one state as it affects its moulding and shaping. Therefore, from such a historical and socio-cultural perspective, Bosnia-Herzegovina encompasses both oriental and occidental cultures, thus reflecting true multiculturalism. As already discussed above, the heritage and culture of Bosnia-Herzegovina are interwoven with ancient medieval, modern and contemporary cultures. Therefore, from a sociocultural perspective, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been very unique throughout the history and, as its heritage indicates, it belongs neither to the West nor to the East but contains elements of both (Mahmutčehajić, 2000, 54-64). In today’s global world where questions of culture, religion and identity have been revisited and discussed, the cultural values of Bosnia-Herzegovina, if properly used, could have become a hallmark of this small European country. The socio-cultural values of Bosnia-Herzegovina should also be looked at from a geopolitical perspective. Bosnia-Herzegovina bridges and separates different civilizations, states and cultures and as such its integrity and sovereignty is vital for civilizational, cultural and security balance. Historically speaking, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the ‘front line’ between Byzantine Orthodoxy and Western European Catholicism, a ‘front’ which run partly along the river Drina. Unique Bosnia-Herzegovina’s position was secured by the establishment of independent ‘Bosnian Church’ by the Bogomils, who cherished religious tolerance and coexistence of different faiths. With the coming of the Ottomans, Bosnia-Herzegovina became the front line between the Muslim Ottoman Empire and Western Christendom. Such front line had consequently created a perennial struggle between Christianity and Islam that had not affected the country’s diversity because a mixed population of Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox Christians has been preserved. Thus, 61

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Bosnia-Herzegovina has to serve as a bridge between the Muslim and the Western worlds. In today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina, three major world religions— Islam, Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity—flourish side-by-side. These three religions should continue to formulate distinctive physical and spiritual features of the state, which guarantee the state’s continuity in the form of a necessary religious balance (Mulalic, 2009, 119). In the Balkan region Bosnia-Herzegovina has been representing the balance of power since the World War I until today. Whenever Serbian and Croatian nationalist pretensions on Bosnia-Herzegovina were exercised, the region as a whole had been engulfed in the bloody wars as in the case of recent Balkan Wars from 1991-1995 (Slack and Doyon, 2001, 140-141). Therefore, BosniaHerzegovina must be preserved as a multicultural and multinational state as it encompasses shared Bosniak, Croat and Serb socio-cultural values. As a consequence of the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina is facing a challenge of how to bridge various national and cultural identities. However, in order to avoid the tragic events of the early 1990s, Bosnia-Herzegovina should function as a bridge between Serbia and Croatia. The people of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be committed to diversity as to check and balance the two exclusively ethnostates of Serbia and Croatia. Apart from three constituent peoples of Serb, Croat and Bosniak, BosniaHerzegovina is a home to seventeen different minorities that affirm the multicultural diversity of a state and articulate the necessity of intercultural dialogue. The socio-cultural values of Bosniak, Serb, Croat, Jewish and other minorities are represented through different cultural and educational organizations. Such socio-cultural values are also a guarantee of the multicultural sustainability of Bosnia-Herzegovina which is historically impressed in the foundations of a state. Therefore, multicultural diversity within BosniaHerzegovina has multiple faces and as such doesn’t generate isolation. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s old towns and cities represent the greatest examples of multicultural inclusiveness. Throughout the country, such old towns are usually the places where one can find a Serbian Orthodox church, a Roman Catholic cathedral, a Jewish synagogue and a mosque. Then, the most important characteristic of the old towns are their markets which are the places where all groups freely come together to buy and sell (Karahasan, 1994, 3-16). Such coexistence contributed to significant oriental and occidental influence on local Bosniak, Croat and Serb culture, language, literature, customs and practices. Today Bosnia-Herzegovina characterizes a rich native culture and tradition which includes folk and oral literature, music, dances, art, clothing, 62

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folk life, architecture, being a result of various cultural influences of the Slavic, Mediterranean, Balkan, Oriental and Middle-European cultural circles.

Socio-Cultural Transformations, Challenges and Prospects

In the recent war multiethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were greatly affected and the state’s socio-cultural features in the form of shared cultural values and artistic monuments were destroyed. After the war institutional preservation and reconstruction of monuments that represent socio-cultural values of the country have been neglected due to the lack of institutional approach, budget and expertise. As a result, Bosnia-Herzegovina can boast only a very small number of museums, libraries, cultural centres and artistic institutions. Therefore, Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to invest in the development of positive climate so that common socio-cultural values subscribe to by all her citizens can flourish again, forming a future common identity too (Mulalic, 2008, 19-29). Shaping such socio-cultural models is indeed a very challenging responsibility that should be instigated by policy-makers, civil society, cultural and artistic organizations and associations, state educational institutions and international organizations. National identity is derived from the notion of a ‘nation’ representing ethnicity, race, culture, language, religion and historical experience (Duncan, Jancar-Webster and Switky, 2008, 264-270). In post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina distinctive ‘peoples’ such as Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks have attempted to create their own exclusive and hegemonic national identities based on different histories, cultures, ethnicities, religions and languages. Therefore, as a result of the war, many citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina do not share a common national identity although their distant past and present indicate common historical, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious traits. It is unfortunate that such exclusive confrontational national identities have been constructed due to recent historical and social contexts (Eriksen and Hylland, 2002, 1-16). Such attempts have been made in spite of the fact that world history clearly indicates that there has never existed single socio-cultural model. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina as elsewhere, national identity should be derived from shared socio-cultural values while ethnic bonds, should be upheld and broadly respected. The history of Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates that ethnic distinctive bonds have been flourishing throughout the centuries while common national identification and a sense of interconnected relationship between diverse groups of people had always been strongly felt. Actually history of Bosnia-Herzegovina points to cultural inclusion and cross-culture, not exclusive cultural isolation. That is why nowadays as throughout the past, although 63

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belonging to different groups of people, many distinguished Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks have accepted a common and shared Bosnian national identity. In the age of globalization and in the world of diversity it has become an imperative to foster and preserve tolerance, understanding and co-existence in multicultural and multi-ethnic societies as an alternative to Huntington’s civilizational clash (Mahmutčehajić, 2000, 88-90). In this regard, the inclusive socio-cultural model of Bosnia-Herzegovina could position a country as very unique socio-cultural state-model, which other multicultural and multiethnic countries could follow worldwide. This is in particular true for the EU member-states that presently cope with the challenges related to minorities, religion, culture, language and ethnicity. Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout history has been united through its sociocultural diversity based on shared tradition. Therefore an alternative to the divisive ethno-nationalist socio-cultural model are commonly accepted and shared traditional values. Any denial of socio-cultural unity in diversity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and hegemony of one socio-cultural model over another is against the true, historically affirmed nature of a country. Therefore, shared tradition as widely represented in Bosnia-Herzegovina could serve as a model for global inter-religious dialogue and coexistence. Apart from inherent traditional socio-cultural values commonly accepted by the people of the country, cosmopolitan multiculturalism that has exploited liberal values could be another source of strengthening common national identity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Drawing from the British, the Dutch and Malaysian experiences in establishing institutional conditions for flourishing of true multiculturalism would be an additional complementary in BosniaHerzegovina. Such approaches are especially inevitable due to the processes of Europeanization and globalization. Although Bosnia-Herzegovina is in essence a multiethnic and multicultural country, multicultural diversity as state policy has yet to be advocated. Therefore, there is a need of developing multicultural policy aimed at civil society and education institutions that could nourish and foster multicultural cosmopolitanism. Socio-cultural aspects of Bosnia-Herzegovina should again be approached from occidental and oriental, i.e., global perspectives. Socio-cultural diversity within Bosnia-Herzegovina should be reinforced by contemporary trends that value such diversity. In the era of globalization, coexistence of various sociocultural aspects of life has become fundamental. Therefore, Bosnia’s very path towards joining the EU and the fulfilment of set requirements guarantee upholding of both traditional and liberal socio-cultural values. 64

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Concluding Remarks

In spite of recent past and present predicaments, Bosnia-Herzegovina as a microcosmic socio-cultural model represents an increasingly interconnected and diverse world. A principle counter the perspective of Huntington’s clash of civilizations as articulated at international meetings, conferences, seminars and scholarly writing worldwide will be manifested in the survival of BosniaHerzegovina. Therefore, diverse socio-cultural models are not only central to the rebuilding and transition of Bosnia-Herzegovina but of the global world as a whole (Karić, 1999, 90-92). Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout history has managed to incorporate ethnic, religious and cultural diversities and had projected a distinctive multicultural state identity. Instances of disputes and conflicts, as clearly elaborated in the paper, have often been sparked by outside influences. Such influences have been in particular politically and economically motivated by regional states such as Serbia and Croatia (Malcom, 1994, 234). Being a multicultural state, Bosnia-Herzegovina has always flourished as a part of a greater whole, i.e., the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire and Yugoslavia. Therefore, the future of this small country lies in joining the EU, a family of nations that uphold diversity. Upholding liberal values, cosmopolitan multiculturalism, the Tradition and diverse socio-cultural values derived from Bosnia’s past and present would in turn uphold and strengthen the EU road towards achieving the goal of creating a family of nations.

References Algar H. (1971). “Some Notes on the Naqshbandī Tarīqat in Bosnia.” Die Welt des Islams 13(3/4): 168-203. Almond M. (1994). Europe’s Backyard War. London: Heinemann. Banac I. (1984). The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bringa T. (1995). Being Muslim the Bosnian Way. Princeton: Princeton New Jersey. Donia R. and Fine J. (1994). Bosnia and Herzegovina, A Tradition Betrayed. New York: Columbia University Press. Duncan R., Jancar-Webster B., and Switky B. (2008). World Politics in the 21st Century. New York: Cengage Learning. Eriksen T. and Hylland T. (2002). Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. London: Pluto Press. Filandra S. (1998). Bošnjačka politika u XX stoljeću. Sarajevo: Sejtarija. Gavran I. (2001). Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History: Seven Centuries of Bosnian Franciscans. Sarajevo: Svjetlo riječi. Glenny M. (1999). The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers (1804-1999). London, Granta Books. 65

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Ibrahimagic O. (1998). Constitutional Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo: The Congress of Bosnian Intellectuals. Imamovic M. (2006). Bosnia and Herzegovina: Evolution of Its Political and Legal Institutions. Sarajevo: Magistrat. Imamović E. (1995). Korijeni bosne i bosanstva. Sarajevo: Medjunarodni centar za mir. Imamović M. (1997). Historija Bošnjaka. Sarajevo: Bošnjačka zajednica kulture Preporod. Jelavich B. (1983). History of the Balkans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Judah T. (1997). The Serbs, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. New Heaven CT, London: Yale University Press. Karic E. (1999). Essays (On Behalf) of Bosnia. Sarajevo: El-Kalem. Karčić F. (1999). The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity. Sarajevo: El-Kalem. Karahasan Dž. (1994). Sarajevo, portrait of an internal city. In: Drakulic S. (trans.) Sarajevo, Exodus of a City. New York: Kodansha International, 1-19. Kirmizialtin S. (2007). Conversion in Ottoman Balkans: A Historiographical Survey. History Compass 5/2: 646-657. Lovrenović I. (2001). Bosnia: A Cultural History. New York: New York University Press. Mahmutčehajić R. (2000). Bosnia the Good: Tolerance and Tradition. Budapest: Central European University Press. Mahmutćehajić R. (2000). Sarajevski eseji: Politika, ideologija i tradicija. Zagreb: Durieux. Malcom N. (1994). Bosnia: A Short History. London: Macmillan. Meier V. (1999). Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise. London: Routledge. Mulalic M. (2009). “Multiculturalism and EU enlargement: the case of Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina.” In: Marcinkowski C. (ed.). The Islamic World and the West. Zurich: LIT Verlag, 109-126. Mulalic M. (2008). “Making good citizens: holistic education and civil society.” In: Chang L. H., Norani M. S., Wan Hasmah W. M., & Vishaletche B. (eds). Asia-Pacific Moral, Civic and Citizenship Education: New Vision and New Realities. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaysia, 19-29. Newton K. (2001). “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy.” International Political Science Review 22(2): 201-214. Purivatra A. (1974). Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija u političkom životu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. Sarajevo: Svjetlost. Ramet S. (1996). Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture and Religion in Yugoslavia. Boulder, Westview Press. Said E. (1993). Culture and Imperialism. London: Chetto and Windus. Slack A. and Doyon R. (2001). “Population Dynamics and Susceptibility for Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Journal of Peace Research 38(2): 139-161. Velikonja M. (2003). Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austin TX: Texas University Press. Vucinich W. S. (1962). “The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule.” Slavic Review, 21(4): 597-616. Zheliazkova A. (1994). “The Penetration and Adaptation of Islam in Bosnia from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century.” Journal of Islamic Studies 5(2): 187-208. 66

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Some Reflections on Islamic Calligraphic Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina Meliha Teparič Introduction

Historically, the period of active presence of Islamic calligraphy in Bosnia and Herzegovina dates back to the second half of the 15th century. That is the period of presence of Ottoman Empire in Bosnia and Herzegovina (14631878), which brought with themselves what they have already developed, by setting high artistic standards, actively beginning artistic activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the wider area of the Balkans. Islamic calligraphy from Ottoman period in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by its manifestations reflected the diversity, although today largely destroyed. Thus, the art of Islamic calligraphy in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be divided into several categories, namely; (1) manuscripts calligraphy; (2) calligraphy on stone (chronogram-tarih) and tombstones (nišani); (3) calligraphy on removable panels (levh); (5) wall calligraphy and (6) calligraphy on objects for everyday use (ceramic, metal, wood, embroidery, etc.).1 Manuscript calligraphy of Arabic script is actually calligraphy written manuscripts, with all the basic principles and requirements of Islamic calligraphy. Here, in the first place is the holy book of Muslims - Holy Qur’an, then the other books in the domain of literature, poetry, etc. Manuscript calligraphy, we could say, is a limited form of calligraphic art in a formal sense, primarily because of the primary role of letters - to transmit information, in particular manuscript expediency - to be read. Calligraphic segment, artistic skills, which manuscript may or may not necessarily possess, is only a secondary element of aesthetically shaped letters with all the necessary legalities and artistic criteria established by Islamic calligraphy.2 Skilled calligraphic manuscripts and books are most often richly furnished and decorated with illuminations. The manuscript calligraphy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is noticeable in number, compared to the other forms of calligraphy. The level of attained 67

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calligraphic skills are also notable because calligraphy, no matter on which material or medium it is performed, always requires respect of the basic rules of calligraphy, that makes it exactly as it should be. Meaningful could be the pages of manuscripts that, in addition to usual written text, bring miniature “calligraphic composition,” which quite resemble calligraphic panels called Lawh.3 These specimens can be usually found in the individual religious books (such as Dalailu’l Hayrat), which represent a symbolic illustration of the themes in the book, and in the artistic, stylistic sense is similar to calligraphic panels – lawh. Manuscript calligraphy has one more form that occurs, and it is within miniature painting where calligraphy is an integral part of the picture, and as such does not violate the concept of miniature, as well as the integrity of the image itself, but becomes one of its elements. This could be interpreted as an adaptability character of Arabic calligraphy to other art forms; it also represents another phenomenon of Islamic calligraphy, which requires special study of Arabic letters. Arabic script, as well as its artistic value in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be found in large numbers, engraved in stone, as chronograms (tarih) on the portals of sacred and profane monuments. These signs inform us about the year of construction, but most often, about other data as well, such as builders, for example, or benefactor – those who endowed money for construction. Another aspect of calligraphic examples engraved in stones can be found on tombstones (nišani). Both these types are formally and stylistically creative aspect of calligraphic expression in relation to the manuscripts, but still quite limited due to its essentials functions, namely transmission of information, and after that the artistic design comes into perspective.4 These monuments have been preserved in large numbers; however, those who are holding high calligraphic art values ​​are rare. Calligraphic panels (lawhs) in comparison with the previous types of the Islamic calligraphic art, represent the most creative visual art phenomenon in Islamic art, art that did not develop an interest for the picture in terms of European Christian art. This avoidance of figural religious themes compensate to a great extent, repertoires of calligraphic panel (lawh), the most often Holy messages, names of God, God’s Prophet and other holy persons. These calligraphic works can be written and made ​​with more freedom and imagination in the form of various compositions, where the letter itself constitute the main elements, which sometimes can include decorative elements such as ornaments, illuminations or ebru paper - painting on water. This kind of calligraphic art 68

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were decorating the walls of the sacred to the profane space, both in the interior and exterior. Over time, in addition to developing different styles of letters, different types of calligraphic panels (lawhs), composition and thematic repertoire and artists - calligraphers have developed their own style of artwork and calligraphy, calligraphy that tends to unify written values, and attain levels of more sophisticated writing. Thus, the primary role of the calligraphic panels is aesthetic and creative effect: decorating the walls with their sacred messages,5 create a visual impression, and after that, as a secondary meaning, read written text.6 The highest number of calligraphic panels (lawhas) in Bosnia and Herzegovina found so far dates back from the 17th to the first half of the 20th century. We should also mention calligraphic activity on the glass, which seems to have been developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because of the fragility of the material, many pieces were destroyed, but there are, fortunately, some examples still preserved. Unfortunately, many of them are without the signature of the author, and their origin is difficult to ascertain. Wall calligraphy, according to its formal and stylistic characteristics, does not deviate from calligraphic panels. Mainly, they have the same stylistic features, with the only difference in the material and the manner of performance.7 Wall calligraphy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, unfortunately, has been preserved in the smallest percentage in relation to all other forms of calligraphic media. Thus, there is no authentic example of artistic activities from the early Ottoman period. Mainly it was destroy by Eugene Savojski, who, in the 17th century, burned down Sarajevo, which was the centre of culture, and most of the original Ottoman heritage was destroyed.8 In subsequent periods, the Austro-Hungarian occupation in the 19th century, “it is assumed that the provincial government has made in that time some kind of action painting of Islamic sacred places throughout Bosnia.9” Therefore, in that way interiors got new oriental decor that has brought about a new aesthetic, a surrogate oriental ‘trick’. In rare cases, a relatively older wall decoration, with the calligraphic art, preserved beneath this layer, as is the case with several of Sarajevo sacred buildings10 where, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, there was found and restored almost complete painting decoration from 19th century. These objects represent the treasures that reveal a bit of the past, while other facilities11 await restoration research. Unfortunately, devastating is the fate of other religious monuments such as the Central Mosque, Gazi Husrev-bey Mosque, whose interior decorations are from Austro-Hungarian period. The Commission of the Federal Bureau of cultural and historical heritage of Yugoslavia along with the Republican Institute for Cultural Heritage of the Federal Republic 69

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of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the end of 20th century, “unanimously rated worthless,”12 all these monuments. Consequently, at the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century restoration started, with removing all layers of plaster - to the heart of stone. In this process of “restoration” they removed the entire interior of the mosque calligraphic repertoire of one of the most important 19th-century calligrapher, Rakim Islamović. It consisted of a large ensemble of calligraphic compositions.13 Why is it now so difficult to reconstruct a picture of calligraphic art in Bosnia and Herzegovina? One of the reasons is the man himself, beside the time. The men was, in fact, deliberately destroying calligraphic art works, once so developed and live artistic activity, destroying and throwing even to the garbage valuable calligraphic works and replacing them with the new ones, at that time the modern prints. However, now those old prints, eventually gain the significance because of the age, in part, while on the other hand, they represent a valuable backup copies of calligraphic works that are experiencing the same fate as former Bosnian calligraphic originals, they are replaced with new patterns of computer graphics so “decorating “walls of religious buildings from the last period. Although, it is known that the activity of Islamic art of calligraphy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was practiced since the second half of the 15th century, however it preserved peaces dating only from the 17th until the first half of the 20th century and it is less known about their fate during the earlier periods. Not much has been done, regarding the past-published contributions to the calligraphic art. The most of the research are about biographies, but not about the calligraphic works within its stylistic and formal characteristics. Most of these contributions have brought more confusion with regard to the calligraphers and copyists or amateurs, who were placed under the authors of calligraphy. It is very significant to make this distinction about calligraphic art in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Art historians in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not thoroughly deal with this artistic discipline; they cited only the basic historical and stylistic characteristics of Islamic calligraphy in general, or, only mentioned individuals who practiced calligraphy, and almost certainly did not deal with its manifestations. For some calligraphers we know just because they are mentioned in biographies as writers, poets but calligraphy was only as secondary activity for them. It appears that it was general opinion that the art of calligraphic was a minor, secondary manifestation of Islamic art. This is certainly completely wrong approach to Islamic calligraphy, on the contrary, not only that it is an integral 70

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part of the art, but also it is already a leading artistic discipline.14 Even in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its manifestations were no less significant.15 The reason for this attitude lies in a fact that in the past of Bosnia and Herzegovina there were few art historians, none of these had in their focus Islamic calligraphy. In most cases, they were specialized in architecture. The reason for this can be found in the fact that until the 20th century calligraphic works were mostly destroyed or that there are few surviving copies buried under the ceilings of private homes and religious buildings, while monumental calligraphic works on the walls of the sacred buildings generally were not preserved. We can find it in the rare data today evidence on how this artistic branch was represented. How it is possible today, to reconstruct the image of the achieved level of calligraphic art, and whether a sufficient number of surviving works, which seem to be equally rare as written data, represents pale reflection of the former state of the art, its representation in the society and the level reached? Negligence and carelessness about cultural art heritage contributed to the rapid deterioration and destruction of calligraphic works, and it will permanently remain unknown to what degree was this developed. With regard to the development of the discipline of art at the time of its greatest prosperity, i.e. from the 16th to the 18th century, one would expect a lot of information, but unfortunately in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is no much written or documented information. For this reason, and because of the lack of professional treatment and research of artistic disciplines, research on calligraphic art of Islam in Bosnia is more difficult, and more so as the information about artists - calligraphers in most cases is impossible to verify because their work for the most part have not been preserved. Although the number of artists’ calligraphic art, based on the data collected so far, is large, and mainly based on poor lists that do not provide enough information about the type of work. However, there are only few basic biographical information about calligraphic art. Another aggravating factor for calligraphic art in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not only past ravages of war (1992 to 1995) but I and II World War, in which a huge part of this heritage was destroyed. In addition, migration and population movement that occurred during the aggression in 1992 to 1995 also influenced the movement of goods, including calligraphic works. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the recent war many examples of Islamic art and crafts were sold very cheap, for “bare survival.” Because of these and similar events present state of Islamic religious buildings lost their authentic 71

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wall paintings and calligraphy. Islamic calligraphy has remained very active in the second half of the 19th century, period of government change and Austro-Hungarian Empire (18781908) taking control of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which brings with them a completely different, not only aesthetics and taste, but also artistic activities. Sudden changes that have occurred in society16 inevitably influenced the artistic activities and calligraphic art, that is how it appears, based on the information about calligraphy, was in slight decline. More significant decline in interest in Islamic calligraphy is felt in the second half of the 20th century, during the period of communism, when there was almost complete extinction of these and similar traditional Islamic arts. It is very important to mention that in the 21st century interest in the artistic discipline concerns increased sharply, and that there comes the interests not only in the professional academic, but also generally at a scientific level.

Some Illustrations Fig. 1: Manuscript Calligraphy, Calligrapher Ahmed Sarayi, 1891, R. 6509, Gazi Husrev-bey Library, (photo Damir Tatlic)

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Fig. 2: Calligraphy Compositions, En’am, R. 8679, Gazi Husrev-bey Library

Fig. 3: Calligraphy and Miniature Painting, Divan-i Hafiz, 16th Century, R 1366., Gazi Husrev-bey Library

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Fig. 4 and 5: Calligraphy Compositions in Stone, Oglavak, Bosnia (Photo Sara Kuhen)

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Fig. 6: Calligraphic Panel (Lawha), Calligrapher Ali Faginovic, 1902, Private Collection Sheikh Musa-Kazim Hadzimejlic, Vukeljici, Bosnia (Photo Refik Omerovic)

Fig. 7: Calligraphic Panel (Lawha), Calligrapher Hadziosmanovic, 1811, (Mehmed Mujezinović, Islamska epigrafika Bosne i Hercegovine I, 1998., 85.)

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Fig. 8: Wall Calligraphy, Calligrapher Rakim Islamovic, 19th Century, Gazi Husrev-bez Mosque, Sarajevo, (Photo Damir Tatlic)

Fig. 9: Wall Calligraphy, Hajji Sinan Tekke, Sarajevo, (Photo Sara Kuhen)

Notes 1. Muslim artisans seem to have covered every conceivable object with writing, often with verses or rhyming sentences. See Annamarie Schimmel, Calligraphy and Islamic Culture, (New York: New York University Press, 1984), p. 25. 2. “Writing or copying the Qur’an requires strict compliance to established and generally accepted rules, first to those dictated by the Holy Quranic Text and then rules that have developed over the centuries.” See Ćazim Hdžimejlić, Umjetnosti islamske kaligrafije, (Sarajevo, Sedam Publishing, 2009), p. 116. 3. First, levha is an Arabic word lawh and indicates a flat surface: ‘panel’, ‘tabla’, in this sense can indicate drawings or pictures, and calligraphic print. 4. “Artistic and calligraphic value is reflected through the use of various forms of 76

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5.

6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

Arabic scripts, finding a specific visual variation that only allows this script, often enriched with elements of pure vegetable-ornamental decorations.” See Mehmed Mujezinović, Islamska epigrafika Bosne i Hercegovine, Vol. 1, (Sarajevo: Sarajevo Publishing, 1998), p. 6. But more than that, their function and religious character that constantly reminds the faithful to God. Here you have particular function forms of the letters that are so typical and abstract, where he developed a whole science of letters and their symbolic-spiritual sense, which extends to the interpretation of these letters, and they are attributed amulets significance. Some calligraphic composition due to its complexity is sometimes difficult to read even for the greatest experts of Arabic script, and if it is related to some Quranic sentences, knowing the text helps in the interpretation. While manuscript calligraphy and calligraphic panels (lawhs) are performed with pen, calligraphy mural is depicted with brush, as well as calligraphy on glass. “During the invasion of Prince Eugene of Savoy (1697), Sarajevo was ravaged by a fire that turned the city into a heap of ashes. Of the 104 mosques, which were then in Sarajevo, just 12 were spared by the fire. Hamdija Kreševljaković, “Džamija i vakufnama Muslihuddina Čekrekčije,” in Glasnik Islamske vjerske zajednice Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Year VI (1938.), No.: 1, Sarajevo, pp. 17-38. Sabira Husedžinović, Dokumenti opstanka, (Zenica: Muzej Grada, 2005), p. 290. Hadži Sinan tekke, Čekrekči Muslihudin mosque, Careva mosque. Džamija Havadže Duraka (Čaršija mosque). Nihad Čengić, Likovni fenomen hadži Sinanove tekije i njegova konzervacija, (Sarajevo: Sarajevo Publishing, 2009), p. 56. From complete calligraphic repertoire that counted over twenty calligraphic compositions there were only two copies preserved of circular calligraphic composition of this great calligrapher at the entrance of portal in Gazi Bey Mosque. “Arabic calligraphy has given to Islamic art the strongest and most original seal.” “The expansion of Islam is updated to the written word, which contributes to the development of Arabic script to the point of becoming” a central, leading branches of Islamic art.” Ćazim Hadzimejlic, Umjetnosti islamske kaligrafije, p. 14. “ Islam has taken and still holds a place with special privileges so that it can say without hesitation that it is the order of the traditional Islamic visual art, and that is the most characteristic manifestation of the visual aspect of Islamic civilization.” “Calligraphy is still a fundamental central visual art that has many forms and very huge range of applications from architecture to poetry.” Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic art and spirituality, (Sarajevo: Lingua Patria, 2005), p. 31. “/ ... / Persians, / ... / Where was the art of calligraphy is not of central importance as it became after they embraced Islam.” (Nasr, p. 36) “/ ... / Calligraphy / ... / Became the most important among the Islamic Arts on the Balkans.” Hilal Kazan, “The Art of Calligraphy on the Balkans,” in The Proceedings of the 3rd International Congress of Islamic Civilization in the Balkans, Bucharest Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA), (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2006). 77

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16. “The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina survived sudden changes of additional social relations that are manifested in the conversion and harmonization of patriarchal way of life and civilization orientation towards the countries of capitalism, this is to say, one Western European country.” See Hajrudin Ćurić, Muslimansko školstvo u bosni i Hercegovini do 1918, (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša , 1983), p. 189.

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The Role of the Islamic Community in the Reconciliation Process in the post-War Bosnia Case Study of Banja Luka Mirsad Karič Introduction

One of the most difficult challenges that nations which have gone through the war face and try to overcome afterwards is the issue of the past. When conflict between groups is brought to an end the building of constructive and nonviolent relations between groups becomes possible. However, enmity, antagonism and mistrust often resume for a long time. The psychological wounds that resulted from the conflict might be the main obstacle in building better relations or even lead to a crisis and consequently to a new conflict. Violence between groups may resume even if the conflict was stopped by negotiations and agreement signed by groups’ representatives such as the case with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) that stopped three and a half year long Bosnian war. Agreements are often not satisfying to all segments of the groups being in conflict because they might be signed under the strong pressure from the International Community, or not implemented in a proper way. It is a greater danger that the conflict and violence would resume after those conflicts that were ended by one side being defeated by another.1 Hence, there is a less danger that those conflicts that were finished without a ‘winner’such as the recent Bosnian conflict 1992-1995- would renew into violence. Furthermore, huge presence of the international security forces makes an escalation of conflict even less feasible. Scholars of international relations have long been concerned with the possible sources of conflict, preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building. However, they have not yet seriously studied, examined and analyzed the role of religion, religious communities and religious leaders in the post-conflict reconciliation process. Due to a secular paradigm that exists among the scholars of social sciences in general and international relations in particular religion has always been considered a source of disagreement, irreconcilable differences and conflict and never a 79

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factor capable to reconcile those differences and promote common universal values that exist among all nations over the world. Hence, the role of religion as possible facilitator in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconciliation process and promoter of justice and peace has been very much downplayed and neglected by the scholars. However, collaborative work for justice and peace is a fundamental commitment of virtually all religious communities. Moreover, religious communities generally have well articulated and differentiated structures that provide a basis for collaboration. Furthermore, they have social assets and traditions to address conflict transformation that have been frequently underutilized.2 The future of truth and reconciliation among the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely Bosniaks (Bosnians Muslims), Croats (Bosnian Catholics) and Serbs (Bosnian Orthodoxies) necessitates constructive and fact-based debates at both, the state and societal levels, because by almost all accounts the process is incomplete. If Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be a model for other countries whether and how has contributed to reconciliation must be examined. This is problematic, because the meaning of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been ambiguous and contested. Projections as to what would constitute a successful project of reconciliation, what are the goals of this project i.e. what reconciled people or persons should look like are generally unclear. Basic questions who should be involved in the process of reconciliation and how remain unanswered. Without basic agreement on its meaning, undertaking and objectives reconciliation remains at best an obscure goal and at worst it is an empty rhetoric subject to political and ideological manipulation. The main goal of this paper is to argue that in a conflict-divided multiethnic and multi-religious society such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, with special focus on the city of Banja Luka and its surrounding areas, one must not ignore the important role religious communities and religious leaders might play in an attempt to bring about peace, reconciliation and coexistence among the people. Process of reconciliation has special importance and urgency for preventing new violence and promoting coexistence in situations, like Bosnia and Herzegovina, where groups in the post-war period in many parts of the country still leave next to each other.

Reconciliation

In its most basic sense, the concept of reconciliation might be defined in terms of building solidarity: building and creating a collective identity, shared values 80

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or common commitment in an effort to overcome and prevent repetition of the past. While this requires a certain amount of moral transformation, it has to be done without placing an excessive and unreasonable burden upon individual victims to reconcile with former oppressors.3 Reconciliation may be defined as mutual acceptance by members of formerly hostile groups of each other. Such acceptance includes positive attitudes and positive actions which express them. This process needs to result in a changed psychological orientation towards the other which is the essence of reconciliation. In such constellation of events reconciliation means that victims and perpetrators or members of ‘till-yesterday’ fighting and hostile groups do not take past as a predominant factor in defining their future. They have to be able to find a common ground and universal values for a constructive relationship, interaction, acceptance, coexistence and humanity of one another. Thus, the process of reconciliation focuses on restoring damaged and deteriorated relationships between the groups taking into consideration both, the used and applied procedure and possible outcomes.4 Reconciliation has also been defined as “a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future”5. The need for reconciliation is especially emphasized in societies that went through ethnic conflicts that resulted in the lost trust, strong grievance, hatred and polarization. According to Kriesberg, shared truth, justice, regard and security are four dimensions of reconciliation essential for conflict transformation and peace-building in post-war societies. Truth is important as societies divided after the war, ethnic cleansing and genocide tend to deny what members of the other side have experienced and thus need to openly recognize that they have different views of reality. Justice is needed as those who have suffered oppression or atrocities seek redress, which may take the form of restitution or compensation, but also punishment of those who committed injustices. Justice may further be exhibited in politics that offer protection against future harm and discrimination. Expression of regards by members of each community towards the other entails recognizing the humanity of the others and their human rights. Security implies that the group that were part of the conflict feel a minimum of trust and have a reason to believe they can look forward to living together without one side threatening the other.6 Psychological change of the people and the role of institutions in such process are of equal importance in promoting reconciliation. The nature of leadership, role of governmental and non-governmental institutions such as religious communities, role of media, functioning of the justice system and 81

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educational system are of crucial importance in promoting and impeding reconciliation.7 Reconciliation is also a phase in the prevention of violence and peacemaking and can be eased by processes such as frequent contacts, dialogue, interaction and peace education.8

Religion, Public Life and Reconciliation

Since the Treaty of Westphalia the contemporary international system has functioned on the premises of secularism which implies total exclusion of religion form the state institutions and reducing the role of religion in the society to the minimum possible level. According to the proponents of secularism when religion is brought into international public life, it has a tendency to cause intolerance, war, devastation, political upheaval and even the collapse of international order. Following this stream they claim that the more religious people are, the more violent they tend to be. The solution therefore lies in secularizing the world. Religions-some more than others- need to be diminished and modernized and rid themselves of their violent essences and legacies.9 Therefore, the secularization of politics was necessary in order to limit religion’s domestic influence through its privatization, minimization of the effect of religious disagreement and ending the bloody and destructive role of religion in international relations.10 At the other end of spectrum are believers who condemn any type of violence done in the name of religion. For them religious teachings are peaceful at their base, meant to re-establish the primordial harmony between heaven and earth, creator and creatures and do not call for violence by any means. Violence might be committed in the name of religion but not approved and condoned by it as religions per se cannot be seen as source of violence; only some bad practitioners of them can be held accountable.11 Since the 1960s the world has witnessed a global resurgence of religion and religious practices. Although that in some instances there might be a correspondence between religious and secular paradigms, however, it is assumed that they are very often in collision. As a result of this, Western approach to the field of international relations studies and the role of religion played in it has been challenged. Consequently, one of the most debated issues and challenges facing the realms of domestic and international politics today is the role that faith and religion should play in the society and hence understanding of actions with religious justification. Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multi-religious community has not been an exception to this. In the Bosnian pre-war, during the war and post-war context religion has played quite 82

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important role in the life of its citizens. It goes to the extent that division of the population into the three main ethnic and religious identities namely Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats (Bosnian Catholics) and Serbs (Bosnian Orthodoxies) largely overlaps. Therefore, religion, either consciously or unconsciously, has been one of the most important factors for defining a national identity of all ethnic communities in Bosnia. Since Islam is defined as a complete way of life leaving no sphere of our worldly affairs undefined it goes without saying that following the principles of Islamic teaching the Islamic Community, which has gone through the transition form a pre-war irrelevant to a post-war quite important factor in the Bosnian social context, has had a great contribution in the process of postwar reconciliation, building the bridges of peace, justice, tolerance, inter-faith understanding and coexistence among Bosnians of all origins. As a religion whose name stems from the word peace Salam, issues of justice, rule of law, peace, religious diversity, tolerance, reconciliation, forgiveness and coexistence are interwoven into the fabric of the faith. In order to achieve this, primary sources of Islam, the Quran and the tradition of prophet reveal and promote the pattern of dialogue and seeking understanding with the followers of other religions and worldviews. By this Qur’an not only promotes religious diversity but considers it to be one of the signs of God, which is second in importance to the creation of the heavens and earth. “And among His Signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the variations in your languages and your colours: verily in that are Signs for those who know” (30:22)

Similarly, Qur’an promotes, supports and encourages diversity, pluralism, cooperation and mutual understanding and respect as mentioned in the following verse: “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)” (49:13)

For Nyang the process of mutual understanding elaborated in this verse is the sine qua non for human solidarity and as such Islam’s interest and receptivity to reconciliation which comes from Arabic islah, meaning to make good, proper, right, to reconcile, to settle, is deemed a normal moral value in Islamic law.12 83

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Furthermore, the main message of this verse is its non-national nature whereby God tells us that there are no good or bad nations. All religions, irrespective of how different they are, try to promote peace, coexistence, tolerance. A careful study and analysis of certain Qur’anic verses discloses a fact for a struggle towards conflict resolution, peace-building and reconciliation under the condition that the other party reciprocates in the same manner. “But if the enemy inclines towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in Allah: for He is One that heareth and knoweth (all things)” (8:61) “It may be that Allah will grant love (and friendship) between you and those whom ye (now) hold as enemies. For Allah has power (over all things); And Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful” (60:7) “But if they cease, Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful” (2:192)

As a result of Islam’s peaceful orientation, the tradition of the Prophet as well as the period of the rightly guided caliphs provide us with a lot of examples of reconciliation with various factions and tribes of that time. For example, the Medina Constitution commands peaceful resolution to Muslim/ non-Muslim disputes. Thus, if we carefully examine and analyze the biography of the Prophet and with whom he was reconciling (mainly pagan polytheists), this sets a great example for Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) to be fully engaged in the process of reconciliation with Orthodoxies (Bosnian Serbs) and Catholics (Bosnian Croats) and approach our differences in a rational way through process of peace-building and dialogue rather than conflict and violence.

Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina As it is mentioned before the main purpose of this study is to examine the role of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the special focus on Banja Luka region in the process of reconciliation. Therefore, some information are needed about the institution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in general and Banja Luka in particular. The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH) is the sole and united community of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Bosniaks outside their homeland, and of other Muslims who accept it as their own.13 It is considered as one of the most organized Islamic administration in Europe by being independent form the state apparatus, self-financed, led by an elected leader Reis-ul Ulema and elected assembly. 84

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The autonomy of ICBH is based on the religious and legal institutions of Bosnian Muslims from the time of Ottoman administration in Bosnia and as such is inseparable part of the Ummah. The organization of the ICBH and its activities are derived from the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah, Islamic traditions of Bosniaks and the requirements of the time. The ICBH is independent in regulating its activities (rituals, Islamic education, management of Islamic endowments, publishing, charity, etc.) and the management of its property. The aim of the ICBH is that all of its members should live in conformity with Islamic norms. The ICBH protects the authenticity of the Islamic norms and assures their interpretation and application. The ICBH is taking care of the religious rights of Muslims and provides necessary conditions for its members so that they may perform their Islamic religious obligations. The ICBH establishes and maintains contact and cooperation with Islamic communities, institutions and organizations worldwide and cooperates with other religious communities and organizations promoting peace, justice and good will among all people.14 Following these principles ICBH has undertaken many steps in facilitating the process of conflict resolution, peace-building, reconciliation, tolerance and coexistence on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-war period. ICBH advocates that the right to the freedom of religion and its manifestation be equally respected throughout the country. It is open for religious dialogue especially with the representatives of traditional monotheistic religions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ICBH considers that every religious community and church, in order to promote interethnic reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, should condemn and sanction individuals and groups in their midst who propagate religious hate, speak negatively and defame others and incite tolerance towards the followers of other religions and faiths. The ICBH rejects, condemns and refuses all sorts of violence and considers it punishable by divine and human laws.15 In its relation with others the ICBH is guided by the Qur’anic teaching on life in peace, justice and kindness with good willing people: “Allah does not forbid you respecting those who have not made war against you on account of (your) religion, and have not driven you froth from your homes, that you show them kindness and deal with them justly; surely Allah loves doers of justice” (60:8)

Driven by this Qur’anic message ICBH is ready and open for any kind of dialogue and cooperation that will in any way facilitate the process of reconciliation among the followers of different religious communities in 85

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Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to produce positive results truth and justice have to be acknowledged for an enduring peace to be established although fragile peace might exist even before justice is served and truth is fully accepted by all sides. War crime perpetrators must be punished accordingly. If criminals are not sentenced and if crime consequences are not neutralized, the future generations of potential criminals might conclude that crime pays and be tempted and encouraged to use the same methods and means again in the future. For reconciliation and coexistence- which have no alternative in multiethnic and multi-religious Bosnia and Herzegovina- to take place refuges have to return to their places of origin as it is their right and society’s and state’s obligation to help them in returning to their pre-war homes.16 ICBH is composed of eight muftiluks: Bihac, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Travnik, Zenica, Gorazde, Sarajevo and Mostar. Muftiluks are further divided into Majlis which are composed of small units called dzemat.

Banja Luka’s Islamic Community and Reconciliation Process

Banja Luka is located in the north-western part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and is its second largest city. Throughout the history Banja Luka was a city known for its multicultural, multi-religious and multiethnic co-habitation. Various religions were tolerated and big number of cultural and religious buildings such as churches, mosques and cathedrals existed in harmony. People of different religious backgrounds used to live next to each other without any difficulties and with full understanding, tolerance and mutual help. Muslims have always tried to promote mutual understanding and coexistence irrespective of the one’s religious conviction. In this context Banja Luka’s Muslim Resolution from 1941 is a very famous document that expressed concern of the most distinguished local Muslims such as city’s mayor, muftis, imams, teachers, doctors, engineers, religious teachers, businessmen etc., vis-àvis their neighbours Serbs who were exposed to various types of tortures and killings from Croats who dominated the state authorities at that time.17 According to the last census held in 1991 the total population of the city was 195.071; Bosnian Serbs made 54.79% or 106.881, Bosnian Croats made 14.84% or 28.957, Bosniaks (then Bosnian Muslims) made 14.64% or 28.561, Yugoslavs made 12% or 23.419 and others made 3.72% or 7.253 of the total population.18 However, the demographic situation drastically changed during and after the war. Although there is a lack of official statistics on ethnic distribution of population in Banja Luka today, there is an unofficial estimation that Serbs make an overwhelming majority in the city with 94% of 86

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the total population while Bosniaks, Croats and others make the rest 6% of the population. Banja Luka was taken over by nationalist Serbs on the eve of the war without any fighting and there was no any fighting in the city during the war. Through the process of “ethnic cleansing” almost all Bosniaks were expelled from Banja Luka with only few remaining in the city and its suburbs upon the end of the war. Beside the expulsion, all buildings of cultural, religious and architectural Muslim heritage were totally destroyed with the intention of wiping out all Islamic symbols in the city and surrounding areas and sending the message to Bosniaks as representatives of the Islamic heritage such as mosques, endowments, cemeteries, mausoleums, clock-tower, shadrvans, etc., that they are not welcome to the city anymore. Serbs did not let any foreign human rights activists to enter the city and examine the condition of nonSerbs. Until the end of the First World War Banja Luka had 38 mosques, some of them built back in the 16th century. First destruction of mosques started in the period between the two World Wars i.e. during the peaceful period. Prior to the 1992-95 Bosnian war, Banja Luka had 16 mosques. In a ninemonth period, between April and December 1993 all 16 of Banja Luka’s mosques were systematically destroyed by the Serbs including the Ferhat pasha Mosque (Ferhadija), a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) listed monument built in 1579 and Arnaudija mosque, built in 1594, which was also on the UNESCO list of protected monuments. The Ferhadija stood for exactly 414 years. It survived, during those four centuries, numerous alternations of war and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkans and even a major earthquake that leveled much of Banja Luka in 1969. Destruction of mosques in Banja Luka is specific for certain reasons. First, destruction occurred while the city was under the full control of Serb authorities and under curfew; second, there was no any fighting in the city as almost all Muslim population was expelled from the city; third, the rubble and ruins of the historic mosques were taken away by trucks to the city damp and buried under tonnes of garbage in order to prevent any possibility of the stones ever being reused for any future reconstruction; fourth, all this was planned, ordered and executed by the authorities and political establishment of the city in order to conceal any sign of Islamic heritage and Muslims ever living there. However, the municipal authorities in Banja Luka not only removed the rubble of the Ferhadija and the other demolished mosques, they also deleted mosques from the city’s master plan.19 87

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Only after the strong pressure from international officials the urban planning department of Banja Luka municipality finally, on March 19, 2001, issued the necessary construction permit authorizing the building of Ferhadija mosque. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) that put a formal end to the Bosnian war stopped the war in 1995. Annex seven of the DPA states that: “All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Refugees and displaced persons are ensured a permission to return in safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or discrimination, particularly on account of their ethnic origin, religious belief, or political opinion...

In order to achieve this following confidence building measures had to be undertaken: a. the repeal of domestic legislation and administrative practices with discriminatory intent or effect; b. the prevention and prompt suppression of any written or verbal incitement, through media or otherwise, of ethnic or religious hostility or hatred; c. the dissemination, through the media, of warnings against, and the prompt suppression of, acts of retribution by military, paramilitary, and police services, and by other public officials or private individuals; d. the protection of ethnic and/or minority populations wherever they are found and the provision of immediate access to these populations by international humanitarian organizations and monitors; e. the prosecution, dismissal or transfer, as appropriate, of persons in military, paramilitary, and police forces, and other public servants, responsible for serious violations of the basic rights of persons belonging to ethnic or minority groups.20 First return of refugees to Banja Luka started soon after the war. However, first wave of a bigger number Muslims going back to their homes of origin begin in 2000. That was the time when Islamic community started to take an active role in the process of return. According to Tarik Sadovic that was possible only after Bosniak political elites in the Assembly of Republic of Srpska (RS) after long and patient 88

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work faced with so many political and administrative obstacles created an environment conducive for somehow normal return of war expelled Bosniaks from Banja Luka and its surrounding areas.21 For Sadovic, Islamic community of Banja Luka has played very constructive role in the process of return, peace-building, promoting reconciliation and coexistence among people in spite of the fact that its representatives had to overcome so many barriers such as the very passive role played by the police in collecting information on certain crimes and the prosecutor and the court in processing various crimes directed against Bosniaks in promoting reconciliation. On the 7th of May 2001, on eighth anniversary of the demolition of the Ferhadija, a peaceful cornerstone laying ceremony for a new structure at the site of the destroyed mosque was arranged. The city authorities had given permission for reconstruction to begin only after years of sustained pressure from international officials and organizations working in Bosnia. However, the event was disrupted and stopped by a serious riot of Serb demonstrators who gesticulated threateningly and chanted Serb nationalist slogans and antiMuslim insult, setting on fire prayer carpets, tearing down the green flag of the Islamic community centre and putting there the flag of RS and brutally beating several of them.22 Murat Badic, Bosniak from north-western part of Bosnia died few days later due to the injuries suffered during the demonstrations. Sadovic urges authorities of RS to identify and bring to justice, with maximum sentences, the perpetrators of the violence including the organizers behind the scenes as well as those who are politically responsible for such an act. He had noticed that Bosniaks saw an only hope in Bosniak elected political elites in the Assembly of RS who were their legal representatives and only protectors of their interests in the institutions of the RS. Therefore, he initiated an idea that Bosniak elected political elites in the Assembly of RS need to meet Muslim returnees to Banja Luka during the Friday congregational prayer in places of worshipping such as the building of the Islamic community in Banja Luka which stands next to the Ferhat Pasha Mosque and show to the people that they are with them and people can count on them according to their capacity.23 For Edhem Camdzic, Mufti of Banja Luka, political and security situation in the city and its suburbs is much better today than before. Number of returnees has increased; however, the process of people’s return to their house of origin has not been finished as still some would like to return. Meanwhile, state institutions must help process of return with reconstructing demolished religious buildings and providing sustainable return. Mufti Camdzic always 89

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conveys the message of coexistence, peace, harmony, tolerance and reconciliation among all people of Bosnia in general and Banja Luka in particular. In 2011 Ramazan Bayram (Eid al-Fitri) speech he called for: “…coexistence, dialogue and understanding in RS and the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Islamic community will put its utmost efforts to facilitate such process and make the strength of belief be present among all people. Religion has to fasten, we have to be united, not to leave next to each other but to leave together and help each other”.24

Mufti Camdzic claims that Ferhat Pasha Mosque’s message is universal and it has always been the message of religion, coexistence, reconciliation, dialogue, tolerance and multiethnic nature of Banja Luka. Past events should not be forgotten but people have to turn to the future. In this context state institutions have to provide equal opportunities for all citizens of Banja Luka so that they feel free and safe in their houses, schools, mosques.25 Islamic community of Banja Luka had tried several times to get in touch with the representatives of the Orthodox Church in RS in order to facilitate and promote the process of coexistence and reconciliation in a peaceful and democratic way. This included invitation to attend religious feasts such as bayram celebration, opening of the rebuild mosques, common condemning of attacks on the religious buildings etc. However, religious authorities of the Orthodox Church have always been reluctant to accept such an offer and never reply to the calls coming from the Islamic Community. As a result of this Islamic community has stopped such kind of activities of a direct invitation.26 Somehow, contacts among the religious leaders at the lower level do exist however, these contacts are merely formalistic without any motive and concrete results. In December 20011, Islamic community proposed even through the USA embassy in Sarajevo some initiatives and programs to be organized at the level of religious teachers of all religious communities in Banja Luka. However, none from the Orthodox community turned up for that event.27 According to some Bosniaks in Banja Luka, they consider themselves being neglected by Bosniak political elites from Sarajevo, who concentrate only on the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina except few such as Tarik Sadovic, Sefket Hafizovic and late Omer Brankovic. In spite of the fact that some of them stayed in Banja Luka during the whole war sometime even under the unbearable circumstances. Those Bosniaks who still reside in the city are 90

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being disunited. In this context, unfortunately, they see Islamic community as the only factor that is capable of bringing them together and struggling for the interests of Bosniaks in Banja Luka. Many things for the betterment of Bosniaks in Banja Luka and its surrounding areas could have been done immediately after the war. Unfortunately, it is too late today.28 Islamic Community in Banja Luka has become a service for merely burying dead people. This is one of the most severe problems faced by Muslims in Banja Luka in the post-war period that only old and disabled people have been going back to the city, live there for a while and die. Thus, the Bosniak population of the city drastically decreases from one year to another. According to the Chief Imam of Banja Luka, 170 Bosniaks died and only 5 new-born Bosniak kids were born in the city last year.29 This resulted in the fact that according to some estimates the total number of Bosniaks residing in Banja Luka is around five thousands in addition to much more who hold the identification card issued in the local municipality but stayed either abroad or in the Federation of B&H.

Conclusion

Throughout the history Banja Luka was known for its multiethnic and multireligious composition. During the last war city demographic picture drastically changed as almost all non-Serb population had been either killed or expelled from the city. All buildings that resembled an Islamic heritage were totally destroyed including Ferhadija and Arnaudija mosques that were under the UNESCO list of protected monuments. Reconciliation process requires full inclusion of all sides that were involved in the conflict and the role of religious communities and their representatives have to be taken seriously into consideration due to the very strong role played by a religion in the recent times. Islamic community tried its best to facilitate the process of return, co-existence, mutual understanding and reconciliation. However, it’s very clear that in the case of Banja Luka there has been no will at all coming from the Orthodox community to take part in the process. As a result of this no desired results have been achieved so far.

Notes 1. Cheryl de la Rey, Reconciliation in Divided Societies. In Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V. and Winter, D. A. (eds.). Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2001, pp.251-261. 2. See “Faith-based NGOs and international peace-building” Special Report no.76, United States Institute of Peace, October 21, 2001, p.5. Available at: http://www. 91

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usip.org/files/resources/sr76.pdf, (Accessed February 12, 2012). 3. Rosemary Nagy, “Reconciliation in Post-Commission South Africa: Thick and Thin Accounts of Solidarity”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No.2, 2002, p.326. 4. Staub E., and Bar-Tal, D., Genocide, mass killing and intractable conflict: Roots, evolution, prevention and reconciliation. In Sears D., Huddy L. and Jarvis R., (eds.), Handbook of Political Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.710-755; Staub E., and Pearlman L.A., Healing, reconciliation and forgiving after genocide and other collective violence. In Helmick S.J.and Peterson R.L. (eds.), Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation, Randor: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001, pp.205-229; Staub E., Pearlman L.A., Gubin A. and Hagengimana A., “Healing, Reconciliation, Forgiving and the Prevention of Violence after Genocide or Mass Killing: An Intervention and its Experimental Evaluation in Rwanda”, Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 24, No.3, 2005, pp. 297-334. 5. Bloomfield D., Teresa B. and Luc H., Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook, Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003, pp. 12-21. 6. Kriesberg L., External Contributions to Post-Mass rehabilitation. In Beatrice P., Simon C. and Albercht S., (eds.), After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and Communities, New York: United Nations University, 2007, pp. 252-256. 7. Staub E., Reconciliation after Genocide, Mass Killing or Intractable Conflict: understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery and Steps toward a General Theory, Political Psychology, Vol.27, No.6, (December 2006), pp.868-9. 8. Ross M.H. and Rothman J., Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorizing Success and Failure, New York: Macmillan, 1999; Salomon G. and Nevo B., Peace Education: The Concept, Principles and Practice around the World, Mahwah: Erlbaum, 2002, pp.27-36; Kalman H.C. and Fisher R.J., Conflict analysis and resolution. In Sears D., Huddy L. and Jervis R., Political Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.315-357. 9. Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol.266, No.3, Sep.1990, pp.47-60. 10. Scott M. Thomas, Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously. In Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 24. 11. Ibrahim Kalin, Islam and Peace: A Survey of the Sources of Peace in the Islamic Tradition. In Qamar-ul-Huda (ed.), Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010, pp. 3-4. 12. Sulayman Nyang and Douglas Johnston, “Conflict Resolution as a Normative Value in Islamic Law: Application to the Republic of Sudan”. In Douglas Johnston (ed.), Faith-based Diplomacy Trumping Realpolitik, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 210-230. 13. Constituion of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 1, [Ustav Islamske Zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, clan 1], available at: http:// www.rijaset.ba/images/stories/Ustavi/Ustav_IZ-e_iz_1997.pdf. (Accessed on July 6, 2014). 92

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14. See The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at: http:// www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=830:theislamic-community-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina&catid=59:islamskazajednica&Itemid=198, (Accessed on March 21, 2012). 15. See “The Platform of the ICBH on Dialogue” [Nacrt Platforme Islamske Zajednice za Dijalog], available at: http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_co ntent&view=article&id=5756:nacrt-platforme-islamske-zajednice-u-bih-zadijalog&catid=262:nacrt-platforme-islamske-zajednice-u-bih&Itemid=76. (Accessed on July 6, 2014). Translation taken from Ahmet Alibasic, “Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Challenges of our Times”. Paper presented at the conference “The Islamic Factor in the New Political and Security Strategy in the Balkans and Southern Caucasus”, the institute of Turkish and Central-Asian Studies of Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 17-19 November, 2011, pp.8-12. 16. Ibid., pp.12-13. 17. See 1941 Resolution of Banja Luka’s Muslims, Banja Luka: Bosnjacka klturna bastina u Banja Luci, 2007, pp.3.9. 18. Demographic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991, available at: http:// www.hdmagazine.com/bosnia/census/cens-sz.html, (Accessed on March 21, 2012). 19. Andras J. Riedlmayer, “From the Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s Cultural Heritage” in Maya Shatzmiller, Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States, Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2002, pp. 98135. 20. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7, Chapter 1, Article 1. 21. Interview with Tarik Sadovic, former member of the RS National Assembly. Interview conducted on April 13, 2012. Private archive. 22. See Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, New York: Oxford University press, 2002, pp.154-56. 23. Ibid. 24. Dnevni Avaz, “Eighteen years after demolishing, bayram prayer first time prayed in Banja Luka’s Ferhat Pasha mosque”, August 30, 2011. 25. Ibid. 26. Interview with Mersudin Hodzic, the Secretary General of Banja Luka’s Islamic Community, Interview held on April 11, 2012 in the building of the Islamic Community in Banja Luka, private archive. 27. Interview with the chief imam of the Banja Luka majlis, interview held on April 11, 2012 in the building of the Islamic Community in Banja Luka, private archive. 28. Interview with the staff of “Merhamet kitchen” in Banja Luka, interview held on April 11, 2012 in the Merhamet building in Banja Luka, private archive. 29. Interview with the chief imam of the Banja Luka majlis.

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References Ahmet Alibasic, “Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Challenges of our Times”. Paper presented at the conference “The Islamic Factor in the New Political and Security Strategy in the Balkans and Southern Caucasus”, the institute of Turkish and Central-Asian Studies of Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 17-19 November, 2011. Beatrice P., Simon C. and Albercht S., (eds.), After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and Communities, New York: United Nations University, 2007. Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol.266, No.3, Sep.1990, pp.47-60. Bloomfield D., Teresa B. and Luc H., Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook, Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003. Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V. and Winter, D. A. (eds.). Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2001. Constituion of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 1, [Ustav Islamske Zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, clan 1], available at: http://www.rijaset. ba/images/stories/Ustavi/Ustav_IZ-e_iz_1997.pdf. Demographic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina 199, available at: http://www. hdmagazine.com/bosnia/census/cens-sz.html Dnevni Avaz, “Eighteen years after demolishing, bayram prayer first time prayed in Banja Luka’s Ferhat Pasha mosque”, August 30, 2011. Douglas Johnston (ed.), Faith-based Diplomacy Trumping Realpolitik, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. “Faith-based NGOs and international peace-building” Special Report no.76, United States Institute of Peace, October 21, 2001. Available at: http://www.usip.org/ files/resources/sr76.pdf, Accessed February 12, 2012. Helmick S.J. and Peterson R.L. (eds.), Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation, Randor: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001. Ibrahim Kalin, Islam and Peace: A Survey of the Sources of Peace in the Islamic Tradition. In Qamar-ul-Huda (ed.), Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010. Interview with Tarik Sadovic, former member of the RS National Assembly. Interview conducted on April 13, 2012, Private archive. Interview with the Secretary General of Banja Luka’s Islamic Community, Interview held on April 11, 2012 in the building of the Islamic Community in Banja Luka, private archive. Interview with the chief imam of the Banja Luka majlis, interview held on April 11, 2012 in the building of the Islamic Community in Banja Luka, private archive. Interview with the staff of “Merhamet kitchen” in Banja Luka, interview held on April 11, 2012 in the Merhamet building in Banja Luka, private archive. Kalman H.C. and Fisher R.J., Conflict analysis and resolution. In Sears D., Huddy L. and Jervis R., Political Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Kriesberg L., External Contributions to Post-Mass Rehabilitation. In Beatrice P., 94

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Simon C. and Albercht S., (eds.), After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and Communities, New York: United Nations University, 2007. Maya Shatzmiller, Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States, Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2002. Qamar-ul-Huda (ed.), Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010. Rezolucija Hrabrih Banjaluckih Muslimana 1941 [1941 Resolution of Banja Luka’s Brave Muslims], Banja Luka: Bosnjacka kulturna bastina u Banja Luci, 2007. Rosemary Nagy, “Reconciliation in Post-Commission South Africa: Thick and Thin Accounts of Solidarity”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No.2, 2002, pp.323-346. Ross M.H. and Rothman J., Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorizing Success and Failure, New York: Macmillan, 1999. Salomon G. and Nevo B., Peace Education: The Concept, Principles and Practice around the World, Mahwah: Erlbaum, 2002. Sears D., Huddy L. and Jarvis R., (eds.), Handbook of Political Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Sears D., Huddy L. and Jervis R., Political Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Scott M. Thomas, Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously. In Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Staub E., Reconciliation after Genocide, Mass Killing or Intractable Conflict: Understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery and Steps toward a General Theory, Political Psychology, Vol.27, No.6, (December 2006), pp.867-894. Staub E., Pearlman L.A., Gubin A. and Hagengimana A., “Healing, Reconciliation, Forgiving and the Prevention of Violence after Genocide or Mass Killing: An Intervention and its Experimental Evaluation in Rwanda”, Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 24, No.3, 2005, pp.297-334. Sulayman Nyang and Douglas Johnston, “Conflict Resolution as a Normative Value in Islamic Law: Application to the Republic of Sudan”. In Douglas Johnston (ed.), Faith-based Diplomacy Trumping Realpolitik, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at: www. ohr.int The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at: http://www.rijaset.ba/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=830:the-islamic-communityin-bosnia-and-herzegovina&catid=59:islamska-zajednica&Itemid=198, (Accessed on March 21, 2012). “The Platform of the ICBH on Dialogue” [Nacrt Platforme Islamske Zajednice za Dijalog], available at: http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_co ntent&view=article&id=5756:nacrt-platforme-islamske-zajednice-u-bih-zadijalog&catid=262:nacrt-platforme-islamske-zajednice-u-bih&Itemid=76. (Accessed on July 6, 2014). 95

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Intercultural Interaction between Bosnian and Turkish Students Tuba Boz

Introduction

While there is a plethora of definitions and scholarly literature on culture, this paper focuses on the impact of culture on communication, on intercultural interaction. When I discuss various aspects and definitions of “culture” with first year university students, they usually respond by giving observable “tip of the ice-berg” examples, such as food, dance, music, clothing and history. However after some reflection and discussion, students begin to recognize how in fact, ‘culture teaches one how to think, conditions one how to feel, and instructs one how to act, especially how to interact with others…’1 Based on three years of ethnographic research, participant observation and informal interviews conducted at the International University of Sarajevo (IUS), this paper focuses on the deeper aspects of culture and its influence on perceptions and behaviour and examines the experiences of Turkish and Bosnian students studying at IUS. Notably, three significant issues emerged over the course of the study: one, the impact of culture shock experienced by Turkish students; two, overlapping beliefs, rituals and customs that stem from shared religion, namely Islam; and finally, how their values contribute to their choice of a conservative or liberal lifestyle as well as their perceptions of one other. It is important to state from the outset what this paper will not examine. It is not within the scope of this paper to delve into historical and political debates in an effort to question what constitutes Bosnian identity, Bosniak identity or Turkish identity. For the purpose of this paper, Bosnian refers to any person who is a citizen of Bosnian and Herzegovina and Turkish refers to citizens of the Republic of Turkey.

Ethnography and Intercultural Communication

Intercultural interaction and communication are becoming increasingly important areas of investigation and academic study as result of increased 97

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mobility of people throughout the world. Temporary and permanent migration for political and economic reasons, for education, trade or employment requires individuals to be prepared for cultural encounters which entails a degree of cultural awareness and skills for cross-cultural and intercultural communication. Hall’s classification of high-context and low-context communication provides a useful framework for analyzing intercultural communication. According to Hall low-context communication refers to explicit verbal communication where as high-context communication relies on implicit and non-verbal communication. Although we cannot classify any culture or society in a dichotomous manner that is categorically as high-context or a low-context culture, these categories are useful for studying the general communicative structures and patterns within various cultures. Accordingly to Hall, generally, countries such as the United States, Australia and Canada and much of Europe are classified as low-context cultures, and countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East Asia are classified as high-context cultures due to the emphasis placed on non-verbal communication and complex deference systems. It is important to note here that this paper focuses on students from Bosnia and Herzegovina, which can be considered a low-context culture and students from Turkey, which can be classified as a high-context culture. 2 Intercultural Communication in Turkish and Bosnian Settings (Boz, 2013)3 examines intercultural communication among and between IUS staff and students using Hall’s high/low context cultures in detail. While culture and intercultural communication are complex subject matters, ethnographic research is a particularly suitable approach for studying intercultural interaction at the International University of Sarajevo (IUS), as it gave me an opportunity to observe, examine and experience social interactions and intercultural communication first hand. Teaching in a crosscultural setting revealed that much of the apparent miscommunication that occurred was directly connected to differences between what Hall classified as high–context and low-context cultures, different values and culture shock experienced by Turkish students in Bosnia. Ethnography is no longer used in remote and “exotic” places by anthropologists conducting fieldwork, but rather ethnographic research is now employed by a number of disciplines for “offering a unique approach to understanding the meanings and intentions that shape the nature of human and social conduct” (Spradley 1971 cited in Clark, p. 1).4 Clark explains, that an “ethnographic perspective is uniquely suited to multicultural practice because of its abiding concern for the emic point of view, for understanding situated meaning, for acknowledging multiple 98

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voices and realities, for grasping the other’s frame of reference, for verstehen.”5 The combination of both emic and etic perspectives in ethnographic research allows for a comprehensive and in-depth analysis. Fieldwork enables the investigator to gather in-depth data within a natural “everyday life” context. The advantages of using informal interviews is explained by David Fetterman (2010) who states, “informal interviews are useful throughout an ethnographic study in discovering what people think and how one person’s perception compares with another’s.”6 Therefore, informal interviews are a particularly useful technique for investigating questions related to intercultural interaction and cross-cultural communication.

Values in Intercultural Communication

It is not only one isolated incident that inspired me to write this paper, however, one particular discussion that emerged in a lecture related to the symbolic and tangible elements of nation building in my class made up of mainly Bosnian and Turkish students drew my attention, and propelled me to focus more deeply on intercultural communication between the students. The discussion on the significance of the national flag, national anthem and national holidays sparked an intense debate about what a national flag signifies. Turkish students spoke passionately of what the Turkish flag represents and what it means to them. They had a shared narrative that elucidated the meaning of the white crescent and star on a red flag. The Bosnian students held various opinions; that the flag was important in representing the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina after so much bloodshed, while others felt that the flag was imposed by the international community and they did not feel such an affinity towards the flag. It took some time for students to consider the historical, social, political and cultural dimensions of each state that in fact influenced their understanding and perception of the flag and national anthem. The different values attached to symbols were striking over the course of discussions. Milton Rockeach sheds lights on how values affect intercultural communication, when people from different cultures come together to interact, their messages are reflect their deep-seated value orientations, for example those who value collectivism over individualism. Therefore, “an understanding of cultural value systems can help identify similarities and differences between people from different cultures from which intercultural communication can proceed”. 68 Before delving into an analysis of the different values held by the respective cultural groups, it is important to consider the potential different categorizations of a population. Kevin Avruch elucidates: 99

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“Individuals are organized in many potentially different ways in a population by many different (and cross-cutting) criteria: for example, by kinship into families or clans; by language, race or creed into ethnic groups; by socio-economic characteristics into social classes; by geographical region into political interest groups; and by occupation or institutional memberships into unions, bureaucracies, industries, political parties, and militaries.”7

While these categorizations are relevant at national and regional levels, they also are relevant to this case-study. While the students at IUS come from diverse national backgrounds, the vast majority are from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey; however, we must consider whether they are from metropolitan or rural areas; their religious affiliations; their socio-economic status; their liberal or conservative values. Avruch explains: “The more complex and differentiated the social system, the more potential groups and institutions there are. And because each group or institution places individuals in different experiential worlds, and because culture derives in part from this experience, each of these groups and institutions can be a potential container for culture. Thus no population can be adequately characterized as a single culture or by a single cultural descriptor. As a corollary, the more complexly organized a population on sociological grounds (class, region, ethnicity, and so on), the more complex will it cultural mappings appear (Avruch 1998: 17-18; emphasis in the original). SpencerOatey and Franklin 2009:40)”

The challenge in researching and clearly defining culture is noted by Gumperz who emphasizes “the fact that ‘culture’ in the sense of a transcendent identity composed of values and norms and linearly related to forms of behaviour is not necessarily there”. He argues that “what can be observed and analysed in intercultural communication are different conventions of communication, different speech styles, narrative patterns, in short the deployment of different communicative repertoires… But in actual fact, not ‘culture’ is deployed, but communicative repertoires.”8 However, it is ‘culture’ that guides the different communicative repertoires. It is critical to consider the broader social context when examining intercultural interactions. For example, Turkish students have the time and willingness to engage in social and extracurricular activities with the purpose of strengthening their relationships with Bosnian and students of different cultural backgrounds. However, we have to take into account that Bosnian students are in their home country and have social commitments to 100

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family, relatives and friends. Turkish and other international students have to build new relationships in a new context. Therefore, it is important, where appropriate, to incorporate intercultural interaction into the curriculum in order to build intercultural competence to prepare students for a globalised world. This is best integrated into assessments that require team work rather than explicitly and solely delivered via content or intercultural communication theory. Further, the level of English language proficiency of student affects their intercultural interactions both inside and outside the class. Students who are fluent in English regardless of whether they are Bosnian or Turkish are more confident and therefore more likely to communicate and interact with their friends and professors. On one occasion, in a Sociology lecture made up of fifty students, non-Turkish students were invited to attend a seminar regarding a Scholarship program offered by the Republic of Turkey. The remaining Turkish students in the class asked whether they could speak in Turkish. Considering that more than half of the class had left to attend the seminar, I decided to hold a class discussion instead of continue the lecture. Students who often remained silent in the class displayed critical and passionate engagement with the material and explained that they were shy to speak in English in front of their peers who were more proficient in English language. The experiences of some of the Turkish students at IUS can be compared to that of international students in the United Kingdom. A Chinese student studying in Britain explains: Although we were scornful of the Greek students’ somewhat showy performance [in class], in fact, in the back of our minds we were really envious of their courage. We felt upset about ourselves; after all, they have gained from the interactions. From the bottom of our hearts, we Chinese want to interact with the teacher and are willing to talk to them, but we are just constrained by old mindsets and cannot pluck up the courage (Xiong, 2005: 157).9

Predictably, language barriers present a significant barrier to intercultural interaction. The responses of forty students can be classified under various categories of reactions to national cultural differences. In addition, the cultural classification of foreign/international students and domestic/local students must be factored when studying intercultural interaction. The different experiences of the respective student groups need to be examined in light of local/international student interaction. Culture shock is a part of intercultural communication in this case. Turkish students, Ayse and Ahmet reflect on Turkish-Bosnian student interaction at IUS: 101

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“Turkish Students are here away from their country so they see the university as their kind of second home but Bosnian students have many things to do here so they don’t spend too much time at university”.

While Ayse has a pragmatic explanation concerning limited interaction between Turkish and Bosnian student, Ahmet expresses a sense of dissatisfaction with the level of relations between Bosnian and Turkish students: I see in the campus, in the faculty, there is too much prejudice between Turkish students and Bosnian students. …Turkish students are more ready to embrace Bosnian students into their social environments. Because before we came to Bosnia, we were aware that Bosnian people are part of our brotherhoods…

This discontentment is a reflection of disappointment that comes along with experiencing a reality different to what was expected, a reality that differs from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Turkish imagination elucidated by some of the Turkish students, especially in relation to affinities built between the two cultures through the Islam, the Ottoman Empire and more recently the war. The student’s responses shed light on the culture shock they experienced; these will discussed in the ensuing sections.

Islam, Values and Culture Shock The classifications used in this paper, such as Bosnians, Muslims, and Turkish, does not imply that we are treating cultures as completely homogenous, however simple, we need such categories in order to examine and to discuss intercultural interaction in this case-study. Students’ responses affirm that Islam plays an important role in facilitating intercultural communication but different lifestyle practices, religious interpretations and values are the cause of miscommunication. According to Bennet,10 culture shock is a common experience for individuals who reside in different cultural environments for extended periods of time. He explains, from a psychological perspective, culture shock refers to the sense of loss and feelings of deprivation in relation to social networks, such friends, social status and possessions; feeling helpless and unable to cope in the new social context; irritation, frustration and anger with “foreign practices”; feeling isolated and rejected by members of the new culture, or rejecting the new culture; a sense of confusion in their social role, values and identity. If we take into consideration, the interaction of different 102

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cultures in one setting, in this case a university, as a microcosm of multicultural contexts in European countries, we can reflect on issues of integration in an objective and cogent manner, taking a proactive approach for improving social cohesion rather than addressing issues primarily using the frame of racism and xenophobia discourses. Indeed, this does not mean racism and xenophobia do not exist in Europe, but rather emphasizes the importance of having a comprehensive and clearer approach and means to decipher what are simply different interpretations of values and social interaction. Bennett’s11 developmental model of intercultural sensitivity is suitable for studying the responses of Bosnian and Turkish students. While culture shock is experienced by Turkish students who are foreigners in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian students are also interacting with their Turkish peers and staff members at the university and also need to develop their intercultural and cross-cultural communication skills. Bennett’s developmental model includes various reactions to cultural differences: “denial of difference” which refers to individual’s inability to interpret cultural, which may stem from naïve observation and benign stereotyping. “Defence against difference” includes the recognition of difference together with a negative evaluation of variations from the native culture which is characterized by dualistic us/them thinking and explicit negative stereotyping. “Minimization of difference” underscores the similarities between people and acknowledges the superficial cultural differences such as eating customs. “Acceptance of difference” refers to an appreciation of cultural differences in behaviour and values, and “adaptation to difference” refers to the development of communications that facilitate intercultural communication, namely effective use of empathy and frame of reference shifting to communicate across cultural boundaries. The “integration of difference” is defined as the internalization of bicultural or multicultural frames of reference. The responses of the students in this case-study highlighted the impact of culture shock and significance of Islam in their interaction with their peers and their understanding each other’s cultures. For example, Bosnian student, Dzenita noted that “People in Bosnia and Turkey celebrate Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr in a very similar way.” Muhammed, a Turkish student explained, “Tassavvuf is another similarity that two cultures share. There are still “tekkes” in Bosnia practicing the way of tarikats as Turks do.” Turkish student Bilgehan referred to religion as a transnational culture that encompasses racial and national cultural differences: 103

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In Ramadan Bayram, Turkish people visit their relatives; it is the same for Bosnian Muslims. This is my second year in Bosnia. I saw three Bayrams in Bosnia. When we went to Bayram namaz and we went to a village for Kurban charity, it is the same for Turkish people. Actually it is the same for Muslim people in the world.

Conversely, the following student responses can be characterized by dualistic thinking and categorized as “defence against difference”: “Most of our Bosnian friends don’t like to participate in activities but most of the Turkish students who are studying at this university, even the student whose grades are not good have something in mind” Muhammed. Significantly, while this response can be classified as dualistic thinking, it is accompanied by positive stereotyping rather than negative stereotyping: I believe that we shouldn’t do anything to improve the relationship because culture is something that only belongs to you. Bosnians have to show their culture and Turkish have to how theirs. If we try to improve the relationship between these cultures, then there is going to be a common new culture and Turks will be lose some of their habits and Bosnians will lose theirs. This is bad for everybody.

This statement reflects a concern over the consequence of fusion between the cultures which may affect the authenticity of each culture. Significantly the student has respect for both cultures and feels the need to protect both cultures. Concerns over prejudice and stereotyping were raised by Rukiye: Between the students, there is a feeling that Turkish students have stereotypical views of Bosnians and Bosnians have a stereotypical view of Turkish students. If we had more international students in the university, there could be a better balance. Because wherever you have two big groups, there will always be some separation.

However, we can see in an effort to minimize cultural differences student’s responses can be there is recognition of superficial cultural differences. The similarities between humanity and common basic values s underscored. Significantly, students made references to western culture as a connecting force young people from both cultures; Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina bilateral relations as well as to the aid and support given during the war; religion, in this case Islam. Kubra, a Turkish student explained: Maybe only among the older generation in Bosnia the Ottoman culture exists, yet among the younger generation, I could not notice the same thing. They are mostly attracted to Western way of life and 104

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thinking, the same as most of the young Turkish generation.

Kubra’s observation reflects Ergun’s response regarding the similarities between modern society’s capital cities, “actually the big and developed cities of countries can be similar because of capitalism and globalization”. Turkish student, Oguz explained how he aims to deal with and minimize cultural differences especially in the context of social interaction and socially acceptable behaviours displayed on public transport. This response is in contrast to Ergun’s response who stated that cultures should be protected and expressed concern over the fusion of cultures which he believes will destroy the national cultures. My Bosnian friend can yell in the bus or tram, and they can behave in a more relaxed way and speak very loudly, however these situations are wrong for me according to my culture which is different than my friends. I explained how to solve this problem, I said ‘problem’ because it is a problem for me. I talk to him sometimes and explain my view and he sometimes understands my point of view and starts to change a little bit but I think this problem will be solved. Turkish people who live in Bosnia will affect each other. They start to change Turkish people and Turkish people start to change Bosnian people and we’ll find a middle way.

The impact of international relations, bilateral agreements and Turkey’s foreign policies towards the Balkans were raised by two Bosnian students, Mija and Aldijana who referred to Turkey’s role in providing aid and support for Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war as a reason for friendly social relations: Bosnian and Turkish mentalities are very similar. Considering that Bosnia was for a certain time a part of the Ottoman Empire, that conclusion does not come as a surprise. The most important legacy that the Ottoman Empire left for Bosnia is the cultural part. That is why Turkey and Bosnia are connected and have good relations. The similarity of two countries is religion. Both countries are majority Muslim countries. Bosnia was a part of Ottoman countries, and so they have a historical connection. Based on that, it is not unusual to have some of the same rituals, food and words. When it comes to differences, I personally would say that the Turks have a connection with from my perspective, have a strong sense of togetherness. They are very religious and very traditional, conservative if I may say. They stick to their values, and in my opinion are very critical 105

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to those who do not share their ideas. When it comes to Bosnians, I would say that they are more flexible in areas that Turks hold on to very tightly. Bosnians are more open to changes and are more relaxed, even when it comes to religious aspects.

Turkey’s relations with Bosnian and Herzegovina have a deep social impact and influence the social interactions between the students as it situates Turkey in a positive light. In my opinion the relationship between Turkey and Bosnia is very friendly. Bosnian people love Turkey because Turkey was one the key countries that helped Bosnia during the war which took place 20 years ago. They were sending food, money and medical support to Bosnian people and Turkey was one of the first countries that accepted Bosnian independence. Mija

Correspondingly, Emina mentioned the support provided by the Republic of Turkey as a contributing factor in the positive relations socials relations between the students: After the war a lot of good things, related to the relationship between the states are made. This university is a very good example. Turkey is opening a lot of schools all over my country, from primary level to universities. It is maybe the best way because through education, mutual help, we learn about each other. Also when Turkish politicians support BiH in any way, we develop some of trust in Turkey and Turkish people.

The international relations between both countries have a significant impact on the social relationships of Turkish and Bosnian students in this case-study. Further, an overarching field that connects the two national cultures in this case-study is religion, namely Islam. Religion minimizes national cultural differences; however, we cannot simply categorize religion as a superficial similarity because it affects every day life and social interaction for those who are religious. As argued by Nalini Tarakeshwar et. al, ‘religion is inextricably woven into the cloth of cultural life. The culture of a religious sub-group can be manifested in various ways, including in member’s values, beliefs and orientations to life, in their communicative conventions…’12. The influence of religion on culture is revealed in the examples students provide concerning the hijab, visiting tekkes, celebrating bayram, going to the mosque, and using classification of religious conservatism or liberalism to describe one another’s values and lifestyle practices. Such religious symbols and rituals provided by 106

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the students illustrate both the similarities and the differences between national cultures of the students who participated in this study. Turkish student Mustafa considered the style of hijab worn by Turkish and Bosnian females as a cultural symbol which showed the similarities between Bosnian and Turkish cultures. The style of hijab, of course having hijab is farz [fard] for Muslim women. But the style I guess is about culture. We can see Arabian, Malaysian and Turkish women wear it differently. So Bosnian and Turkish women wear it in a similar way. Mustafa

Kemal explained that while he never visited a tekke in Turkey, his visit to a tekke in Bosnia surprised him as the nasheeds were sung in Turkish language. I never go to tekke in Turkey but when I heard there is a tekke in Sarajevo, I was interested and I went there. They were all Bosnian, and nobody knew Turkish but they were singing nasheeds in Turkish language and I was surprised and shocked.

Conservatism is another topic students referred to. Bosnian student Damir for example, considers Turkish culture to be more conservative than Bosnian culture. He emphasizes the multicultural frame of referencing in Bosnia because of its multi-religious and multicultural make up. The religious similarities have an impact on some customs, for example Bayram. Both of the cultures have during history been living with other ethnicities, and therefore developed a sense for multiculturalism and respect for others who are different. I may add that I think that Turkish culture is more conservative than Bosnian in the sense that it connects much more to religion than Bosnians.

Edin too describes Turkish students as religiously conservative. What is significant here is he believes religious conservatism is not only connected to individual religiosity, but what he deems to be the influence of conservative trait of Turkish society. Similarities are seen through religion, but there are also differences. I think Turks are much more religious but not because (not in all cases) they are religious themselves, but because society is different. Edin

While religion guides values, the national cultures influence how religion is interpreted and practiced or not practiced in daily life. Our religion is the same and as a covered girl, we do not feel ourselves outside of society. Hatice 107

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Here, it is important to consider recent Turkish history where the hijab was banned in universities and public institutions. Such discriminatory policies marginalized female students who wore the hijab and they were excluded from tertiary education. Moreover, this feeling of belonging Hatice expressed is connected to the university’s location in cosmopolitan capital city Sarajevo, which is more culturally diverse than other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Shared tradition and religious conservatism is an overlapping area which brings Turkish and Bosnian students closer together, but paradoxically it can also become a barrier. Turkish student Sumeyra refers to her friendship with her Bosnian roommate noting cultural similarities namely, religious conservatism: I have a Bosnian roommate; her approaches to events are almost the same as Turkish people. She is conservative. She has a conservative approach and I don’t feel like I am from another nation. We talk about traditional issues and religious issues. They celebrate Bayram in the same way.

Several students explained that they are ready to embrace cultural difference and their responses can be seen in light of the classification of “acceptance of difference”. The similarities between these two cultures began with the conquest of the Ottoman Empire, but the fact is that my country was always conquered by someone so with that in mind we can understand why our culture does not belong to anyone at all, but it is a sum of many cultures which developed throughout the centuries. Similarities can be seen through a pride of histories. Both people in Turkey and Bosnia are proud of their history, but it is also based on different grounds. Turks are mainly proud because of their great Empire, because in one point of history they were the greatest force in the world. On the other Bosnian people are proud because, contrary to the Turks, we were under someone’s rule, and now we exist as an independent state, despite a harsh history we achieved our independence and existence.

Adaptation to difference is reflected in the responses of Bosnian students Marijana and Turkish student, Seyda. Significantly, while adaptation to difference refers to the development of communication skills enabling intercultural communication, through the use of empathy, common language also emerged as a barrier if overcome could significantly improve intercultural interaction: 108

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Bosnian and Turkish students at our university don’t have close interaction with each other as much as they have with other friends. Most of the Turkish students prefer to hang out with Turkish friends, the case is similar with Bosnian students. I believe that language might be a cause of this problem. I think this is a problem because we are living in the same environment. I do not want to generalize, there are some students who have close Bosnian friends. However, when I observe the majority I don’t see this.

Better language proficiency will lead to improved relationships between Bosnian and Turkish students as there is a demonstrated willingness to interact not solely for the purpose of “cultural exchange” but to have social interaction and genuine form relationships with each other as peers, as students at the same university, faculty or program. Marijana explains: Turks appreciate Bosnians very much, and Bosnians appreciate Turks. In my opinion, the main reason why those interactions may occasionally be of poor quality is language barriers. From my experience, I have learned that Turks are not eager to talk with Bosnians. When I asked a Turkish friend why that is, he explained to me that Turks are not very good at English, well not as good as Bosnians, he said, and that is why they do not interact with us. So, as I understand, Turks are a very proud people and they would rather not talk to Bosnians than be ashamed. So, I would state that minimizing that problem would lead to a better level of interaction between Turks and Bosnians at an everyday level. Marijana Sego

The majority of the student’s responses can be classified under Bennett’s developmental model of intercultural sensitivity. While the student’s responses can be classified under defence minimization, acceptance, or adaptation to difference, none of the responses reflect the integration of difference which entails the internalization of bicultural or multicultural frames of reference. While this study is based on micro-level analysis of social interaction between Bosnian and Turkish students, we can extrapolate that in addition to the problem of xenophobia and discrimination in Europe towards the “other”, there are subtle elements that tend to be overlooked in intercultural communication, and that divergent perceptions and misinterpretations tend to emerge through various deference systems in cultures, and the different meanings attached to various symbols. The importance of reflexivity is underscored in this paper. While much has been written about eurocentrism, it is vital that we reflect on our ethnocentric views. 109

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Notes 1. J.W. Neuliep, Intercultural Communication: A Contextual Approach, (California: Sage Publications, 2012), p. 46. 2. E. T. Hall, The Silent Language, (New York: Anchor Books, 1959). 3. T. Boz, ‘Intercultural Communication in Turkish and Bosnian Settings’, M Mulalic, H. Korkut, and Elif Nuroglu (ed.), Turkish - Balkans Relations: The Future Prospects of Cultural, Political and Economic Transformations and Relations, (Istanbul: TASAM, 2013). 4. J. Clark, Beyond Empathy: An ethnographic approach to cross-cultural social work practice, University of Toronto. No date. Cited in Boz, 2013. 5. Ibid., p. 3. 6. D. M. Fetterman, 2010. Ethnography: Step by Step, Third edition. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2010), p. 41. 7. K. Avruch, Cross-Cultural conflict Analysis and Resolution. (EOLSS: Arlington, USA, no date). 8. J. Gumperz, Discourse strategies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 9. Z. N. Xiong, Cross-Cultural Adaptation and Academic Performance: Overseas Chinese Students on an International Foundation Course at a British University, 2005, PhD Thesis, University of Luton, 2005. 10. Bennett, M.J. (1986). A developmental approach to training for intercultural sensitivity. International Journal of Intercultural Relations 10 (2), 179-95, p. 180. 11. Ibid. 12. N. Tarakeshwar et al., ‘Religion: An Overlooked Dimension in Cross-Cultural Psychology’, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, Vol. 34, no. 4, 2003, pp. 377-394, p. 377.

References Avruch, A., Cross-Cultural conflict Analysis and Resolution, (Arlington: EOLSS, no date). Bennett, M.J., “A developmental approach to training for intercultural sensitivity,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 10 (2), 1986. Boz, Tuba, “Intercultural Communication in Turkish and Bosnian Settings,” M. Mulalic, H. Korkut, and Elif Nuroglu (ed.), Turkish - Balkans Relations: The Future Prospects of Cultural, Political and Economic Transformations and Relations, (Istanbul: TASAM, 2013). Clark, J., Beyond Empathy: An ethnographic approach to cross-cultural social work practice, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, No date). Fetterman, D. M., Ethnography: Step by Step, Third edition, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2010). Gumperz, J., Discourse strategies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Hall, E. T., The Silent Language, (New York: Anchor Books, 1959). Neuliep, J. W., Intercultural Communication: A Contextual Approach, (California: Sage Publications, 2012). Xiong, Z.N., Cross-Cultural Adaptation and Academic Performance: Overseas Chinese Students on an International Foundation Course at a British University, 2005, PhD Thesis, University of Luton, 2005. 110

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Interfaith Dialogue Initiatives in Kosovo Jeton Mehmeti

Introduction

Kosovo has a multiethnic and multi religious society. Majority of its population are Muslims, while Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Protestants and Jews make the minority groups. Kosovo, just like the rest of Muslim majority Western Balkan countries, was renowned for the interreligious harmony amongst its diverse religious communities. However, the 1998-99 war interrupted the harmony amongst faith communities. The relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, the former predominantly belonging to the Islamic community and the latter mostly belong to Christian Orthodox Church was severally damaged. Although religion was not the driving force behind the war, it was an inseparable part on how the parties identified each other, the reason why religious monuments were a primary target during and after the war. According to a post-war survey “The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Kosovo 1998-1999” submitted to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as evidence for the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, nearly half of the mosques and Islamic congregation spots were damaged or destroyed during the war, and over 30 percent of Christian Orthodox buildings were damaged or destroyed too. The ICTY document shows that religious and cultural heritage suffered great losses during the war. Mosques dating from the fifteenth-century, Sufi shrines, eighteenth-century madrasahs, a fifteenth-century hamam, historic archives and libraries of Islamic community were destroyed during the seventeen months of fighting. On the other hand, between June and October 1999 many Orthodox Churches and monasteries, some dating from the medieval period, suffered serious structural damage or were destroyed completely. Roman Catholic architectural heritage was not spared either, although in much smaller scale compared to the former ones. “These acts of reciprocal vandalism seemed motivated on both sides more by the desire to eradicate the evidence of the other’s presence in Kosovo than by religious fanaticism”, says an International 111

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Crisis Group Balkans Report. The multiethnic harmony was challenged once more in 2004, in an inter-ethnic riot which ended with 19 people dead, nearly a thousand injured and many churches and mosques damaged. Such events made interfaith dialogue in Kosovo an imperative activity. In general, heads of religious communities have shown a good commitment to engaging in dialogue activities. Indeed, the first meeting among religious representatives happened during the war, and continued in a regular manner until it was interrupted by 2004 events, to resume again in 2006. Foreign embassies in Kosovo and international religious and non-religious organizations have contributed in organizing interfaith conferences and other initiatives that promote dialogue, tolerance and reconciliations. Two of those organizations whose mission is to promote interfaith dialogue and who have been active in Kosovo are Tony Blair Faith Foundation and Fethullah Gülen Movement, whose engagement in Kosovo will be elaborated here. This is a descriptive study that looks at the history of interfaith dialogue in Kosovo since 1999 and while acknowledging the contributors to organizing interfaith meetings, some of the challenges to interfaith engagement are also identified. In addition, an explanation on the notion, objectives, paradigm, principles and etiquette of interfaith dialogue is identified.

The notion of interfaith dialogue

There has often been an association between religion and conflict, in many local or international wars, where religious differences were the primary cause of the conflict or at least made the differences between two sides wider. The Kosovo-Serbia war was not entirely a religious war, although religious authorities played a significant role. Although religion can contribute to violent conflicts, it can also be a powerful factor in the struggle for peace and reconciliation. This is possible when two or more faiths come together to explore and promote the possibility of peace. These are indeed elements of interfaith dialogue. “At its most basic, interfaith dialogue is a simple concept: persons of different faiths meeting to have a conversation”, says Smock (2002). This conversation is carried out amongst people of different faiths on a common subject, with the purpose of learning from and about one another. But dialogue is not debate, suggests Leonard Swidler (Smock, 2002). In dialogue each partner must listen to the other as openly and sympathetically as possible as he can, in an attempt to understand the other’s position as precisely as possible. Swidler further categorizes interfaith dialogue into three areas: the practical – where we collaborate to help humanity, the spiritual dimension 112

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– where we attempt to experience the partner’s religion, and the cognitive – where we seek understanding of the truth. Interfaith dialogue is necessary both during the armed conflict as well as during the peace building process. Successful dialogue during the conflict can lead towards peace, while dialogues after the war can help reduce if not eliminate prejudice and discrimination against members of another religious community. Despite the positive outcome from interfaith dialogue, in multi religious societies, some religious groups are wary from interfaith engagements. This is mainly the case when a particular religious group takes the initiative for organizing such events, as other religious groups may express suspicions behind and wariness at the motives behind such efforts as Kamar Oniah Kamaruzaman (2010) lists several reasons behind the lack of positive response to interfaith initiative: “Conversion - the fear that one may get converted into the faith of the dialogue partners; dilution of faith – the suspicion that influential arguments in the dialogue may dilute one’s faith; defensive – the apprehension that one may hear something unpleasant or discomforting about one’s religion; embarrassment – the anxiety that one may be embarrassed at dialogue sessions if one fails to expound one’s religion well enough; disservice – the worry that one may do a disservice to one’s religion if one fails to explain or defend it properly; inferiority complex – the nervousness if one is good enough to enter into dialogue; social innuendoes – the feeling of discomfort that fellow adherents may suspect one’s commitment to one’s religion if seen to associate with adherents of other religions; agenda – the dread that one may be lured into supporting hidden agendas; history – the memories of unpleasant history and painful encounters with certain religious communities”, are among the chief reasons why religious groups feel anxious from engaging in interfaith dialogue. For interfaith dialogues to be well received and be accepted and so become more effective, it is first necessary to clearly clarify the premises and paradigms, the objectives and the etiquette of such efforts, something that Kamaruzaman refers to as the “what”, the “how” and the “who” of the initiatives. Interfaith initiatives can be classified into two, interfaith dialogue which is the discursive part where all participants will be discussing about the stance or position of their religion vis-à-vis certain issues, and interfaith engagement which is the practical part where the various faith communities cooperate and work together for a common good. Since in interfaith dialogue the positions of the religions on certain issues are to be discussed, it is therefore imperative that the dialogue 113

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partners and participants be among those who are competent, knowledgeable and committed to their religions. This is to avoid misrepresentations of the religions. In general, interfaith dialogue should be a platform to know more about each other, to learn from each other, to set up report and establish respect for all. Thus, interfaith dialogue is not a theological debate, nor is a platform for conversion and polemics. Moreover, discipline, respect, sincerity, sensitiveness, sympathy, responsibility, patience, among others should form the fundamentals of the etiquette of interfaith dialogue.

Place of religion during the war

Before we engage in a discussion about interfaith dialogue in local context it should be clear that the Kosovo war was not a religious war, nor a war started on religious incidents. However, religious people played a crucial role, in particular the Serbian Orthodox Church who blessed its army’s activities in “defending” Kosovo, Serbia’s “soul, mind and heart”. This way the Orthodox clergy gave the war a holy dimension. Religion and conflict are two concepts often associated with one another. Madeline Albright (2006) suggests that policy makers should understand the role of religion when they analyze the situation in different parts of the world, because, in case of conflicts, religion should play a role in encouraging peace and not be a further aggravation of the conflict. She further explains how different religions have many things in common, like preaching for peace, love and social responsibility. In Kosovo’s case religion and everything that was religious became a target of parties involved in the conflict due to the perception that religious monuments represent the existence of a community i.e. while mosques represented the existence of Albanians, Orthodox Churches represented Serbs’ existence. Destroying religious monuments was considered a way to wipe out the existence of the group too. Thus, what Serbs did to Islamic monuments during the 1998-1999 war, Albanians tried to do to Serbian Orthodox monuments during the first months after the end of the war, although the level of damage to Orthodox Church is significantly lower compared to the human and technical losses done to the Islamic Community. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia show that of 498 mosques that were in active use, approximately 225 of them were damaged or destroyed during 1998-1999. Much of this damage was clearly the result of the attacks directed on the mosque: explosive devises planted in the mosque or inside the minaret, artillery aimed at the minaret or fires started in the mosque. In some cases, anti-Albanian and pro-Serbian graffiti were written on mosque walls. 114

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At least four of these mosques were built in 1400s, another four in 1500s, a fifteenth-century hamam, eighteenth-century madrasahs, Sufi shrines, libraries and archives of Islamic heritage, among others, were all destroyed. The same documents show that close to 80 Orthodox Churches and monasteries were damaged and destroyed between June and October 1999, half of them suffering serious structural damages or were destroyed completely. The major medieval Orthodox shrines however have been under close guard by KFOR and have not been affected. While the attack against Islamic heritage was a coordinated attack carried out by Serbia’s state military action against Kosovo, one may argue that the destruction of Orthodox churches was not an orchestrated campaign, it was carried out by individuals who saw this as a retaliation opportunity for the destruction of mosques. Another offensive against religious monuments was repeated on 17-18 March 2004 during the inter-ethnic clash between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. Again Orthodox Churches and mosques became a target were groups expressed their anger and hostility. Such events should be an alarm, at least for religious leaders, that their religious adherents do not fully understand the role of religious monuments and other sites. Rancor and frustrations should not be allowed to be manifested in burning down and destroying religious objects no matter who they belong to.

Responding to the call for dialogue

Regardless of many problems and difficulties that the Kosovo society had to go through during and after the war, which created an even wider gap among ethnic and religious groups, one can strongly argue that the interfaith dialogue in Kosovo long preceded the technical and political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Indeed the first interfaith dialogue in Kosovo was held during the war on 1 March 1999 in Prishtina. This difficult meeting was organized by the World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP)1, an international organization based in New York, who managed to bring together for the first time representatives of three traditional religious communities that exist in Kosovo. The leaders of the Islamic Community, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church expressed opposition to the misuse of religion for political reasons on all sides and called on all parties not to use religious symbols to promote violence or intolerance. They also expressed their determination to maintain direct contacts among religious communities and to build channels of communication. 115

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The level of interfaith dialogue continued on informal basis since then, in most cases these meetings were convened by international organizations and were held in various places such as: in Vienna on 15-16 March 1999, Amman 29-30 November 1999, Sarajevo 9 February 2000, Pristina 9-10 April 2000, Oslo 29 September 2001, Sarajevo 1 November 2003, etc.2 There were also other meetings in different occasions which were organized mostly by international representatives in Kosovo, who were serving in Kosovo in diplomatic or civilian missions. It is important to note here that the interfaith dialogue meetings had been regularly held until 17 March 2004. On this day 19 people (11 Albanians and 8 Serbs) were killed on the worst clash between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians since 1999, and a number of religious buildings were destroyed. These events were a step backward to interfaith dialogue initiative, but not the main obstacle to the progress of dialogue. The main obstacles to dialogue and reconciliation were the involvement of the Serbian Orthodox Church in politics, its refusal to accept the new reality in Kosovo, and the hesitation to apologies for the crimes committed by the army whose military campaign it had blessed. The first reason that hindered the success of interfaith dialogue in Kosovo during the last decade was the involvement of the head of SOC for Kosovo, officially known as the bishop of Raska and Prizren (i.e. Kosovo) Artemije, in the political developments of Kosovo. He was, at that time, also the head of the Serb National Council of Kosovo, a political position which came in direct conflict with his position as the spiritual leader of Kosovo Serb community. He was continuously warned from his counterparts, the former president of the Islamic Community of Kosovo and Grand Mufti, Rexhep Boja, and the late cleric of the Catholic Church of Kosovo, Mark Sopi, that he should not interfere in the politics. Indeed, any political intention or motivation can hinder the flow of dialogue initiatives, especially in the case of Kosovo where the essence of the problem was more of a political, ethnic, and social character, rather than a religious one. The Orthodox Church was politically influenced by Serbian Government, which could be one of the reasons why the Church never apologized for the crimes committed by Serbia against Albanian civilians and the destruction of Islamic heritage during the war. The Church did not show any signs either towards accepting the new reality of Kosovo created after June 1999 when NATO troops and the UN convoy started a new phase of peacekeeping and state building. Therefore, the Church deserves a great deal of the blame why the Kosovo Serb community is not fully integrated in Kosovo’s political and socio-economic life. 116

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After March 2004 events, the Serbian Orthodox Church categorically refused any form of inter-religious engagement with the rest of religious communities of Kosovo. This decision was against the declaration signed by three religious communities in previous meetings which called for respecting the common moral norms. If one had any reasons to withdraw from the dialogue, then it would be the Islamic Community of Kosovo, which suffered the most from an unjust war blessed by the Orthodox Church. Instead, they chose to stay because boycotting the interfaith dialogue was definitely not the way nor a method for solving the problems. Dialogue opens new doors and new opportunities for all Kosovo citizens represented by their religious leaders. The tradition of interfaith meetings resumed in 2006 and continues to this day although not on regular basis.

Privileges of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo

Religion, although rarely being the principal cause of conflict, was nevertheless a contributing factor to the Balkan wars, especially in the Bosnia and Herzegovina war of 1995 and in Kosovo war in 1999. The latter pushed the profoundly secular organization NATO, whose member states practice several religions, to fight the first war in its fifty-year history to protect Muslims who were being expelled from Kosovo from Orthodox Serbs. The Serb military operation during the Kosovo war was from the beginning blessed by the orthodox clergy. And when religious authorities support a military activity, then the activity becomes a sacred endeavour, while the whole conflict becomes more fanatical. Hans Küng once said that the “most fanatical and cruellest political struggles are those that have been coloured, inspired, and legitimized by religion” (Smock, 2002). Traditionally the Serbian Orthodox Church has been closely linked with politics and politicians and has never hesitated to publically call for political actions against other groups. The head of SOC during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the late Patriarch Pavle, never distanced its Church neither apologized for the genocide and aggression of Serbian regime towards the non-Serb nation, especially towards Muslims in Bosnia, Croatians in Croatia and Albanians in Kosovo. When Pavle was hospitalized before his death, then the acting Patriarch bishop Amfillohije Radoviq made a political statement: “damned be the one who recognizes Kosovo,” referring to the countries that were recognizing Kosovo as an independent state after the declaration of independence in 2008.3 Pavle’s successor Patriarch Irinej in his inaugural speech promised to “protect Kosovo and Metohia, because Serbia without 117

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Kosovo and the holy sites that are there, is without soul, mind and heart.”4 A more positive discourse towards Kosovo and inter-religious engagements was recently seen from the new Bishop of Raska and Prizren Teodosije. During the interfaith conference held in Peja on 24 May 2013 he spoke about the importance of the dialogue not as a tool to merge different faiths but rather as a mechanism to achieve better understanding of one another’s tradition and teaching and define areas in which religious groups can work together to offer a significant contribution to the society. “We are deeply aware that the painful events of the last decades and particularly the armed conflict intensified the atmosphere of animosity between the Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo but we also believe that the power of forgiveness and reconciliation is stronger and we have to find the way out of the vicious circle of hatred and prejudices. In this process, we religious leaders have a particularly important role and responsibility in front of God our Creator and Benefactor,” said Teodosije in his speech at the conference.5 He also stated that although the conflict in Kosovo was not a religious conflict, religion has nevertheless played a role in the culture of the people who misleadingly still see religious sites as symbols of national ideologies rather than the house of God. “We must change this perception and this is our primary task now,” said Teodosije. Today the Serbian Orthodox Church enjoys full protection by Kosovo institution, and unlike the Islamic Community and other religious organization, the status of the SOC was clearly regulated even before the declaration of independence. The document upon which the new state of Kosovo was formed, the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement of the Security Council, shortly know as the Ahtisaari Proposal, as it was designed by the former Finish President Martti Ahtisaari, was designed to make Kosovo a multi-ethnic society, giving non-Albanian communities substantial power and tremendous influence in all sectors. To avoid any religious favouritism, first and foremost, the Proposal demands that the Constitution of Kosovo affirms that Kosovo has no official religion and that it shall be neutral on questions of religious beliefs. Annex V of Ahtisaari Proposal, although entitled Religious and Cultural Heritage, in all of its six pages speaks only about SOC. Here the rights, privileges and immunities of the Church are defined, and guarantees that Kosovo shall recognize the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, including monasteries, churches and other religious sites, as an integral part of the Serbian Orthodox Church seated in Belgrade. This document also guarantees the SOC that it will be free to receive donations and other beneficial support from within or outside Kosovo, and 118

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the latter shall grant customs duty and tax privileges to the SOC, in addition to those enjoyed by all religions in Kosovo, for economic activities of the Church. The Proposal guarantees that all SOC monasteries, churches and other religious sites will have security and physical protection by Kosovo Police, while a selected number of these sites will have special protection through the establishment of Protective Zones. Any industrial and commercial construction in Protective Zones, such as structures taller than the monastery, street constructions, shops, public gatherings and entertainment, etc., are prohibited or they should seek the agreement of SOC. The territory of some of these zones today is clearly regulated by specific laws on such zones, while some sites are limited up to one hundred meter area around their perimeter. Indeed some of these monasteries and churches date from the fourteenthcentury, and there is no doubt that their existence enriches the cultural heritage of Kosovo, only that neither the Proposal nor any other legislation protects in a similar manner other religious sites, such as many mosques that were built in the fifteenth-century by the Ottomans. To this date the legal status of the rest religious organizations is not defined and the only law that speaks about religion is the 2006 Law on Freedom of Religion in Kosovo, which is a very general law that speaks about freedom to express one’s religion, freedom of religious association, and while it repeats that there is no official religion in Kosovo, it does not even mention any names of recognized religious communities in Kosovo, not to speak of protection or economic activities. Thus, of the five largest religious communities that exist in Kosovo, namely Islamic Community, the Catholic Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Protestant Church and the Jewish Community, only the status of the SOC is properly regulated, while others are registered merely as non-governmental organizations. Among them the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) seems to suffer the most from the status quo, who has repeatedly asked from the state institution to adopt a new law on religious communities that would eventually define their legal status as well as provide some sort of financial support and help ICK to retain many of its land that was originally given to the mosque as waqf and then claimed by the state during the Serbian occupation.

Contributors to interfaith dialogue

Almost all interfaith dialogue conferences, roundtables and other initiatives that brought together representatives of religious communities in Kosovo were organized by foreign organization. Among the organizers are foreign embassies serving in Kosovo, religious and non-religious international organizations 119

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like OSCE, Tony Blair Faith Foundation, Gülen Movement, as well as local governmental and non-governmental organizations. Among all contributors to interfaith tolerance and dialogue in Kosovo, the Gülen Movement has been very active and deserves a bit of attention. The “Gülen Movement”, whose educational activities today reach over 130 countries,6 opened its first office in Kosovo in 2004. Today it is known as the Foundation for Education and Culture “Atmosfera”. A movement inspired by the teachings of its founder, M. Fethullah Gülen, a scholar who preaches for tolerance and dialogue among civilizations, one of first activities of the Foundation was to translate and publish his books into Albanian language. So far, at least 16 books of M. Fethullah Gülen have been published in Albanian, including his well-known book “Towards a global civilization of love and tolerance,” which was received very well from the Albanian intellectuals. Besides books, this foundation has organized conferences on the necessity of interreligious and intercultural dialogue for the world peace. In addition, the foundation has opened schools and dormitories. The “Gülen Movement” is a well respected organization, whose activities show that it tries to eliminate intolerance, poverty and divisions among civilizations, religions and ethnicities. The personality of Fethullah Gulen, his ideas, philosophy and his contribution to education and interfaith dialogue have been discussed among Albanian intellectuals, like in the 26 May 2007 conference on the “The necessity of interfaith and intercultural dialogue for global peace” organized in Tirana. One of the speakers at this conference Muhamed Pirraku talks about the contribution of Fethullah Gülen in interfaith and intercultural dialogue, while quoting Gülen saying “Today the interfaith dialogue is a necessity and the first step towards its implementation is forgetting the past, ignoring the disputable arguments and giving priority to the common points, which are more than the disputes”.7 He even proposed that the “Gülen Movement” and its contribution to interfaith and intercultural dialogue become a part of university’s curricula as a study subject. In 2008 another conference was organized on the contribution of Fethullah Gulen. Zyhdi Dervishi, a renowned sociologist, in his presentation acknowledged the contribution of Gülen and his call for dialogue among religions, cultures and civilizations. Another presenter, Gjergji Sinani, supported the idea of “Gülen Movement”, who as he said “strives to overcome enmity and hatred and unite the society through tolerance and conciliation, because only in this way the culture and knowledge can be in favor of the society.8 Another speaker, Kiril Temkov said that, “Gulen’s ideas could be fundamental 120

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against prejudices and the building tools for a peaceful thinking. This is what we need today – a friendly hand to walk together and universal hope to restore peace all around the globe”.9 These are just a few examples on how Albanian intellectuals, although belonging to different religions, have found in Gulen’s ideas the best alternative and the best example for enhancing interfaith dialogue in this region. In general, Fethulla Gulen’s ideas have been widely discussed in conferences, papers and articles particularly during the last decade.10 Another example of promoting interfaith dialogue in Kosovo is set by Tony Blair Faith Foundation. He is a politician who knows well the history of the war in Kosovo, and who is widely regarded as a hero in Kosovo for his contribution both on NATO intervention and peace building process. During his visit in Kosovo in 2012 the former Prime Minister not only spoke about the role of dialogue in promoting peace and tolerance, he managed to establish concrete programs of that nature too. To teach to the new generation dialogue and negotiation skills his organization has agreed to launch two major programs in Kosovo. First, a Memorandum of Understanding between his Foundation and the Government of Kosovo for implementing the Foundation’s global schools programme Face to Faith in Kosovo schools was signed between Mr. Blair and Kosovo Minister of Education and second, a partnership with two universities in Kosovo, the University of Prishtina and the American University of Kosovo for joining the Faith and Globalization Initiative was established. This partnership aims to offer university courses that will train current policy makers and future leaders to examine the role that religion plays in areas where there are political and religious tensions. Another major contribution of Tony Blair Faith Foundation was the organization of a major international interfaith conference in Peja in May 2013. This conference, which was also supported by the Kosovo Government and some foreign embassies, brought together representatives of all Kosovo religious communities as well as international scholars to discuss the role of religion in a secular state that aims EU integration. Events like these bring high level politicians to talk about the role of religion in society, and they attract media attention too.

Concluding Remarks

The interfaith dialogue could have been successful if there had been a political dialogue prior to it, because the essence of the problem in Kosovo is more of a political, ethic, and social character, rather than a religious one. Kosovo needs to keep the interreligious harmony which was inherited for centuries 121

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and in this aspect our religious communities should be very careful, in order not to allow any escalation of any kind of interreligious intolerance against any group. This is a not only a religious duty, but also one of the valuable standards of any democratic and civilized society. Religious communities could play an important role in restoring normal life in Kosovo, if their religious leaders have good will and sincerity, and if there is support from the local institutions. People of religions are more than anyone else in close contacts with the ordinary people in all situations, in the happy and in the sad situations of life, during daily prayers, and weekly and yearly observances. Their words have significant meaning to the believers. In fact, leaders of religions can do even more for the nation’s peace than political leaders. Religious leaders often have more people listening to them. Their presence and interests transcend all boundaries, political, national, geographical, cultural and linguistic. As such, their influence, and their power and impact could be more than those of political leaders. Thus, it should be their duty to communicate the message of tolerance and forgiveness.

Notes 1. http://www.wcrp.org/news/press/ecrl-kosovo-03-05-08, (Accessed on 14.2.2009). 2. http://www.bislame.net, (Accessed on 13.2.2009). 3. Qemajl Morina, “Kisha ortodokse serbe dhe shqiptarët,” Edukata Islame, nr. 91/2010, Bashkesia Islame e Kosoves: Prishtine. 4. Ibid. 5. Bishop Teodosije’s statement at the Interfaith Conference in Peć, Kosovo, 24 May2013. 6. Muhamed Pirraku, “Fethulla Gulen, urelidhes i botes islame me perendimimin,” p. 46. 7. Muhamed Pirraku, http://al.fgulen.com/index.php?option=com_content&task =view&id=522&Itemid=26 (Accessed on 15.2.2009). 8. http://al.fgulen.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=535&It emid=26, (Accessed on 15.2.2009). 9. Ibid. 10. The author has conducted two studies on Gülen Movement in Kosovo. First paper “The need for interfaith dialogue in Kosovo – the contribution of Gülen Movement” was presented at: The fifth International Conference on Islam in the Contemporary World, at Louisiana State University, 2009, USA. Second study is now published, see: Jeton Mehmeti. The role of education in Kosovo – the contribution of Gülen Movement, edited book: The Gulen Hizmet Movement and its Transnational Activities: Case Studies of Altruistic Activism in Contemporary Islam, Sophia Pandya and Nanacy Gallagher (Ed.), publisher Brown Walker Press, Florida USA, 2012. 122

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References Albright, M. (2006). The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs. USA: Harper. Kamaruzaman, Kamar Oniah. (2010). Religion and Pluralistic Co-Existence. Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Press. International Crisis Group Balkans Report (2001). Religion in Kosovo. Pristina/Brussels. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (2002). The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Kosovo, 1998-1999: a post war survey. The Hague. United Nations Security Council (2007). Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Settlement Status. New York. Smock, R.D. (2002). Interfaith dialogue and peacebuilding. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.

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Waqf-Based Institutions in Kosovo

in the Post-Ottoman Period

Islam Hasani Before proceeding with our concerned subject matter, it is necessary to state some of the facts regarding Kosovo as it gives clearer picture to the reader. Kosovo over 6 years ago declared its independence and up to date is recognized by more than 100 countries. As a newly established country it faces challenges in different sectors until it matures as an independent country. Although Kosovo is declared as secular state according to Gallup surveys, 90% of Kosovo people claim religion plays an important part in their daily life. The capital city of Kosovo is Prishtina, and its size is around 10,887 km². The climate is mainly continental with some Mediterranean and alpine influences, and summers are quite warm and winters cold. The temperature extremes range from +35C in summer, to -20C in the winters. Kosovo has an area of 1.1 million hectares and more than 53 % of it is land that can be cultivated. Around 60% of the population lives in rural areas and the rest live in urban areas. Waqf as an Institution: The religion of Islam controls and regulates all affairs of human beings. It provides comprehensive guidance for all affairs. It covers economic issues as well, they are found in the main sources of Islam, the Holy Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad peace be on him and other sources of Shari’ah. The history of the Prophet Muhammad is very rich in this regards and there are many lessons available for regulating socioeconomic life. After the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) migrated from Mecca to Medina one of the important events that happened was the establishment of economic and financial institutions. The Prophet, a respectable, truthful, and experienced merchant who had visited Palestine, Yemen, and the Gulf region for trade purposes, and who had endured the effects of a severe economic embargo placed on him by the pagans of Mecca, was conscious of the significance of the reality that socio-economic independence leads to political 125

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sovereignty.1 One of the ways for reaching socio-economic independence is the empowerment of waqf institution. With the passing of time the Islamic state expanded rapidly. It consisted of Muslims from different races and places. With the expansion of the Islamic state there was an increase in economic activities which furthered the need for finance. There were various types of finance in Arab countries before Islam. However, under Islamic rule, finance and financial practice changed in accordance with the teachings of Islam. Lending and borrowing of wealth existed before, but it was practiced with the involvement of Riba (interest). Interest is strongly prohibited and condemned by the Qur’an.2 As the relevant Qur’anic verse indicated, those who had practiced interest in the past were allowed to keep what they had earned before, but they were not allowed to continue with charging interest. After the death of the Prophet (PBUH) early Muslims were faced with economic situations that did not exist at the time of the Prophet. Originating from the basis of Islamic teachings, Islamic economic thought started developing as scholars were forced to find solutions for new problems. Early Caliphs with the help of fuqaha’ (Muslim jurists) established some basic principles of large scale state administration.3 Islamic scholars paved the way to vast business opportunities and international trade. The mainstream of Islamic economy was trade and this was insistently pursued during the first 800 years of its commencement. A combination of several economic and political factors, including the ability to mobilize adequate resources, was responsible for the increased prosperity of the Islamic world. These factors provided a great boost to international trade. By the middle ages, international financial network had been established supporting trade between Muslim communities. This system was highly developed of the time, and continued to be so until the banking system was introduced by the West in the 16th century.4 Kosovo and other parts of Balkans during the time they were part of the Ottoman Empire from 15th century until beginning of 20th century have had very organized educational and financial institutions. Knowing the importance of the economic development the Ottomans developed all aspects of the economy. In the financial sphere, they established Bayt al-Mal (treasury house). The finance of the Islamic state at that time was through local treasury houses and the central treasury house. The local treasury houses were established in every province of the Islamic state and the central treasury house was established in state’s capital. 5 126

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Another important Islamic institution which is well known in the Islamic civilization is the voluntary institution called Waqf, which was established by the Prophet Peace be on him himself in the light of Qur’anic teachings for the support of the general welfare, and which exists in all Muslim countries. There was a difference in the organization of funds from waqf and from baitul-mal, when Companions of the Prophet Peace be on him voluntarily offered their properties for the public use, he did not take it in the name of the baitul-mal but under the name of waqf. During the Ottoman time this institution was very much alive and played an important role for the general welfare of the Muslims of Kosovo.6 The Ottomans developed very much these institutions in all countries they were present. In particular they had very sophisticated the system of taxation and financial system. There have been investment and other transactions done under the baitul-mal and waqf institutions during that time.7 They facilitated investment and trade besides serving the purpose they were initially established.8 This continued to be the case with Kosovo as well until 1912 when Ottomans started withdrawing from Balkans and Muslims were left under the regime of the kingdom of Serbia-Montenegro. When Serbo-Montenegrians came to power they considered Muslims as betrayers for accepting Islam and started all sorts of genocide on the Muslim population for the reason of reverting them back to Christianity.9 On the economic aspect they started confiscating their properties, many waqf places and Islamic community properties as well as private properties belonging to religious people were taken by force and turned into public places which were under the state control. Some mosques and Madrasahs which were considered property of Islamic community built in the cities were turned into army basis, or police station and even prison and some others who were built in the villages were turned into horse farms and depot for state for army ammunition.10 From the facts mentioned, it is obvious that the baitul-mal as a financial institution in Kosovo during the communist regime did not function at all. The same fate goes with waqf institutions, not only people stopped endowing into these places but most of them that were endowed earlier did not survive the terror caused by the Yugoslavian and Serbian regime. However, after the declaration of independence by Kosovo many are expecting that the position of religion and religious institutions would change for better but up to date nothing has been done in regards to getting back those waqf properties that were confiscated before. According to the politicians and especially the ruling party Kosovo is a new country and many things have taken place and this is 127

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the process that cannot be solved in a short period. Waqf-Based Institutions in Kosovo: Another important Islamic institution which is well known in the Islamic civilization is the voluntary institution of waqf, which was established by the Prophet (peace be upon him). The waqf continues to be an important institution in all Muslim countries: they take the form of document records of endowments of cash, land, water-wells, books, buildings, etc. Many waqf documents that are preserved in private and public collections posses high artistic qualities; they display high quality calligraphy, illumination and other decorative elements.11 The institution of waqf has played very important role in the Islamic society. Waqf has had a great impact in the life of Muslims and Islam and has been studied from different perspectives, like: religious, moral, economic, politic and social perspective. Ottomans have showed great interest and respect to follow the sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions in serving the Ummah by taking care for the wellbeing of the people. Kosovo, being part of the Ottoman Empire since 14th century has followed Ottomans in this regard. For pure religions reasons waqf have been dedicated to humans and there are waqf dedicated for animals as well. Muslims of Kosovo not only have endowed waqf in Kosovo territory but they have contributed to building waqf properties throughout Ottoman Empire territory. Types of waqf established in Kosovo: There have been a good number of waqf established in Kosovo territory which seems not easy to cover all of them and divide them in groups based on their dedication and function. The following can be categorized based of their function:12 • • • • • • • • • •

Building and maintenance of the Mosques, Musala, tekke and tombs; Madrasahs and other scientific and research institutions; Shelter services, hans, hamams and health buildings; Libraries, bookshops, and the like; Wells, water systems, fountains: Public kitchens, kinder gardens and nurseries: Help for widows and needy people; Food and clothes for the students of the Madrasah; Funeral services of the poor people; Land

From the list of the types of waqf can be shown that it has played a very important role into the life of Kosovo Muslims, in religious aspect as well as cultural, social and humanitarian aspect. 128

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Waqf has played very important role in the formation and development of many cities and other dwellings in the territory of Kosovo. In urban places there are more waqaf properties that have dedicated for special purposes. Today we can find waqf institutions that are named according to the person who has endowed it or according to the purpose it has been dedicated. Nowadays, Islamic Community of Kosovo, the highest religious organ of the country, benefits from these kinds of waqf that have been endowed long ago for the purpose of helping the religious life in Kosovo and for the maintenance of the mosques and well being of religious leaders. Waqf in other words were the only means for keeping alive Islam and Muslims in the territory of Kosovo. Islamic Community of Kosovo headed by Grand Mufti of Kosovo is the only body that is responsible for organizing religious life in the country. It takes care of different waqf properties that have survived from the communist regime. Current challenge for Islamic community is to process procedures for getting back some properties confiscated earlier and there is enough evidence for the ownership of them by Islamic Community. Religious life in Kosovo is organized well, Islamic community is spread throughout the country, in every city or town there is Islamic council for organizing religious life locally and all of them report to the Grand Mufti’s office that is located at the capital city. There are records available for many waqaf properties in Kosovo that were confiscated by the then regime some records still exist but some were destroyed.13 Currently there are nearly 80014 religious objects in the territory of Kosovo that function under the jurisdiction and care of the Islamic Community of Kosovo: 713 Mosques 13 Masjids 5 Mektebe 5 Madrasahs (3 for boys and 2 for girls) 1 Faculty of Islamic Studies 1 Madrasah for Hifz (Tahfizul Qur’an) After the end of war in Kosovo in 1999, 195 new mosques have been built. Also 212 out of 218 of the mosques that were destroyed during the war have been reconstructed, 6 of them have yet to start building in the same place because reconstruction of them is not possible due to the level of the demolition caused by the Serbs. 129

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There is quite good number of shops15 that were left by people as waqf for the purpose of financing mosques activities. Some of them are still in function and in some places are considered as the only economic source for the survival of mosques activities. Also there parts of land that have been endowed to serve as an asset to the mosque, there are cases that mosques were built in such land and also some were used for giving them with rent and the rental income was used for the dedicated purpose. Islamic community of Kosovo has survived economically from donations from people that were organized as a yearly membership for every person and this was on voluntarily basis because they had no power to make everybody pay. The other income was the rental income from these waqaf properties. Islamic Community of Kosovo was never financed by the state so they had to work very hard for little income in order to survive, even today is not financed. Although Kosovo is declared as a secular state and it has bitter history in the past under communist regime that fought religion in all aspects a worldwide survey published this year puts Kosovo alongside countries that consider religion to be relevant for its people. The list is topped by Bangladesh, Niger, Indonesia and Malawi. According to Gallup, 90% of Kosovo people claim religion plays an important part in their daily life. In conclusion, we can agree that, Kosovo has passed through hard times after the withdrawal of Ottomans from Balkans. The communist regime that dominated in the twentieth century was against everything religious and in particular Islamic. Besides passing through this bitter history there is great lesson to be remembered that things cannot be taken for granted and this made people more active in this aspect. On the other side, the survival of religious institutions was very difficult after the withdrawal of Ottomans and it took some time to reorganize and find a way to function without help of the government. The position of baitul-mal and waqf institutions was in a very bad shape; many were confiscated and destroyed making it even harder for religious institutions to function. Nowadays Islamic Community of Kosovo is more active and religious life is being better organized and the institution of waqf is gradually taking the place it deserves. There is a lot to be done in this regard but we are very optimistic that better days are coming for Islamic Community of Kosovo and its institutions.

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Notes 1. Cengiz Kallek (1995), “Socio-Politico-Economic Sovereignty and the Market of Medina”, Journal of Islamic Economics, Vol. 4, No. 1 & 2, IIUM Press, pp. 2-3. 2. Al Baqarah: 275. 3. Ahmed Abdel-Fattah El-Ashker, (1987) The Islamic Business Enterprise, London: Croom Helm, pp. 15-19. 4. Nik Norzrul Thani, (2003) “Using Gold in International Trade Settlements: The Legal and Regulatory Issues” Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. International Conference on Gold in International Trade: Strategic Positioning in Global Monetary System. 5. Abdul Azim Islahi, (1996) op. cit., pp. 372. 6. Justin McCarthy (1997), The Ottoman Turks – An introductory History to 1923, London: Longman, p. 8. 7. Murat Cizakca (1996), A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships The Islamic Word and Europe, with Specific to the Ottoman Archives, Leiden: E.J. Brill, p. 131. 8. Halil Inalcik (1993), The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society, vol. 9. Bloomington: Indiana University English Studies, p. 223. 9. Norman Cigar, (2003), Roli i Orientalisteve Serbe per Justifikimn e Gjenocidit ndaj Muslimaneve ne Ballkan (The Role of Serbian Orientalists in Justification of Genocide Against Muslims of the Balkans) trans. Xhabir Hamiti, Prishtine. Logos-A, pp. 27-29. 10. Jusuf Osmani (1992), “Rezistenca e Kuadrit dhe e Institucioneve Fetare Kunder Reformes Agrare dhe Kolonizimit ne Kosove Midis dy Lyfterave Boterore”, (The Resistance of Religious Staffs and Institutions Against the Agrarian Reform and Colonization in Kosovo Between the two World Wars) International Seminar Feja Kutura dhe Tradita Islame Nder Shqiptaret October 15-17 1992. Held in Prishtina. pp. 481-483. 11. Ibid. 12. Sadik Mehmeti, (2009) “Roli i Vakefit ne Perhapjen e Kultures dhe Arsimimit Islam ne Vendin Tone” (The role of Waqf in Spreading Islamic Culture and Education in our Country) Takvim – Kalendar 2009, p. 128. 13. Sadik Mehmeti, “Veshtrim Tri Vakefnameve Origjinale (1608) te Mehmed Pashe Kacanikliut,” Edukata Islame No. 89, 2009, p. 92. 14. Official statistics published by the office of the Grand Mufti of Kosovo on December 2010. 15. Around 500 in the whole territory of Kosovo.

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Ferit Vokopola’s Religious and National Contribution for the Albanian Cause Islam Islami

Introduction

Ferit Vokopola, not only made his ​​ name as an Albanian Muslim devoted patriot, but also as a diplomat, lawyer and publicist, who gave valuable ideas in the field of journalism. Vokopola will remain one of the outstanding Muslims of the Albanian national figures, and inspirer for the Albanian cause.1 His contribution is multi-dimensional; he was a believer, patriot, philosopher, essayist, poet; he wrote and translated poetry, and was a Sufi sheikh. His writings have been published mainly in the magazine Zani i Naltë [“Highest Voice”], published in Tirana from October 1923 till April 1939, while from 1939 to 1944, he wrote for monthly religious magazine Kultura Islame [“Islamic Culture”] published by the Albanian Islamic Community in Tirana.2 Ferit Vokopola was born in Berat on 18 August 1887, but was originally from Vokopola which was an important center of religious and socio-cultural milieu and a connecting point between the cities of Berat and Skrapar. At the same time, Vokopola was an important centre of the well-known Albanian Patriotic Movement. Although Vokopola’s family settled in Berat in the early 19th century, it did not cut the ties with the place of origin.3 In 1938, Vokopola with his exhausted efforts managed to unify the four Sufi sects namely Sa’adi, Rifa-i, Kadiri and Tijani,4 which came together and formed their own organization called “Divine Light” in Tirana. This organization, besides the implementation of Islamic rules and obligations, aimed at establishing and developing educational and spiritual purity. A publication of a newly initiated magazine namely Njeriu [“The Human”] in July 1942 in Tirana, where it focused in expressing above mentioned organization’s ideas and initiatives in the fields of religion, literature, culture and spirituality. In the following section, we will try to elaborate further on this latest magazine by looking at the contents of it. 133

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Magazine of “The Human”

The editorial board of “The Human” magazine defined the essence of theoretical mysticism, and this was indicated in the first issue of the magazine: “In the beginning, mysticism reached the level of devotion and purity, and later on was illuminated with other spiritual virtues such as humility, surrender, love, benevolence, etc. and at the end followed the self-denial and total devotion towards God. Thus mysticism became a treasure of noble virtues.”5 Based on the content analysis and appearance of religious-cultural magazine ‘The Human’, one can draw certain information and results, which would somehow contribute to the Albanian historiography with high significance of the culture and religious spirit. The ‘Human’ magazine was published beginning from July 1942 until September 1944. Vokopola drastically turned the focus of magazine into Islamic Mysticism (Tasawwuf) which managed to achieve its aims and recognition from all others. Vokopola with his selective and well articulated manuscripts for the magazine explained in details the meaning of life from different perspectives such as philosophical, historical, moral, social, scientific and sentimental significance. But above all, he had set the task of writing on important human mystical life following the “twelve thousand years” old history with extensive problematic assertions and denials.

Religious Contribution

Ferit Vokopola’s religious contribution is multi-dimensional, where he essentially focuses on spirituality namely Sufism as it deals with internal improvement of man. The man is created from the body and soul, in which both taken together have a particular importance to the existence of human being. In Vokopola’s writings one can observe the revival of spirituality in people and religious persons in particular. In the second issue of the magazine, he wrote the article “In the Brink of Mysteries,” where he attempts to find the divine strength that create the human structure in a beautiful image, and inspired him with excellent spirit.6 In this article, he tries to define general analytical thoughts and studies by looking at the stages of history of mysticism dating back to the old Egyptian civilizations and comparing with the following other civilizations. In this regard, Vokopola related the discovery of truth with the majestic spirit/soul and body that weighs the secrecy of the beginnings and the ends. Although his intended opinions was not meant to be understood by all the folks 134

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of people except the educated.. According to him, the old Egyptians before everyone comprehended this impossibility, Isis, which lied before the gate of the little chapel under the ground, held on its knees a closed book; its face was covered with a veil and under its magic bed carried a description reading: “No man on earth has lifted my cheesecloth!”7 Despite this, he indicates that Brahma of India, Hermes of Egypt, Pythagoras of Plato, and all the eminent people tried to uncover the mystical body of Isis in their beliefs and principles. By willing to serve the spiritual development of the human being to the highest divine spheres, they divided these fragments into two types: esoteric and exoteric treatments. In a way that the most important problems are learned from erudite people, and those who have an extraordinary spiritual talent. Ferit Vokopola’s definitions to Tasawwuf reflected also in his stands as a Sufi master. The Islamic Tasawwuf derived from the Qur’anic verses, Hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad and interpretations of the traditional of scholars whose existential wisdom was also referred as Islamic mysticism. In principle, Tasawwuf aims to provide general spiritual tradition of Ali, the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad. As Vokopola wrote, the wise men of the time Ali said that in order to gain supremacy over the lust (nafs), one should move towards physical, moral and mental integration. Such transformation can be done only by exercising the mind, heart and energy through the masters (shaykh), in order to waken up the feelings of the soul. With such effort and action as well as with mediation of the real religious leader (shaykh), one can strengthen the relationship with the hidden powers of the universe. In the paper “Where does humanity go?,” Vokopola elaborates on the issues related to disputes and divisions, whose sources are very deep and he judges impartially on these complicated problems. He believes that the propulsive causes were born along with the animal element inside the human nature.8 As an argument for this view, he refers to the first human tragedy, the murder of Cain (Qaabil) by Abel (Habil). Here, he mentions two main factors as the cause of this progress: the mind and soul, which are two inseparable powers in the field of civilizing developments. Furthermore, in the paper “Why Two Souls Struggle?,” he presents each side of this world, every field of human activity, the efforts of two souls struggling with one another, with an ardour increasing each day and which attract man towards meaninglessness of moment as a gift for a dubious future. These two souls, not coming closer to each other, are comprised of old and new mentality, of two different incomprehensible worlds, and therefore 135

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can never agree without avoiding the targets of the extremity, and without being subject to real reasoning required by the reality of the common good. The author attacks the egoist feelings that prevails the opinion of a constant disruption, which cannot fully develop the frozen souls for the common good, the supreme goal, and for the non-susceptible mentality flaming eternally inside the pure, conscious people with remarkable mind for high worldly realizations.9 Vokopola through allegory which is recognized as the language of Tasawwuf tries to explain the human world, being shaken between different systems of capitalism, rationalism and liberalism. He tries to defend esoteric and exoteric knowledge as a legacy of oriental civilization, with wisdom of their spirit by trying to introduce into the empty hearts of human society the high feelings of a real love as well as the effort to halt the ardour of the unconstrained power of materialism, which aims at modern civilization. Driven by altruistic feelings strikes the self-consent, the greedy self-profit which bow to the appealing lusts of instant entertainment, regardless that every new thing originates from the depths of old life, and that by maintaining this spirit, Vokopola believes that the appearance of civilization can be transformed. He concludes the article with a hope that the severe sufferings and full of sacrifice will be compelling lessons for the establishment of a fair peace, where the two souls struggle only for this sacred purpose. Vokopola’s religious contribution is also seen in other activities of his life, when in 1920s there were possibilities to establish an Islamic high school with modern physiognomy. Initiators of this idea and struggle were recognised personalities of Albanian politics during those years. The group of initiators was consisted of Hafiz Vehbi Dibra, Senator Sali Vuciterni, Ferit Vokopla and Qamil Bala. The established Madrasah was aimed at preparing knowledgeable religious leaders, equipped with high knowledge of religious, philosophical and scientific achievements within the domain of contemporary education. Albanians produced many erudite scholars of the Qur’anic Sciences and Exegesis of the Qur’an (Tafsir). Among the first who studied the Quran at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century were Ferit Vokopla, Hafiz Ali Korca, and Vehbi Dibra. These scholars were undoubtedly the distinguished during the past two centuries. The Communist regime, the government of Enver Hoxha, the Dictator, imprisoned Vokopola. However, while in prison, he neither fell into despair, nor pessimism. During the imprisonment, he was often quoted saying: “I am 136

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neither pessimistic nor opportunist, but optimistic.” And he proved to be right, because the opportunity comes only with hard work and dedication of creative intelligence to create values of ​​ society and the nation.

National Contribution

Ferit Vokopola was a patriot and idealist serving the independent state of Albania as well as the realization of independence and accomplishment of the old Albanian dream. One can observe this in his opinion towards Ismail Qemali and delegates of the Congress of Vlore.10 In his article: “I Met Him!,” he dedicated this piece of writing to the establishment of an independent Albanian state as a fundamental political premise for developmental capacity of all Albanians. Vokopola on the occasion of Qemali’s hundred centenary,11 he evokes memories from key moments of his meeting with Ismail Qemali. He reveals some meetings with him, but points out the decisive moment for Albania, much different than other times, which expression at such moments were wisdom and exemplary love for all. The draft of the Declaration of Independence was published in the newspaper Revival of Albania, a body of the Provisional Government of Vlora under the auspices of the youngest signatory of the Independence Act, where Ferit Vokopola was at the age of 25. During the years 1920-1928, he was elected as Deputy of Vlora, and during the years 1928–1939 he was a Deputy of Berat. At this time, in co-operation with Sali Vuciterni and the others, he becomes one of the pioneering organizers for the establishment of the Albanian Muslim Community, and provided a significant contribution for the establishing a Madrasah (Islamic high school) in Tirana. Between the years of 1927-1928, he served as the Minister of Agriculture in the Albanian government. With his deep knowledge and conviction to the religion of Islam, he was dedicated himself to the translation of the Qur’an, in which he completed in ten years. When he was released from prison, he found an awkward environment which was brought by the communist regime, freedom of speech and thought was banned, and opponents were hostile toward religion. In such circumstances, being a speaker of oriental languages, he was offered the associate position at the Institute of History, where he served as an interpreter of historical and archival documents from the Ottoman-Turkish language until he passed away in 1969. He is remembered among Albanian Muslims to be a prolific scholar, multi-lingual, activist, and revivalist of Sufi intellectual tradition in Albanian speaking milieu. 137

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Notes

1. Archive of the Institute of History (AIH), Tirana; Ferit Vokopola Fund, Historical Studies and Opinions, Albanian Hurufis, Their Origin and Doctrine, dos. A-III.233. 2. Albanian National Library, “Zani i Naltë” magazine, October 1923-April 1939, “Kultura Islame” 1939-1944. 3. Yvejsi M, “Ferid Mustafa Vokopola” 1887-1969, www.zemrashqiptare.net (Accessed on 06.07.2014). 4. AIH Tirana, Necip Alpan Fund, “Unknown Aspects of Albania,” Dos.AV.13, p.12. 5. “Definition of Mysticim in Islam,” “The Human” Magazine, Vol. 1, July 1942, Tirana, p.7. 6. Ferit Vokopola, “In the Edge of Mysteries,” in The Human Magazine, Tirana, September-October issue 1942. 7. Ibid. 8. Ferit Vokopola, “Where Does Humanity Go?”, The Human Magazine, Vol. 9, Tirana, March 1943-XXI, p. 1. 9. Ferit Vokopola, “Why Two Souls Struggle,” The Human Magazine, Vol. 12, Tirana, June 1943-XXI, p. 1. 10. Out of total 84 Albanian delegates at the Congress of Vlora, only 41 arrived in Vlora and proclaimed indpendence of Albania. Among the delegates were also Don Nikol Kacorri, Abdyl Aziz, Rexhep Mitrovica, Dhimiter Tutulani, Abdi Toptani, Mid-hat Frasheri, Qemal Elbasani, Luigj Gurakuqi, Bedri Pejani, Nebi Sefa, etc. 11. Ferit Vokopola, “Hoisting the National Flag,” The Human Magazine, November 1942, p. 4.

References

Archive of the Institute of History (AIH), Tirana; Ferit Vokopola Fund, Historical Studies and Opinions, Albanian Hurufis, Their Origin and Doctrine, dos.A-III.233. AIH Tirana; Necip Alpan Fund, “Albania in so far unknown aspects” dos.AV.13, p. 12 Albanian National Library, Zani i Naltë, October 1923-April 1939. Albanian National Library, Kultura Islame, 1939-1944. Vokopola, Ferit, “Definition of Mysticim in Islam,” in The Human Magazine, Tirana, Vol.1, July 1942. Vokopola, F. “In the Edge of Mysteries,” in The Human Magazine, Tirana, SeptemberOctober, 1942. Vokopola, F. “Hoisting the National Flag” in The Human Magazine, Tirana, November 1942. Vokopola, F. “Why Two Souls Struggle,” in The Human Magazine, Vol. 12, Tirana, June 1943. Vokopola, F. “Where Does Humanity Go”, in The Human Magazine, Vol .9, Tirana, March 1943. Vokopola, F. “Importance of the Point in Mysticm and Atomisim of Mysticism,” in The Human Magazine, Vol.7, Tirana, February 1943. Yvejsi, M. “Ferid Mustafa Vokopola” 1887-1969, www.zemrashqiptare.net (Accessed date 06.07.2014). 138

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Religious Diversity and Albanians Qani Nesimi Globalization as social, political, economic and cultural process is found in all stages of human kind history. In different periods the meaning of the word globalization, like any other term in different times and environments has changed, even in the absence of this term, semantically is manifested in various forms of understanding. Therefore, we can mention the case of the Qabil (Cain) and Habil (Able), who wanted to dominate even Allah with his thoughts and desires, i.e. Allah to be under the influence of his thoughts and desires. Also, as another important historical moments, we might mention the tendency of Alexander the Great for complete Hellenization of the World, intention of the Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman empire for cultural and religious unification, the tendency of the Buddhist Chandragupta Maurya, or different tendencies for dominance in Mediterranean, India, Asia and Persia, as it is the case with St. Paul. Also here we should mention the tendency for colonial globalization of Portuguese, Spaniards and British, like the trips of Christopher Columbus, Vasco de Gama, and etc.1 Islam as original, divine and universal religion does not recognizes “we” and “them”, or centre and periphery, a single place, or only East or only West, as it is the case with dominant culture in the globalisation process, which says that the West and North America are Centre of the World, while the rest of the regions are just e periphery of this main world power. The Islam declares: “To Allah belongs the East and the West. Wherever you turn there is the presence of God...”2 The centre of spiritual cosmology is the system of collective beliefs and values, which do not recognize any material or geographical boundary.3 For instance we can mention the case of Tarik ibn Zeyad, when he reaches in Spain, he burned the ships because he was convinced that he did not step down on foreign land but the whole land belongs to mighty Allah, the divine speech of Hz. Omer in the steps of church and not inside of the church, it is of a great importance that Muslims whenever they went they have not destroyed the native/local culture nor they have rubbed it, but they have helped, developed or restarted the culture in that country, or they have developed a good tradition in that country. 139

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Another aspect of critical approach of Islam toward globalisation is the failure to give advantage to some individuals over others, namely Islam denies the theory that a group of people or individuals, classes or nations should rule with other people, some are more privileged in comparison to others. As well denies the mission of white people, the chosen nation, as it is the case with the German nation, Hebraism, Christianity, Castes System in Hinduism, etc. With this falls down the theory the globalization of economics, politics and local culture. In the holy Qur’an is stated: O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted.4

Albanians belong to two major universal religions, Islam and Christianity. Multiple data for material and spiritual culture of the Albanian people testify that two-religious affiliation of Albanians (Christians and Muslims), makes richer and more complicate their national identity. There is no doubt that three-religious affiliation has its negative side, which makes vulnerable the Albanian national identity, if one of these religions would have been in favour of political and social institutions. Another moment that negatively affects and contributes to the decay of religious and national harmony is over-stressing and over-distinguishing the religious feelings. For this reason the Albanian renaissance intellectuals will do intellectual battle to reduce over-stressed awareness at the natural level of awareness for religion. Anti-clerical approach of the Albanian renaissance intellectuals is not anti-religious approach, because majority of them were religious and believers, without taking in consideration their religion affiliation. In fact, their opposition was concentrated against over-stressing religious consciousness, which impede the development and consolidation of national consciousness, which had confusing influence in the national integration process and spiritual faith Albanian people. Even the famous saying of Vaso Pasha, “The Religion of the Albanians is Albanianism”, should not be understood as an anti-religious or unfaithfulness approach, but it must be understood within the time frames and semantic aspect when he lived, but always taking into account the question to which this statement is referred to.5 The famous saying “Fe e Shqyptarit asht Shqyptaria - The Religion of the Albanians is Albanianism”, taking into account the political and expansionist circumstances that dominated at that time on the Balkan Peninsula, does not represent anti-religious or unfaithfulness approach. The author in the above 140

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mentioned verses wants to stress out those feelings against disruption and against disputes. Thus, the author before coming to his famous saying “The Religion of the Albanians is Albanianism”, he is says the following verses: “...Albanians! We are killing among brothers/in hundred bands we are divided;...” “a foreigner comes and resides at your home/toa shamed you with your wives and sisters; for that amount of money that you will earn/do not forget the word (besa) that you have given to your ancestors..”, “let’s die as our ancestors did/to not be ashamed in front of God”(Shqyptarë! Me vllazën jeni tu evram/dhe më një qind çeta jeni shpërndamë;...”, “... vjennjeriihuej, jurrinëvotër/me juturpnue, me grue, me motër; edhepërsa para që do tëfitoni/ besën e t’parëvet’gjithë e harroni...”, “...Të desim si burr at që diqnemotit/e të mos ma rohna përpara Zotit”).6 In coloration to the Vaso’s verses, academician Krasniqi says: “the verses of Vaso Pashë Shkodrani “The Religion of the Albanians is Albanianism,” are not an expression of romantic patriotism of the 19th century, but finding of the truth, evidence of high national awareness. Many people misunderstand these verses, as an atheist, or anti-religious expression. The poet was a catholic believer and patriot, he was not against religion, but he supported the idea that Albanians, like other nations over everything should put the national interest, we should love our nation with a love set in the degree of love for religion and religion should not be in any way element of divisions between the Albanians, but the only condition for the existence the Albanian nation.”7 The communist ideology, i.e., Enver Hoxha’s ideology, based on anti-religious principal, according to Feraj, not that only banned everything religious, but even nationalist idea that are expressed to keep alive the strong national and tolerant spirit of Albanians, has tried to present as atheist and anti-religious approach, in relation to Pashko Vasës’s verses “The Religion of the Albanians is Albanianism”, it does not come the Enver Hoxha’s atheism. Feraj says that in the Vasës’s verses is expressed the need to put the national identity over the religious identity. This requirement is found in the majority of nations and other people and is not something particular only for the Albanians. However the requirement for hierarchy of identities, to set national identities over the religious identity and atheism it does not appears logically. Secondly in the Vasës’s verses is expressed the joint need for the Albanian nationalism in multireligious environment, however even the need for tolerance does not results with atheism.8 While Gazmend Shpuzain relation to the Vasos’s poem, says this poem does not has anti-religious content and neither is against religious ceremonies or against faith.9 So, the process of globalisation by benign an opportunity for many positive 141

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elements, same time serves as opportunity for bad elements in this process. Nowadays, in the Albanian society, according to Rexhep Qosja, globalization has given to a phenomenon, which cannot be positive even for those that deal with this process. This phenomenon is called over-distinguishing the religious awareness. Over-distinguishing of religious awareness among Albanians is done in different manners, over-distinguishing of the religious catholic awareness is supported now for several years by different political and state institutions in Kosovo and Albania, obviously under the influence of some religious institutions of foreign states, especially through some foreign media, which continue to be present in Balkans as “lobby of Barbarian Orient” and as “lower category of civilization”. But what makes this situation harder is participation of some intellectuals and creators form various fields of arts and sciences in e over-distinguishing the religious awareness, especially those intellectuals who write novels in Albanian.10 In some intellectual circles, having discussed the issue of Islamic fundamentalism, say that the same does not exist among the Albanians, in this case they also try to cover that in the Albanian identity main important factor is Islamic culture and civilization. Also, by denying the presence and importance of Islamic culture and civilization in shaping the Albanian identity, they try to do through the question of Islam to which belong the majority of Albanians is the obstacle of the integration of Albanians, namely integration of Albania and Kosovo, into the European Union. The idea if the Albanians would have belonged only to western civilization, they would not have been divided in several countries and today they would have been part of the big European family, this is only supposition. Because in actual circumstances that Albanians are in the Balkans, is result of many political and economic circumstances, many individual and group interests that have happened during the history of Balkans and beyond. For instance we can mention the communist regime of EnverHoxha. This is proven with the postcommunist period and putting down the eastern communist ideology and the appearance of political and cultural pluralism in Balkans. For instance here we can mention the NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Signing of the accession agreement for EU membership with Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia and others. Therefore nowadays if you say that the spiritual identity of Albanians is only the Christian identity, it means to become religious propagandist or religious politician that is not saying the truth and does not contributes to harmonious coexistence of the three religions in the lives of Albanians. 142

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Among Albanian intellectual community there are two poles divided based on their opinion about their religious identity. At one pole are those who think that the Albanians should return to their religious origins, namely the decline of Christianity, more specifically to return to their Catholic Christian routs. In this pole belong Ismail Kadare, Aurel Plasari, Piro Misha etc. Meanwhile in the other pole stand those who think that the religious identity of Albanians is consisting by Islam and Christianity. In this pole are the Albanian intellectuals Rexhep Qosja, Muhamedin Kullashi, Shkëlzen Maliqi etc., it should be clear that members of the second pole are not supporters of Islam and opponents of the Christianity. These are personalities that do analyses of the actual Albanian issue concerning the Albanian identity. But being a sympathizer of one religion is something else. Eqrem beu Vlora shows another way of identification of Albanians. According to him, Albanians were divided into two groups. In the first group were those that were saying “tyrk elhamdulil-lah” (Turks, Lord protect us) and “gjaurë” (orthodox and catholic Albanians). In this case the expression “tyrk elhamdulil-lah” should not be taken in its narrow sense, that is should not be considered as ethnic affiliation. So, with this statement Albanians did not wanted to become or declare themselves as Turks, but this is an expression that wants to minimize the Albanian Islamic religious affiliation, which was spread by anti-Albanian and anti-ottoman policies lead by priests and politicians of Orthodox faith, namely the Greeks. At that time (19th and 20th century) anti-Albanian policies were presenting an effort that automatically if you are a Muslim you are Turkish, which is not true at all. The expression used by Albanians “tyrk elhamdulil-lah” it was not used to show their ethnic background or to declare themselves as Turkish but to show their religious affiliation. Even nowadays there are old Albanians, if you ask about their religious affiliation would say “jam tyrk elhamdulil-lah”, and s/he speaks, writes and communicates in Albanian and they are ready to sacrifices everything about the Albanian culture. While the expression “turko alvanoi” (TurkishAlbanians), was used by the Orthodox Greek policy, which is a real paradox, it remains among one of the anti-Albanian methods used by the policies of the time in order to achieve their goals. Eqrem Beu continues by saying: ‘in the history and literature of the Balkans nations, the motive of persecution and atrocities of Muslim Albanians against the Christian Albanians was drawn and coloured with hundreds of colours, was described, wept and sung in hundreds of ways. A continuous propaganda during last century had cultivated among people of the Balkans a deep hate against Turks and Albanians, a hate that was 143

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materialized in the most monstrous crimes during and after First World War. “My intention is not to defend either Turks or Albanians, but for the sake of truth I want to stress out this fact: that in these 4-5 years period Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, committed that much crime against Albanians that was not done against them for 4 to 5 centuries.”11 There is no social identity which could say that is completely original and authentic identity. Every identity is a result of historical and social identity. Particularly there is no social identity which is simple, uniform intermediate. All identities, even individual identities are structured and complex identities. Exclusion from this category do only those most primitive social groups, that their development is at a tribe level, where their lives are held in complete isolation, without contact and interactions with other groups and societies. Until recently, such groups are existing in the jungles of Africa and South America. Albanians, surprisingly, have created one of the most complex national identities in the region and possibly on the planet. Albanian lands divided by mountains and valleys in dozens of regions, where communication between them has been very difficult, despite invasions, splits and corrugation, they have remained up to date a compact land inhabited by Albanian-population. In the lands where they live, irrespective of country and their status, Albanians are majority. They are majority in Kosovo; in the part of Macedonia where they live, in the Preshevo valley; in the border stripe between Montenegro and Albania. Albanians have not occupied foreign lands, but their lands are occupied by neighbouring states. Ethnic (Great) Albania, politically and geo-strategically is presented as ghost and unrealizable dream, while it is an undeniable reality in the region. The other greater miracle of the complex Albanian identity is the high level of tolerance among religions. Albanians have in their corpus of identity all the major European lessons. Although the being and the identity of the Albanians in any aspect it has not been put in doubt, this does not mean they do not have or will not have different challenges arising from tearing mobility of Albanian society (or more accurately, societies) in transition. The enormous shakes actually that Albanians are facing in political, economic and cultural life cannot go without consequences, or at least without a serious re-defining of their identity. In positive terms current processes should lead to reconstruction of the state and institutions on sound foundations and more stable than those of the twentieth century. After the collapse of the institutions built on a mixture of communist and nationalist ideologies, now should be installed new laws and institutions, based on an individual’s right and liberal principles.12 144

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Albania accommodates people of different religious traditions, communities and ethnic minorities are considered Albanians as well. The relationship between the Albanian identity and Islamic culture is of extremely important nature. Indeed, the word which describes the word “nation” in Albanian is the word “komb”. The word “komb” has its origin in the Arabian word “kaum”, which has come to the Albanian culture through the Ottoman language. Thus, in order to define the very notion of the Albanian nation, the founders of Albanian nationalism chose precisely this Arabic word. The issue of the relationship between Islamic culture and Albanian identity is very well represented in this symbolic example.13 Broadly, the role of Islam is argued to be positive in the construction of Albanian identity. This idea is partly supported by some academicians and historians who defend this thesis, by saying that the reason behind our conversion into Islam was to distinguish our ethnicity from the Serbs and the Greeks. This view has made many Albanians to think that the main reason for conversion into Islam was to “save” the national identity.14 Albanian elites, being aware of the weakness of the existence of the Albanian state to face ideological and military power of the nations around, tried to legitimize the existence of their state by undertaking a series of radical reforms in order to smoothen and blurry Ottoman and Islamic traditions, by trying to “Westernize” the characteristics of our society. The question then was how to become less Muslim. This is how the politics of hiding Muslim identity, came in light, by deleting or hiding all the noticeable features of Islamic and Ottoman culture. All visible signs of the Ottoman past started to disappear, starting with the magnificent architecture of the urban buildings, markets and sarays. Their destruction was intended to show that Albania had taken very seriously the way of modernity as understood by the socialist revolution. Each of the obvious signs of the Oriental past became a daily target for propaganda and subject to repressive laws of the communist dictatorship. This declared war, first against tradition and later against the religion, Muslims and Christians, became an Albanian brand. Christianity whether Orthodox or Catholic, are seen as a modern European label and fashion which exceeds secularism, although perceived as something very natural. Examples of the Albanian politicians, who openly participate in Sunday mass, follow Christian rituals, are getting married in church and participate in religious ceremonies. According to them this is natural and according to Albanian customs. In contrary, is unheard and unseen for a Muslim Albanian politician to attend a prayer or even publicly to show the 145

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smallest his/her Islamic affiliation. Moreover, in parliament we see Christian political party, while the very idea of creating a nominal Muslim party would create something similar to an earthquake of a high magnitude. Schoolbooks also often contain Christian fundamentalist interpretations and the same are served as facts to children of various confessions. In response to this, fearing Albanian elites, including religious ones, began to limit the number of mosques or just closing them. Bureaucrats stopped their public prayers and participation in Islamic religious ceremonies. They felt they had to show serious signs of de-Islamization and de-Ottomanization of Albanians.15 In my opinion we Albanians can enter into European Union only by showing the actual religious reality. Neither words nor thoughts for departure from Islam, or returning back to Christianity, nor hiding Albanian religious reality, it will accelerate the integration process. Those who think that leaving or abandoning Islam is the condition for our integration into the EU do not do anything else as they just show their subjective feelings and hide the Albanian reality.

Notes 1. Josip Simic, Religijeicrkvepredizazovomglobalizacije, FilozofksaIstrazivanja, 116 God. 29 (2009), s. 745-761; Globalization and Religion, Conference on Globalization, Conflict & the Experience of Localities, Rome, Italy, 8-29 June 2007 (director programs Ms. Mahjabeen Khaled-Institute of Hazrat Mohammad (SAW); Mehmet Aydin, “Kuresellesmeye Genel Bir Bakis”, Kuresellesme, Stamboll: Ufuk Kitaplari 2002, f. 11-13; Adrian Civici, Globalizimi…ante portas, Tirane, 2009, pp. 18-21. 2. Qur’an: Baqara, 115. 3. Davutoglu, p. 52. 4. Qur’an, Hujurat, 13. 5. Rexhep Qosja, Ideologjia e shpërbërjes, trajtesë mbi idetë çintegruese në shoqërinë e sotme shqiptare, (Tiranë: Toena, 2006), pp. 23-28. 6. Pashko Vasa, VepraLetrare 1, botoi “Naim Frashëri”, Tiranë 1987, f. 37-39. 7. Mark Krasniqi, Toleranca fetare mes myslimanëve dhe katolikëve në Kosovë, Feja, kultura dhe tradita islame ndër shqiptarët, simpozium ndërkombëtarënë Prishtinë15,16,17Tetor, 1992, botoi Kryesia e Bashkësisë Islame të Kosovës, Prishtinë 1995, p. 206. 8. Husamedin Feraj, Skicë e mendimit politik shqiptar, (Skopje: Logos-A, 1999), p. 280. 9. Gazmend Shpuza, Millet Sistemi Çerçevesinde Arnavutların Durumu, Osmanlı IV, ed. Güler Eren, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, Ankara 1999, pp. 294-297. 10. Qosja, p. 29. 11. Eqrem bej Vlora, KUJTIME 1885-1925, Tiranë, 2003, f. 152, 335-336. 12. ShkelzenMaliqi, the author is philosopher and publicist, article has been taken by the weekly journal “Java” published in Prishtina. 146

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13. Ervin Hatipi, Identiteti shqiptar, www.forumi.kuranidhesuneti.net (Accessed on 20.11.2010). 14. Sami Frashëri, Kush e prishpaqënnë Ballkan, (Skopje: Logos-A, 2005); Roberto Morocco Dela Roka, Feja dhe kombësia në Shqipëri 1922-1942, (Tiranë: Elena Gjika, 1996). 15. Ervin Hatipi, Identiteti shqiptar, www.forumi.kuranidhesuneti.net (Accessed on 20.11.2010).

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Religious Organization of the Montenegrin Muslims after the Berlin Congress Lejla Ramič-Mesihovič Muslims in Montenegro successfully preserve continuity of their organising, despite the fact that their community now operates in the eight state structures.1 Despite being the smallest federal unit in all federal state structures prior to declaration of independence of Montenegro, representatives of this community have always demonstrated their active and constructive attitude towards establishment, preservation and maintenance of vitality of organisation of Muslims. Islamic Community was established in Montenegro2 as one of the outcomes of a complex set of decisions following the 1878 Berlin Congress.3 The congress was hosted by Germany’s Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who, together with other European superpowers at the time, had intended to control territorial and power redistribution which had been following the gradual decay, and eventually, collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Prior to formal establishment of this religious community, Montenegro and the Ottoman signed an agreement to recognise the right of Montenegrin Muslims to founding of their Islamic community and guaranteed them the liberty to independently manage religious affairs and property. The first Mufti, Hajji Salih Huli of Ulcinj, a Muslim Albanian dominated part of Montenegro, was authorised by Montenegrin Duke Nikola to apply principles of Shari’ah as it had been the case under the Ottoman rule. The seat of the Islamic Community had initially been in Ulcinj, but subsequently was moved to Podgorica. Already in 1883, the Mufti left to Shkodra, Albania, due to disagreements with the Duke’s administration. Upon request of Duke Nikola for appointment of a new Mufti, Istanbul sent Hajji Mustafa Tikveshlija of Bulgaria. Tikveslija strongly objected the authorities’ order that burial can be allowed only after 24 hours pass, and returned to Istanbul objecting to antiShari’ah elements of the order.4 149

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The third Mufti was Murteza Karadzuzovic from Bar, Montenegro. He was the first Mufti appointed by Montenegrin sovereign authorities, i.e. King Nikola the First. The High Meshihat based in Istanbul completed this appointment in accordance with the Shari’ah principles in 1912.5 These correct relations and cooperation between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire in the past two decades of the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th century, until the First Balkans War, had been just a segment of generally stable bilateral relations. During the period, the two countries signed several agreements on their borderlines. Also, the Turkish authorities provided guarantees to the Montenegrin Government for getting a loan from the Imperial Ottoman Bank for activities on establishing and preservation of peace and order on Montenegrin borders. At the time, their main common fear originated from expansion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The First Balkan War in 1912 gathered Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro against the Ottoman Empire. King Nikola resisted to enter into this coalition at first, as he had suspected that the two great empires might reconcile at one point as well as the other allies, and that this would leave Montenegro out of the new equation.6 Karadzuzovic had been leading the community until Montenegro merged with Serbia in 1918, after the Mufti’s Office was moved first to Nis, Serbia. Eventually, the Grand Mufti’s Office responsible for Serbia and Montenegro was located in Belgrade, newly-established capital of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Until 1930, there were two Islamic communities in the Kingdom: one with its seat in Serbia, covering Serbia with territories of now independent Kosovo and Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro, and second for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia managed by the Reis Office located in Sarajevo. Under rein of Aleksandar Karadjordjevic the First, centralisation of the Belgrade influence and his personal authority escalated in every segment of public life of the Kingdom. In 1929, the King named his rather multi-ethnic and multi-religious state the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, under the slogan: one people – one king – one state. Religious communities were not exempted from these logics. The two communities had finally merged in 1930, when the main seat of the Islamic Community was located in Belgrade. Further administrative centralisation of the Islamic Community under the new constitutional circumstances continued in 1936 when the Constitutional of the Community abolished the institution of Mufti offices. At this time, main seat of the 150

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Community was moved from Belgrade, Serbia to Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the Second World War ended in 1945, along-awaited stabilisation of the newly created political and social circumstances, both in Yugoslavia and in general, finally allowed Muslims to reorganise themselves in accordance to the new situation. According to the records of the Montenegrin Islamic Community, Montenegrin imams had taken an active role in the debate on new draft constitution of the community in on 13 August 1947. Just days later, on 26 August 1947 delegate and nominee from Montenegro, Ibrahim Fejzic was appointed for the first Reis in the Federative Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia. In line with this new constitution, Waqf assemblies and assembly board established in every federative republic resulted from both the new constitutional setup, but also the need for decentralisation of religious activities in post-war Yugoslavia. Islamic Council of Elders was established in Montenegro in 1948. This enabled formal re-emerging of organising and management of religious activities of Muslims on level of Montenegro. As all other religious communities existing in the Socialist Yugoslavia, the Islamic Community was not exempted consequences of logics and indoctrination of the Communist ideological mainstream, which had inevitably brought along marginalisation of religion. Following decomposition of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, Islamic communities of different republic have become independent. The Montenegrin Islamic Community are currently organised in thirteen local communities coordinated from Montenegrin capital of Podgorica. They operate in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Community from 1994. Rifat Fejzic has been the Reis (Head) since 2003. Local boards of the community are located in all places significantly inhabited by Muslims: Podgorica, Ulcinj, Bar, Ostros, Dinos, Tuzi, Rozaje, Berane, Petnjica, Bijelo Polje, Pljevlja, Plav and Gusinje. Islamic Community in this country is inevitably ethnically heterogeneous. According to results of the 2011 census presented by Montenegrin Institute for Statistics, out of 30,439 Albanians 22,267 declare themselves as Muslims. Out of 53,606 Bošniaks, 53,453 are Muslims, while 20,537 persons who ethnically declare themselves as Muslims, 20,270 are Muslims in religion as well. Among 278,856 of those who prefer Montenegrin civil identity, there are 12,758 Muslims. In addition, out of 6,251 Roma, 5034 are Muslims. 151

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This Islamic Community is self-funded. According to the Montenegrin Constitution from 2007, it is also entitled to assistance of the state, as all other religious communities in this tiny European country. On 30 January 2012, Prime Minister Igor Lukšić and Reis of the Islamic Community Rifat Fejzić signed the agreement regulating relations between the Government and the Islamic Community in Montenegro. On the occasion, Luksic and Fejzic pointed out that this agreement is to both further strengthen the constitutionally defined relations, as well as an additional incentive to promote Montenegro as a European country that cherishes tolerance and wealth of differences. Montenegro aspires to regulate relations between the state and the religious communities functioning in the country, in order to create a legal framework for adopting the law on legal status of religious communities and law on the restitution of property rights.7 Islam gained its legal status by the Constitution of the Principality of Montenegro in 1905 and the agreement from 2012 can also be interpreted as preservation of legal and formal continuity of the Islamic Community and the official recognition of Islam in Montenegro. Although Muslims of Montenegro were not always self-governed during the recent history, vitality and coherence of their Islam-driven thought, organisational and spiritual ideas have always been able to find their way towards formalisation and implementation through different forms of Islamic communities that they had been a part of. Multi-ethnic in composition of its membership, the Islamic Community successfully resisted all challenges of ethnic-based turbulences that the Balkans went through since decomposition of Yugoslavia. Both this profile and modus operandi have proven to be rather unique in comparison to the situation in other former Yugoslav countries. Its constructive and consistent functioning has continuously been an important contribution to enhancement of social cohesion within the Republic of Montenegro. Also, the official rhetoric and performance of this religious community has proven to be extremely valuable for affirmation of stability both domestic and regional, but also important for aspiration of Montenegro to approximate the European Union structures through respecting and advancement religious rights of its citizens.

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Notes

1. Principality of Montenegro; Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; Kingdom of Yugoslavia; Federative Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia; Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia; Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; State Union of Serbia and Montenegro; independent Republic of Montenegro. 2. Montenegro is one of six republics of former Yugoslavia, bordering Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, and having a sea border with Italy. This country covers 13.812 km2. According to the 2011 census, this country has 620,029 inhabitants. 3. Representatives of Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Russia and Turkey held the congress in the period 13 June - 13 July 1878. 4. Agovic, Bajro; “Islamic Community in Montenegro”, Official Portal of the Montenegrin Islamic Community - http://www.monteislam.com/islamskazajednica-u-crnoj-gori (Accessed on 29.08.2014). 5. Ibid. 6. Andrijasevic, Zivko; Rastoder, Serbo (2006): “Crna Gora i velike sile”, Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva, Podgorica, pp. 60-61. 7. Statements and full text of the agreement available on: http://www.monteislam. com/novosti/islamska-zajednica-u-crnoj-gori-i-vlada-crne-gore-potpisaleugovor-kojim-se-definise-uredenje-medusobnih-odnosa

References Andrijasevic, Zivko; Rastoder, Serbo (2006): “Crna Gora i velike sile”, Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva, Podgorica Crampton, Richard J. (2002) “The Balkans since the Second World War”, Pearson Education Limited, London. Jelavich, Barbara; (1994) “History of the Balkans, XX century, Volume 2”; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Todorova, Marija; (1997) “Imagining the Balkans”, Oxford University Press, New York. Websites: Institute for Statistics of Montenegro (MONSTAT) - http://www.monstat.org/cg/ page.php?id=534&pageid=322 Government of the Republic of Montenegro - http://www.gov.me Official Portal of the Montenegrin Islamic Community - http://www.monteislam. com/islamska-zajednica-u-crnoj-gori

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Waqf Institutions in Macedonia throughout the

History and Current Challenges

Sherif Abdullahi The idea of waqf is as old as the humanity. Muslim jurists argue that the first waqf ever made is the sacred building of Ka’bah in Makah since the Qur’an mentions that it is the first house of worship set for people: “The first House (of worship) appointed for men was that at Makkah: Full of blessing and of guidance for all kinds of beings…” [Qur’an, 3:96]. Waqf is “holding an asset and preventing its consumption for the purpose of repeatedly extracting its usufruct for the benefit of an objective representing righteousness/philanthropy”.1 This definition grants perpetuity to waqf, i.e., it applies to non-movable properties whose benefit can be extracted without consuming the property itself. Therefore, waqf widely relates to land and buildings. However, there are waqf of books, agricultural machinery, and cattle’s, shares and cash money.2 This institution of waqf is defined by privately ownership where the corpus is endowed for a charitable purpose in perpetuity and the revenue generated meets the objectives for which the waqf was established. The waqf stands as an important philanthropic Islamic institution which played a significant role in Islamic civilization as inherited institutions from the past and which possesses huge potential for reconstruction of economic and social life in Muslim countries and communities.3 Historically the waqf institution was supporting and providing health, education, other public services such as water supply for the cities, public kitchen, public bath, and many other services and goods at no cost to the central government. The waqf could fulfil public services as mentioned above (health, education, municipal, etc.) by voluntary donations made by the well-intentioned founders. Therefore, privately accumulated capital was voluntarily endowed to finance all sorts of social services to the society, which not only reduced the government spending and budged deficit, and lowered interest rates, but also ensured a better distribution of income in the society.4 155

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This article aims is to provide an overview of developments and the role of waqf institutions in Macedonia throughout the history and highlights the current challenges. It considers the history of the waqf in Macedonia and its development during three phases. The first section gives a snapshot of the concept of waqf. The second section will discuss the development and role of waqf during the Ottoman Empire era. The third section will discuss the post Ottoman Empire era, respectively the period from 1918 – 1990. The forth section deals with the period from 1991 until present. The final section summarizes the discussion.

Socio-economic Dimension of Waqf Institutions of Macedonia and its Implications during the Ottoman Era

Historically, Macedonia was important centre in southern Balkans, where its geographic and strategic position, as far as business, trade and industry are concerned, played an important role in socio-economical life. As an example, the city of Manastir (Bitola), was developed into important urban and business centre as a result of its advantageous location on the Via Egnatia and continued to be develop during the Ottoman Empire period. In Macedonia, after the Ottoman Empire established the socio-economical, juridical and cultural changes began to appear in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious society.5 From early stage of Islam, it was know that Caliphs and pious people made a practice of devoting part of their wealth for establishing endowment institutions. The revenue from religious institutions was derived from private charities, principally in the form of permanent endowment of the land and other movable and immovable properties either by deed of waqf or habs. In fact in Muslims societies, philanthropic institutions were always part of the life of the nation. The property restrained (mawquf or mahbus) was thereby withdrawn from all further transfer of ownership, and its usufruct was devoted to a specific aim which was designated by the endower (waqif). Such waqfs were created by innumerable and wealthy governors and private person from earliest century of Islam for the benefit of mosques, madrasahs, tekkes and all other forms of charitable, by the intention or theory were infinite or in perpetuity.6 These kinds of endowments were widely practiced in the Balkans especially in Macedonia. In Macedonia under the Ottoman rule, anyone Muslim or dhimmi (non-Muslim) was entitled to form the waqf. The objectives for which waqfs were established apart of religious purpose are numerous such as mosques and zawiyahs, educational institutions (madrasahas, maktabs and libraries), public goods such as roads, bridges, fountains and lighthouses, hospitals, hostels and 156

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kitchens were provided by these private means, as charitable institutions. In addition to this, many waqfs were founded to supply money (cash waqfs) to the needy and to give assistance in kind, such as aid for the poor inhabitants of the particular villages and quarters of town, and food and clothing for elderly and children. All these types of endowments were called waqf khayri (public waqf) which may distinguish from another type of waqf called waqf ahli (family waqf).7 The later is a type of waqf where the endower would allocate property in the same way as other wafqs, but the revenues it accrued would be solely for the provision of livelihood for his descendants as long as any remain, and from which succeeding generations might benefit from it. From the early nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire administration introduced a special ministry for awqaf and established awqaf laws. The Law of Awqaf of 29th November 1863 (19/6/1280H) was the most important among others. This law was applicable in many countries after the dividing up the Ottoman Empire in 1918 such as Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Palestine.8 A title deed of endowment was called waqfiyyah and was drafted institutionally before a qadi (judge) in the court, was registered in the sijil (register) and approved by the Sultan (Caliph). In the waqfiyaahs of both types of endowment, public and family, the properties and revenues derived from each which meant to maintain them and all persons appointed to manage or administer and serve them, together with the salaries, were diligently particularized. Although the waqf institution was a financially and administratively independent, in the Ottoman Empire in general, the state controlled and confirmed all waqfs, since they had the character of freehold property.9 The founder of a waqf (Waqif) was free to appoint anyone he wished as administer. In all waqf the endower appointed an administrator (Mutawalli), which is called “tawliyyah”. In large waqfs usually are superintendent, called a “Nazir”, and was usually appointed as well. The Mutawalli was responsible for all matters related to the waqf, taking measures for the collection and growth of its income, using these funds to fulfill the conditions of the endowment, to pay the foundation’s employees, and for maintenance and repair. The Nazr was an inspector, determining whether or not the conditions of the endowment being fulfilled. Once a year, the principal officers and employees of the waqf would meet to discuss whether they had accomplished their duties stipulated by the waqfiyyah. This group could request for the Mutawalli’s dismissal. The state, through the local qadi or a specially appointed inspector, audited the accounts of each waqf. The aim of all these precautions was to ensure that the institution continued to fulfill its proper function.10 157

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Since all waqfs were recorded in the qadi’s sijjils, it is possible by an examination of the sheer extant of the archives of various provincial courts to obtain detail and exact figures of the numbers, destinations, and character of waqf foundations during the Ottoman era in Macedonia. People, who owned a property, from the Sultan and his family down through the social ranks, were establishing waqfs. Cities in Macedonia were not exception to this pattern. However, in comparison to other cities where the population was considerably higher, the number of waqf institutions established in Manastir (the city of Bitola, Macedonia) was sufficient. During the 18th century, the number of waqf institutions that were established in the city of Manastir was less than 10% in comparison to the waqf institutions established in Aleppo, Syria, during the same period. There were almost fifty waqf institutions in Manastir compared to five hundreds in Aleppo.11 Apart from immovable waqf institutions which were considered the essentials of socio-economical life, the movable or cash waqf institutions were established and played an import role to facilitate all business activities in the society. The qadi sijils or registers of Manastir contain hundreds of court cases, which recorded how loans, financing, rate of return, debt and others forms of crediting through cash waqf institutions were implemented in the society. In Macedonia, most of cash waqf institutions were managed by appointed administrator who acted as a sole manager for cash waqf institution, and who was responsible for collection of the revenues generated, the preservation and increasing the funds of the cash waqf institution under his management.12 During 18th century, the numbers of craftsmanship was more than one hundred and twenty and continued to increase. Beside of craftsmanship the Ottoman Empire administration established guild’s organizations or corporations. They acted as intermediary bodies between individuals and central government, by securing manpower, social control, quality of goods and services, taxes and others.13 To facilitate all above mentions activities, the cash waqf institutions were very important. Through the cash waqf institutions, companies were financed and supported to engage in productions of goods and services, obtaining new skills far away from their local home town, and financed to sell their products around entire the Empire and outside.14 Waqf Institutions of Macedonia between 1918 – 1990 After the collapse of Ottoman Empire 1918, the Kingdom of SCS (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) established its presence in Macedonia. They annulled and dismissed all lists and registers of waqf, thus, the SCS regime took and 158

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destroyed a huge number of Muslims institution and property (mosque, khans, mills, madrasah and hamams etc.), with one purpose to expel Muslims from the Balkans. Then, After the Second WW, the communist regime established its presence in former Yugoslavia which Macedonia was part of that federation. Again, all waqf institutions that were left during the SCS regime untouched, communist continued with same speed of nationalization, expropriation and usurpation of waqf institutions, based on the name of public interest or agrarian reform.15 As the data are scare, destroyed and some still locked in the archives related to waqf property, bellow, the data, facts and documents (all they are cumulative) are presented about the waqf property usurped in different manner by communist regime beginning from the year of 1945 in the cities of Skopje, Tetova, Gostivar, Manastir (Bitola), Diber, Resnje, Struge and Oher, or cities which belong to the western part of Macedonia and mostly Muslims population is concentrated and some other cities in east part of Macedonia which actually a small number of Muslims are living because they faced hardest exodus than the other part.16 Communist regime in different ways and by different acts, took huge number of waqf property some especially in city of Skopje capital city of Macedonia. Based on the archive of the Islamic Community of Macedonia, the waqf properties such as land, houses, shops, hammams, madrasahs, tekkes and others which are usurped, are shown below.

The city of Skopje Table 1 Number of the Act Numbers of different Acts

Date 1957 - 1968

Number of parcels Numbers of different parcels

Surface in total 16.599 m2

Number of the Act

Date

Number of parcels

Number of houses

Numbers of different Acts

1959 - 1969

Numbers of different parcels

102

Nationalization Central Body (government institution) decided to nationalize Ibni Pajko waqf property (shops) that is around old market in the city of Skopje, by act number 146-a/59, on 13.05.1960. In total, was usurped 166 m2 of Ibni Pajko waqf building. 159

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Table 2 Number of shops

Number of the Act

Date

Number of parcels

Numbers of different Acts

1960

Numbers of different parcels 40

The city of Tetovo Also, the state communist regime usurped great numbers of waqf in this city. They started from the most beautiful and wealthy tekke in the Balkans and entire Ottoman Empire, named Arabati Baba Tekke. According to the decision 14049 date 16.08.1947 in behalf of the agrarian reform, state usurped all property (land) of the tekke, cemeteries and tekke itself.17 Table 3 Number of the Act

Date

Number of parcels

Surface in total

Numbers of different Numbers of different 1947 - 1988 724.864 m2 Acts parcels No. of Number of the Act Date Number of parcels shops/ houses Numbers of different Numbers of different 1960 33 Acts parcels

Also state nationalized and usurped some mosques and their gardens, shops and schools (madrasah), lately the have been destroyed and demolish and the places transform either to parks and streets or other building. Table 4 Number of the Act

Date

Number of parcels

Name of the Mosque

Surface in total

4565/55

21.02.1958

3723

Selce Bek

937 m2

4571

04.03.1957

3506

Sinan Tekke

1740 m2

03-6832/1

03.07.1965

2185-2186-2137 Tupan Mosque

Without act

1645

3046 m2

Mehmet Celebi 1104 m2

Total

6.985 m2 160

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The city of Gostivar Same in Gostivar as in majority Muslims populated cities in Macedonia, state sometimes by acts, but sometimes even without acts usurped and nationalized numbers of tangible waqf assets. Table 4 Number of the Act Date

Number of shops and houses

Number of shops

754

27.12.1959 1 house

270 m2

754

27.12.1959 3 shops

79 m2

675

27.12.1959 16 shops

327 m2

Total

676 m2

Also, the government has expropriated Muslim cemeteries so called “Turk Cemeteries”, by number of parcel 706 date 1951–1952, which first of all the parcel has been transformed to city market then later transformed to the park. In the year of 1938 after the beautiful Yuri Mosque has been demolished, its place was transformed to market. The state usurp 28 shops around the mosque that were part of the tangible waqf for purpose of generating cash as a cash waqf for the support of the mosque and madrasah and other expenses for the mosque, still until today these shops are in use by different people and return back to the real owner the Islamic Community of Macedonia. There are other waqf tangible and non tangible assets that were taken in the villages around the city, such as Toplice, Kalishte, Negotine, Pirok, etc.18

The city of Manastir (Bitola) Historically, the city of Manastir, with its geographic and strategic position as a junction of several roads, most famous Via Egnatia, was an important center of Macedonia during the Ottoman Empire and was a capital city of Vilayet of Manastir. Later, during the 19th–20th century, Manastir was known as a city of consults, because of many foreign diplomatic establishments.19 Compare to the most of the cities in the Ottoman Empire territory, number of waqfs founded in Manastir was very high. For instance, during the 18th century, waqfs was less than 10 percent in comparison to the city of Aleppo in Syria. When a 161

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new waqf institution was to establish be it tangible or cash, public or family, it had to be approved by the court as being legitimate and official before being functional. A number of waqf institutions were recorded in the sijils (registers) of city of Manastir. Most of these endowments either waqf khayris (public) or waqf ahlis (family) established for maintenance of other institutions such mosque, madrasahs and maktabs, for paying salaries for the officials of these institutions. Some waqfs were established for the purpose of feeding the people in need, and some other waqfs were founded with the purpose of benefiting the family members and their descendants from the cash generation that these waqf were made.20 Property that was registered and recognized in the Ottoman’s sijils (registers) as waqf property, during the SCS regime was confiscated and destroyed with the purpose of expelling Muslims from their territories. But under the new communist regime in power from 1945 to 1990, the remaining waqf assets nearly all were either demolished or confiscated. The communist regime denied the existence of waqf property. Today, in this city only around 15 waqf properties remain in existence and majority of them are not in function for the purpose that they have made. Below the table shows in total the surface of the shops, houses, land and others that are seized.21

Table 5 Number of the Act

Date

Number of parcels

Numbers of different Acts 1945 - 1988

Surface in total

Numbers of different 266.511 m2 parcels

The city of Dibra Same situation was with the city of Dibra, state seized and demolished numbers of waqfs. Some waqf properties have been mosques during the Ottomans, but latter in during the Bulgarian occupation between the 1919 and 1920, one of the mosque had changed to church which exist as a church until today, then another mosque that in 1950 was burned, Communists did not allow to be rebuilt it again.22

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Table 6 Number of the Act

Date

Number of parcels

Numbers of different 1945 - 1990 Numbers of different parcels Acts

Surface in total 5.671 m2

The city of Resnje From the evidence that Islamic Community of Macedonia possess in this city there were large waqf property but usurped from communists and given to individuals or state companies. State registers of the properties from 1936, recording a large numbers of waqf, but in the name of land reforms and public interest, only few waqf properties remain.23 Table 7 Number of the Act

Date

Number of parcels

Surface in total

Numbers of different 1955 - 1990 Numbers of different parcels 297.797 m2 Acts

The city of Struga Same situation happened in the city of Struga, state seized and demolished numbers of waqf properties. In 1997 the official letter from Mufti’s Office of Struga was addressed to the Islamic Community of Macedonia saying that the large number of waqf property is destroyed, usurped and nationalized. Table 8 Number of parcels

Surface in total

Number of the Act

Date

Numbers of different Acts

1955 - 1990 Numbers of different parcels 297.797 m2

The city of Ohri The beautiful city of Ohri was well known for the numbers of mosques and madrasahs and they had a large number of waqf (land and shops) for supporting the activities of madrasahs. Same here the waqf properties either destroyed or usurped.24 163

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Table 9 Number of the Act

Date

Number of parcels

Numbers of different Acts

1945 - 1990 Numbers of different parcels

Number of the Act

Date

Numbers of different Acts

1945 - 1990 Numbers of different parcels

Number of shops and houses

Surface in total 38.955 m2 Shops in total 31

The table below shows the mosques, madrasahs and cemeteries that are usurped or fully destroyed. Table 10 Number Date of the Act 14312/51021614312/6 2679

1953 (demolished)

1353

1953 (demolished)

1473

1953 (demolished)

328

1953 usurped

1412

1953 (demolished)

2776-2774

2001 (demolished)

No. of taken Name of the parcels Mosque 303-469/92

Surface in total

Mosque 1.664 m2 Madrasah Sherif Beg Emin Mahmud mosque

1951 (demolished)

1.037 m2 1.027 m2

Cemeteries

2.405 m2

Hajji Hamza mosque Imaret mosque (now is church) Hajji Qazim mosque

4.516 m2

1951 (demolished)

Madrasah

1945 (demolished)

Peshtan mosque

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The Eastern Part of Macedonia

In this side of the country, Muslim population was under high state pressure and their properties were damaged or usurped with main reason to expel from the country to send to Turkey. Therefore, to make it happen, the communist regime destroyed and seized waqf properties. After they demolished large numbers of mosques, madrasahs, and other waqf institutions, the remaining left, government confiscated and divided between non-Muslim people. As data shows, during the Ottoman Empire era, there was huge number of waqf institutions, but by expelling the Muslims people and destroying their wealth in various ways such as expropriation and nationalization, nowadays a very small number of waqf institutions remained untouched, only 5 to 10 mosques from hundreds that were.25 In the year of 1958 in the city of Shtip local municipally by the act 04183/1 demolished the Sultan Murat mosque by surface of 940 m2 which was in the city center and replaced by the primary school. Another mosque, by the name Husamedin Pasha, was tried to be demolished, first attempt was done by SCS Kingdom and they transformed the mosque to butchery, then latter, communist regime attempted to demolish but was actively protected by Muslim community. Then, in 1994, the Orthodox Church of Macedonia tried to transform the same mosque to a church, but without success. The Islamic Community of Macedonia strongly opposed this action and local and international authorities were alarmed.26 Same situation happened with other cities in eastern part of Macedonia such as Veles, Kocan, Kratove, Radovish, Strumic, etc. Based on the data from Evliya Celebi (1611–1682, a famous Ottoman  traveler), who noticed that in the city of Veles there has been many mosques, one madrasah, one khan (motel) and fifty shops as a waqfs, but today only one mosque stand in this city. For the city of Kocan data says that there were four mosques, one madrasah, one watch tower, and some houses and shops for generating cash to support above mention waqf institutions. In the city of Kratove documents prove that there were twenty mosque, one madrasah, one tekke, two hammams, three hundred and fifty shops for generating cash to support waqf institutions. City of Radovish had five mosques, one madrasah with rooms for students, one tekke, one hammam, three khans (motels), one library and one hundred and fifty shops. In the city of Strumica data says that there were many mosques, madrasahs, hammams, tekkes, five hundreds shops and seven khans for traders, with the purpose to generate cash to support above mention waqfs.27 Besides government and non-Muslims who were destroying the waqf 165

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property, even some irresponsible Muslim individuals who were in charge on protecting and managing the waqf property, they themselves mismanaged, and, in some cases seized the waqf (be it shop or house) and sold to a third party for the compensation or some still are using the waqf property without paying respect to the purpose of that waqf institution. Need to mention some real examples that took place and are documented. In the village of Velusa municipally of the city of Strumica Sheikh Rustem had sold the cemeteries that were registered under the act 1749 and the surface was 8000 m2, this shameful events is proven by sate documents from the archives by the Act 07-3/1750 date 30.12.1982. Rasim Demirov as authorized person from the Islamic Community of Macedonia in the city of Shtip, on 04.11.1979, in the village of Zrnovci municipally of Kocani, has sold land parcel by number 3984, surface 509 m2. In the same city authorized person Bulent Mehmedov from Islamic Community of Macedonia, instead protecting and managing the waqf property, in 16.12.1982, has sold land parcel number 315, surface 500 m2, to another Muslim individual by the name Muhamed Abdij Mehmedov. The sale contract is registered in the city of Strumica by act number 408/80.28 These facts show that sometimes even authorized officials of the Islamic Community of Macedonia implicated in usurping and destroying the value of the waqf property, just to benefit personally and without taking into the consideration that all waqf properties belong to Muslim community in perpetuity. Waqf Institutions of Macedonia from 1991 until the Present Days After communist regime collapsed and Macedonia introduced pluralist political system, situation for waqf institution unfortunately remained the same. On 20.01.1992, Islamic Community of Macedonia, made a request No.60 to the Committee of Property Denationalization asking for return of all waqf properties and compensation for the waqf properties that had been damaged and destroyed or were built something else in the place of the waqf property. On 12.06.1997 the Ministry of Finance officially replied to the request of the Islamic Community of Macedonia, which stated that: “because of lack of the law for denationalization, waqf properties will be returned or compensated in the future”. After one year, the government approved the law for denationalization in terms of returning and compensation the usurped property during communist regime, but still is hard to be implemented. The government institutions purposely delaying the procedures when it comes to return the waqf properties compare to the church properties. The table below shows the waqf properties that need to be return in possession of the Islamic Community of Macedonia and still pending until present days.29 166

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Table 11 Type of the Waqf properties that has Surface in m2 to be returned to ICM30 Buildings (mosques, madrasah, hamams, 19.135 m2 khans, imarets, and watch towers) Cultivated land

3.869.806 m2

Parcels in mountain

1.934.903 m2

Meadows

825.000 m2

Uncultivated land

335.942 m2

Construction land

22.123 m2

Total

7.006.909 m2

The Denationalization Law in the Republic of Macedonia

In 1998, Parliament of Macedonia approved the law for denationalization, but the law did not directly state that waqf properties and church properties will denationalize. Thus, on 10.03.2000 Islamic Community of Macedonian together with the Orthodox Church of Macedonia proposed to the parliament to amendment the law by no. 33-1048/1. They requested that waqf properties and church properties to directly to be mentioned in the law for denationalization. After the parliament accepted the request of these two religious institutions, still the law did not fulfill the expectations of the Islamic Community of Macedonia. In the new revised law state: “Property will be returned, respectively will be given compensation for property taken from individuals, religious temples, monasteries and waqf, which had been taken after 2 august 1945.” 31 In the law itself there are too many acts and legal gaps that make difficult for the Islamic Community of Macedonia to get the waqf properties in their possession. The act 10 states: “The nationalized property that is in public interest will not be return, but instead will be compensated in these events: - the property that had been taken by law and had remained for public interested such as roads, city squares, parks, and other municipally infrastructural buildings; - the property that is in possession of army and security forces of the state; - the construction land that supposed to be build for purposes of above postulates and public interested; - the property that after was nationalized is in the service of public interest which is proven by law.” Therefore, from the content of the law itself is derived that Muslims will not get back all waqf properties and even will not be compensated for the waqf properties that had been taken and are still in function or for public interest. The Islamic Community of 167

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Macedonia several times intervened by new proposals to amendment the actual denationalization law but without success. The approved law should have been implemented from the year of 2002, until now very little has been done. In some cases the situation has be worsen, such in the case of watch tower of the city of Manastir (Bitola), which the Orthodox Church of Macedonian had put a cross on top of that waqf institution. Same happed in the city of Prilep.

Summary

From the article, we can conclude that what was built during the 500 hundred years of Ottoman Empire period was destroyed or usurped during the last hundred years, both by the SCS (Serbs-Croats-Slovenes) Kingdom and later by the Communist regime. Additionally, in Macedonia even after the political system changed to the democratic and pluralist one, still the waqf institutions facing destruction and usurpation. As we mentioned early that huge number of waqf properties has to be returned back to original owner that is the Islamic Community of Macedonia, still it is not happening, the government is delaying the process of denationalization. Present government of Macedonia is undertaking it’s not fulfilling the dateline of law for denationalization. A proposal from the Islamic Community of Macedonia was given to the government and municipally of capital city to rebuild in the city square the 500 hundred years old “Burmali mosque” which was destroyed in 1924 during the SCS regime. Instead, giving the permission to be rebuilt, ironically, the government will build in the waqf property another building. Another, big case is about Kapan Khan as waqf institution in capital city of Skopje. In 2009 government approved the request of the Islamic Community of Macedonia that Kapan Khan has to be returned. But, one year later, government changed the decision that the Kapan Khan belong to the state as a public interest. Muslims in city of Prilep want their 500 years old mosque in the city center to be rebuilt after non-Muslims destroyed during the ethnic conflict in 2001. After 13 years, still city municipally is not allowing Muslim population of this city and the ICM to rebuild the burnt mosque. As we mentioned earlier in the same city during the 1990s, by intervention of the Orthodox Church of Macedonia, they put on top of a watch tower a cross, same action they did with Manastir’s watch tower, and is well known that these watch towers belong to Muslim culture and civilization as a waqf institutions. Unless these problems are not addressed and resolved properly, the fear for another ethnic and religious conflict in the country and in the region is highly likely. 168

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Notes 1. Kahf, Monzer: “Waqf: A Quick Overview”. 2. Ibid. 3. Hasanuddin Ahmed and Ahmedullah Khan: (H1418): “Strategies to Develop Waqf Administration in India” IRTI, Jedah, KSA. 4. Cizakca, Murat (2000): “A history of Philanthropic Foundations” Bogazici University Press, Istanbul, Turkey. 5. For details see Idriz, Mesut (2010): “The Balkan City of Ottoman Manastir – A Model Paradigm for Applied Shariah with Reference to Ottoman Judicial Records”, Pelanduk Publication, Kuala Lumpur. 6. Cizakca, Murat (2000): “A history of Philanthropic Foundations” Bogazici University Press, Istanbul. 7. Idriz, Mesut (2005): “Waqf Property and its Administration in the Ottoman Empire: A Case of Manastir with Special Reference to 18th Century Judicial Records” Hikmet Journal of Scientific Research, Adeksam, Gostivar. 8. Kahf, Monzer: “Waqf and Its Sociopolitical Aspect”. 9. İnalcık, Halil, (1989): “The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600”, Aristide D. Caratzas, NY. 10. Idriz, Mesut (2010), “The Balkan City of Ottoman Manastir – A Model Paradigm for Applied Shariah with Reference to Ottoman Judicial Records”, Pelanduk Publication, Kuala Lumpur. 11. Ibid. 12. “Turskite Dokumenti za Istorija na Makedonskiot Narod-Serja Prva, (1607-1623)” vol.1. 13. Vishko, Ali, “Manastiri me Rrethina”. 14. Peter Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule (1354-1804). 15. Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakefi ne Maqedonij 1391 - 2001 (in Albanian) Bashkesia Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup. 16. Ibid. 17. Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakefi ne Maqedonij 1391 - 2001 (in Albanian) Bashkesia Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup. 18. Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakefi ne Maqedonij 1391 - 2001 (in Albanian) Bashkesia Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup. 19. Idriz, Mesut (2010), The Balkan City of Ottoman Manastir – A Model Paradigm for Applied Shariah with Reference to Ottoman Judicial Records, Pelanduk Publication, Kuala Lumpur. 20. Ibid. 21. Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakefi ne Maqedonij 1391 - 2001 (in Albanian) Bashkesia Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ahmet, Sherif (2006), Vakefet ne Maqedoni ne Periudhen Osmane (in Albanian) Nun, Shkup. 169

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28. Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakefi ne Maqedonij 1391 - 2001 (in Albanian) Bashkesia Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup. 29. Ibid. 30. For more information in details about waqf properties refer to Islamic Community of Macedonia and Archives of Macedonia respectively. 31. Bilsimi, Taxhedin, Vakefi ne Maqedonij 1391 – 2001.

References Ahmet, Sherif (2006), Vakefet ne Maqedoni ne Periudhen Osmane (in Albanian) Nun, Shkup. Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakefi ne Maqedonij 1391 – 2001, (in Albanian) Bashkesia Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup. Cizakca, Murat (2000), A History of Philanthropic Foundations, Bogazici University Press, Istanbul. Hasanuddin Ahmed and Ahmedullah Khan (Hijrah Year 1418), Strategies to Develop Waqf Administration in India, IRTI, Jeddah. Idriz, Mesut (2005), “Waqf Property and its Administration in the Ottoman Empire: A Case of Manastir with Special Reference to 18th Century Judicial Records”, Hikmet - Journal of Scientific Research, Year 6, Vol. 2, Adeksam, Gostivar. Idriz, Mesut (2010), The Balkan City of Ottoman Manastir – A Model Paradigm for Applied Shariah with Reference to Ottoman Judicial Records, Pelanduk Publication, Kuala Lumpur. İnalcık, Halil, (1989), The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, Aristide D. Caratzas, New York.

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Continuity of Islam in the Southern Balkans: Muslim Turkish Minority of Western Thrace as a Case Study Ali Hüseyinoğlu

Introduction

Islam in Greece has been an old phenomenon in southern Europe and Balkans. After its formation in 1830, Greece signed various agreements with the Ottoman Empire so that significant number Muslim communities with different ethnic origins continued to live on the old and new lands of Greece. These treaties, such as the Treaty of Istanbul (1888) and Treaty of Athens (1913), enabled the formation and strengthening of various state mechanisms to protect rights of Muslims living in a country where the vast majority of its society was Orthodox Christian. Members of the minority are primarily followers of Sunni Islam. Only a small section of them belong to the AleviBektashi sect. The World War I had a great impact on states and societies across the European continent. The map of the whole Europe was redrawn from which autochthonous, national and imperial minorities were highly affected. After the collapse of multiethnic empires, many people belonging to minority groups found themselves in disadvantaged and discriminated positions compared to the majority community. In this new map of Europe, both Greece and Turkey agreed on a population exchange process between the two countries. Thus, around half a million ethnic Turks who lived in Greece would be exchanged with around 1.5 million Greeks living across Turkey (Pentzopoulos 2002:69). This would not only contribute to homogenization of both countries (Huseyinoglu 2012:123) but also would free them from those people who had widely been perceived by members of the majority community to be the “possible Trojan horse” of the neighbouring kin state. 171

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Two communities were exempted from the abovementioned population exchange process; the Muslim Turkish Minority of Western Thrace and Greek Orthodox Christian (Rum) Minority of Istanbul, Imbroz and Tenedos Islands located by the Dardanelles Strait. Both communities were numbering around 120.000 people in the 1920s. The incorporation of Western Thrace into Greek territories may be interpreted as an indication for the overall increase in the number of Muslims living in Greece. Nevertheless, the Turkish-Greek Population Exchange, half a million people’s leaving from Greek soil, was a severe blow against the Islamic presence across the country. In fact, this demographic downturn of Muslims in Greece would come to a halt with the large influx of both legal and illegal immigrants in the beginning of 1990s. Originating primarily from Southeast Asia, Africa and Albania, the gradual flow of these people enabled the formation of strong Muslim presence particularly in urban Greek centres such as Athens, Thessaloniki and Patras where Muslims count more than half a million altogether in a country with around 11 million population (see Triandafyllidou 2001:92-93). This was a clear and significant increase in the overall number of Muslims in Greece. Yet, this study argues that it is still highly difficult to talk about strong cooperation and collaboration between the “old” Muslims and “new” Muslims of Greece given that both communities belonging to the same religion cannot enjoy the same religious liberties of Islam since Greece confines enjoyment of groupbased minority rights - known also as individual rights with a collective aspect - to a certain geographical area and a specific community, i.e. Muslim Turks living inside the region of Western Thrace. Meanwhile, either individual or collective initiatives that will enable the beginning of close and continuous cooperation between these two Islamic entities on different parts of Greece have been almost nonexistent since the beginning of the 1990s. As it is previously underlines, there are a number of Muslims across Greece living outside of Western Thrace. Most of them are immigrants who live in main urban centres where there are more possibilities to work and survive. Athens is the number one city where hundreds and thousands of immigrant Muslims live. However, they still struggle for even basic religious liberties, e.g. an official house of prayer/mosque. In this respect, Athens still stands as the only capital city of the European Union without a mosque although the initial demands and discussions for its establishment dates back to the end of the 19th century (Triandafyllidou and Gropas: 2009:963). Despite the fact that many discussions have recently been raised by Greek officials for building of a mosque in the capital city, no step has been taken yet for the beginning of 172

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its construction. Similarly, Muslims living in Athens suffer from not having an Islamic cemetery. Their demands for an Islamic cemetery keep falling on deaf ears of Greek officials and state representatives (Antoniou 2007:165). Other than Muslim immigrants, today, while talking about Islam in Greece one should also take into consideration the small but historical Muslim Turkish minority in the two islands of the Dodecanese, Rhodes and Kos islands whose presence goes back to the Ottoman administration of the Aegean Sea. Known also as Oniki Ada Türkleri (Dodecanese Turks), the autochthon Muslim islanders of Rhodes and Kos became citizens of Greece when all of the Dodecanese Islands were annexed by Greece in 1947. In the 1950s, they actually constituted a significant community numbering around 10.000 people (Tsitselikis 2012:103). In time, however, their numbers gradually decreased as a result of Greek policies of discrimination and violation of their group-based collective rights. For example, unlike the functioning of bilingual Turkish-Greek minority primary schools no bilingual schooling in both their mother tongues (Turkish) and the state language (Greek) has been available for the Muslim Turkish islanders since the early 1970s. Thus, basics of Islam could not been taught inside the school area. Along with the lack of minority schooling, visiting the island one can spot tens of mosques on both islands. But, only two of them are given necessary permission to function as a house of prayer. Some of them are actually restored. Nevertheless, many of them still remain either dilapidated or have already collapsed because of the lack of necessary restoration and renovation facilities carried by the Greek authorities (see Gross 2011; Sevi2009). As of 2014, henceforth, around five thousand Muslim Turks remain on both islands who cannot fully benefit from fundamental group based collective rights emanating from their ethnic and religious identities as native Turks and Muslims of the Dodecanese. Related with the main theme of this study, it is useful to underline the following point. According to practices of the Greek state since 1923, there has been only one-officially recognized minority in Greece whose members’ individual and collective rights and liberties are safeguarded by Greek state mechanisms. This is the Muslim Turkish Minority in Western Thrace. No other community across the country is perceived and interpreted within the framework of minorities and minority rights in Greece. In the context of Greece, any kind of official recognition of a group as a minority automatically brings together some obligations for the state to protect and promote survival of that group. This is possible only if that group is granted some group-based 173

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special rights emanating from international agreements that Greece signed and ratified, e.g. religious liberties of Western Thracians based on Articles 37-45 of the Lausanne Treaty (FEK A’ 238, 25.8.1923).This has been the case for the old Muslims of Greece since 1923 but never for those new Muslims members of whom settled in different parts of the country after 1923. The abovementioned lack of Islamic common spaces is not limited with Athens. It is the same with all other parts of Greece except the region of Western Thrace where mosques and cemeteries have fully been functioning inside the region of Western Thrace since 1923. From this point of view, members of the Muslim Turkish minority have a variety of group-based collective rights that aims to safeguards the religious autonomy of Islam in Western Thrace. Nevertheless, the fate of Islam outside of Western Thrace is completely depended either on Greek domestic law or the mercy of the Greek state apparatuses-officials, both of which remain insufficient to protect religious liberties of those Muslims living in other parts of the country. Although members of the autochthonous Muslims in Western Thrace have had many religious freedoms since 1923, various kinds of limits to those rights as well as their applicability in practice constitute one of the fundamental aims of this study. Having made a brief clarification regarding the distinction between the old and new Islam in Greece1, the following sections of this study focuses on the main characteristics of Islam in Western Thrace. While doing so, it also questions to what extent religious freedoms of the Minority in Western Thrace have been protected and promoted by Greece since the incorporation of the region into Greece in 1923. For this purpose, three main sections that fall within the religious liberties of the Minority is elaborated: religious representation and leadership (muftis, imams), Muslim charitable foundations and sacred places (mosques, cemeteries).

Religious Representation

Provisions of the 1913 Athens Treaty, signed between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, were incorporated into Greek law with Law No. 2345/1920 (FEK A’ 148, 3.7.1920) that gave a number of religious rights for Muslims across the country. One of the most important aspects of this treaty regulated the election of the religious leaders, i.e. the Chief/Grand mufti of Greece and the regional muftis at each prefecture with Muslim concentration as well as the administration of Muslim charitable foundations/awqaf. Various issues of religious autonomy, conscience and belief codified by the aforementioned law would be reinforced with the 1923 Peace Treaty of Lausanne, an international 174

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treaty that has been one of the most frequently invoked international treaties by members of the Muslim Turkish minority, Greece and Turkey while speaking about religious liberties of the minority in Western Thrace since the mid 1920s. The policy of Greece towards preservation of Islam on the former Ottoman lands has usually been ambiguous with matters about religious representation at regional and national level, i.e. the Head Mufti of Greece and the muftis of Xanthi (İskeçe), Komotini (Gümülcine) and Evros (Meriç) Prefectures. In fact, the Law No. 2345/1920 provided for elections of the Head mufti (Başmüftü) who would have represented all Muslims of Greece. Nevertheless, such elections never occurred mainly because the vast majority of Muslims (around half a million) had to leave Greece as a result of the compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey in the early 1920s. This number would further decrease by the 1950s since the Cham Albanian community had to flee the Epirus region located in northeastern part of Greece on the grounds that they had cooperated with Italian and Albanian forces against the Greek Army during the World War II. Thus, old and new lands of Greece were largely freed from the historical presence of native Muslims. The incorporation of the Dodecanese Island in the Aegean Sea in 1947 and the large influx of immigrant Muslims after the end of the Cold War actually contributed to the overall increase in the number of Muslims in Greece. As of 2014, one can come across with Muslims in different parts of Greece. Yet, no Greek government promoted reestablishment of a central religious institution, i.e. Chief Muftiate, which will be responsible for matters of all Muslims, regardless of ethnicity and country of origin, living across the Greek mainland and its islands. Unlike the consistency of Greece regarding the highest religious representation of Islam on its own lands, issues related to the religious leadership at the local level varies before and after the beginning of 1990s. From 1923 until the death of the Mufti of Komotini in 1985, Greek governments allowed members of the Minority to define their own muftis in all three prefectures of the region. Nevertheless, the Law No.1920/1991 (FEK A’11, 4.2.1991) abolished this right and transferred it to the Greek state. Thus, all three muftis started to be appointed by Greece. Here, the main reason of this change was stated that muftis, also, had partial judicial function in matters of marriage and inheritance arising from the application of Shari’ah/Islamic Law. However, this judiciary power was not newly introduced. Muftis had had those rights and obligations since the Ottoman times (see Tsitselikis 2012:390-399). 175

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In fact, this policy change was a clear indication of the Greek state’s anxiety about growing bonds between the functioning of muftis as well as imams who affiliated themselves with these religious leaders and the political mobilization of the minority especially throughout the 1980s. This is a decade when minority members, for the first time after 1923, acted and reacted collectively and effectively at all local, regional and international levels against decadeslong human and minority rights violations by the Greek state in Western Thrace. The critical juncture, in fact, was the 29th of January 1988. For the first time after 1923, more than 10,000 minority members, both men and women, gathered in Komotini so as to protest against the Greek state’s official denial of the ethnic Turkish identity of the Minority and the continuity of violations of their fundamental human and minority freedoms (see Chousein 2005:77-117). In this rising activism of the minority fighting for return of their individual and group based rights enshrined in the Greek constitution as well as the bilateral-international treaties that Greece signed and ratified, the role of religious clergymen of the minority, both muftis and imams, was of utmost importance; they were among the primary actors who had a slightly higher education than other minority members. Thus, they contributed to the development of consciousness among the minority about their rights that had been violated by the Greek state for a long time. Seeing this link, the Greek state opted for new policies to control the religious leadership of local Muslims for the sake of increasing its overall control over the minority. The first step was to introduce the aforementioned law and appoint one mufti at each prefecture of Western Thrace for ten years. For this sake, the death of the Mufti of Komotini, Hüseyin Mustafa Efendi, in 1984 provided suitable grounds for Greece to cease the election of muftis and rather start appointing them. Thus, Meço Hafız Cemali was appointed as the new mufti of Komotini, whose tenure was renewed twice in 2001 and 2011 for ten years. Developments over the appointment of muftis in Xanthi would not go different from the events in Komotini. When the mufti of Xanthi died in 1990, Greece appointed Mehmet Şinikoğlu as the new mufti of Xanthi under the new law. As for the Evros Prefecture, Mehmet Şerif Damataoğlu was appointed to the mufti’s office in Didimotiho in 1986, and he still remains in his office. Not surprisingly, this manner of appointing the muftis in the beginning of the 1990s created strong resentment in the Muslim community against the intervention of the Greek state into the realm of religious autonomy. One 176

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of the main indications was that the vast majority of congregations living in all three prefectures refused the appointed muftis. Instead, they accepted the elected ones as their religious heads. For instance, many of them sided with both Ibrahim Şerif and M. Emin Ağa, the elected muftis of Rhodopi and Xanthi respectively, when they were put on trial in the 1990s for usurping the authority and title of the appointed muftis. Both muftis applied to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Regarding their cases, i.e. Serif versus Greece (ECtHR Judgement 1999) and Agga versus Greece (ECtHR Judgement 2002), the Court concluded that Greece had violated the rights to the freedom of thought, religion and conscience in Western Thrace. In spite of the ECtHR decisions, Greece keeps rejecting the statuses of them as muftis. Yet, both of them continue functioning as elected religious leaders of Muslims in Western Thrace. Thus, from the early 1990s until today, there are two parallel muftis in Komotini and Xanthi (one appointed and one appointed mufti at each prefecture), and one appointed mufti in Didimotiho. This contested and double-headed structure of religious representation of the autochthonous Muslims Turkish minority of Western Thrace continues to cause various problems in terms of the practice of Islam in everyday life, while simultaneously disregarding a clearly-expressed and democratic popular will of the minority to define their religious leaders.

Muslim Charitable Foundations

Muslim charitable foundations/awqaf remained at the epicentre of the religious and social lives of Muslims under the Ottoman Empire. In Greece, a country with a predominant Orthodox Christian population, religious charitable of Muslims have been playing even a more significant role in the promotion and the protection of the socio-economic wellbeing of the minority in Western Thrace since 1923.In fact, awqaf had a historical importance in Western Thrace on the grounds that revenues coming from those moveable and immovable properties of these organizations enabled to provide food and shelter for the poor people as well as taking care of schools and sacred religious places such as mosques, tombs and Islamic cemeteries. In this respect, the more valuable lands and properties were owned by a waqf the more money was used for socioeconomic development of that locality or sub-region. Thus, Administrative Boards of Komotini and Xanthi, the two main cities of Western Thrace with high minority concentration, had more revenues than any other awqaf located in small municipalities and villages. 177

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From 1923 until the advent of the junta regime in 1967, there had been no major problem between the minority and the Greek authorities regarding the functioning and administration of awqaf. Nevertheless, the dictatorship removed all those members of the Administrative Boards of Awqaf who were defined by the Minority and replaced them with those minority members appointed by the military rule. Although democracy returned to Greece by 1975, this authoritarian application never ended. As of 2014, Muslim Charitable Organizations in Western Thrace are still governed by those members of the Minority who had been appointed by the colonel’s regime four decades ago. Similar to what happened with Muftis, this was another significant violation of right for members of the Minority to define those people who would administer charitable foundations of their own society. In this way, Greece also increased its power and control over historical moveable and immovable properties of its native Muslim nationals. Today, Muslim Turks of Western Thrace have no full access to the accounts of those properties belonging to awqaf. So it is difficult to make comparison regarding the number of properties of awqaf in the past and the ones in the present. What is apparent is that a number of valuable awqaf, particularly the ones located in the city centres of Komotini and Xanthi do not belong to the Muslim Turkish minority any more. In recent decades, awqaf in Western Thrace also started to face loss of properties due to excessive taxes. Although the debts of waqfs to Western Thrace were expunged under the new Law No. 3554/2007, the income tax and fines imposed on them remained intact. As a result, Administrative Boards of Waqfs needed more revenue to compensate this loss. To do so, some properties needed to be sold that would decrease the overall number of properties owned by awqaf. For instance, the total debt of the Komotini Aqwaf recently rose to 775,463 Euros in 2009. This resulted in the revocation of 23 shops and one farm owned by Komotini Awqaf (Hayrullah 2009:10). Talking to members of the Minority, it is frequent to hear many complaints about appointed members of awqaf who are blamed to cooperate with Greek authorities for the loss of valuable awqaf properties across Western Thrace. In fact, the Greek Parliament adopted Law No. 3647/2008 that foresees elections for those minority members governing administrative boards of awqaf. However, such an election never took place in the last six years. This research underlines that any kind of ignorant manner of local and national Greek state apparatuses related to finding solutions to fundamental problems in the realm of administration and functioning of the Muslim charitable foundations of the minority keeps violating Islamic liberties in Western Thrace and prevents 178

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autochthonous Muslim Turks from enjoying their rights fully as citizens of Greece and the European Union.

Sacred Places of Islam

Compared to various problems regarding the functioning of the two main religious institutions of the Muslim Turkish minority in Western Thrace, mosques have been functional in all three prefectures of the region. With a few exceptions, performing prayers inside and outside of mosques as well as the echoing of the call for prayer, adhan, five times a day have never been prevented by Greek authorities since 1923. Based on a recent report, more than 250 mosques across Western Thrace were reported to serve for the religious needs of Muslims (WTMUGA Report 2012:7). At some villages, there are also some masjids that function for the same purpose. A number of mosques and masjids are constructed after 1923 with money collected primarily from Muslim congregations across Western Thrace while the old ones are remnants of the long administration of Western Thrace by the Ottoman Empire. As of today, major problems keep occurring about the building of new mosques and/or maintenance of the old ones. Until recently, the Law No. 1369/1938 (FEK A’317, 10.9.1938) required Muslims to apply to the local Metropolitan Greek bishop to get the necessary permission for construction of an Islamic house of prayer. From time to time, local Greek authorities together with local metropolitan bishops either delayed or refused to give permits for construction of new mosques or restoration of old ones. In the municipality of Iasmos (Yassıköy), for instance, it was reported that local authorities insisted on refusing to provide the necessary building permit to complete a half-built minaret for almost three decades (Whitman 1990:27). From the mid-1990s, such restrictions against building permits lessened and finally the bishop’s role regarding the construction of places of worship was transferred to the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs in 2006 (Giannakou 2006). Therefore, as of 2014, the local metropolitan churches have no official say in the establishment of mosques and less problems occur regarding the building of new mosques. Along with official permission, major problems between the minority and Greek authorities continue to occur on matters regarding the height of the minaret. According to practices of the Greek governments, minarets should not be taller than the church bells, i.e. no more than 16 meters long. In the past, many official construction certificates were granted for establishment of mosques with minarets not taller than 16 meters. But recently, some problems occurred between the Greek authorities and the minority when some Muslim 179

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Turkish villagers demanded the same height but the former rejected their application on the grounds that the Greek law limits the height of minarets with 7.5 meters (Kirbaki 2008). Since then, minority members have been refusing any limitation of minarets with shorter than 16 meters. They also interpret this application as another discouraging factor to construct minarets adjacent to their houses of prayers, which also violates their religious freedoms. Islamophobia, a rather new concept in the Western World, is not a new phenomenon for members of the Muslim Turkish minority. Mosques, that are one of the most apparent symbols of Islam, have occasionally been targeted since 1923 by extremist and Islamophobic individuals or groups who feel uncomfortable with the historical presence of Turkish and Muslim identities in Western Thrace. Looking through the local Turkish-language newspapers of the Minority, it becomes blatant that arson attacks towards sacred places of the minority, e.g. mosques, masjids, cemeteries and Turkish associations in the past and today. It is common for almost all incidents that no individual or group of people is brought in front of the Greek courts and punished since they remain unidentified by the Greek authorities. The most popular example is the mosque located in the Toxotes village of Xanthi where only a handful of Muslim Turks live. This mosque was attacked and severely damaged four times between 2006 and 2012 (Millet Gazetesi, 24.5.2012). Along with Islamophobia, anti-Turkish sentiments are also displayed through hate-motivated attacks to sacred places of Islam. For example, one of the most famous slogans against Turks and Turkey, i.e. Τουρκός Καλός, μόνοΝεκρός! [The best Turk is the dead Turk] was written in bold capital on the wall of a Bektashi tomb located in downtown Xanthi. (Hayrullah, et.al. 2014:36). It is possible to foresee that similar attacks targeting either the ethnic Turkish identity or Islam in Western Thrace may increase as a result of growing extreme nationalism and xenophobia inside the Greek society in recent years. Less problems seem to occur with functioning of Islamic cemeteries in Western Thrace. Each locality with a Muslim Turkish concentration has its own house of prayer and cemetery. Religious funerals can be freely performed at cemeteries according to the rules and practices of Islam. Still, cemeteries, similar to mosques, cannot escape from becoming possible targets of hatemotivated and Islamphobic attacks. From time to time, it is possible to come across with incidents where some tombstones of Muslim graveyards were destroyed during the night while those attackers could never be identified and put before the Greek courts. 180

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Visiting all three prefectures of Western Thrace, it is easy to spot many dilapidates buildings, mosques, cemeteries and tombs most of which constitute the Ottoman heritage of Western Thrace. In spite of unabated demands of members belonging to the Muslim Turkish minority, restoration of the Ottoman heritage is either very slow or non-existent. For instance, the restoration of the Çelebi Sultan Mehmet Mosque, one of the oldest buildings of the Ottoman heritage in the Balkans and Europe dating back to the 14th century, started in the mid-1990. As of 2014, its restoration has not finished yet. My visit to this mosque earlier this year indicates that there is a lot more work to be done as well as big amounts of money to be spent. Given that Greece is under a heavy economic crisis any expectation regarding the mentioned-above restoration as well as other Ottoman heritage sites remains weak. Along with need for restoration there were a few cases of the conversion of small Ottoman shrines (tekkes) into small churches. For instance, the Hıdır Baba Tekkesi in Petrota (Taşlık) and the Kütüklü Baba Tekkesi in Selino (Gereviz)-Ksanthiwere either partially of fully converted into places for Orthodox Christians (Kürşat 2008; Tahsin 2011).

Religious Schooling – Madrasahs

Regarding religious schools/madrasahs in Western Thrace, there has been a numerical decline since 1923. Two years after the Lausanne Peace was signed, the total number of madrasahs was reported to be 16 across Western Thrace; eight in Komotini, three in Xanthi, and one in each of Εchinos (Şahin), Pachni (Paşevik), Dimario (Demercik), Oraio (Yassıören) and Sappes (Şapçı) (Andreadis 1956:74). Yet, madrasahs gradually closed and by 1939, only four madrasahs remained inside the region; all of them were functioning in Komotini (Tsitselikis 2003:50). Since the end of the Greek Civil War in 1949, only two of them have been functioning for religious schooling of the Minority; one is located in Komotini and the other one in Echinos Municipality of Xanthi. The primary function of madrasahs was to satisfy the minority’s need for imams/preachers inside and outside the mosques, ranging from leading daily and weekly prayers to teaching the holy Qur’an. Until the beginning of the 1970s, most of the courses taught in the two madrasahs were primarily in Turkish and Arabic. Nevertheless, this started to change when courses instructed in Turkish were gradually replaced by courses taught in Greek. This also enabled increasing number of Greek teachers to start teaching at religious schools of Muslim, which has widely been interpreted by the minority as an indication of the increasing state control over religious 181

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education. As of 2014, the vast majority of courses are taught in Greek while the total number of Minority students attending to these schools is not more than 500 (Huseyinoglu 2012:251-256). This study underlines that the madrasahs actually ceased to function as preparing the next-generation imams and local religious clergymen of the minority. Rather, they keep providing education similar to that at Greek public schools. Thus, the vast majority of Muslim Turkish students who finish religious schools sit for the national university entrance exam and try to win a place at a Greek higher education institution. Only a few of them choose to develop their knowledge of Islam at the tertiary level and start functioning as clergymen inside Western Thrace.

Concluding Remarks

The survival of Islam passed from different phases of inclusion and exclusion in Western Thrace. Despite many controversies between the minority and the Greek state, Islam is still alive in Western Thrace. Nevertheless, a variety of problems concerning the religious autonomy of the minority, some of which are elaborated in this research, keep violating religious freedoms of those Greek citizens belonging to the Muslim Turkish minority; the obstruction of the election of muftis and members for the administrative boards of waqfs, arson attacks against mosques and cemeteries are some of the major issues indicating that both individual and collective rights of the minority in the field of religion has not been fully implemented and safeguarded yet by Greek state mechanisms. The continuation of such violations of religious rights in the second decade of the new millennium also highlights the lack of an effective dialogue between the minority and the Greek state apparatus both at the local and national levels. This study emphasizes that it is mainly the Greek state officials who decide on the fate of religious autonomy without any cooperation with the minority members. Thus, it is a matter of fact that the latter have almost no say throughout the decision making process which determines the extent of religious liberties in Western Thrace. Given that Greece insists on tackling minority-related issues without starting any effective dialogue with the minority members in Thrace, then, this study anticipates that a variety of problems in the realm of religious autonomy of the minority will likely to continue in the second decade of the millennium. This will probably result in widening of the gap between the Greek state and the minority as well as the gap between the minority and majority locals of Western Thrace, thus contributing to further isolation and ghettoization of the Muslim Turkish entity inside the society of Greece. 182

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Notes 1. For a recent and comprehensive study on old and new Islam in Greece see Tsitselikis (2012).

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Contributors Mesut Idriz Dr. Mesut Idriz, a native of Macedonia, received his graduate and doctoral degrees from the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Currently he is Professor of Comparative History of Civilizations, Law and Ethics, and Political Science courses at the International University of Sarajevo. He has taught in various countries and international institutions (Malaysia, Turkey and Kosovo) and was Chief Editor at MPH Group Publishing (Kuala Lumpur). He is Vice-President of Dituria Foundation, a philanthropic organization based in Macedonia that serves towards the studies on science and culture. He has published, edited and translated numerous academic books and articles concerning the Balkans, Ottoman and Muslim history, Islamic civilization, history of Islamic education (particularly the tradition of  ijazah, diploma). He has co-edited a book titled Past, Present & Future of Turkish-Albanian-Macedonian Relations, (Ankara: ADAM Publications, 2012). [[email protected]] Osman Bakar Dr. Osman Bakar, a native of Malaysia, received his PhD in Islamic philosophy from Temple University, Philadelphia (USA). He is currently Chair Professor and Director of Sultan Omar ‘Ali Saifuddien Centre of Islamic Studies (SOASCIS), Universiti Brunei Darussalam. Formerly Malaysia Chair of Islam in Southeast Asia at the Prince Talal al-Waleed Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, Washington DC. He is also Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Malaya. Dr. Bakar is an author of 18 books and more than 300 articles on various aspects of Islamic thought and civilization, particularly Islamic science and philosophy. His most well-known books are Classification of Knowledge in Islam (1992) and Tawhid and Science (1992). [[email protected]] Muhamed Ali Dr. Muhamed Ali is as assistant professor at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, International University of Sarajevo, where he teaches courses in the area of law and political sciences. Previously, he served as lecturer at the faculty of Islamic Sciences in Skopje, where he taught courses of Islamic Law and the Philosophy of Islamic Law. He actively participates in different international conferences and is author of several articles published in edited books and international academic journals. [[email protected]] 185

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Christoph Marcinkowski Dr. Christoph Marcinkowski is an independent German consultant and scholar in Islamic Studies based in Berlin. His work focuses on Shi’ite and Persianate societies, especially in the Arabian Gulf region, the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. He obtained his MA from the Free University of Berlin and his PhD from the International Islamic University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, both in Islamic Studies. For more than 15 years, he has taught and done research at universities and policy think tanks in Malaysia and Singapore and has also been in the editorial team of Columbia University’s renowned Encyclopedia Iranica (New York).He is also an External Research Associate for the Bahrain Institute of Banking and Finance (BIBF), focusing on ethics in Islamic banking and finance, and a Senior External Expert for the Middle East Institute’s Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) in Washington DC. He has organized several international conferences on interreligious issues and human rights in the Middle East. Among his 12 books are The Islamic World and the West (Berlin: LIT, 2009) and Islam in Europe (Kuala Lumpur: IAIS Malaysia, 2012). [[email protected]] Anja Zalta Born in Maribor, Slovenia, Dr. Anja Zalta studied Sociology, Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, where she received her PhD in Sociology in 2002. She is an Assistant Professor of Sociology of Religion, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and author of many articles on religious traditions and identities, inter-religious dialogue, ethics and human rights. She is the author of the book Light in the Occident and co-editor of Poligrafi, the international edition of the Slovenian journal for the interdisciplinary (sociological, philosophical and anthropological) study of religion. In 2013 she has received Turkish Research Grant to study Religious (Christian) Minorities in Turkey. She is also a certificated mediator with specialization in Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation from the International Peace Training at Stadtschlaining, Austria. Currently she is working as a visiting researcher at the Nan Tien Institute in Wollongong, Australia, in the project entitled Mindfulness and Conflict Transformation. [[email protected]] Senad Nanić Senad Nanić is architect and publicist from Zagreb, Croatia, with M.A. in philosophy of science (Kuala Lumpur, 1996). As architectural designer he worked in Istanbul, Sarajevo, and Zagreb. He designed more than 80 projects having over 50 realizations ranging from city planning to public, business and 186

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residential buildings, interiors and interventions on architectural monuments. He was president of Preporod - Cultural Association of Croatian Bosniaks (20012014). He is member of editor’s board of Preporod’s rewarded magazine Behar publishing column Multimonolog and articles in philosophy of science, Islamic arhcitecture and arts, social and minority studies. He published three books, Al-Ghazzali’s Natural Philosophy (1998), Zagreb Mosque (2009), Multimonolog (2011). He was consultant on documentary Muslims of Europe produced by European Broadcast Union (2007). He teaches Islamic arts, culture and civilization at Islamic High School in Zagreb. [[email protected]] Muhidin Mulalič Dr. Muhidin Mulalič, a Bosnian, received his PhD from the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) in 2007. Before joining the International University of Sarajevo (IUS), he has been teaching in various higher learning institutions in Malaysia. He has published many academic articles in various journals and book chapters. His latest book is A Survey of Early Muslim Historiography published in 2011, Kuala Lumpur. [mmuhidin@ hotmail.com] Meliha Teparič Born in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Meliha Teparič is lecturing at the Faculty of Art and Social Sciences, International University of Sarajevo. She completed her BA and MA in the Academy of Fine Art, University of Sarajevo. She is a PhD candidate at the Department of History of Art, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb. She has 48 collective exhibitions in the country and aboard, 7 solo exhibition, and 3 art awards. She has several published articles. [[email protected]] Mirsad Karič Dr. Mirsad Karic graduated from the Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia and joined the International University of Sarajevo in October 2007. He is an Assistant Professor and has been teaching courses dealing with comparative politics and religion and politics. He has contributed chapters in edited volumes and published several articles in various journals. He is currently working on a book titled “Consociationalism as a power-sharing approach: Case study of the postDayton Bosnia and Herzegovina”. His research and teaching interests cover: International Relations Theories, Comparative Politics (with special reference to Political Participation, Elections and Electoral Studies) and Islam and Politics. [[email protected]] 187

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Tuba Boz Dr. Tuba Boz, a native of Australia, is a social researcher with extensive experience in the fields of anthropology, media and strategic communications. She earned her PhD from the Monash University in 2009. She works on interdisciplinary projects for academic institutions, the media industry, nongovernment organizations and government departments. She is currently a consultant to the chairperson at the Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies (TASAM), Vice President of European Muslim Initiative for Social Cohesion (EMISCO) and is a lecturer at the International University of Sarajevo (IUS). [[email protected]] Jeton Mehmeti Jeton Mehmeti is a young publicist born in Kosovo. He holds two BA degrees from the International Islamic University Malaysia, one in Comparative Religion and one in Mass Communication. He earned his MA degree from the Central European University, Budapest. He is the recipient of Marshall Memorial Fellowship for academic exchange in the USA. His first book Tensions between Freedom of Expression and Religious Sensitivity – the Case of Danish Cartoons, was published in Germany in 2011. He has published articles in various journals in the USA, Turkey, Austria and Bulgaria, and has presented papers in Los Angeles, Kuala Lumpur, and Brussels. His latest article is The Economic and Social Involvement of Turkey in Kosovo, published in a special issue entitled “The Balkans: Past, Present and Future Prospects,” Journal of ADAM Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 1, 2012. He is a promoter of interfaith dialogue and has been part of many TV shows, roundtable discussions and other interfaith initiatives. He is a lecturer of communication at the University of Prishtina. [[email protected]] Islam Hasani Dr. Islam Hasani is the economic advisor to the Grand Mufti of the Republic of Kosovo, and also in charge of awqaf development projects within the presidency of the Islamic Community of Kosovo. He is actively involved also in supervising the Shari’ah affairs to Banks and Microfinance institutions in Kosovo. Prior to joining Grand Mufti’s office, he was teaching at the Kingdom University in the Kingdom of Bahrain. He was also Managing Director of START Microfinance institution in Kosovo. He is author of three books, five journal articless, around 40 magazine and conference papers. He holds bachelor in Shari’ah from the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Prishtina, Master in Islamic Civilization from the International Islamic University Malaysia and PhD in Islamic Banking from the University Malaya, Malaysia. [[email protected]] 188

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Islam Islami Islam Islami is PhD candidate at the South Eastern European University, where he is working on the dissertation to be completed by the end of 2014 with the theme “Egypt amid State Secularism and Political Islamism.” He is actively involved in both academic and non-governmental institutions in Macedonia and abroad. He has been official interpreter of the Islamic Community of Macedonia. He is presently lecturer at the Isa Beg Medrese in Skopje. [[email protected]] Qani Nesimi Dr. Qani Nesimi is an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Religion at the State University of Tetovo, Macedonia. He earned his PhD from the University of Saint Cyril and Methodius with the theme: “The Ottoman State relations with Christians in Republic of Macedonia 15-16 century”. Besides attending various international conferences, he has published five books in Albanian language and he is the translator several works from Turkish, Bosnian and Arabic languages into Albanian. He is also an academic advisor to the Rector of the International Balkan University, Macedonia. [[email protected]] Lejla Ramič-Mesihovič Lejla Ramič-Mesihovič is a researcher, analyst and political scientist from Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Her academic background is in literature of countries of former Yugoslavia and political sciences, with particular focus on international relations. She is specialized in geopolitics of the Southern Balkans countries. Her professional history includes agency journalism, running of International Relations Department of the BiH Union of Journalist, political activism and activism in the NGO sector and political mentoring, advising and consultancy. Currently, she is a PhD candidate at the International University of Sarajevo. [[email protected]] Sherif Abdullahi Sherif Abdullahi, a native of Macedonia, is currently Head of Islamic Banking at New Kabul Bank, Kabul, Afghanistan. He obtained a Master in Islamic Finance from INCEIF, The Global University in Islamic Finance, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He is a PhD candidate in Economics and Muamalat at Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia (USIM), Malaysia. [[email protected]]

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Ali Hüseyinoğlu Dr. Ali Hüseyinoğlu was born in Komotini/Greece. After secondary and high school education in Istanbul/Turkey, he received his BA and MSc from the Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara/Turkey. His master thesis, awarded with the best thesis of 2005 at METU, was about continuities and changes of the Greek minority policy of Western Thrace in the post-Cold War era. In 2012, he completed his doctoral studies at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex/UK. His thesis was about the historical development of the educational regime of the Muslim Turkish Minority of Western Thrace in Greece after the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Currently, he is an Assistant Prof. in the Balkan Research Institute at Trakya University in Edirne, Turkey. [[email protected]]

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