Behavioural Economics of Self-Concept Clarity, Interpersonal Trust and Leader-Integrity in Perceptions of Co-operative Risks Within Dishonest Trade Liaisons
Iboro F. A. Ottu, Department of Psychology & Godwin E. Akpan, Department of Economics, University of Uyo, Uyo, Nigeria
[email protected] [email protected]
The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the OECD or of its member countries. This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. This paper was submitted as part of a competitive call for papers on integrity, anti-corruption and trade in the context of the 2016 OECD Integrity Forum.
Abstract Burdened by the prevalence of corrupt practices in every aspect of international trade transactions across the world, the present study investigates the roles of self-concept clarity, interpersonal trust and leader integrity in perceptions of cooperative risks in dishonest deals among business executives in Uyo, Nigeria. A large scale survey was carried out in a number corporate institutions including banks and related agencies associated with knowledge of international trade. Participants completed measures of self-concept clarity, interpersonal trust and perceptions of leadership integrity as predictors of cooperative risk behaviour in non-transparent trade liaisons. A prisoner’s dilemma scenario was created to test participants’ tendency to agree or disagree to the adoption of unethical practice in an international trade transaction where the other party is kept away from knowing the intentions and decisions of the “cooperating” partner. The study was preceded by a pilot study using students of economics at the University of Uyo. Logistics Regression results from the pilot study show that only interpersonal trust (𝛽 = .219, df = 1, p < .05, Cl = 1.001 – 1.547) predicted cooperative risk behaviour. The overall predictive strength of the model was 57.7%. In the main study results from multinomial (logistic) probit analysis showed that self-concept clarity inversely affected cooperative risky behaviour while interpersonal trust with greatest impact, affected cooperative risky behaviour positively.
Keywords behavioural economics, self-concept clarity, interpersonal trust, leader-integrity, corruption, trade risks __________________________________________________________________________________
1
1. Introduction Every human decision has the probability of at least two outcomes, either favourable or unfavourable. Since we cannot live without making decisions, we are bound to take some actions aimed at increasing the quality of our lives. Among nations, matters of international trade and cooperation are important decisions intended to enhance both economic and social welfare of the citizenry. The engagement by nations in international trade and cooperation has been a long time practice with established gains of trade and diplomatic advantages. Without international trade and cooperation, there will be diverse problems of reversal economic gains from trade and immiserization of growth. Notwithstanding the expected gains from trades, every level of economic cooperation is laced with the uncertainty of risk, especially in the area of bearing unknown costs in the form of hidden tariff and transaction costs that may burden the vulnerable party. When there are unfair dealings between trade or business partners, the outcome is likely to result in unfair terms of trade. The International Competition Network (ICN) has been in the forefront of promoting fair trade interaction among nations. Also, the Organization for Economic Cooperative and Development (OECD) has over the years remained as a watchdog for the promotion of trade without corruption, among its member countries. In search of trust and fairness in international trade transactions, James (2012) developed a theory of fairness in international trade in which he suggested should address at least three constructive methodology questions from the works of John Rawls based on the social contract tradition, including: i.
What at the basic level should we assess as fair or unfair in the trade context?
ii.
What sort of fairness issue does this basic subject of assessment raise? and
iii.
What moral principles must be fulfilled if trade is to be fair in the relevant sense?
2. Economic Decision and Corruption Economic decisions are complex and fluid forms of social contract which means they can be influenced by a labyrinth of factors, especially when the risks of fair cooperation and cheating are high. These factors range from cognitive projections by individuals of the likelihood of crimes of
2
business engagements to social implications of their outcomes. International trade decisions are therefore, like other forms of economic ventures, centred on uncertainties. One way to overcome uncertainties in investment decisions is to consider behavioural economics strategies used by people in arriving at rational decisions. The field of behavioural economics combines psychology and economics to examine human behaviour and decision making (Anderson & Adam 2014). It identifies the effect of psychological, social, cognitive and emotional factors on the economic decisions of individual and institutions. Because it is mostly used in business domains such as banking, marketing, digital banking and other forms of diplomatic and political duties, it works on the assumption that the ordinary consumer does not exhibit the dexterity expected of the “rational consumer”. This is why much of the literature in behaviour economics have been linked with financial decision making and dishonest behaviour of various kinds. With respect to trade, the overriding motive has always been to increase the profit margin of co-operating parties (nations) are engaging in honest ways. But at times the two variables of cooperative risk and corruption risk presenting as major problems in international trade require different perspectives for solution. The dilemma of either cooperating or not cooperating with trade partners engaging in a particular trade deal is a moral risk at one side of the coin while on the other side is the risk which entails some quantifiable financial loss. Based on our declining economic circumstances, the average Nigerian is basically interested in making outrageous “profit” in numerous areas of transaction-either morally or economic. This, (profit intentions) however, is not a Nigerian dictum. The human race generally is hounded by economic goal of maximization of profits and utility which, in some cases, may lead to corruption. Corruption , as viewed by Transparency International (TI), impedes development prospects of a country, stunts economic growth, affects the poor disproportionately and can contribute to increased instability and fragility of a country’s major exchange tools. According to Transparency International Report (2014), poorly equipped schools, counterfeit medicine and elections decided by money are just some of the consequencies of public sector corruption. Sometimes, the motives of parties involved in trade may also be tainted with selfish intentions leading to corrupt practices. Corruption therefore remains one of the greatest challenges to international trade. Corruption has been defined as an 3
exchange between two parties that has an influence on the allocation of resources and involved the use or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private ends (Shenkar & Luo 2015) or the misuse of public power for private profit (Jain 1998). Generally, corruption is observed to undermine trade liberalization and foreign direct investment, produce distorted information, cause misallocation of resources and obstructs growth of local industries. According to Kotler (2000) corruption in international business transactions is usually categorized under “grand corruption” because it usually involves high profiled actors such as politicians and chief executive officers of multinational enterprises. Among several acts of corrupt practices in international trade are physical cash, return service, a gift or what is generally known as “baksheesh” and black checkouts. All these are forms of bribes to facilitate services rendered or expected services. Apart from acts of bribery, other forms of corrupt practices in trade may be in forms of hidden tariffs. Tariffs are taxes imposed in imported goods that have the tendency to increase the price of relevant goods in the domestic market. However, hidden tariffs are a form of unofficial tax that is not visible to a trade partner and can reduce the purchasing power of trading partners. Tariffs increase the cost of imports leading to a decline in consumer surplus. The corruption situation in Nigeria and other nations is disheartening and it appears our nations are becoming ready incubators of inhuman social misdeeds. For instance, a country’s score in TI’s corruption perception index indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). A country’s rank however shows its position relative to other countries in the index. In 2015, Nigeria scored 26th to ranks 136th among 167 nations, an indication that the country is still very endemic to corruption. We should not wear mournful looks because our national pride and patriotism, have been injured. This is because if all Nations had and sincerely guarded this (patriotism) in abundance, we would not have gathered here to locate or search for our lost integrity. Today we are gathering here to fine-tune our principles and priorities for integrity in public procurement, but it would be difficult to do this with tainted personalities and self concept. Let us imagine a child who lives in a country where it does not matter if he or she takes another child’s pencil home from school. The same child will grow up to cherish a system which allows him or her to copy another child’s work during examinations, with, maybe, a promise of a little reward such as 4
cracker biscuit. The child will then become an adult who is rewarded for causing violence at elections and manipulating votes with impunity. As Abed and Davoodi (2002) observed, corruption is not an exclusively economic phenomenon but occurs within the political process, in the judicial system and other less visible spheres, making it difficult to close all possible avenues against corrupt acts. Recent court judgements in Nigeria regarding electoral victories clearly indicate that corrupt politicians can favourably adopt the foot-in-the door technique as the surest way of occupying public and/or government positions through “successive approximation”. According to Freedman and Fraser (1996), the-foot-in-the-door technique is a compliance (without pressure) tactic that involves getting a person to agree to a large request by first setting them up by having that person agree to a modest request. Thus, in Nigeria, politicians will first of all employ violence and deceit to bring out a wrong candidate for a political position, then sensitize the public about their names so that we may be helplessly used to them, before bribing the courts to pronounce unsavoury verdicts of “victories” on them. When governments are installed through such crass procedures, the citizens become helpless when “supreme” adjudications are made in matters of supreme importance. With situations like this, we turn to people with clear and directional self-concepts who are also trustworthy and dependable to join the vanguard of the fight against corruption.
3. Self-Concept and Corruption An individual’s self-concept is globally seen by researchers as a person’s cognitive schema – an organized knowledge structure that contains traits, values, episodic and semantic memories about the self and controls the processing of self-relevant information (Greenwald & Pratkanis 1984; Kihlstrom, Cantor, Allbright, et al., 1988). This means that the self-concept is what directs our thought processes in order to determine what is filtered out as accepted behaviours. In the words of Onyeneje and Eyo (1996), self-concept is the product of a history of successes and failures, which is also explained in Martin, Carlson and Buskist’s (2007) short definition of self concept as “one’s knowledge, feelings and ideas about him or herself”. No one’s self concept is fixed, or permanent, a position held by social psychologists in their proposition that our selves are phenomenal in nature. A number of studies support this position indicating that selves not only describe how we are, but also 5
how we would like to be a repertoire of possible selves (Markus & Nurius 1986, Rhodewalt & Agustsdothir 1986, Rhoolewalt 1986). Therefore if our selves are malleable “substances”, then the cognitive content of our thought process could swing in any direction to determine what behaviour we may exhibit, including corrupt behaviours. Relating the self concept to corruption, Ottu (2006) reflects, on the one hand on Freud’s personality conception that centres on the pleasure principle (id), the reality principle (ego) and the moral principle (the super ego) and on the other hand projects corruption to available examples and the social context in line with Cooley’s (1902) and Mead’s (1934) postulation that self-concepts are heavily influenced by social contexts, thus introducing the element of leadership integrity which is very much dependent on self-concept clarity. Self-concept clarity is defined as the extent to which self-beliefs are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and stable (Campbell, Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavallee & Lehman 1996). It represents the structural aspect of the self-concept which is relatively stable and may result in passive coping behaviours if an individual faces low clarity (Smith, Wethington, & Zhan (1994). An individual with a clear self-concept will, to some extent demonstrate some level of stability despite the malleability of the self.
4. Issues with Trust With regards to interpersonal trust, research suggests that trust is an essential ingredient to any form of relationship. As Rempel, Holmes and Zanna (1985) conceptualized, trust is defined using three factors: predictability the confidence you have in your partner’s ability to be reliable, dependability, the assurance you have in your partner in case of unforeseen potential hurt, and faith, the feeling of certainty that your partner will be responsive and caring in the face of an uncertain future. Though the authors reflected all these on romantic relationships, the concept of trust which can adequately be applied in business circles was an important rhythm in the present study. As observed by Debenham and Sierra (2008), trust between two trading partners is derived by observing two types of behaviour- the exhibition of trustworthy behaviour through the enactment of promised commitments and also, exhibition of trustworthy behaviour by respecting the confidentiality of
6
relevant information. Thus commitment and confidentiality laced with respect, become the supporting tripod in trust building. Moreover, trust has been seen as the ability of people to cooperate with one another even if they are strangers. It has been described as a measurable societal trait that can be linked to everything ranging from efficiency of large corporations to infant mortality rate. In their study, “trust in large organizations”, La Porta, Lopez-de- Silanes, Shlefer and Vishny (no date) observed that increasing levels of trust are correlated with less corruption, better bureaucracies and greater tax compliance.
5. Leader Integrity and Corruption Observing that trust is key to success in any setting, whether governmental or business, we now explore the rudiments of leader integrity in embracing trade terms between nations. In the first place integrity has been variously defined. Beginning from Palanski and Yammarino’s (2007) definition of integrity as “consistency of an acting entity’s words and actions” to Dunn’s (2009) submission as a holistic construct which describes coherence among a set of moral values that are consistent with a set of social values”, the construct of integrity is well acknowledged as an important index in trade and other relations. The importance of integrity can be located in a number of logical reasoning including Dwight Eisenhower’s assertion that “the supreme quality of leadership is integrity, without it, no real success is possible” and Warren Buffett’s intelligent quote that “in looking for people to hire, you look for three qualities: integrity, intelligence and energy. And if they don’t have the first, the other two will kill you”. Integrity can be transmitted through leadership examples to the citizens just as corruption may also be “exemplified”. Using Sutherland’s (1937) differential association with criminal behaviour (which corruption is), we can come to the knowledge that using integrity to combat corruption remains a matter of choice since corruption can be replicated through any or all of Sutherland’s classic theorization of criminal behaviour as follows: (a)
“Criminal behaviour is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication.
(b)
A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favourable to violation of the law over definitions unfavourable to violation of the law. 7
(c)
The principal part of the learning of criminal behaviour occurs within intimate personal groups.
(d)
When criminal behaviour is learned, the learning includes: (i)
Technique of committing the crime, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes very simple, and
(ii) (e)
The specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations and attitudes.
The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the legal codes as favourable or unfavourable.
(f)
Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.
(g)
The process of learning criminal behaviour by association with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other learning.
(h)
While criminal behaviour is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values, since non-criminal behaviour is also an expression of the same needs and values”. In this study we conceptualize corruption from the lens of the prisoner’s dilemma, a popular
game theory where two criminals are engaged to make self-serving choices as a form of bargain against heavy prison terms. Game theory as a formalized study of strategy, started in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until when average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. Camerer (2003) used psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing and learning which helped to predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Behavioural game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other, a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of “I think he thinks”, reasoning people naturally do, and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decision in events such as bargaining, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or living. As noted by Kollock (1998), the study of social dilemmas is the study of the tension between individual and collective rationality, leading to a situation where individually reasonable 8
behaviour leads to a situation in which everyone is worse off. There are however three broad categories of solution: motivational solutions, where actors are not completely egoistic and so give some weight to the outcomes of their partners; egoistic solutions, which are strategic in nature; and neutral solutions where none of the two approaches is embraced. Game theory is generally seen as a mathematical language for describing strategic interactions in which each player’s choice affects the payoff of the other player’s choice where players can be genes, people, companies, nation-state, depending on experimental conception. The impact of the game theory in psychology has been limited by lack of cognitive mechanisms underlying game theoretic-predictions. Writers have always argued that in game theory, a “game” is a complete specification of the strategies which each ‘player’ has, the order in which players chose strategies, the information players have and how players value possible outcomes that result from strategy choices. Based on the literature reviewed, we hypothesize that self-concept clarity interpersonal-trust and leader integrity will influence participants perception of cooperation risk in including hidden tariffs in international traded transactions.
6. Method of Study 6.1
Design: The study used cross sectional exploratory survey design, since according to Mc
Burney and White (2007) many social psychological phenomena are difficult to bring into the laboratory in a realistic fashion.
6.2
Participants: Participants were 113 (male = 74, 65.5%; female = 39, 34.5%) private
entrepreneurs in Uyo metropolis and other experts in banking and allied groups who have adequate knowledge of the business world and understand clearly issues relating to international trade.
6.3
Measures: Three validated scales were used in the study, together with scenario presentations
in the prisoner’s dilemma. They include the following:
9
6.3.1
Self-concept clarity scale: This is a 12-item, 5-point scale (Strongly Disagree = 1, Strongly
Agree = 5) developed by Campbell et al (1996) that taps into temporal stability of people’s beliefs with some more generic, self-uncertainty items. Alpha reliability coefficient from the authors was .86. Sample items include: “I spend a lot of time wondering what kind of person I am”, “In general I have a clear sense of who I am”.
6.3.2
Trust in Close Relationships Scale: This scale, developed by Rempel, Holmes and Zanna
(1985) to gauge levels of trust in one’s relationship (marriage) partner was adapted to measure trust in business relationships. It is a 17-item, 7-point, Likert-type scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7) and has subscales measuring predictability, dependability and faith. The authors derived an alpha coefficient of .81 for the overall scale and .80, .72 and .70 for faith, dependability and predictability respectively, concluding that faith is the most important aspect of love. Sample items include: My (international trade) partner has proven to be trust-worthy and I am willing to let him/her engage in activities which other partners find too threatening”, “I am never certain that my partner won’t do something that I dislike or will embarrass me”. 6.2.3
Perceived Leader Integrity Scale: This is an 8-item scale developed by Moorman, Darnold,
Priesemuth and Dunn (2012). It is based on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to strongly agree” (5). The scale has two subscales: perceived morality (Cronbach alpha = .73) and perceived consistency. (Cronbach alpha = .69). The present study adapted the scale by substituting “president” for “leader’ in all the items. Sample items were: “my president is guided by a clear moral compass” and “my president is fair”.
6.3.4
Co-operative Risk in Trade Liaisons: Perceptions of cooperative risks within dishonest trade
liaisons were measured using scenarios created to represent versions of prisoner’s dilemma. There were three decisions available for choice as follows: “Assuming you are an economic diplomat for Nigeria. Your recent presentation on the business and trade opportunities in Nigeria caught the interest of one international economist/diplomat. Your presentation on the business potentials and trade opportunities in Nigeria caught the interest of one 10
international economist/diplomat who discussed a trade deal between his country and Nigeria which you represent. Unknown to both of you, an illicit business broker had overheard every bit of your discussion and agreement, and he engaged each of you independently behind the scenes to sell a corrupt deal of inflating the business cost by 30%, which if accepted will form hidden tariffs. The hidden tariff proceeds are intended to be shared between you and the illicit broker if the deal is successfully covered up. Each of you in isolation could accept this deal in secret but none of you fully trusted each other. The broker however warned that each of you will be responsible for the terms of the fraud, and there will be grave penalty for the defaulting party. The decision on whether to undertake the hidden tariff deal or not depends on the incentives which are associated with each of the three options of action listed on the table below”.
Which one of the three options do you think may represent your own the possible course of action? Tick in one of the boxes provided against A, B or C. Decision A
Decision B
Decision C
None of you will accept You will reject the corrupt deal of Both of you will accept the the illicit hidden tariff hidden tariffs and leak it to your
corrupt deal, taking the risk of
deal. Each of you will home country in expectation that lack rather choose to report the the
other
partner
might
of
trust
between
have yourselves and the fact that the
deal to your home country accepted the deal. The rewards to all of you may be caught and which
rewards
such you (the partner that rejects and may expose the deal. The
patriotic act with national report the corrupt deal) if the other returns honour/merit award.
(rewards)
are
the
partner accepted the deal are (i) financial share from the deal national honour/merit award (ii) (if never caught) but risk being some financial reward less than the dismissed) and jailed 5 years if value of the deal. The other partner caught. will
be
dismissed
and
jailed
(maximum sentence) 10years
11
7. Procedure The researchers served questionnaires to participants in large scale trading businesses, banks and financial service organizations within Uyo metropolis using convenience sampling procedure of consultations and appeal. Some questionnaires were completed on the spot while others (especially by bank officials) were returned after few days. At a particular bank, employees refused to complete the measures citing time constraints and interference with official duties.
8. Statistics The statistical method used in this study was the multinomial probits analysis.
9. Results Table 2: Mean, standard deviation and other statistics of demographic and main variables in the study Variable
Valid N
Mean
St. Error of Mean
SD
Variance
Sum
Age
113
1.40
0.06
0.65
0.42
158.00
Gender
113
1.35
0.04
0.48
0.23
182.00
Religion
113
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
113.00
Perception of
113
1.23
0.04
0.42
0.18
139.00
Income
113
1.85
0.08
0.90
0.81
209.00
Marital Status
113
2.35
0.14
1.44
2.07
266.00
Ethnic group
113
1.86
0.12
1.23
1.52
210.00
Occupation
113
3.83
0.25
2.62
6.86
410.00
self-concept clarity
113
27.16
0.65
6.87
47.14
3069.08
Interpersonal Trust
113
64.17
1.52
16.19
262.23
7251.00
Perceived
113
22.34
0.65
6.88
47.33
2524.00
friendship
Leader-
Integrity
12
Cooperative risks
113
1.85
0.07
0.73
0.54
209.00
Estimated cell
113
0.35
0.03
0.28
0.08
40.00
113
0.44
0.03
0.29
0.29
50.00
113
0.20
0.02
0.25
0.06
23.00
probability for response category 1 Estimated cell probability for response category 2 Estimated cell probability for response category 3
The investigation of cooperative risk between trade partners adopts individual’s response to decision option A, B or C in the above Table 1. To guide the respondents, a brief passage that gave a background on the risks and expected gains from a corrupt deal of inflating the price of a negotiated deal preceded the response table. Responses from Table 1 become the dependent variable for multinomial probit regression analysis. The two options that received the higher frequencies, A (35.4%) and B (44.2%) were adopted in turns as regressor, while option C with the least response frequency (20.4%) was chosen as reference category of the sample. The responses for A and B, serving as corrupt behaviour indicator were regressed on three composite variables of self-concept clarity, inter-personal trust, and leader integrity. Each of these variables comprised 12, 17 and 7 items in the questionnaire, respectively.
The summary of the multinomial regression coefficients, bs , with associated decision statistics is presented in Table 2 below.
13
Table 3: Refraining from Risky Corrupt Deal with Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable (Decision A
b (estimated Standard
Wald
DF
Significant
in Table 1)
coefficient)
Error
Intercept
6.426
4.641
1.917
1
0.166
B – Self-concept Clarity
-0.17
0.074
5.315
1
0.021
C – Inter-personal Trust
0.137
0.039
12.499
1
0.000
D – Leader Integrity
-0.057
0.068
0.703
1
0.402
level
From the results in Table 3, self-concept clarity has negative impact on refrain from corrupt practices among respondents in the region surveyed in Nigeria. This means that lower self-concept clarity will engender higher propensity to accept national honour and expose corrupt deal proposals, while people who have higher clearer self-concept will be less disposed to refrain from corrupt deal. This relationship is important since the coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level, but the odds for the relations occurring are less than unity (which makes the risk of its occurrence less probable).
Interpersonal trust variable has direct effect on refraining from risky corruption deal. The higher interpersonal trust among business partners the higher they are likely to be honest in excluding hidden tariffs and also to expose shoddy deals for gain of national honour. The coefficient of interpersonal trust is significant and its odd statistic greater than one. Interpersonal trust is not only moral capital that protects and preserves international trade relations; it is also mutually beneficial in securing countries from the scary scorch of corruption. The variable of integrity of leadership of the country has weak negative and insignificant effect on people refraining from risky corrupt deal. This may mean that participants as citizens of their country are not influenced by the quality of political leadership and mentorship to refrain from corrupt deals within and outside the business circles. The attitude of respondents towards refraining from corruption is higher if the incentive potentials are higher. This is depicted in the higher frequency and proportion of people choosing option B in Table
14
1. The effect of the explanatory variables on cooperative risk is captured by the results of the regression presented in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Refraining from Risky Corrupt Deal when Offered Higher Economic Incentive for Restraint Dependent Variable (Decision B
b (estimated Standard
Wald
DF
Significant
in Table 1)
coefficient)
Error
Intercept
29.53
6183.558 0.000
1
0.996
B – Self-concept Clarity
-0.21
0.077
7.336
1
0.007
C – Inter-personal Trust
0.083
0.036
5.269
1
0.022
D – Leader Integrity
-0.091
0.066
1.894
1
0.169
level
The result in the above Table 4 showed that self-concept clarity inversely affects cooperative risky behaviour. The coefficient associated with the self-concept clarity is negative and significant, but again, the odd statistic is less than one. This means that notwithstanding the negative statistically significant relationship existing between self-concept clarity and the dependent variable, given that the odds statistic is less than one, the possibility of this relations occurring is infeasible. In the framing of our option B of the dependent variable, it is obvious that when incentives for refraining from corrupt deal include pecuniary benefits people tend to cooperate in reporting corrupt deal proposals. Here too, the interpersonal trust variable generates a positive coefficient in relation to attitude towards corruption when there is incentive for exposing it. The b is statistically significant at 5 % level and the odds statistic is greater than one. Interpersonal trust is thus a very significant variable to be explored in fighting corruption. With respect to effect of respondents’ perception of leader’s integrity on corruption, the relationship is weak, negative and insignificant.
10. Discussion
15
The result of the study shows that self-concept clarity and interpersonal trust are important factors in corruption control than leadership integrity in the setting where the study was undertaken. Smith et al, (1994) had earlier found that self-concept clarity was a good determinant of positive coping styles. Since corrupt practices are negatively related to self-concept clarity, the study indicates that people with higher self-concept clarity are likely to hide in the cloak of their social relevance to perpetrate criminal acts of corruption while those low in self-concept clarity may seize such opportunities to enhance their self-concepts (esteem). With reference to interpersonal trust, there is direct effect on refraining from risky corruption deal as well as more confidence being posed on the partner. The finding supports the works of Rempel et al (1985) which indicated that trust was an important factor in sustaining relationships.
11. Implications of the Study The implications of the results of this study are multi-dimensional: there are some economic, psychological and even political dimensions of the observed effects of the respondents’ behaviour. The responses of the survey demonstrate that corruption is both an economic and a psychological problem (as treated in this paper) even though its effects and treatment prescriptions will have various social perspectives. The frequency of responses to the preference for corruption or refrain from it as captured in Table 1 showed that people are favourably disposed to avoiding and even reporting corruption plans if there are financial rewards for avoidance and rewarding such plans. This means that corruption can only be tackled successfully if the measures to curb the spread of it include financial rewards to those who are vulnerable to being corrupted. Needles to say that just like economic prescription for control of corruption would usually mention raising of wage rate or disposable income, increase in wages to living wage rate for the citizenry would curtail the desire to raise some earnings from corrupt sources for sustenance. The study has also shown that the ancient moral capital of trust which has always been an essential basis for business interactions is still as important in the exposure of corruption plans and in the treatment of the social malady of corruption in the society. Interpersonal trust variable is not only significant in statistical sense; the feasibility of the relations occurring is indubitable given that the 16
value of its odds statistic is greater than one. There is a need to emphasize on factors and moral values that engender interpersonal trust among people in the society. Besides, interpersonal trust variable is a voluntary relational activity among individuals in the society, thus, it is less expensive policy approach although the efficacy of programmes/policies to influence attitudes in interpersonal relations can hardly be monitored effectively.
12. Conclusion and Recommendations The importance of self-concept clarity and interpersonal trust in international trade relations has been shown in present study. It is recommended that this factor be strengthened in individual through selfevaluation and forms of behaviour modification. Also, based on the outcome of leader integrity in this study, leaders should run inclusive governments in order to gain the confidence of their followers with result: multiplier effect on the social perception of their leaders.
17
References
Abed, G. T. & Davoodi, H. R. (2002). Corruption, structural Reforms and Economic Performance in Transition Economies. In G. T. Abed & S. Gupta (Eds)., Governance, Corruption and Economic Performance. Washington D. C. International Monetary Fund.
Anderson, M. S. & Adam, J. A. (2014). A Proposal for considering Research Integrity from the Perspective of Behavioural Economics. Journal of Microbiology and Biological Education 15(2): 173-176.
Camerer, C. F. (2003) behavioural game theory: Experiments in strategies interaction, Princeton University Press.
Campbell, J. D., Tapnell, P. D., Heine, S. J., Katz, I. M., Lavalle, L. F. & Lehman, D. R. (1996). SelfConcept clarity: measurement, personality correlates and cultural boundaries. Journal of personality and social psychology, 70(1), 141-156.
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human Nature and Social Order. New York: Sebeekem.
De Cremer, D; & Sedikides, C. (2005). Self-Uncertainty and responses to procedural Justice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41, 157-173.
Debenham, J. & Sierra, C. (2008). A map of trust between trading partners. In S. M. Furnell, Sik Katsikas and A. Lioy (Eds). Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) 5185, pp 8-17. Springer-Velag. Berlin Heidelberg.
Freedman, J. L. & Fraser, S. C. (1966). Compliance without pressure: Foot-in-the-Door technique. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4(2) 195-202. 18
Greenwald, A. G. & Pratkanis, A. R. (1984). The Self. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds). Handbook of Social cognition (Vol 3, pp 129-178). Hillsdale, N. J. Erlbaum.
Jain, A. K. (1998). For a closer look into the meaning of Corruption. In Jain, Arvind K. (Ed). Economics of Corruption. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, Doreckdt: London pp. 1-34.
James, A. (2012). Fairness in practice: A social contract for a global Economy (New York: Oxford University Press).
Kilstrom, J. F., Cantor, N., Allbright, J. S., Chew, B. R., Klein, S. B. & Neidenthal, P. M. (1988). Information processing and the study of the self. In L. Berkowilz (Ed). Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol 21, pp 159-187). San Diego, C.A Academic Press .
Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 183-214.
Kotler, P. (2000. Marketing concepts and tools: Core marketing concepts” under “marketing in the 21st century. In Kotler (Ed). Marketing Management (International edition). The millennium edition. Prentice Hall International Inc. New Jersey, USA pp. 11-12.
Laporta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, F. Shleifer A; & Vishny, R. (no date). Trust in Large Organizations (National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER) working papers, No 5864. In “From Governments to Business, trust is key to success”.
Markus, H; & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist, 41, 954-969.
19
McBurney, D. H. & White, T. L. (2007). Research Methods. (Seventh Edition). Australia: Thompson, Wadsworth.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self and society: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Moorman, R. H.; Darnold, M. D. Priesmuth, M. & Dunn, C. P. (2012). Toward the Measurement of Perceived Leader Integrity: Introducing a Multi-Dimensional Approach. Journal of Change Management, 1-16.
Onyeneje, E. C. & Eyo, I. E. (1996). Custodial Status and Self-Concepts of Nigerian Inmates Remanded in Prison Custody. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 82, 209-210.
Ottu I. F. A. (2016). Panaroma of phenomenal selves: Supplemental Evidence from Strategic SelfPresentation among Depressed and Non-Depressed Nigerian Undergraduates. Paper to be presented at the 2nd International Meeting of the Psychonomic Society, Granada, Spain, 5-8 May 2016.
Ottu, I. F. A. (2006). Involvement of the self-concept in corruption: Implications for the Anticorruption drive in Nigeria. Paper presented at the Nigerian Psychological Association Conference, in collaboration with the Department of Psychology, University of Uyo, Nigeria, on the theme: Psychology and Corruption in Nigeria: Causes, implications and Control Mechanisms, August 28-31st 2006.
Rempel, J. K; Holmes, J. G. & Zanna, M. P. (1985). “Trust in close Relationships”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(1), 95-112.
Rhodewalt, F. & Augustsdottir, S. (1986). Effect of Self-Presentation on the Phenomenal Self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 47-55. 20
Rhodewalt, F. T. (1986). Self-presentation and the phenomenal self: on the stability and malleability of self-conceptions. In R. Baumeister (Ed). In Private and Public Selves. New York: SpringerVerlag pp 117-142.
Shrenkar, O. & Luo, Y. (2015) Ethics and corruption in the Global Market Place. International Business.
Slotter, E. B; Gardner, W. L; & Finkel, E. J. (2010). Who am I without you? the influence of romantic breakup on the self-concept. Personality and social psychology Bulletin, 36, 147-160.
Smith, M., Wethington, E., & Zhan, G. (1994). Self-concept clarity and preferred coping styles. Unpublished manuscript. Cornell University.
21
