British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies

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British Policy in the Arab-Israeli Arena 1973-2004 Jonathan Rynhold; Jonathan Spyer Online Publication Date: 01 August 2007 To cite this Article: Rynhold, Jonathan and Spyer, Jonathan (2007) 'British Policy in the Arab-Israeli Arena 1973-2004', British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 34:2, 137 - 155 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13530190701427891 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530190701427891

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British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, August 2007 34(2), 137–155

British Policy in the Arab – Israeli Arena 1973 – 2004 JONATHAN RYNHOLD* and JONATHAN SPYER*

ABSTRACT British policy has oscillated between a ‘Diplomatic’ and a ‘Strategic’ orientation. The Diplomatic orientation regards the Arab –Israeli conflict as the most important element in Middle East policy, while the Strategic orientation views the conflict as less important than the need to contain radical anti-Western forces in the region. The Strategic orientation is associated with a mutually reinforcing combination of ideological sympathy for Israel, a pro-US orientation and the Prime Minister, while the Diplomatic orientation is associated with a mutually reinforcing combination of ideological sympathy for the Palestinians, the Foreign Office, a pro-European orientation and, to a deceasing extent, commercial interests. Since 1973, in an attempt to manage its declining power, Britain’s has sought to ‘bridge’ the widely differing EU and US approaches, in order to achieve maximum influence and relevance. On occasion, this strategy has succeeded, however Blair’s ambition to be the pivot at the centre of international involvement in the region is completely unrealistic. For while ‘bridging’ allows Britain the satisfying sense of ’punching above its weight’ in the Middle East, it often produces the appearance, rather than the reality, of substantive influence.

Introduction Beginning with its withdrawal from Palestine in 1948, through the 1956 Suez debacle and culminating in the withdrawal of British forces east of Suez in 1971, Britain ceased to be a power of the first rank in the Middle East. Despite its decline, Britain has continued to be deeply involved in the region. In part this is related to its historical links. But it is also a function of the way British foreign policy in general has sought to sustain influence by working more closely with international partners in the form of the ‘special relationship’ with the US and its burgeoning role in European institutions. Yet, there has been little analysis of how these changes affected British policy in the Middle East. This study examines British policy in the Arab –Israeli arena since 1973. The year 1973 was important both for Britain and the Arab– Israeli arena as it saw Britain join the EEC, while the Yom Kippur War eventually triggered the start of what has become known as the Middle East peace process. *Department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 5200, Israel. ISSN 1353-0194 print/ISSN 1469-3542 online/07/020137–19 q 2007 British Society of Middle Eastern Studies DOI: 10.1080/13530190701427891


JONATHAN RYNHOLD AND JONATHAN SPYER

From a Realist1 perspective a state’s material strategic interests primarily drive its foreign policy, which is severely constrained by the balance of power. In this vein, it is certainly true that British policy was heavily constrained by Britain’s declining power and significantly influenced by strategic changes in Middle East. Yet, in spite of these changes there was a significant degree of consistency within policy throughout the period. More fundamentally, Britain always had options; policy was never determined by material externalities even as these factors severely circumscribed Britain’s ability to play a major role in the Arab – Israeli arena. Thus, while there was broad agreement that Britain had a clear interest in resolving, or at least containing, the Arab– Israeli conflict, there has been no consensus on how to achieve this objective. It is argued below that British policy has oscillated between a ‘Diplomatic’ and a ‘Strategic’ orientation. Whereas, the Diplomatic orientation tends to define British interests primarily in terms of building and preserving relationships, the Strategic orientation tends to define Britain’s core interest in terms of containing and countering threats. These orientations do not float freely. Rather, they provide the focal point for two combinations,2 which consist of a variety of institutions, organizations, interests and ideas. Thus, the Strategic orientation is associated with a mutually reinforcing combination of ideological sympathy for Israel, a pro-US orientation and the Prime Minister, while the Diplomatic orientation is associated with a mutually reinforcing combination of ideological sympathy for the Palestinians, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a pro-European orientation and, to a decreasing extent, commercial interests. The relative hold of the Strategic and Diplomatic orientations over British policy is not a function of their objective merits. Rather it is determined both by changes within each combination and by changes in the external strategic environment. The strategic environment includes both the regional level, especially the Arab– Israeli peace process, and the global level, most notably the end of the Cold War. Below, British interests in the Middle East are outlined. The Diplomatic and Strategic orientations are then discussed. Subsequently, the various factors that determine the influence of each orientation on British policy in practice are assessed. British policy from 1973 onwards is then analyzed in light of this framework. Finally, the effectiveness of British policy is evaluated. British Interests in the Middle East and the Arab– Israeli Arena Britain has a vital interest in keeping the flow of oil from the Gulf open. It also has a broader commercial relationship with the Middle East. In particular, the region has been an important customer for British arms exports, which have constituted a significant element of the British economy.3 As a state with 1 On Realism see Tim Dunne, ‘Realism’ in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), The Globalisation of World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 2 In theoretical terms, the two combinations are broader and more disparate in nature that the bureaucratic coalitions based on parochial institutional interests sometimes used to explain US foreign policy. Yet, they are not consciously focused or deliberately organized around a single objective as per the theory of foreign policy advocacy coalitions, see Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); Jeffrey Peake, ‘Coalition building and overcoming legislative gridlock in foreign policy, 1947– 98’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 32(1) (2002); Karen Litfin, ‘Advocacy coalitions along the domesticforeign frontier’ Policy Studies Journal, 28(1) (2000). 3 Mark Phythian, ‘Batting for Britain: British arms sales in the Thatcher years’, Crime Law and Social Change, 26(3) (1997).

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extensive commercial links to the region, the UK seeks to ensure an environment in which commercial activity can be smoothly pursued. Britain’s interests lie in the preservation of regional stability, to make possible the pursuit of the ‘real business—which is business’, as one British diplomat put it.4 In addition, Britain retains a strategic interest in preventing the volatility of the Middle East from upsetting stability across Europe and in the wider international arena. In the future, this strategic threat could become more acute if radical forces in the Middle East obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles with the capability of posing a direct threat to the UK.5 Since 9/11 there has been increased concern about the combination of WMD and terrorism. As regards the Arab– Israeli arena it is clear that resolution, or at least containment of the conflict, between Israelis and Arabs is a key goal of British policy, as it would enhance regional stability, as well as British commercial interests in the region. While there has been a consensus on the need to resolve the conflict and on the shape of core elements of any permanent settlement, for example Israeli withdrawal from virtually all the territories occupied in 1967, there has not been consensus within the British policymaking community as to how best to deal with the conflict in practice. Policy Orientations to the Arab– Israeli Conflict The Diplomatic Orientation The Diplomatic orientation emphasises maintaining the best possible relations with existing regimes or those forces that seem likely to take power. It recommends that Britain try to meet the demands of such forces as much as possible and to avoid confrontation. It stresses Britain’s immediate economic interests and commercial relationships with regional powers. Advocates of this position regard themselves as pragmatic, willing to treat with whatever power seems to be on the rise. They argue that engagement with problematic regimes will envelop them in a web of rational, mutually beneficial relations and thus blunt their enmity. A central demand of such regimes, in return for closer relations, will be the adoption of a pro-Arab stance on the question of the Arab– Israeli conflict. Keeping Israel at arms-length, echoing criticism of its actions and policies, at least to a certain extent, may be accepted as a necessity.6 Of course, Israel is an important commercial partner too, and hence its own stances in the conflict will be part of the equation. But Israel’s much smaller size, and the sense that there are few potential negative repercussions from adopting a critical stance to its policies mean this orientation finds little to require a serious counter-balancing of the pro-Arab position. Consequently, this orientation regards Israel mainly as an irritant, a factor complicating British relations with the Arab world. Divisions within the Arab world regarding the peace process with Israel mean that the Diplomatic approach has been unable to adopt a stance that will be approved of by the whole Arab world. Nonetheless, demonstrating British distance from or criticism of the Israeli position is still 4

Author conversation with British official, 2004. James Bone, ‘UN fears Iraq may build missiles that can reach Britain’, The Times, 22 February 1996; Ewan MacAskill, ‘Iraqi nerve gas could paralyse western cities’, The Guardian (24 May 2000). 6 See for example Sir Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests (London: John Murray 1998), pp. 160 –161. 5

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viewed as a way to win favour in the Arab and Muslim world. Consequently, advocates of this viewpoint thus stress the solution of the Arab– Israeli conflict as quickly as possible, placing little priority on Israeli interests or security. Great stock is put in the priority that Arab states say they and their masses place on this issue, which is seen as the cause rather than the result of radicalism, instability, and anti-Western feeling in the Arab world.7 Israel’s supposed refusal to make the possible and necessary concessions for peace to the Palestinians and Arab states is thus depicted as the principle engine of regional unrest. American support for Israel, meanwhile, is seen as a regrettable factor to be tempered by British influence. The Diplomatic orientation has deep roots. It informed Foreign Office opposition to Zionism from the 1930s onwards, culminating in the anti-Israel orientation of Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945– 1951. In the immediate post1945 period it advocated the building of British regional policy around the preservation of the monarchical regimes in Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. As part of this policy it sought to impose a settlement on Israel that called for significant Israeli territorial concessions in the Negev, limitations on Jewish immigration to Israel and a reduction in the size of the Israeli army.8 Later, when revolutionary nationalism was accepted as the rising force in the region,9 it paradoxically proposed an accommodation with revolutionary Palestinian nationalism in Jordan in the late 1960s.10 This too required maintaining a cool attitude towards Israel, as witnessed by the Foreign Office’s refusal to assist Israel in reopening the Straits of Tiran prior to the Six Day War in 1967.11 The ‘Strategic’ Orientation The Strategic orientation puts more emphasis on dividing the Middle East into moderate and hostile regimes. Its focus is on threats—military, political and ideological, and their countering. It assumes that aggressive, anti-Western governments and belief systems, radical Pan-Arab nationalism or revolutionary Islamism, are the principle threats to regional stability and to British interests. Since regional tyrannies tend to rely on instability, adventurism and support for terrorism and insurgency as tools for legitimating themselves, they will inevitably undermine stability. Against this background, Israel is perceived as an ally by virtue of its pro-Western orientation and its military strength. Indeed, the Strategic orientation has tended to view Israel’s enemies; Islamist Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Ba’athist Syria, Hamas and Hizbullah, as the main source of regional problems and as such, as threatening British interests. The Strategic orientation also adopts a relatively tough line against terrorism, fearing that negotiating with terrorists only leads to further terrorism. More generally, it asserts that only by containing and sometimes challenging anti-western states, movements and 7 Ibid.; Sir Anthony Parsons, They Say The Lion: Britain’s Legacy To The Arabs: A Personal Memoir (London: J. Cape, 1986), pp. 149 –150. 8 On the Alpha Plan, see Public Records Office, FO 371/115867; CAB 129/35. One of the main architects of the plan thought its implementation would pose an existential threat to Israel, Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1986), pp. 279, 297. 9 Parsons, They Say the Lion, pp. 43–45. 10 ’UK Confidential’ BBC Television, ‘Interview with Peter Tripp’ [former British diplomat in Amman], http:// www.bbc.co.uk 11 Moshe Gat, Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964–67 (New York: Praeger, 2003), pp. 98, 148, 209.

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ideologies can they be stopped from subverting British interests. Against this background, the Arab– Israeli conflict is perceived as one more outcome of a generally unstable regional situation. The Strategic orientation has been less dominant than the rival Diplomatic orientation, but it too has deep roots. Strategic factors had some influence on the granting of the Balfour declaration in 1917, in which Britain promised to support the establishment of a Jewish National home in Palestine. Churchill and fellow Conservative MP Oliver Stanley viewed the newly created State of Israel as a potential bulwark against Soviet influence in the Middle East.12 While in 1956, Britain colluded with Israel and France to attack Egypt and cause the downfall of its radical nationalist leader, Nasser. Following the failure of this effort, in the early 1960s Britain supplied arms to Israel in order to help sustain a pro-Western balance of power against perceived attempts by pro-Soviet Arab radicals to destabilize the region. Indeed between 1957 and 1967, the strategic orientation had the upper hand within British policy.13

The Foundations of the Diplomatic and Strategic Orientations As already noted, the Diplomatic and the Strategic orientations do not exist in a vacuum. Rather they are underwritten by other factors and provide the political, institutional and ideological basis for these orientations in practice. Below the most important of these factors are explored.

Bureaucratic Politics:14 Between No. 10 Downing Street and the FCO The FCO is responsible for the conduct of relations between Britain and all foreign countries. It is the main institutional base of support for the Diplomatic orientation. The operational code of the FCO, maintaining normal relations and avoiding conflicts, favours the Diplomatic orientation. Institutional factors are also responsible. There are 22 slots for ambassadors to Arab countries and only one for Israel, a ratio that repeats itself throughout the ranks. Interacting with Arab counterparts and informants, the diplomat working on the Middle East tends to see them as his clients and gradually begins to echo their beliefs and interpretations of events. In contrast, only in recent years has the Foreign Office begun to make some effort to allocate resources to equip staff with the skills necessary for understanding Israeli society.15 These factors have generated an organizational culture of underlying sympathy for the Arab/Palestinian position, including a 12

Harold Wilson, The Chariot of Israel (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1981), pp. 184 –188, 239. Moshe Gat, ‘Britain and Israel before and after the Six Day War: From support to hostility’, Contemporary British History, 18(1) (2004). 14 On the centrality of Prime Minister and the Foreign Office in the making of foreign policy see Michael Clarke, ‘The policy-making process’, in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds), British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation (London: Unwin 1988). On the making of British Foreign Policy in this period more broadly see also William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976); John Dickie, The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works (I.B. Tauris 2004); Paul Williams, ‘Who’s making UK foreign policy?’, International Affairs, 80(5) (October 2004). On the limited role played by Parliament and think-tanks in contemporary British foreign policy, see Dickie, The New Mandarins pp. 138 –161. On the ways in which British NGOs, often partly funded by government, play a political role in support of the Palestinians see NGO Monitor www.ngo-monitor.org 15 Sharon Sadeh, ‘Withdrawing from the Arabs to the embrace of the Europeans’ Ha’aretz (26 January 2004). 13

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sense of unease at Britain’s historical responsibility for the creation of Israel.16 In 2001 an unnamed FCO official described Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to The Guardian as ‘The cancer at the heart of the Middle East crisis’17 while in 2004 a letter signed by 52 former senior British diplomats, was fiercely critical of Tony Blair’s policies toward the Israeli – Palestinian conflict.18 British Prime Ministers have tended to provide the main counterpoint to the FCO, often based on the consideration of a wider variety of factors than British– Arab bilateral relations, or even the Middle East in general. Historically, Prime Ministers as varied as Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and Margaret Thatcher of the Conservatives, and Harold Wilson and Tony Blair of Labour have adopted, to some degree, the Strategic point of view. In comparison, only Clement Atlee and Edward Heath can be said to have completely adopted the Diplomatic orientation. Still, none of the Strategic-minded Prime Ministers have moved to permanently alter the FCO consensus. Their transient term in office, as well as their need to devote attention and energy to other matters has left the FCO with considerable staying power as regards the Middle East.19 Nonetheless, when they decide to intervene, Prime Ministers’ can determine policy. For example, while Britain officially adopted the FCO line by trying to remain neutral during the Six Day War, Prime Minister Harold Wilson ignored Foreign Office objections and secretly supplied Israel with weapons.20 Under Tony Blair, 10 Downing Street is probably more powerful than ever in the making of British policy. Blair has also been subjected to criticism for his use of special advisers, such as Lord Levy and the No. 10 Downing Street staff, rather than making more use of Foreign Office personnel. Much of this, however, has to do with strong advocacy of a particular policy he has supported, rather than bureaucratic arrangements.21 Domestic Politics and Ideological Affinities The Labour Party has a long tradition of sympathy for Zionism. Leading party figures such as Aneurin Bevan22 and Richard Crossman were identified strongly with the Jewish national cause throughout their careers. Despite the generally antiZionist approach of the Labour government under Foreign Secretary Bevin 1945– 1951, the Labour party was broadly associated with a positive stance towards Israel until the mid 1970s. This stance was based on a sense of moral responsibility to resolve the Jewish question especially after the Holocaust, ideological affinity with Israel’s ruling Labour party and democratic system of government, and 16 See for example Parsons, They Say the Lion, pp. 148 –153; William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–51 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) pp. 114 –115; Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, pp. 279, 297; David Hughes, ‘Top diplomat in storm over ’anti-Israeli’ views’ Sunday Times 19 May 1991. 17 Ewan MacAskill, ‘Israel’s tactical indignation’, The Guardian (25 September 2001). 18 Robin Renwick, ‘My fellow ambassadors are not a pretty sight’ Daily Telegraph (2 May 2004); Chris Hastings, ‘Diplomats failed to disclose their own Arab links’, Daily Telegraph (2 May 2004). 19 Moshe Raviv, ‘British–Israeli relations’, Paper presented at the Truman Institute, Hebrew University Jerusalem at a Conference entitled Britain and the Middle East, 22 June 2004. 20 ‘Britain armed deceitful israel in Six Day War’, The Guardian (1 January 1998). 21 Peter Stothard, 30 Days: A Month at the Heart of Blair’s War (London: Harper Collins, 2003); Anthony Seldon, Blair (London: Free Press, 2004) pp. 692, 386 –407, 580; Anthony Sampson, ‘Hijacked by that mob at no.10’, The Observer (8 June 2003). Similar charges were leveled at Mrs Thatcher see Clarke, ‘The policymaking process’, in Smith et al., British Foreign Policy, pp. 74 –77. 22 Wilson, The Chariot of Israel, pp. 184–188.

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domestic political interests—most of Britain’s 300,000 Jews voted Labour until the 1970s. To this day there is an active pro-Israel lobby in the Labour party in the form of Labour Friends of Israel. In the 1970s and 1980s, a generation influenced by the politics of the 1960s and the European New Left entered the Labour Party. For leading party figures such as Robin Cook, Clare Short, Peter Hain and Ken Livingstone, the cause of Palestinian nationalism was an important rallying point. This position became increasingly dominant in the Party following the 1982 Lebanon War.23 A number of pro-Palestinian bodies have been created within the party and the broader Labour movement. The most prominent of these is the Labour Middle East Council. There is a direct correlation with stances in other areas, with left-wing socialist MPs (such as Jeremy Corbyn) supporting the Palestinians, though the influence of the party’s left has been limited in recent years. In contrast, inheritors of the more centrist Labourite tradition (such as Gordon Brown and Tony Blair) are sympathetic towards Israel. Having been influenced both by European social democracy and by the Christian Socialist tradition, Blair is untouched by the more hardcore left-wing currents in Labour where support for the Palestinian cause tends to be stronger. Nonetheless, Blair has to pay attention to the pro-Palestinian voices in the party. Partly for this reason, in an attempt to dampen their opposition to the Iraq War, Blair took a lead in the peace process hosting the conference on Palestinian reform in March 2005.24 The traditional-patrician, wing of the Conservative Party was strongly associated with the public service professions in Britain, notably the Foreign Office. This branch of conservatism was characterized by strong ties and sympathy to the Arab world. In the past, leading Conservative figures such as Sir Ian Gilmour, Edward Heath and David Mellor have been associated with this approach. Representing a contrasting stream of Tory patrician opinion, there was a minority sympathetic to Zionism on the basis of Christianity or romantic nationalism, such as Sir Arthur Balfour and Sir Winston Churchill.25 This stream, while no longer relevant, played an important role in early British support for the Jewish national home. Yet, the real shift in Conservative attitudes came with the rise of Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher was always surrounded by close Jewish associates, including Sir Keith Joseph, Leon Brittan and Malcolm Rifkind. Her lower middle-class origins and the value she placed above all on the entrepreneurial spirit made her a natural ally of the new forces in the party to which these individuals were also connected. Her constituency, Finchley, also has a large Jewish population. In her foreign policy outlook, 23 June Edmunds, ‘The British Labour Party in the 1980s: The battle over the Palestinian/Israeli conflict’, Politics, 18(2) (1998). 24 Peter Hirschberg, ‘Blair hopes parley will take him beyond Iraq’, Ha’aretz (1 March 2005). On the hard Left’s approach to Israel and their organizational alignment with Islamists on the issue see Ben Cohen, ‘The persistence of anti-Semitism on the British left’, Jewish Political Studies Review, 16(3–4) (2004); Dave Hyde, ‘Europe’s other Red–Green alliance’, www.zeek.net/politics_0304.shtml; Paul Iganski and Barry Kosmin (eds), The New European Extremism: Hating America, Israel and the Jews (Profile Books 2006). While the hard Left do not have much sway over government policy, they have sought to influence Israeli–Palestinian affairs via the Trade Union movement where they are a force to be reckoned with. In April 2005 they got the AUT (Association of University Teachers) to boycott two Israeli universities, until a large majority of the union’s membership overturned the decision a few months later. Given that the question of legitimacy lies at the heart of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the potential snowball effect of such a boycott cannot be dismissed lightly. On the boycott campaign see International Advisory Board for Academic Freedom, www.biu.ac.il/academic_freedom/ and Engage www.engageonline.org.uk/. On transnational aspects of foreign policy see Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 187–218. 25 See for example Churchill’s speech in the House of Commons debate immediately preceding recognition of Israel in January 1949, cited in Wilson, The Chariot of Israel, p. 239.

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Thatcher’s anti-communism and opposition to terrorism all naturally inclined her to tilt toward Israel, as did her strong support for a close relationship with America. Thatcher’s influence in the Conservative Party, in this regard, has proven lasting. Her successor, John Major, was no more connected to the old, patrician, anti-Zionist wing of conservatism than was she. An active pro-Israel lobby, the Conservative Friends of Israel, exists in the party. There is also a pro-Arab Conservative Middle East Council. In general, electoral politics has not played an important role in the formation of British policy. British Jews are relatively few in number and vote primarily on domestic issues, while the much larger Muslim community only began to become politically organized in the 1990s. In the future, it is possible that the Muslim community will be more influential, as the Muslim vote is important in over 40 marginal constituencies, whereas the Jewish vote is estimated as important in around seven marginal constituencies. Against this background Jewish community leaders felt a distancing from No. 10, after the 2003 Iraq war.26 Nonetheless, it is not clear that the Palestinian issue is of central importance to Britain’s Muslims, most of who hail from the Indian subcontinent, rather than from the Middle East.27 International Politics: Between Europe and the United States Following its decline as a great power after 1945, Britain sought to retain a major role in international politics through its relationship with the US and its membership in European institutions. British Prime Ministers have been particularly keen on the ‘special relationship’ as it provides an image of Prime Ministerial statesmanship, allowing a PM to claim greater international authority than British power alone would provide. In contrast, since the Suez crisis, Whitehall, including the Foreign Office, have increasingly preferred a proEU orientation as a means of maximizing the UK’s international influence.28 When Britain joined the EEC in 1973, the move was primarily viewed as a means for improving the British economy and not as a political project that would culminate in the creation of a federal Europe. To some degree breaking with this orientation, the New Labour government of Tony Blair has sought to take a lead in regard to the EU’s stated goal of a common foreign and security policy (CSFP) with British foreign policy becoming increasingly integrated within EU institutional mechanisms.29 Since the early 1970s, British policies in the Arab– Israeli arena have been increasingly influenced by the ‘special relationship’ and its membership in the European Union. On the one hand, Britain accepts and supports US leadership of the peace process. Britain appreciates that only the US has the ability to act as an effective broker due to its military and strategic position in the region and its credibility with Israel. Unlike France, Britain does not feel such a need to assert a European political presence for its own sake and instead it seeks to encourage 26

Interview with an official in a leading Anglo-Jewish institution. For a discussion of this issue see Ben Cohen, ‘Evaluating Muslim– Jewish relations in Britain’, Jerusalem Viewpoints, No. 527 (February 2005); Rory Miller, ‘EU policy towards the Middle East’, Paper Presented at Conference entitled Israel’s Strategic Agenda (Bar-Ilan University, 4 July 2005). 28 Roger Murphy, ‘The special relationship and British foreign policy after 9/11’, Paper presented at APSA Conference, 2003; Clarke, ‘The policy-making process’, in Smith et al., British Foreign Policy, pp. 89–90; David Allen, ‘Britain and Western Europe’, in Smith et al., British Foreign Policy, p. 188. 29 Anthony Forster and Alistair Blair (eds), Britain’s European Foreign Policy (London: Longman 2001). 27

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Europe to play a complimentary role to US diplomacy. For example, while Britain supported the appointment of an EU special envoy to the Middle East in 1996, it insisted that the envoy’s mandate be much less ambitious than the French desired. The Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind emphasised that the European envoy must complement rather than compete with the Americans.30 In addition, Britain’s strategic culture is less antagonistic to the use of armed force than the European norm, according to which the amenability of problems to negotiated solution tended to be taken as a given31 As a consequence, the UK is more inclined than most of its European partners to view ‘hard’ power as indispensable for confronting anti-western forces in the region. This, coupled with its direct experience of IRA terrorism, has made Britain adopt a tougher stance on terrorism than most of its European partners.32 The overall effect has been to push the UK closer to the ‘hard security’ US approach than most of its European partners. On the other hand, the European approach has generally been in line with the Diplomatic orientation according to which the Arab – Israeli conflict is understood as the main cause of the political problems in the Middle East. The status of many European countries as former colonial powers, the desire to develop a European stance separate from that of the US, commercial interests, and a general lack of concern at the anti-Western and authoritarian nature of many local political and ideological forces also contributed. While, there are of course differences of approach within Europe itself, it makes sense to talk about an approach that characterized the collective European policy as a coherent entity in of itself. After all, European policy towards the Arab– Israeli conflict is the area in which consensus has been maintained most successfully33 and Britain has been supportive of this. Thus, Britain has demonstrated a consistent willingness to adopt formal European positions that differ from the US stance. Moreover, as the machinery of foreign policy co-ordination has become stronger, the influence of Europe on British policy has grown. Overall, the effect has been to move British policy closer to the more pro-Arab position of the EU consensus. This was evident with regard to British policy towards Israel’s separation barrier. After the International Court of Justice ruled against Israel on the issue in 2004, Britain was initially against supporting a Palestinian sponsored UN General Assembly resolution condemning Israel and calling on it to comply with the ruling. However, following intra-European negotiations, Britain gave way to France and voted with the EU bloc in favour of the resolution and against the US position.34 30

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Western Europe (24 October 1996). On the different foreign policy approaches of the US and the EU see Robert Kagan Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Vintage Books, 2003). 32 See, for example, the British stance regarding Hizbullah, David Rudge, ‘British ambassador sends EU message’, Jerusalem Post (23 March 2005). 33 On European and US polices towards the Arab–Israeli conflict see Philip Gordon, The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998) pp. 13–137; Dana Allin and Steven Simon ‘The moral psychology of US support for Israel,’ Survival, 45(3) (2003); Rosemary Hollis, ‘Europe and the Middle East: Power by stealth?’, International Affairs, 73(1) (1997); Robert Oslon, ‘Partners in the peace process: The United States and Europe’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 26(4) (1997); Kenneth Stein, ‘Imperfect alliances: Will Europe & America ever agree?’, Middle East Quarterly (March 1997). On hostile trends in Europe towards Israel, see Joseph Joffe, ‘The axis of envy’, Foreign Policy, 132 (September –October 2002); Dimitri Keridis, Europe and Israel: What went Wrong? (Ramat Gan: BESA Centre for Strategic Studies, 2003). 34 Shlomo Shamir, ‘UN overwhelmingly adopts draft condemning W. Bank fence’, Ha’aretz (21 July 2004). 31

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Overall though, the general aim of British policy has been to serve as a bridge between the US and Europe. As Tony Blair put it: ‘The stronger we are in Europe, the stronger our American relationship’.35 In the Arab–Israeli arena. this usually takes the form of trying to get the US to adopt a more proactive policy, including more pressure on Israel, in return for European support and assistance.36 However, the tension between these two orientations is not so easily nullified. This was evident with regard to the Iraq war in 2003 when Britain’s unambiguous support for the US contrasted with the policies of France and Germany. Economics and Commerce British foreign policy is greatly influenced by economic factors, especially as the British economy has always been more dependent on trade than any other economy in Europe.37 In addition, since the 1970s there has been an increased emphasis within the Foreign Office on the ‘low politics’ of trade, at the expense of ‘high politics’.38 Similarly, in the Middle East, after the Six Day War, Britain’s economic difficulties became an increasingly important influence on policy, pushing it towards the Diplomatic orientation. The Arab oil embargo, the closing of the Suez Canal and the withdrawal of Arab money from UK banks had a severe effect on Britain’s balance of payments. To counter this and dispel the Arab perception that Britain had secretly helped Israel in the war, Britain adopted a pro-Arab line.39 Subsequently, the Yom Kippur War led to a massive rise in the price of oil, which in turn caused Britain to have a visible trade deficit with the Middle East of over £2 billion.40 The Arab world tried to lever this situation to change British and other countries policy towards the conflict, with some success. Following the Yom Kippur War Britain, along with the rest of the EEC, reinterpreted UN resolution 242 along more pro-Arab lines.41 Meanwhile in 1980, Britain responded to Saudi pressure to take a more pro-Arab line in exchange for an arms deal by actively helping to formulate the EEC’s Venice Declaration, which called for the first time for a PLO role in the peace process.42 Furthermore, even in 1985 it was still possible for a British company to obtain a certificate from the Foreign Office demonstrating compliance with the Arab boycott of trade with Israel.43 However, by the mid 1980s ‘the oil weapon’ had lost most of its potency. There was an oil glut, Britain had already become a net oil exporter due to North Sea oil. It also had a positive balance of trade with the Middle East primarily as a result of large arms sales in the Gulf. Against this background, despite threats of economic retaliation from Arab states, Mrs Thatcher refused to allow British ministers to meet PLO 35

‘Blair’s Ghent Speech’, Daily Telegraph (24 February 2000). For expressions of this view among senior British officials see Parsons, They Say the Lion, pp. 150– 151; Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests, pp. 160 –161. 37 Williams, ‘Who’s making UK foreign policy?’; Roger Tooze, ‘Security and order: The economic dimension’, in Smith et al., British Foreign Policy. 38 William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain (London: Chatham House 1975) p. 36. 39 Gat, ‘Britain and Israel’. 40 Frank Brenchley Britain and the Middle East: Economic History, 1945–87 (London: Lester Crook 1991), pp. 210, 233, 255. 41 Ibid., pp. 194, 210. 42 Mark Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2000) pp. 217 –218. 43 ‘What price a boycott’ (The Guardian 31 October 1984). 36

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representatives until they renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist.44 Since the financial crisis of the mid 1960s Britain looked to arms sales as a way to help balance its terms of trade and provide employment. Increased financial pressure meant that Britain was prepared to sell weapons with far less consideration as to the impact of the sale on the Arab– Israeli strategic balance. Under these circumstances arms sold to Jordan and Saudi Arabia found there way to Iraq as did certain ‘dual use’ items. Britain also sold arms to Iran in the 1980s, despite strong opposition from the US. None of this served to assist the Middle East peace process. Since the 1991 Gulf War Britain has tightened up its arms export policy, though in the future arms sales are likely to decline in importance.45 1991 also signaled the eclipse of the relationship between economic considerations and the diplomatic orientation in British policy. Following the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the secondary boycott effectively disappeared. This was symbolized in 1995 when Prime Minister John Major led a large business delegation to Israel.46 Subsequently, bilateral trade reached an annual rate of £2.5 billion in 2000, making Israel the UK’s biggest trading partner in the Middle East in the first years of the new millennium.47 Local Politics: The Actions of the Parties to the Conflict Finally, the policies of the parties to the conflict also influenced British policy significantly. Britain has always opposed Israeli settlements and always supported a settlement based on the ‘land for peace’ formula. Consequently, British relations with Israel have tended to improve when the Israeli Labour Party, as opposed to the Likud, has been in power. For example in 1998 Britain suspended implementation of a newly signed Memorandum of Strategic Understanding (MoU) with Israel due to the Netanyahu government’s refusal to implement the Wye Agreement fully. When the Barak government came to power in 1999, the MoU was resurrected.48 As regards the Palestinians, despite support for some form of Palestinian self-determination since the mid 1970s, British support for the Palestinians has been constrained at times when the Palestinian leadership refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist and continued to engage in terrorism. British Policy in the Arab – Israeli Arena 1973 –2005 The Yom Kippur War When the Arab states launched a surprise attack on Israel on 6 October 1973, the Conservative government of Edward Heath took the controversial decision 44 Stephanie Gray, ‘Row defused over Arab League visit to London’, Financial Times (13 December 1982); David Tonge, ‘Qatar and UAE scrap Pym visit’, Financial Times (6 January 1983); Roger Matthews, ‘Britain and Arab League try to heal wounds today’, Financial Times (18 March 1983); ‘PLO visit off: Yasser Arafat cancels visit to Britain’, The Guardian (29 November 1984). 45 Mark Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) pp. 10, 29–32, 213, 235– 236, 319 –322; see also D. Miller, Export or Die: Britain’s Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq (London: Cassell 1997). 46 Arthur Leathley ‘Prosperity key to peace, major tells Israelis’, The Times (13 March 1995). 47 British Embassy to Israel website: http://www.britemb.org.il 48 Bernard Josephs, ‘Deal on arms research collaboration’, Jewish Chronicle (20 November 1998); Joseph Millis, ‘British Defence Secretary to push for deal with Israel’, Jewish Chronicle (29 October 1999).

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to declare neutrality, embargoing arms supplies to ‘all sides’. This form of neutrality clearly benefited the Arab side. While the Soviets could rely on their satellite countries, the Nixon Administration found itself without allies regarding its airlift of vital military supplies to Israel. Heath refused a personal request from the President for landing rights in Cyprus en route to Israel.49 The use by Arab oil-producing countries of the European reliance on Middle Eastern oil (85 percent of European petroleum was imported from the region at that time) was undoubtedly an element in making Britain reluctant to appear to back Israel. The Heath government’s policy thus represented a classic expression of the Diplomatic orientation reinforced by Heath’s pro European orientation, which made British policy essentially representative of EEC policies in the 1973 War. Labour opposed this policy. In the House of Commons, Leader of the Opposition Harold Wilson called for an end to the embargo and pointed out that while the government had remained silent regarding past Arab aggression against Israel, it had sponsored resolutions condemning Israeli military actions on three occasions. Wilson called for support for Israel on the basis of its being the only democracy in that region. He then returned to the oil issue, addressing it in the following terms, a clear statement of the Strategic view, ‘No one underestimates the gravity of what is happening on this front, the cost, simply, of the increase in prices and its effect on inflation in this country . . . but we must not be blackmailed . . . the characteristic of Danegeld is insatiability. They come again. Their appetite feeds on appeasement’.50 Parliament endorsed government policy, by a margin of 251 votes to 175. The Peace Process 1977 – 1990 In 1977 Menachem Begin made the first official state visit by an Israeli Prime Minister to Britain. The visit included consultations over the recent breakthrough in Egyptian– Israeli relations. To begin with, the Foreign Office was opposed to bilateral Israel– Egyptian negotiations, as it feared this would lead to a separate peace rather than a comprehensive agreement. According to the logic of the Diplomatic orientation open British support for the Israeli –Egyptian talks could pose a threat to Britain’s wider relations in the Arab world. However, Begin succeeded in gaining Prime Minister Callaghan’s endorsement of the talks and subsequently Britain was actively supportive of the US sponsored negotiations, hosting a round of Israeli – Egyptian talks at Leeds Castle in 1978. President Carter believed that Callaghan’s modest mediation efforts helped to inject momentum and trust into the negotiations. Britain also tried, unsuccessfully, to use its historically close relationship with Jordan to get King Hussein to enter the Camp David negotiations.51 While Britain supported the US-led peace process, it began to co-ordinate its positions towards the conflict within the EEC context. As early as November 1973, and again in June 1977, the European Council expressed its support for the 49

Howard Sacher, A History of Israel (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 790. Wilson, The Chariot of Israel, p. 372. 51 Kenneth Morgan, ‘Callaghan: A life’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 608. Morgan cites the following documents: Record of Meeting between Callaghan and Begin, 3–4 December 1977 (Callaghan Papers, box 21A); Telephone conversion between Callaghan and Carter 14 January 1978, TII/78 Callaghan Papers box 34. See also Sir Anthony Parsons ‘The Middle East’, in Peter Byrd (ed.), British Foreign Policy under Thatcher (London: Phillip Allen 1988), pp. 87–88. 50

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principle of Palestinian self-determination. European Middle East policy crystallized in the Venice Declaration 1980, which differed significantly from official US policy. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington played a leading role in crafting the declaration.52 British policy throughout the 1970s and 1980s was marked by a desire to stay within the EC consensus. Unlike France, Britain did not pioneer criticism of Israel within European bodies, unlike Germany; the UK was not a perennial factor in opposing such criticism. In 1982, Britain signalled its disapproval of the Begin government’s invasion of Lebanon by placing an arms embargo on Israel. Meanwhile, Britain sought to play a bridging role between US and European approaches to the peace process. Britain supported the American efforts to advance the peace process through the 1982 Reagan Plan, which called on Israel to negotiate with a Jordanian – Palestinian delegation on the basis of ‘Land for Peace’. Britain used its special relationship to promote the European view in Washington. In particular, Britain sought greater US pressure on Israel regarding settlements, in order to make it easier for King Hussein to enter negotiations. Britain also tried to use its good connections with Jordan to encourage and assist King Hussein in trying to gain the support of Palestinians. In this vein, between 1983 and 1985, the Foreign Office tried to bring about a meeting between the British Foreign Secretary and PLO representatives. British efforts to help generate a Jordan– Palestinian delegation were consistent with US diplomacy. However, the British emphasis on ‘associating the PLO’ with the peace process was opposed by President Reagan, and in line with the European position. These efforts nearly reached fruition in 1985; however, Mrs Thatcher cancelled the planned meeting at the 11th hour when PLO representatives refused to renounce terrorism and recognize Israel.53 In 1986, Britain took three steps that tilted policy towards the more pro-US Strategic orientation. First, Britain broke off diplomatic relations with Syria in the wake of that country’s involvement in a thwarted terror attack at Heathrow airport. Second, Britain supported the US air strike against Libya in 1986, against the position of most its European partners. Third, on the first visit by a sitting Prime Minister to Israel, Mrs Thatcher declared an independent Palestinian state impracticable. This move took place against the background of her disappointment at the PLO’s continued radicalism and the collapse of the Hussein – Arafat axis. It also gelled with the active attempts of Jordan, Israel and the US to forge a diplomatic breakthrough without the PLO. Subsequently, in 1987, following a request by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Mrs Thatcher used Britain’s contacts with King Hussein, in conjunction with US efforts, to help facilitate a breakthrough without PLO involvement.54 This resulted in the April 1987 London Agreement between King Hussein and Shimon Peres to begin peace negotiations within the confines of an international conference. However, the agreement was stillborn due to the opposition of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and US Secretary of State, George Shultz’s, refusal 52

Parsons, ‘The Middle East’, p. 86. John Wyles, ‘EEC calls on Arafat to support peace talks’, Financial Times (23 March 1983); ‘Arafat willing to resume talks with Hussein on Reagan plan’, Financial Times (14 April 1983); Patrick Keatley, ‘Howe demand dashes peace initiative hopes,’ The Guardian (15 October 1985); Patrick Keatley, ‘Howe to ignore US pressure over PLO visit’, The Guardian (14 October 1985). 54 Ian Murray, ‘Israeli initiative: Peres tribute to Thatcher’s peace role’, The Times (21 January 1987); ‘Mission improbable’, The Times (22 January 1987). 53

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to pressure Shamir on the matter. Despite the ‘special relationship’ Britain failed to get Shultz to change his mind.55 The outbreak of the Intifada led to a worsening of British –Israeli relations, when Foreign Office Minister David Mellor caused a diplomatic incident by upbraiding an Israeli officer in public on a visit to Israel. There was wide support for Mellor in the House of Commons, but Mrs Thatcher was angry as she felt Mellor’s actions undermined Israel’s trust in Britain and thus undermined Britain’s ability to mediate.56 Later, Britain opened a ministerial dialogue with the PLO in tandem with the US in December 1988, after Arafat finally renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist. This dialogue was suspended in September 1990 over the PLO’s support for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Unlike, the US, Britain had not suspended the dialogue in June 1990, after Arafat refused to condemn a terrorist attack on an Israeli beach.57 The Peace Process 1991 – 2000 The end of the Cold War, coupled with US victory over Iraq, contributed to the start of formal negotiations between Israel and its neighbours. This led to the decline of the perception of the conflict as a zero-sum game, whereby all that benefited Israel must by definition be contrary to the interests of the Arab states. For British policy this lessened the tension between the Diplomatic and Strategic orientations. Thus, following the defeat of Iraq in March 1991, Britain supported US efforts to convene an international peace conference, which took place in Madrid in November 1991. As part of the effort to encourage Israeli participation, Britain promoted an initiative to strengthen EU legislation against the Arab boycott.58 For a period, strong ties with Israel and with the Arab world ceased to appear mutually exclusive. Thus, on the one hand in 1995 Prime Minister John Major became the first Western leader to hold talks with Yasir Arafat, inside PA territory.59 On the other hand, the first official royal visit to Israel took place in 1998. While, following the ending of the British arms embargo on Israel in 1994, the defence relationship grew significantly.60 Britain played a major role in sponsoring EU economic support for the peace process. Britain has been a major provider of financial assistance and technical know-how to the Palestinians, both bilaterally and through the EU framework. Between 1994 and 1997, the overall sum of money involved was £85 million and in November 1998 a package of assistance to the Palestinian Authority and to UNWRA totalling £100 million was announced.61 These activities signalled a certain interest in bolstering European Union political norms and modes of interaction in the PA, but they were not part of any broad project to link the region 55

Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests, p. 162. Hella Pick, ‘Outburst by Mellor angered Thatcher’, The Guardian (15 January 1988); John Carvel, ‘Mellor stance unites parties’, The Guardian (12 January 1988). 57 Andrew McEwen, ‘Meetings with PLO suspended’, The Times (3 September 1990). 58 Michael Knipe ‘Major puts case for conference to Shamir’, The Times (7 December 1990); Colin Narbrough, ‘EC toughens stance on Arab boycott’, The Times (13 May 1991). 59 Arthur Leathley, ‘Prime Minister carries aid into PLO heartland’, The Times (15 March 1995). 60 Amnon Barzilai, ‘The British like our defence mechanisms’, Ha’aretz (29 August 2000). 61 Anthony Parsons, ‘Britain, Europe and the Middle East’, Middle East International, (21 June 1996), pp. 16–17. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Mr Robin Cook, Press Conference’ (26 November 1998), www.fco.co.uk 56

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with Europe. In fact, Britain has been critical of PA corruption related to EU financial assistance.62 With the return of the Israeli Right to power in 1996, internal tensions within British policy re-emerged. During the British presidency of the European Union in the Spring of 1998, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook made his controversial visit to Israel, visiting the settlement at Har Homa but not the Israeli Holocaust Museum Yad Vashem, and publicly hugged PA Chairman Yasir Arafat, while coolly receiving Israeli ministers.63 At the same time Prime Minister Blair held talks in the region and in London. The focus of the British Presidency was to promote economic development in the PA, with which the EU was heavily involved.64 Meanwhile, Blair reiterated Britain’s support for US diplomatic proposals and made it clear that Britain did not seek to supplant the US in any way.65 Against this backdrop the idea of an Israeli – Palestinian summit hosted by Blair was co-ordinated by British and US officials.66 The American orientation in British policy was also evident regarding the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence by Arafat. Rather than simply recognize a unilateral declaration of statehood by the Palestinians, as Spain and Italy suggested, Britain and Germany led the effort to adopt the US line, against recognition of such a move.67 When Ehud Barak came to power in Israel in 1999 and began to make bold moves in the peace process, Blair expressed ‘101% support’ for Barak, leading a campaign to normalize Israel’s position in the UN by calling for Israeli entry into the Western European group.68 The Collapse of the Peace Process 2000 – The year 2000 witnessed the collapse of the Oslo process and with it the eclipse of the assumptions that had dominated British and European thinking toward Israel and the Palestinians throughout the 1990s. It had been widely believed that the conflict was winding down, and that a final settlement was imminent. This assumption now appeared questionable, leading to greater tension, over how to respond to this situation, between the Diplomatic and Strategic orientations, with their ties to the EU and US viewpoints, respectively. The tension between these two orientations increased further following the terrorist attacks on the US on 9 September 2001 and against the background of the American campaign against Saddam’s Iraq. On the one hand, the British Left and the EU opposed the war on Iraq, distinguished between Palestinian and Al Qaida terrorism and supported prioritizing an attempt to resurrect the Israeli – Palestinian peace process, primarily 62

Michael Binyon, ‘Arafat warned on funds misuse’, The Times (15 July 1997); Maria Colvin, ‘British Aid for Gaza went to Arafat Men’ Sunday Times (6 November 1994). 63 Christopher Walker, ‘Britain spearheads EU drive to halt new Israeli homes on West Bank’, The Times (14 January 1998); Christopher Walker, ‘Britain warns Netanyahu not to crush Palestinian hopes’, The Times (6 June 1996). 64 Michael Binyon ‘Blair rebukes Israel over stalled Oslo Agreement’, The Times (14 November 1997); Lucy Ward, ‘Blair quest for Mid East Peace’, The Guardian (18 April 1998); David Makovsky, ‘Blair makes some headway in brokering peace get-together’, Ha’aretz (20 April 1998). 65 Ian Black, ‘Middle East talks in London’, The Guardian (5 May 1998). 66 Lucy Ward, ‘Israeli talks offer seals Blair tour’, The Guardian (22 April 1998). 67 Ian Hazboun, ‘EU to recognise Palestine’, The Guardian (21 June 2000); Joel Borger ‘Bloody Palestine’, The Guardian (28 August 1998); Dana Harman ‘Netanyahu off to Europe tomorrow’, Jerusalem Post (24 November 1998). 68 Bernard Josephs, ‘UK backs Israel bid for UN group’, Jewish Chronicle (12 November 1999); ‘Blair backs Barak 101%’,Ha’aretz (22 July 1999).

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through pressure on Israel. On the other hand, the Bush administration took the opposite approach on all these questions. Tony Blair tried to synthesize these two orientations, in line with the traditional ‘bridging’ role played by Britain. On the one hand, Blair adopted the Strategic orientation, supporting the US war against Saddam. On the other hand, he argued that reform of the Arab world required a resolution of the Arab– Israeli conflict, since Arab regimes used the conflict as an excuse for blocking domestic change. Blair also argued that progress in the Arab– Israeli arena was a factor in combating terrorism in Europe itself, as he declared in his opening speech at the London Conference on Palestinian Reform in March 2005, ‘There’s probably no more pressing political challenge than to move this process forward, because it has a relevance on the streets of Britain, on the streets of European countries as well as in the Middle East itself’.69 To begin with, the renewed violence between Israelis and Palestinians led to the resurgence of the Diplomatic orientation bolstered by the Left’s ideological outrage at Israeli policy. Remarks by Cherie Blair, and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and Liberal Democrat MP Jenny Tonge seemed to express understanding for the motivations of suicide bombers.70 Straw’s words led to the cancelling of a planned meeting between him and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Other comments by Straw, on alleged ‘double standards’ at the UN regarding Security Council resolutions dealing with Iraq and those dealing with Israel indicate the extent to which the British government’s position often sounds similar to that of the European mainstream. More substantively, the Blair government hosted Syrian president Bashar al-Asad on an official visit in December 2002, despite his regime’s continued sponsorship of rejectionist Palestinian terrorist organizations. On the other hand, Britain opposed calls within the EU for the freezing or rescinding of trade agreements with Israel. Moreover, Blair has been among the European statesmen most critical of the PA’s failure to act against terror.71 Blair also stood out among European leaders in expressing early approval of Ariel Sharon’s plan for unilateral disengagement.72 The unique stance of the Blair government showed itself once more after President George Bush’s speech of 24 June 2002, in which Bush said that Middle East peace would not be achieved unless Arafat was replaced. The speech was widely criticized by EU leaders. Blair, by contrast, expressed an equivocal position. On the one hand, he substantively agreed with his European colleagues and British officials continued to meet Arafat. On the other hand, Blair echoed Bush’s remarks by stating that the Palestinians had to realize ‘the consequences of electing people who are not serious negotiating partners’.73 Subsequently, Blair tried to get the US to undertake a strong diplomatic initiative towards the Israeli– Palestinian conflict, in the form of the Road Map, prior to or in parallel with, the war against Iraq.74 However, President Bush delayed the formal announcement 69 ‘PM’s opening statement, London Meeting Supporting the Palestinian Authority. 1 March 2005’, http://www. pm.gov.uk/output/Page7234.asp 70 ‘UK’s Straw voices compassion for suicide bombers’, Ha’aretz (27 May 2002); Nicholas Watt, ‘Lib Dem MP: Why I would consider becoming a suicide bomber,’ The Guardian (23 January 2004). 71 Hansard (22 April 2002). 72 Aluf Benn ‘Blair: I will gather international support for Gaza pullout’, Ha’aretz (7 April 2004); Joe Lyons, ‘Israel must pull out of Gaza, says Blair’, The Scotsman (25 May 2004). 73 Janine Zacharia, ‘Bush threatens to halt PA funds’, Jerusalem Post (27 June 2002); Herb Keinon, ‘Britain pursues contacts with Arafat’, Jerusalem Post (3 July 2002). 74 Douglas Davis, ‘Blair: Arab–Israeli peace talks should precede strike on Iraq’, Jerusalem Post (4 August 2002).

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of the plan until after the main war in Iraq was completed. With the issuing of the Road Map in April 2003 British policy toward the Israeli – Palestinian conflict became, in essence, an attempt to keep the plan alive in the minds of American policymakers. In this vein, in an attempt to kick-start negotiations, Britain tried to facilitate reform of the Palestinian security services. This was important because the US considered Palestinian reform as the first chronological step of the Road Map that has to be enacted before Israel would be expected to make political concessions. Alistair Crooke of MI6, operating under a formal EU umbrella, tried to arrange an internal Palestinian cease-fire. He argued that it was necessary to deal directly with the Palestinian opposition, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Tanzim. In 2003 Blair rejected Crooke’s approach, following the US in defining Hamas as a terrorist organization.75 Instead, Britain obtained US support and Israeli acquiescence for an international conference on Palestinian reform, which was held in London in March 2005. At that conference Blair seemed to shift towards the Diplomatic orientation by arguing that progress in the Arab– Israeli arena was a factor in combating terrorism in Europe itself.76 This also seemed to be the government’s line immediately following the terrorist attacks on London on 7 July 2005. However, one month later, Blair swung back to the Strategic orientation, declaring: ‘There is no justification for killing people in Israel either . . . There is no justification for suicide bombing, whether in Palestine, London, Egypt or the United States of America . . . We are not having any of this nonsense about it being to do with what Britain is doing in Iraq or Afghanistan or support for Israel or support for America, all the rest of it. It is nonsense and we have to confront that. And when we confront it we will start to beat it’.77 Conclusion British policy in the Arab– Israeli arena has been informed by two widely differing viewpoints, labelled the Diplomatic orientation and the Strategic orientation. The former has been stronger in the FCO and backed by ideological supporters of the Palestinians, while the latter has tended to be represented by British Prime Ministers and backed by ideological supporters of Israel. These two orientations, and the bodies which have tended to uphold them, correspond to the wider dichotomy in British foreign policymaking between membership in the community of European states, and the special relationship with the US. In this regard, the Diplomatic and Strategic outlooks correspond to a more ‘European’ and more ‘American’ view, respectively. Since the early 1970s the EU – US tension has become increasingly influential in determining British policy, as Britain could no longer act independently as a great power. The same rival Diplomatic and Strategic conceptions which emerged, for example, in the debate during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 have been apparent in the post Cold War period, and have served to set Britain apart from other EU member states. The ending of the Cold War led to increasingly close relations between Britain and Israel, and a corresponding close relationship between Britain and the emergent Palestinian Authority, as the zero-sum aspect of the conflict 75 76 77

Shmuel Bar, ‘Gaza—The British are coming’, Access Middle East (11 April 2004). See note 69. ‘PM’s Press Conference, 26 July 2005’, www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page7999.asp

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appeared to lessen. Despite the collapse of the Oslo process the basic parameters of the British view of the conflict, of its ultimate solution, and of the road leading toward that solution, have in fact remained remarkably consistent with British policy in the 1970s and 1980s. The context in which policy is to be implemented has changed. But the basic thinking behind those policies has remained consistent. Regarding the relative effectiveness of the diplomatic and strategic orientations—the diplomatic orientation has, on occasion, shielded Britain from the repercussions that a more activist policy might have brought—for example, Britain avoided the economic costs of support for pro-western Israel in the Yom Kippur war of 1973, which were incurred by the United States and Holland. Adherence to the Diplomatic orientation, however, lessens the British ability to play a mediating role in the Arab – Israeli conflict, since it inevitably engenders the opposition of the Israelis, and hence lessens the effectiveness of ‘bridging’. This is important because, the UK, unlike the US, cannot impose itself as a mediator on Israel. This was evident in January 2003 when Britain attempted to host a conference on Palestinian reform, which failed when Israel refused to allow the Palestinian delegates to leave the country to attend.78 Conversely, the occasions when Britain has clearly followed the strategic orientation, such as support for US bombing of Libya in 1986, or Tony Blair’s involvement in the Iraq War of 2003, may have earned immediate criticism from regional leaders, but this has had little lasting effect. Margaret Thatcher secured the al-Yamama arms deals with the Saudis despite her backing for the bombing of Libya. Tony Blair’s involvement in the Iraq War did not prevent his securing of Palestinian involvement in his London conference initiative. The instinct to ‘bridge’ between US and European policy remains constant, though it has been increasingly called into question.79 This alternative to bridging involves following the French lead in trying to create an alternative European axis of power to the US. Such a move would be unlikely to improve Britain’s standing in Europe, given that the new EU member states prefer the bridging strategy in any case. Moreover, such a strategy would probably hinder the peace process by allowing recalcitrant parties to play off international actors against each other.80 On the other hand, the bridging strategy has, on occasion; strengthened Britain’s standing while contributing to a more united and thus more influential international role in the peace process. In this vein, it is unlikely that there would have been a conference on Palestinian reform in 2005 without British leadership, as the US was not inclined to act, while the other major powers in the EU lacked the ability to gain US and Israeli support, without which no progress could be made. However, Blair’s vision of Britain as a ‘pivotal power, a power that is at the crux of alliances and international politics which shape the world’81 is completely unrealistic. Britain’s ‘bridging’ role may be useful, but it is hardly pivotal. Ultimately, British diplomatic efforts depend on the good will of other parties, not 78

Robert Greene, ‘Israel, Britain at odds over forum’, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (10 January 2003). See William Wallace, ‘The collapse of British foreign policy’, International Affairs, 82(1) (2005). For an argument in favour of bridging see Gordon, Transatlantic allies and the changing Middle East. 80 It is worth noting that the peace process only took off when the USSR decided to follow the US lead in the Middle East. More recently, an independent French diplomatic intervention in autumn 2000, scuppered US-led efforts to negotiate a Palestinian– Israeli ceasefire, see Gilad Sher, Within Touching Distance (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonoth, 2001) [Hebrew] pp. 294–298. 81 Cited in Wallace, ‘The collapse of British foreign policy’, p. 55. 79

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on British power. The conference on Palestinian reform did not produce significant results. Indeed, in endeavouring to meet all sides partway, and lacking the necessary muscle to insist on anything, Britain always run the risk of eventual irrelevance. While, the cost of this has been low, the real returns in terms of influence wielded remain questionable. Moreover, if expectations are raised by grandiose promises that are not fulfilled, then British prestige will be damaged and its political capital depleted. In any case, it might be argued that ‘bridging’, while allowing Britain the satisfying sense of ‘punching above its weight’ in the Middle East, often produces the appearance, rather than the reality, of substantive influence. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for their insightful comments and Ms Na’ama Naor for her assistance in preparing this article.

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