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THE URBAN INSTITUTE

Building Knowledge about Crime & Justice in the Global Age: Infrastructure First Address to the Fifth Biennial Conference of International Perspectives on Crime, Justice and Public Order Bologna, Italy June 8, 2000

JEREMY TRAVIS, SENIOR FELLOW

THE URBAN INSTITUTE 2100 M STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20037 | fax 202-659-8985 | e-mail [email protected]

phone 202-261-5587

The nonpartisan Urban Institute publishes studies, reports, and books on timely topics worthy of public consideration. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders.

Dear General Barbato, fellow panelists and colleagues: I am very pleased to join you this morning and to participate in this Fifth Biennial Conference on International Perspectives on Crime, Justice and Public Order and wish to express my appreciation to John Jay College of Criminal Justice, University of Bologna, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the other sponsors of this conference. I was privileged to participate in the fourth conference, held in Budapest, and look forward to meeting with you again in two years. These conferences have the potential for becoming an important forum for scholarly discussion about the international criminal justice challenges we face. My topic this morning is the development of knowledge about crime and justice in a global era. I realize that the title for this plenary session is ^the use of technology in criminal justice,] so it might seem, at first, that a discussion of the research agenda on criminal justice matters might seem out of place in a plenary also devoted to discussion of the power of automated fingerprint systems and the implications of the science of DNA. On closer examination, however, I think that our topics are indeed linked _ we are all talking about the role of science in our societyZs response to crime, and ways to harness the power of scientific inquiry to achieve a better society. And, as you will soon see, it is the thesis of my presentation that we in the field of criminal justice should look to other disciplines, other sciences, particularly the health and physical sciences, to find models we should emulate to enhance the development of useful knowledge about responses to the challenges of crime and justice in the global era. I. The Changing Nature of Crime and Justice in the Global Era We should begin our discussion by recognizing that we live in a remarkable era, one in which the nature of crime, the nature of our response to crime, and the centrality of crime to the future of the nations of the world are all without precedent. I think there are three distinct dimensions to this new global1 reality which, taken together, create the context for a new strategy for research that will assist in the development of sound policy and practice. A. First Reality: Transnational Crime. It has certainly been the case through much of this history of nations that crimes were committed across national boundaries, but in the new global era, the phenomenon of transnational crime has taken on new dimensions. Crimes committed in one country can more easily have impacts in other countries. Offenders can more easily move across borders to commit crimes and to evade detection. And the global economies and technologies have made possible a greater number of criminal schemes and opportunities. Three years ago, the National Institute of Justice asked the National Academy of Sciences, the highly prestigious, independent scholarly academy of the United States, to examine the phenomenon of transnational crime and to design a research agenda for understanding it better. The Academy, in its report, identified three factors that have converged to create an environment in which transnational crime can flourish _ first, the globalization of the economy, 2

second the rise in immigration, and third the improved communications technology that has transformed our world so that national borders no longer serve as barriers to human communication.2 These three forces both define our global era, and make possible a new strain of criminal activity, some of it highly organized and some of it quite fluid. These three forces _global economics, immigration, communications technology _ also appear to be gaining momentum, so we can confidently predict that the new types of criminal behavior will continue to evolve at a high rate. B. Second Reality: International Justice. The second powerful trend we can observe is the movement toward international systems of justice. In order to respond to these changing crime conditions, and to the changing political structures among nations, we feel compelled to develop new legal institutions and understandings. Multi-lateral assistance treaties are being developed on any number of topics. Extradition treaties are proliferating. International police forces and multi-national task forces of law enforcement agencies are expanding. The body of substantive law is also expanding, with new definitions of international crimes and human rights violations that can be adjudicated before international tribunals. Nowhere are these issues more pressing than in the European Union where new political arrangements, and newly open borders, with increasing immigration and transnational commerce, have created an imperative to develop new forms of law enforcement and adjudication. The new order that is being born is also reflecting certain geopolitical realities. The United States is exerting enormous influence over the globalization of the worldZs systems of policing and justice as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs Service and other American law enforcement agencies establish offices overseas, train foreign counterparts, and develop operational links with local police agencies. At the level of diplomacy, the American influence is felt as well, as the United States exerts its sway over negotiations of multilateral treaties on extradition and transnational organized crime. The net effect of these developments is the emergence of a kind of lex americana, with insufficient attention being paid, in my view, to the consequences for national and local legal traditions. C. Crime and Justice in Emerging Democracies. The third dimension to the new global reality is that the welcome transition from totalitarian regimes to democratic forms of government has often been accompanied by rises in crime, fear of crime, and calls for the police, who, under the prior regime, may have enforced the wishes of the class in power, to bring crime down and restore order. Whether it is in Haiti, or South Africa, or Russia, the efforts to establish democratic regimes have been threatened by the rise in crime and the difficulties in creating an effective police and adjudicative capacity that reflects those democratic values. The crimes that concern these countries may not be “new” crimes, such as transnational crime. Increased drug dealing, high levels of street violence, a wave of car jackings, intergroup hatred and violence _ all of these can be highly corrosive of the publicZs trust in government if the government cannot bring them under control. And, if the prior (more repressive) regime did not experience these crime conditions, then the forces of the old

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order have won another skirmish in their battle to return to the status quo ante. The unique problem of official corruption deserves special mention. In a fragile democracy, where the police forces are not accustomed to investigating crimes by agents of the state, the rule of law is uncertain, the prosecution and judiciary have no tradition of independence, and the weak economy provides temptations to government workers to supplement their income. In these fragile democracies, the risk of corruption on the part of government officials is high. Combined with an unstable economy and weak forms of business regulation, the potential for organized criminal behavior, sometimes sanctioned by the corrupt acts of government officials, is also very high. The net effect of these powerful social forces is that to create a threat to the viability of the many new democracies around the world. So, in my view, these three historical forces _ the breeding of new forms of transnational crime, the development of international systems of justice, and the threats posed by crime to emerging democracies _ combine to create an imperative for better understanding of the phenomenon of crime and the effective responses to crime. II. The State of the International Research Infrastructure Set against these powerful three forces that are bringing about fundamental changes in the worlds of crime and justice, we should ask ourselves whether we have adequate understanding of the changing nature of crime _ adequate to the task of providing for societies that are safe and just. To ask the question is to answer it _ clearly our knowledge is weak and our understanding of the forces that produce low crime rates and effective responses is poor. Before turning to a substantive discussion of the gaps in our knowledge, we should take a moment to ask what a system might look like that could produce useful knowledge about these forces. We should envision the infrastructure of a global research program on crime and justice. A. The Building Blocks of Research Infrastructure. I have consciously chosen to use the word “infrastructure” to describe a social capacity to produce this knowledge. Infrastructure connotes strength, durability, and dependability. We also think of infrastructure as encompassing the support systems _ the highways, buildings, waterways, communications networks that make organized human endeavor possible. Infrastructure also conveys a sense of purposefulness _ as a society, we had to decide to create infrastructure in order to support and sustain our development; we had to invest today in order to make tomorrow more productive. So, using this metaphor of infrastructure, we should ask what the highways, the buildings and the communications networks should look like that could sustain the development and dissemination of knowledge about crime in our global era. In my view, this global research infrastructure would have five components _ it would be built on good data, would reflect independence and integrity in research method and research findings, would embrace the opportunities for regional, economic and cultural diversity and inclusion, would reflect international priorities and would work in close partnership with international entities developing policy.

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LetZs take a look at these building blocks and see whether our current infrastructure is ready for the challenges of the global era. 1. Data. The most basic building block is that we have good data about crime, fear, safety and the operations of the formal systems of justice. Over the past twenty-five years, there has been a sustained effort by the United Nations to create data on these topics through the UN Crime Survey.3 Yet, I think a fair assessment would conclude that these efforts have not been very uniformly successful. In part, this shortcoming lies in the nature of the data being collected. Any system that depends upon official reports of crimes is inherently suspect. Governments are understandably reluctant to publicize the levels of crime, or the efficiency of their courts, police and prison systems. There are also problems with definitions, with recording systems, with yearto-year fluctuations. A number of critiques of the United Nations Crime Survey have demonstrated the limited reliability of those data. At the National Institute of Justice, we awarded a visiting fellowship to Professor Bill Burnham of England who documented many of the weaknesses of the UN data set. This is not to say that the problems are uniform across all countries _ some countries have official reports that are highly reliable.4 But even in those countries _ and I include my own _ official records are often inadequate to the important task of analyzing crime trends. But this problem points to a deeper, structural problem, namely the difficulty of relying on data that are reported to an external agency, in this case the United Nations, where there is little effort by the external agency to work with the reporting countries to ensure the integrity and value of the data being reported. By contrast, the creation of the International Crime Victimization Survey, developed by Jan van Dijk, Pat Mahew, Ugi Zvekic, Matti Jousten and others, shows that a international survey on crime can be administered, with high reliability and integrity.5 The ICVS is loosely coordinated by UNICRI, the United Nations Interregional Crime Research Institute, with a heavy emphasis upon scientific rigor and independence. Similarly, I understand that the European Union is now engaged in an effort to standardize data across the EU countries _ called the EUCLID project, or the European Union Crime and Law Indicator Development Project _ and this effort holds great promise for creating a research capacity that will enormously benefit our understanding of crime trends in the European Union.6 I also note, with personal pride, the efforts of the National Institute of Justice to create the International ADAM project _ “I-ADAM” stands for the International Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring project which will create in a half dozen countries the first uniform, empirically rigorous assessment of the relationship between illegal drugs and crime.7 Why is it so important to create this data infrastructure? We need only review briefly the report recently published by HEUNI, the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control located in Helsinki.8 Using the criminal justice data collected by the UN Survey, augmented by the international crime victimization survey, and further merged with data from the World Health Organization, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Transparency International,

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among other data sets, HEUNI was able to publish a highly sophisticated, scientifically robust analysis of crime in Europe and North America. This analysis, the first of its kind, linked crime data to important factors such as alcohol consumption, car ownership, levels and perceptions of corruption, gun ownership, and population densities. In their book, the authors were able to develop typologies of countries arrayed by level of violent crime, property crime, corruption, and other important variables. The HEUNI report sets a new standard for scientific inquiry, but it could only be conducted because of the reliability of the data.9 So, one of our first tasks must be to create the data infrastructure to track crime conditions, to document the work of the police and the agencies of justice, to assess citizen satisfaction with the criminal justice response of their government. This data infrastructure should exist in all countries, not just developed countries. The data should be collected on an ongoing basis, not just occasionally. It should either be collected independently _ independent of governments _ or, if collected by governments, it should be open to review. The role of the international community is to provide financial support, leadership in development of data systems, technical assistance for the development of uniform systems, insistence on public access to the data for accountability and research purposes. But the sad reality is that we are so far from achieving this baseline of reliable data. 2. Independence and Integrity A second fundamental building block of research infrastructure is to support the integrity and independence of the research process. Much of our international policy development in the crime policy arena is understandably driven by the agendas of governments. So it is difficult to imagine that these same governments would support the independence of the research process, particularly when the research process might produce results displeasing to the government. Yet this is precisely what we need to accomplish. We need critical, objective assessments of the changing nature of crime and the effectiveness of our responses to crime. We need to document the rise in crime in a new democracy, even if it gives the government a public relations problem. We need to evaluate the effectiveness of our international training programs even if the evaluation shows they are not having their desired results. We need to open up our prisons, courts, police departments and prosecutors offices to independent, objective scholarly assessment, even if the picture they paint is not pretty. We need to create an objective, independent capacity to learn from the many natural experiments in development of democratic forms of security and justice. It is remarkable that we begin each new intervention in countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and others without adequate attention to the lessons learned from earlier efforts.10 In short, we need an international understanding about the importance of this research, and its long term benefits _ and I fear that understanding is lacking. Our natural partner in this goal should be the universities of the world, illustrative of a form of infrastructure that should be a perfect vehicle for creating independent, scientifically respectable research on crime and justice issues. There are a number of examples of universities that have met this challenge _ I think of the Nathanson Centre on Organized Crime at York University in Toronto and I am sure there are others represented in this room. We need to bring them into this discussion and encourage governments (and others) to support the creation of

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centers of scholarship that will examine one or more of the key issues on our international agenda. 3. Regional, Economic and Cultural Diversity Third, in our global age, we need to recognize the importance of regional relationships, as well as economic and cultural diversity. Often, the regional character of an issue is more important than its national or international character. Many social policy issues are organized around regions of the world _ economic issues, health issues, political relationships _ and it would be quite natural for crime and justice research issues to be organized regionally as well. For example, the Central and Latin American countries are coming together to create a Justice Studies Center that will focus on changes in the justice systems of those countries _ a natural linkage given the common jurisprudential heritage of that region of the world. But our ideal research infrastructure would also tap into cultural diversity for substantive purposes, not just geopolitical purposes. For us to understand crime and the social context within which crime occurs, we should welcome the opportunity to look at crime in different cultural settings. For example, the Kriminologishes Forschungsinstut von Niedersachsen (KFN) conducted research on the levels of child abuse and domestic violence among immigrant families living in Germany as well as German families _ and found very high levels of both phenomenon among Turkish immigrants. The researchers then discussed these findings in Turkey and have now undertaken a similar study in Turkey in order to gain understanding of the impact of the immigrants’ experience upon these important issues of family violence.11 A second example also illustrates the point. The report by Bill Burnham on the UN Crime Survey pointed out the following puzzle in the data. In Japan, during the 1980's, of 100 juvenile arrests, approximately 80% of them were disposed of by a caution, or some other informal disposition. In Italy, over the same period, 100 juvenile arrests would result in 80% of them being formally charged and handled through traditional prosecution.12 Why is this so? With comparable data on the table, we can begin the important discussion about our different approaches to crime and offending behavior, a discussion that should enrich research and practice and our understanding of cultural differences in both countries. Our research will be infinitely richer and deeper if we could create true comparative research agendas that cut across country, region, language and culture. And this ideal research agenda would not reflect a domination by developed countries, as does the current research knowledge base. This means that we need to support scholars in all countries of the world; we need research conferences that do not reflect American and Western European domination. The International Society of Criminology meets only every five years; the American Society of Criminology cannot house a truly international discussion; this conference in Bologna reflects the profile of its sponsors; the annual meeting of the UN Commission are devoted to the important work of governments, not research on trends in crime and justice. There are exciting developments in the growth of the internet as a way to create a global research community. At NIJ we were particularly pleased to sponsor Sergey Chapkey and the Rule of Law Foundation in its development of justinfo.net. But access to the internet is not the same as collaborative

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research. So there is substantial room for development of this building block of our infrastructure. 4. Reflecting International Priorities Fourth, it is particularly important, in my view, that the international research agenda on crime and justice issues reflect international priorities. Understandably, there will always be issues of local and national concern, but I think the goal for this new international research agenda should be to focus on particular crime problems that are particularly pressing in the new global era, and would benefit from a comparative approach. Prior to coming to this conference, I was in contact with Professor James Lynch of the American University in Washington, D.C. on the question of the contours of such an agenda He nominated nine research topics that he thought should be on any respectable international research agenda. I pass them along to you, with my endorsement, to illustrate the difference between an international and a national research agenda. Professor Lynch suggested these priorities: 1. Immigration, and the criminal involvement of immigrant populations. 2. Drug problems, drug policies and their impact on society. 3. Social integration, absorption policies and the criminal behavior of second generation immigrants. 4. Private policing and social inequality. 5. Police legitimacy _ threats and remedies. 6. Building community _ the role of community in crime control. 7. Technological approaches to crime prevention. 8. The use of prisons. 9. Human trafficking. I would add to this list a tenth priority — perceptions of the legitimacy of the processes of justice, which involves the trust in the police and criminal justice system, experiences with the police and criminal justice system, and experiences with corruption. In April of this year, Jan van Dijk, director of the Center for International Crime Prevention at the UN, presented some important and provocative research on crime rates and experiences with corruption to the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders.13 I recommend that anyone seriously interested in the issues of corruption and the rule of law become familiar with his

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research. For each of these areas, we can imagine how much richer the research agenda would be if the research were carried out in international context. For virtually all of these, a research agenda confined to one country, or even to one region of the world, would miss the complexity _ and therefore the intellectual challenge _ that would come from conducting the same research in other parts of the world. Building community, handling immigrants, drug policy, social exclusion issues _ all resonate differently in different parts of the world, yet our research tends to be isolated and therefore necessarily inadequate to the development of sound knowledge or informed policy. In this regard, it is important to note that the international community, particularly the United Nations Center for International Crime Prevention in Vienna, has made a commitment to combating _ and conducting research on _ transnational crime, particularly transnational organized crime. Under the leadership of Pino Arlacchi, Under Secretary General of the United Nations, the issue has been given a high priority. It is noteworthy that the international convention on transnational crime, now under consideration, calls for continuous reporting by signatory states on the incidence of this kind of crime. Even more important, twelve countries are now working together to administer a pilot version of a survey of transnational organized crime.14 So, it is encouraging to see this level of attention being paid to a research agenda on an issue of international importance simultaneous with a meeting of nations to respond to the underlying crime problem. If this model were embraced more widely _ in the consideration, for example, of issues involving trafficking in humans, or drug policy, or immigration conventions, then research could be supported that would benefit the development of new approaches to those issue. 5. Partnership with Policy Making Agencies Finally, I would assert that the research infrastructure on crime and justice issues should be conducted in an atmosphere of partnership with policy making agencies. This may sound like it contradicts the principle of independence I advocated a moment ago, but I have come to believe that independence need not be sacrificed by working closely with policy makers and practitioners, and, on the contrary, that the relevance of the research can be enhanced by such partnerships. For example, if we were conducting research on the effectiveness of international law enforcement training efforts by working with the police to conduct the evaluation, then our findings and any related policy implications could be released in a way that could improve training. I do not pretend that this transfer of research into practice works in all cases, nor even in a majority of cases, but I think we should look for those opportunities to work closely with colleagues in the world of practice who are open to research findings. In this regard, I must note how difficult it has been to get the support of the American policy making apparatus for research on international crime issues. With notable exception of a major research project in Ukraine, it was nearly impossible to get funds from the U.S. Department of State to support any kind of research. The State Department has been very supportive of the dissemination and technical assistance efforts of the National Institute of

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Justice. For three straight years, the U.S. Congress rejected the Clinton Administration’s modest request for $1.5 million to support research on international crime. Within the U.N. structure, the Center on International Crime Prevention has historically been underfunded compared to other centers in the U.N. The World Bank, and other international business institutions, have been reluctant to support research on the crime conditions that impede business development. We clearly have a long way to go before the international policy apparatus supports research on crime. III. Directions for the Future As we move forward to create this research infrastructure, we should be mindful of our successes, and honest about our failures, and inspired by the examples of other disciplines. I think we have successes we can be proud of. Even with all their shortcomings, the UN Crime Reports provide a solid beginning for the creation of a database on the operations of the systems of justice. Our governments need to support the efforts at standardization, data integration and electronic transfers of data so that these data can become timely, dependable and accurate. The victimization surveys are a great success story and need broader support. The new efforts in the area of transnational organized crime show that the processes of multilateral treaty negotiation can encompass a serious effort at collection of data, original research, and development of ongoing systems of measurement. But we should also remember that our knowledge is really shallow and our infrastructure is quite immature. We need only to look to other disciplines to see how far we have to go. Our colleagues in the health sciences, for example, are far ahead on all measures. To begin with a critique of my own government, I note that the National Institutes of Health, within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, accounts for the majority of funds available for international health research, but the National Institute of Justice has been unable to secure any congressional funding for international crime research. At the international level, the World Health Organization sponsors surveillance programs that track diseases in all countries. The Global Burden of Disease Study actually projects disease burdens by different regions of the world. Although they face the same problem we do regarding data from underdeveloped countries, there is much more pressure from the international community to focus on health issues in those countries. We can look to another area of research and policy for inspiration, the agricultural research community. The Consultative Group for International Agriculture Research (CGIAR) conducts systematic analysis and projections of agricultural issues across countries. They have a remarkably robust data and research infrastructure. Established in 1971, they describe themselves as an informal association of 58 public and private sector members that supports a network of sixteen international agricultural research centers. The CGIAR budget for 1998 was $340 million and was fully funded by member contributions. The World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, the United National Development Programme and the United Nations Environment Programme are all cosponsors of CGIAR. They work to strengthen national agricultural research in developing countries, to conduct research programs in partnership with a variety of other institutions, and, in their words, seek to “mobilize the best in

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agricultural science on behalf of the worldZ s poor and hungry.”15 Their mission statement is as follows: “to contribute to food security and poverty eradication in developing countries through research, partnership, capacity building, and policy support.” I think we can learn from our colleagues in the health and agricultural sciences. The first step in building greater knowledge about crime and justice is to create the research infrastructure. Maybe some day soon there will be an international organization, like CGIAR, that will have as it mission, “to contribute to the creation of safe and just communities around the world through research, partnership, capacity building, and policy support.” I thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you this morning.

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1

I use the word “global” as defined by McDonald in “Crime and Justice in the Global Village: Toward Global Criminology” in Crime and Law Enforcement in the Global Village (McDonald, ed. 1997). He distinguishes between “global” criminology, “comparative” criminology, and “international” criminology with “global” criminology viewing the issues of crime and justice throughout the world rather than merely comparing those phenomena across countries (p. 7). 2

Reuter, Peter, and Carol Petrie, (eds.), Transnational Organized Crime, Summary of a Workshop, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999.

3

van Dijk, J.J.M., “Does Crime Pay?; On the Relationships between Crime, Rule of law and Economic Growth,” Centre for International Crime Prevention, United Nations, Vienna.

4

Burnham, R.W., “A First Analysis of the United Nations Data Set on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems,” unpublished final report for the NIJ grant 97-MU-CX-0002.

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van Dijk, J.J.M., and Kristiina Kangaspunta, “Piecing Together the Cross-National Crime Puzzle,” National Institute of Justice Journal, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, January 2000.

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Personal communication with Bill Burnham.

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I-ADAM participating countries are Australia, Chile, England, Scotland and South Africa. Other governments have also expressed an interest in participating in the I-ADAM program. The first publication based on the I-ADAM research platform provided a comparison of drug use rates among detained arrestees in the United States and England. (Taylor, Bruce, and Trevor Bennett, “Comparing Drug Use Rates of Detained Arrestees in the United States and England,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, April 1999 (NCJ 175052)).

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Kangaspunta, Kristiina, Matti Jousten, and Natalia Ollus (Eds.), Crime and Criminal Justice in Europe and North America, 1990-1994, Helsinki, Finland: HEUNI Publication No. 32, 1998.

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See also van Dijk, J.J.M., and Kristiina Kangaspunta, “Piecing Together the Cross-National Crime Puzzle,” National Institute of Justice Journal, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, January 2000.

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U.S. Department of Justice, “Policing in Emerging Democracies: Workshop Papers and Highlights,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1997, (NCJ 167024).

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Pfeiffer, Christian, and Peter Wetzels, “The Structure and Development of Juvenile Violence in Germany,” Forschungsberichte Nr. 76, Hanover: Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen (KFN), June 1999.

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Burnham, R.W., “A First Analysis of the United Nations Data Set on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems,” unpublished final report for the NIJ grant 97-MU-CX-0002.

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J.J.M. van Dijk, “The State of Crime and Criminal Justice Worldwide,” paper presented to the 10th United Nations Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, April 2000.

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For more information on the Global Programme Assessing Transnational Organized Crime Groups by the Centre for International Crime Prevention, see the United Nations Office for Drug Control Policy and Crime Prevention, Centre for International Crime Prevention at www.uncjin.org.

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For more information on The Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), see the website at www.cgiar.org.

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