Catherine Hundleby Review by

Hypatia, Inc. Review Author(s): Catherine Hundleby Review by: Catherine Hundleby Source: Hypatia, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 2008), pp. 233-237 Published by: Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25483233 Accessed: 21-06-2016 16:22 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms

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Book Reviews 233

inflicted by U.S. slavery and its enduring corrosive legacy. But it's a brief brief, and the discussion there, along with the survey of relevant literature, isn't nearly as well developed as those in earlier chapters. She doesn't provide much of an exploration of what it would mean and what it would take in this case to restore (or create) confidence, hope, and trust, especially in the absence of an adequate description of the institutions that continue to provide such sturdy and reliable support for the racism to which restorative justice is proposed as the best means of repair?for example the police, the criminal justice system, or uneven access to decent health care and education. Moral Repair does little to help us imagine the road from restorative justice initiatives in cities such as Greensboro, North Carolina, or universities such as Brown and Yale, to the kind

of drastic overhaul of the major societal institutions that at the very least fail to undermine racial discrimination and violence and too often serve to abet them.

Walker mentions as a promising restorative justice initiative Representative John Conyers's H.R. 40, a bill proposing, among other things, a kind of truth commission to study slavery and its legacy; and indeed, Conyers's proposal exemplifies Walker's reminder that "communities capable of responding are not always well-defined in advance, but may be formed in response to the demands of repair" (222), perhaps anticipating the by now common objection that "my ancestors had nothing to do with slavery, so don't expect me to do anything about it." But Walker doesn't note how difficult it has been for Conyers to get other representatives to sign on to the project: almost twenty years after he first proposed the bill, there are only about forty signatories, despite Conyers's reintroduction of the bill every year. It has yet to make it to consideration on

the House floor. That Conyers has not given up hope in its eventual passage does not relieve Walker of the need to comment on the resistance to it.

Perhaps in a sequel to this engaging book Margaret Walker will develop richer descriptions of the means by which restorative justice initiatives are or can be crafted to respond to the massive political and economic stanchions of racism to which she offers restorative justice as our best hope.

Scandalous Knowledge: Science, Truth, and the Human. By BARBARA HERRNSTEIN SMITH. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 2006. Catherine Hundleby Few people get excited about a new book on the science wars, given that the academic battle has persisted for at least thirty years and become quite tired. I am an exception because I work on feminist philosophy of science and face the battle on a daily basis, but I'm also quite exhausted by it all, and almost


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cynical. So I was encouraged to see Barbara Herrnstein Smith's Scandalous Knowledge: Science, Truth, and the Human. A rhetorical analysis by such a dis tinguished scholar (Braxton Craven Professor of Comparative Literature and English at Duke, and Distinguished Professor of English at Brown) promised fresh insight by taking a step back and considering the debates in a larger

historical context.

Herrnstein Smith's historical approach even accounts for the fatigue of the dialogue that has become known as "the science wars." The tediousness of the

debate of traditional and specifically rationalist against newer, radical, and social accounts of scientific knowledge receives a lively treatment that suggests direction for relief. When we stop making empty gestures toward resolution and

reconciliation in attempt to escape imaginary villains, we can move on with exploring the real reaches of what can be said about science. The scandalous aspects of knowledge begin with traditional epistemological skepticism, which claims that knowledge is impossible. The skeptical skeleton in the closet, which Herrnstein Smith so vividly pictures for us as periodically rattling chains, haunts all epistemological inquiry. But it is, she insists, a mere ghost, not seriously defended by anyone: a "straw herring" (39). That first scandal underpins the second, which arises from constructivist explanations of scientific knowledge. On that view, objects of understanding do not exist prior to or independently of human cognitive engagement, but rather are "constructed by" this activity. Constructivism differs from the more politicized "constructionism" that feminists among others (such as later Fou cault) develop, which "denaturalizes" scientific claims by pointing out their dependence on history and cultural practice.

The fear of constructivism depends on the allegations of relativism and skepticism that trace back at least to the 1960s, but that are nevertheless largely unsubstantiated. This fear is basically a reaction (a "backlash," I would suggest) that reveals the tenacity of early twentieth-century epistemology more than it reveals any problems with putative successors. Only from a position of dogmatic traditionalism, Herrnstein Smith argues, can constructivist approaches appear

to be perverse denials of the possibility of knowledge, and so to be invitations

to skepticism.

The third scandal (I think: it's not clearly named, although promised) is the employment of skeptical ghost stories to excuse the excesses of evolution ary psychology. In particular, Stephen Pinker cries out "relativist" in order to dismiss critics and rivals. Despite these linking themes, the book reads much like a series of papers, and can be read that way. Chapter 2 traces the history of the relativism scare to the early twentieth century. Observing that charges of "postmodern relativ ism" usually attack straw figures based on no recognizable person or position is familiar enough, as is criticism of "overheated interpretations and gratuitous


Book Reviews 235

inferences" (30). However, Herrnstein Smith reveals a worrying depth to these appeals to straw herrings, finding them even among Satya Mohanty, Donald

Davidson, and Charles Taylor. Chapter 3 looks back historically to Ludwik Flek to demonstrate how misplaced the concerns are over historical accounts of science. His Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (1935) directly influenced Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), and later gained currency in the

history and sociology of science. This original and inspirational constructiv ism, Herrnstein Smith argues, contains no hint of skeptical relativism, despite its account of truth as fluid. Flek requires that beliefs and theories be bodily

and materially engaged, and denies that truth reduces to belief or even to membership in a conceptual system. Of particular interest to feminist philosophers is chapter 4, which addresses how the illusory threat of skepticism undermines the project of feminist epis temology. The way that feminist philosophers situate themselves against the

existing dialogue appeals to the gerrymandered extremes of relativism and conservatism. The moderate middle position then claimed by feminist episte mologists repeats the error of antifeminist-epistemology philosophers such as Susan Haack and not-specifically feminist epistemologists. Whether the thus obscured position has a more conservative or more radical set of goals, those goals would be better served by abandoning moderate pretensions. Not only are claims of moderation dishonest; Herrnstein Smith argues they also create theoretical incoherences and detract from real innovation. Pursuing positions as far as possible to see where they'll lead us is more effective in demonstrating theoretical strength than the hedging that usually goes on. Chapter 5 begins to generate a larger picture of the contemporary scholarly impasse, and argues that integrating disciplines is a neither plausible nor desir

able response. Disciplinary distinctions are not based on traditional divides between normative and descriptive inquiry, but on differently specialized training. Failure to appreciate the expert training required for humanist schol arship is the reason that scientists dismiss "science studies," misperceiving it as a naive challenge to the authority of science. Furthermore, given the very real authority of science, the public gives little further thought to the accuracy of such accounts. The solution to the misunderstanding is engagement across disciplines in the form of cross-disciplinary courses and research centers. Cross ing disciplines does not entail merging them, however, and unifying projects such as E. O. Wilson's are fundamentally mistaken. The sixth and seventh chapters form a pair. Chapter 6 criticizes the preemp tive character of evolutionary psychology, claiming to have answered questions that remain, not only highly debatable but also heavily debated among scien tists themselves. The controversies are assuming that human sexuality differs very little from that of other animals, and that human minds function like


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computers. Ignoring the questions surrounding these views entails explanatory oversimplification.

Evolutionary psychology's oversimplification of the distinction between humans and nonhumans receives further treatment in the seventh chapter,

which also closes the book. So the discussion ends in a critical mode focused

specifically on evolutionary psychology. Given that there is no separate concluding chapter, this final theme must be taken to illuminate the whole book. Herrnstein Smith does not warn only against the conservatism of the traditionalism she identifies but also against all superficial claims of modera tion and evenhandedness that come from all political directions. Instead, she advises we embrace a "posthuman" ambivalence and contingency regarding our "naturalistic" connection to other animals, and regarding putatively scientific accounts of the human. Everyone in epistemology and philosophy of science, and many others across the academy, should read this book. Of course, few of us have the time. So pick up the book and read the chapter that fits your interests best (or perhaps the last

two chapters together), then keep it on your bookshelf so you can go back to it when the need and desire arise; they will. The breadth of research combined with depth of criticism may overwhelm the general public, but many scholars will appreciate individual chapters on their own. Feminist theorists of all kinds will be interested in chapter 4, especially for its criticisms of Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, and Lorraine Code. I suggest that Haraway can be excused for exploring popular tropes. Yet this is not Hard ing's method, so she can be fairly faulted for invoking stereotypes; and Code also positions herself without irony against the straw herrings of monolithic traditionalism and ghostly relativism. Nevertheless, parts of Herrnstein Smith's project resonate with Code's own arguments that we need new rhetorical spaces and ecological mindsets; so, the criticism of Code is fairly superficial, as is the

criticism of Harding given her forthright embrace of ambiguity. The incoher ences Herrnstein Smith claims to identify are not clearly exposed, and even if they were, the works she addresses are over ten years old; Haraway, Harding, and Code have moved on to more constructive and less defensive projects.

Also, skepticism is more than a specter that some philosophers seriously defend. And I remain unconvinced that there is no skepticism in the sociology

of science. Certainly, the whole "epistemological chicken debate" among the factions is premised on each approach having at least some skeptical implica tions. How deep a problem this is remains subject to debate, but even if the scandal is overblown, it is certainly real to those sociologists. Despite my quibbles, this book deserves to be very influential. It can help motivate and justify feminist theorists in moving on from the defensive position enforced by the specter of relativism that we face when we try to appease tradi

tional philosophers. Fighting the double standard against feminist epistemology


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has become a minor publishing industry, but it's time we stopped wasting our time on it. Admittedly, we often have to court favors and draw material resources from traditional bodies, and then must employ conservative rhetoric. Yet we should remember to resist employing and retrenching false stereotypes

employed by our theoretical opponents. Instead, we can laugh along with Herrnstein Smith, because she is wickedly funny as well as clear and profound.
