Christian Obermayr Informal Settlements in Surakarta ...

The Urban Book Series

Christian Obermayr

Sustainable City Management Informal Settlements in Surakarta, Indonesia

The Urban Book Series

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Aims and Scope The Urban Book Series is a resource for urban studies and geography research worldwide. It provides a unique and innovative resource for the latest developments in the field, nurturing a comprehensive and encompassing publication venue for urban studies, urban geography, planning and regional development. The series publishes peer-reviewed volumes related to urbanization, sustainability, urban environments, sustainable urbanism, governance, globalization, urban and sustainable development, spatial and area studies, urban management, urban infrastructure, urban dynamics, green cities and urban landscapes. It also invites research which documents urbanization processes and urban dynamics on a national, regional and local level, welcoming case studies, as well as comparative and applied research. The series will appeal to urbanists, geographers, planners, engineers, architects, policy makers, and to all of those interested in a wide-ranging overview of contemporary urban studies and innovations in the field. It accepts monographs, edited volumes and textbooks.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14773

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Christian Obermayr

Sustainable City Management Informal Settlements in Surakarta, Indonesia

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Christian Obermayr Institute of Geography University of Innsbruck Innsbruck Austria

ISSN 2365-757X The Urban Book Series ISBN 978-3-319-49417-3 DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49418-0

ISSN 2365-7588

(electronic)

ISBN 978-3-319-49418-0

(eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016958978 © Springer International Publishing AG 2017 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

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Foreword

Today, more than half of the world’s population lives in cities and more than 30% of all urban dwellers live in slums or slum-like marginalized quarters. Against this background, the provision of decent housing continues to be one of the main challenges of our urbanizing world. This is internationally recognized by the Sustainable Development Goals, approved in 2015, which establish as the first target of its Sustainable Development Goal 11 to ensure, by 2030, access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing as well as to ensure access to basic services and to upgrade slums. In the same sense, Habitat III, the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, has tried to progress in direction of a New Urban Agenda in 2016. However, once again it became clear very rapidly that the urgency of the worldwide deficits in the provision of adequate housing is not recognized enough as a political priority. This is insofar astonishing as the shortcomings in housing continue to cause severe conflicts in cities all over the world. To claim the ‘Right to the City’, as it became a common practice in recent years, means, above all, to fight against inequality and marginalization on the one hand, and the struggle for improvement of housing conditions, the access to basic services and for the guarantee of a self-determined life, on the other. Therefore, urban policies and urban governance not only have to design and to implement innovative strategies and measures to alleviate the still existing massive deficiencies in the housing sector, but also have, in a broader sense, to uncover and to eliminate the underlying causes of those deficiencies. This is the context of Christian Obermayr’s work which is based on his outstanding master’s thesis in urban geography. It is the Indonesian case study Surakarta, a mid-sized Javanese town, where he studied the dynamics of urbanization, housing patterns and, more specifically, measures of slum-upgrading and inner-urban resettlements during several months of empirical research. Concerning these issues, Surakarta represents an excellent case study, being internationally recognized as an example for ‘best practices’ in the fields of urban policy. Besides the very interesting findings of his empirical study, Christian elaborates a wider framework on urban development and urban policies in Indonesia as a whole.

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Foreword

This country has run through an accelerated process of urbanization only in recent years, causing manifold challenges for urban policies and urban planning. In order to contextualize the specific Indonesian political approaches and answers against this urban challenge, Christian Obermayr analyses systematically the international debates on housing strategies for the urban poor, on the treatment of informal settlements, marginalized quarters and slums, which have changed significantly over the last decades. Christian Obermayr’s book does represent an important contribution to the study of informal settlements, their characteristics and formation processes in general, highlights important strands of global discourses on adequate housing policies and gives deep insights into the recent state and developments of housing conditions of Indonesian settlements. Furthermore, it provides a detailed insight into the structure and processes of successful housing policies in an Indonesian city. All in all, Christian’s book is a remarkable contribution to the international and interdisciplinary discussion on one of the most challenging topics for our common urban future. Prof. Dr. Martin Coy Institute of Geography University of Innsbruck Innsbruck, Austria

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Preface

One billion people live in slums. Inadequate housing conditions prevail for a large part of humankind and efforts to ease the problem seem to be inadequate and not sufficient. This study contributes to the global debate on adequate housing policies by the presentation and comprehensive examination of the approach of an Indonesian city—Surakarta—in managing its informal settlements. The question is addressed whether Surakarta’s policy in dealing with the informal sector and marginal settlements can be a role model for other cities and an example for ‘good governance’. For this purpose, first, current trends in urban development, as well as international discussions on adequate strategies to improve the living conditions in slums are illustrated on both, a global and a national (Indonesian) scale. Following this analysis, a detailed examination of Surakarta’s housing policy regarding the poor— its procedures and mechanisms—is carried out, using four concrete programmes as examples. For understanding the procedures applied, Surakrta’s resettlement scheme is analysed in more detail. The results show that Surakarta’s city government has put in place an effective and inclusive approach characterized by community-based steering groups for implementing slum-upgrading and resettlement measures. By involving substantial parts of the affected residents, a political commitment for improving living conditions of the poor and showing elements of ‘good urban governance’ the examined policies can be assessed as inclusive and efficient. It can be argued, however, that the approach is top-down induced and shows also deficits regarding participation and transparency. This work is based on Christian Obermayr’s outstanding master’s thesis, defended in 2013 at the Institute of Geography, University of Innsbruck, Austria. Innsbruck, Austria

Christian Obermayr

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Acknowledgements

This book was tricky to compile. When I began to think about doing my thesis in Indonesia, I heavily underestimated the work lying ahead of me. Interestingly, the first idea to this study was born on one of the long rides on Argentina’s dusty roads. Crammed in a car with Martin Coy, enjoying free lectures and his comprehensive advice, the idea matured to do some field work in an Indonesian city. Martin, thank you for your guidance! The research would not have been possible without the financial support of University of Innsbruck which funded a part of the fieldwork. At the Institute of Geography, I had the possibility to become integrated into a great working group and I owe special thanks to you, the members of the AGEF, for your advice and your support with coffee and mate tea. You saved me from desperation… At this point I want to express my gratitude to all Indonesians, who supported my work in 2011, endured my questions and made me feel at home. Junun, Nurhadi, Emma and Utia, Fauzan, Fadilla, Febrisca, Ahmad, Hazan thank you for your help and your attempts to teach me some pieces of Bahasa Indonesia. A big matur nuwun goes to my flatmates in Solo’s English dormitory for their advice and kindness. In particular, I thank Ian who saved me from thieves and introduced me to his family and his hometown. I also thank the members of UNS, Pak Gamal and Ibu Winny for their professional council. In particular, I express my gratitude to Agung, without whom this work would never have had any chance to be realized. Thanks for your help with the interviews and for the great discussions! Furthermore, I want to express my thanks to all the staff of Solo’s government, for their support in all questions and their willingness to provide me with all available information. Thanks for all your efforts! Thanks are also owed to my parents, Rosemarie and Hans-Otto, who supported me and made my studies possible. Thanks also go to my sister Alexandra for her help with the graphics and proofreading. To my flatmates, Jenny and Viola, and all other friends, thanks for your patience in enduring my absence of social life. Last but most importantly, I owe thanks to my girlfriend Marina, who did not only proofread the whole work two times (!), but is also a sorceress in increasing my mood. Thank you for being there!

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Contents

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3 Informal Housing and Marginal Settlements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Slum, Squatter, Marginal and Informal—What Does It Mean? . . . . 3.2 UN-Habitat’s Slum Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 A Low-Cost Housing Typology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Central Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Purpose and Research Questions . 1.2 Structure and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part I

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Global Developments and Urban Challenges

2 The Global Development Context . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Population Growth and Urbanization . . . . . . 2.1.1 Reasons for Urbanization . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Effects of Urbanization . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Democratization and Decentralization . . . . . . 2.2.1 Democratization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Decentralization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Globalization and Neoliberalism . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Neoliberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Structural Adjustments . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Effects on Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Fragmentation, Inclusion and Exclusion . . . . 2.4.1 Fragmenting Development . . . . . . . . 2.4.2 Fragmentation in Cities . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3 Challenges for City Administrations . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

3.4 Formation of Slums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Invasion and Infiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 Model of Inner-City Migration and Its Influence on Squatter Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 The Global Housing Discourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1 Habitat I and Habitat II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2 ‘Cities Without Slums’ and the Millennium Development Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.3 Sustainable Development Goals and Habitat III . . . . . 3.6 Dimensions of the Challenge of Slums—Recent Data and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Global Housing Policies and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Stakeholders of Housing Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 The World Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 UN-Habitat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Phases of Housing Policies—A Historic Perspective . . 4.2.1 Negligence, Social Housing and Subsidies . . . . 4.2.2 Eviction and Resettlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 Assisted Self-help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.4 Enabling Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.5 Participatory Slum Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Constraints for Effective Housing Policies . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 The Concept of Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1 The Evolution of Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2 Urban Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3 Good Urban Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part II

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Indonesia

5 Introduction to Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Administrative Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Socio-economic Disparities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.4 Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Historical Paths. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Struggle for Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Guided Democracy and Authoritarian Rule . . . .

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5.3.3 Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.4 Consequences for Indonesian Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Indonesian Settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2 Distinctive Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.3 A Model of the Indonesian City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Dawn of the Urban Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1 Population Growth and Urbanization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2 Contemporary Urban Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Indonesia’s Slums and Housing Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.1 The Kampung Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.2 The ‘Kampung Improvement Programme’ (KIP) . . . . 5.6.3 Current Slum Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.4 Recent Developments in the Kampungs . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part III

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Case Study: The Indonesian City Surakarta . . . . . . . . . .

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7 Urban Policies in Solo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Participatory Planning: Musrenbang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Informal Sector Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Housing Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.1 Social Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.2 Slum-Upgrading I: ‘Program RTLH’. . . . . . . . . 7.3.3 Slum-Upgrading II: ‘Program RTLH Cluster’ . . 7.3.4 Programme Relocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Case Study: Resettlement of 112 Families . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.1 Socio-economic Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.2 Residents’ Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.3 Comparison Between Old and New Settlement . 7.4.4 Successful Relocation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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6 Introduction to Surakarta (Solo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Methods Used During the Fieldwork . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Solo, a City in Central Java . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Administrative and Socio-economic Setting . . . . . 6.4 The Housing Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1 Slums and Squatters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2 Pressing Issues and the Lack of Planning . 6.4.3 An Accurate Slum Map? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Spatial and Functional Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

Conclusion

8 Sustainable City Management–Final Considerations 8.1 Slums and Intervention Strategies–Global and Indonesian Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Surakarta’s Pro-Poor Policies Critically Assessed . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Appendix A: Indicators Used for Generating a ‘Slum Map’ for Solo City (cf. Sect. 6.4.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Appendix B: The Original Questionnaire Used for the Household Survey (n = 52) in the New Settlement in Mojosongo . . . . . 183 Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

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Abbreviations

BAPERMAS, PP, PA and KB

BAPPEDA BAPPENAS BLUD—GLH BPN BPS CBD CBO CSR DPPKA DPU DTRK GDP GNP IDR ILO IMF KADES KIP KTP

Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, Pemberdayaan Perempuan, Perlindungan Anak dan Keluarga Berencana—Agency of community and women empowerment, child protection and family planning Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah—Regional Development Planning Agency Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional—National Development Planning Agency Badan Layanan Umum Daerah—Agency of regional public service Baden Pertanahan Nasional Republik Indonesia—National Land Agency of Indonesia Badan Pusat Statistik—Central Agency of Statistic Central business district Community-based organization Corporate social responsibility Dinas Pendapatan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Aset—Office of Revenue, Finance and Asset Management Dinas Pekerjaan Umum—Office of Public Works Dinas Tata Ruang Kota—Department for spatial planning Gross domestic product Gross national product Indonesian Rupiah International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund Kepala Desa—Head of village administration Kampung Improvement Programme Kartu Tanda Penduduk—Identity Card

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LKMD/LPMK

MDG NGO PPP RPJMD RT

RTLH RTRW RUSI RW SUF UNDP UN-Habitat UNS VOC WTO

Abbreviations

Lembaga Ketahanan Mayarakat Desa—Community Residence Council—part of village administration. Later the name was changed to Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kelurahan (LPMK), mostly to differentiate to the Suhar-to era Millennium Development Goals Non-governmental Organization Public private partnership Rencana Pembangunan Jengka Menengah Daerah—Regional medium-term development plan Rukun Tetangga—Neighbourhood (smallest administrative unit), consisting of 10–50 households and headed by the Ketua RT Rumah tidak layak Huni—Sub-standard houses (slum houses) Rencana Tata Ruang Wilaya—General spatial plan Republik Indonesia Serikat Rukun Warga—Community unit (second smallest administrative unit), consisting of 5–10 RTs and headed by the Ketua RW Slum Upgrading Facility United Nations Development Programme United Nations Human Settlements Programme Universitas Sebeles Maret Vereinigte Oostindische Compagnie—United East India Company World Trade Organization

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List of Figures

Figure 2.1

Figure 2.2 Figure 2.3 Figure 2.4 Figure 3.1 Figure 3.2 Figure 3.3

Figure 3.4 Figure 4.1 Figure 4.2 Figure 4.3 Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2 Figure 5.3 Figure 5.4

Global population development 1950–2050 and share of urban and rural population (based on data from UN-DESA 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Global population growth 1985–2005, summed up for five year periods (based on data from UN-DESA 2014). . . . . . . Model of global fragmentation (reproduced from Scholz 2002: 7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fragmentation of Brazilian cities (reproduced from Coy and Töpfer 2014: 104) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Low-cost housing typology (based on Davis 2006: 41–46; Pacione 2005: 517–524; Samyahardja et al. 2006: 97) . . . . Exemplary model of migration flows and squatter formation in Latin-American cities (reproduced from Bähr 1986) . . . . Urban slum population in developing countries 1990–2010 (based on United Nations 2015b: 6; UN-Habitat 2016: 203) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Urban population and share of slum dwellers in the MDG regions 1990–2010 (Obermayr 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Changing housing policies in developing countries (by author). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sectors of society and actors involved in governance (based on United Nations 2007; Graham et al. 2003) . . . . . UN-Habitat’s characteristics of good urban governance (UN-Habitat 2003b: 19–29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indonesian provinces and capital cities (The Australian National University 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Administrative levels of Indonesia (by author) . . . . . . . . . . Population density of Indonesia’s regions 2010 (Obermayr 2012c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GDP distribution: share of Indonesia’s regions (based on BPS 2016b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Figure 5.5 Figure 5.6 Figure 5.7 Figure 5.8 Figure 5.9 Figure 6.1 Figure 6.2 Figure 6.3 Figure 6.4 Figure 6.5 Figure 6.6 Figure 6.7 Figure 6.8 Figure 6.9 Figure 6.10 Figure 6.11 Figure 6.12 Figure 6.13 Figure 6.14 Figure 7.1 Figure 7.2 Figure 7.3 Figure 7.4 Figure 7.5

List of Figures

Indonesia’s poverty rate 1996–2011 (based on Stalker 2007: 7; BPS 2016a, b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Human development index of Indonesia’s regions 2010 (Obermayr 2012a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Migration balance of Indonesia’s regions 2005–2010 (Obermayr 2012b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indonesia’s rural and urban population 1950–2050 (based on UN-DESA 2012a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indonesia’s urban and slum population 1990–2005 (based on UN-Habitat 2008: 178) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Applied methods and their connections (by author) . . . . . . . Sub-districts and selected quarters in Surakarta (Solo) (Obermayr 2012e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Surakarta (Solo) and surrounding region (by author) . . . . . . Impressions from Solo. Photos Obermayr (2011) . . . . . . . . Solo’s administrative units (modified, based on Solo Kota Kita 2010a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Solo 2010: population density (Obermayr 2012b) . . . . . . . . Solo 2010: distribution of poverty (Obermayr 2012a) . . . . . Solo’s metropolitan region—SUBOSUKAWONOSRATEN (by author). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Middle-class apartment block in Solo 2011. Photo Obermayr (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sub-standard housing areas in Solo. Photos Obermayr (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Identified slum and squatter areas in Solo 2011 (Obermayr 2012d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spatial location of probable slum areas in Solo 2010 (Obermayr 2012c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shopping malls and hotels west of the centre. Photos Obermayr (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commercial axis northeast of the centre. Photos Obermayr (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . One of the newly constructed markets (left) and kiosks in such a market (right) (Photos Obermayr 2011) . . . . . . . . The structure of the slum-upgrading programme—program RTLH (by author) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inadequate houses in Solo 2006 (RTLH) and upgraded houses until 2010 (by author) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Areas flooded during the 2007 flood event (Obermayr 2012a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The structure of Solo’s relocation programme (by author) . .

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. . 103 . . 112 . . 113 . . 116 . . 117 . . 119 . . 120 . . 121 . . 122 . . 124 . . 125 . . 127 . . 130 . . 132 . . 132 . . 139 . . 142 . . 144 . . 149 . . 150

List of Figures

Figure 7.6

Figure 7.7 Figure 7.8

Figure 7.9 Figure 7.10 Figure 7.11 Figure 7.12 Figure 7.13 Figure 7.14

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Relocation of 112 families from the riverbank in Kelurahan Pucang Sawit to a new settlement in Kelurahan Mojosongo (Obermayr 2012b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The new village in Mojosongo (Photo Obermayr 2011) . . . Each family receives one basic house (left); the installed septic tank is coated with concrete (right) (Photos Obermayr 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geographical location of the residents’ working place (by author). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The residents’ monthly household income (by author) . . . . Residents’ satisfaction with the new settlement (average of all answers, by author) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Resident’s satisfaction with the relocation process (average of all answers, by author) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Residents’ preferred place to live (by author) . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison between old and new settlement (by author) . .

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. . 154 . . 155

. . 156 . . 157 . . 158 . . 159 . . 160 . . 161 . . 162

List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 4.1

Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4

Table 6.5 Table 7.1 Table 7.2

UN-Habitat’s characteristics and indicators for slums (based on UN-Habitat 2003b: 11–12, 2008: 33) . . . . . . . . . . The habitat agenda: important commitments (based on UN-Habitat 1996b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dimensions and activities of the approach ‘participatory slum improvement’ (based on UN-Habitat 2003a: 164–187, 2009b: 53–54) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Country profile of Indonesia (if not indicated otherwise based on BPS 2016b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interviewed stakeholders and experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Population of Solo 2009 (based on BPS and BAPPEDA Surakarta 2009: 36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Slum and squatter households in Solo 2006 (Astuti 2009; BPS and BAPPEDA Surakarta 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Available indicators (Solo) and similar UN-Habitat indicators for creating a slum map (Solo Kota Kita 2010b; UN-Habitat 2003, 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defined indicators and thresholds for the creation of a slum map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Official criteria for slum houses (RTLH) in Solo (Perwali 13/2007 art. 5 & 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flood event 2007 in Solo: victims and received government aid (2008–2010) per quarter (data received from Bapermas Surakarta 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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43

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62

.. 77 . . 114 . . 119 . . 126

. . 129 . . 129 . . 142

. . 152

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List of Boxes

Box Box Box Box Box Box Box Box Box Box Box

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 7.1 7.2

Statistical Issues—What is Urban? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defining Urbanization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Decentralization—Explanation Attempts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Washington Consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The ‘Earth Summit’ (Rio 1992) and Agenda 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . Transmigrasi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pancasila . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Origins of the Asian crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Solo Kota Kita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kelurahan (LPMK) . . . . UN-Habitat’s Slum-Upgrading Facility (SUF). . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

. 11 . 13 . 15 . 17 . 41 . 84 . 87 . 89 . 127 . 137 . 145

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In political, socio-economic and environmental respects the last few decades of the twentieth century were characterized by changes without precedents. From a political view, humanity saw the collapse of the ‘second world’ resulting in the end of a simple and classifiable world. It was said, history came to an end, and western ideas became the leading ideology. Democracy in all its variations spread and was adopted by more and more countries and societies. The victory of western ideas meant also the triumph of capitalism and liberalization policies were increasingly pursued as the new economic paradigm. By pushing for open markets and free-trade, this economic shift was strongly promoted by the Bretton Woods Institutions1 and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Together with economic globalization, which was accelerated by advances in information and communication technologies, these developments brought many benefits and a considerable number of people was lifted out of poverty. However, the advantages are unevenly distributed since the majority of people and even entire regions are excluded from globalization or are unable to participate. Facing these global developments, it became clear that also global solutions are necessary. Under the aegis of the United Nations, world conferences were organized in order to find answers to the upcoming problems. The simple recognitions that every growth has its limits and that sustainable development could bring the ultimate solution for these global problems was adopted at the Rio conference in 1992—birth was given to the sustainability agenda. Since that date sustainable strategies are being developed and increasingly adopted at all tiers of governments around the world and initiatives are started at the very local level. The emergence of this discourse, the more and more evident impacts of global‐ ization as well as the changing patterns of political cooperation and governance are

1Bretton Woods Institutions: World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 C. Obermayr, Sustainable City Management, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49418-0_1

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1 Introduction

only few examples, which are still shaping an increasingly complex world at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The plans of action formulated during the conferences of the 1990s cumulated in the so-called millennium declaration, which was signed by all 193 United Nation member states. At this millennium summit in 2000, eight broad global goals were agreed to be achieved until the year 2015, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Among others, these were the eradication of poverty and the commitment to environmental sustainability. By the set of quanti‐ tative targets with clear deadlines, the international community made a strong commit‐ ment to the world’s poor and to sustainable development (Auclair 2005). Cities were recognized as those areas most important for reaching the MDGs: during the 2000–2015 implementation period the world population was growing daily by approx. 220,000 people, 200,000 of them were urban (UN-DESA 2014, 2015a). Indeed, by the year 2007 for the first time in history the majority of the world’s population lived in cities. It is estimated that inhabitants of all regions will be predominantly urban by the year 2030 and around three quarters of all humankind will live in urban areas (UN-Habitat 2008a). Cities require vast areas of space, consume most of the resources, are the primary source of wealth and the centre of innovation, culture and politics. Clearly, they have become the most important arena of humanity, the places where conflicts are disputed, decisions are made and where problems and chances are determined (Evans 2005). The process of urbanization, meaning the expansion of cities both in their population and the area they occupy, is particularly dynamic in the cities of the Global South.2 The United Nations expect that less developed regions, which still show low urbanization degrees—40–50% compared to approximately 80% of indus‐ trialized countries—will have to cope additionally with 700 million new citizens between 2015 and 2025 (UN-Habitat 2016: 196). This on-going urbanization process puts a lot of pressure on these cities. Wellknown problems are apparent: insufficient supply of infrastructure, public transport, working opportunities, etc. One of the most significant challenges remains the supply of adequate shelter for approx. 180,000 new citizens each day. In most cases, there is no possibility to keep up with an estimated daily demand of 30,000 new housing units (UN-Habitat 2002b). For this reason, people tend to build their own shelters and houses frequently in places with unclear tenure rights. The results are the massive expansion of urban fabric, which is referred to as slums, squatters or marginal settlements.3 In some cities of developing countries up to 70% of all inhabitants live in such marginal settlements and the total number of the world’s slum dwellers amounts nearly one billion (UN-Habitat 2003: 25; United Nations 2014). The intervention strategies pursued in the past, e.g. social housing, site- and service schemes or self-help housing initiatives must be assessed as inadequate or insufficient to cope with the global challenges of urbanization, fragmentation and 2In this work the term ‘Global South’ is used synonymous for ‘developing countries’. Just the same

the expression ‘developed countries’ is frequently replaced with the terms ‘Global North’ or ‘industrialized countries’. 3For a

differentiation of the terms slum, informal, squatter etc. see Sect. 2.3.1.

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1 Introduction

3

exclusion. Against this background, a quantitative slum target (target 7.D) was included in the millennium declaration: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers (Target 7.D of the Millennium Development Goals, United Nations 2001).

The official endorsement of this target provided an impulse for cities and organ‐ izations to address the challenge. Marking a turning point, the millennium declara‐ tion was reinforced by the flagship report The Challenge of Slums compiled by the Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat) of the United Nations (UN). For the first time a comprehensive overview on the topic, an attempt to estimate the number of slum dwellers and most importantly, guidelines and recommendations on how to cope with the challenge were available. Countries and cities have undertaken increased efforts to reach the MDGs. Devolution of political power to local govern‐ ments and the increasing recognition of the importance of local and participative policies have led to bottom-up strategies focusing on capacity building and the development of suitable institutions (UN-Habitat 2002a). Despite all challenges city administrations around the world are now in a unique situation: in the majority of cases they possess increasing political power through decentralization, giving them the possibility to carry out new sustainable and compre‐ hensive approaches. A framework of good governance is widely recognized as a precondition to a sustainable housing policy characterized by more democratic decision-making and implementation processes. Many countries have already put in place well formulated and comprehensive housing strategies, but there is often a wide gap between these statements and the locally applied measures. In general, most cities carry out ambitious efforts to solve the problem and a lot of progress has already been made. However, until now, it was not possible to reverse the global trend: the number of people living in marginal areas is increasing each and every day. This importance of cities and also the universal right to adequate housing for all is increasingly acknowledged since the adoption of the sustainable development goals (SDG) in 2015. For the first time a stand-alone urban goal was endorsed high‐ lighting the importance of cities and targeting to make cities safe, inclusive, resilient and sustainable (goal 11). As a follow-up to the slum-target of the MDGS, a similar, but more ambitious target was subordinated to the new urban goal (goal 11): By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums (United Nations 2015a).

Now it is the role of the upcoming 3rd conference on human settlements in 2016— Habitat III—to accept the challenge and set the normative principles for a ‘New Urban Agenda’ operationalising the target of providing adequate housing for all. Progress in fulfilling the MDGs and especially the ‘slum target’ are already reported for many countries of the Global South (United Nations 2015b). Although the absolute number of slum dwellers is increasing, some Asian countries have achieved a noticeable reduction in the proportions of citizens living in slums. One of these countries is Indonesia. According to the UN (UN-Habitat 2008a: 39–40) the country managed to improve the living standards of 21.2 million slum dwellers

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1 Introduction

between 2000 and 2010. This progress was made despite the effects of the devastating economic crisis (the Asian crisis) of the late 1990s, which was followed by foodshortages, unemployment and a spread of poverty. Like most other countries of the developing world, Indonesian cities have to cope with rapid urbanization. The proportion of people living in urban areas is still very low and it was not until the year 2011 that Indonesia reached the point where more people live in urban than in rural areas. The urbanization degree is expected to increase to 63% until 2030, leaving Indonesian cities with the task to cope with approx. 56 million new citizens (UN-DESA 2015b). Considering this background, the achieved improvements in the housing sector are a fortiori impressive. The reasons for this results are diverse: in 1999 Indonesia’s highly centralized government introduced reforms initiating the processes of decentralization and democratization. Now competences, responsibilities and resources became suddenly available for the local authorities in the districts and the cities. This situation caused many problems (e.g., lack of capacities), but also opened up new opportunities. The shift in the mode of governance was accompanied by changing planning approaches. While before 1999 top-down approaches, commonly initiated by Jakarta, were favored, now more bottom-up approaches with participatory elements are increas‐ ingly introduced by local authorities. Many of these developments in the governancefield contributed to the successful policy with respect to the MDGs and were often termed as good practices by the United Nations. One of these good practice examples can be found in the city of Surakarta (commonly referred to as ‘Solo’ by its residents) situated in Central Java, Indonesia. Between 2005 and 2012 the city’s policy was substantially shaped by the mayor Joko Widodo (known as ‘Jokowi’). Soon after his inauguration, he became known for his people-oriented policies. In close collaboration with relevant stakeholders (e.g. UN-Habitat, NGOs, the private sector) and the citizens, new programmes and measures were implemented, particularly addressing the informal sector and informal settlements. One example is the formalization of large parts of the city’s street vendors. In more than 50 meetings with their representatives a peaceful relo‐ cation to newly built market places was achieved. The project is widely seen as very successful and was rewarded as ‘good practice’ by the United Nations (UN-Habitat 2008b). For this reason, it appears reasonable to conduct a comprehensive analysis of Surakarta’s policy concerning its innovative strategies of coping with the informal sphere.

1.1

Purpose and Research Questions

The main interest of this study is to examine and analyze the governance strategy of Surakarta’s government concerning informal settlements. Due to the limited scope of this work the main focus was set on the city’s housing policy. The purpose is to

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1.1 Purpose and Research Questions

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describe and critically assess this policy, particularly concerning informal housing.4 The city’s street vendors and the municipality’s measures for dealing with them are also briefly addressed (cf. Sect. 7.2). Several approaches, programmes and measures implemented by the city administration are examined and evaluated with respect to their level of sustainability and good governance. Thus, the two main research questions are: • Which approaches, programmes and measures concerning informal settlements are applied in Surakarta? • Are these measures and the implementation process sustainable and an example for ‘good governance’? Although Surakarta’s policy is the centre of this research, it is important to put the findings also in a national and global context. Urban development trends, espe‐ cially urbanization as a driving force for the formation of marginal settlements, have specific impacts on urban areas. Furthermore, every city faces explicit constraints and possibilities influenced by national and global actors and developments. Cities are, for instance, embedded in a national framework of regulations limiting their actions and also subject to the forces of global economic developments. Similarly, concepts of how to govern cities are discussed globally and can strongly shape the applied policy of cities. For these reasons the following additional research questions were formulated: • What are the global and Indonesian trends in urban development? • What are the characteristics of the informal sector and marginal settlements? • Which approaches and concrete policies concerning informal settlements are applied on a global and Indonesian level? • Which concepts and models served as orientation for Surakarta’s government? • Is Surakarta’s governance model recognized as an example for other cities?

1.2

Structure and Scope

The study is structured in three parts. First, some theoretical approaches and concepts as well as the global discourse on housing issues are addressed. The second part introduces Indonesia in general and in particular the urban (housing) situation of the country. The third part analyses applied policies in the city Surakarta. The first part provides an overview about the world’s urban situation—facts and discussions on the world’s housing issues are addressed. This includes urban devel‐ opment processes, which are caused by specific forces, the housing situation and trends of the world’s urban population, emerging approaches and concepts in managing urban areas as well as concrete policies concerning informal settlements.

4For

a definition of informal housing cf. Sect. 3.1.

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1 Introduction

A special thematic interest is set on the definition, characteristics, formation processes and future projections of slum settlements around the world. The second part focuses on the housing situation in Indonesia. All framework conditions influencing housing issues, e.g. the historical background, the adminis‐ trative framework as well as the democratization and decentralization processes are briefly compiled. Particular attention, however, is given to the actual condition, the formation and the future development of the country’s slum and squatter settlements. Subsequently, national policies with the objectives to improve the slum settlements or simply to ‘clean up’ the cities by eviction are also described. The third part comprehensively illustrates the housing situation and governance policy of the Indonesian city Surakarta. In the first section a broad overview of some physical and socio-economic aspects of the city are provided and a detailed descrip‐ tion of the empirical methods used for gathering information is presented. Based on these empirical data, the strategies and programmes introduced by the municipal government are described. Finally, in a concluding remark, a detailed interpretation and evaluation to answer the main research questions is provided.

References Auclair C (2005) The millennium declaration and the habitat agenda. Habitat Debate 11(3):9 Evans B (2005) Governing sustainable cities. Earthscan, London UN-DESA (2014) World urbanization prospects: the 2014 revision, CD-Rom Edition UN-DESA (2015a) World population prospects: the 2015 revision, DVD Edition UN-DESA (2015b) World population prospects, the 2015 revision: key findings & advanced tables, New York UN-Habitat (2002a) Cities without slums. HSP/WUF/1/DLG.I/Paper 4. http://www.scribd.com/ doc/31303705/Cities-Without-Slums. Accessed 15 Nov 2011 UN-Habitat (2002b) Report of the first session of the world urban forum. http://ww2.unhabitat.org/ uf/report.pdf. Accessed 08 June 2012 UN-Habitat (2003) The challenge of slums: global report on human settlements 2003. Earthscan, London UN-Habitat (2008a) State of the world’s cities 2010/2011: bridging the urban divide. Earthscan, London UN-Habitat (2008b) Surakarta: empowering the informal sector: street vendor management. http:// bestpractices.at/database/. Accessed 15 Apr 2014 UN-Habitat (2016) Urbanization and development: emerging futures: world cities report 2016, Nairobi United Nations (2001) Millennium development goals. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/envi ron.shtml. Accessed 07 July 2012 United Nations (2014) The millennium development goals report 2014, New York United Nations (2015a) Sustainable development goals. http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelop ment/cities/. Accessed 29 Jan 2016 United Nations (2015b) The millennium development goals report 2015, New York

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Part I

Global Developments and Urban Challenges

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Chapter 2

The Global Development Context

Abstract Global development trends are substantially shaping today’s cities. This chapter presents a brief overview about some of the most dominant development trends influencing the appearance of cities in the Global South and the way they are governed. To start with, the current prospects of population growth and urbanization are discussed as well as their temporal and spatial manifestation. This section is followed by a brief introduction of the on-going processes of democratization and decentralization. Devolution of power and responsibilities from national to local levels has become a dominant approach to satisfy local demands for more autonomy and participation in decision-making. The third section describes the framework conditions characterized by economic globalization and neoliberal policies in which all cities are embedded. The impacts and implications of these trends for urban areas in less-developed countries are discussed in a last section: increasing inequalities, exclusion of significant parts of society and poverty has created fragmented and spatially expanding cityscapes increasingly shaped by segregated spaces for the rich and the poor. These developments pose new challenges for the governance of cities, new obligations for local authorities, but also new possibilities. Keywords Urban challenges · Urbanization · Decentralization · Neoliberalism · Fragmentation

2.1

Population Growth and Urbanization

One of the most significant global trends of the last century was population growth. While in 1950 only 2.5 billion people lived on our planet, this number has nearly tripled to more than seven billion people in 2015. According to the United Nations population prospects (UN-DESA 2015b) the world population will likely increase by another two billion until the year 2050. This demographic growth is unevenly distributed. Nearly the entire population growth is occurring in the lessdeveloped regions, while the population of the developed regions is hardly changing (cf. Fig. 2.1). © Springer International Publishing AG 2017 C. Obermayr, Sustainable City Management, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49418-0_2

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10 9

Urban Population (less developed regions*) Urban Population (more developed regions**) Rural Population

8

Billions

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

* Less developed regions: all regions of Africa, Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America, the Caribbean plus Micronesia and Polynesia ** More developed regions: Europe, Northern America, Australia / New Zealand and Japan

Fig. 2.1 Global population development 1950–2050 and share of urban and rural population (based on data from UN-DESA 2014)

Furthermore, as illustrated in Fig. 2.1, population growth increasingly happens in urban areas (= urbanization). The world’s share of people living in urban areas (= urbanization degree) has steadily climbed from only 29.4% in 1950 over 37.9% in 1975 and 46.7% in 2000 to 50% sometime during the year 2008. In that year, for the first time in human history, more people lived in urban than in rural areas. Today the urban population is clearly growing, reaching 3.9 billion people living in cities and 3.3 billion in rural areas in the year 2015. This trend is expected to continue: the global urbanization degree is predicted to rise over 60% until the year 2030, meaning 1.5 billion additional citizens in the next 20 years (UN-DESA 2015a). Looking at absolute numbers, global population growth has decreased slowly over the last few decades (cf. Fig. 2.2). However, in the same time period urban population growth has intensified, while rural growth has significantly declined. Between 2000 and 2005 the share of urban growth was above 88%, stressing the dominance of urbanization processes. The number of the world’s rural population stagnates and will reach its tipping point around the year 2020 with approximately 3.4 billion people. Thereafter the absolute number of rural inhabitants will decline, and global population growth will be absorbed solely by cities. Similar to population growth also urbanization degrees are unevenly distributed. Most developed nations and also the Latin American countries already show high urbanization degrees ranging from 70 to 80%, but the less developed regions, partic‐

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2.1 Population Growth and Urbanization

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500 450 400 350

Millions

300 250 200 150

Urban Population

100

Urban Population

(less developed regions*) (more developed regions**)

50

Rural Population 0 1985 – 1990

1990 – 1995

1995 – 2000

2000 – 2005

* Less developed regions: all regions of Africa, Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America, the Caribbean plus Micronesia and Polynesia ** More developed regions: Europe, Northern America, Australia / New Zealand and Japan

Fig. 2.2 Global population growth 1985–2005, summed up for five year periods (based on data from UN-DESA 2014)

ularly the African and Asian countries, have lower values around 40% (Bähr 2005: 35–38). These degrees, however, are slowly catching up to those of more developed regions and the predicted urban growth of 1.5 billion new citizens will almost completely happen in those two continents (cf. Fig. 2.2). However, these numbers must be treated carefully as counting the world’s urban population poses a specific challenge. Most countries use different schemes for clas‐ sifying urban areas which can result in unreliable data (for details cf. Box 2.1). Similarly, the term urbanization must be handled with care. It can take on different qualitative and quantitative meanings describing it as phenomenon or process (for details cf. Box 2.2). In this study the term is used to describe the demographic process of a growing urban population. Both aspects must be kept in mind, when dealing with urbanization and working with population data.

Box 2.1: Statistical Issues—What is Urban? There is a consensus that urbanization is a general process and phenomenon that affects all countries, but there is no common understanding of its meaning. Two issues are important: first, according to the UN, urbanized regions are those areas where people do not work in the agricultural sector. Depending on each country this definition is interpreted differently, resulting in many heter‐ ogeneous opinions on the categorization of ‘the urban’ and ‘the rural’. Second,

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for statistical purposes cities and towns are defined by their population size. Also this definition is subject to a country-based differentiation. While in Ethiopia a settlement with more than 2000 inhabitants already counts as a city, an urban area in Senegal is statistically relevant not until it reaches 10,000 inhabitants (Scholz 2006: 38). These contrasting definitions and interpreta‐ tions must be kept in mind when addressing any statistical issue concerning urban population data.

2.1.1

Reasons for Urbanization

Even if the population data are unsatisfying, it cannot be denied that an enormous population growth is happening in the cities of the Global South which is unprece‐ dented in its size. It outreaches the growth of European cities in the nineteenth century and also the growth of classical immigration countries during their fastest rates. Bähr (2005: 40–43) sees the reason for this fact in the different course taken by the demographic transition1 in today’s development countries compared with that of the industrialized countries in the nineteenth century. The spread between birth rate and mortality rate in the third world is much wider, resulting in a much higher population surplus in both the urban and the rural areas. As a consequence, third world cities do not only face their own natural population growth, but also high migration gains from rural areas. With the exception of most Chinese cities where jobs are provided by industri‐ alization similar to the historic development in most European cities, urbanization of most other third world cities has taken a different path: people move to the cities without any job opportunities. Urbanization happens not due to fine opportunities the cities can provide (pull factors of the cities), but more because people lost their jobs in rural areas and see no other choice (push factors in rural areas). Davis (2006: 16–23) argues that the neoliberal agenda of the IMF has facilitated this process since the 1980s. By an increasing capitalization and mechanization of the agricultural sector combined with deregulation and privatization policies, a huge amount of labour force was set free. Facing unemployment and deprived of the basis of their livelihood, these people have limited options. Frequently they choose to migrate to the cities. Beyond that, massive growth of third world cities could have begun much earlier if it would not have been diminished by a bundle of repressive measures implemented by colonial governments. Prior to independence—in many cases not achieved until the 1950s—developing countries were often ruled with an iron fist by their colonial 1Demographic transition means the slow change from a regime with high birth- and mortality rates

to a regime with low birth- and mortality rates. As the mortality rate is falling first and the birth rate is coming down much slower, the population is strongly growing during the transition.

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2.1 Population Growth and Urbanization

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masters. Human rights abuses were common and strong migration controls were in place. After independence, the dam formed by repressive law controlling the people’s movement broke to pieces, opening the way to the urban centres for many rural migrants (Davis 2006: 54–66). Even if the development of cities cannot be generalized, as many aspects, at all dimensions can have significant impacts, the reasons presented explain some of the common facets in the history of growing third world cities: in the first part of the twentieth century population growth was slow due to repressive measures of colonial governments, after independence it became massive, mostly due to the effects of demographic transition, and finally it was again accelerated by neoliberal politics at the end of the twentieth century.

Box 2.2: Defining Urbanization Urbanization has many meanings: looking at it in a quantitative way, it can be seen as a demographic condition meaning the share of urban population of the total population. This is also called the urbanization degree. On the other hand, the term is also used to describe the demographic process meaning the growth of the urban population in a city or region. Considering the term as a qualitative process it can be used to describe the dissemination of the urban life style (Bähr 2005; Fassmann 2004: 49–50).

2.1.2

Effects of Urbanization

Everywhere in the world cities expand spatially, swallowing smaller towns and villages and forming whole city regions and urban corridors. More and more people move to urban fringe areas, blurring the boundaries between urban and rural. Diver‐ gent processes have led to the same result: extensive urban landscapes. In the Global North, the development was driven by suburbanization processes which are compa‐ rably limited in scale and driven by the upper class. They dream the idea of a better live in ‘the garden city’ and move to ‘satellite’ and dormitory cities in the urban periphery. The same result—vast urban landscapes—is also visible in developing countries although different processes and actors are responsible for this formation: the development is driven on the one hand by the profit-seeking interests of private developers but also by the poor who do not dream of a garden city but build squatter and slum settlements as their only option to satisfy their need for shelter (Bähr 2005: 50–54). Every day, 170,000 people move to the urban areas of the Global South requiring 30,000–40,000 new housing units. Pressure is put on all dimensions of cities: the housing market cannot meet the demand, infrastructure and services are overstrained and the labour market is unable to provide enough jobs for the new residents. City

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2 The Global Development Context

governments frequently lack the training and capacities to steer rapid urban growth, and most of the poor have no other option than to move to the cities’ existing slumand squatter settlements to find accommodation. These settlements grow rapidly and in many cities in developing countries more than half of the urban population is currently living in such inadequate housing conditions (UN-Habitat 2002a). The most significant result of rapid urbanization, particularly in developing countries, has been growth of urban slums and informal settlements. These settlements are fast becoming the most visible expression of poverty worldwide, the expressions of an in-creasing urban‐ ization of poverty (UN-Habitat 2002b: 11).

This development is happening in all types of cities of the Global South regardless their size: in the megacities known and famous for their marginal settlements, but also in the smaller cities which got not much attention yet. There is evidence that development in the latter is likely to gain momentum and over three quarters of the global population growth is projected for these smaller cities (Davis 2006: 12).

2.2 2.2.1

Democratization and Decentralization Democratization

A second trend visible in the global development context is democratization and decentralization. Since the 1980s, the triumphal march of democracy which began at the end of world war two has quickened and swept through many countries of the world. Generally, there is consensus that democratization means the process of introducing representative democracy at national and regional levels, but there is no common understanding what this really means (Atkinson 2004: 26–29). Democracy itself is a much disputed concept and so is its implementation. Some countries considering themselves as democratic would never accept individual rights or the freedom of press. However, even if patronage systems and vote buying are still persistent in many countries, evidence can be found that democratization opens up opportunities for previously marginalized groups. Their voice is now more often recognized and participation in decision-making processes is no longer out of reach. At least they have now a choice of representatives who will make the decisions affecting them. These emerging possibilities of participation introduced by a repre‐ sentative democracy are probably the most significant aspects of change which affect increasingly the mode of urban governance (Devas 2004: 27–35).

2.2.2

Decentralization

Implementation of democracy on local levels of government is often followed by another complex process: decentralization. Regional and local communities, who

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2.2 Democratization and Decentralization

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have often experienced the failure and inability of the centralized government to address their needs, begin to claim the right of having a voice in their development. By the means of newly established local councils or associations, they begin increas‐ ingly to articulate their demands and ask for more autonomy. Confronted with these claims, national governments usually do either suppress the tendency or try to appease the local society by yielding some of the state power to local authorities. This process of giving up certain functions and responsibilities to lower tiers of government is referred to as ‘decentralization’ (cf. Box 2.3 for other explanation attempts).

Box 2.3: Decentralization—Explanation Attempts Decentralization is a complex process that concerns redistribution of power and resources from central control to regional, municipal and community levels (Atkinson 2004: 27). Decentralization entails fundamental changes to the structure of intergovernmental relations, involving a shift away from vertical hierarchies to a differentiation of roles and the reallocation of functions among actors operating in the same sector or territory (UN-Habitat 2001: 146).

The concept of decentralization is not new. During colonial rule, for example, it was a commonly used mean of exerting control. In Indonesia, the Dutch government tried to stifle any occurring resistance or demand for independence by transferring some power to regional governments. In this way, things could often be calmed down in the long run. This strategy, also known as ‘divide and rule’, was similarly used by other colo‐ nial powers in their empires, e.g. the English in India (Devas 2004: 27–35). Nowadays the decentralization of responsibilities and empowerment of local authorities has become a widely acknowledged concept of urban governance. It is seen as a development path which helps to reduce disparities in regions and provides more flexibility to respond to different local problems. Regional governance can be improved by more autonomy and increased accountability of the local authorities. Furthermore, it is seen as a good way to empower people and their communities (UN-Habitat 2001: 46). Critical voices on the concept argue that decentralization has not necessarily only advantages. In economic terms, it remains unclear if locally made decisions are more efficient than the ones made on a national level. While on the one hand, decisions made in situ are clearly better suited to local conditions, on the other hand a national approach is necessary to pursue policies which promote economies of scale. Further‐ more, decentralization could also foster unintended processes, such as the fragmenta‐ tion of the nation state or increasing inequalities of different regions. In order to counteract such tendencies, a regulatory framework (e.g. revenue sharing) as a supporting measure is necessary. Finally, the capabilities of local authorities facing

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2 The Global Development Context

enhanced functions and responsibilities are often overstrained which can lead to inad‐ equate accountability and increased corruption (Kearns and Paddison 2000: 846). Summarizing, it can be said that decentralization can provide many gains for local communities. In particular, the process can bring decision-making closer to the citi‐ zens by opening up opportunities for citizens—also for marginalized people—to achieve more influence in urban policies. Therefore, decentralization efforts are strongly promoted by UN-Habitat since this agency considers actions of local authorities as fundamental to the development of adequate shelter provision, partic‐ ularly for low-income groups. All activities of municipal governments and also the housing policy are determined to a large extent by the leadership role of local author‐ ities. UN-Habitat argues in multiple publications (UN-Habitat 2002a, 2008, 2009, 2016) that city governments must be equipped with all necessary tools and powers including their own revenue funds to enable them to find comprehensive strategies for addressing the housing problems in their cities.

2.3

Globalization and Neoliberalism

As a development framework, globalization and with it economic liberalization has influenced most aspects of the described processes of urbanization, democratization and decentralization. There are many definitions and interpretations of what glob‐ alization is or could mean, but a common understanding does not exist. An example for an interpretation is given by Westendorff (2004: 203–209): Globalization is among other things, a process of increasing interaction and inter-change of persons and resources across national boundaries. It is not a new phenome-non, but appears to have quickened remarkably over the last five decades, as the pace of scientific and tech‐ nological change shrunk the importance of borders and distance of economic, social and political life (Westendorff 2004: 196).

Meanwhile all corners of the world and in particular urban areas are increasingly integrated in the global economy and in the global division of labour. Over the last few years this so-called economic globalization has gained momentum and the international economic ties have become more important at the expenses of national economic dependences (Kraas 2003: 196–197). At the same time, the outcomes for developing countries remain unclear. There are two contrary positions: One the one hand, globalization offers benefits and possibilities for all and in particular for the countries of the Global South, on the other hand it also causes widespread poverty, increasing inequalities and social exclusion. Therefore, globalization is a deeply contradictory, heterogenic and restructuring process (Scholz 2002: 6) enforced and strengthened by neoliberal politics.2

2The

terms ‘neoliberal politics’ and ‘neoliberal agenda’ are used in this study as a description for a bundle of economic measures promoting liberalization, free trade and open markets.

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2.3 Globalization and Neoliberalism

2.3.1

17

Neoliberalism

Since the 1970s, powerful organizations, primarily the IMF and the World Bank (WB), but also the Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have promoted the dissemination of neoliberal politics. As the main concept for achieving development these organizations see liberal economic growth as the mechanism to reach it (Atkinson 2004: 26–29). Driven by the notion that free enterprise and free trade would lead to perfect economic conditions creating opportunities and wealth for all, a bundle of economic measures is propagated and strongly supported. During the 1990s, these measures were summarized under the term Washington Consensus (see Box 2.4) and include, among others, policies of liberalization, deregulation and privatization. The mentioned organizations agreed that this approach is the panacea to cure economic failure. Economic liberalization basically means the reduction of trade barriers and the opening-up of national economies to attract foreign investments. In order to enhance the effectiveness of national and local authorities and to create an ‘enabling environment’ for private enterprises, liberal politics are accompanied by policies of deregulation. These policies mean the reduction of state interventions in economic affairs and also the diminishing of laws and rules regulating the economy. Most economists agree that under a theoretically perfect environment3 and without any interventions, unrestricted market mechanisms would cause economic devel‐ opment. In the same way, it is argued that the privatization of state-owned enterprises which usually have a poor economic performance would lead to an increased effi‐ ciency and thus to reduced government expenses (Harvey 2007b). Neoliberal politics are aiming at the creation of a global free market and the establishment of a good environment for investments. It has become an ideology, a path leading to economic growth, a formula for ubiquitous wealth and an opportunity for third world countries to catch-up with more developed regions (Harvey 2007a).

Box 2.4: Washington Consensus The term Washington Consensus is in itself controversial discussed. John Williamson coined the term in 1989 by creating a list of ten policies as a common set of issues to be discussed at a conference in Washington. These ten policies were in his opinion the lowest common denominator of political advice given by the Bretton Woods institutions to Latin American countries. Among others they were fiscal discipline, trade liberalization, privatization and deregulation. There are many interpretations of the term: One under‐ standing is that of a comprehensive economic and neoliberal agenda which has lead the developing countries to crisis and misery. Often the term is also used synonymous with neoliberalism (Williamson 2004).

3Economic

conditions where people act according to the principle of homo oeconomicus.

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2.3.2

2 The Global Development Context

Structural Adjustments

Neoliberal politics have been strongly promoted by international organizations, especially IMF and WB, pushing for the so-called ‘structural adjustment programmes’ (SAPs). The objectives were to realize an idealized form of economic openness by opening up the national market, reducing the state share in all economic activities and by privatizing the public sector (Atkinson 2004: 26–29). In the late 1970s, IMF and WB began to introduce SAPs: credit schemes for developing countries were successive extended, enhancing the influence of these organizations. The funds however, were only lent to the bank’s conditions in conformity to the neoliberal agenda. For the receiving countries this implied the constraint to introduce austerity, deregulation and privatization programmes. Economic growth and a more efficient administration were the promised outcomes, but most of the times the expectations were not met. Instead, foreign debts were increasingly accumulated. As the repaying mechanism had priority over other needs, governments had to look for other means to find the necessary money. Often they saw no other options than to reduce their public spending and to carry out further privatizations of state-owned enterprises. In some cases, even essential services like water or electricity supply were privatized—a process which often had fatal effects in particular for the poor. However, due to financial needs many less-developed countries were forced to introduce these SAPs during the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, these decades are characterized by an increasing state retreat from more and more essential responsibilities (Davis 2006: 160–165). During the 1990s, the world economy indeed underwent an accelerated globali‐ zation with more and more economies being integrated, an increasing suspension of custom duties and subsidies as well as boosting trade and investment. Yet, it became also increasingly clear that the outcomes of the structural adjustment policy are not as good as expected. It was found that even in cases where the economic outputs were positive the remove of government responsibility for key areas had mostly resulted in a rise of poverty (Atkinson 2004: 26–29). Davis (2006: 183) stated that neoliberal politics and in particular the SAPs have not lead to a reduction of poverty. Quite the contrary, they have contributed to increasing inequalities and poverty visible most of all in a constant rise in numbers of marginalized people working in the informal sector and living under insufficient conditions.

2.3.3

Effects on Cities

The impacts of neoliberal policies and globalization on cities are complex and influ‐ enced by many factors—depending on their level of integration in global networks, national and local policies and also the local economy. Relevant effects are, among others, the steadily deteriorating financial situation of cities and the ever fiercer interurban competition (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 267). Both aspects have signif‐

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2.3 Globalization and Neoliberalism

19

icant implications for the cities’ housing policy and especially for the way how to deal with marginalized people. A general consequence of this development is the reduction of funds available for the improvements of housing conditions. By introducing policies of structural adjustment an improvement of the cities’ poor financial situation was expected. However, this has not happened due to different reasons: the liberalization of trade, one of the ultimate goals of neoliberal policies, has brought only small or even negative returns for the economies of cities in the Global South, because competition got fiercer and markets of developed nations remained closed in many fields. Urban expenditures were reduced by austerity measures and privatization efforts generating some yields, but these yields were instantly devoured by obligations for repaying loans. In many cases, the results were increasing foreign debts. Additionally, the revenue of cities is increasingly shortened: in centrally organized countries transfer payments for secondary cities from the national government have been diminished due to structural adjustments as well as decentralization policies adopted at the national level. Local authorities are now forced to find their own solutions to fill upcoming financial shortages. To do so, city governments have usually no other choice than to implement further cuts on their expenditure and to take out loans with stakeholders from abroad (Westendorff 2004: 203–209). The devastating outcomes of this poor financial situation of many cities are often an additional worsening in the provision of public services and the creation of even more dependencies. To fulfil the donor requirements, city governments have to surrender parts of their fiscal and decision-making autonomy to international actors. Naturally, these donors show a higher interest in the return of their investments and in constant repayment patterns, than in the welfare and prosperity of the citizens of their debtors (ibid: 203–209). Besides these increasing financial shortages, all cities of the world feel the more intense global competition. As the markets have become more open, cities try to improve their position within the international competition by providing better economic conditions for investment and by underlining those features making them unique and distinct to other cities. This process has also been emphasized as ‘place wars’ (Haider 1992). Increased competitiveness also entails more tasks for city governments. They are now not only responsible for the provision of services and the realization of city development plans, but also for a good environment to attract investment and skilled labour. Thus, cities must be run in an entrepreneurial and flexible way (the corporate city) to retain the highly volatile capital necessary to make the city prosperous (Hall and Hubbard 1996; Kearns and Paddison 2000: 845–850). These changes are not only risky—the highly mobile capital can easily disappear again; they also happen at the expense of other responsibilities. Resources are now redirected from various other fields to the new obligation of creating the best possible economic environment. This can mean cuts in the public and social sector which is seen as less important for the international ranking and performance of the city (Devas 2004: 27–35). Although intended to improve the efficiency and the budgetary situation of cities, neoliberal politics have, in combination with economic globalization, often led to

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2 The Global Development Context

the opposite, above all to less resources available for public services. In practice, this means fewer funds for measures aiming at improving access to adequate shelter and basic services. In the struggle to cope with these described trends—less budget, more tasks, fiercer competition and often under pressure of rapid population growth, new ways of governing cities are needed. Consequently, a shift to new modes of gover‐ nance can be observed, characterized by the slogans ‘good governance’, ‘sustaina‐ bility’ and ‘inclusive city’.4

2.4

Fragmentation, Inclusion and Exclusion

Reinforced by neoliberal politics, globalization has brought integrating as well as separating processes which happen in direct vicinity and temporally close to each other. The geographer Scholz (2002) was the first who conceptualized these processes in the theory of a ‘fragmenting development’. He stated that against the background of economic globalization and considering the insufficient effects of development aid in past decades the countries in the Global South are not capable to catch-up to the more developed nations in terms of economic development. Thus, the paradigm of a ‘catching-up development’ should be abandoned and replaced by the theory of a ‘fragmenting development’. In the following section, the model of a fragmenting development and its manifestation in cities is explained.

2.4.1

Fragmenting Development

Economic globalization and neoliberal principles have induced a complete shift of the international division of labour. Previously, the roles of both developing and developed countries were clearly defined. The former had to deliver the resources; the latter used these resources to produce industrialized goods. With globalization this simple pattern is more and more changing towards a fragmented system of places. The former dichotomy of countries (north-south; developed-developing) is substituted by a dichotomy of places, areas affected and integrated in the global economy and areas which are excluded. Depending on the grade of integration in the global economy Scholz (2002, 2003, 2006) distinguishes three types of places (cf. Fig. 2.3): places extracting resources and providing cheap labour for mass production (globalised places), places combining the production of high-quality products and high concentrations of capital power and know-how (global places) and those places not integrated in the global economy (excluded rest of the world). Global places or cities are highly integrated in the global economy. They host the headquarters of the world’s transnational companies, high-tech production zones as 4The

changing mode of governance is discussed in Sect. 4.4.

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1 3 2 4

3

9

6

2

5

6

7

1

9

8 6 2 8

Headquarters Hight-tech production / 2 research an innovation centres 3 Fordist industrial zones

1

4 5 6 7 8 9

Hight-tech services Outsourced industries Low-wage production / consumer good production Resource extraction and food production Child labour and informal sector Leisure and tourism industry

4

4 9

New periphery (Ocean of poverty)

5 4 8

2 4

9

5

9

1

3

7

Global "Places"

Globalised "Places" Affected / exposed global cities

9 1

21

Acting global cities (Islands of wealth)

2.4 Fragmentation, Inclusion and Exclusion

Excluded "rest of the world" "New South"

Fig. 2.3 Model of global fragmentation (reproduced from Scholz 2002: 7)

well as research and innovation centres. These places are seen as the commandcentres of the global economy. The second category, global places, are areas affected or exposed to global processes. These are, for instance, outsourced industry, resource extraction zones, tax havens and also informal or low wage production zones. The excluded rest of the world falls in a third category, ‘the new periphery’. The majority of the world’s population is located here. They do not contribute to the global economy, neither as producers nor as consumers. In economic respects, these people are completely irrelevant and therefore expendable. The belonging to one of these classes is not a fixed condition. In an environment of highly volatile capital and facing excessive global competition, cities or even whole regions can easily change their position in this hierarchic structure. Especially the globalized places are exposed to this process, as they are subject to external control. Location decisions for outsourced industries, for instance, are made in the company headquarters of transnational enterprises, located in global places. There‐ fore, globalized places are always threatened by decisions beyond their control. Easily, their functions can be replaced by another place, leaving them virtually over‐ night in the third category: ‘excluded rest of the world’ (Scholz 2002: 7–8).

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2.4.2

2 The Global Development Context

Fragmentation in Cities

A fragmenting development can also be found at the very local level. In cities more and more urban fragments have emerged, often conceptualized as ‘islands of wealth’ embedded in an ‘ocean of poverty’. Coy (2004: 15) describes this development for Brazilian cities (cf. Fig. 2.4). There the rich are segregating themselves in gated communities, settlements fortified by walls and watched by security teams. They spend their lives in their own segments of the cities, places where public access and hence contact to other social groups is limited: shopping centres, business parks and entertainment centres are some of the examples (Coy 2006). In this way, they can avoid any contact with the others, the excluded and marginalized rest of the citizens. Most of the latter live in squatter and slum settlements, often under unbearable conditions and covering vast urban areas. Usually they are excluded from any formal employment and have no other options than to find work in the informal economy (e.g. as street vendors). For these marginalized people the informal part of the city has become the only option to find shelter and earn a living. It represents an inevitable space of survival. Immense inequality and segregation between social classes are nothing new for the Brazilian cities. A new development is that the conditions are worsening, resulting in an even deeper fragmentation. Furthermore, this development is neither limited to Brazilian cities nor to developing countries, it has in fact become an omnipresent phenomenon affecting most cities in the world albeit to different degrees. Urban spaces have become increasingly disintegrated, disorganized and destabilized resulting in a mosaic of urban fragments (Borsdorf and Coy 2009: 4–5; Borsdorf and Bender 2010: 368–371). The reasons for this development can be attributed to a number of external and internal forces. External factors are above all the influence of globalization, neolib‐ eralism and privatization politics. Internal forces are especially group inherent inter‐ ests, such as status, lifestyles and security. The introduction of neoliberal politics opened up more and more space for private capital interests. As a consequence, and at the expense of state control, urban change is now driven by transnational compa‐ nies, real estate companies, private investors and rich individuals. These powerful actors now shape the face of the cities by building extravagant citadels of wealth in accordance to globalized lifestyles and with globally interchangeable architecture. On the other side, remain poor citizens, marginalized groups as well as fresh migrants from rural areas. These people often live in unacceptable conditions, without adequate shelter, water supply, electricity or possibilities to earn a livelihood. They have no power to make their voices heard and no possibilities to gain their share of the benefits of globalization. For them, globalization has brought only more margin‐ alization and exclusion (Coy and Kraas 2003: 35–36; Coy 2004: 11).

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2.4 Fragmentation, Inclusion and Exclusion

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The fragmentation of Brazilian cities

Islands of wealth Driving forces External

Internal - Status - Security - Lifestyle

Gated communities Shopping Centers

Entertainment Centers Business parks

Urban fragmentation

- Globalization - Privatization - Neoliberalism

Urban fragments

Places of informal activity Low-cost housing projects

External Squatter settlements Inner-city slums

Revitalized areas

Public regulation

Driving forces

Urban fragments

local governance - urban planning - public services

- Neoliberalism - Deregulation - Pauperization Internal - Marginalization - Survival necessities

Oceans of poverty Martin Coy 2004

Fig. 2.4 Fragmentation of Brazilian cities (reproduced from Coy and Töpfer 2014: 104)

2.4.3

Challenges for City Administrations

For all city administrations, these urban fragments cause immense challenges. Facing the described cuts in their budgets, city governments have two options: they can either act as if nothing had happened and stay passive; or they can become actively involved in the search for new solutions. Many city governments chose the latter allowing their mode of governance to change to a more effective config‐ uration. Different scenarios are imaginable. The so-called scenario of a ‘correcting city’ has become reality in some parts of the world. In this scheme, the municipality becomes aware of the problems and tries to introduce countermeasures, such as regulations for the private sector, renewal of inner-city slums, well-designed public private partner‐ ships (PPP) and inclusive measures for the informal sector. Although these measures are important and have positive impacts, they are not sufficient to solve the problem of marginalization and exclusion. Other more comprehensive approaches are needed, such as a more radical shift to the concepts of sustainable development and good urban governance.5 A scenario following this approach would be that of a ‘(re)integrating city’. Such a city would be characterized by participatory strategies of enablement and empowerment and a reduction of the barriers between informal and formal sector (Coy 5The concept of good urban governance is discussed in Chap. 4.

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2 The Global Development Context

2004: 20–21). By adopting this idealized approach which also includes the participa‐ tion of all stakeholders and the formation of internal and external networks (e.g. city alliances), cities might be able to counterbalance the ‘top-down globalization’ domi‐ nated by economic and financial forces with ‘bottom-up globalization’ integrating social, civil and cultural aspects (Girard et al. 2005: 4–5).

References Atkinson A (2004) Promoting environmentalism, participation and sustainable human development in cities of Southeast Asia. In: Westendorff D (ed) From unsustainable to inclusive cities. UNRISD, Geneva, pp 15–57 Bähr J (2005) Stadtgeographie II: regionale Stadtgeographie. Westermann, Braunschweig Borsdorf A, Coy M (2009) Megacities and global change: case studies from Latin America. Die Erde 140(4):1–20 Borsdorf A, Bender O (2010) Allgemeine Siedlungsgeographie. Böhlau, Wien Brenner N, Theodore N (2002) Spaces of neoliberalism: urban restructuring in North America and Western Europe. Blackwell, Oxford Coy M (2004) The fragmentation of the Brazilian city. Recent tendencies and challenges for urban policy. Ágora 10(1/2):9–22 Coy M (2006) Gated communities and urban fragmentation in Latin America: the Brazilian experience. GeoJournal 66(1–2):121–132. doi:10.1007/s10708-006-9011-6 Coy M, Kraas F (2003) Probleme der Urbanisierung in den Entwicklungsländern. Petermanns Geogr Mitt 147(1):32–41 Coy M, Töpfer T (2014) Inner-city development in megacities between degradation and renewal: the case of São Paulo. In: Kraas F, Surinder A, Coy M, Mertins G (eds) Megacities: our global urban future. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 101–119 Davis M (2006) Planet of slums. Verso, New York Devas N (2004) Urban poverty and governance in an era of globalization, decentralization and democratization. In: Devas N (ed) Urban governance, voice, and poverty in the developing world. Earthscan, London, pp 15–37 Fassmann H (2004) Stadtgeographie I. Westermann, Braunschweig Girard LF, Forte B, Carreta M, De Toro P, Forte F (eds) (2005) The human sustainable city: challenges and perspectives from the habitat agenda. Ashgate, Aldershot Haider D (1992) Place wars: new realities of the 1990s. Econ Dev Q 6:127–134 Hall T, Hubbard P (1996) The entrepreneurial city: new urban politics, new urban geographies? Prog Hum Geogr 20(2):153–174. doi:10.1177/030913259602000201 Harvey D (2007a) Kleine Geschichte des Neoliberalismus. Rotpunktverlag, Zürich Harvey D (2007b) Neoliberalism as creative destruction. ANN Am Acad Polit Soc Sci 610(1): 21–44. doi:10.1177/0002716206296780 Kearns A, Paddison R (2000) New challenges for urban governance. Urban Studies 37(5–6): 845–850. doi:10.1080/00420980050011118 Kraas F (2003) Verstädterungs- und innerurbane Entwicklungsprozesse in Südostasien. In: Feldbauer P, Husa K, Korff R (eds) Südostasien: gesellschaften, Räume und Entwicklung im 20. Jahrhundert, Promedia, Wien, pp 196–211 Scholz F (2002) Die Theorie der fragmentierenden Entwicklung. Geographische Rundschau 54(10):6–11 Scholz F (2003) Globalisierung und “neue Armut”. Geographische Rundschau 55(10):11–13 Scholz F (2006) Entwicklungsländer: Entwicklungspolitische Grundlagen und regionale Beispiele. Westermann, Braunschweig UN-DESA (2014) World urbanization prospects: the 2014 revision, CD-Rom edition

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UN-DESA (2015a) World population prospects: the 2015 revision, DVD edition UN-DESA (2015b) World population prospects, the 2015 revision: key findings & advanced tables, New York UN-Habitat (2001) Cities in a globalizing world: global report on human settlements 2001 UN-Habitat (2002a) cities without slums. HSP/WUF/1/DLG.I/Paper 4. http://www.scribd.com/ doc /31303705/Cities-Without-Slums. Accessed 15 Nov 2011 UN-Habitat (2002b) Report of the first session of the world urban forum. http://ww2.unhabitat.org/ uf/report.pdf. Accessed 08 June 2012 UN-Habitat (2008) State of the world’s cities 2010/2011: bridging the urban divide. Earthscan, London UN-Habitat (2009) Planning sustainable cities: policy directions: global report on human settlements 2009. Earthscan, London UN-Habitat (2016) Urbanization and development: emerging futures: world cities report 2016, Nairobi Westendorff D (ed) (2004) From unsustainable to inclusive cities. UNRISD, Geneva Williamson J (2004) A short history of the washington consensus. http://www.iie.com/publications/ papers/williamson0904-2.pdf. Accessed 15 Aug 2012

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Chapter 3

Informal Housing and Marginal Settlements

Abstract Marginal settlements, slums, squatters—these are only few terms describing informal settlements. As the definition of ‘slum’ is controversial, counting slum dwellers is a difficult venture. In the first section, this chapter provides an overview about common definitions, develops a low-cost housing typology and explains how the different terms are used. Characteristics, formation processes and spatial patterns of slums are addressed. A second section is concerned with the global debate on the challenge of slums reflected in several global summits on housing questions. The principles adopted and initiatives introduced (e.g., the Habitat Agenda) are explored, from the first World Conference on Human Settlements in 1976 (Habitat I) until the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. Highlighting the importance of the challenge of slums, the last section gives an overview about current estimations about the state of the world’s slum population, its spatial distribution and prospected development. Keywords Informal housing · Slum · Definition · Housing typology · UN-Habitat · Housing discourse Recent trends in global development draw the background for current urban changes1 and impacts also the formation and distribution of marginal settlements. Although such marginal areas and the informal sector are not new phenomena— diverse geographical research has already been conducted in the past (Mertins 1984; Gaumnitz 1994; Bronger 2007)—the processes of globalization, fragmenta‐ tion and urbanization have further reinforced their appearance during the last decades. Many cities in developing countries are overwhelmed by the sprawl of new settlements at their fringe areas which are established informally. In some of these cities an estimated share of more than 70% of their residents live in slums and over three quarters of their citizens work in the informal sector (Bähr 2005: 50–54). As 1The global development context, characterized by population growth, urbanization, democratiza‐

tion, decentralization, globalization, neoliberalism and fragmentation, as well as effects on cities are discussed in Chap. 2. © Springer International Publishing AG 2017 C. Obermayr, Sustainable City Management, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49418-0_3

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3 Informal Housing and Marginal Settlements

a consequence of the world’s population growth and rapid urbanization the actual numbers increased significantly over the last few decades and according to an esti‐ mation for the year 2014 nearly 900 million people lived in slums (UN-Habitat 2016: 203). Despite these numbers, indicating the immense dimension of the asso‐ ciated problems and challenges in the cities of the Global South, the attention given to the issue has noticeably declined in the last decades, at least in the wider public. People seem to get accustomed to the visibility and existence of huge slum areas in developing countries, their appearance is less questioned and widely accepted as a characteristic feature of third world cities. The challenge of slums is, however, acknowledged by international actors and housing experts, and the topic has never left the international development agenda since the first Conference on Human Settlements in Vancouver in 1976 (Habitat I). Governments have begun to understand their responsibility for providing adequate housing for all. Reinforced by the second conference on Human Settlements in Istanbul 1996, initiatives were developed and introduced to address the challenge. Consequently, a measurable quantitative target for improving the living conditions of slum dwellers was included in the Millennium Development Goals in 2000. In the following years the rising awareness of urban development issues is reflected, most of all, in the adoption of an urban stand-alone goal as one of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. This goal has put the development of sustainable human settlements at the centre of attention and calls for increased action. It remains to be seen how this goal will affect the discussions on a ‘new urban agenda’ to be adopted during the third United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat III) in Quito 2016. Achieving adequate housing for all as a basic human right is certainly one of the biggest challenges for the decades to come.

3.1

Slum, Squatter, Marginal and Informal—What Does It Mean?

There is no agreed definition of the term ‘slum’. The word has many connotations leading to broad confusion and to an interchangeable use of terms such as slums, squatter settlements, informal areas, shanty towns, marginal settlements, illegal settlements and many more by authorities and agencies. To diminish this chaos some of the most common definitions are provided in the following section. Inner-city slums: The term ‘slum’ appeared for the first time at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Authors in that period identified the poorest areas of London characterized by the most unsanitary conditions, criminality, heavy overcrowding, the worst diseases and all kinds of vices as a ‘slum’. In this traditional sense ‘slum’ means densely populated and degraded housing areas situated near or in the city centre. This type of slum is also called ‘inner-city slum’ (UN-Habitat 2003b: 80).

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3.1 Slum, Squatter, Marginal and Informal—What Does It Mean?

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These classical slums were originally inhabited by high- and middleclass resi‐ dents, but were subsequently abandoned, when they moved to newer and more fash‐ ionable residential areas. During this self-reinforcing process, the old houses have continuously declined and were progressively subdivided into smaller units which were rented out to low-income groups (UN-Habitat 2002). At the beginning of dete‐ rioration cycle the initially high- and middle-class residential areas are well supplied by public infrastructures. Over time and with growing overcrowding the strain on public services can reach a breaking point, resulting in inadequate supply. One of the reasons for this process can be attributed for instance to rent freeze decrees, introduced with the contrary objective to provide more affordable housing for lowincome groups. Even though research on the impacts of rent control show ambiguous results (cf. Olsen 1988; Kutty 1996), these regulations involve the risk of making the maintenance of property uneconomical for homeowners, possibly transforming whole areas in slums. Sometimes, the process of decline is reversed by gentrification or upgrading processes. In contrast to squatter settlements (see below) a traditional slum has usually a high proportion of tenants, renting their units from homeowners who have a legal and registered right on their property. The umbrella term slum: since the early invention of the term ‘slum’ in the nineteenth century it has progressively obtained a broader meaning. Other types of marginal settlements were now included in the umbrella term ‘slum’. These are, for instance, illegal or semi-legal and unplanned dwellings which sprawl around most cities of the developing world. Depending on the world regions the slums of the cities are called favela in Brazil, colonias populares in Mexico, villa miseria in Argentina or kampung kumuh in Indonesia. Just the same as the names of these settlements differ, also the meanings of what they describe are considerably different. They are very heterogenic in terms of their physiognomic and social structure. Simple shacks with walls and roof made out of tin and covering vast areas at the urban periphery are considered as slums just the same as occupied and run down houses near the city centre (e.g. the cortiços of Brazil) or inner-urban marginal quarters located on unproductive land e.g. near railway tracks or rivers (UN-Habitat 2003b: 8–11). Therefore, a ‘slum’ must also be defined in a more general way: An area of substandard housing, inadequate provision of public utilities (especially water and sanitation), inhabited by poor people in high densities, who develop a distinctive culture as a means of both survival and self-respect (Gregory 2009: 688).

As a clear distinction between the traditional and the catch-all understanding of ‘slum’ is not always possible, the term ‘inner-city slum’ is used in this work when referring explicitly to a slum in its traditional sense. Marginal settlements: similar to the term slum the term marginal settlement is utilized as a collective word for all poor settlements around the world. It originates from Latin America, where it was used to describe the rapidly sprawling settlements in the urban peripheries. Later the residents of these new quarters were also labelled as marginalized (Mertins 1994: 8). Although marginality is a multidimensional phenom‐ enon and cannot be conceptualized, due to heterogenic perceptions of its defining parameters (Bronger 2007: 106), two different forms of marginal settlements are

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3 Informal Housing and Marginal Settlements

distinguished: slums in its traditional meaning and squatters. Common features of these marginal settlements are (Bähr and Mertins 2000: 19–20): • • • • •

high density insufficient housing structure high proportion of residents working in the informal sector majority of inhabitants with low and irregular income inadequate public and private infrastructure.

Depending on the cultural region these factors may vary also regarding to infra‐ structural and structural criteria. In this work the term ‘marginal settlements’ is used as the generic term interchangeably with the term ‘slum’ and comprising the innercity slums as well as the squatter settlements. Squatters: In Australian history a person called ‘squatter’ meant someone occu‐ pying crown land for sheep breeding purposes with a legal license to do so. While the Australian squatter had a legal basis for his occupation, the North American squatter was someone occupying government owned land without any legal author‐ ization. Beginning in the seventeenth century this individual occupation of land (squatting) initiated the actual and planned colonization of the western territories of the USA (Samyahardja et al. 2006: 97–98). The contemporary understanding of squatting was shaped by the latter interpretation coming from Northern America and can be defined as follows: Dwelling in a home built on land that does not belong to the builder, typically without the consent of the land owner, in the absence of formal planning and regulation (Gregory 2009: 719).

Squatters are people occupying free areas within cities or at the urban periphery without legitimation. They live in an illegal or semi-legal condition usually on government- or private-owned land. Often the building sites are situated on unpro‐ ductive land (steep slopes or near river or railway lines) spared of urban development. Often, these sides are also affected by the frequent occurrence of natural hazards, e.g. flooding, landslides, etc. Squatters are confronted with a permanent risk of evic‐ tion, as governments often react with restrictive measures to these illegal settlements (bulldozing and relocation). The following features are characteristic for squatters (Gregory 2009: 719): • • • • •

built quickly to establish a de facto claim built without legitimation basic infrastructure is missing (e.g., water, drainage, sanitation, electricity, etc.) located on the periphery of urban areas (this can change as the city grows) located often on unproductive land such as swamps, steep hillsides, etc.

Increasing urbanization is among others one of the driving factors for the massive expansion of squatter settlements. Coinciding with urbanization rates also the peaks of squatter developments can be determined spatially and temporarily. Starting in the 1940s in Latin America and during the 1960s in South Asia, Africa was the latest to see the squatter formation starting in the 1970s, as colonial migration restrictions

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endured there for the longest time. Squatter settlements can, with some exceptions (Martínez 2013), primary be found in developing countries (Gertel 1999: 705–711; Bähr and Mertins 2000: 20–21). Squatting and the illegal subdivision of tenements are both seen as informal activities and thus they are also referred to as ‘informal housing’. However, the term ‘informal sector’ has more commonly a different meaning. Informal sector: Shaped during the 1970s the term describes all economic activ‐ ities which do not fit under regular (formal) classification schemes. Basically, it includes those parts of the economy beyond state control, sometimes illegal and untaxed, mostly family oriented, without regular payment of wages or any social insurance. Examples for informal occupations are street vendors, rickshaw drivers, carpet weavers or waste collectors (Gregory 2009: 381; Scholz 2006: 180–183). Characteristics of the informal sector are (Amis 2004: 146–149): • • • • • • •

ease of entry reliance on indigenous resources family ownership of enterprise small scale of operations labour intensive methods of production and adapted technology skills acquired outside the formal school system unregulated and competitive market.

As the informal economy is characterized by low entry barriers, it represents usually the simplest way to earn a livelihood for the masses of unskilled workers or newly arrived migrants. Sometimes, and particularly in times of recession, working in the informal sector is the only option to earn a living for the poor and therefore it is also referred to as survival economy (Buchholt 1999: 717). Informal workers, however, are not per se poor and not all poor people work in the informal sector. Nevertheless, according to an estimation of the International Labour Organization (ILO), their amount represents one third of the world’s workforce and in developing countries even more than two thirds (Scholz 2006: 182). The formal economy is closely linked to the informal sector and this relationship is characterized by mutually dependencies (dual economy). The informal sector, however, tends to absorb more labour than the formal economy and about 85% of all new jobs are informal (UN-Habitat 2008: 90). Due to these dependencies most of the informal activities are situated in close spatial distance to the central business district (CBD) and activities which cannot be executed on the streets are often performed in the operators’ homes. This results in mixed residential–commercial quarters near the CBD but more importantly in an increased demand for low-cost homes near the city centre, as the poor often cannot afford the transport cost to the urban peripheries. For many cities in the developing world this meant a successive spread of slum-like quarters around the old city centres (Scholz 2006: 180–183).

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3.2

UN-Habitat’s Slum Definition

In the comprehensive report ‘The challenge of slums’ (2003) the United Nations agency for human settlements, UN-Habitat, estimated for the first time in history the number of people living in slums on a global scale. For this purpose, they needed clear indicators and an agreed definition of the term slum. Neither of those was available, not only due to the divergent opinions of what should be named a slum settlement, but also of several other features of the concept ‘slum’ (UN-Habitat 2003b: 11): • Slums are multidimensional in nature and thus are too complex to be defined according to one or two parameters. • Slums are a relative concept, the assignment of an area as a slum is dependent on many factors, e.g. the subjective perception of the observer, cultural and local backgrounds, etc. • Universal applicable indicators cannot be found as there is a wide variation of criteria for defining slums even in the same city. • Slums change very fast, a characteristic which is valid today may be incorrect in a short period of time. For comparative studies, such wide issues as the development stage of the observed country, the cultural background, the researcher’s perception or local circumstances must be considered as well as at first glance simple questions such as “What are basic needs? Proper access to drinking water? Electricity supply? Both?” Leading to further questions such as “Drinking water from a water tap or a public well?” and “What is a reasonable distance to the well?” These questions exemplify only some of the problems for the utilization of the concept. The list of the difficulties can be nearly infinitely extended (Gilbert 2007: 699–700; Bronger 2007: 35–55). Despite all these controversies it can be agreed, however, that slums or marginal settlements are a multidimensional phenomenon that have some characteristics which can be clearly defined, such as access to infrastructure, and others, such as social capital, which cannot (UN-Habitat 2003b: 11). For an operationalization of the concept, UN-Habitat established the following definition: A slum household consists of one or a group of individuals living under the same roof in an urban area, lacking one or more of the following amenities: access to basic services, durable structural quality of housing, sufficient living area, security of tenure (UN-Habitat 2008: 33).

This definition attributes physical and legal characteristics to a slum household, excluding the social and economic dimension (e.g., poverty rate). Measurable Indi‐ cators are derived from these characteristics, representing the basis for all quantita‐ tive estimations of slum dwellers provided by UN-Habitat (cf. Table 3.1).

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3.3 A Low-Cost Housing Typology

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Table 3.1 UN-Habitat’s characteristics and indicators for slums (based on UN-Habitat 2003b: 11–12, 2008: 33) Characteristic

Operational indicator

Description

Access to basic services • Proportion of households with access to save water supply (affordable and can be obtained without extreme effort) • Proportion of households with improved sanitation (private toilet or shared with a reasonable number of people)

Slum areas are most frequently characterized by missing or inadequate access to basic infrastructure. Most importantly, this means the lacking access to sanitation facilities and safe water resources, but also the absence of waste collection systems, electricity supply, surface roads, street lightening and rainwater drainage

Durable structural quality of housing

• Proportion of households with dilapidated structures (materials used for construction and compliance with local building standards and laws) • Proportion of households residing on or near a hazardous site

Houses in slum settlements are often considered as substandard, built with nonpermanent materials inadequate for housing purposes. They are frequently located in hazardous areas or land unsuitable for housing (floodplains, in proximity to industrial, waste disposal sites, etc.)

Sufficient living area

• Proportion of households with more Many slum dwellings are than two persons per room overcrowded, with five or more persons sharing a one-room unit

Security of tenure

• Proportion of households with formal title deeds to land and/or residence • Proportion of households with enforceable agreements of any document as a proof of tenure arrangement

3.3

Security of tenure is one of the central aspects of slums. The informality of occupation or the non-compliance with land use plans are often regarded as synonymous with slum

A Low-Cost Housing Typology

The umbrella term ‘slum’ covers a wide range of substandard housing forms and in official language little distinction is made between the various types of marginal areas. It is crucial, however, to have a clear understanding of the different settlement types considered as slum, their formation processes and their characteristics to develop effective measures and suitable governance strategies addressing their distinctive challenges. Slums can be classified according to criteria such as origin and age, location and boundaries, size and scale, legality, vulnerability or develop‐ ment stages (Mertins 1984: 438; UN-Habitat 2003b: 84–85).

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3 Informal Housing and Marginal Settlements

Since the 1970s the spatial distribution pattern of poor households within urban settlements has changed. In the 1950s generally greater numbers of the urban poor were found in inner-city tenements or classical slums in central locations, whereas today most of the urban poor live in the urban periphery (Atkinson 2004: 26). Davis

Central areas authorized

Room in subdivided inner-city tenements

Public housing

authorized

Room in publicly owned tenements

Hostel, pension, hotels etc.

authorized

Cheap room in pension

authorized by owner

Semi-legal-rooms are rented or "bought" from de-facto owner

unauthorized by owner

Invaded empty houses or appartments

authorized

Space to sleep outside

formal

Tenements

Squatters

informal Pavement dwellers

Periphery Tenements

formal

Public housing

authorized

Room in private tenements

authorized

Room in publicly owned tenements

authorized by owner

House construction on private owned land or received from governmental programs

unauthorized by owner

Invaded public or private land

authorized by owner

Privatized, semi-legal squatting illegal subdivided land bought or rented from developers or landowners

Semi-legal squatters Pirate urbanization

informal Squatters

= de-jure claim

= de-facto claim

= no claim

Fig. 3.1 Low-cost housing typology (based on Davis 2006: 41–46; Pacione 2005: 517–524; Samyahardja et al. 2006: 97)

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3.3 A Low-Cost Housing Typology

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(2006: 36) states that in some cities of the Global South only 20–30% of the poor live in inner-city areas, implying that more than two thirds live in the urban periphery. Therefore, a classification scheme for low-cost housing types should consider spatial location in the first place and only than the dualism of formality and informality (cf. Fig. 3.1).

3.3.1

Central Areas

In central locations2 marginalized people (i.e., the poor, migrants from rural areas without legal status, people working in the informal sector, etc.) often rent rooms in subdivided inner-city tenements, which were legally built as residences for middleand upper income groups, but are now subdivided and turned into tenements, when the original inhabitants have moved to ‘better’ quarters. These tenements pose significant advantages for the tenants due to their central location: informal employ‐ ment opportunities are nearby, transport costs are low and sometimes the area is also subject to rent control regulations. The land lords in turn try to maximize their profit by subdividing their property in many units and renting them to marginalized people who have little legal means to oppose them. Due to the subdivisions and the neglected maintenance investments by the owners, the buildings are often overcrowded and the supply with public services (water, electricity, etc.) is usually very poor, as it was never adapted to the high density of occupation. During the 1960s and 1970s governments around the world introduced large social housing programmes in an effort to cope with the insufficient housing stock. Publicly owned tenements for low-income groups were constructed close to central locations, but also in urban peripheries. The units were constructed adopting western technologies and housing standards, resulting in high costs per unit. Through this strategy, however, the rents were often—even with subsidies—beyond the reach of the poorest part of society (Pacione 2005: 517). Today, many of these governmentbuilt houses are degraded and inadequate maintenance is common. A third formal option for the urban poor in inner-city areas are low-cost hostels, pensions or cheap hotels, which can be found frequently near the bus- or train stations. These accommodations are used by migrants or single persons as entry basis to the city and are often characterized by the same problems, such as overcrowding and poor service provision. Informal options of housing consist mostly of authorized and unauthorized squatter dwellings, contributing a larger share of available housing units than the formal options. Without legal permission, existing units are subdivided or extended by their owners, and eventually rented or sold to third parties. These semi-legal procedures are authorized by de facto owner–occupiers who act as landlords, even if they are tenants themselves. Thus, this type of accommodation can be concep‐ 2By

‘central’ not only the city centre is meant, but also other areas with central functions. This includes, e.g. commercial or industrial areas with many job opportunities.

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3 Informal Housing and Marginal Settlements

tualized as ‘authorized squatting’ and must be distinguished from its ‘unauthorized’ counterpart. Unauthorized squatters are constructed or occupied without any permis‐ sion and originate from the illegal invasion of vacant property or land by people in need of shelter. In contrast to the ‘authorized’ squatters who possess a certain kind of tenure security, the residents of unauthorized squatters must accept highly inad‐ equate housing conditions and the constant thread of eviction. The third informal housing category in central areas are the so-called pavement dwellers (Jagannathan and Halder 1988). With no option for shelter at all, these homeless people are forced to sleep in available public spaces (Pacione 2005: 518–524; Davis 2006: 35–40).

3.3.2

Periphery

Low-cost housing options in the formal sector are comparatively limited in the urban periphery. Beside rented rooms in private houses, there are those in publicly owned tenements. Within social housing programmes governments have also built tene‐ ments in the periphery, even though in more limited numbers. These programmes, however, have been abandoned or reduced in their size during the 1980s as it became clear that they do not have a significant impact on providing adequate and affordable housing for the urban poor (Bähr and Mertins 2000: 24–26). The majority of the sprawling housing units around third world cities originate from two different kinds of informal activities: either from authorized and unauthorized squatting or from ‘pirate urbanization’ (Davis 2006). Unauthorized squatting means basically the occupation of public- or privateowned land without permission of the owner. People unable to afford a legal site or house organize themselves or hire workers to construct their houses or shacks ille‐ gally in these occupied places. Without legal land tenure the established settlements are often subject to eviction by the authorities and due to their location in areas not suitable for residential purposes, access to public services is poor and commonly the locations are threatened by natural hazards. People settle often in these areas, as they have a low commercial value, giving them a better chance to avoid any interest of the government in this land (Pacione 2005: 523–524). By authorized squatting the housing activities of those residents are meant, which are allowed by the owners to construct their shacks and houses on land they do not possess (Davis 2006: 35). This includes either land informally sold by private actors as well as plots received from the participation in government programmes. Many municipalities have introduced so-called site and services- or core housing programmes as an alternative to the social housing strategies perceived as ineffective. In both programmes governments provide publicly owned land and some basic infrastructures for people in need to construct their house in self-help. Most of these settlements, however, are far away from any central area, resulting in high extra costs for transportation (Pacione 2005: 523–524). The numbers of housing units originating from unauthorized and authorized squatting reached its peak during the late 1970s and has diminished since that time.

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3.3 A Low-Cost Housing Typology

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Most of the available urban space had been consumed and a more professional type of squatting begun to develop—so-called ‘semi-legal squatting’ or ‘pirate urbani‐ zation’ (Davis 2006: 44). Private land developers and investors subdivide and sell parts of their legally owned land informally, without complying to building permits, planning or zoning rules. Thus, in contrast to squatter settlements the land of these poor quality housing areas is owned legally, but the process of subdivision, the transaction and the construction of the houses themselves is illegal. The inhabitants of these de jure illegal houses consider themselves as owners as they bought or rented the land where they build on. As owner occupiers they possess a de facto claim to this land which is stronger than that of unauthorized squatters (UN-Habitat 2003b: 83–84). Semi-legal squatter settlements are characterized by a more schematic arrangement, poor service levels, high security of tenure, non-conformity with urban development plans or construction standards and a high degree of self-help housing (Baross and van der Linden 1990: 2–7). It is estimated that 50–70% of all marginal settlements originate from this type of housing (Bähr and Mertins 2000: 20).

3.4

Formation of Slums

Nowadays slums are widely seen as a phenomenon, or even as a characteristic of countries of the Global South. European cities are mostly considered as slum-free and it is often forgotten that the term arose in England just 200 years ago. Bronger (2007: 55–92) clarifies that marginal settlements were a common characteristic of European cities through the different stages of their development. He states that Rome (most severe during the glamorous Roman times), Athens, Paris and even such small cities like Bordeaux had quarters which would be seen as a slum today. In modern times the slum development in Europe reached its peak around 1900 and was afterwards addressed by vehement interventions (social housing and other programmes) of the city governments. It is argued that this ‘counter attack’ (ibid.) of the cities did not yet take place in the developing world and is therefore one of the reasons for the deso‐ lating living conditions of so many slum dwellers. It remains unclear, however, if these measures alone were the only explanation for the broad improvements in European slums. Certainly, the slowdown of the urbanization dynamics in Europe at the begin‐ ning of the twentieth century and consolidation processes introduced by the slum dwellers themselves have contributed to this success. Accelerated urbanization has led to an extensive urban growth of cities in the Global South in terms of population and spatial extension. This growth affects mostly the informal sector in the urban periphery. Traditional slum areas in central locations remain static (in terms of in-migration and density) and are even improved by gentrification or consolidation processes. The most dynamic areas are clearly those in the urban periphery. Squatters construct their shacks and houses in these areas, pushing the boundaries of the cities further into the countryside. This growth is mainly driven by the lower social class and migrants from rural areas, which cannot afford the prices of the formal housing market (Samyahardja et al. 2006: 96–97).

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3.4.1

3 Informal Housing and Marginal Settlements

Invasion and Infiltration

Informal settlements in the urban periphery originate either from squatting or more importantly from ‘pirate urbanization’. Both are characterized by two different formation processes: large-scale squatter invasions and the slower process of infil‐ tration. The former is known from Latin American cities (for Peru cf. Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989: 83–85), where squatters sometimes perform land invasions as a well organized and planned operation. In such a case hundreds of participating fami‐ lies move overnight into a spot of land, usually government owned, and construct simple shacks. If the settlers are not evicted immediately, they will start a consoli‐ dation process by using more permanent building materials, demarking their slots, etc. In this case the squatter settlement may develop into a more settled community over time. Sometimes, the process is also tacitly authorized by the approval of poli‐ ticians who are interested in the support of the squatters (Pacione 2005: 522). Infiltration, instead, is more common in African or Asian settlements. This process is not organized and happens successive over years. Early settlers may settle illegally in public land or semi-legal with permission of a local landlord or the leader of a local settlement. Others may be invited to join and over time they will form an extended or new settlement. The process of ‘pirate urbanization’, the illegal subdivision of land into building plots violating all planning regulations, is usually involved and contrib‐ utes a large part of the available housing plots (Pacione 2005: 525).

3.4.2

Model of Inner-City Migration and Its Influence on Squatter Formation

The formation of squatter settlements is indirectly influenced by inner-city migration of the poor. Based on Turner (1968), who distinguished three types of squatters— bridgeheaders, consolidators and status-seekers, a model of urban migration patterns can be drawn. The process started (I in Fig. 3.2), when migrants from rural areas came to the city usually with the intention to find an employment. As employment opportunities are best near the central areas, they try to find accommodation in the degraded tenements nearby. The bad conditions in these inner-city slums and changing life phases force these bridgeheaders to move again. In a second migration step, they move to squatter settlements in the outskirts of the city. These new squatter settlements were established either by illegal occupation or pirate subdivision of land. With tenure rights getting more secure over time, the new citizens become consolidators as they try to improve the settlement by their own initiative (self-help housing). In a third step some of the settlers may become status-seekers, when they raise their social position within society by gaining a better job. This new status may be connected with another move to a better area, as e.g. accommodation in a regular quarter or a rental apartment in a tenement.

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3.4 Formation of Slums

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Fig. 3.2 Exemplary model of migration flows and squatter formation in Latin-American cities (reproduced from Bähr 1986)

This model does, of course, not cover all intra-urban migration patterns and, as the city grows, it must be extended and adapted. In larger cities both new and consolidated squatter settlements are used by migrants as a bridgehead to the city beside the inner-city slums. Intra-urban migration flows are now getting more complicated, as not only migrants participate, but also citizens born in the city (II in Fig. 3.2). When the city becomes even bigger, migration flows originating outside of the city tend to target directly the periphery (III in Fig. 3.2). This observation may be attributed to a loss of centralities of the city centre followed by less job opportu‐ nities or to the limited absorption capacities of marginal settlements near the centre (Bähr 2005: 50–54).

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3 Informal Housing and Marginal Settlements

Without interference squatters and ‘pirate subdivisions’ often undergo similar processes. The building slots are divided in smaller parts and rented or sold out again, resulting in a successive overcrowding of these areas. Over time and depending on the level of tenure security, the residents improve their houses themselves and convert a small shack successively to a better house. They may even enlarge their houses by adding another storey or other extensions. Also the access to public serv‐ ices such as water supply, drainage, etc., may be improved over time, often by joint actions of the community (Bähr and Mertins 2000). These consolidation processes may happen to a certain degree without intervention, but even than living conditions remain inadequate and the residents often cannot satisfy their basic needs.

3.5

The Global Housing Discourse

Facing the immense population growth and rapid urbanization during the second part of the twentieth century together with an increasing awareness of environmental issues3 starting in the 1970s the notion that the impacts of urbanization must be addressed was more and more recognized. Facing this background, the United Nations called for the first time to a conference on human settlements (HABITAT I).

3.5.1

Habitat I and Habitat II

The first conference on Human settlements took place in Vancouver in 1976 and is known as HABITAT I. The conference was convened following the concern over the extremely serious condition of human settlements expressed at the former United Nations Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm. In the resulting ‘Vancouver Declaration’ it was recognized that […] the circumstances of life for vast numbers of people are unacceptable, particularly in developing countries, and, unless action is taken, these conditions are likely to be further aggravated […] (UN-Habitat: 2). […] the improvement of quality of life of human beings is the first and most important objective of every human settlement policy […] (UN-Habitat: 4).

During the conference for the first time the insufficient housing conditions and the urgent need for addressing this issue was officially acknowledged. Furthermore, the notion that adequate housing is a prerequisite for the satisfaction of all basic needs was accepted and an urgent call upon all countries and organizations, to support attempts for improving the living conditions in human settlements, was 3During

the 1970s a growing environmental movement emerged. The oil crisis in 1972, as well as books such as ‘The limits of growth’ (Meadows 1972) and ‘Silent spring’ (Carson 1962) contributed to a broader discussion about the impacts of human action on the environment.

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3.5 The Global Housing Discourse

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made. Beside the exchange of experiences and recommendations for improved settlement policies, one of the most visible outcomes was the establishment of the United Nations Human Settlement Programme ‘UN-Habitat’. This new UN agency was founded in 1978 with the mission to assist national governments in imple‐ menting measures and policies for an improvement of housing conditions in their countries (UN-Habitat 2012). Exactly 20 years later UN-Habitat called for a second conference on human settlements, this time in Istanbul 1996. This conference is known as ‘HABITAT II’ or also as ‘the city summit’. In the time period between 1976 and 1996 the housing challenge neither vanished nor decreased in its severity but rather reached crisis proportions, as it was now facilitated by more intensive global development trends (see Chap. 2). The conference was also influenced by a series of other world confer‐ ences which took place in the beginning of the 1990s, in particular the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio 1992 (cf. Box 5). There‐ fore, the 171 participating nations set themselves two goals: they reaffirmed not only the goal of improved housing conditions for all, but introduced also the new goal of sustainable urban development. To reach these goals, concrete strategies and guide‐ lines were put forward and subsequently included in the main outcome of the confer‐ ence—a political document known as the ‘Habitat Agenda’. This document was signed by all representatives of the participating nations, who made in this way a strong commitment to implement the agenda’s objectives, principles and recom‐ mendations. […] we commit ourselves to implementing the Habitat Agenda, through local, national, subregional and regional plans of action and/or other policies […] (UN-Habitat 1996b).

Box 3.1: The ‘Earth Summit’ (Rio 1992) and Agenda 21 In 1992 a major conference of the United Nations, the United Nations Confer‐ ence on Environment and Development, was held in Rio de Janeiro. Over 17,000 participants, among them representatives of all governments and numerous NGOs discussed approaches to achieve more sustainable develop‐ ment and environmental protection. In the face of global threads for the envi‐ ronment (climate change, loss of biodiversity), as well as alarming social trends of marginalization and exclusion, concrete countermeasures were agreed. Among them are, e.g. the climate change convention and Agenda 21. While the first addresses the reasons and impacts of climate change and led to the well-known Kyoto Protocol, Agenda 21 is a document promoting sustain‐ able development as the priority issue of the twenty-first century. The interesting thing about Agenda 21 is that emphasize is laid on local activities, meaning in particular that local authorities should participate in the realization of the goals of sustainable development. It is recommended that municipalities should enter into a dialogue with their citizens, local organiza‐ tions and private enterprises to implement projects and measures in accordance to Agenda 21. Following this not binding appeal, Agenda 21 initiatives were

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3 Informal Housing and Marginal Settlements

adapted in surprisingly many cities underlining the growing importance of the local dimension in achieving sustainability (Atkinson 2004: 17–22; United Nations 1992).

The Habitat Agenda: a global plan of action for the development of sustainable human settlements—the Habitat Agenda—was adopted during the Habitat II confer‐ ence (Istanbul 1996). It can be seen as a turning point in international housing poli‐ cies, as during the event the widespread view that there is no solution for the problems of rapid growing cities was dismissed. To demonstrate possible solutions, experi‐ ences and best practices from around the world in dealing with rapid urbanization were presented and subsequently transferred in policy recommendations (UN-Habitat 2001: 3). The document itself was signed by 171 nations and presents guidelines, principles and recommendations for dealing with accelerated urbanization and its impacts. It consists of over 100 commitments and 600 recommendations, all circling around the main thematic goals: (1) adequate shelter for all and (2) sustainable human settle‐ ment development in an urbanizing world. The most important commitments are summarized in Table 3.2. The agenda provides a strong framework of concepts and recommendations for many national and local governments. Summarizing, it can be said, that it lays out two clear goals which are the provision of adequate shelter for all and to develop more sustainable cities. To achieve this, the agenda recommends and strongly supports an approach which enables all stakeholders—meaning municipalities, NGOs and also community members at the very local level—to participate actively in the planning and decision-making process. Governments are encouraged to build capacities for this purpose, adopt the principles of good governance at all levels and to introduce comprehensive policies to achieve the agenda’s goals. International cooperation is highlighted as a possibility to share experiences, best practices, knowledge and technologies to assist national action plans for improving living conditions. Furthermore, the subscribing countries recognize that more finan‐ cial resources are needed to implement the agenda and accept UN-Habitat as the leading agency for coordinating all efforts. It is recommended, however, that the organization must be strengthened within the system of the United Nations. The Habitat Agenda requests from the participating countries a regular monitoring and evaluation of the progress towards shelter for all and sustainable development. This assessment of the progress is supervised by UN-Habitat by creating urban indicators, statistics and a best practice database (UN-Habitat 1996a).

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Table 3.2 The habitat agenda: important commitments (based on UN-Habitat 1996b) The right to adequate housing and adequate shelter for all

We reaffirm our commitment to the full and progressive realization of the right to adequate housing […]. In this context, we recognize an obligation by governments to enable people to obtain shelter and to protect and improve dwellings and neighbourhoods. We commit ourselves to the goal of improving living and working conditions on an equitable and sustainable basis, so that everyone will have adequate shelter that is healthy, safe, secure, accessible and affordable and that includes basic services, facilities and amenities, and will enjoy freedom from discrimination in housing and legal security of tenure […] (UN-Habitat 1996b)

Sustainable human settlements

We commit ourselves to the goal of sustainable human settlements in an urbanizing world by developing societies that will make efficient use of resources within the carrying capacity of ecosystems […] (UN-Habitat 1996b)

Enablement and Participation

We commit ourselves to the strategy of enabling all key actors in the public, private and community sectors to play an effective role—at the national, state/provincial, metropolitan and local levels—in human settlements and shelter development (UN-Habitat 1996b)

Gender equality

We commit ourselves to the goal of gender equality in human settlements development (UN-Habitat 1996b)

Financing shelter

[…] for commercial financing, we commit ourselves to strengthening existing financial mechanisms and, where appropriate, developing innovative approaches for financing the implementation of the Habitat Agenda […] (UN-Habitat 1996b)

International cooperation

[…] we commit ourselves […] to enhancing international cooperation and partnerships that will assist in the implementation of national plans of action and the global plan of action […] (UN-Habitat 1996b)

Assessing progress

We commit ourselves to observing and implementing the Habitat Agenda as a guide for action within our countries and will monitor progress towards that goal […] (UN-Habitat 1996b)

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3.5.2

‘Cities Without Slums’ and the Millennium Development Goals

In September 2000 world leaders met at the so-called ‘Millennium Summit’ in New York City to discuss the future role of the United Nations and to establish goals for humanity in the twenty-first century. Based on key documents from a series of world conferences during the 1990s—e.g. Agenda 21 and the Habitat Agenda—the summit ended with the ‘Millennium Declaration’, an umbrella document containing a wide range of commitments and goals for poverty reduction, sustainable development, environmental protection, health, gender equality, education, democracy, human rights and good governance (United Nations 2000). At the following session of the General Assembly of the United Nations a road map with eight goals for human development in the twenty-first century was established. Subordinated to these goals are 18 quantitative targets to be measured and monitored with 32 indicators. Most of these targets were to be achieved until the year 2015. Through this deadline the international community had made a strong and verifiable commitment to the world’s poor population to improve their living conditions (Auclair 2005; UN-Habitat 2003b: 7). Subordinated to goal 7: ‘ensure environmental sustainability’ one target is concerned with slum settlements (target 11)4: by 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers (United Nations 2001).

The target which is also referred to as ‘cities without slums’ or simply as the ‘slum target’ was breakthrough for the international housing community, as it marks not only a recognition that slums are a key development problem, but also because a timebound and quantifiable target was now established (Bazoglu 2005; UN-Habitat 2003a). This clear goal gave a perspective for all stakeholders which had been missing in all previous documents, such as e.g. the Habitat Agenda. However, the commitments of the Habitat Agenda were reaffirmed and constitute the framework for the slum target. By addressing for the first time an explicitly urban issue the UN gave attention to the growing importance of cities, raising the profile of urban issues and also that of the leading housing organization of the United Nations: UN-Habitat (UN-Habitat 2008: 46–47). Since that time, the organization has become the key agency for all housing issues and was responsible for the development and estab‐ lishment of the indicators concerned with target 11. In 2002 the mandate of UN-Habitat was also formally enhanced by elevating its status to that of a fullfledged programme of the UN system (UN-Habitat 2012). Counting slum dwellers: the new obligations of monitoring the ‘cities without slums’ target were difficult to fulfil. Due to the immense variety of slum definitions of different countries and agencies for a long time no attempt was made to estimate the world’s slum population. Although some indicators were developed for meas‐

4Target 11

is also referred to as ‘target 7.D’.

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uring inequality or poverty,5 it was not until the announcement of the Millennium Development Goals, when it became clear that a count of the world’s slum population is needed. UN-Habitat assigned this task to an expert group which had to start from the very beginning. They had to find an approach for homogenizing the available data and for developing new indicators for operationalizing the measuring obliga‐ tions. Based on a variety of definitions, this group defined what should be regarded as a slum (see Sect. 3.2) and subsequently a first assessment of global numbers could be performed. UN-Habitat presented the results in 2003: an estimated number of 924 million people was living in slums in 2001, representing one third of the world’s urban population (UN-Habitat 2003b). Critics on ‘cities without slums’ and the resuscitation of the term ‘slum’: in the following years target 11 was criticized in many ways. First, it remained unclear what a ‘significant improvement in the lives of slum dwellers’ could mean. Second, the deadline of the target was, unlike the other MDG targets which ended in 2015, extended to 2020, leaving a huge time frame for governments to introduce suitable policies (UN-Habitat 2008: 46–47). Third and most importantly, it was pointed out, that the target was simply set too low. Absolute numbers of the global slum popu‐ lation were not available at the time the target was developed and when new data became available, it appeared that 100 million is only a small fraction (10%) of the total number (Bazoglu 2005). Furthermore, the target was, unlike other MDG targets, set on a global scale as an absolute number without reference to a specific baseline (e.g., 1990). This might have led to difficulties for national governments to set country-specific targets, delaying their action, as other countries may contribute a greater share for achieving the goals. Thus, incentives for governments to introduce national action plans and to intensify their efforts have been possibly diminished by these issues (United Nations 2010: 63). The use of the slogan ‘cities without slums’ was also criticized. Gilbert (2007) analysed the reasons, why the UN chose a slogan with so many negative connota‐ tions. He points out that multinational development organizations, just the same as NGOs, must justify their existence and have to convince their international donors that they address serious problems of humanity and that they have the ability to do so. Glamorous terms and also apocalyptic assessments and prognosis may awake the public and make more people aware of the problem which in turn certainly means more funds for UN-Habitat and associated NGOs. By accepting the responsibility of monitoring and implementing target 11, UN-Habitat achieved a strong position within the international debate, surely also enhancing funds for the agency. Gilbert indicates further (ibid: 702–703), that the renewed use of the term may impose dangers. First, he states that with the prevalence of the term also the negative conno‐ tations prevail, leaving slums further on perceived as areas of crime and disease and slum dwellers as crooks and fraudsters. Second, the set of this goal may be interpreted as an invitation to further slum clearances by certain governments, even if UN-Habitat has clearly moved away from such policies. 5The World Bank developed for instance the much disputed indicators ‘less than 1$ a day’ or ‘less

than 2$ a day’ as tool for measuring poverty.

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3.5.3

Sustainable Development Goals and Habitat III

At the end of the planned implementation period for the Millennium Development Goals in 2015, the results were ambivalent. Some goals where achieved, but others remain a challenge for international development (United Nations 2015b). According to the United Nations the slum target was surpassed threefold, with improvements in sanitation, housing, etc., for over 300 million people (cf. Sect. 3.6). Bearing in mind the statistical difficulties for counting slum dwellers, of course this result must be interpreted with caution. Simultaneously, the UN also admitted that due to urbanization the absolute number of slum dwellers has increased every year with no trend reversal in sight. In the MDG implementation period it has become even clearer, that cities must play a decisive role for global development. The majority of humankind is living in cities, 80% of the GDP is coming from urban areas, income inequalities are on the rise in more than two-thirds of the world’s cities and urban agglomerations are responsible for more than 70% of all carbon dioxide emissions (Cohen 2015; UN-Habitat 2016). Urban areas do not only cause many challenges, they provide also the opportunities for the needed transition to sustainability. Considering this background, the Sustainable Development Goals were discussed in 2015, setting the scene for the global development agenda until 2030. For the first time a stand-alone urban goal was endorsed, targeting to make cities safe, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable (Goal 11). Subordinated to this goal, a number of targets were included, one of them concerned with inadequate housing and slums (United Nations 2015a): By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums.

The adoption of a comprehensive urban goal explicitly sets out the normative base for the international community (safe, inclusive, sustainable and resilient) and is implicitly a collective acknowledgement that cities represent necessary pathways to sustainable development (Parnell 2016). This ‘urban turn’ (Parnell 2016: 529) has huge implications for the upcoming 3rd Conference on Human Settlements— HABITAT III. On this global summit the normative and operative details of a ‘New Urban Agenda’ are negotiated which will frame the agenda for sustainable urban development over the next decades.

3.6

Dimensions of the Challenge of Slums—Recent Data and Trends

Reassured by the millennium declaration, UN-Habitat has the obligation to count the world’s slum dwellers on a regular basis in order to monitor the progress towards achieving the target ‘cities without slums’. In a first assessment, reported in UN

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3.6 Dimensions of the Challenge of Slums—Recent Data and Trends

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HABITAT’s document ‘the challenge of slums’ (2003), it was estimated that 921 million people lived in slums in the year 2001, a number growing by 25 million each year. In the following decade many prognoses and projections were developed, some of them predicting that the number will double to two billion until the year 2030 (Bunting 2005; SUF 2006). In the follow-up reports of UN-Habitat the number of slum dwellers is, contrary to previous calculations, estimated to only 767 million (UN-Habitat 2008), 760 million (UN-Habitat 2013: 151) or 792 million (UN-Habitat 2016: 203) for the year 2000. This represents over 100 million less than in the organization’s first assessment. Such opposing numbers exemplify the difficulties of finding clear definitions and methods of measurement. For this reason strong doubts, as for instance expressed by Bronger (2007: 30–35), about the quantitative deter‐ mination and the intercultural transferability of the term and the concept of ‘slum’ seem reasonable. Progress: In 2015 the United Nations presented an assessment of target 11 (target 7.D) and announced that the slum target was not only achieved, but more than tripled. According to this report, between 2000 and 2015 over 320 million people in the devel‐ oping world have been lifted out of slum conditions (United Nations 2015b: 60). Asia had contributed most to reach this success, with governments in that region improving the lives of over 172 million slum dwellers between 2000 and 2010 (UN-Habitat 2008). In this report it is stated that most progress was made in China, India, Indonesia, Turkey and Vietnam. It must be questioned, however, if these improvements were made due to a comprehensive policy, as stated for India, and not simply due to the rapid economic growth of these countries. The absolute and relative number of people living in slums in developing coun‐ tries between the years 1990 and 2010 is illustrated in Fig. 3.3. The proportion of urban population living in slums has declined from 46% in 1990 to 32% in 2010. This finding is even more remarkable, considering that in the same period the urban population, summarized for the same countries, rose from roughly 1.4 billion to 2.5 billion. All of these new citizens needed places to live and it is estimated that approximately 40,000 new dwellings are required in the developing world each and every day (UN-Habitat 2002: 2). The progress made, however, has not been sufficient to offset the growth of slums. Due to constant urbanization the absolute number of slum dwellers has grown from 791 million in 2000 to 871 million in 2010 (cf. Fig. 3.3) and is expected to reach 889 million by 2020 (UN-Habitat 2008). According to the latest estimations, this number has already been reached in 2014, with 881 million people living in slums (UN-Habitat 2016: 203). Global distribution: Although there might be progress towards the goal of ‘cities without slums’, proportions of urban population living in slums as well as progress in slum alleviation remains unevenly distributed. While the developed world is— with some exceptions—regarded as slum-free, in the developing regions and in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa and also in many parts of South Asia the proportion of slum population is very high. In Fig. 3.4 this uneven spatial distribution is clearly

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3 Informal Housing and Marginal Settlements 1000

50 46.2

900

42.0 39.4

800

40 35.6 32.6

30

600 500

749

400 300

791

830

871 20

Percentage

Millions

700

689 10

200 100 0

0 1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Urban slum population Proportion of urban population living in slums

Fig. 3.3 Urban slum population in developing countries 1990–2010 (based on United Nations 2015b: 6; UN-Habitat 2016: 203)

demonstrated for specific country groups known as the ‘Millennium Development Goals Regions’ (MDG regions).6 With nearly 200 million or two thirds of the urban population living in slums, Sub-Sahara Africa has the highest proportions of slum dwellers in 2010, followed by South Asia with a proportion slightly more than a third of the urban population. In all other MDG regions of the developing world the share is less than a third. According to the data used, slum alleviation seems to be successful in all regions, with shares of slum dwellers decreasing everywhere. An exception is—again—SubSahara Africa, where the share of slum population remained stable implying an absolute increase in the number of urban population living in slums. Linkages between globalization, slums and the informal sector: Unlike the urbanization of Europe, which was most intense in the nineteenth century, today’s urbanization of the developing countries is only in some cases accompanied by industrialization. This means that there are many people moving to the cities not because of job opportunities, but rather to escape poverty in rural areas. Reasons for this migration trend, however, are diverse. On the one hand, increased use of capital in agriculture has released many former farmers to unemployment, pushing them to the cities to find new jobs. On the other hand, globalization has brought some ‘cita‐ 6Millennium Development Goals Regions is a country classification developed by the UN Statistics

Division.

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Fig. 3.4 Urban population and share of slum dwellers in the MDG regions 1990–2010 (Obermayr 2011)

3.6 Dimensions of the Challenge of Slums—Recent Data and Trends

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dels of wealth’ (see Chap. 2) to many cities pulling migrants by rising hopes for a better life. This life, however, usually starts in informal settlements, where the new residents are trapped by the absence of formal employment opportunities. Therefore, some authors (e.g., Davis 2006: 208–215) conclude that another global trend is emerging: the urbanization of poverty. Most of the slum dwellers are forced to earn their livelihood in the informal sector. It is estimated, that approximately 85% of all generated new job opportunities around the world are created in the informal sector and two thirds of the population in developing countries are working in this sector (Scholz 2006: 182). Despite some advantages, informal employment implies threads and risks. Small and unstable income without any insurance leaves informal workers under the constant thread to lose their source of income. They are in absence of any state-provided social system not only vulnerable to sudden events such as injuries or diseases, but also to exter‐ nally induced economic changes. An example for such a thread can be found in Indonesia during the economic and political crisis in the late 1990s. When Indonesia was hit by this crisis, the informal sector served as the last resort for all those having lost their jobs. In absence of other opportunities and in an attempt to survive, people moved to the cities and tried their luck as street vendors. During several years after the crisis their number rose, for instance in Surakarta, from 1000 to over 5000 (Gervasi 2010). All these new vendors made competition fiercer threatening the survival of the weakest.

References Amis P (2004) Regulating the informal sector: voice and bad governance. In: Devas N (ed) Urban governance, voice, and poverty in the developing world. Earthscan, London, pp 145–163 Atkinson A (2004) promoting environmentalism, participation and sustainable human development in cities of Southeast Asia. In: Westendorff D (ed) From unsustainable to inclusive cities. UNRISD, Geneva, pp 15–57 Auclair C (2005) The millennium declaration and the habitat agenda. Habitat Debate 11(3):9 Bähr J (1986) Innerstädtische Wanderungsbewegungen unterer Sozialschichten und peripheres Wachstum lateinamerikanischer Metropolen (mit Beispielen aus Santiago de Chile und Lima). Eichstädter Beiträge (18):143–177 Bähr J (2005) Stadtgeographie II: Regionale Stadtgeographie. Westermann, Braunschweig Bähr J, Mertins G (2000) Marginalviertel in Großstädten der Dritten Welt. Geographische Rundschau 52(7/8):19–26 Baross P, van der Linden J (1990) The transformation of land supply systems in third world cities. Whitaker, Avebury Bazoglu N (2005) The need for a more ambitious target. In: The MDGs and the City, Nairobi, p 8 Bronger D (2007) Marginalsiedlungen in Megastädten “Erste” Welt – “Fünfte” Welt: Begriffliche und methodische Erfassungsprobleme für einen weltweiten Vergleich. In: Bronger D (ed) Marginalsiedlungen in Megastädten Asiens. LIT, Berlin, Münster, pp 29–114 Buchholt H (1999) Handel, Händler und Märkte im informellen Sektor Indonesiens. Geographische Rundschau 51(12):716–720 Bunting J (2005) Global goals for local change. In: The MDGs and the City, Nairobi Carson R (1962) Silent spring. Houghton Mifflin. Riverside Press, Boston

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References

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Cohen MA (2015) From Habitat II to Pachamama: a growing agenda and diminishing expectations for Habitat III. Environment and Urbanization. doi:10.1177/0956247815620978 Davis M (2006) Planet of Slums. Verso, New York Gaumnitz E (1994) Nairobi—“Slums of despair” oder “Slums of hope”? Praxis Geographie 24(1): 24–29 Gertel J (1999) Informeller Sektor: Zur Erklärungsreichweite des umstrittenen Konzepts: Das Beispiel Khartum. Geographische Rundschau 51(12):705–711 Gervasi M (2010) Surakarta, Indonesia: empowering the informal sector: street vendor management. http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/committees/cisdp/Upload/database/sura karta_2011_en_es.pdf. Accessed 08 July 2012 Gilbert A (2007) The return of the slum: does language matter? Int J Urban Reg Res 31(4):697– 713. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2007.00754.x Gregory D (ed) (2009) The dictionary of human geography, 5th edn. Blackwell, Malden Hardoy JE, Satterthwaite D (1989) Squatter citizen: Life in the urban third world. Earthscan, London Jagannathan NV, Halder A (1988) A case study of pavement dwellers in Calcutta: occupation, mobility and rural-urban linkages. Econ Polit Weekly 23(49):2602–2605 Kutty NK (1996) The impact of rent control on housing maintenance: a dynamic analysis incorporating European and North American rent regulations. Hous Stud 11(1):69–88. doi: 10.1080/02673039608720846 Martínez MA (2013) How do squatters deal with the state? Legalization and anomalous institutionalization in Madrid. Int J Urban Reg Res. doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12086 Meadows DH (1972) The limits to growth: a report for the club of Rome’s project on the predicament of mankind. Universe Books, New York Mertins G (1984) Marginalsiedlungen in Großstädten der Dritten Welt. Geographische Rundschau 36(9):434–442 Mertins G (1994) Verstädterungsprobleme in der Dritten Welt. Praxis Geographie 24(1) Obermayr C (2011) Urban population and share of slum dwellers in the MDG regions 1990-2010. https://christianobermayr.wordpress.com/maps-and-graphs/. Accessed 17 Aus 2016 Olsen EO (1988) What do economists know about the effect of rent control on housing maintenance? J Real Estate Finance Econ 1(3):295–307. doi:10.1007/BF00658922 Pacione M (2005) Urban geography. Routledge, London Parnell S (2016) Defining a global urban development agenda. World Dev 78:529–540. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.028 Samyahardja P, Subiantoro I, Saraswati (2006) The understanding of physical development forces for estimation of administrative definition of urban areas. In: Agency of Research and development (ed) Public Works International 2006, Jakarta, pp 95–104 Scholz F (2006) Entwicklungsländer: Entwicklungspolitische Grundlagen und regionale Beispiele. Westermann, Braunschweig SUF (2006) The SUF handbook: an approach to financial action planning for slum upgrading and new low-income residential neighbourhoods, Nairobi Turner I (1968) Housing priorities, settlement patterns and urban development in modernizing countries. J Am Inst Planners 34(6):354–363 UN-Habitat (1976) The Vancouver declaration on human settlements UN-Habitat (1996a) The habitat agenda goals and principles, Commitments and the global plan of action. http://www.unchs.org/downloads/docs/1176_6455_The_Habitat_Agenda.pdf. Accessed 06 Dec 2011 UN-Habitat (1996b) United nations conference on human settlements (Habitat II): Istanbul (Turkey) 3–14 June 1996. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G96/025/00/PDF/ G9602500.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 06 Dec 2011 UN-Habitat (2001) Das Urbane Jahrtausend. Istanbul +5. http://www.unric.org/html/german/ habitat/istanbul.pdf. Accessed 06 Dec 2011 UN-Habitat (2002) Cities without slums. HSP/WUF/1/DLG.I/Paper 4. http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 31303705/Cities-Without-Slums. Accessed 15 Nov 2011 UN-Habitat (2003a) Guide to monitoring target 11: improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers

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UN-Habitat (2003b) The Challenge of slums: global report on human settlements 2003. Earthscan, London UN-Habitat (2008) State of the world’s cities 2010/2011: bridging the urban divide. Earthscan, London UN-Habitat (2012) History. http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=10&cid=927 UN-Habitat (2013) State of the world cities 2012-2013. Routledge, New York UN-Habitat (2016) Urbanization and development: emerging futures: world cities report 2016, Nairobi United Nations (1992) Agenda 21. United Nations (UNCED), New York United Nations (2000) Millennium declaration. http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares 552e.pdf. Accessed 07 July 2012 United Nations (2001) Millennium development goals. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/enviro n.shtml. Accessed 07 July 2012 United Nations (2010) The Millennium Development Goals Report United Nations (2015a) Sustainable development goals. http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelop ment/cities/. Accessed 29 Jan 2016 United Nations (2015b) The millennium development goals report 2015, New York

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Chapter 4

Global Housing Policies and Governance

Abstract Governmental intervention strategies in the housing sector and approaches on providing adequate housing for the poor have a long history and besides national and local authorities also other stakeholders have increasingly shaped the interna‐ tional debate. In this chapter, first, an overview is given about two of the main actors setting the scene for global housing policies—the World Bank and UN-Habitat. Their differing objectives as well as their ambivalent impacts are addressed. Second, from a historic perspective applied approaches and strategies for coping with slum and squatter settlements are explored. Considering their historic trajectories phases of dominant housing policies are derived as well constraints hindering a prevailing success. Finally, this chapter focuses on the concept of good governance seen as a prerequisite to realize the emerging paradigmatic approach of introducing compre‐ hensive and participatory slum improvement policies. Keywords Housing policies · Urban governance · Participatory slum improvement

Contemporary cities are shaped by global development trends. Economic globali‐ zation, urbanization, neoliberalization and the devolution of power influence national and local housing policies as well as the stock of available housing possi‐ bilities for the urban poor. Depending on local, regional, national and global circum‐ stances, the consequences of these influences can be positive or negative for slum dwellers. The slum problem has thus become more severe in some parts of the world, and has diminished in others. Nevertheless, despite some progress, until now housing policies failed to address the problems of slum dwellers in a comprehensive way and did not prevent the formation of new slum settlements. During the last decades housing issues and in particular the topic of slums have become more and more recognized as a major issue at the international development agenda. Increasingly more actors, such as NGOs, multilateral and bilateral devel‐ opment organizations as well as local and national authorities, became involved in housing policies concerned with the improvement of slums. It is the mission of all these stakeholders to direct global developments and processes in a way that allevi‐ ates poverty and provides adequate shelter for all. © Springer International Publishing AG 2017 C. Obermayr, Sustainable City Management, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49418-0_4

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4.1

4 Global Housing Policies and Governance

Stakeholders of Housing Policies

Various actors are involved in housing policies of developing countries. They range from multinational organizations, such as the World Bank or the United Nations over bilateral development organizations and city networks or international NGOs and foundations to national and local bodies, as for instance the central government or local and municipal authorities. At the local level also many community-based organizations (CBOs) as well as local networks and NGOs have frequently a stake in housing issues. Some of these actors are directly involved in slum improvement projects (most of all local authorities, CBOs and NGOs); others have more indirect impacts as they shape national policies or intervene in areas, such as decentralization, capacity building, etc. Over the last decades and partly visible in the progressively changing approaches to tackle the challenge of slums, a shifting mode in addressing housing issues can be observed on the global level. Although the organizations have different priorities, in recent years an increasing convergence got visible. Two issues are common: First, the emerging strategies are more comprehensive, addressing not only single issues, such as sanitation, and second, project-based measures increasingly give way to multisectorial strategies, which consider the relations between involved stakeholders and also their distinct and interrelated impacts. Such comprehensive perspectives are slowly emerging as new paradigmatic approaches (UN-Habitat 2003a: 136–147). The global discourse on housing is important, as it has massive impacts on local and national actors, who then implement concrete actions. Since the 1970s, espe‐ cially the World Bank and the United Nations started to shape the world’s housing agenda significantly by the provision of loans and consulting activities. Soon these organizations became the main donor of advice and financial support for the devel‐ oping nations. While the World Bank’s priorities have been traditionally more on market-based solutions, the United Nations, with its housing agency UN-Habitat, laid more emphasize on social and environmental issues. Since that time both organ‐ izations have undergone significant changes. It is important to analyse the diverging strategies of these two organizations in order to understand possible impacts on applied housing policies (ibid.).

4.1.1

The World Bank

The World Bank (WB) started to intervene in housing policies in the early 1970s. Through central government agencies and development authorities, urban develop‐ ment projects (site-and-services and slum-upgrading) were promoted by the provi‐ sion of large loans. The Bank’s policy was in this first phase (between 1970 and 1985) heavily influenced by the architect Turner (1968, 1977), who proposed that slum households should improve their living conditions by themselves and that government should take up only an assisting function. The strategies of self-help

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4.1 Stakeholders of Housing Policies

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improvements were seen as most cost-effective and more appropriate than social housing or slum clearances (evictions). After a decade of such projects the WB acknowledged that the outcomes were not satisfying and the governance framework was taken responsible for the uneven outcomes. National and local authorities were identified as obstacles, which prevented an effective success, a replication and upscaling. Therefore, the WB tried to react by shifting priorities in order to address the regulatory framework seen as inadequate and to promote urban management strat‐ egies which include broader and deeper institutional reform (Pugh 2000: 137–142). The upcoming neoliberal agenda shifted the policy in the mid-1980s completely away from its poverty focus to the emerging paradigm of neoliberalism. The approval of credits by the WB was now linked to the demand to introduce structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that are macroeconomic interventions and policies of deregu‐ lation and privatization (see Sect. 2.3). As an example, it was recommended to privatize basic services, such as water, sanitation and also housing, moving to a ‘minimal state’ approach. The outcomes were devastating for the urban poor, as cities following this approach withdraw from public service provision and cut their expen‐ ditures for social programmes dramatically (Davis 2006: 160–165). During the 1990s and after the SAPs were heavily criticized, the WB and the associated IMF began slowly to move to more comprehensive policies. Buzzwords, such as enabling, participation, capacity building, micro credits and security of tenure began to appear in WB documents, revealing an increasing concern not only for economic questions, but also for social and environmental issues. In 1999 this development culminated in the introduction of the ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’ (PRSP), recognizing that there is no single blueprint of development (World Bank 2000). These documents must be prepared by each country in order to be eligible to obtain a loan from the World Bank. Even if these papers improved assess‐ ments of the dimensions of poverty, accepted the necessity of comprehensive approaches and placed emphasis on the engagement of the poor as stakeholders, the macroeconomic framework had hardly changed compared to the period of structural adjustment programmes (Cammack 2004).

4.1.2

UN-Habitat

During the 1990s UN-Habitat emerged as the most important player shaping the housing discourse. The UN agency pursues a right-based approach to the slum problem by focusing on ‘adequate shelter for all’ as a human right. With the task to make the objectives of the Habitat Agenda (see Sect. 3.5) operational, UN-Habitat has launched two global campaigns addressing the two major thematic issues of the agenda in 1999: The Global Campaign for Secure Tenure addressed the goal of ‘adequate shelter for all’ and the Global Campaign on Good Governance addressed the goal of ‘sustainable human settlement development’ (UN-Habitat 2003b: 9).

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The campaign on secure tenure was an advocacy instrument, designed to promote security of tenure for the poorest population, as this issue was seen as an essential entry point of improving living conditions. Suitable and affordable land, centrally located is vital for improving the lives of slum dwellers and provides alternatives to new slum formation (UNDP 2005: 89).

Formalization of squatter areas (titling-policies) does not only provide security of tenure, but releases also financial assets bound to the occupied land (Soto 2002). In such cases, residents are able to obtain mortgage loans on their property, encour‐ aging them to improve their homes with their own resources. The certainty that no eviction can take place provides another incentive for housing improvements. A land title may also serve as an instrument for the recognition as genuine partners in nego‐ tiations with local authorities (UN-Habitat 2002: 11–12). It must be understood, however, that awarding land titles also means property tax for the residents and prizes may rise when a formal property market is established in informal settlements. Therefore, accompanying measures by the local authorities are necessary to anticipate the displacement tendencies after the introduction of formalization policies (Davis 2006: 86–88). The global campaign on governance highlighted another essential issue: the need of good governance. The objectives were to increase the capacity of local govern‐ ments and other stakeholders to practice good urban governance by the operation‐ alization of agreed norms through inclusive planning and decision-making (UN-Habitat 2003b: 12). There is an emerging consensus that good governance is the sine qua non for sustainable human and settlements development (UN-Habitat 2003b: 7).

The vision of the campaign is to realize the ‘inclusive city’, a place where good governance ensures that everyone can participate in the opportunities and decisionmaking processes (UN-Habitat 2003b: 12). An extensive review on the concept of ‘good governance’ is provided in Sect. 4.4. The importance of both, WB and UN-Habitat, cannot be underestimated. While the first currently promotes more macroeconomic interventions, aiming at the alle‐ viation of poverty by economic development, the latter gives emphasize to a compre‐ hensive and multi-sectorial approach in achieving the main goals of the Habitat Agenda: adequate shelter for all and sustainable urban development.

4.2

Phases of Housing Policies—A Historic Perspective

During the twentieth century many concepts and strategies were put forward to deal with slum settlements. Already in the nineteenth century the challenge to find adequate responses for deteriorated urban areas and related housing issues was addressed in European and US cities (Gould 1900). The following strategies and approaches were carried out over the last century and still prevail in many places today:

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4.2 Phases of Housing Policies—A Historic Perspective World Bank begun to intervene

Habitat I

Problem recognition

57

Habitat II

MDGs

‘Slum goal’ Right to housing Wider urban policy

SDGs

Stand-alone urban goal

Participatory slum improvement Enabling policies

Assisted self-help

Eviction and resettlement Housing capital subsidies Social housing Negligence

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2015

Fig. 4.1 Changing housing policies in developing countries (by author)

• • • • • • • •

Negligence Social housing Housing capital subsidies Eviction Resettlement Site-and-services and slum-upgrading Enabling policies Participatory slum improvement.

From a historic perspective, the development of these approaches can only parti‐ ally be assessed as a linear policy evolution towards more effective responses. In Fig. 4.1 the chronology of the described approaches is illustrated, thicker strokes indicating those approaches which dominated the international discourse in the corresponding period of time. Although newer concepts were developed, adapted to changing realities and to overcoming deficiencies of older strategies, older approaches are still favoured by many of the different actors. Frequently, different concepts are carried out simultaneously in the same region or country (UN-Habitat 2003a: 129).

4.2.1

Negligence, Social Housing and Subsidies

Until the early 1970s the strategy of negligence predominated in most developing countries. As resources for social housing were scarcely available and slum settle‐ ments were seen as a temporary phenomenon which would be overcome by

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economic development, slum settlements were simply negated by the local author‐ ities. Therefore, slums were not addressed in planning documents and their location was often not even marked on land use maps (UN-Habitat 2003a: 130). The approach of social housing implemented by many developed nations in the first half of the twentieth century was used as a blueprint in less developed countries to establish similar strategies. After World War I ‘wild settlements’ had popped up around many European cities, because governments had not been quick enough to react to the upcoming housing shortages. As a countermeasure, the cities started large-scale social housing schemes. High rise blocks were constructed to replace existing slum areas and provide adequate housing for the socially weak (UN-Habitat 2003a: 123–124). In a context of steady economic growth in the post-war period resources for these costly programmes were available and thus in many developed nations the problem of slums could be solved in this way. However, even though the newly constructed quarters may not match to the characteristics of slums, as defined by UN-Habitat, yet they remain socially marginalized, as they are often perceived as ghettos or slum-like quarters of the underclass (Gilbert 2007: 707–709). Examples can be found for instance in the French banlieues. Some observers may encounter here characteristics of slums, using the word in its traditional sense. In the developing countries first attempts to solve housing problems were made during the 1950s and 1960s by copying the shining European model of social housing. High rise tenements were built and populated with slum dwellers, often resettled with the use of force. The results, however, were less satisfying for two reasons: First, the small stock of available tax revenues in these countries prevented a large-scale realization of social housing schemes. With the exception of Singapore and Hong Kong (Deng et al. 2013), where the needed financial resources were avail‐ able and successful and massive social housing programmes could be realized, the total housing units built in all developing nations did not reach more than 100.000 units until the 1970s (UN-Habitat 2003a: 124). This number is, considering the urban growth of that time not more than a drop in the ocean. Second, the constructed houses were inadequate and simply too expensive. Slum dwellers, who often work in the informal economy, receiving unstable and low salaries, are in most cases unable to pay any rent, even at a low rate and heavily subsidized. As a consequence, the social housing units were in many cases occupied by members of the middle class. In the case of Indonesia, for instance, most tenants of such government subsidized housing units are civil servants or military personal (Davis 2006: 66–74; Evers and Korff 2000: 68) Therefore, in the 1970s most governments gave up or shortened their social housing programmes drastically, due to high cost and the failure to provide access to low-cost housing units for the target group of the urban poor. Housing capital subsidies: after a period of strong promotion of social housing and in coherence with the upcoming neoliberal ideas during the 1980s, expenditures for public housing schemes were increasingly cut and demand-side subsidies became more favourable. Direct payments were given to eligible households in order to make housing more affordable. Despite the ever increasing cost of such cash grants this approach to ease the housing problems of the urban poor was adapted by a number of developing countries. Examples are given by Chile and South Africa that

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large-scale cash grant schemes can be a successful instrument in producing a great deal of housing units (UN-Habitat 2003a: 123–128). However, for the main part of the developing world this approach is due to the involved high costs no option at all.

4.2.2

Eviction and Resettlement

When it became clear during the 1970s and 1980s that the problem of slums will not be solved by economic development, many governments opted for eviction as the adequate measure to eradicate slum settlements. Most of these evictions took place without offering any alternative or compensation to the affected communities. Various reasons for such measures were put forward and are still used today: slums are an eyesore for the city, a threat to society, the breeding grounds of crime and unrest. Furthermore, they cannot be controlled effectively through state authorities, forming a threat to the state itself (Davis 2006: 103–127). Usually evictions are justified as necessary and as ‘serving the public good’ (Plessis 2005). International mega-events, such as the Olympics, are welcome occasions for displacements and slum clearances (Bender 2008). Land occupied by slums is needed for these events and everything is done to prevent international visitors from perceiving the poor and excluded people in their slum settlements. Examples can be found in the ‘pacification’ and partial clearance of some of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas in the wake of the Football World Cup 2014 and the Olympics 2016 (Steinbrink 2013). UN-Habitat has collected data about evictions for seven countries1 over the time period between 1995 and 2005. The data show that over ten million people were reported to be a victim of forced eviction in this period (UN-Habitat 2007: 7). Especially, inner-city slums are due to their prime location under an increased threat of eviction. The challenge of slums, however, is not solved by eviction. It is moreover only transferred to urban fringe areas, where state control is less intense and the evicted can establish new informal settlements. Causing the displaced people to find other housing options, evictions also worsen the living conditions in other slum areas by an increased overcrowding (UN-Habitat 2003a: 130). Resettlement of slum dwellers has various connotations to all other approaches, mostly connected with the notion to commodify the land occupied by slum dwellers. Unlike eviction, relocation or resettlement can be done in agreement and in coop‐ eration with the slum dwellers and involving adequate compensation. In the best cases, relocation leads to improved living conditions for the affected people, but in the worst cases, when relocation is done without consultation and the designated housing location is situated in the periphery, far away from services, public transport or job opportunities, it is little better than eviction (UN-Habitat 2014).

1Zimbabwe,

Indonesia, China, Bangladesh, Nigeria, India and South Africa.

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4.2.3

4 Global Housing Policies and Governance

Assisted Self-help

Facing increasingly unbearable costs and ambiguous results of previous approaches, a new strategy was developed during the early 1970s. The World Bank began to intervene in housing policies of the countries of the Global South promoting initia‐ tives of assisted self-help. In the context of an emerging civil society and accelerated processes of decentralization and democratization, it was recognized that improve‐ ments cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the slum communities and by top-down imposed measures. The idea that slums are not the problem but the solution was previously outlined by the architect Turner (1977), who found during his field studies an astonishing ability of slum dwellers to organize themselves for construc‐ tion work, even under worst conditions. He favoured an approach which would support these self-assistance skills of the residents by financial and technical help as well as regularization of tenure. The World Bank in turn rushed for this strategy as it promised—in line with the upcoming neoliberal agenda—the ability to provide housing construction without subsidies and at low-cost. Based on local potentials of slum dwellers and supported by technical and financial resources, slum residents should be encouraged to improve their settlement themselves. The main areas of concern of this new approach are the provision of basic services, secure tenure as well as access to credits for the residents of slums (UN-Habitat 2003a: 130). Assisted self-help programmes were carried out either by site-and-service initia‐ tives or by slum-upgrading measures. Site-and-service projects, on the one hand, work by the provision of land already connected to basic services (sanitation, road network, etc.) and subdivided in adequate building plots. Only then the land is assigned to eligible families or households, who are provided with cheap building materials in order to construct their houses themselves. Slum-upgrading programmes, on the other hand, aim at the improvement of already existing slum settlements. This includes the regularization of land rights and the improvement of existing infrastructure to a satisfying standard. Additionally, grants and/or conven‐ ient loans are provided for home improvements which must be done by the residents themselves (Mertins 1984; Bähr and Mertins 2000: 22–24). Upgrading and site-and-service appeared considerably cheaper than all other alternatives and the affected communities are less disturbed by interventions from outside. Although there are examples of positive outcomes of these programmes, for instance by Indonesia’s Kampung Improvement Programme (KIP; Silas 1992), and already a large number of slum households received this type of aid, the overall outcome still remained inadequate (Marx et al. 2013: 204). It appeared that due to missing skills and commitment of public authorities and communities the mainte‐ nance of upgraded public and newly constructed facilities frequently was neglected. Furthermore, due to a lack of political will and capacities of the involved actors, governance structures often disappeared, when the projects ended and international experts were gone (Davis 2006: 79–80). Lessons were learned that such projects must not only include an active participation of all stakeholders, but also the creation

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of capacities and the raising of awareness, to enable involved actors to maintain and enlarge the achieved progress (UN-Habitat 2003a: 130–131).

4.2.4

Enabling Policies

Experiences made with the self-help strategies were essential for the development of a so-called ‘enabling policy’. The awareness began to rise that slum dwellers should be involved in the implementation phase of upgrading projects and also as active part in the decision-making process. It was increasingly recognized that only under participation of the affected residents and also involved authorities sustainable effects can be achieved (Nuissl and Heinrichs 2013). Starting in the 1980s the ‘enabling approach’ was developed also as an argument for a further withdrawal of the governments from the delivery of housing for the urban poor (the neoliberal agenda). The guiding notion was that people and commun‐ ities must be mobilized to play the active role in slum improvements and the tasks of the government would only be to provide plans and advice. The principle of subsidiarity is used in this approach, recognizing that effective policies must be introduced at the lowest level, which is mostly the community itself. At this level, however, support is needed in form of training, financial help and organizational assistance to build the required capacities. The responsibility for this task rests with local authorities and/or NGOs, which are in turn assisted by international develop‐ ment organizations (UN-Habitat 2003a: 131; Chiodelli 2016).

4.2.5

Participatory Slum Improvement

During the 1990s the enabling policies were further developed. Meanwhile, the HABITAT II conference had taken place and all participating nations adopted the Habitat Agenda, as a global plan of action to provide adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlements. UN-Habitat had become the major housing organiza‐ tion and the leading actor in directing concepts and strategies. In this context and considering the experiences and outcomes of all previous approaches, it was recog‐ nized that a more comprehensive and multi-sectorial strategy must be followed to reach any success (Nuissl 2013). At the moment the ‘participatory slum improvement approach’, which combines the market-based enabling approach with new holistic and partnership approaches, is seen as best practice. Much more than only physical upgrading, i.e. home improvements or installing of basic infrastructure (sanitation, water supply, etc.), is needed to achieve enduring improvements. Questions of gover‐ nance, ownership and rights, social capital, the inclusion of poor citizens in economic and political activity as well as the cooperation between all stakeholders are high‐ lighted. The approach is to be conducted as a political, social and organizational action

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plan and must be undertaken with the participation of the slum dwellers and within the framework of a citywide and national plan (UN-Habitat 2003a: 164–167). The dimensions and activities of this comprehensive approach are illustrated in Table 4.1. In order to receive best and sustainable results, possibly all aspects must Table 4.1 Dimensions and activities of the approach ‘participatory slum improvement’ (based on UN-Habitat 2003a: 164–187, 2009b: 53–54) Dimension

Activities

Physical upgrading

• Construction or improvement of basic infrastructure (water, sanitation, electricity, etc.) • Construction of community facilities (schools, health, etc.) • Home improvements by self-help activities • Removing or mitigating environmental hazards

Employment

• Support of small enterprises to generate jobs • Remove obstacles and suppressive measures against the informal sector

Tenure security

• Transfer of tenure rights to slum households • Protection against gentrification and marketdriven evictions

Finance

• Provision of grants • Promoting the involvement of banks (designed mortgage programmes) • Making the poor bankable (access to loans)

Partnership

• Partnerships between all stakeholders (intergovernmental, NGOs, CBOs, private sector) • Coordination of top-down and bottom-up planning

Participation

• Involvement of the community from the outset, during implementation and thereafter (maintenance) • Provision of an adequate environment and funds for CBOs or NGOs to operate

Political will and formalization

• Formal recognition of slum dwellers as citizens and their settlements as part of the city • Enhancement of accountability to citizens

Sectorial reforms

• Reforming of regulatory and policy regimes for housing • Decentralization and empowerment of local authorities • Removing of obstacles and regulations to introduce pro-poor policies • Establishment of a land information system preferable decentralized

Capacity building

• Training of local authorities and community members

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be considered in the implementation of such a multi-sectorial strategy. However, the introduction of such a wide approach is not easy. So far, most of the examples are small-scale or pilot projects. The main challenge remains scaling-up such initiatives. This requires appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks at the national and the municipal levels as well as political will and a great deal of patience (DurandLasserve 2006: 11).

4.3

Constraints for Effective Housing Policies

After half a century of housing policies aiming at the improvement of living condi‐ tions for the poor, the performance of applied measures appears less than satisfying. Frequently, it is argued that housing authorities (national as well as local) are simply overstrained by the impact of urbanization and not able to provide basic services and sufficient shelter in rapid growing cities. The reasons for the prevailing of slums, however, go beyond this explanation attempt. First, it must be recognized that there are indeed individuals or groups which profit from the existence of slums. ‘Slumlords’ (Davis 2006: 89–96) often legally or semilegally own huge areas within a slum, renting their property to the slum dwellers or collecting illegal taxes as protection money. Naturally, these actors have no interest in government interventions in ‘their’ slum and often they are protected by corrupt polit‐ ical elites. Under these circumstances all efforts to improve the settlement will most likely put more money in the pockets of these powerful local actors. Second, in many developing countries, slums provide the lion’s share of cheap labour for the formal sector and the whole national economy. Slum settlements deliver cheap accommodation for those who cannot spend more money on housing. The low-cost production economy, e.g. in China, India or Bangladesh, needs this cheap work force to sustain economic growth for these countries. Thus, any improve‐ ments in slum settlements would raise the housing costs, making it uneconomical for such cheap labour to live there or forcing them to move. As a consequence, slum improvements may harm national economies, in particular, the parts of the industrial sector which is only competitive due to very low wages (UN-Habitat 2002: 3). Third, and most importantly, the changing mode of how people are governed, i.e. the change from policies of intervention to policies of liberalization, has in many cases led to a retreat of government from housing policies. Caused by the effects of globalization and the neoliberal agenda in most countries local and national author‐ ities have now less resources available for housing policies (Westendorff 2004: 203–209). Under changing framework conditions, it becomes even more important for municipalities to find new forms of governance. For this reason, it is essential to mitigate the shortcomings of the different housing approaches. Some of them were identified (UN-Habitat 2002; Nunan and Devas 2004: 164–165; Nuissl 2013): • Weak or lacking institutional arrangement • Inadequate legal framework

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• Inadequate or missing participatory processes in all project phases (decisionmaking, planning, implementation) • Missing capacity and skills of civil society and local authorities • Inadequate tools, e.g. an effective land information system • Limited financial resources • Limited or lacking political will • Limited local authority (missing decentralization attempts) • Difficulties in scaling-up and replication of successful approaches • Perceptions that new initiatives are a thread to existing administrations. Successful solutions of the housing problem do exist. Using the multi-sectorial approach (participatory slum improvement) favoured and promoted by UN-Habitat, best practice examples are available. In such approaches strong and democratic community organizations guide, in cooperation with the municipality and sometimes supported by NGOs, the upgrading strategy. Control over land (local ownership), the availability of public resources (decentralization can provide autonomy over acquisition of public revenues) as well as sustained political will are key issues (Westendorff 2004: 204). The introduction of such a comprehensive policy goes far beyond the thematic and often project-based issue of slum-upgrading. Slogans and buzzwords, such as ‘setting the scene for NGOs’, ‘collective action of all stakeholders’, ‘creation of an adequate legal framework’, ‘capacity building’ ‘decentralization’ or ‘enabling’, can be found in countless publications on housing policies and slum improvements. All these aspects are characteristics of the prerequisite for adequate housing for all: good urban governance.

4.4

The Concept of Governance

After decades of development aid at the national as well as at the local level and count‐ less strategies tested and discarded, the outcomes of international development coop‐ eration are still unsatisfying. When looking for deficits, it is often argued that devel‐ opment aid is insufficient equipped with financial resources,2 but when giving a closer look to the operational deficits, particularly the lack of ‘good governance’ is high‐ lighted. During the 1990s this issue was more and more seen as the main cause of the numerous failed attempts to initiate economic development, and also as a reason for the prevailing housing problems. Therefore, main international donors, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, began to insist on ‘good governance’ as a precondition for the flow of official development aid (UNDP 2005: 35). The term and the concept of governance, however, are due to its complexity and various meanings disputed under scientists and international organizations alike. 2Only few developed nations reach the agreed minimal level of development aid of 0.7% of the GNP

(OECD 2013).

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4.4 The Concept of Governance

4.4.1

65

The Evolution of Governance

Before the 1990s it was not common for stakeholders involved in development cooperation to use the term governance. Although bad working habits of institutions and governments were recognized as a development constraint, little was done to address these conditions. This happened due to the background of the cold war, where non-interference in inner-state affairs and political self-determination were high‐ lighted by development agencies, resulting in a focus on technical assistance (Schläppi 2003: 189–216). After the end of the cold war, when political and ideological reasons for develop‐ ment aid became obsolete, the pattern of development assistance, its efficiency and its contribution to development of the countries in the Global South were increasingly questioned (the justification problem). Other political interests emerged, aiming at the promotion of open markets and political stability, always with the goal to return the investments made to the own economy. In order to reach these objectives and create the basis for an increased economic performance, it was recognized as essential to improve the framework conditions (political and social). In this context the term ‘Governance’ was born (Schläppi 2003; Kwon and Kim 2014). What is governance? It remains unclear, where the term ‘governance’ has its origin—from political, social or economic sciences—and its meaning is not clearly defined. Depending on the perspective, the view, the goals and interests of organi‐ zations, scientists or other actors defining the concept, it is interpreted differently. What all interpretations have in common is that governance is not synonymous with government: Government is “the sphere of local authority activity, the internal organization of local government and the legal, financial and political process (Evans 2005: 2).” Governance is the sphere of “[…] coordination between organizations, parts of organizations groups and individuals, ranging from hierarchical ‘command and control’ systems to decen‐ tralized forms of interaction (Gregory 2009: 312).”

Another aspect common to most definitions is that governance is seen as a process, namely “the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented) (United Nations 2007)”. Simply spoken, gover‐ nance comprises not only the management of a country’s affairs at all levels, but also the complex mechanisms and processes through which citizens articulate their inter‐ ests and mediate their conflicts. Since it is not easy to analyse a process, studies of governance tend to examine on the one hand the governance system, as this is the framework for the process. This system comprises the agreements, procedures, conventions or policies that define who gets power and who is involved in decision-making. On the other hand, analyses focus more on the actors involved and the operational structures set in place to make decisions and implement them (Graham et al. 2003). Studies of governance can be conducted at different levels: local, national or global. Depending on these dimensions the actors vary, but often they can be allo‐

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4 Global Housing Policies and Governance

Civil Society

Government

Scientists

Municipality

NGOs

Province Nation

Formal employees Informal workers

CBOs

The urban poor

Military

The urban middle class Media Lobbyists

Trade unions

Private Sector Entrepreneurs Multi-national companies

Fig. 4.2 Sectors of society and actors involved in governance (based on United Nations 2007; Graham et al. 2003)

cated to three social bodies: the government, civil society and the private sector (for examples of these three sectors and involved actors cf. Fig. 4.2). At the local dimen‐ sion, informal and formal actors may be the municipal planning bureau, NGOs, CBOs, scientists, local media, influential entrepreneurs, etc. Governance describes hereby the process of interaction between these three entities, the actors involved in the decision-making process and its implementation. Thereby, government remains the central political institution, but the approach recognizes the existence of power structures outside the formal institutions which determine who is to be involved and at what extent (Graham et al. 2003: 2; Kraas and Mertins 2008: 9).

4.4.2

Urban Governance

There are many scales of governance and the concept can be applied to any form of collective action. For a governance analysis of housing in an urban area, however, one scale is of particular importance: urban governance. Basically urban governance means the process of governing an urban area.

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4.4 The Concept of Governance

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It refers to the complex set of values, norms, processes and institutions by which citizens and governments interact to organize the functions, activities and space that make up the urban environment (UN-Habitat 2001: 211).

The old and in most cities still existent system of governing a city showed a very hierarchic structure. The officials of the municipality usually worked on new ideas and plans and the city council, if existent at all, agreed or rejected these proposed measures and programmes. Cities were ruled in a top-down and bureaucratic manner either by the city officials alone, or together with a city parliament or members of the urban elites. This old system is often called ‘government’ contrasting the new system of ‘governance’. This new way of managing a city, however, is a multilevel activity, focusing on the establishment of relations between all tiers of government, supranational institutions and the emerging organizations of civil society (Kearns and Paddison 2000). Such organizations, which are mostly self-organized by community members, comprise volunteer organizations, trade unions, topic-based organizations or other community organizations. The concept includes informal and formal relationships and institutions as these are the main processes in shaping the city landscapes (Devas 2004: 23–27). Therefore, the objectives of governance are to strengthen the relations between all stakeholders particularly to civil society and encourage them to an active participation in decision-making and in operational implementation. All parts of society and especially those, who are marginalized, are to be involved: employees of the government, representatives of NGOs and CBOs, entrepreneurs, etc. Together and by dialogue, these stakeholders have the task to find a consensus aiming at the introduction of more sustainable policies (Borsdorf and Bender 2010: 323–324). It is argued that the combination of bottom-up and top-down solutions and the involvement of all actors have specific advantages over the old system of govern‐ ment. Changing patterns in managing cities, often described as a ‘shift from govern‐ ment to governance’, can be observed (Kearns and Paddison 2000). Reasons for the change to governance: Beside an increasing promotion of governance by the international development aid community, also other reasons emerged at the local level for the rising demand to find other forms urban manage‐ ment. Due to the process of globalization urban areas are confronted with rapidly changing framework conditions in terms of social, economic and political shifts and city governments find themselves no longer able to direct events, as they were used to be before (UN-Habitat 2009a: 11). The most important changes3 are as follows (Fassmann 2004: 122–123): • Urbanization and population growth, resulting in increased pressure on cities and, in particular, on city governments to cope with the ever growing demand for services, housing, etc. • The capitalist logic and neoliberal reforms, resulting in declining city budgets and increasing tasks for city governments (the corporate city) as well as in processes of fragmentation and polarization. 3For more

details on these changes cf. Chap. 2.

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• Decentralization, resulting in an increased autonomy of cities, but also in increased obligations for frequently overstrained city administrations. • Democratization, resulting in demands of the civil society to make their voice heard. Coping with massive urbanization, evident in mushrooming of new urban areas in the urban peripheries provides one of the most challenging tasks for today’s city administrations. Past attempts have shown that a city management, that is hierarch‐ ical and only in the hands of government, is not able to address the emerging needs of these new urban realities (UN-Habitat 2009a: 3). For this reason, the city manage‐ ment system has changed to market- and people-based solutions under the label of ‘good governance’.

4.4.3

Good Urban Governance

When adding a ‘good’ to the term governance, the discussion becomes normative. In the 1990s international organizations (World Bank, UN, OECD, etc.) developed different approaches of good governance. Based on the organization’s economical view, guiding principles and interests, different versions were defined. If they see the task of the state in non-interference into the markets, they will interpret policies of good governance as policies of deregulation and privatization. If they see it in a broader sense, good governance may include policies which intervene more actively in urban issues (Schläppi 2003: 189–216). As for this study above all the urban context is important, the definition provided by UN-Habitat seems to be most appropriate. UN-Habitat has based this definition on experiences made through the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Habitat Agenda. The organization defines good urban governance as […] the exercise of political, economic, social and administrative authority in the manage‐ ment of an urban entity. It is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken. It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens. It is thus a broader concept than ‘government’. It is characterized by transparent decision-making, sound financial management, public accountability, decen‐ tralized and equitable resource allocation, and probity (UN-Habitat 2009a: 3).

UN-Habitat sees good urban governance as an ideal, which is difficult to achieve, but must be followed. It is the precondition for a sustainable and inclusive city, which includes all citizens—in particular those marginalized—and gives voice to their demands. Seven dimensions (cf. Fig. 4.3) are defined as the characteristics of good urban governance (UN-Habitat 2009a: 5): 1. Sustainability in all dimensions of urban development to ensure the balance of social, economic and environmental needs of present generations without dimin‐ ishing that of future generations (urban poverty reduction, economic activity and environmental concerns).

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Sustainability Security

Subsidiarity

Good Urban Governance Equity

Civic Engagement

Transparency and Accountability

Efficiency

Fig. 4.3 UN-Habitat’s characteristics of good urban governance (UN-Habitat 2003b: 19–29)

2. Subsidiarity of authority and resources to the closest appropriate level (strengthen decentralization and local democracy). 3. Equity in the access to decision-making processes and necessities of life (inclu‐ sion of all groups of society). 4. Efficiency in the delivery of public services and in the promotion of local economic development. 5. Transparency and accountability of decision-making processes and all stake‐ holders to create an environment of trust and openness (provision of access to information, eradication of corruption, decisions follow rules and regulations). 6. Civic engagement for an active participation of all stakeholders (building of a democratic culture and enabling environment). 7. Security of individuals and their living environments (Environmental manage‐ ment, disaster management, crime control, security of tenure). How to achieve good urban governance? Looking at housing issues, it is evident that the nature of governance affects strongly the quality and extent to which basic services, land titles and housing units are provided for the urban poor. Factors, such as the policy framework, the willingness of the city government, the existence of CBOs and NGOs or the engagement of international fund agencies—to name only a few—determine, where and to which extent resources are available and allocated in housing programmes. Therefore, it appears essential to address good governance as an ideal and vision within comprehensive housing policies (Nunan and Devas 2004: 164–184).

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Although the city administration may play a key role in reaching good urban governance, also civil society and the private sector must contribute their part. While the city administration has the task to develop and maintain an appropriate environ‐ ment for inclusive urban development, the private sector must contribute efforts for creating employment and revenue. It falls into the hands of civil society to facilitate the interaction and dialogue between all three sectors (UN-Habitat 2009a). Evans (2005) argues that participatory approaches and citywide development strategies are to be introduced by the city administration to encourage the shift to good urban governance. On the one hand a shift to a structure of cooperative networks including new actors (NGOs and CBOs) must be facilitated and on the other hand a broader field of participation or more precisely, an increasing degree of direct participation, is to be promoted. For such attempts the capacity of the key players in an urban arena—the city government—is essential. The municipality must have the willingness to allow the submission of power to other stakeholders, but also the skill to initiate new policies. In many developing countries, however, the officials of the city government are often poorly paid, poorly trained and poorly motivated; in other words, they lack the capacity to introduce sound policies for reaching good urban governance. Decent remuneration in order to diminish corruption, as well as an improvement of the technological and institutional capacity (e.g. an efficient cadastral system) are some of the measures which could improve their capacity and motivation to introduce a policy leading to good urban governance (UNDP 2005: 44). Thus, development aid agencies often highlight the need for ‘capacity building’. Another factor, namely “the networks and assets that facilitate coordination and cooperation of citizen for mutual benefit” (Evans 2005: 14)—in other words ‘social capital’—is also considered as important for reaching good urban governance. Social capital is formed by and within civil society, and comprises trust and trust relation‐ ships between the involved actors, in the urban case between the local authorities and the community representatives. High degrees of social capital can make it easier to introduce new policies and can contribute to sustainable development (Dale and Newman 2009). Although the question how to improve social capital is not yet clarified, it is recognized that the institutional design—the internal patterns of local authorities in working with organized groups of society—has an influence on social capital. The degree of social capital is determined by the relationship with the volun‐ tary sectors, the provision of participation opportunities for citizens as well as demo‐ cratic leadership and social inclusion (Lowndes and Wilson 2001: 634–645).

4.5

Outlook

The heavy pressure on cities of the Global South caused by urbanization will continue over the next few decades resulting in an inevitable increase of the world’s slum population. City governments addressing the housing issue feel the constraints of globalization, but benefit also from new opportunities. Even if the economic logic

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of neoliberal politics has become omnipresent, the global discourse shows a rising recognition that the negative impacts of globalization must be addressed. Using their campaigns and the commitments made with the adaption of the Millennium Devel‐ opment Goals the United Nations managed to place the housing problem on the international development agenda. With the adoption of a stand-alone ‘urban goal’ in the Sustainable Development Goals and the priority target of “access to all for adequate, save and affordable housing” the attention for housing issues is on the rise. Globalization has not only accelerated economic integration, but also the spread of knowledge and ideas. Looking at the quest for adequate housing policies, this means an increased appearance of new approaches accompanied by an easy spread of ‘best practices’ to all parts of the world. The approach of participatory slum improvement embedded in a policy framework which adopts the principles of good governance seems to emerge as a new paradigm for coping with the challenge of slums.

References Bähr J, Mertins G (2000) Marginalviertel in Großstädten der Dritten Welt. Geographische Rundschau 52(7/8):19–26 Bender C (2008) London 2012—displaced by the olympics. TRIALOG 98(3):34–39 Borsdorf A, Bender O (2010) Allgemeine Siedlungsgeographie. Böhlau, Wien Cammack P (2004) What the world bank means by poverty reduction, and why it matters. New Polit Econ 9(2):189–211. doi:10.1080/1356346042000218069 Chiodelli F (2016) International housing policy for the urban poor and the informal city in the global south: A non-diachronic review. J Int Dev. doi:10.1002/jid.3204 Dale A, Newman L (2009) Social capital: a necessary and sufficient condition for sustainable community development? Commun Dev J 45(1):5–21. doi:10.1093/cdj/bsn028 Davis M (2006) Planet of slums. Verso, New York Deng Y, Sing TF, Ren C (2013) The story of Singapore’s public housing: from a nation of homeseekers to a nation of homeowners. In: Chen J, Stephens M, Man Y (eds) The future of public housing: Ongoing trends in the East and the West. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 103–123 Devas N (ed) (2004) Urban governance, voice, and poverty in the developing world. Earthscan, London Durand-Lasserve A (2006) Informal settlements and the millennium development goals: global policy debates on property ownership and security of tenure. Glob Urban Dev 2(1) Evans B (2005) Governing sustainable cities. Earthscan, London Evers H-D, Korff R (2000) Southeast Asian Urbanism: The Meaning and Power of Social Space Fassmann H (2004) Stadtgeographie I. Westermann, Braunschweig Gilbert A (2007) The return of the slum: does language matter? Int J Urban Reg Res 31(4): 697–713. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2007.00754.x Gould ERL (1900) The housing problem in great cities. Q J Econ 14(3):378–393 Graham J, Amos B, Plumptre T (2003) principles for good governance in the 21st century. http:// unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNPAN/UNPAN011842.pdf. Accessed 22 Jul 2016 Gregory D (ed) (2009) The dictionary of human geography, 5th edn. Blackwell, Malden Kearns A, Paddison R (2000) New challenges for urban governance. Urban Stud 37(5–6):845–850. doi:10.1080/00420980050011118 Kraas F, Mertins G (2008) Megastädte in Entwicklungsländern: Vulnerabilität, Informalität. Regier- und Steuerbarkeit. Geographische Rundschau 60(11):4–10

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H-J Kwon, Kim E (2014) Poverty reduction and good governance: examining the rationale of the millennium development goals. Development and Change:n/a. doi:10.1111/dech.12084 Lowndes V, Wilson D (2001) Social capital and local governance: exploring the institutional design variable. Polit Stud (49):629–647 Marx B, Stoker T, Suri T (2013) The economics of slums in the developing world. J Econ Perspect 27(4):187–210 Mertins G (1984) Marginalsiedlungen in Großstädten der Dritten Welt. Geographische Rundschau 36(9):434–442 Nuissl H (2013) Angewandte Geographie als anwendungsorientierte Grundlagenforschung. Standort 37(1):17–21. doi:10.1007/s00548-013-0249-1 Nuissl H, Heinrichs D (2013) Slums: perspectives on the definition, the appraisal and the management of an urban phenomenon. Die Erde 144(2):105–116 Nunan F, Devas N (2004) Accessing land and services: exclusion or entitlement. In: Devas N (ed) Urban governance, voice, and poverty in the developing world. Earthscan, London, pp 164–184 OECD (2013) Development co-operation report 2013: ending poverty. OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/dcr-2013-en Plessis J (2005) The growing problem of forced evictions and the crucial importance of communitybased, locally appropriate alternatives. Environ Urbanization 17(1):123–134 Pugh C (2000) Sustainable cities in developing countries: theory and Practice at the millennium. Earthscan, London and Sterling Schläppi E (2003) Governance: die neue Aufmerksamkeit für politische und rechtliche Strukturen im Prozess wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Entwicklung. In: Kohler G, Marti U (eds) Konturen der neuen Welt(un)ordnung. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, pp 189–238 Silas J (1992) Government-community partnerships in kampung improvement programmes in Surabaya. Environ Urbanization 4(2):33–41. doi:10.1177/095624789200400204 Soto Hd (2002) Freiheit für das Kapital!: Warum der Kapitalismus nicht weltweit funktioniert. Rowohlt, Berlin Steinbrink M (2013) Festifavelisation: mega-events, slums and strategic city-staging—the example of Rio de Janeiro. Erde 144(2):129–145. doi:10.12854/erde-144-10 Turner J (1968) Housing priorities, settlement patterns and urban development in modernizing countries. J Am Inst Planners 34(6):354–363 Turner J (1977) Housing by people: towards autonomy in building environments, Pantheon Books UNDP (2005) A home in the city: achieving the millennium development goals. Earthscan, London UN-Habitat (2001) Cities in a globalizing world: global report on human settlements 2001 UN-Habitat (2002) Cities without slums. HSP/WUF/1/DLG.I/Paper 4. http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 31303705/Cities-Without-Slums. Accessed 15 Nov 2011 UN-Habitat (2003a) The challenge of slums: global report on human settlements 2003. Earthscan, London UN-Habitat (2003b) The Global campaign on urban governance: concept paper, 2nd edn March 2002, Nairobi UN-Habitat (2007) Forced evictions—towards solutions? Second report of the advisory group on forced evictions to the executive director of UN-HABITAT UN-Habitat (2009a) Good Urban governance: towards an effective private sector engagement. http:// www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/WG_B_Background_Urban_Governance&the_ PrivateSector_draft0.pdf. Accessed 24-11-2011 UN-Habitat (2009b) Planning sustainable cities: policy directions: global report on human settlements 2009. Earthscan, London UN-Habitat (2014) Forced evictions. Fact Sheet, New York United Nations (2007) What is good governance? http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/ Ongoing/gg/governance.pdf. Accessed 22 Nov 2011 Westendorff D (ed) (2004) From unsustainable to inclusive cities. UNRISD, Geneva World Bank (2000) World development report: attacking poverty. Oxford University Press, New York

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Part II

Indonesia

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Chapter 5

Introduction to Indonesia

Abstract This section gives a general introduction to Indonesia which is essential for understanding local strategies for coping with marginal settlements. The wider national development context and legal framework conditions influence in many ways the development of cities and urban policies. Three of the main questions are addressed in this section: What are the urban development trends in Indonesia? Which approaches and concrete policies concerning informal settlements are applied on a national level? What are the characteristics of marginal settlements in Indo‐ nesia? To begin with, a general introduction to the country including its adminis‐ trative levels but focusing socio-economic framework conditions and disparities (economy, population, poverty, migration) is provided. Recent changes in the polit‐ ical system are briefly described, as the recent turnover to democracy and decen‐ tralization has led to massive consequences for Indonesian cities and the way they are governed. Second, the focus is laid on urban developments in Indonesia. Out of a historic perspective the evolvement and distribution of Indonesian cities is explained as well as their typical structure. Subsequently, an overview is given about the current stage of urbanization, population growth and development of slums. A last part focuses on the latest urban developments, particularly concerned with applied programmes and strategies relating to slum settlements. Keywords Indonesia · Socio-economic disparities · Urban development · Housing policies · Slum · Kampung · KIP Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelago reaching over a distance of 5000 km spanning along the equator from west to east. It consists of over 17,000 islands1 (6000 are inhabited) which are situated between the continents Asia and Australia (cf. Fig. 5.1). Altogether, Indonesia’s territory covers 1919 km2 and was populated in 2010 by approx. 240 million people (McDonald 2014). The political, cultural and socio-economic heart of this vast region is clearly the island Java, as it is the most fertile island and home to half of Indonesia’s population (Gamino 2012: 4). On this

1The number

of islands varies from one source to another.

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 C. Obermayr, Sustainable City Management, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49418-0_5

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5 Introduction to Indonesia

Fig. 5.1 Indonesian provinces and capital cities (The Australian National University 2013)

island over 60% of Indonesia’s GDP is generated, and four of the five biggest Indo‐ nesian cities are located here. In terms of population, the capital Jakarta clearly takes the lead. The population of this city is estimated to approxinately ten million, but for decades the city has spilled over its borders. Together with the surrounding cities Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi it forms an agglomeration where boundaries have blurred. This area of greater Jakarta is known as Jabodetabek, a megacity and home to over 22 million people. In terms of ethnicity Indonesia is not a homogeneous country. Uncountable ethnic minorities, often speaking a different language, inhabit the archipelago besides the most common groups of Javanese (40.6% of total population) and Sundanese (15% of total population). It is estimated that 300–800 different languages are spoken in the country. Therefore, Bahasa Indonesia, the official language in Indonesia, is only the second language for almost all Indonesians. This language, sometimes believed to be created artificially, has its origin in the Malaysian languages, which have been the lingua franca throughout the archipelago since historic times. Today, Bahasa Indonesia is seen as one of the means to create a unifying culture among the different ethnic groups and thus is strongly promoted by the national authorities (Gamino 2012: 4). All measures to promote unity, however, cannot detract from the fact that Indonesia’s regions and cultures are extremely diverse. On the one hand, there are less developed regions in the Indonesian periphery, such as Papua, where infra‐ structure is scarcely available, poverty is high and people follow traditional believes. On the other hand, there are the contrasting pictures of the westernized holiday island

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5 Introduction to Indonesia

77

Table 5.1 Country profile of Indonesia (if not indicated otherwise based on BPS 2016b) Area

1,912,992 km2

Population, total (2010)

237.6 million

Population density (2014)

132 people per km2

Urban population (2015)

53.3% of total population

Share of urban population living in slums (2007)a

23%

GDP (2010)b

547.6 billion US$

GDP growth (2010)

+6.2%

GDP per capita (2010)c

2304 US$

Employment per sector (2010) Agriculture

38.3%

Industry

19.3%

Services

42.3%

Human development index (2010)

0.72

Percentage of poor people (2016)1

10.86%

Population with access to improved sanitation facilities (2015)

62.14%

a

Source UN-DESA (2012a) Source UN-Habitat (2008: 178) c Calculated using an exchange rate of 1US$ = 9650 IDR 1 The relative poverty line is calculated by Indonesia’s statistical agency (BPS) using a basic needs approach [for details cf. BPS (2016a) and Priebe (2014)] b

Bali with its Hindu tradition and the strict Islamic province of Aceh, where—based on the principles of sharia—increasingly strict regulations are being introduced. In Table 5.1 some selected indicators are illustrated, giving an overview about Indonesia’s development status. Only recently, the urbanization degree has reached more than 50% of the total population and 23% of Indonesian citizens still live in substandard housing units. However, the GDP has grown at a relatively solid rate of 6% per year over the last decade and the indicator of human development has also increased steadily to a value of 0.72 in the year 2010.

5.1

Administrative Structure

Indonesia consists of 33 provinces (Provinsi) which are divided in numerous rural districts (Kabupaten) and cities (Kota) with equal legal status (cf. Fig. 5.2). Districts and cities are further subdivided in sub-districts (Kecamatan). In urban areas each of these sub-districts consists of several quarters (Kelurahan), while in rural areas a

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5 Introduction to Indonesia

National Government

(Provinsi)

City (Kota)

Sub-district

Sub-district

(Kecamatan)

Village

(Kecamatan)

Quarter

(Desa)

(Kelurahan)

Community unit

Community unit

(Rukun Warga)

(Rukun Warga)

Neighbourhood

Neighbourhood

(Rukun Tetangga)

(Rukun Tetangga)

Rural areas

Urban areas

Unofficial administration

District (Kabupaten)

Official administration

Province

Fig. 5.2 Administrative levels of Indonesia (by author)

sub-district is composed of several villages (Desa). Villages and quarters are the smallest formal administrative units (Bawole 2007: 73). Below these levels two more unofficial administrative units, the so-called Rukun Warga (RW) and the Rukun Tetangga (RT) are situated. The latter can be translated as neighbourhood unit, which is headed by one person elected publicly (within a neighbourhood meeting) and responsible for all matters of the daily lives of a number of households. The function of this person (also called RT) is being the contact person for all problems within the neighbourhood. In Surakarta, for instance, each RT is responsible for 50 households on average (BPS & BAPPEDA Surakarta 2009: 13). A grouping of five to ten RTs form a community unit called Rukun Warga (RW). The head of a RW is elected secretly by the associated RTs and has the task of acting as the contact person to the quarter (Kelurahan) administration.

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5.1 Administrative Structure

79

As the local RTs are directly elected, and the view dominates that only sincere and honest people run for this office, residents usually identify with ‘their’ RT. In fact, being RT and also RW is a voluntary activity, not providing any renumeration and possibly implying much work and problems. However, RWs and RTs have in many ways a big impact on the day-to-day life of the citizens. All bureaucratic transactions, as for instance business permits, identity cards or land transactions have to be accom‐ panied by a permission letter of the RT or RW. Furthermore, any kind of project intro‐ duced by the city government must also include these local leaders, as they are the contact persons to the citizens. If there is, for instance, an ongoing slum-upgrading project, aiming at physical improvements, it is the RTs and RWs, who decide which family is eligible to obtain a grant and which is not (McCarthy 2003: 14–15).

5.2

Socio-economic Disparities

Despite its wide ethnic, religious and cultural diversity the country is also charac‐ terized by strong spatial and social disparities in terms of population, economy and poverty. In many respects, Java Island is the centre of the country. There, most Indonesians live, economic activity is strongest, infrastructure is best and poverty is least severe. The other islands are regarded as periphery with less dense population, an economy mostly focused on resource extraction, high poverty rates and subsis‐ tence farming.

5.2.1

Population

While for the city Jakarta, which itself forms one of the 33 provinces, a very high population density of over 14,000 people per km2 is recorded, provinces in Papua or Kalimantan show only records of less than 20 people per km2 (cf. Fig. 5.3). Compared with Java, which is with 1033 people per km2 one of the most densely populated island in the world, these parts of Indonesia are mostly undeveloped and still covered by vast rain forests. On Java there is an increase of population density clearly visible from east to west. This is most likely caused by the attraction of the metropolitan region Jakarta, situated in the northwest of the island. Already in ancient times Java was densely populated, as due to the fertile soils high rice yields could be achieved. During colonial times the rice production was further improved by irrigation systems, increasing the carrying capacity of the island. As Java was the centre of the colony, the health system was and still is better compared with the outer islands. This has brought down the mortality rate and thus facilitated population growth (Vorlaufer 2009: 50–51).

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5 Introduction to Indonesia

Fig. 5.3 Population density of Indonesia’s regions 2010 (Obermayr 2012c)

5.2.2

Economy

Similar to the population, Indonesia’s economic activities are distributed in the same spatial pattern, mostly concentrated in Java. The economy is based on the extraction of natural resources, a system inherited from the Dutch, who ruled the country over 300 years until the end of the 1940s as their colony. The main exploited resources are a variety of metals, rubber, spices, coffee, tea, tobacco, gas and oil. The extraction of oil, however, is declining. While in 1980 over 1.6 million barrel were produced per day, in 2006 it was only one million. Simul‐ taneously, the demand has exploded due to the increased motorization of society. In 1990 only eight million cars were registered in the country, but the number has increased to 42 million until 2004 (Vorlaufer 2009: 173–174). Out of these reasons Indonesia has become the only OPEC member which is now a net importer of oil. The extraction, however, has shifted to other resources. Rich gas deposits are still to be developed and the immense increase in the production of palm oil has made Indonesia to one of the biggest global producers. This rich‐ ness on natural resources, however, does not result in a broad share of the reve‐ nues in the society. Even if national development projects are funded by the profits, a big share remains in the pockets of the country’s elites (Gamino 2012). Despite the setback through the Asian crisis in 1997 and 1998 (cf. Box 5.3) the country has recovered and has seen a steady economic growth since 2001, visible in

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5.2 Socio-economic Disparities

81

Fig. 5.4 GDP distribution: share of Indonesia’s regions (based on BPS 2016b)

Sumatra

23% Java & Bali

59%

Kalimantan

9% Sulawesi

5% Nusa Tenggara, Maluku & Papua

5%

an annual rise of the GDP by 5–6%. The generation of this GDP, however, illustrates also the disparities of the regions (cf. Fig. 5.4). The economic activities are concen‐ trated on Java and here in particular on Jakarta, where the headquarters of all impor‐ tant enterprises are located. Indonesia’s periphery is mainly used for resource extrac‐ tion. Plantations of the cash crops for export with an increasing share of palm oil can be found on Sumatra and Kalimantan, where the remaining rain forest is progres‐ sively cleared in farmland. Mineral resources are extracted in Papua, where the USAmerican operators of one big copper and gold mine have advanced to the biggest tax payer of the country (OECD 2010: 25–26).

5.2.3

Poverty

The regional disparities in income and investment contribute to the widespread poverty in Indonesia. According to Indonesia’s national statistical agency (Badan Pusat Statistik—BPS) 12.49% or approximately 31 million Indonesians are regarded as poor in 2011 (BPS 2016b). The poverty rate has dropped significantly over the last decade (cf. Fig. 5.5), coming down slowly from its peak in 1998, when the Asian crisis struck the country hardest (cf. Box 5.3). Another small peak was recorded in 2006, when fuel prizes increased dramatically. The data illustrated here are based on complex calculations carried out by BPS using an approach which attempts to incorporate the multidimensionality of poverty (BPS 2016a; Priebe 2014). Other sources point out different proportions of poverty, as for instance Vorlaufer (2009: 229), who states a poverty rate of 37.2% in 2007. Whatever the actual number of the poor is, the data also illustrate other aspects: they show not only that poverty is a severe problem in Indonesia, but also a contrasting spatial distribution at both, the national and the local level. Core regions

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5 Introduction to Indonesia 30 1998: Asian crisis

Proportion of poor people (%)

25

24.2 2006: Increased fuel prices

20

15

17.8 17.5

12.49

10

5

0

Fig. 5.5 Indonesia’s poverty rate 1996–2011 (based on Stalker 2007: 7; BPS 2016a, b)

tend to have less people living below the poverty line than peripheral regions. In the national context this is true for Java compared with the outer islands; in the local context this is often true for provincial capitals in contrast to remote areas and their hinterland. However, a visualization of this uneven distribution of poverty does not seem to be suitable, as there are strong local differences which would blur at a coarser level of analysis. Instead, the Human Development Index (HDI)2 is visualized (cf. Fig. 5.6), although hereby the same problems can occur. The index indicates the stage of human development across the country which varies considerably throughout the regions. There are provinces such as Jakarta with a value of over 0.77 and Papua with only 0.64. The interprovincial differences are even more enormous. In the province East Java, for instance, the indicator varies between the city Surabaya with a HDI of 0.72 and the adjacent island of Madura with a HDI of only 0.5 (UNDP et al. 2004). The index can be a useful tool for an assessment of development in the different regions, even if local differences are concealed by generalization. In general, it can be concluded that many regions in Indonesia, most of all those located in peripheral areas, face severe problems related to poverty and show low values of human devel‐ opment, indicating lesser life expectancy, income and education. 2The

human development index (HDI) combines measures of life expectancy, educational attain‐ ment and income in a single value between 0 and 1. It was developed as an alternative to other indicators, such as GDP/per capita, for measuring development. The nearer the value is to 1 the better is the human development in the region.

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5.2 Socio-economic Disparities

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Fig. 5.6 Human development index of Indonesia’s regions 2010 (Obermayr 2012a)

5.2.4

Migration

The illustrated disparities force many Indonesians to migrate to other areas in order to find work. Despite seasonal migrations from Java to the plantations on the outer islands during harvest time, there are also permanent migrations within projects of agricultural colonization supported by the government (cf. Box 5.1). In recent years the migration from rural areas into the cities and also interurban migration patterns became more and more important, which is reflected by Indo‐ nesia’s ever-increasing urbanization degree. It is estimated, for instance, that 40– 60% of Jakarta's citizens have migrated to this metropolitan region only in the last decades (Vorlaufer 2009: 68–69). This pull effect of the capital is unique and can only partially be transferred to other Indonesian cities. Each town must be analysed separately, as the local socioeconomic conditions are important for their migration balances. In the medium-sized town Surakarta in central Java, for instance, the population balance was only slightly positive over the last decades, and this despite a negative balance of the whole prov‐ ince (BPS & BAPPEDA Surakarta 2009: 11–26).

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5 Introduction to Indonesia

Box 5.1: Transmigrasi Already in colonial times the uneven distribution of population over the Indo‐ nesian archipelago drew the government's attention. For development reasons, but more importantly for strengthening the control over remote areas, the Dutch introduced in 1905 a programme aiming at the redistribution of popu‐ lation from Java to the peripheral islands. This programme, known as Trans‐ migrasi, was continued after independence and further intensified under the authoritarian rule of Suharto in the 1980s. In the centralized system of Suhar‐ to’s ‘New Order’, it was seen as one of the means to create an Indonesian identity, but also to suppress separatist movements in Papua, the Moluccas and Aceh. Until 2001 over five million people were resettled from Java and Bali to the other islands, where they formed new agrarian colonies (Vorlaufer 2009: 74–77).

Looking at migration balances of the provinces between 2005 and 2010 (cf. Fig. 5.7), a negative migration tendency in eastern Java, the lesser Sunda Islands (Lombok, Flores, Timor, etc.), the Moluccas and the north-western parts of Sumatra was recorded. Other provinces on the contrary, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua as well as large parts of Sumatra, Bali and the western part of Java had a positive

Fig. 5.7 Migration balance of Indonesia’s regions 2005–2010 (Obermayr 2012b)

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migration balance. Two trends are visible: a contrasting migration pattern on Java and a disparity between the outer islands and Java. While the province of western Java (Java Barat) registered a plus of 1.7 million people between 2005 and 2010 in the province of central Java (Java Tengah) a population loss of 4.7 million was recorded in the same time period. When summing up the values of all Javanese provinces, the result is a negative migration balance of more than 4 million between 2005 and 2010. These people moved to the outer islands, where jobs are promised by the resource extraction industry and land by the agricultural colonization of the Transmigrasi programme.

5.3

Historical Paths

For understanding contemporary Indonesia, and in particular the recent changes in the way Indonesian cities are governed, a brief look at Indonesia’s latest history is necessary. Since independence in 1948 Indonesia’s history can be categorized in three phases: a short period after independence under the charismatic leader Sukarno, the long period of authoritarian rule under the general Suharto and his ‘New Order’ and finally the period of transformation to a democratic system starting in the late 1990s. In all these periods, decisions and events are illustrated which have implica‐ tions for Indonesian city development.

5.3.1

Struggle for Independence

The fact that the multi-ethnic state of Indonesia appears today as a unified country, must be contributed to its long time as a colony. When the Dutch conquered gradually the diverse archipelago with its different kingdoms, they decided to rule their new possessions as a single colony, the Dutch East Indies. This meant a single state apparatus with a single capital: Batavia, known today as Jakarta. A further unifying aspect for the emerging national movement at the beginning of the twentieth century was the goal to remove the Dutch from their colonial rule. Thus, when the Dutch were finally detached from power by Japanese forces invading the colony in 1942, the national movement, consisting of various groups (modernists, traditionalists, communists, Islamic groups, etc.) was united by the deep commitment to aspire a unified country (Cribb and Brown 1995: 5–13). When World War II slowly turned against Japan, the Japanese occupants decided to support an Indonesian national movement to create a puppet state in their favour. Sukarno and Hatta, the most dynamic and influential leaders of this movement, were chosen to supervise the process of independence. Thus, a constitution based on the Pancasila (cf. Box 5.2) was already prepared, when Sukarno finally declared inde‐ pendence on 17th Aug. 1945, briefly after World War II had ended following Japan’s surrender (Dahm 2015: 65–67).

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Shortly after its foundation the new Indonesian Republic was challenged by the arrival of allied troops (mostly British and Australian, but also Dutch), who had the task to disarm the remaining Japanese forces and restore the colony. Even though many cities were occupied unopposed, heavy fighting occurred in Surabaya. This surprisingly strong resistance of the Indonesians convinced the British to press for negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesian side. As Batavia was occupied by the Dutch, the capital was moved to Yogyakarta, where the Indonesian Republic found prestigious support by the famous sultan of the city. The following years were characterized by periods of negotiations and two more military campaigns of the Dutch who tried to suffocate the national movement by attacks in 1947 and 1948. The most intense fighting happened on Java island, where the Dutch managed to occupy more and more cities, while the Indonesians turned to guerrilla warfare to resist the aggressors. Only when the USA and the UN threatened the Dutch to exclude them from financial aid received from the Marshall Plan in Europe in 1949, the Dutch agreed to recognize an independent Indonesian republic (Wessel 2003: 63–70). After this agreement, the former Dutch East Indies emerged as the ‘Republic of the United States of Indonesia’ (Republik Indonesia Serikat—RUSI), a federation consisting of the independent Republic of Indonesia and 15 other states, quickly established by the Dutch. Federalism was seen as a Dutch strategy to undermine national unity by dividing their old colony in fragments. These new puppet states, however, were not capable of surviving on their own, which is why nearly all of them (except Moluccas) dissolved their sovereignty to the republic only one year later. President Sukarno announced in 1950 the abolishment of the federal system and the restoration of unity (Cribb and Brown 1995: 32–38). Out of these historic experiences it is not surprising that there was a broad consensus for a centralized state system. Although it was recognized in theory that in such a diverse country there is a need to devolve some power to the sub-national units of the new government, in fact little power was given to the regions. While province heads and even city mayors were appointed from Jakarta, only at village level the authority of the state remained relatively weak. Another result of the struggle for independence was the strong position of the army. The army had not only won the war of independence, but also repulsed attempted coups from Islamic and communist groups, making these groups per se suspicious in their future actions. Therefore, the army saw their task in defending the republic, not only to foreign aggressions but also to all threats to the state from within—known as the double function (dwifungsi) of the armed forces (Cribb and Brown 1995: 38–41).

5.3.2

Guided Democracy and Authoritarian Rule

In 1957 Sukarno outlined his proposal of restructuring the political system which he called ‘Guided Democracy’. After one decade of a western style democratic system based on parties which had not brought the desired progress for the country, he

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announced that this system, which would be alien to the Indonesian culture and an obstacle to development, had to be abandoned. He argued, that in traditional Indo‐ nesian villages decisions had never been taken by vote, but by exhaustive discussions (musyawarah) involving all community members and resulting in a communal consensus (mufakat), not necessarily supported by a 50% plus one majority, but representing the interest of the whole community. He envisaged a parliament drawing its representatives of all sectors of society, not relying on vote but instead aiming at consensus (Cribb and Brown 1995: 76–77). The basis for this change was the philosophy included in the Pancasila (cf. Box 5.2) and the Javanese culture and ethic which focuses on consensus, stability and peace within society. Corresponding to this way of thinking individual demands have to subordinate to these values and the suggestion of alternative concepts, the expression of critics or an open political opposition are seen as a mean to sabotage a harmonic decision-making. However, out of a European point of view it must be criticized that the positive aspects of opposition, such as constructive suggestions and not least a system of checks and balances against the government, are completely missing in this philosophy (Frings 2012).

Box 5.2: Pancasila In Indonesia’s constitution of 1945 five principles were put in the preamble as the pillars of the nation. They are called the ‘Pancasila’ and considered as the principles which should be shared by all Indonesians regardless their ethnicity and political believes (Dahm and Ptak 1999: 230–231). 1. Belief in god: guarantees the freedom of religious believes, as long as the religion is recognized by the state. 2. National unity: has to be promoted by all means. 3. Humanitarianism and Internationalism: respect against others, particu‐ larly regarding international relations. 4. Democracy: not meant as imitation of western democracy, but in the sense of Indonesian tradition (consultation and consensus). 5. Social justice and prosperity: as the aim for all actions of the state.

Although contemporary Indonesia shifted back to a party-based democracy in the late 1990s, this illustrated habit of decision-making in consensus can still be observed. During the field work in Surakarta I often noticed that interview partners hesitated to criticize openly various decisions made by their city government. In general, municipal policy was regarded as harmonic and implemented programmes as proceeding successfully without any problems. The origin of this habit may lay in the Javanese culture, in Indonesian history or possibly in both.

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With the abolishing of the party-based system in 1957, Sukarno induced a progressive change away from democracy towards a more and more authoritarian rule. The system of guided democracy puts the president in the centre of power and was based on a strong military. Sukarno “[…] set in motion a chain of events that led to the fall of his own government, the deaths of as many as one million people, and the creation of a military, centralised rule that would last until the end of the twentieth century (Vickers 2005: 144)”.

In 1965 a group of military officers murdered six of the countries generals in an attempt of what they called an action to defend the great leader of the revolution: President Sukarno. The actual reasons for their actions remain mysterious until today. Fact is that Suharto, the remaining highest general in the hierarchy, who claimed to be overlooked by the assassins, put himself into power with the help of loyal forces under his command. He justified the action with his obligation to defend the state (dual function of the army) and soon he started a propagandistic campaign which held the communistic party (PKI) responsible for an attempted coup. Tolerated by the army and watched by a more and more powerless president, a nationwide persecution of communists began. The results were devastating. It is estimated that 200,000 to one million communists, or those considered as commu‐ nists, were killed during this ‘purge’ and the PKI was banned. Released from his enemies, Suharto gradually consolidated his power in the following years and after Sukarno died in 1970 he became the unchallenged ruler of the country (Vickers 2005: 156–166). Suharto’s power was based on personal dependencies and the loyalty of the army. Soon after he took over, he introduced politics which he called 'The New Order' (orde baru). They consisted of two aspects: first, he simplified the party landscape with only three parties allowed to parliament. All of them were brought to the predominant line of the government and in this way any opposition against his poli‐ tics was eliminated. Second, he assigned more power to the national planning agency BAPPENAS which had the task to oversee and introduce national development plans aiming at the intensification of agrarian production and the establishment of basic industries. The financial resources for these comprehensive development plans were available due to the bubbling profits from the booming oil exports (oil boom in the 1970s and 1980s) (Dahm and Ptak 1999: 243; Gersten 2011: 69–82). In line with global development, Indonesia introduced under Suharto also first steps of liberalization and deregulation of the economy starting in the 1980s. Laws regu‐ lating investments from abroad, including the purchase of land, were changed. Suddenly, the country was swept with inflowing foreign capital, evident in the mush‐ rooming of skyscrapers in Jakarta, five star hotels in Bali or shopping malls spreading across the country. Suharto’s 'New Order' managed to establish an economic growth at annual rates of seven to eight per cent and Indonesia was regarded as a ‘new tiger’ of Asia at the beginning of the 1990s (Vickers 2005: 197–209; Hadiz 2008). Suharto’s regime could only hold its grip on power as long as there was steady economic success. When in 1997 a financial crisis (the Asian Crisis cf. Box 5.3) spread like wildfire from one country to another in Southeast Asia, Indonesia was

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hit hardest. Coincident with one of the worst droughts in Indonesian history, the crisis affected not only the banks and the economic sector, but also all other parts of society. Within days the Indonesian Rupiah lost 80% of its value (krismon—krisis monetar), industries went bankrupt and financial institutions collapsed (Mukherjee 1999: 7–8). Similar to other economic crises in the world, the poor were hit hardest and the proportion of Indonesians living below the poverty line doubled to over 24% (cf. Fig. 5.5). Most of the economic progress made during the boom years of the 1980s and 1990s had been shattered (ibid.).

Box 5.3: Origins of the Asian crisis The Asian crisis had its origin in Thailand and soon affected all so called ‘tiger economies’ in Southeast Asia. The reasons for the crisis are diverse and much disputed. Many authors argue that the crisis is caused by deregulation and financial liberalization without a simultaneous strengthening of state supervi‐ sion and regulation (Furman et al. 1998). The credit boom in the 1990s is seen as one of the reasons for the crisis. Lending to the private sector by Thailand’s banks was based on loans taken on the international financial markets, yielding profits thanks to differing interest rates. The banks, however, did not have sufficient reserves in foreign currency and were therefore vulnerable to external shocks, such as changes in the interest rates or a devaluation of the domestic currency. When rumours emerged that the Thai Bath had to be devalued compared to the US$, investors panicked and withdraw their money from the country, provoking the crisis. Hedge funds further worsened the situation as they had speculated for a falling currency. When investors began to look a little closer at other economies in Southeast Asia, they found similar economic and financial framework conditions. Thus, just the same as in Thailand, they started to withdraw their money, putting other countries also in this self-fulfilling spiral (Berger and Wagner 2000: 3–6; Gersten 2011: 99–106).

In the cities the shrinking economy set free a mass of unemployed, who lost their jobs and were now forced to earn their living in the informal sector or to migrate back to the villages which they had left for the cities years ago. Simultaneously, a rush to urban areas began, as rural areas were hit even harder by the crisis exaggerated by a severe drought. Political instability added to the crisis, paralyzing any economic activity. Collu‐ sion, corruption and nepotism (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme—KKN) around the Suharto circle were soon seen as the main factors contributing to the crisis and people did not longer accept these conditions. The call for reform became omnipresent. During 1998 many cities were erupted by riots, fires and lootings, notably in Medan,

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Surakarta, Yogyakarta and Jakarta destroying many shopping malls and office build‐ ings (Firman 1999: 69–81). In Surakarta, for instance, the complex of the city government was set on fire, as it was the hated symbol of Suharto’s corrupt govern‐ ment. After violent crashes in Jakarta, with some students killed, the following outrage swept away the regime and forced Suharto to resign in May 1998.

5.3.3

Transformation

After the end of Suharto’s authoritarian rule Indonesia was ripe for far reaching changes. Already under the interim government reforms were introduced hastily, most remarkable the processes of democratization and decentralization. In the following years “Indonesia’s efforts have been so dramatic that they effectively changed the way the country is governed at all levels” (Wicakasono 2006: 156). In 1999, the first democratic election took place and since 2004 the Indonesian president is elected directly. During the crisis increasingly more of Indonesia’s regions called for a greater autonomy or even independence. Not only those areas with existing separatist move‐ ments (e.g. Aceh or Papua), but also resource-rich regions, such as Kalimantan or Riau, demanded the right for self-determination. The latter were tired of Jakarta’s constant drain on their resources and demanded a greater share. These demands were accompanied by the perception that the centralized administration had directed all development efforts and funds to Jakarta, increasing the disparities in the country. Further, it was criticized that the system had produced a large and complex bureauc‐ racy regarded as ineffective and also as responsible for the multidimensional crisis (Mawardi et al. 2008). To bring decision-making closer to the people and to prevent a disintegration of the country, the notion to change the centralistic system radically, gained predomi‐ nance. As a federation was for historic reasons no option at all, it was decided to devolve the power to the local level: the cities and districts. Coordination between them is one of the few responsibilities left to the provinces, leaving this tier of government relatively powerless (Vickers 2005: 144). In this way the region’s claims for autonomy could be met and at the same time weak provinces guaranteed the unity of the nation. Shortly after the first election in 1999 two laws concerning the autonomy were enacted and became effective in 2001: law 22/1999 on local governance and law 25/1999 on fiscal balance. The former eliminated the hierarchical relationship between the government levels and transferred most of the tasks and obligations of the national government to the districts and cities, leaving only the authority over foreign affairs, judiciary, monetary, defence and religion in the hands of Jakarta (May 2015: 232). The second law redistributed the financial resources needed to fulfil the new obligations to the local governments (Atkinson 2004: 39–47).

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5.3.4

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Consequences for Indonesian Cities

The autonomy laws were a big bang for the cities. Virtually overnight more than 2.3 million staff (including also school teachers) and 20,000 facilities were trans‐ ferred into their responsibility. While during Suharto’s rule provincial and district heads were appointed by the national government, citizens were now enabled to vote not only the representatives for the local parliaments, but also directly for the mayor’s position (since 2004). Furthermore, in an attempt to overcome the uniform programmes directed by Jakarta, which were often unsuitable for specific circum‐ stances in the regions, the cities were enabled to allocate their budget themselves. This means, they were not only enabled to make their own decisions on how to spend their budget, but also to obtain tax shares and to raise their own local taxes (Mawardi et al. 2008: 6). New regulations, however, such as the introduction of a new tax, are still subject to the central government’s approval. Suddenly, the cities were also responsible (and accountable) for the delivery of public services and only issues like energy supply and land management remained centralized (Delgosea 2008). It must be mentioned in this context that the administrative units Kota (cities) and Kabupaten (districts) were treated equally, assigning them with the same rights and responsibilities, regardless their infrastructural needs or their expenses required for public services. Considering the speed of these reforms, it is not surprising that many problems occurred. Most important was the lack of capacity in terms of staff, skills and expe‐ riences. Every administrative unit was now obliged to establish its own spatial plan‐ ning unit, manage its financial affairs, etc. In remote districts, where it is difficult to attract skilled officials, these new obligations of governance turned out difficult to fulfil. Government officials were mostly unprepared for the upcoming changes and did not know how to proceed with the new freedoms. They were used to follow instructions and their only experience in leadership was given by the authoritarian style of their former president, who plundered a fortune during his rule. Thus, the centralized system of corruption, which prevailed also during the era of the reforms, was soon accompanied by new excesses of corruption on the local level (Vickers 2005: 144). Despite the new authority over local revenues, cities often lacked the capacity or simply failed to use it as a mean to generate more income. Instead, city budgets still relied on national transfers and after paying the wages of the city staff not much was left for other expenses (Delgosea 2008: 4–7). Under the pressure to cut expenses— resources were often more limited than before the crisis (Wicakasono 2006: 159)— issues traditionally handled by the city government (water supply, waste processing, etc.) were increasingly directed to the private sector (ibid.: 156). This development was also induced by the IMF, which demanded more deregulation and privatization efforts from the national government as a precondition for the urgently needed loans. These tendencies of privatization of public services imposed the risk to see a further worsening situation regarding service supply for Indonesian citizens.

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Reform outcomes: Indonesia successfully transformed from authoritarian rule to a decentralised electoral democracy and shows, in general, political and economic stability. Cities and districts have meanwhile adapted to their new powers and many innovative developments regarded as ‘good practice’ begun to emerge. Problems of corruption, however, remain ubiquitous and are now also decentralized to the cities and districts. Furthermore, elements of the former new order regime prevail in the system and key persons of the old regime partly remain in charge (Vickers 2005: 209–223; Hadiz 2008: 2–14). Even if responsible governance, the aim of all reform efforts, has not yet been reached, in economic terms, Indonesia has come back to the pre-crisis status. In 2008, the OECD announced in their analysis a full recovery of Indonesia’s economy (OECD 2008: 16–18). Due to the structural reforms and due to the high reliance on domestic demand the country’s economy has become more resilient to external shocks. Thus, the latest global financial crisis 2007/2008 has barely affected Indo‐ nesia and the country is again handled as a newly industrialized country with an emerging economy (OECD 2010).

5.4 5.4.1

Indonesian Settlements Origin

The Indonesian system of settlements must be considered out of a historic perspec‐ tive to understand contemporary urban structures and urban development. Three epochs of city foundations can be distinguished: a first decade before 1400 under the influence of Hindu–Indian kingdoms, a second decade between 1400 and 1700, where cities have been founded by Islamic kingdoms and the arriving Europeans, and a third decade from 1700 until 1900, where most of today’s cities have been founded under colonial rule. Not much is known about the first decade. What can be said with certainty is that when the Europeans arrived at the Archipelago in the beginning of the sixteenth century, they did encounter some important towns along the Strait of Malacca. These settlements had been established by Hindu kingdoms as strategic trading posts for the important long distance trade with India. Also on Sumatra and Java several Hindu kingdoms existed, their power concentrated in some important cities mostly in coastal areas. Beside these towns not many urban areas existed in the interior and the natives lived rather in a dense system of smaller villages (desa) (Rutz 1985: 65–67). Roughly 100 years before the first Portuguese ships arrived in the Strait of Malacca, the Islam spread in the region and the second decade of city foundations began. Brought by Arabic traders, the small kingdoms and principalities progres‐ sively adopted the new religion. New sultan cities were founded and the existing cities were enriched and reshaped with Islamic elements (Rutz 1985: 47–52). Meanwhile different European nations had arrived searching for lucrative spices. Initially, the Portuguese controlled trade, but soon Spanish, English and Dutch ships

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began to challenge this domination. All these European powers acted in a similar way. They established trade and military posts on strategically favourable spots or near existing settlements along the coastlines. Often, these small posts grew into today’s cities, as for instance Batavia (today’s Jakarta) which was founded by the Dutch in 1621. Progressively, the Dutch succeeded to secure the commercial advan‐ tages of the spice trade in their favour. By territory expansion with force, but also by the means of negotiations and contracting with the native kingdoms they managed to consolidate their power. Until 1700 Batavia had become the unchallenged economic centre in the region (ibid. 52–59). The following 200 years (1700–1900) were characterized by a further expansion of Dutch control. Soon, the Dutch ruled not only the sea and the coastal areas, but also large parts of the interior. To exert administrative control a net of settlements was established in the inland of Java and Sumatra and also at the coasts of the remote islands. The presence of the Europeans and their demand for local resources brought also an increase in trade and interchange between these settlements and the native villages in general. Progressively the Dutch enlarged their control until the archipe‐ lago became their colony. The roots of most Indonesian cities can be traced back to this time (Röll 1981: 68–79; Rutz 1985: 65–67).

5.4.2

Distinctive Elements

Today, Indonesian cities combine different elements of history in their city structure. Hindu, Islamic and European influences were mixed up with the indigenous culture creating a unique city landscape (Guillot 2005). Ford (1993: 376) distinguishes three types of Indonesian cities: the coastal cities, interior towns and palace cities. Under coastal cities he understands those cities founded or strongly influenced by the Dutch, such as Jakarta, Semarang or Surabaya. Later the colonial rulers had also founded interior towns in higher places to escape the heat of the low land areas. These towns, such as Bogor and Bandung, were designed as garden cities with vast estates and much open space. As a third type Ford names the palace cities, which have been founded by Hindu or Islamic rulers and show a traditional structure. In all three types of cities the following characteristics are present to a greater or lesser extent (Rutz 1985: 68–76): • • • •

Linear structure of the traditional centre, oriented at the compass rose European historic quarter Chinese quarter near the city centre Irregular pattern of residential areas known as ‘Kampungs’.

Linear structure around a central crossing: in many Indonesian cities, in particular on Java and Bali, a characteristic element originating from Hindu influence remains dominant until today: the different elements of the city core (residence of the ruler, free square and place of worship) were oriented following the compass rose, i.e. along two straight lines from west to east and north to south. Where these

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roads cross, the centre of the city can be located. At the southern edge the residence of the ruler was established and the northern edge is marked by a place of worship or another sacred place. This pattern was taken over by the later Islamic rulers, and in many cities with Islamic origin (e.g. Yogyakarta and Surakarta) the traditional centre is aligned in the same way as during Hindu times, with the palace (Kraton) located south of a free square (alun alun) which represents the former crossing (Rutz 1985: 76–78). European historic quarter: the Dutch influence was strongest in the coastal cities and the interior cities, but also many of the palace cities have a historic quarter influenced by European planning and architecture. The port cities were built after the Dutch model of an ideal city, with cathedral, canals and tightly packed town‐ houses. These first European settlements were surrounded by indigenous villages, but only behind the city walls. In contrast to the indigenous houses in these rural villages, which were free standing, surrounded by greenery and built from nonpermanent building materials, the Dutch followed the ideal of an European medi‐ aeval town and constructed their houses with solid material and very close to each other. Soon it became obvious that this architecture is not suitable for tropical climates, as it allows no air circulation. Furthermore, standing water in the many channels set up by the Dutch developed bad smells and mosquitoes could use these channels as breeding ground (Röll 1981: 68–79). In the case of Jakarta, this architecture was recognized as inadequate at the end of the eighteenth century. At that time the city had to endure raging diseases and soon the unfitting urban structure and design was held responsible. Thus and also owed to a changing ideology of urban planning, it was decided to establish a new settlement roughly three kilometers south of the old European quarter. The old settlement was handed over to the Chinese and soon the new location became the preferred residential area for the urban elites using Javanese inspired bungalows as their residential houses. Old and new town were connected by a road running linear from north to south, sketching the future urban development. Interestingly, the Dutch had developed a similar linear pattern already present in many of the Javanese palace cities. The new European settlement became the equivalent for the Javanese Kraton located on the southern edge of a linear strip (Ford 1993). Chinatown: the Dutch were also responsible for an increasing immigration of Chinese. Already prior to the arrival of the Europeans many Indonesian cities had Chinese minorities. For the colonial economy of resource extraction, a large work force was needed, but indigenous workers were perceived as unskilled and not suit‐ able due to an assumed hostile attitude. Instead, the colonial government actively promoted the immigration of Chinese labour. The immigrants brought their own culture and also their own urban design which was as ill-suited as the European to the tropical climate. Usually, the Chinese in Indonesia lived and still live in ethnic segregated quarters which are simultaneously commercial centres adjacent to the European historic quarter. The typical houses are from solid material, the shops located in the ground floor, while the first floor is used for living. Tightly crammed together with small streets in between these houses do not provide the perfect condi‐ tions for an adequate air circulation and a healthy environment in a tropical climate

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(Ford 1993). Soon the Chinese began to dominate the economy and after Indonesia became independent, they filled the gap left by the Dutch elites. Many of the higher administrative positions were subsequently handed over to them (Bähr 2005: 246– 259). Kampungs: one of the most symptomatic characteristic of all Indonesian cities is the irregular structure of the residential areas, known as Kampungs. Frequently, the term ‘Kampung’ is used synonymous with ‘slum’, but this interpretation is not correct. In fact, there is no exact English translation. Originally the Indonesian word means ‘village’, pointing at the origin of most Indonesian cities which were born as clusters of autonomous villages. These urban Kampungs originally had a rural struc‐ ture, were self-sufficient and were located near the developing urban centres, often located one or two blocks away from the alun alun. Successively, as the cities were growing, the surrounding Kampungs were absorbed, initially keeping their distinc‐ tive culture, agricultural activities and social networks (Spreitzhofer 2007: 267–279). The cities have developed around the former villages and have incorpo‐ rated these Kampungs as urban area. Behind a facade of old colonial buildings or modern structures, the remnants of these villages can still be found in various stages of transformation. As rural villages Kampungs consisted of free standing houses built from bamboo or timber and thatched with palm leaves or straw. Green spaces were common and many palm and banana trees provided the desired shadow (Rutz 1985: 77). Incor‐ porated into the cities, Kampungs became popular residential quarters due to their closeness to job opportunities. A slow immigration to these areas began in the nine‐ teenth century and became massive after independence (Samyahardja et al. 2006). Since that time and in absence of urban planning the number and density of houses as well as population has jumped up rapidly. The former rural Kampungs have become urban and are now characterized by tightly cramped one-storied houses, only separated by narrow tracks. Infrastructure development could not hold pace with the increased demand and over time the inner-city Kampungs showed more and more signs of deterioration. Characteristics similar to those of slums are common, such as inadequate housing conditions and the lack of basic services. Urban Kampungs are increasingly perceived as poor neighbourhoods, even if these quarters actually contain a mixture of lower and middle class residents and most dwellers have legal tenure (UN-Habitat 2003, p. 1). This cycle of Kampung development is evident in all Indonesian cities. There is a wide variety of Kampungs: dense populated inner-city Kampungs with improved infrastructure are located in close proximity to Kampungs with inadequate housing conditions. There are rural Kampungs in the periphery of the cities, squatter Kampungs constructed illegally and various other Kampung types with conditions in between. For this reason, a Kampung is neither an inner-city slum or squatter settlement, nor a well-serviced settlement of the middle class but it can be either of these types. For Jakarta a rough estimation states that 60–70% of the population lives in various types of Kampungs (Bähr 2005: 259–265) and these numbers can also be transferred to all other Indonesian cities (Ford 1993).

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5 Introduction to Indonesia

A Model of the Indonesian City

The common characteristics of Indonesian cities can be incorporated into a model. Although it is difficult to find spatial entities in an Asian city, where clear spatial patterns are often non-existent and a western style separation of city functions is less present, Ford (1993) has proposed a distinct model of an Indonesian city. As his model is based on Jakarta, it is mostly true for the capital and for other coastal cities and many elements can also be identified in the palace cities. He claims that all developments of Jakarta can be more or less transferred to other Indonesian cities. Indeed, this is true for Surakarta and Yogyakarta, where many of the described spatial elements can be observed. Ford distinguishes nine structural elements of Indonesian cities. All of them are lined up along a central strip, a linear street or main boulevard characteristic for almost all cities of the archipelago. This strip connects the old colonial city with the elite residential area. The former is situated near the waterfront, but today has mostly lost its functions and is often deteriorated. Adjacent to this quarter historically the Chinese commercial zone had developed, characterized by compact blocks of tradi‐ tional shop houses and high population densities. Although this ‘china town’ is less visible compared to other cities of the world—under Suharto it was not allowed to place Chinese letters in public—the quarter is still a separate entity with a distinct culture and predominantly commercial use (Ford 1993: 385). Somewhere along the main road through the Chinese quarter the mixed commer‐ cial zone begins. Here, all of the city’s commercial activities are concentrated and the quarter is nowadays often regarded as the heart of the city. The space in this district is shared by modern pedestrian shopping malls, traditional Chinese shop houses as well as street vendors who set up their non-permanent shops everywhere in the area. Traditional markets (pasars) are present even though such pasars are also distributed over the whole city (Rutz 1985: 74–82). The commercial district is not only a place where all ethnics are represented, but also a mixture of functions and architecture. Streets are wider than in the older parts of the cities, but structures are not very tall and also governmental buildings and even residential areas are present or nearby. Further along the spine, moving away from the waterfront the international commercial zone begins. Similar as any of these globally exchangeable districts it contains skyscrapers, international hotels, discos, theatres and megamalls, all in western style. The area, however, covers only small parts of land adjacent to the main boulevard and immediately behind this band the Kampungs begin. If there are any high rise apartment houses, they are located in this area. The westernized habit of living in such apartment blocks is not fully adopted by all Indonesians, as they prefer the advantages of living in Kampungs with its one- or two-storied houses and its good social network over the living conditions in anonymized apartment complexes. The increasing number of such high rise buildings, however, can be contributed to the demand of the middle class and reflects changing attitudes.

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Next to this zone there is, at least in Jakarta, the governmental zone. Under Sukarno and Suharto this district was developed in a style inspired by the architecture of Brasilia. Massive governmental buildings were constructed, situated in wide open spaces and gardens enriched with various fountains, etc. Further away from the centre and next to the international commercial district the elite residential zone is located. Often, this area had already been developed under colonial rule, when the Europeans built their healthy garden cities well away from the old city centre (Rutz 1985: 74–82). However, not all of the Indonesian cities have such a former garden city, but high-class residential areas inspired by them and sometimes also secured as gated communities begin to emerge throughout the country (Ford 1993: 388–390). Both, the planned middle-income suburbs and the industrial zones are phenomena emerging not before the 1970s. Indonesia’s cities were bypassed until that time by any bigger industrial developments, as the economy was based mainly on resource extraction and services. Thus, in Indonesian cities no steel mills, warehouses and huge railroad yards are present. This began to change with the booming economy during the 1970s, when ring roads, industrial parks and new planned settlements for the increasing middle class were built. In Jakarta these middle-income suburbs developed perpendicular to the linear urban core and covered places close enough to the central districts, but well away from the urban Kampungs (ibid. 390–391). Visible in his model, Ford puts emphasize on the most striking element of the Indonesian cities: the Kampungs. Distributed all over the urban area he distinguishes between inner-city, mid-city, rural and squatter Kampungs. He based his differen‐ tiation among others on factors, such as density, the access to public services, greenery and also the vulnerability against natural hazards. While the inner-city Kampungs are closest to job opportunities, they are also overcrowded and pose the worst living conditions. Access to adequate water supply and sanitation is often not present and health problems are frequent. Nevertheless, these areas are the starting point for most of the migrants to the city. In contrast to the inner-city Kampungs which primarily surround the commercial districts, the mid-city Kampungs are farther away from the economic core and living conditions are often better. This type of Kampung is less crowded, some greenery is present and the public services are much better. In a way the location of these mid-city Kampungs would pose the best locations for residential areas, as they are still located close to the centre and traffic is due to the narrow streets minimal. Rural Kampungs in turn are far away from the city core and are still characterized by agricultural activities. Densities are low, but the provision of services is frequently poor. The temporary squatter Kampungs are shattered throughout the city and are often associated with hazardous sites and unse‐ cure tenure. They are considered as temporary, even if they have been present in some spots for many decades (Ford 1993).

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Dawn of the Urban Age

It was not until independence when fundamental changes began to emerge in Indo‐ nesian cities. Sukarno actively intervened in urban development focusing his atten‐ tion on Jakarta. His vision was “[…] to create a capital of which the third world could be proud (Ford 1993: 378).” Remnants of this time in the form of monumental and symbolic buildings are still visible today. Other Indonesian cities, however, were neglected in this period, just the same as infrastructure improvements in general. Jakarta became a dual city, with monumental buildings on the one hand and sprawling Kampungs on the other (ibid.). After the takeover of Suharto, a different style of development emerged. The Suharto regime was pro-capitalistic and pro-western attracting more foreign invest‐ ments. Economic growth began to accelerate in the beginning of the 1970s and more funds became available for urban development. Now, also the Kampungs gained attention and first upgrading schemes were introduced (cf. Sect. 5.6). With increasing economic activity, however, also migration to the cities and in particular to Jakarta became stronger. Effects were that for every Kampung improved others became more deteriorated due to increased densities or new squatter Kampungs emerged in different locations. Until the late 1980s most of these developments remained focused on Jakarta and in 1990 a quarter of all Indonesians lived in the capital (Firman 1999: 72). During the 1990s the Indonesian government adopted policies of deregulation and privatization recommended by WB and IMF. Indonesian cities became increas‐ ingly integrated in the global economy by the borderless flows of capital goods and information. Of course, this process affected primarily the urban centres, neglecting rural areas and further widening existent disparities (Firman 1999: 72).

5.5.1

Population Growth and Urbanization

The most dominant processes emerging in the second half of the twentieth century and pushing urban development were population growth and increased urbanization. While in the first decades after independence a moderate but constant urbanization had taken place, this process accelerated in the second part of the twentieth century (Kraas 2003: 197–198). In 1950 only 12.4% of the Indonesians lived in urban areas, but until 2010 the degree of urbanization reached 50%. This meant an increase of urban population from 9.2 million to over 119 million in only 60 years (cf. Fig. 5.8). Urbanization is driven by both, population growth in general and migration from rural to urban areas. Since the 1970s, however, Indonesia’s population growth has slowed down and it seems that rural–urban migration has become the dominant factor for urban growth. In some time around the year 1990 the population in rural areas began to decline and since that time all of the general growth of 2.7 million per year (2005) has been absorbed by the cities (UN-DESA 2007). While in the five-year

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300

Urban Population

275

Rural Population

250 225

Millions

200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 0 1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Fig. 5.8 Indonesia’s rural and urban population 1950–2050 (based on UN-DESA 2012a)

period from 1985 to 1990 the number of Indonesians living in cities rose by 12.5 million people, between 2005 and 2010 this amount increased to over 15.3 million (UN-DESA 2012b). Until 2030 the United Nations estimate a further increase of the urbanization degree to 63% meaning a possible number of 176 million Indonesian living in urban areas. If this comes true, additional housing and infrastructure will be needed for over 56 million Indonesians in the next 20 years (UN-DESA 2012b). Most of this urbanization is happening at Java Island. Nearly half of Indo‐ nesia’s population is crammed on only 15% of the country’s land territory and one would expect a much higher urbanization degree on this island (UN-Habitat 2003: 3–4). Perhaps the relatively low values can be contributed to the method used for defining Indonesian cities. Not all agglomerations on Java have an official munic‐ ipal status, although some village clusters may have more than 100,000 inhabi‐ tants (Ford 1993).

5.5.2

Contemporary Urban Developments

The continuing urbanization results in a massive expansion of urban areas above all in and around Jakarta, today the metropolitan region Jabodetabek (Spreitzhofer 2010; Zhu and Simarmata 2015), but increasingly also in all other bigger cities throughout the country (Firman 1999; Fahmi et al. 2014). This trend is not new and was already evident in the last decades of the twentieth century. In that time urban

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growth happened in both inner-city areas and at the urban fringe. Now, nearly all of the development is focused on the urban periphery (Atkinson 2004: 39–40). In the urban fringe zone new residential areas are sprawling along with industrial estates, recreational areas and other socio-economic facilities. This formal develop‐ ment is rarely properly planned, limited by any legislation and often only ruled by market laws. Most of all in the Kabupaten surrounding the larger cities on Java (Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya) land use is changing rapidly. On Java urban corri‐ dors begin to emerge, blurring any difference between urban and rural areas. These so-called ‘desakota regions’ are most dynamic in their development (McGee 1991). On a drive from Yogyakarta to Surakarta in central Java, for instance, it is difficult to make a distinction between urban and rural. This development is characterized by a mesh of urban and rural elements covering more and more territory, but showing low densities. A mix and close spatial proximity of residential, agricultural and industrial areas is characteristic (Firman 1999: 72). In the city cores increasingly more Kampungs must give way for business districts, offices and hotels. Rapidly, the functions of the city are spatially redistrib‐ uted and the old structures of the cities begin to disintegrate. In many cities the old core loses centrality in favour for other emerging agglomerations in the desakota area and a polycentric urban structure begins to emerge. Similar to other urban regions in the world, social disparities and tendencies of polarization are increasing. Gated communities, new towns for middle and high-class residents, (former) rural Kampungs and squatter Kampungs are emerging in close proximity to each other and situated next to hyper malls, golf courses and informal markets. Effects of glob‐ alization are present, resulting in an inclusion and exclusion of different social groups, social fragmentation and tendencies of displacement (Kraas 2003). Compared to other parts of the world, however, segregation of social groups is less significant in Indonesian cities. Until now only few gated communities exist within the cities and many city quarters, blocks or streets show a very heterogenic structure of social classes and urban functions (Simone 2010: 89–95). Individuals of different social classes live close to each other and their street or quarter accom‐ modates also small enterprises operating in services or manufacturing. Considered on a larger scale, these quarters begin to change into a mosaic of heterogenic frag‐ ments with a social and functional mix (Kraas 2003).

5.6

Indonesia’s Slums and Housing Policies

Compared to other developing countries, the amount of people living in squatter settlements is not very large in Indonesia and classical inner-city slums, which were former ‘good’ residential areas and have deteriorated over the years, are nearly nonexistent (Kraas 2003: 204). The poor live in a distinct type of settlements, the former indigenous villages (Kampungs) and urban growth in terms of population is almost completely absorbed by these settlements. Most of all the inner-city Kampungs, but also the squatter Kampungs are targeted by migration flows from rural areas. Often

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these settlements are the first station for new migrants, as they are close to job opportunities, but frequently they also can be classified as slum areas due to their high population densities, deteriorated conditions and lack of basic services. In contrast to the inner-city Kampungs, residents of squatter Kampungs have no clear tenure rights and these settlements can be found as fragments distributed over the urban territory mostly on government owned land near railroad tracks or rivers. They are gradually created in small patches of land, not by invasion, but by a slow infil‐ tration process (Gamal Rindarjono 2014). The residents of both types of settlements usually work in the informal sector, where they have an easy entry as street vendors, rickshaw (becak) drivers, etc. (Bawole 2007: 106).

5.6.1

The Kampung Question

Already under Dutch rule the ‘Kampung question’ (Kampongvraagstuk) was perceived as a major problem of the Indonesian cities. By the Dutch East Indian Constitution of 1854 autonomy had been guaranteed to these indigenous villages. However, when they were progressively engulfed by the cities, it became clear that there must be a concept to change the bad conditions of these settlements, even though not for altruistic reasons, but to create a healthier city for the Europeans. Thus, in 1905, the Dutch introduced a concept of abolition (opheffing) and improve‐ ment (verbetering) of the Kampungs in worst conditions (Cobban 1974: 403–404). A main obstacle for these efforts was the colonial dual system of land rights, with Kampungs frequently following the traditional law (Adat) and other parts of the city ruled by an official tenure system (Zhu and Simarmata 2015). After independence this problem was addressed by the basic agrarian law of 1960, but could not be completely solved. As a consequence, still today various forms of land tenure exist in the urban Kampungs. Many of the arrangements are neither accepted under the system of statutory land rights, nor under the traditional Adat. Therefore, in many cases Kampung dwellers have no legal claim to their possessions, even if they possess a de facto claim secured by the daily practices with the authorities. These circumstances made it easy for the government, in particular under the authoritarian rule of Suharto, to perform evictions without compensations, when space was needed for development projects (Reerink 2006). This system of land tenure is one of the reasons, why at the beginning of the Suharto’s ‘new order’, not much had been achieved in terms of slum improvement. At that time 80% of the Kampung houses in Jakarta did not have a toilet or electricity supply (Spreitzhofer 2007: 267–279).

5.6.2

The ‘Kampung Improvement Programme (KIP)

Despite some efforts under colonial rule it was not until the year 1969, before slum improvements were initiated on a larger scale. Suharto’s government introduced in

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that time the first extensive slum-upgrading programme, known as the Kampung Improvement Programme (KIP). Based on the Dutch approach to upgrade the Kampungs by improving physical infrastructure, the programme was carried out in 89 Kampungs with over 1.2 million residents benefitting until 1975 (Bawole 2007: 38–41). These measures were perceived as a breakthrough, as it was recognized that slum settlements must be improved and cannot be eradicated by eviction. The programme consisted of different stages which reflect the international changes in the perception of what is the best practice of slum alleviation (cf. Sect. 4.2). Initially, the focus was laid on the upgrading of physical infrastructure, such as the construction of sanitation, sewers, pavement of footpaths and also the establishment of schools and health facilities. In 1974 the programme was announced as national policy and with loans of the World Bank it was possible to scale up the projects. Starting in the late 1980s also participatory elements became part of the concept as the paradigm shifted to an inclusion of more stakeholders (Spreitzhofer 2007). The programme is celebrated as a great success by the World Bank and according to this institution over 18,000 ha of Kampung area has been improved until the year 2000 and it is estimated that the measures have reached over 15 million people (World Bank 2003: 68–70). Initially only performed in Surabaya and Jakarta, the measures were replicated in most of Indonesia’s cities. In 30 years of experiences with slum-upgrading “[…] KIP has changed from a largely phys‐ ical response to an increasingly sophisticated broad-based poverty-reduction targeted community empowering approach generating support from the affected communities, public sector institutions and politicians alike (Darrundono 2005: 15).”

Notwithstanding the success of KIP (Silas 1992), it must be clarified, that for the programme the beautification of the cities was always set at the centre of attention. Most of all in Jakarta, the perception was and still is predominant that the city must be presented in a sophisticated and pleasant way. Thus, the capital has to become a slum-free and green city (Kusno 2011). In central areas this may have been achieved, but in the Jakarta’s periphery the problem remains present (Spreitzhofer 2007; Kusno 2011). During the 1980s and 1990s a number of similar programmes, aiming at poverty alleviation, provision of infrastructure, slum improvement, capacity building, etc., were introduced to a greater or lesser extent (World Bank 2003; Agustina 2006; Spreitzhofer 2007; Hartono 2009). The results of all these efforts, however, remain unsatisfying as the improvements cannot hold pace with the massive urbanization trend. Slum settlements thus will remain a major challenge for Indonesian cities over the next decades.

5.6.3

Current Slum Dimensions

When looking for concrete data about Indonesia’s slum population, many contra‐ dicting numbers and statements are encountered. Similar to the corresponding

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120

60%

50.8% 50%

100

42.6% 40%

80

Million

34.4% 60

26.3%

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29.9

30.6

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20% 28.6

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10%

0%

0 1990

1995

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2005

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Urban population living in slums Proportion of urban population living in slums

Fig. 5.9 Indonesia’s urban and slum population 1990–2005 (based on UN-Habitat 2008: 178)

attempts to estimate the slum population of the whole world (cf. Sect. 2.1) it is difficult to estimate an absolute number. Different authors (among others e.g. Stalker 2007: 31; Hartono 2009: 15–16) state an expansion of the slum areas and also an increase of the slum population in Indonesia. In contrast to this, the latest reports of UN-Habitat (UN-Habitat 2008, 2010) claim a decreasing share of slums. The reports describe on the one hand the rapidly increasing urban population of Indonesia, which nearly doubled in only 15 years and on the other hand an absolute number of slum dwellers remaining steady in the same period of time (cf. Fig. 5.9). Considering these numbers, it is concluded that Indonesia is among the best performing countries in terms of slum alleviation. According to UN-Habitat the country managed to improve the living conditions of 21.23 million slum dwellers between 2000 and 2010 (UNHabitat 2008: 39–40) and contributed in this way a large part for achieving the ‘slum target’ of the Millennium Development Goals.

5.6.4

Recent Developments in the Kampungs

In the last decades Indonesian Kampungs have increasingly come under pressure from development processes. Major changes occurred most of all in the innercity- and squatter Kampungs. The most visible trends are:

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Expansion of business districts in former Kampung areas Eviction of squatter settlements Establishment of new squatter Kampungs in other areas Transformation of rural Kampungs into urban Kampungs.

Due to the prime location of many urban Kampungs near to the economic centre or the business district, they are not only targeted by strong migration flows but also by private developers, who intend to extent the business district into these areas. Commercial or industrial modernization has already driven out most of the former low-income inhabitants (Kraas 2003). Despite the political change in the late 1990s towards a democratic system, evic‐ tions of squatter settlements are still common. Particularly in Jakarta measures were taken against squatter settlements and street vendors to create a clean city without slums (Wiegard 2007: 4–10). As space is highly valuable for private investors to build shopping malls, hotels and upper class residential areas, the marginal dwellers and informal workers must give way for this development, which is perceived as ‘modernization’. Often, force is used to perform such evictions, sometimes also with the help of the military and only rarely with compensation for the affected citizens (Spreitzhofer 2007: 279–289). For the period between 1995 and 2005 UN-Habitat has reported over 640,000 persons being victim of forced evictions in Indonesia (UN-Habitat 2007: 9). Most of these evictions took place during the Asian crisis and the following period of political instability, but also thereafter evictions remained common practice, most of all in Jakarta (Rolnik 2013: 15–17). The takeover of former Kampung areas by these developments has put even more pressure on the housing market, which is already strained by urban growth. The evicted and expulsed residents must find new accommodation and with every slum cleared, the problem is likely to get worse in other areas. Consequences are twofold: first, new squatter Kampungs emerge repeatedly in new spots; second, the pressure on remaining Kampungs increases, leading to overcrowding, deterioration and subsequently to new slum areas. Furthermore, as urbanization continues, more and more rural Kampungs become urban, often lacking basic services. Therefore, the total number of substandard housing units is steadily on the rise (Spreitzhofer 2007: 263–276).

References Agustina SI (2006) Manual for facilitator organized self-help rental flat housing in Indonesia. In: Agency of Research and development (ed) Public Works International 2006, Jakarta, pp 79–88 Atkinson A (2004) Promoting environmentalism, participation and sustainable human development in cities of Southeast Asia. In: Westendorff D (ed) From unsustainable to inclusive cities. UNRISD, Geneva, pp 15–57 Bähr J (2005) Stadtgeographie II: Regionale Stadtgeographie. Westermann, Braunschweig Bawole P (2007) Informelle Siedlungen an Flussufern in gefährdeten Stadtgebieten Indonesiens: Fallstudien in den Städten Medan, Yogyakarta, Malang und Surabaya. Dissertation, Universität Stuttgart

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Berger W, Wagner H (2000) Ursachen und Erklärungen der Asienkrise. http://deposit.fernunihagen.de/188/1/db286.pdf. Accessed 14 Dec 2012 BPS (2016a) Konsep. https://www.bps.go.id/Subjek/view/id/23#subjekViewTab1|accordiondaftar-subjek1. Accessed 18 Aug 2016 BPS (2016b) Statistics Indonesia. https://www.bps.go.id/. Accessed 18 Aug 2016 BPS & BAPPEDA Surakarta (2009) Surakarta dalam Angka 2009, Surakarta Cobban J (1974) Uncontrolled urban settlement: The kampung question in Semarang (1905-1940). Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 130:403–427 Cribb R, Brown C (1995) Modern Indonesia: a history since 1945. Longman, London Dahm B (2015) Geschichte Indonesiens. In: Stange G, Jordan W, Großmann K (eds) Handbuch Indonesien. Horlemann, Berlin, pp 45–90 Dahm B, Ptak R (1999) Südostasien-Handbuch: Geschichte, Gesellschaft, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur. Beck, München Darrundono (2005) The first large-scale upgrading programme: an Indonesian success story. In: The MDGs and the City, Nairobi, pp 15–17 Delgosea (2008) Country profile—Republic of Indonesia. http://www.delgosea.eu/cms/content/ download/299/2645/file/Country%20profile_Indonesia.pdf. Accessed 25 Aug 2011 Fahmi FZ, Hudalah D, Rahayu P, Woltjer J (2014) Extended urbanization in small and medium-sized cities: the case of Cirebon, Indonesia. Habitat Int 42:1–10. doi:10.1016/j.habitatint.2013.10.003 Firman T (1999) Indonesian cities under the “Krismon”: a great “urban crisis” in Southeast Asia. Cities 16(2):69–82 Ford LR (1993) A model of Indonesian city structure. Geogr Rev 83(4):374–396 Frings M (2012) Zivilgesellschaft in Indonesien. APuZ 62(11–12):43–49 Furman J, Stiglitz JE, Bosworth P, Radelet S (1998) Economic crises: evidence and insights from East Asia. Brookings Pap Econ Act 2:1–135 Gamal Rindarjono M (2014) “Slum” urban inequality: reclamation, inundation and social impact in Central Java, Indonesia. Media Perkasa, Yogyakarta Gamino DK (2012) Annäherung an ein unbekanntes Land. APuZ 62(11–12):3–8 Gersten G (2011) Das globale neoliberale System und seine Auswirkungen auf Indonesien. Diplomarbeit, Universität Innsbruck Guillot C (2005) Urban patterns and polities in Malay trading cities, fifteenth through seventeenth centuries. Indonesia 80:39–51 Hadiz VR (2008) Indonesia a decade after Reformasi: continuity or change? Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, Singapore Hartono IG (2009) Sustainability of neighborhood upgrading and shelter sector project (NUSSP). In: Santosa H, Astuti W, Astuti DW (eds) Sustainable slum upgrading in urban area. Universitas Sebelas Maret, Surakarta Kraas F (2003) Verstädterungs- und innerurbane Entwicklungsprozesse in Südostasien. In: Feldbauer P, Husa K, Korff R (eds) Südostasien: Gesellschaften, Räume und Entwicklung im 20. Jahrhundert. Promedia, Wien, pp 196–211 Kusno A (2011) The green governmentality in an Indonesian metropolis. Singap J Trop Geogr 32(3):314–331. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9493.2011.00440.x Mawardi MS et al (2008) The specific allocation fund (DAK): mechanisms and uses. SMERU Research Institute May B (2015) Dezentralisierung eine wechselvolle Geschichte. In: Stange G, Jordan W, Großmann K (eds) Handbuch Indonesien. Horlemann, Berlin, pp 230–246 McCarthy P (2003) Urban slum reports: the case of Jakarta, Indonesia. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpuprojects/Global_Report/pdfs/Jakarta.pdf. Accessed 18 June 2012 McDonald P (2014) A population projection for Indonesia, 2010–2035. Bull Indonesian Econ Stud 50(1):123–129. doi:10.1080/00074918.2014.896240 McGee TG (1991) The emergence of Desakota Regions in Asia: expanding a hypothesis. In: Ginsburg NS, Koppel B, McGee TG (eds) The extended metropolis: settlement transition in Asia. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu

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Mukherjee N (1999) Consultations with the poor in Indonesia: country synthesis report. http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/ 335642-1124115102975/1555199-1124138866347/Indon1-3.pdf. Accessed 18 June 2012 Obermayr C (2012a) Human development index (HDI) in Indonesia 2010. https://christian obermayr.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/2010-hdi-indonesia1.png. Accessed 31 Aug 2016 Obermayr C (2012b) Migration balance of Indonesia’s regions 2005-2010. https://christian obermayr.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/migration-in-indonesias-regions-2005-2010.png. Accessed 23 Aug 2016 Obermayr C (2012c) Population density in Indonesia 2010. https:// christianobermayr.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/population-densitiy-in-indonesia-2010.png. Accessed 20 Aug 2016 OECD (2008) OECD economic surveys: Indonesia—economic assessment. OECD Publications, S.l OECD (2010) OECD economic surveys: Indonesia. OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/978 9264000000-en Priebe J (2014) Official poverty measurement in Indonesia since 1984: a methodological review. Bull Indonesian Econ Stud 50(2):185–205. doi:10.1080/00074918.2014.938406 Reerink G (2006) The price of uncertainty: kampung land issues in Post-Suharto Bandung. IIAS Newsl 40:14 Röll W (1981) Indonesien: Entwicklungsprobleme einer tropischen Inselwelt. Klett, Stuttgart Rolnik R (2013) Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context on her mission to Indonesia: Report to the Human Rights Council Rutz W (1985) Die Städte Indonesiens: Städte und andere nicht-landwirtschaftliche Siedlungen, ihre Entwicklung und gegenwärtige Stellung in Verwaltung und Wirtschaft. Urbanisierung der Erde, vol 4, Berlin, Stuttgart Samyahardja P, Subiantoro I, Saraswati (2006) The understanding of physical development forces for estimation of administrative definition of urban areas. In: Agency of Research and development (ed) Public Works International 2006, Jakarta, pp 95–104 Silas J (1992) Government-community partnerships in kampung improvement programmes in Surabaya. Environ Urbanization 4(2):33–41. doi:10.1177/095624789200400204 Simone A (2010) City life from Jakarta to Dakar: movements at the crossroads. Routledge, New York Spreitzhofer G (2007) Marginalisierte Kampungs, zentralisierte Superblocks? Aspekte der Regionalentwicklung in Metro-Jakarta. In: Bronger D (ed) Marginalsiedlungen in Megastädten Asiens. LIT, Berlin, Münster, pp 251–296 Spreitzhofer G (2010) Zwischen Malls und Marginalität: Städtische Gesellschaften Südostasiens im Umbruch. Kritsche Geographie, vol 41, Wien Stalker P (2007) Let’s speak out for MDGs: achieving the millennium development goals in Indonesia The Australian National University (2013) Indonesia provinces and capital cities, including maritime boundaries—2013. CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific. http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/ mapsonline/base-maps/indonesian-provinces. Accessed 20 Aug 2016 UN-DESA (2007) World population prospects: the 2006 revision. United Nations, New York UN-DESA (2012a) World population prospects: the 2011 revision UN-DESA (2012b) World urbanization prospects: the 2011 revision UNDP, BPS, BAPPENAS (2004) Indonesia human development report: the economics of democracy, Jakarta UN-Habitat (2003) The challenge of slums: global report on human settlements 2003. Earthscan, London UN-Habitat (2007) Forced evictions—towards solutions? Second report of the advisory group on forced evictions to the executive director of UN-HABITAT UN-Habitat (2008) State of the world’s cities 2010/2011: bridging the urban divide. Earthscan, London

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UN-Habitat (2010) The State of the Asian cities 2010/11 Vickers A (2005) A history of modern Indonesia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Vorlaufer K (2009) Südostasien: Brunei, Indonesien, Kambodscha, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Osttimor, Philippinen, Singapur, Thailand, Vietnam. WBG (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft), Darmstadt Wessel I (2003) Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Dekolonisation in Südostasien. In: Feldbauer P, Husa K, Korff R (eds) Südostasien: Gesellschaften, Räume und Entwicklung im 20. Jahrhundert. Promedia, Wien, pp 60–78 Wicakasono S (2006) Indonesia. In: Roberts B, Kanaley T (eds) Urbanization and sustainability in Asia: case studies of good practice. Asian Development Bank, Philippines, pp 155–187 Wiegard B (2007) Indonesien Vertreibung aus der Megacity. Misereor Aktuell 4:4–10 World Bank (2003) Cities in transition: urban sector review in an era of decentralization in Indonesia. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/Publication/03Publication/Citiesintransition-Eng.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2016 Zhu J, Simarmata HA (2015) Formal land rights versus informal land rights: governance for sustainable urbanization in the Jakarta metropolitan region, Indonesia. Land Use Policy 43: 63–73. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.10.016

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Part III

Case Study: The Indonesian City Surakarta

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Chapter 6

Introduction to Surakarta (Solo)

Abstract The medium-sized Indonesian city Surakarta (Solo) is internationally recognized for its policies of managing the informal sector. For addressing and crit‐ ically assessing these policies, specific quantitative and qualitative methods are used (mainly semi-structured expert interviews, a household survey, mappings and stat‐ istical analyses). In the first section, these methods as well as the applied research process are described in detail. Based on the collected data, subsequently the city is introduced in its spatial and administrative setting as well as in its social and economic framework conditions. Specific interest is given to the housing sector. The general settlement structure and housing conditions are described, current challenges and the spatial location of slum and squatter settlements are identified. For a system‐ atic assessment of the location of Solo’s slum areas, a GIS-based analysis approach is developed and applied, resulting in a map indicating the probability of slums for each of Solo’s neighbourhoods. Finally, all the collected information is merged in a qualitative description of the city’s spatial and functional patterns. Keywords Solo · Surakarta · Research methods · Housing situation · Slums · Squatters · GIS-analysis

6.1

Methods Used During the Fieldwork

In order to collect information about the housing situation in Surakarta and to eval‐ uate the city policy in a critical way, beside a comprehensive literature review, the following methods were applied: mappings, observations, semi-structured expert interviews and a standardized questionnaire (cf. Fig. 6.1). Observations: As a first step of the in situ research, it was necessary to get an overview of the city, its spatial extent and socio-economic structure. Second, it was important to get a feeling for the appearance of Indonesian’s slum- and squatter settlements, as these types of housing are often difficult to distinguish from the common types of settlements, at least for European (un-trained) eyes. Thanks to the help of experienced students and Dr. Gamal, lecturer of Universitas Sebelas Maret © Springer International Publishing AG 2017 C. Obermayr, Sustainable City Management, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49418-0_6

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6 Introduction to Surakarta (Solo)

Fig. 6.1 Applied methods and their connections (by author)

Surakarta (UNS), this could be accomplished rapidly by jointly visiting different areas of the city. To get an impression of the measures introduced by the city govern‐ ment, several places, where the impact of these measures is visible, were visited. Such areas targeted by the city policy are places of informality or/and marginality, such as squatter settlements, slum areas, places of informal trade, newly build market

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6.1 Methods Used During the Fieldwork

113

Fig. 6.2 Sub-districts and selected quarters in Surakarta (Solo) (Obermayr 2012e)

houses for relocated street vendors, areas of social housing and areas where families have been relocated due to the risk of environmental hazards. All observations made during the field work are included into the final interpretation and evaluation. Expert Interviews: To get a broad range of information, 20 experts were inter‐ viewed in a semi-structured way. The initial search for participants was assisted by members of UNS, who suggested suitable individuals. Later, contacts to other stake‐ holders having a say in Surakarta’s housing policies were established by using a pyramid scheme. Among the interviewees were municipal staff of different admin‐ istrative levels (Kota, Kabupaten, Kelurahan, RW and RT), academics, employees of NGOs and community representatives. The latter consisted of local leaders repre‐ senting communities affected by government interventions or other persons having a voice in housing policies. Depending on their function or occupation the inter‐ viewed individuals can be categorized in four different groups: (1) Municipal workers, (2) Researchers of Sebelas Maret University (UNS), (3) Employees of NGOs and (4) Other persons having a stake in the city’s policy (cf. Table 6.1). Usually, the interviews took place in the interviewee’s office, sometimes also in his or her private home, and lasted at least one hour. English was the language used; hence a translator was present during all appointments, although not always needed. Several students of UNS, of the English-, Geography- and Sociology department, helped as translators. To make sure they understood the meaning of the semistructured questions, which were prepared by thematic fields, and to minimize

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6 Introduction to Surakarta (Solo)

Table 6.1 Interviewed stakeholders and experts No.

Date

Function or occupation

Group

1.

11.04.2011

Lecturer at UNS, faculty of engineering

University

2.

09.05.2011

Head of BAPERMAS

Municipal

3.

10.05.2011

Head of SUPOSUKOWONOSRATEN

Municipal

4.

12.05.2011

Chief executive officer of BLUD

Municipal

Chief technical officer of BLUD 5.

12.05.2011

Employee of BAPERMAS

Municipal

6.

13.05.2011

Founder of SOMPIS, subcontractor of DTRK

Other

7.

18.05.2011

Employee of Konsorsium Solo

NGO

8.

20.05.2011

Lecturer at UNS, faculty of social and political sciences

University

9.

23.05.2011

Employee of DPU, Head of sub-division for rental housing

Municipal

10.

24.05.2011

Head of Kelurahan Sewu

Municipal

11.

24.05.2011

Head of Kecamatan Jebres

Municipal

12.

25.05.2011

Director of the zoo, former head of FKIP

Other

13.

26.05.2011

Bandahara (treasurer) of Pokja Relocasi in Kelurahan Sewu

Other

14.

27.05.2011

Employee of Dinas Tata Ruang Kota

Municipal

15.

27.05.2011

Employee of DPPKDA

Municipal

16.

31.05.2011

Head of RT03 in RW29, Kelurahan Mojosongo

Municipal

17.

01.06.2011

Head of RT03 in RW02, Kelurahan Sewu

Municipal

18.

01.06.2011

Head of RT04 in RW29, Kelurahan Mojosongo

Municipal

19.

02.06.2011

Former member of Subpokja Pucang Sawit

Other

20.

10.06.2011

Head of Pokja Relocasi of Pucang Sawit

Other

Abbreviations and Indonesian expressions are explained in the glossary Mentioned areas can be located in Fig. 6.2

eventual misunderstandings, every translator was briefed before each interview. In order to ensure the best results, those students were selected, who already had expe‐ riences in qualitative research and/or had done interviews before. Standardized questionnaire and mapping: After assessing the information received from the interviews, it became clear that a closer look at the practical implementation of the city’s measures and programmes would be helpful. Doing this, it was expected to get a better understanding of the process of implementation, the effects of the measures and, most importantly, of the perception of the affected people. Thus, one programme to focus on was chosen: the relocation of residents within the city from one place to another. After a disastrous flood event of Bengawan Solo River (2007), which defines the border of Solo’s territory to the east, the city government decided to relocate all people living near the river bank to other areas within the borders of the city. This process was still on-going during the field work

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115

(2011), hence abandoned areas with demolished houses as well as new settlements built as compensation could be visited (for more details cf. Chap. 7). One of these new settlements hosting 112 families in the Kelurahan Mojosongo, a quarter in sub-district Jebres, was chosen as an example for a comprehensive examination. In order to get unfiltered information from a direct source—the affected people—and a good data basis for further analyses, it was decided to carry out a mapping and a standardized questionnaire. The following steps were taken: 1. Mapping: The new settlement was fully mapped using a Trimble Juno GPS handheld. In a first step all streets and houses were sketched. Second, it was recorded for each house of which materials the walls, roofs and the floors inside the houses consist. If it was deemed necessary, additional information was noted for each house (e.g. vacancy). 2. Preparation of a questionnaire: Based on the gained impressions and the gathered knowledge out of the literature as well as the expert interviews, a questionnaire was prepared. The translation of this questionnaire into Bahasa Indonesia was done with the help of UNS students, who also agreed to help with the realization of the survey. An example of the used questionnaire is available in Appendix B. 3. Random selection of households: Participants for the questioning were selected based on a spatial approach. A sample of 50 households was prepared by a random selection from the settlement’s houses (excluding vacant houses). Each house got assigned a unique number and therefore also one unique questionnaire sheet with the corresponding number. By doing this, the received information became spatial and could be used for further analysis. 4. Realization of the questionnaire: The questioning was carried out on June 5 and June 6, 2011. With the help of three UNS students two groups, containing two interviewers each, were created. Now every previously selected household was visited. If nobody was encountered, the neighbouring family was interviewed, altering the map by marking their house with the number matching the ques‐ tionnaire sheet. The questions were usually read out to the participants by one interviewer while the other one recorded the answers. Usually, the questions were responded by the Kepala Keluarga (family head), even though in many cases both parents complemented each other. The completion of one interview usually took 20–30 min. 5. Data analysis: The received questionnaire sheets were encoded and put into an SPSS database. Subsequently, the data was analysed using SPSS and ArcGIS. Analysis and Interpretation: In a final step, all collected data and information resulting from the literature review, the observations, the expert interviews, the mappings and the questionnaire were analysed. In this chapter and Chap. 7, the results are presented and culminate in an interpretation and evaluation of the city’s policies regarding informal settlements.

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6.2

6 Introduction to Surakarta (Solo)

Solo, a City in Central Java

Surakarta, a medium-sized city of about 530,000 inhabitants, is located on a flatland in approximately 100 m height at the centre of Java Island between Lawu Mountain to the east and the volcanoes Merapi and Merabu to the west, roughly at 110° 45′ E and 7° 40′ S. The city, commonly called ‘Solo’ by its inhabitants, is the centre of politics, economy and culture in the eastern part of Central Java Province (Java Tengah). Other important cities in this region are the provincial capital Semarang and Yogyakarta, which are situated 100 km to the northwest and 65 km to the south‐ west, respectively (cf. Fig. 6.3). Java Island belongs to the most densely populated areas in the world, a region characterized by paddy fields, scattered villages and volcanoes towering sometimes more than 3000 m above this landscape. The climate is tropical, bringing the city a constant average temperature of about 30° throughout the year and annual precipi‐ tation sums of more than 2000 mm. Depending on the monsoon, the year can be divided in a rainy season ranging from October until June, with December and January as the wettest months, and a short dry season in the remaining three months (BPS and BAPPEDA Surakarta 2009). Unlike the provincial capital Semarang which is, as other important Javanese cities (Surabaya and Jakarta), a port city at Java’s northern coast, Yogyakarta and

Fig. 6.3 Surakarta (Solo) and surrounding region (by author)

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117

Fig. 6.4 Impressions from Solo. Photos Obermayr (2011)

6.2 Solo, a City in Central Java

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6 Introduction to Surakarta (Solo)

Solo do not have direct access to the sea. Therefore, they were cut off from the so important sea trade during colonial times and Dutch influence was less compared to the port cities. The fact that—despite this disadvantage in terms of trade—such vibrant urban centres exist in the inland area must be contributed to their historic roots. Both, the cities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta owe their existence to the fact that they were located in the heartland of the Mataram Empire at the beginning of the eighteenth century. At that time—most welcomed by the Dutch—a conflict broke out between the heirs to the throne which resulted 1755 in the separation of the empire in two sultanates, the sultanate of Yogyakarta and the one of Solo (Vorlaufer 2009: 88). Since those days both cities have been rivals to each other in many respects, although they share many commonalities and are both regarded as the origin of Javanese culture. Compared with Yogyakarta, Solo’s economy is more characterized by industrial production, in particular chemical and textile products, while Yogya‐ karta’s economic base lies more on services, tourism and science. Some impressions of the city are illustrated in Fig. 6.4.

6.3

Administrative and Socio-economic Setting

Administrative structure and population: Solo shares boundaries with the districts (Kabupaten) Boyolali, Sukoharjo and Karanganyar and at its eastern edge the city borders the river Bangawan Solo. The city’s territory is divided in five sub-districts (Kecamatan) with an area of 44 km2, 51 quarters (Kelurahan) and 2669 RTs (cf. Fig. 6.5). In 2009, the total population was according to the official statistic of BPS 528,202 people, which means an increase of 38,000 people since the year 2000, and an annual growth rate of 1.23%. With a population density of 13,198 people per km2, the city is considered as one of the most crowded places in Central Java. With respect to countless commuters from the surrounding districts, Solo is clearly ‘the city which does not sleep’ as commonly referred to by its inhabitants (BPS and BAPPEDA Surakarta 2009: 35–36). The official population figures, however, must be handled with care, as those received from the quarters (Kelurahans) show different values for the sub-districts and can be summed up to a total population of 580,849 people in 2009 (cf. Table 6.2). This means over 50,000 people more than in the official statistic, maybe also counting the many migrants without identity card as citizens.1 Another source sets Solo’s population to 585,319 people (DPU Surakarta 2011: 7). Whatever the actual number of Solo’s residents is, it is obvious that the southern parts of the city, namely the sub-districts Pasar Kliwon and Serengan are a lot denser populated than the other districts. Within these districts higher densities can be found in their eastern parts, close to the river (cf. Fig. 6.6).

1It

takes three years of permanent residence in the city, the allowance of the RT as well as the Kelurahan officials to receive an official identity card (KTP—Kartu Tanda Penduduk).

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6.3 Administrative and Socio-economic Setting

119

Fig. 6.5 Solo’s administrative units (modified, based on Solo Kota Kita 2010a)

Table 6.2 Population of Solo 2009 (based on BPS and BAPPEDA Surakarta 2009: 36) Sub-district

Area (km2)

Population

Density (Pop. per km2)

Laweyan

8.6

110,555

12,795

Serengan

3.2

63,659

19,955

Pasar Kliwon

4.8

88,044

18,266

Jebres

12.6

143,319

11,392

Banjarsari

14.8

175,272

11,834

Total

44.0

580,849

13,189

Migration: As an economic centre, Solo attracts much commuting and also migration from the surrounding districts. Two interviewees (interviews 07 and 12) pointed out that most of the migrants would originate from poor rural areas and would stay only temporarily in the city, as they were farmers and try to earn some extra money outside of the harvesting season. According to the interviewees, the process of migration begins with only the father of a family moving to the city to seek work, usually in the informal sector (street vendor, construction worker, Becak driver, etc.). If he is successful, the family often follows him to the city.

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6 Introduction to Surakarta (Solo)

Fig. 6.6 Solo 2010: population density (Obermayr 2012b)

All surrounding districts are considered to be the original home of these migrants, but particularly the poorer districts Wonogiri, Sukoharjo and Sragen were mentioned. In the view of the interviewed persons, inner-city and supra-regional migration does not play a significant role for Surakarta’s migration balance. According to the official statistics (BPS and BAPPEDA Surakarta 2009), Solo’s population balance was positive in 2009 with a plus of over 13,000. Unlike the years before, where in- and outmigration was nearly stable, the sub-district Banjarsari received the lion’s share of the new residents. Migrants without identity card, however, are not counted in this statistic. Land use: When looking at the land use patterns of Solo, the uneven distribution of inhabitants across the sub-districts becomes more evident. While most of the commercial areas are located in the central and southern parts of the city, indicating the commercial centre, the northern parts are characterized by much more open space, which is used for agricultural purposes. One bigger commercial area is located in the eastern part of the city. It is adjacent to the University and its existence can be accounted to the students, who are good customers for specific products. Industrial areas are mostly located outside the city boundaries in the surrounding districts, although some of them can be found in the western part of the city, at the roads to Yogyakarta and Semarang.

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6.3 Administrative and Socio-economic Setting

121

Fig. 6.7 Solo 2010: distribution of poverty (Obermayr 2012a)

Poverty: Poverty is widespread in Solo and the official poverty degree for the city is 15.4%, implying that over 90,000 of Solo’s residents living in poverty.2 Unlike in other cities of the world, poverty is not concentrated in single areas of the city and every RT-unit of Solo has a certain degree of poverty (Solo Kota Kita 2010a: 14). Similar to the regions with highest population densities, areas showing highest poverty degrees are located in the south-eastern part of the city, along the riverbanks of Bengawan Solo River, but also along other channels, railroad lines and on govern‐ ment owned land (cf. Fig. 6.7). Economy: Solo is regarded as a major centre of industrial production (textile) and trade in Java. Similar to whole Indonesia the GDP growth was relatively stable over the last few years at a rate of 5–6%. The economic structure is dominated by the industrial and the service sector, each of them contributing nearly 50% to the city GDP (Pemerintah Kota Surakarta 2009). Metropolitan region Surakarta: The need for a more comprehensive and crossborder thinking and planning becomes clear, when looking at the interregional rela‐ tions in terms of migration, commuting and economics. Therefore, already in colonial times a metropolitan region was created, comprising today the administra‐ 2The

statistical agency of Indonesia (BPS) has established a sophisticated system for measuring poverty which is based on a consumption bundle of food and nonfood items of a reference house‐ hold. The measurement system has changed over time, raising questions on temporal comparability (Priebe 2014).

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6 Introduction to Surakarta (Solo)

Fig. 6.8 Solo’s metropolitan region—SUBOSUKAWONOSRATEN (by author)

tive units Sukoharjo, Boyolali, Surakarta, Karanganyar, Wonogiri, Sragen and Klaten (cf. Fig. 6.8). This metropolitan area—called SUPOSUKAWONOSRATEN —covered a population of roughly 5.8 million people in 1998 (DPU Surakarta 2011: 24). It is institutionalized and a whole office building in Solo is reserved for over 60 civil servants. The obligations and competences, however, are still to be developed and more clearly defined. At the moment, some of the few tasks of this institution are the coordination between the districts in terms of water, culture and most of all the coordination of emergency services in case of disastrous events affecting the whole region (Interview 01; Interview 03). The institution, however, possesses only limited instruments and decision rights to translate their tasks into concrete action. Often only dialogue can be used by civil servants as a mean to mediate between the assigned districts. Albeit good practices do exist (Firman 2010), the duties remain very difficult to fulfil, most of all because the districts and cites are not willing to give up any of their newly gained competences after decentralization (Interview 01).

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6.4 The Housing Situation

6.4

123

The Housing Situation

The majority (approx. 60%) of the land covered by the city is designated as residen‐ tial. According to DPU3 approximately 106,000 houses existed in Solo 2001, implying the not only the existence of high population densities but also high densi‐ ties of houses (DPU Surakarta 2011: 6). Most of these residential areas are charac‐ terized by one-storied or two-storied buildings, where often all generations of a family live together under one roof. Thus, an average household in Solo consists of over five persons. Even in the city centre, the residential houses rarely reach more than two or three floors and except the shopping malls and hotels only one high apartment block stands out of this pattern (cf. Fig. 6.9). According to DPU, the city faces a severe housing backlog which has worsened over the years. In 2001, a shortage of over 23,000 houses was estimated and consid‐ ering the population growth and newly constructed houses since that time, in 2011 the shortage has increased to over 33,000 units (DPU Surakarta 2011: 12–13). Taken into account the projected growth of all urban areas in Indonesia, the situation will probably further worsen over the next years. Most of the construction work of new housing units is done by the people them‐ selves. The private and public sector are not capable to ease the tension on the housing market by increased supply. In recent years, land use has changed particularly the northern part of the city from agricultural or open space towards residential. Space in these sub-districts, however, is limited and thus the development has begun to affect Solo’s surrounding districts, in particular Sukoharjo and Karanganyar (ibid. 26–27).

6.4.1

Slums and Squatters

The sub-standard housing units in Solo (cf. Fig. 6.10) can be categorized in two types: inner-city slums, the overcrowded Indonesian Kampungs4 developed histor‐ ically, and unauthorized squatter settlements which emerged in more recent times on government owned land. The former type can be located in very central areas, in the historical regions of the city. There, many of the old houses were continually subdivided over the years, giving space for the increasing population of the city. Although the inhabitants usually are the owners of these houses, and government sponsored upgrading programmes—such as the KIP-programme5—have led to significant improvements, many of these areas are characterized by successive dete‐ 3DPU

(Dinas Pekerjaan Umum) = the ministry of public works. DPU is operating offices in all Indonesian cities.

4For a

more detailed discussion about Indonesian Kampungs cf. Chap. 5.

5KIP

= Kampung improvement programme; the famous Indonesian slum-upgrading programme is described in Chap. 5.

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6 Introduction to Surakarta (Solo)

Fig. 6.9 Middle-class apartment block in Solo 2011. Photo Obermayr (2011)

rioration. During historic city expansions, the inner-city Kampungs were slowly engulfed by the city and enclosed by other historical structures constructed during colonial times. Today, many of these aged houses are also neglected, abandoned or significantly altered in their utilization. Thus, an overall deterioration of the historic city centre is evident, even though the general structure of the quarters remains intact, thanks to on-going revitalization efforts (DPU Surakarta 2011: 22). The second type of slum settlements in Solo, the unauthorized squatter settle‐ ments, poses a more serious challenge for the city. Illegal housing activities can be detected on government owned land near the river and the railroad tracks, near the centre of the socio-economic activities as well as on some of the graveyards (Ober‐ mayr and Astuti 2016).

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6.4 The Housing Situation

125

Fig. 6.10 Sub-standard housing areas in Solo. Photos Obermayr (2011)

The formation of these squatter settlements happened by the process of infiltra‐ tion. At the riverbank of Bengawan Solo River in Kelurahan Sewu, this development can be exemplified. In this case, government-owned land was occupied by families who managed to get legal land titles due to failures in planning and unclear juris‐ diction. In 1987, a dyke had been constructed to protect the quarter Sewu from annual flood events. The dam was constructed in roughly 50–100 m distance from the river‐ bank and all land between river and dyke was announced as government owned. Despite this fact, people with legal land certificates were actually living on this riverbank. When they were not evicted over the years other families were attracted to settle there, often with permission of the old migrants. The later migrants, however, were unable to secure their property by obtaining land titles and thus remained only semi-legal owners with a de facto claim to the land where they live on (Interview 17). Solo’s city government counted 6612 households located in slum- and 4522 households in squatter areas in 2006 (Interview 02, Astuti 2009). With an average of approx. five people per household a number of over 55,000 people were living in marginal settlements at that time (cf. Table 6.3). However, the actual numbers might be higher, as supposedly not all households were counted and slum settlements are usually more crowded. The sub-district Pasar Kliwon clearly emerges as the region with most marginal settlements, but the data show also that marginal settlements have spread all over the city and cannot be located in one spot. During the field work in 2011 and based on Astuti (2009) roughly 15 spots with sub-standard living condi‐ tions (marginal settlements) could be detected (cf. Fig. 6.11).

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6 Introduction to Surakarta (Solo)

Table 6.3 Slum and squatter households in Solo 2006 (Astuti 2009; BPS and BAPPEDA Surakarta 2009) Sub-district

Total households Slum HH (HH)

Squatter HH

Marginal HH (%)

Laweyan

25,899

819

369

4.6

Serengan

14,033

530

271

5.7

Pasar Kliwon

22,035

2.115

1.363

Jebres

37,605

1.447

823

6.0

Banjarsari

45,965

1.701

1.696

7.4

145,537

6.612

4.522

7.7

Total

15.8

Note Marginal households are slum and squatter households combined

6.4.2

Pressing Issues and the Lack of Planning

Summarizing the latest housing developments and trends five aspects can be derived: 1. The housing shortage is increasing. 2. Most of the housing development is happening in the northern part of the city, where agricultural land is progressively transformed into residential areas. This area, however, will soon reach its capacity limit. 3. The city is expanding to the surrounding districts, especially to the districts Sukoharjo and Karanganyar. 4. The historical parts of the city are partly neglected and in deteriorated condition. 5. Marginal settlements are distributed all over the city and squatter settlements are located along the river, the drainage system and the railroad tracks. All these issues are recognized by the city authorities, but until now no sufficient planning system is in place to mitigate the problems. In Indonesia, housing issues are usually addressed by a comprehensive housing and development plan (RP4D). Until recently, however, such a plan did not exist, as already criticized by Astuti (2009). Furthermore, she points out, that the problem of housing and in particular the issue of informal settlements is not addressed in the medium development plan of Surakarta (RPJMD) as well as the general spatial plan (RTRW). The latter, for instance, was still in place during the field work phase for the time period 1993–2013 and did not contribute to the changed dynamics of the city and the surrounding regions (DPU Surakarta 2011: 26). Other constraints for a comprehensive housing policy are the lack of coordination between the numerous public and private stake‐ holders (e.g. DPU, BPN, DTRK, DPPKA, etc.) and the missing formulation of a concrete vision and mission for Solo’s housing policy (ibid. 23). To complicate the situation, in the presidential decree 34 of 2003 all authority over land management except the land owned by the city was given to BPN, the national land authority. Thus, all ordinary citizens must deal with BPN in tenure issues, and also most of the land currently occupied by squatter settlements is subject to BPN. Given these

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6.4 The Housing Situation

127

Fig. 6.11 Identified slum and squatter areas in Solo 2011 (Obermayr 2012d)

circumstances, it is difficult for Solo’s authorities to move for a more comprehensive housing policy.

6.4.3

An Accurate Slum Map?

All the presented findings portray the city in many different ways and valuable insights are provided about the administrative and social structure of the city. A more accurate map, however, illustrating the distribution of sub-standard housing areas, does not exist. The only reliable slum map was drawn by Astuti (2009), based on her own field research. During an interview she admitted, however, that her map is by far not complete. Therefore, I decided to start my own attempt to create such a map, combining observations, the findings of Mrs. Astuti and, most of all, quanti‐ tative data received from Solo Kota Kita (cf. Box 6.1). Box 6.1: Solo Kota Kita Solo Kota Kita is an initiative for collecting data about Solo’s neighbourhoods in order to develop tools for neighbourhood advocacy and city planning. The project is among other contributors funded by USAID and UN-Habitat and aims at the provision of easily accessible information about the city to

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6 Introduction to Surakarta (Solo)

strengthen the local participatory planning process, known as Musrenbang (cf. Chap. 7). Solo Kota Kita completed a survey in 2010 and data for all 2669 RTs are freely accessible (Solo Kota Kita 2010b). Approach: A quantitative approach was needed to solve two of the major ques‐ tions for the creation of a slum map: “which indicators should be used for generating the map?” and “what values should be used as thresholds for these indicators?” Inspired and based on the operational definition of slums developed by UN-Habitat, statistical and GIS software was used to find five indicators and their thresholds. The following steps were taken: 1. Generation of a sample layer of observed slums. 2. Statistical analysis. 3. Map generation and validation. 1. Generation of a sample layer of observed slums: In order to distinguish slum areas from other residential areas, it is first of all necessary to find common charac‐ teristics of Solo’s slums. To do this, a layer of those areas was generated, which were identified as slums by in situ observation and information gained through the inter‐ views. This mapping was done in ArcGis, using also Google Earth imagery for verification. Ten slum areas were mapped in this way. In a next step, 100 sample points were generated and distributed randomly within the boundaries of these areas. Next, all these points were assigned to the social and demographic values of the intersecting RT-units. The resulting 100 sample points, which indicate common characteristics of slum areas in Solo, were subsequently exported to SPSS, just the same as the raw data for the 2669 RTs, representing the characteristics of all areas in Solo. 2. Statistical analyses: A statistical analysis of both datasets is necessary to decide which of the provided social and demographic data could be used as indicators and at what value a threshold should be set. For this task, the characteristics of slums defined by UN-Habitat were considered (cf. Chap. 3 and Table 3.1): unsecure tenure, inadequate access to save water, inadequate access to sanitation, poor quality of housing structure and overcrowding. For each of these five characteristics, matching counterparts worth a closer analysis were identified (cf. Table 6.4) out of the data pool provided by Solo Kota Kita (2010b). Using both datasets (the 100 sample points and the 2669 RT-units) as input, frequencies for all eight indicators were generated and illustrated with histograms. Based on this statistical analysis, it could be decided, which of the indicators are more suitable and where the threshold should be set (cf. Appendix 1 for detailed explanations). Only for UN-Habitat’s indicator ‘poor quality of housing structure’ no matching counterpart was available. Instead, the degree of poverty was used, as this indicator incorporates among other dimensions of poverty also the housing standards. Finally, five indicators and their thresholds were chosen for the aspired slum map (cf. Table 6.5).

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6.4 The Housing Situation

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Table 6.4 Available indicators (Solo) and similar UN-Habitat indicators for creating a slum map (Solo Kota Kita 2010b; UN-Habitat 2003, 2008) Available indicators (Solo)

Similar UN-Habitat indicator

1. Households with public WC

Inadequate access to sanitation

2. Households with private WC 3. Households using public wells

Inadequate access to save water

4. Households using private wells 5. Households using pipe water 6. Households with land certificate

Unsecure tenure

7. Population density

Overcrowding

8. Degree of poverty

Poor quality of housing structure

3. Map generation and validation: Using the defined indicators and thresholds, every RT-unit of the city was given a value between 0 and 5. If a RT-unit matches one of the chosen indicators, it is assigned with the value 1; if it matches two indicators it is assigned the value 2, and so on. As a result, a map of the whole city can be drawn, showing the likelihood of slums (cf. Fig. 6.12). To validate the map, it was visualized in Google earth and subsequently checked. The results show a quite good correlation with the slum areas observed in situ and the findings of Astuti (2009). Limitations: The indicators and the chosen thresholds certainly have some limi‐ tations. The population density, for instance, can be above the threshold of 200 persons per hectare, simply due to a high apartment block in that area. Similar to this example, also the other indicators have individual limitations (cf. Annex 1 for details). To overcome these problems an appropriate classification was chosen: If an RT-unit matches only one or two indicators, the area cannot be considered as a slum, but if four or even five indicators are true for a RT-unit, the existence of slum settle‐ ments in this area can be considered as very likely. Interpretation: The generated map (cf. Fig. 6.12) verifies in general the findings of Astuti (2009) and broadens the understanding of slum settlements in Solo. Also the statements of some of the interview partners that slums in Solo are concentrated most of all along the river to the east and along the railway lines (Interviews 01 and Table 6.5 Defined indicators and thresholds for the creation of a slum map Selected indicator

Operationalization

Threshold (Value of the RT-unit)

(a) Households using public WC

Percentage of households using public toilets

>30%

(b) Households using public wells

Percentage of households using public wells

>6%

(c) Households with land certificate

Percentage of households with 200/ha

(e) Degree of poverty

Percentage of households considered as poor

>17%

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Fig. 6.12 Spatial location of probable slum areas in Solo 2010 (Obermayr 2012c)

130 6 Introduction to Surakarta (Solo)

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09) can be confirmed. Furthermore, the map often shows a higher slum probability along the many channels running through the city as well as in the oldest part of the town, near the Kraton (the area enclosed by the square of arterial roads). Most of the riverbanks as well as the land nearby the railroad tracks belong to the national government. As the government, most of all during the reform era, did not enforce their land titles effectively, it is not surprising that in these areas squatter and slum settlements could be established over the years. Some of the inhabitants managed to receive an official title, but others who did not, live under the constant threat of eviction.

6.5

Spatial and Functional Patterns

As a centre of textile production, Surakarta (Solo) represents the economic, political and cultural heart in the eastern part of Central Java Province. The city shows typical characteristics of a ‘palace city’, although the urban structure becomes increasingly influenced and reshaped by modernization processes. Solo’s historic settlement area is located in the southern part of the city, within and around the commercial and political centre. Besides the town hall also the Kraton, the palace of the sultan, is located in this area. With exception of some blocks reserved for offices and commer‐ cial use, the area is characterized by very high population densities and sufficient provision of public services. The highest densities in terms of population are recorded east of the centre where also the poorest quarters are situated. Most areas with low housing quality are present in this region, an area frequently threatened by riverine flood events. Small squatter settlements are distributed all over the city located on land next to the river channels and railway tracks. The other areas of the city, the northern, eastern and western parts are less dense populated and have different functions. To the west a mixed-up area is located, hosting some industrial estates. In the eastern part of the city the Surakarta’s main university complex is located (UNS—Universitas Sebelas Maret), its surrounding clearly shaped by the activities of 20,000 students (food stalls, dormitories, etc.). The northern area can be considered as the most dynamic area in terms of housing development. As this region is, compared to the rest of the city, only lightly popu‐ lated, new streets and residential areas are planned (e.g. a northern bypass) or currently constructed by the government or private developers. The commercial centre shows three development axes. First and most visible, it expands to the west along the road Jalan Slamet Riyadi, one of the arterial roads leading to the industrial areas and further to the other urban centres. Here, the inter‐ national commercial zone is located, characterized by modern shopping centres and international hotel chains (cf. Fig. 6.13). A second development axis aims north to the central train station and spills across the river into the northern development zone. This axis represents the main connection to the northern part of the city and thus attracts much commercial activity. The third axis aims northeast (cf. Fig. 6.14), connects the university district and runs further to east Java.

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Fig. 6.13 Shopping malls and hotels west of the centre. Photos Obermayr (2011)

Fig. 6.14 Commercial axis northeast of the centre. Photos Obermayr (2011)

The city’s annual population growth is not extreme, but still many migrants from surrounding areas are attracted, which leads to a steady growth. These new migrants tend to settle in the existing slum and squatter settlements, even though an actual growth of these areas cannot be claimed with certainty. The provided data are far too inhomogeneous and the distinct categorization of slums makes things not easier.

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However, national and global developments indicate a further increase in the urban population in general implying a rising housing shortage and a further proliferation of city’s slum and squatter settlements.

References Astuti W (2009) Slum and squatter settlements in Surakarta institutional constraints and potencies for self-help housing development. In: Santosa H, Astuti W, Astuti DW (eds) Sustainable slum upgrading in urban area. Universitas Sebelas Maret, Surakarta, pp 13–25 BPS and BAPPEDA Surakarta (2009) Surakarta dalam Angka 2009, Surakarta DPU Surakarta (2011) Executive summary: Penyusunan Data Dasar RP4D Kota Surakarta Firman T (2010) Multi local-government under Indonesia’s decentralization reform: the case of Kartamantul (The Greater Yogyakarta). Habitat Int 34(4):400–405. doi:10.1016/j.habitatint. 2009.11.005 Obermayr C (2012a) Solo 2010: distribution of poverty. https://christianobermayr.files.word press.com/2014/06/solo-2010-distribution-of-poverty1.png. Accessed 31 Aug 2016 Obermayr C (2012b) Solo 2010: population density. https://christianobermayr.files. wordpress.com/2014/06/solo-2010-population-density1.png. Accessed 31 Aug 2016 Obermayr C (2012c) Solo 2010: spatial location of probable slum areas. https:// christianobermayr.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/spatial-distribution-of-probable-slum-areasin-solo-20101.png. Accessed 31 Aug 2016 Obermayr C (2012d) Solo 2011: identified slum and squatter areas. https://christian obermayr.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/identified-slum-and-squatter-areas-in-solo-2011.png. Accessed 31 Aug 2016 Obermayr C (2012e) Sub-districts and selected quarters in Surakarta (Solo). https://christian obermayr.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/sub-districts-and-selected-quarters-in-solo1.png. Accessed 31 Aug 2016 Obermayr C, Astuti W (2016) Paradigm shifts in the international housing debate and its local implications for Surakarta’s approaches on housing the poor. In: Rachmawati R, Pomeroy G, Mookherjee D (eds) Rapid urbanization and sustainable development in Asia. The 13th international asian urbanization conference proceedings. Badan Penerbit Fakultas Geografi (BPFG) Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, pp 571–580 Pemerintah Kota Surakarta (2009) Rencana Pembangunan Jengka Menengah Daerah (RPJM Daerah): Kota Surakarta Tahun 2010–2015 Priebe J (2014) Official poverty measurement in Indonesia since 1984: a methodological review. Bull Indonesian Econ Stud 50(2):185–205. doi:10.1080/00074918.2014.938406 Solo Kota Kita (2010a) Introduction to Kota Solo and its urban systems. http:// solokotakita.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-SKK-City-Scale-Analysis-English.pdf. Accessed 02 Aug 2016 Solo Kota Kita (2010b) Solo GIS shape file 2010. http://solokotakita.org/gis/solocity_2010.zip. Accessed 02 Aug 2016 UN-Habitat (2003) The challenge of slums: global report on human settlements 2003. Earthscan, London UN-Habitat (2008) State of the world’s cities 2010/2011: bridging the urban divide. Earthscan, London Vorlaufer K (2009) Südostasien: Brunei, Indonesien, Kambodscha, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Osttimor, Philippinen, Singapur, Thailand, Vietnam. WBG (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft), Darmstadt

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Chapter 7

Urban Policies in Solo

Abstract This chapter looks the applied urban policies of Solo since the election of mayor Joko Widodo in 2005. The empirical results of this study are presented focusing on Solo’s approach on managing informal settlements. The chapter starts with the description of Solo’s participatory planning approach, draws on its origins and assesses challenges and difficulties. Second, the issue of managing the informal sector that brought international recognition is briefly addressed. After these remarks, the focus is set on the main topic of this study: the city’s housing policies. Deep insights on four governmental housing programmes (social housing, slumupgrading and resettlement measures), their structure, their procedures, involved actors and their outcomes are provided. In a final section the case of resettling 112 families within the city borders is addressed in detail. A critical evaluation reveals the general residents’ satisfaction and success of the participatory approach used, but mentions also remaining challenges and potentials for improvements. Keywords Solo · Surakarta · Urban policies · Participatory planning · Housing policies · Slum-upgrading · RTLH · Relocation In 2005 a new mayor was elected in Surakarta: Joko Widodo (commonly called ‘Jokowi’). Under his leadership comprehensive programmes and measures were initiated to improve the living conditions in the city for all—including also margi‐ nalized groups (Taylor 2015; Bunnell et al. 2013). To achieve his vision of “society welfare and the city advance based on the spirit Solo as a city of culture” [Vision and Mission of Mayor and Vice Mayor of Surakarta (2010–2015 periods)] a number of mission points (tasks) were formulated as guidelines for all initiated measures. Those important for the informal domain of the city are: • Mission point one, which includes support for small and medium enterprises, the revitalization and better management of traditional markets and the regulation of the street vendors (ibid.) • Mission point eight, which states “to improve the city infrastructure […], the refurbishment of all slum houses, the regulation of unlicensed residential areas, development of green space area and waste management (ibid.).” © Springer International Publishing AG 2017 C. Obermayr, Sustainable City Management, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49418-0_7

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While the task of relocating the street vendors was successfully carried out and brought international attention to the city, the task of a refurbishment of all slum areas in Solo has despite the glamorous slogan “city without Slums in the year 2010” not yet been achieved. However, in his period of office Jokowi introduced a new polit‐ ical culture, a new way of getting things done. On the one hand, this is evident in the attempt to improve the participation of society at all administrative levels and on the other hand in the way how new programmes are introduced and initiated in the city.

7.1

Participatory Planning: Musrenbang

Solo is regarded as one of the pioneers in participatory planning in Indonesia. In 2001, an initiative was started by a senior municipal official, who had gained expe‐ riences on decentralization and participatory governance on a study tour to the Phil‐ ippines (Phelps et al. 2014). When he returned to Solo, he founded IPGI Solo, a local NGO, and began to advice the mayor and other municipal workers about participa‐ tory practices. After broad discussions with the regional development agency, the university (UNS) and other NGOs, obstacles could be overcome and Solo introduced “(…) a mechanism known as participatory development planning - Perencanaan Pembangunan Partisipatif (PPP) (Widianingsih and Morrell 2007: 6–7).” This new mechanism was put into practice by the introduction of annual citizensmeetings at the Kelurahan level. In these forums the community gathers to discuss local development needs and to decide about development priorities for their community. This process is called Musrenbang and is carried out annually at all three official administrative levels: the quarters (Kelurahan), the subdistricts (Keca‐ matan) and the city level. During the forum in the distinct quarters representatives are elected who will attend the Musrenbang at the sub-district level in order to communicate the decisions made. This process is repeated at the sub-district Musrenbang and at the city-wide Musrenbang. Finally, the prioritized issues of the community are proposed to the regional development planning agency (BAPPEDA) and the municipal parliament. Subsequently, the priorities are translated into concrete action by allocating financial resources for each Kelurahan dependent on available funds and on actual needs (e.g. degree of poverty is used to determine the proportion of funds allocated for each Kelurahan) (Interview 07; USAID 2009). Difficulties and problems: initially the process of Musrenbang faced many problems. First of all, the Javanese hierarchical culture must be mentioned, which sharply contrasts with a participatory governance approach. Within this tradition and facilitated by the experience of a long lasting repressive rule during the Suharto era, patron-client systems and with them top-down approaches remained resistant to any changes. Government officials and even more the ordinary citizens were used to remain passive, unaware that they may have possibilities to influence actual policies (Widianingsih and Morrell 2007: 8). Furthermore, it was not clear what could be understood under participatory plan‐ ning and capacities to provide information about this issue were often non-existent.

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Thus, in many cases the process was not performed in a proper way and the proposals about development priorities were submitted without knowing the actual needs and wishes of the community. Even when the demands of the citizens were captured accurately, they did not reflect the actual needs of a neighbourhood. ‘Wish lists’, often containing individual needs, were generated and as these proposals were rejected by the city authorities, people and municipal workers got increasingly frus‐ trated about the whole process. Thus, it was called upon NGOs and university staff to get further involved in order to provide adequate trainings, more information for stakeholders and to facilitate the process (Interviews 01 & 07). Over the years it became clear, that the quality of participation is still not suffi‐ cient. It appeared that the people attending the annual meetings are the same every year: the RTs, RWs and members of the local council (LPMK; see Box 7.1). An adequate representation of women, the youth or informal groups has not been achieved yet. In reality, the proposals are chosen not by consensus but under the influence of powerful groups, people with good networks or those which are close to the government (Interviews 01 & 08).

Box 7.1: Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kelurahan (LPMK) The LPMK is a council at Kelurahan level which undertakes tasks of the administration in close cooperation with the Lurah, the head of each Kelurahan. As the members of this council are not paid by the government, the council is relatively independent. Its members are selected from the RWs and each RW is eligible to send two representatives. Beside some administra‐ tive work, the council is involved in most decisions concerning the Kelurahan (Interview 13).

Success of Musrenbang: today, Musrenbang is adopted in many Indonesian cities and districts and is regarded as an effective way to increase the awareness of problems in the neighbourhood, create a sense of ownership for introduced measures, reduce conflicts and promote democracy. Even if this process still has to face many chal‐ lenges, for the first time in Indonesian history the citizens have the possibility to articulate their problems and to influence decision-making about the developments in their neighbourhoods. While the old planning habit involved only the head of a quarter (Lurah), the LPMK and other governmental staff, now a wider variety of stakeholders is involved—NGOs, CBOs, university staff, municipal workers and even representatives of the informal sector. What began as a strange idea of a single NGO, has led to a partnership between community, NGOs and local leaders, bridging the gap between society and govern‐ ment. The establishment of such a participatory planning environment had preceded Jokowi’s election, but by his support for this approach, he laid the first piece of the fundament for a new political style.

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7.2

7

Urban Policies in Solo

Informal Sector Management

The impact of mayor Jokowi’s new political style was recognized for the first time when he regulated successfully Solo’s informal sector (UN-Habitat 2008). Since the economic crisis in 1998 the number of street vendors in Solo had steadily increased. During the economic downturn, formal job opportunities had diminished, and the informal sector became the only option. In 2001 there were 1115 street vendors in the city and their number rose to over 5800 in 2006 (Sudarmo 2010: 51). Most of them originated from one of the poorer districts surrounding Surakarta. The vendors could be found on side-walks, in parks and other public spaces, where they tempo‐ rarily or permanently installed their shops. Most of Solo’s residents benefited from this development, as the vendors provided cheap goods and most of all cheap meals. Nevertheless, they were also seen as a problem. Sometimes only perceived as disfig‐ uring the city landscape, more often serious problems were attributed to the street vendors, as for instance traffic disruptions or the increasing amount of waste around the locations of their shops (Gervasi 2010: 2). Past reactions of the city government had always resulted in conflicts. Thus, Mayor Jokowi favoured a different and more inclusive strategy. He tried to involve the street vendors personally in the process of finding a solution. As a pilot project for a city-wide regulation, the area around the revolution monument on Banjarsari square was chosen. The place was occupied by nearly 1000 street vendors. In over 50 meetings with their leaders and facilitated by a NGO, he managed to convince them to leave their current locations and move to the Notoharjo market in Kelurahan Semanggi. In turn for their agreement the city promised free use of the kiosks in the newly constructed market house, legal status of the traders’ business, tax exemptions, advertising of the new market and free training. This successful relocation event took place in 2006 and was followed by other measures, partly similar relocations and partly other actions, such as provision of new market tents, temporary sale slots, new carts, etc. (Gervasi 2010: 4). A success story? The project of relocating the street vendors to new market places (cf. Fig. 7.1) is described as very successful by different scholars (Gervasi 2010; Delgosea 2011) and acknowledged as best practice by UN-Habitat (2008). All stake‐ holders (city government, citizens and affected traders) are presented as winners of the new situation. The citizens because of a more liveable city, the government because of increased tax revenues received from the now formalized traders and the street vendors themselves, as they have profited from new equipment or have even received a small slot in a market. It is reported that the traders relocated to Notoharjo were able to increase their revenue by 200–400% (UN-Habitat 2008). When talking to some of the traders at the Notoharjo market this statement could not be fully confirmed. They reported that the first six months after the relocation had been very difficult for them due to the absence of customers, but thanks to the promotion and support of the government business was now running well. In another market—Pasar Panggungrejo—a market where 200 street vendors had been

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Fig. 7.1 One of the newly constructed markets (left) and kiosks in such a market (right) (Photos Obermayr 2011)

relocated, a contrasting picture could be observed. Due to the relocation the venders in this market commonly have lost their customer base (Nugroho 2010: 128–130). Doubts about the success of the street vendor management were also articulated by one of the interviewees (Interview 08), who stated that the relocation was a success looking at the outcomes, but not a success when looking at the process of implementation. The city government has treated the street vendors inconsistently, based on … whether the type of market activity looks clean or dirty, whether individuals have power or links with the officials in authority, whether they come from outside or not, whether they have links with local residents or not, their ability to lobby the power holders, and the selfinterests of the power holders, but are not based consistently on the existing local law (Sudarmo 2010: 98).

While the whole group of street vendors from the monument side was moved to a newly constructed market and provided with free slots for selling their goods (kiosks), others did not get these amenities. It can be further assumed that some groups of street vendors, who initially rejected the relocation, must have experienced pressure or other kind of persuasion, as they suddenly and without apparent reason changed their mind and agreed to the government’s proposal (Interview 08). Another interview partner, a representative of a local NGO (Interview 07), also expressed doubts about the success of the programme. He pointed out that in the case of the Notoharjo relocation many of the kiosks had been closed due to the lack of customers or had been sold or rented, despite the ban to do so. To search better business loca‐ tions, many of the street vendors have gone back to the streets, only in different locations.

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Considering the characteristics of good governance, such as equity and transpar‐ ency, it must be questioned whether the process can be assigned the attribute of good governance. However, the news of the successful and peaceful street vendor manage‐ ment in Solo has been disseminated and many government officials of other cities travelled to Solo to learn from the experiences made in dealing with the informal sector (Interview 07).

7.3

Housing Policies

Housing the poor, coping with increasing migration and improving the living condi‐ tions of the many slum dwellers are major problems to be addressed by the city government in Solo. A number of measures and programmes are carried out by the municipality of which the following are analyzed in more detail: a social housing programme, a slum-upgrading programme (RTLH), a variation of this RTLH programme including international actors (UN-Habitat) and a programme to resettle the residents living on the river bank of Bengawan Solo River.

7.3.1

Social Housing

In Solo the office of public works (DPU) is responsible for the realization of the national social housing programme. The programme aims at the provision of lowcost housing units in high-rise apartment blocks. Every Indonesian city is eligible to apply for national funding for this programme; the only condition is to provide the necessary construction sides. Although most of these new ‘towers’ were built in Jakarta, also in Solo five of these buildings were realized and two more were under construction in 2011. In Solo, each of these apartment blocks has a height of maximal four floors consisting of maximal 98 units of 20–30 m2. One room is designed for a family of four persons and a monthly rent of 70,000–100,000 IDR (depending on the floor) is collected by DPU (2011). Expenses for water and electricity, however, must be added to the monthly rent to calculate the real costs of one unit. Altogether the seven buildings in Solo (will) consist of 658 units, possibly accommodating 2632 residents, when occupied with four persons each (Interview 09). Every citizen of Solo with a regular income between 750 thousand and 2.8 million IDR per month (2011) can apply for such a room at the office of DPU. As mentioned by an official of DPU (Interview 09), the number of families applying is three-times higher than the available housing units, which reflects the acute housing shortage in Solo. Furthermore, he stated that it is forbidden to sublet the flat to a third party, which is strictly controlled by officials of DPU. Although the programme is designed to ease the tension on the Indonesian housing market and to provide cheap housing possibilities—slum dwellers are explicitly mentioned—the programme misses the point completely. Slum

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dwellers do not even fulfil the condition to apply for such a subsidized flat, as their income is mostly irregular. Even if they obtain a regular income, it is often lower than the limit of 750,000 IDR. Thus, the programme appears to be of greater benefit for the lower middle class.

7.3.2

Slum-Upgrading I: ‘Program RTLH’

The main instrument to implement the formulated mission point eight, “(…) the refurbishment of all slum houses”, is a slum-upgrading programme known as the “Program Pemberian Bantuan Pembangunan/Perbaikan Rumah tidak Layak huni” or in short, ‘Program RTLH1’. The programme was initiated in 2007 and is based on a regulation of the mayor (Perwali No. 13/2007). The objectives of this ongoing project are to improve those houses in the city which are considered inhabitable by the authorities. For this task, a two million IDR grant is provided for each eligible household. The programme consists of the following steps: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Socialization and public consultation Establishment of a committee Data collection of all slum households (RTLH) Submission of proposals Establishment of working groups (Pokja) Collaborative community action for improvements Reporting.

To initiate the programme (cf. Fig. 7.2), it was necessary (1) to disseminate information about the plan to all Kelurahan offices and further to the people in need of assistance (Socialization). In order to achieve a broad resonance, several meetings were held in each quarter, with attendance of the Lurah, informal community leaders as well as the RTs and RWs (public consultation). (2) In these meetings the project was explained and a committee was formed to carry out an initial survey on slum houses. This committee usually consisted of five persons: two Kelurahan officials, one member of the community council (LPMK), and two respected persons of the community. (3) Their first task was to collect data about all sub-standard households in their Kelurahan which they did in close cooperation with the RTs and RWs (Kristianto 2010: 110–111). For the purpose of data collection, a catalog of characteristics for slum houses had been defined previously, outlined in the mayor’s regulation (Perwali 13/2007 art. 5 & 6). If at least three of these specific conditions (cf. Table 7.1) apply to a house, the family will be classified as a household eligible to benefit from the programme. In addition, only citizens of Solo with legal tenure status are able to

1Sub-standard

houses are called Rumah tidak layak huni (RTLH). The classification is based on several indicators developed by the local authorities (Perwali 13/2007).

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City level BAPERMAS

Committee

í introduces the program í reviews the proposed list of candidates í issues a decree for the beneficiaries

consult

í reviews the proposed list of candidates í coordinates the whole program

Kelurahan level advise

Lurah (head of Kelurahan) í explains the program at the community meetings í proposes the candidates to BAPERMAS í supervises the POKJA

attend

Community meetings í the program is explained í a committee is established

attend

POKJA

Committee

í manages the funds í organizes the upgrading process í encourages people to work together í finds skilled workers í reports expenditures to the Lurah

í performs the survey í reports findings to the Lurah

attend

Informal leaders

RTs and RWs

Housing and neighbourhood improvements

í help with the survey í disseminate information about the program

= members of government and community

= community members

= government body

Fig. 7.2 The structure of the slum-upgrading programme—program RTLH (by author)

Table 7.1 Official criteria for slum houses (RTLH) in Solo (Perwali 13/2007 art. 5 & 6) House conditions

Environmental conditions 2

• Living space of less than 4 m per resident • No adequate access to clean water • No access to adequate sanitation • Non-permanent building material • Not enough sunlight and air ventilation • No room division (no separate room) • Wet or musty floor • Overall deteriorated condition

• Dirty and muddy surrounding area • No adequate drainage system • No proper path to the house • Location of the houses is irregular and close to each other

participate. Thus, citizens must provide their identity card2 and prove the legal ownership of their land, or show a permission of their landlord (Interview 05). After the committees completed their survey in every quarter, the findings were reported to the Lurahs, who in turn (4) proposed the families eligible for the grant to the city government (to Bapermas). At the city level also a committee consisting of government officials is formed with the task to check the proposed name-lists. When this committee and the responsible

2An identity card (KTP—Kartu Tanda Penduduk) can be obtained after three years of residence in

the city and an official confirmation letter of the Kelurahan office.

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lead-agency (Bapermas) approve the lists, a decree is issued and handed back to each Lurah. Now, (5) community-based working groups—Klempok Kerja (Pokja)—can be formed in each Kelurahan to steer the upgrading and construction process. These Pokjas, which are similar in size and members to the Kelurahan committees, are the interface between community and government with the task to mediate between them. The granted money is not handed over directly to the people, but given to these Pokjas, which have the full responsibility to carry out the project in their area (Interview 11). The funds are mostly used to buy building materials. Other tasks of the Pokja are to find suitable workers, encourage the people to spend additional resources for the project, organize the actual improvements and to report the expenditures back to the governmental institutions (Interview 06). Managed by the Pokjas and under supervision of Kelurahan officials, (6) concrete upgrading measures are subsequently done by the people themselves. Since the funding is limited, the members of the working groups try to encourage the residents to spend additional resources. These can be building materials, donations or also simply time and manpower. Even though the funds are granted under the condition to be used for housing improvements only, the neighbourhood has, in close cooper‐ ation with the Pokja, the choice how and for what purpose the funds are used. It was mentioned during the interviews (Interview 05 & 12) that two million rupiahs are by far not enough to improve a house substantially. Therefore, the granted money is often used jointly to realize larger projects. This can be the substantial improvement of some selected houses in worst condition, but also infrastructure improvements for the whole neighbourhood (e.g. proper path or proper access to clean water). Status of the programme 2010: the survey conducted by the responsible agency of the city government (Bapermas) in 2006 found 6612 sub-standard houses (RTLH) within the city borders. Until 2010, a number of 4336 grants of two million IDR each were awarded to a corresponding number of households. RTLH-houses are distrib‐ uted over the five subdistricts of the city and until 2010 approx. two-thirds of the eligible households participated in the upgrading programme (cf. Fig. 7.3). Only in the sub-district Serengan the proportion of assisted households is still hardly above 50%. Data inconsistencies and the actual number of slum households in Solo: The data received from Bapermas show some inconsistencies. In the quarter Ketelan (sub-district Banjarsari), for instance, a number of 47 slum houses was recognized in 2006, but 117 households received the grant until the year 2010. When addressing this issue in an interview with a Bapermas official, it was explained that there were difficulties in differentiating between households and houses due to the fact that houses are often subdivided and more than one family is living in them (Interview 05). Thus, in some quarters the number of families in need of assistance is underes‐ timated in the survey 2006. In other quarters, such as Kelurahan Joyotakan (sub-district Serengan), 100 houses were considered as sub-standard in 2006, but only 13 households received the promised grant until 2010. This could mean either that the families did simply not yet receive the grant or that slum houses were overestimated. In this respect the response of another interview partner seems reasonable (Interview 01), who pointed

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Fig. 7.3 Inadequate houses in Solo 2006 (RTLH) and upgraded houses until 2010 (by author)

out that when it becomes known that there will be financial assistance, local leaders tend to qualify more houses as sub-standard than existing in reality. Other inter‐ viewees confirmed this view, when they explained that there always will be people trying to profit from government programmes distributing money, regardless if eligible or not (Interview 06 & 07). Most of these inconsistencies must be contributed to the nature of the indicators used to classify a slum houses. As Astuti (2009) points out, the characteristics of slums and the derived categorization gives space for interpretation and is subject to subjective perception. Furthermore, in the case of the survey of 2006 only physical aspects are used as characteristics, social and juridical aspects, such as poverty, income or security of tenure, are excluded. Thus, it can be concluded that the number of slum households in Solo found in the survey of 2006 is just a rough estimation. It is difficult to assess if the numbers might be lower or higher, but considering that Solo’s residents without citizenship (without identity card) are not counted, the actual number of slum dwellers is probably much higher. Assessment: Solo’s slum-upgrading programme illustrates clearly that there is political will to address the challenge of slums. Looking at the results, the programme can be considered as successful. It must be mentioned, however, that it excludes all ‘illegal’ settlements and is only designed for Solo’s citizens. Furthermore, the programme cannot be claimed to be very inclusive and participative. The process of initiation and introduction of the programme is top-down, with the initiative starting

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from the city authorities and the Pokjas at Kelurahan level carrying out most of the work. Although affected people get involved at later stages, they are less involved in the decision-making process, but more needed for the collaborative construction work. This issue and particularly the subject how decisions are made within the working groups (Pokjas) and how power relations between local leaders and representatives influence these decisions would be an interesting subject for further studies.

7.3.3

Slum-Upgrading II: ‘Program RTLH Cluster’

One aspect of the RTLH programme is the involvement of international donors. In 2009 Solo’s city government asked the national ministry of Housing and UN-Habitat to join the slum-upgrading programme. The attention of UN-Habitat had already been drawn on Solo’s urban policy, thanks to the successful management of the informal sector in previous years. Therefore, it was decided to support Solo’s upgrading programmes with several pilot projects supervised by UN-Habitat’s slum-upgrading facility (SUF, cf. Box 7.2). As these projects involve not a city-wide funding mecha‐ nism, but are focused on some very small spots in the city where the whole neighbour‐ hood is subject to renovation, it will here be referred to as ‘RTLH-cluster’. Box 7.2: UN-Habitat’s Slum-Upgrading Facility (SUF) In 2004 UN-Habitat founded SUF as a strategic element to facilitate the process to reach target 11 of the MDGs—to improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers. As a pilot programme the agency has established tech‐ nical advisory facilities in four countries (Ghana, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Tanzania) and aims to facilitate local housing projects by the mobilization of domestic capital (UN-Habitat 2006: 2). In accordance to the global trend to financial liberalization and following neoliberal principles (Jones 2012), SUF tries to find alternative ways for funding local housing projects (CSR, micro-finance, new financial products, etc.). One of these means is the enablement of slum dwellers to obtain loans from local financial institutions. In order to overcome the perception of these institutions that individuals and groups without regular income or land title are not bankable, the established local financial facilities guarantee the repayment of obtained loans. These facilities develop individual concepts of repayment for each borrower and offer technical assistance in the design and implemen‐ tation of the upgrading activities (SUF 2006; UN-Habitat 2011). In Indonesia, this approach was agreed on in 2005 and local financial facili‐ ties were established in Yogyakarta and Solo. They are highlighted as inno‐ vative and effective although the impact on the urban poor remained low—in all four countries 1600 persons benefited until 2011. It is recommended to scale up the concept (UN-Habitat 2011).

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When the decision was made that UN-Habitat will support the RTLH programme, a local financial facility supported by SUF was installed, initially as a unit of Bapermas. To enhance the collaboration with other institutions, improve the profile of this unit outward and to escape the close guidelines of the RTLH programme (Interview 06), it was soon decided to transform this unit into an independent agency, concerned explicitly with slum-upgrading: Badan Layanan Umum Daerah Griya Layak Huni (known as ‘BLUD—GLH’ or simply ‘BLUD’) was founded. Based on a mayor regulation (Perwali 04/2009), this new agency was established outside the conventional government, financed by UN-Habitat and directly subor‐ dinated to the mayor. As the staff of this agency consists of both, independent community members and former Bapermas officials, a close cooperation and impor‐ tant links to the municipal authorities are guaranteed. The mission of BLUD is to facilitate and develop a comprehensive programme to increase the habitability of slum houses and also the environmental conditions in slum areas. To do this, the main task is to make loans available for slum dwellers. The steps of such an upgrading process are the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Selection of participants Creation of a business plan (calculation of costs, credit-repayment and risks) Connecting the applicants with a bank Technical assistance Construction activity.

The initiation of the programme was disseminated through a council meeting with all Lurahs encouraging them to name areas for pilot projects. However, as explained by interviewed experts (Interview 04), also private persons or whole communities can participate of their own accord under the condition that candidates must possess a Solo-ID card. When applicants want to join the project, they must visit the office of BLUD, fill in a form and get directly help and advice how to carry out their planned activities of improvements in their neighbourhood or for their own house. Costs and risks of the desired projects are discussed as well as technical and legal issues. The applicants also get information about possible grants by participating in government programmes—such as the RTLH programme—and are encouraged to apply for an additional loan from a local bank. The banks in turn must be persuaded to provide this loan, which is done by negotiations and the provision of a guarantee by BLUD which includes a full cost recovery in the case that applicants are unable to repay the loan. As the BLUD officials pointed out, sometimes a motor bike or even a driving license is enough as a security for obtaining a loan (Interview 04). In addition to this help, BLUD also provides technical assistance in the form of discussions about the planned renovation including the consultation of an architect. Furthermore, BLUD tries to promote the cooperation with other stakeholders— municipal units and private actors—and to create a connection to other pro-poor programmes and measures in order to bundle all available resources aiming at the best possible results for all applicants.

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The performance of BLUD is continually evaluated by a team of government officials out of the different municipal institutions and the mayor himself. A perform‐ ance agreement exists, which states that at least six projects must be done per year (Interview 04). Activities: the ‘Program RTLH Cluster’ has been performed and tested in three pilot areas: Ketelan, Setabelan and Kratonan. In all three areas the households received a grant of two million IDR within the RTLH programme and an additional loan of ten million IDR per household could be negotiated on favourable conditions with a bank. Similar to the RTLH programme the established Pokjas managed the money and carried out the upgrading activities in full responsibility (Interview 02). Additionally, CSR activities could be mobilized, as for instance in Ketelan, where the Bank of Indonesia could be won to sponsor the renovation of the public toilet facility in that area (SUF 2008a). Also other municipal or national authorities, such as DPU, BPN etc. are involved in this comprehensive upgrading scheme. In Ketelan, for instance, the residents asking for assistance did possess a Solo-ID card but not a legal title for their land. Through mediation of BLUD and in cooperation with the neighbourhood private land as well as land owned by the municipality nearby could be given to them and a legal status was quickly provided by the national land authority BPN. With security of tenure the resident’s motivation to improve their houses rose significantly (Inter‐ view 04). Although the projects are very small in their scale (e.g. Ketelan 44 households, Kratonan 55 households), the results are impressive. The houses are not only repaired, but substantially renovated or rebuilt. Furthermore, also the surrounding infrastructure, such as roads, sanitation and water supply was improved. In 2011 eleven projects were managed by BLUD in Solo, but sometimes they are not larger than one household (Interview 04). Problems: the persuasion of financial institutions to lend money to people or even whole communities without regular income or without land titles remains difficult. The banks have no experiences with this issue which is why they remain reluctant to do so. Furthermore, banks in Indonesia have to report any credit default to the authorities. Therefore, it happens that they are more afraid about their reputation than about the probability of a financial loss (SUF 2008b). BLUD tries to answer these concerns not only by guaranteeing the loan, but also by supervising the whole projects and the provision of technical assistance. Nevertheless, initially most of the banks refused to take part in the projects (Inter‐ view 04). Although the programme is open for people living in squatter settlements, it is very difficult for them to participate. As they have no legal tenure status, banks only rarely agree into the provision of a loan. Initially, BLUD had put forward plans to improve squatter settlements, but because of incalculable consequences and obstacles within the government the plan was dismissed. The BLUD officials see it as very difficult for private persons without a certificate to apply for a loan. They mentioned, that maybe a small loan could be arranged, depending on the individual status of the applicant (Interview 04).

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As the service of BLUD seems to be open for everyone, also low-paid municipal workers who do not have a house yet, are eligible to apply for BLUD’s service. The institution is than trying to connect them with a bank to obtain a loan using also the mechanism of giving a guarantee (Interview 04). It is questionable, however, if this procedure is compatible with the institutional goal of improving slum settlements. Assessment: Looking at the scale of the performed projects and the number of applicants, it seemed that information about BLUD and the possibilities to receive a loan is not disseminated far in the city and between the slum dwellers. For a city like Solo, one could expect much more applicants. It must be recognized, however, that the process of obtaining a loan from a regular financial institution is also new to the poor. Never before they had the possibility to lend money from regular insti‐ tutions, thus they may be afraid to do so. Another interview partner mentioned concerns about the risks for poor people to accumulate such an amount of debts (Interview 07). Residents with irregular income may be put further into misery if they cannot fulfil the repayment plan. The initiative for the connection of BLUD with other housing programmes can be contributed to the mayor of Surakarta and to a local NGO who see the provision of loans as an additional incentive for slum dwellers to upgrade their homes in selfhelp (Interview 12). Together with the grant of the RTLH programme, these addi‐ tional funding opportunities have shown their effectiveness in the three pilot areas. Furthermore, it can be recognized that such collaborative action by municipal government, NGOs, a known international organization and relying on self-help of the community does promote the whole programme in such a way that it draws attention from other actors who can eventually be persuaded to join the projects with additional funding (CSR, development aid, etc.). Other Indonesian regions have begun to show interest in Solo’s slum-upgrading measures. To share experiences municipal officers from Padang, Banda Aceh, Blitar and Klaten and also officials from the national land authority have visited Surakarta (SUF 2008a).

7.3.4

Programme Relocation

Caused by heavy rainfall in 2007 with an accumulated amount of over 600 mm for the month December,3 Bengawan Solo River, which limits the city to the east, bursts its banks and caused the most severe flooding since the flood disaster in 1966 (Zein 2010: 12–13). Although people in Solo’s south-eastern quarters are used to annual flood events during the rainy season, this event was outstanding. Large parts of the city were flooded up to four meters high (cf. Fig. 7.4) and several thousand houses were damaged or completely destroyed (Interview 02). A dam that had been established in 1982 to protect the city could not withhold the water. This dam runs along the river, in a distance of roughly 50–100 m from its 3This precipitation

amount was measured in Solo.

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Fig. 7.4 Areas flooded during the 2007 flood event (Obermayr 2012a)

western bank. In recent decades, the space in between had been used by many migrants as a place to construct their homes on this mostly government owned land. Of course, these squatter settlements were most affected by the flood. After the disaster, a survey among the flood victims found 6368 families affected, 3761 most severe (Interview 02). For the latter, a substantial renovation of their houses or even reconstruction had to be done. When the national government agreed to provide assistance for each of these 3761 families by the provision of an 8.5 million IDR grant, the city government put forward an additional plan to relocate 1571 of these families living closest to the river (Interview 15). In this way the municipality hoped to take advantage of the moment in order to transform the riverbank occupied by slum and squatter settle‐ ments into a green recreational area for the citizens. The method of resettlement4: it was decided to raise 13.75 million IDR for each of the 1571 families in addition to the national funds in order to resettle them. An amount of 12 million was budgeted for the purchase of new land and 1.75 million for the construction of infrastructure in the new locations (Interview 15). As conditions being eligible, families must be declared victims of the flood event and must possess a Solo-ID card. Nevertheless, also families without citizenship were able to apply for the programme, when the respective Lurah confirmed that the family had already lived in the neighbourhood for many years (Interview 05). 4The

terms ‘relocation’ and ‘resettlement’ are used interchangeably.

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City level

Urban Policies in Solo

Evaluation í team

Mayor í issues regulation

Municipal departments

BAPERMAS DTRK

DPPKA

BPN

DPU

- checks the proposed location - creates the site plan

- oversees the financial resources

- provides the land certificate

constructs - sanitation - electricity - roads

í leading agency í controls all steakholders

Lurah attend

í controls the POKJA

attend selects the members

POKJA Relocation í collects all data, reports to BAPERMAS í manages the funds í validates the proposed land and proposes it to BAPERMAS í organizes and monitores the relocation process í controls the SUBPOKJAs

Community meetings - Explanation of the program - Establishment of POKJA und SUBPOKJAs

attend

Affected people

SUBPOKJAs discuss

í look for available land í organize the relocation

Construction of the new houses

Kelurahan level = community members

= members of government and community

= government body

Fig. 7.5 The structure of Solo’s relocation programme (by author)

Experiences from the measures carried out previously by the municipality—i.e. the relocation of the street vendors and the RTLH programme—were used to design the relocation programme in a similar way (Interview 06). Based on a mayor’s regulation the following steps of the programme were initiated (for an overview cf. Fig. 7.5): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Socialization and public consultation Establishment of Pokjas and Subpokjas Search of land Creation of a site-plan Construction Resettlement.

Similar to the other programmes of the municipality, the first step of the relocation programme is public consultation and socialization. For this purpose, a number of community meetings were held with all victims of the flood event in order to inform them about the project. Under attendance of the mayor, officials of Bapermas and the Lurah, the reason for the relocation as well as the intended process was explained to the people in detail. During such meetings, the families were also asked if they agree

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to the measure. Since the offer of a newly constructed house including a legal land certificate was very tempting—in particular, for those possessing no legal status— almost all of the residents gave their consent. Only those already holding a legal land title refused. The visit of the mayor, a very respected and high ranked person, may have influenced the decision in favour of the programme. After the community meetings a working group (Pokja relocation) was estab‐ lished in each of the affected quarters (Kelurahans). The Pokja represents the focal point of the whole programme and its members were chosen by the Lurah, who selected them in most cases from the local council, the LPMK (Interview 20). The tasks of the Pokja were to collect all data and to carry out the whole relocation process in full responsibility (Obermayr and Astuti 2016). Furthermore, all families eligible for the government grant gave up their claim to receive the money in favour for the Pokja. Thus, this temporary institution5 managed also the whole financial resources of the process, which were provided by the city’s financial office (Interview 20). As the five or six members of the Pokja, which are volunteering for this job, would have been overstrained by their tasks, so-called Subpokjas were established. These working groups differed in their size and also in the numbers of families they were responsible for. Their members were chosen by the affected people. Frequently, respected persons of the community, such as the local RTs or RWs, were asked to take on the job. Now these Subpokjas and also the residents themselves started to look for adequate land, where the whole community (all residents managed by one Subpokja), could be relocated (Interview 17). It was one condition of the programme that the citizens should not look individ‐ ually for land, but as a whole community. If a good spot was found, it was the Supokjas’ task to propose the area to the Pokja. Subsequently, the members of the Pokja validated the area, talked to the actual owner and proposed it in turn to Bapermas and DTRK, the department of spatial planning. DTRK checked the proposed location again in terms of environmental conditions, planning issues and the possibility to connect the area to the city infrastructure. If the location satisfied all requirements, DTRK informed Bapermas and created a side plan for the new village. After this site-plan was signed by DTRK, the Lurah, the Pokja, the Subpokjas and Bapermas, the actual purchasing of the land could be carried out by the Pokja. Once the process of land certification had been initiated by BPN6 the actual construction process could begin (Interview 17). Here the Pokja and the responsible Subpokja(s) decided together with the affected people if they want to construct the houses themselves or assign this job to a private contractor. In both cases, the infrastructure, such as electricity, water and sanitation was constructed by DPU, using the assigned money. When the new village was finished, it was decided by the Pokja which family will be assigned to which house in the new village. According to the head of Bapermas

5The working

groups are dissolved when the programme is finished.

6This was done free of charge for the families, otherwise the costs of approx. 1.5 million IDR per title

would have been out of reach for the participating households.

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(Interview 02) the common practice was to draw lots about this issue. For the new house owners, it is not allowed to sell their property within five years after construc‐ tion. The whole relocation programme is supervised by an evaluation team, which jointly controls the process and the financial flows within the project (Interview 10; cf. Fig. 7.5). Status of the programme: Each family declared as seriously affected by the flood event in 2007 was eligible to receive the national grant for renovating or restoring the house. In Solo, 3761 families were counted as victims, 1571 of them living on the river bank. While nearly all of the families living elsewhere received the grant and subse‐ quently renovated their homes in situ, one-third of the people designated for resettle‐ ment (1571 people) had not yet received any help of the government until 2010 (cf. Table 7.2). As a Bapermas official in charge of the relocation programme pointed out (Interview 05), this issue can be contributed to the rejection of the relocation by several families. Residents on the river bank with legal land tenure did not agree to the reloca‐ tion, as they perceived the offer of the municipality as insufficient, demanding higher compensation payments. However, 993 of the 1571 families living on the river bank were successfully relocated between 2008 and 2010 (cf. Table 7.2). Challenges: during the implementation of the relocation programme a number of problems were encountered. One of these problems is related to land rights. Of the 1571 families living on the riverbank, only 993 did not have legal land tenure (Taylor 2015: 628). The others refused to take part in the relocation programme, as they have a legal claim on their land. They demand higher compensations, oriented at land values behind the dam, in order to give their consent to be relocated. The city authorities, on the other hand, argue that the land in question is nearly worthless, as it is prohibited to build any structures on it. This argumentation is backed by the Table 7.2 Flood event 2007 in Solo: victims and received government aid (2008–2010) per quarter (data received from Bapermas Surakarta 2011)

Kelurahan

Victims (households)

Aid received (households)

Riverbank

Riverbank

Other areas

Other areas

Pucang Sawit

300

282

268

282

Sewu

363

101

230

100

Sangkrah

294

114

107

113

Semanggi

339

93

170

91

Joyosuran

57

406

47

386

218

118

171

63

Gendekan

0

10

0

10

Jagalan

0

464

0

463

Sudiroprajan

0

35

0

35

Pasar Kliwon

0

0

0

0

Kedung Lumbu

0

62

0

62

Joyotakan

0

505

0

504

1571

2190

993

2109

Jebres

Total

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tense budgetary situation of the city which simply cannot afford to pay higher compensations (Interview 11). To find a solution for this issue, the city government has established a team consisting of government officials and community represen‐ tatives. During the field work period in 2011, the discussion was still ongoing and a solution was not yet in sight (Interview 10, 13). Another problem occurred in the initial phase of the programme. Encouraged by the authorities to look for a location for the new settlement, many of the residents did this not as a group, but individually. In most cases the proposed land had than to be rejected by the authorities, as the promised supply of infrastructure for individual houses distributed across the city went beyond the scope of the programme’s finan‐ cial capacities (Interview 05, 10). Therefore, frustration about the whole process had spread among the affected families. In some cases, also the slow progress of the programme led to frustration. Often, the residents already moved to the new area when the houses were finished, even though the access to public services was not yet installed. Following this, it took the city authorities, at least in the eyes of the residents, sometimes too long to establish the infrastructure. Communication with the responsible authorities was, in some cases, reported as difficult and a NGO was needed to advocate for the residents. The people were not only complaining about the missing infrastructure and public serv‐ ices, but also about the inadequate transport system or missing possibilities for their children to go to school (Interview 07). A system inherent problem must be mentioned for this programme: suspected fraud cases. As the Pokja is the focal point of all operations including the awarding of contracts to private companies, collusion and nepotism might emerge easily. The work of these community-based working groups is voluntary and authorities’ control remains incomplete. In general, the work of the Pokjas was reported as sincere and accountable, but considering the circumstances the emergence of contrasting reports of disappearing money and corruption is not surprising (Interview 06). Assessment: the grant of the national government was successfully disseminated among the victims of the flood event. Due to the additional efforts of the city govern‐ ment also many of the squatter areas on the riverbank could be resolved by the means of resettlement. The experiences previously gained during the implementation of other programmes, e.g. the RTLH programme, were essential for a swift implemen‐ tation of the relocation programme. Incorporating a similar mechanism of programme implementation into the applied relocation policy proved to be a very effective way to carry out the programme. In these respects, the relocation can be assessed as a success. There are also constraints and limitations. For the affected people this programme did not include a great piece of participation. They were only informed by the authorities about the need to be relocated and the only thing where the affected people had a say, was the search for the sites of their new settlement. The decision-making about all issues concerning the relocation were made in the focal point of the programme, the community-based working groups (Pokjas). Although their members are regarded as honourable persons emerging from the LPMK, they are not elected by the people, but appointed from the Lurah. Therefore, they are not

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Urban Policies in Solo

accountable to the people, but to the government with the obligation to carry out the programme most effectively. Nevertheless, there are interactions between Subpokjas, Pokja and community, their intensity dependent on structure and attitude of the Pokja’s members. The nature of these interactions as well as the connected degree of participation is subject for the following case study.

7.4

Case Study: Resettlement of 112 Families

Reaching a deep insight into the process and the outcomes of the city’s policy, one of the newly constructed villages established during the relocation programme was selected for in-depth analysis. The chosen village is situated in Kelurahan Mojo‐ songo where 112 families were resettled from the river bank of Kelurahan Pucang Sawit (cf. Fig. 7.6). Families living on the riverbank at the southern part of Kelurahan Pucang Sawit had to cope with annual flood events of Bengawan Solo River. As squatters they were living in front of a dyke, their houses facing the river and suffering from inadequate supply of public services. After a very severe flood event in 2007 the 112 families

Fig. 7.6 Relocation of 112 families from the riverbank in Kelurahan Pucang Sawit to a new settlement in Kelurahan Mojosongo (Obermayr 2012b)

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155

in this area were also selected to participate in the city’s relocation programme. A new settlement was constructed in the quarter Mojosongo at the north-eastern edge of the city and in a distance of about four kilometres from the old settlement. Finished in 2009, the whole community moved in and the houses in the old area were demol‐ ished to give way for the construction of a recreational area. In this relocation case, the Pokja relocation of Pucang Sawit gave the job to construct the new houses (cf. Fig. 7.7) to a private building contractor (Interview 20). For each of the families a plot of 50 m2 land was bought, where a house of approx. 40 m2 was constructed (Interview 14). The rest of 10 m2 was reserved for the general infrastructure (roads, sanitation, etc.). One house consists of a room without separations, the walls made of bricks, the roof made from corrugated sheet and the floor left as pure soil (cf. Fig. 7.8). All the 115 houses were constructed in the same way and DPU took care of the road network, electricity, the sanitation and the water supply. A toilet was constructed attached to each house in its back-yard, the sewage running through a drainage system into a septic tank (Fig. 7.8) built at the southern edge of the settle‐ ment. This tank gets emptied in regular intervals. Initially, a connection to the city’s water system was provided only in one spot, but soon the community helped together (relying on their own resources) to build their own pipe system for the village. Now, most of the houses are connected to this system and a water tap is installed directly in front of each house (Interview 19).

Fig. 7.7 The new village in Mojosongo (Photo Obermayr 2011)

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Fig. 7.8 Each family receives one basic house (left); the installed septic tank is coated with concrete (right) (Photos Obermayr 2011)

All the houses were constructed and handed over in the same way, but already two years after the new residents had moved in, significant improvements were visible. Often, the one-room houses were subdivided by the construction of sepa‐ rating walls, the floors were concreted or laid out with tiles and also the walls were plastered. Even some houses with a new roof can be observed as well as others which are enlarged by the construction of a second floor. Of course, these improvements depend on available financial assets and also other houses in more basic condition do exist in the village. Some were not changed compared to their initial shape, others are already more deteriorated and even some abandoned houses are present in the village.

7.4.1

Socio-economic Structure

Socio-economic data of the families living in the new settlement were collected by a household survey in 2011 with 52 of the 112 households participating (for the questionnaire cf. appendix II). The 52 houses were inhabited by 182 people, meaning an average of 3.5 persons per house. Mostly, two generations live in such a house, two parents and several children. Altogether the 52 houses are populated by 95 parents, 83 children (also grown-up children) and four grandparents. By asking for the occupation of each resident it was found that 41 of the children were still going to school, and 93 of the residents were working (informal and formal work). The rest of the population was retired, unemployed or too young for school. Asking for their jobs, the most frequent answers were employees, teachers, fabric and construction workers, drivers, painters, parking attendants and street vendors.

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7.4 Case Study: Resettlement of 112 Families Fig. 7.9 Geographical location of the residents’ working place (by author)

157

Outside Solo

13%

Pucang Sawit

33% Elsewhere

23% Jebres Mojosongo

20%

11% n= 52

By categorizing these jobs in formal and informal activities it can be concluded that at least 50% of the residents are working in the informal sector. Regarding the location of their daily activities (school or work) an interesting spatial pattern was found. While most of the school children go to school nearby in Kelurahan Mojosongo or adjacent Kelurahans, the working place of the employees is much more distributed across the city and beyond. Only 20% of the work force was working in Mojosongo, but over 33% in Pucang Sawit or adjacent areas. The rest claimed that their working place is somewhere in Kecamatan Jebres, in the whole city or even outside Solo (cf. Fig. 7.9). These results indicate that due to the residents’ primary occupation in the informal sector, e.g. as street vendors, many of them do not have a fixed geographical location of their working place. Most of the relocated families live below the poverty line. In 2009 the minimum living necessity was set to 0.7 million IDR per month7 (BPS & BAPPEDA Surakarta 2009: 68). In the new settlement 58% of the residents stated that their household income is below 0.8 million IDR per month and none of the respondents declared to have a household income above 1.5 million IDR8 (cf. Fig. 7.10). When asking for their possessions, these findings were partly confirmed. While none of the families possessed a car, 73.1% owned a motorbike and 69.2% a cell phone (n = 52). These numbers might be seen as quite high in a national comparison, but for Solo they are below average (cf. BPS & BAPPEDA Surakarta 2009). As the most important posts of monthly expenditures the questioned families declared the spending for food (~0.5 million IDR, n = 40) followed by the costs for 7In

Indonesia every region has a defined minimum wage generated annually by the provincial government.

81€

= 12,000 IDR (2011); 1.5 million IDR = ~120€.

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7

Fig. 7.10 The residents’ monthly household income (by author)

Urban Policies in Solo

6%

36% 58%

Household income per month ( million IDR)

1.5 – 2.5 0.8 – 1.5 n= 52

< 0.8

public services (~66,000 IDR; n = 38). Some families also mentioned expenditures for education, transport or the repayment of a loan. Former creation of the old settlement: when asking the relocated people how long they had lived in Pucang Sawit prior to the resettlement, most of them (68%) answered that they had migrated to the area five to twenty years ago. Only 21% responded that they had lived there for more than 20 years. Different regions were named as their place of origin. Although no exact spatial pattern could be found, the areas Jagalan9 and Wonogiri10 were frequently mentioned. These responses illus‐ trate the creation of the old squatter settlement near the river in Pucang Sawit. Initially, some pioneers had constructed their houses there and when they had succeeded and were not evicted from the government owned land, other people were attracted to join them. Thus, a slow infiltration of new migrants had begun, expanding the squatter settlement in its size and density.

7.4.2

Residents’ Satisfaction

The relocated people were not completely pleased with their new settlement. On the one hand they felt happy with the public services, such as sanitation, water supply and electricity (cf. Fig. 7.11). On the other hand, they were complaining about their houses. Nearly 80% of the questioned families answered, that they are less (30.8%) or not at all (48.1%) satisfied with the quality of their new homes. Furthermore, many inhabitants were unhappy about the location of their houses, although here the results are more balanced. All residents agreed that there is a problem with the garbage disposal in the settlement. As there is no regular collection, the garbage is put at a

9Jagalan

is a Kelurahan adjacent to Pucang Sawit within the city boundaries.

10Wonogiri is known

as a poor district southeast of Solo.

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159

Are you satisfied with the... ...city government? ...Pokja relocation? ...house as a whole? ...garbage disposal? ... electricity supply? ... water supply? ...sanitation? ...location of the house? ... quality of the house? n=52 very

slightly

less

not at all

Fig. 7.11 Residents’ satisfaction with the new settlement (average of all answers, by author)

heap in the southern part of the village, just beyond the septic tank. There it gets burned from time to time.11 Most interestingly, in the northern part of the settlement more families were dissatisfied with their houses as in the middle or southern part. Although this pattern must be investigated for each household individually, the opinions expressed in several houses at the northern edge of the settlement clearly can be contributed to a flood event in the year 2010 during the rainy season. As the whole settlement is located in a depression, eleven houses in the north had been hit by a flash flood after heavy rainfalls (Interview 19). Therefore, it is understandable that the residents of this area were not very satisfied with the location and the quality of their houses. However, this single event does not fully explain the bias between north and south. Other factors, such as irregular lot drawing about the houses, enabling influential people to receive the better house or location, might have contributed their part. Satisfaction with the relocation process Also the process of relocation is praised as very participative, it was not very satis‐ fying for the affected people. Most of all, the resident’s impression of the work done by the Pokja relocation is not positive. Over 70% of the residents were completely dissatisfied with the Pokja and 19% less satisfied (cf. Fig. 7.12). Most of them criti‐ cized that they were not asked about the selection of the houses within the settlement and had no influence on the appearance and structure of their new homes. Only in 11Burning

the collected garbage is commonly performed throughout the city.

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Are you satisfied with the... ...POKJA relocation?

...the city government?

Where you able to participate in... ... the selection of the settlement's location? ... the selection of the house within the settlement? ...the appearance and structure of the house?

Did the city government consider your requests and wishes? n=52

very

slightly

less

not at all

Fig. 7.12 Resident’s satisfaction with the relocation process (average of all answers, by author)

the selection of the settlement’s location some of the residents had a say. Lacking transparency about the whole process involving the Pokja and also the private company which constructed the houses led to the suspicion that funds were misap‐ propriated. In the resident’s opinion corruption has led to a reduced quality of their homes. Despite all these assumptions, in the eyes of the residents the municipal govern‐ ment is not to blame for the Pokja’s misconduct. Over 78% are very satisfied with the city government, which suggests that the residents are in principal convinced that the relocation was necessary. This pattern can also be found when analyzing the responses on the question if the city government considered the requests and wishes of the residents, where over 46% gave a positive answer. However, there are also 50% (less: 32.7%; not at all 17.3%) of the residents which responded that their opinion was not taken into account by the government. This response behaviour suggests that there were deficits in the participation of the residents. When asking more specific questions, to find out if the people were involved in various decisions about the new settlement, this impression was confirmed. Although there are certain persons, who did participate in the selection of the settlement’s location (19.2%) the selection of the houses within the settlement (11.5%) or the appearance and structure of the houses (13.5%), the average responses for all three questions were clearly negative. Only in the decision about the spatial location of the new settlement a considerable amount of residents was involved (36.5%).

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7.4 Case Study: Resettlement of 112 Families

161

Looking at the spatial distribution of the responses, in particular those questions about the selection of the houses within the settlement and the appearance and struc‐ ture of the houses, again a contrasting spatial pattern was found. In the northern part residents are not only dissatisfied about the quality of the houses, but were also less involved in the process of relocation. Although it is difficult to generalize this finding, the results indicate differences between the inhabitants of the settlement’s northern and southern part. These coincidences of inhabitants with better houses and more participation in the south on the one hand, and residents with less good houses and less participation in the north on the other, suggests that there might have been irregularities in the assignment of the houses, distributing them not completely fair. It seems that some people may have had the opportunity to choose their house, while for others the house was assigned. This assumption, however, is difficult to verify.

7.4.3

Comparison Between Old and New Settlement

Roughly half of the questioned families said that the new settlement in Mojosongo offers better living conditions while the other half stated that life in the old settlement in Pucang Sawit was better (cf. Fig. 7.13). Different aspects were found: many of the residents (~50%) said that their old houses were bigger and had also a better quality (~44%). As Pucang Sawit is closer to the city centre and job opportunities,

Fig. 7.13 Residents’ preferred place to live (by author)

3%

45%

51%

n=52

Pucang Sawit

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Same

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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Size of the house

Quality of the house

Transportation

Sanitation

Water supply

Living costs n=52

Pucang Sawit

Mojosongo

Same

Fig. 7.14 Comparison between old and new settlement (by author)

the old area is regarded as much better connected to the city. Over 88% of the ques‐ tioned families claimed that transport in their old area of residence was much better. This problem was also addressed by one of the interviewed inhabitants (Interview 19). He pointed out, that there was only one bus with unsatisfying intervals and a ride to the city centre takes 30–60 min. With a motor bike this ride would take only ten minutes. Further he mentioned that he needs now two liters of fuel per day instead of one liter in his old home. The transport issue might be one of the reasons why most of the households (over 70%) are also confronted with higher living costs. However, at least the supply with water and the sanitation infrastructure is seen as much better than in the old settlement (cf. Fig. 7.14).

7.4.4

Successful Relocation?

The relocation of 112 families from Pucang Sawit to Mojosongo has been success‐ fully carried out by the responsible working group (Pokja). Generally, the families in the new settlement were happy about their new legal status and their own property. However, many of them were not satisfied with the quality of their new houses, which they attributed to the unsatisfying work of the Pokja. Substantial problems in the settlement were the unsatisfying transport to the city and the inadequate garbage collection. However, due to higher living costs, smaller homes and the other prob‐ lems mentioned, many residents thought that their old residential area was a better place to live.

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163

When asking the responsible RT, who is a long-established resident of Mojosongo and living near the new settlement, he pointed out that in his view the whole process was a success. He said that initially members of the Pokja relocation had approached him asking for his content to the new settlement: “Of course I agreed, it’s a govern‐ ment programme […]” (Interview 18). He further explained that the old residents in the neighbouring area have accepted the newer ones, although there is not much interaction between these groups. As an emerging problem he mentioned that some of the new residents would sell self-made alcohol which he fears might have a bad influence on the youth.12 In terms of participation the results show, that only few of the relocated people were involved in the resettlement process. There are some indications that those participating could have had some influence on the whole process and might have been able to receive a reward, as for instance a better house and/or location within the settlement. The response behavior suggested sometimes that many positive answers about the government might be owed to the Javanese traditional behavior against higher ranked persons13 and the feeling that there is a need to show gratitude towards the government. Minding this background, it can be concluded that residents in this new village in Mojosongo are thankful for the new houses and the land title, but are disappointed about the process of relocation where an active participation of all families did not happen.

References Astuti W (2009) Slum and squatter settlements in Surakarta institutional constraints and potencies for self-help housing development. In: Santosa H, Astuti W, Astuti DW (eds) Sustainable slum upgrading in urban area. Universitas Sebelas Maret, Surakarta, pp 13–25 BPS & BAPPEDA Surakarta (2009) Surakarta dalam Angka 2009, Surakarta Bunnell T, Miller MA, Phelps NA, Taylor J (2013) Urban development in a decentralized Indonesia: two success stories? Pac Aff 86(4):857–876. doi:10.5509/2013864857 Delgosea (2011) Best practices on fiscal management and investment planning in southeast-asian local government. www.delgosea.eu. Accessed 25 Aug 2011 Gervasi M (2010) Surakarta, Indonesia: empowering the informal sector: street vendor management. http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/committees/cisdp/Upload/database/surakarta_2011_en_ es.pdf. Accessed 08 June 2012 Jones BG (2012) ‘Bankable Slums’: the global politics of slum upgrading. Third World Q 33(5): 769–789 Kristianto L (2010) Sinergi kebijakan penanggulangan kemiskinan berbasis pemberdayaan masyarakat di kota Surakarta: Studi Implementasi Program Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Berbasis Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Di Kota Surakarta. Master thesis, Universitas Sebelas Maret

12Alcohol

is judged in general as a bad thing by most of Solo’s residents.

13According to Javanese tradition higher ranked persons have to be treated very respectful and open

critics are scorned.

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Nugroho FA (2010) Penataan Sektor Informal di Belakang Kampus UNS: Studi Kasus Dampak Sosial Ekonomi Pada Pedagang Di Pasar Panggungrejo Jebres. Skripsi, Universitas Sebelas Maret, Surakarta Obermayr C (2012a) Flood event in solo 2007. https://christianobermayr.files.wordpress.com/ 2014/06/flood-event-in-solo-2007.png. Accessed 31 Aug 2016 Obermayr C (2012b) Solo 2010/2011: resettlement of 112 families. https://christianobermayr. files.wordpress.com/2014/06/relocation-from-pucang-sawit-to-mojosongo.png. Accessed 30 Aug 2016 Obermayr C, Astuti W (2016) Paradigm shifts in the international housing debate and its local implications for Surakarta’s approaches on housing the poor. In: Rachmawati R, Pomeroy G, Mookherjee D (eds) Rapid urbanization and sustainable development in Asia: the 13th international Asian urbanization conference proceedings. Badan Penerbit Fakultas Geografi (BPFG) Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, pp 571–580 Perwali (13/2007) Peraturan Walikota Surakarta: Pedoman Pelaksanaan Pemberian Bantuan Pembangunan/ Perbaikan Rumah tak Layak huni bagi Masyarakat Miskin Kota Surakarta Perwali (04/2009) Peraturan Walikota Surakarta: Penerapan Pola Pengelolaan Keuangan Badan Layanan umum Daerah Pada unit Pelaksana Teknis Griya Layak Huni Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Pemberdayaan Perempuan Perlindungan Anak Dan Keluarga Berencana Kota Surakarta Phelps NA, Bunnell T, Miller MA, Taylor J (2014) Urban inter-referencing within and beyond a decentralized Indonesia. Cities 39:37–49. doi:10.1016/j.cities.2014.02.004 Sudarmo (2010) Dynamics of governance: structural and cultural obstacles in public decision making. Lindu Pustaka, Surakarta SUF (2006) The SUF handbook: an approach to financial action planning for slum upgrading and new low-income residential neighbourhoods, Nairobi SUF (2008a) Newsletter January. The UN-Habitat Slum Upgrading Facility Newsletter, Nairobi SUF (2008b) Newsletter July. The UN-Habitat Slum Upgrading Facility Newsletter, Nairobi Taylor J (2015) A tale of two cities: comparing alternative approaches to reducing the vulnerability of riverbank communities in two Indonesian cities. Environ Urbanization 27(2):621–636. doi:10.1177/0956247815594532 UN-Habitat (2006) SUF action planning methodology and development guidelines. http://www. unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2359. Accessed 13 Oct 2011 UN-Habitat (2008) Surakarta: empowering the informal sector: street vendor management. http:// bestpractices.at/database/. Accessed 15 Apr 2014 UN-Habitat (2011) Slum upgrading facility pilot programme end of programme evaluation. Evaluation report, 4/2011. UN-Habitat, Nariobi USAID (2009) Musrenbang as a key driver in effective participatory budgeting: key issues and perspectives for improvements. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADQ129.pdf. Accessed 05 Feb 2012 Vision and Mission of Mayor and Vice Mayor of Surakarta (2010–2015 periods). http://www. surakarta.go.id/news/mayor.and.vice.major.surakarta.html. Accessed 18 Nov 2011 Widianingsih I, Morrell E (2007) Participatory planning in indonesia: seeking a new path to democracy. Policy Stud 28(1):1–5 Zein M (2010) A community-based approach to flood hazard and vulnerability assessment in flood prone areas: a case study in Kelurahan Sewu. Surakarta City, Indonesia. Master Thesis, UGM

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Part IV

Conclusion

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Chapter 8

Sustainable City Management–Final Considerations

Abstract Surakarta’s city government has acknowledged its responsibility to provide adequate housing and to manage the informal sector. In order to mitigate the challenges posed by informality, several pro-poor programmes have been intro‐ duced, such as a social housing programme as well as slum-upgrading and relocation measures. All these multi-sectoral activities show a similar design, involve a broad variety of stakeholders and are oriented on global approaches of inclusive and participative strategies. Summarizing the study, this chapter addresses each of the research questions outlined in the introduction, providing a critical assessment of Surakarta’s housing policy embedded in the national and global context. Looking at the outcomes, the implemented measures look impressive and are evaluated as successful albeit all analysed programmes show improvement potential. Keywords Conclusion · Surakarta · Housing Policy

8.1

Slums and Intervention Strategies–Global and Indonesian Trends

What are the characteristics of the informal sector and in particular of marginal settlements? A broad variety of marginal settlements does exist around the world. Low-cost housing can take any form ranging from pavement dwellers to poor people living in sub-standard tenements (cf. Chap. 3). It is acknowledged that the word ‘slum’ cannot be clearly defined and is used as an umbrella term covering many different kinds of marginal settlements. Nevertheless, a distinction can be made between inner-city slums, areas which were former ‘good’ settlements and have deteriorated over time, and squatter settlements, which are built without permission of the owner on govern‐ ment or private owned land (cf. Sect. 3.3). For an operational definition UN-Habitat has chosen four distinct indicators: access to basic services, quality of housing, sufficient living area and security of tenure (cf. Sect. 3.2).

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In Indonesia, the term Kampung is often used synonymously with ‘slum’, but this does not reflect the reality (cf. Chap. 5). There are various types of Kampungs, among them also those showing the characteristics of marginal settlements (in particular inner-city Kampungs and squatter Kampungs). Both types can also be found in Surakarta, although the distinction from ‘better’ settlements is fluent. Which Approaches and Concrete Policies Concerning the Informal Sector Are Applied on a Global and Indonesian Level? On a global scale many approaches were tried and discarded to meet the challenge of slums. After World War II and oriented at European models, social housing was seen as panacea, but due to the high costs, this strategy was soon abandoned in favour for other approaches, such as site-and-service or slum-upgrading. Frequently, slum clear‐ ances (forced evictions) took place legitimated by powerful actors to create space for modern urban developments (for the different approaches cf. Sect. 4.2). Since the millennium declaration UN-Habitat praises an approach called ‘participatory slum improvement’ as the best practice strategy to meet the challenge of slums. This strategy is a comprehensive approach including not only physical improvements, but also many other dimensions, such as security of tenure, participation, sectorial reforms, political will, capacity building, etc. (cf. Fig. 4.1). This approach goes far beyond expensive social housing models or project-based slum-upgrading schemes from the past, but includes ‘Good urban governance’ which is seen as a precondition for successful and efficient slum improvements and sustainable development. In Indonesia, the Kampung question was already discussed under Dutch rule, but it was not until the year 1969 when far reaching programmes were initiated. Among them, the most famous one is the ‘Kampung improvement programme’ (KIP). Initially, this approach of slum-upgrading was implemented in Jakarta and Surabaya, but soon it was scaled up to the whole country. Over the years the programme evolved in accordance to international changing paradigms from a focus on physical housing improvements to a more comprehensive approach, including other socioeconomic aspects (cf. Sect. 5.7.2). What Are the Global and Indonesian Trends in Urban Development? The effects of global development trends (cf. Chap. 2) are clearly visible in Indonesia. The including and excluding effects of economic globalization and the adaption of neoliberal policies have led together with the persisting urbanization trend to the emergence of fragmented urban landscapes. In particular, on Java Island, the urban frontiers have blurred and a mosaic of urban and rural elements characterize the former urban fringe areas. High-class residential areas, hyper malls and Pizza Hut are situated in close proximity to informal areas, such as slum and squatter settle‐ ments or the informal sector. Cities are getting more important. Only recently (2010) more Indonesians live in urban than in rural areas and in the next 20 years the UN expects 56 million additional residents for Indonesian cities (cf. Sect. 5.6.1). Clearly, urbanization puts massive pressure on municipal governments which are already busy in trying to mitigate the effects of globalization. On the one hand cities must cope with rapid urban growth

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continuously creating slum and squatter settlements and fragmented urban land‐ scapes, on the other hand the city budgets are strained by the integration in the global economy and strong interurban competition (cf. Sect. 2.4.3). Less money is available for the increasing demand of infrastructure, services, comprehensive planning, slumupgrading or poverty alleviation. To make the situation even worse, processes of democratization and decentralization have not only brought increased power to the cities, but also more time and cost-intensive obligations. Since the reform era following the Asian crisis in 1998, Indonesian cities have now more duties, exceeding in their expenses the increased earnings received from new revenue possi‐ bilities (cf. Sect. 5.3.3). Given this situation, municipal governments desperately need new approaches and procedures which are more cost effective, in order to deal with the now so different task of governing the people. As apparent in many Indonesian cities, this background provides an opportunity to implement and test new strategies of gover‐ nance which are discussed on a global level and promise a solution to their problems. One of these cities is Solo (Surakarta), a city trying to adopt a new political style to mitigate the upcoming problems and to create a new integrating city.

8.2

Surakarta’s Pro-Poor Policies Critically Assessed

Which approaches, programmes and measures concerning the informal sector are applied in Surakarta? Under the strong leadership of the city’s first directly elected mayor Joko Widodo, Solo’s city government has introduced a new political style. The mayor showed the political will to implement a comprehensive and inclusive policy with participative elements and to address the complicated problems of the informal sector and the marginal settlements. Under his influence a participatory approach of city planning was introduced as well as a successful relocation and formalization of most of the city’s street vendors (cf. Sect. 7.2). In terms of housing policy, three programmes of the municipality were analyzed (cf. Sect. 7.3). First, a participatory slum-upgrading programme (RTLH), aiming mainly at physical improvements but showing also bottom-up elements, second a more comprehensive slum improvement programme, which includes international actors (RTLH-cluster) and third a relocation programme targeting the residents of squatter settlements (programme relocation). All the analyzed programmes show the same design and follow the same proce‐ dure: 1. Regulation: A new regulation issued by the mayor. 2. Socialization: Information sent to the affected people with an invitation to take part in the discussions. 3. Public consultation: Discussions and meetings with the community where the programme is explained. 4. Pokjas: Establishment of working groups (Pokjas) consisting of community members with the task to implement the programme.

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In terms of effectiveness this procedure has proven to be successful in all investi‐ gated programmes. Often, also the mayor intervened directly in the community meet‐ ings, demonstrating his will to overcome any problems or obstacles. A specific char‐ acteristic common to all analyzed municipal programmes are the community-based steering groups, the Pokjas. Also an element in other governmental measures (Astuti and Prasetyo 2014), these working groups are the cornerstone of the programme structure and responsible for the strategies’ success. Since members of these working groups originate from the community, they are more trusted by the residents, and since they work voluntary, Pokjas represent a cheap instrument for the authorities for implementing intervention strategies. When looking at the outcome, all analyzed programmes must be regarded as successful in reaching their goals. When looking at the process of implementation, however, also criticism must be expressed: the municipal government claims the process to be bottom-up, integrative and participative. This is only partly the case. All measures are initiated by the mayor or the government body, and thus the measures are not grass-root or bottom-up. In contrast to this, the programmes can indeed be seen as largely integrative, as it is tried to involve as many stakeholders as possible. However, this inclusiveness is limited to the different government institutions, private companies, NGOs and influential community leaders. Depending on the programme, the affected citizens are mainly involved in the actual execution of the measures, and hereby only in those issues where their knowledge or manpower is needed. Thus, they have hardly any chance to influence the actual process and the decision-making. At least, there is the possibility to make proposals during the ‘public consultation’ process, but still, it lies in the hands of the government and the Pokjas whether they want to consider these proposals and let the implementation be influenced by the demands of the people. The Pokjas themselves, which are the key elements of the new policy, cannot always be considered as independent and as a beneficial interface between community and government. Depending on their members’ individual goals, power relations and their accountability towards the government, they do not always pose the perfect representation of the community. Moreover, sometimes they even must be regarded as government corrupted bodies looking for their own advantages. Speaking plainly, Solo’s government uses a policy with participative and inclu‐ sive elements, which is claimed to follow a bottom-up approach, in order to persuade the affected people from the desired project or plan. In reality, this strategy is used partly to convince the people to carry out the project themselves and—more impor‐ tantly—to enforce the city government’s goals in a top-down manner. Thus, the government can remove arising difficulties and simultaneously reach the own targets at low costs cloaked by an approach of inclusiveness and broad participation. Are These Measures and the Implementation Process Sustainable and an Example for ‘Good Governance’? Despite all these critics and deficiencies of Solo’s new political style, the fact that there is a pro-poor policy in place at all, a political will to listen to the problems of marginal and excluded people and a commitment to solve the problems of margi‐ nalized citizens, is outstanding.

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When assessing Solo’s policy, based on the characteristics of ‘good governance’ (cf. Sect. 4.4), it can be recognized that a new mode of governance has emerged in the city. A citywide development strategy is put into place incorporating participa‐ tory elements. Relations between all stakeholders are fostered and it is tried to encourage them for an active participation in decision-making and operational implementation. Measures are no longer simply ordered by the authorities, but it is aspired to reach consensus through dialogue. The administrative authorities also showed the willingness to give up power to other stakeholders (e.g. the Pokjas), albeit supervision remains in government hands. Furthermore, achieved by numerous community meetings, the municipality has succeeded in establishing an environment of trust, which is visible in a predominating high opinion among the poor citizens towards the city government and in particular towards the mayor (cf. Sect. 7.4). Of course, this fact makes it easier for Solo’s government to enforce new measures or programmes, but it can also mean a fertile ground for the aspired dialogue and participation processes. Recommendations Overall, the city government has accomplished some crucial steps in achieving the ideal of good governance. There remain, however, some serious deficiencies to be overcome. 1. More transparency: the decision-making process is often influenced by dominant actors and follows rules which are not easy to understand, in particular for margi‐ nalized groups. This still leaves them in the perception not to have any influence on the projects at all. Information and data about government projects are not easily accessible, and corruption (e.g. within the Pokjas) remains a serious problem. Effective controls and most of all an easy accessible tool for the provi‐ sion of all statistics and information about the project and also the decisionmaking process must be established. 2. Civic engagement: civil society must be more involved in the programmes. The city government should further foster the creation of an enablement culture to increase the involvement of the community through NGOs and CBOs. This could also be placed on a legal basis, as a precondition for the programmes. 3. Equity: the procedures of the ‘new political style’ are still ruled by influential people within and outside the government, by the power relations between them and the relations towards other actors they favour. Thus, the design of the programmes should be aligned to reach a better social inclusion. Participation opportunities must be provided not only for the RTs and RWs, which rule the LPMK, but also for those groups not represented by these informal authorities. 4. Capacity building: efforts should be undertaken to increase the capacities of all involved actors. Adequate tools and trainings are needed especially for govern‐ ment staff, but also for the different actors having a say of all parts of society. Practical instruments, such as for instance access to an adequate and up to date cadastral system, are urgently needed.

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Which Concepts and Models Served as Orientation for Surakarta’s Govern‐ ment? Within the framework of this study, the analysis of Solo’s policy did not clearly unfold which of the many strategies or elements of the international discourse on housing had the most influence on Solo’s new policy. During the study it became obvious that the targets of the millennium declaration are well known by the inter‐ viewed experts and many elements of the United Nations concept on good gover‐ nance were adopted by the municipality. A clear link, however, can be traced to the participation of a government official to a study tour to the Philippines in 2000 funded by the Ford Foundation (Widianingsih and Morrell 2007; Phelps et al. 2014). This visit resulted in initiatives of introducing a participatory planning system in the city and successively created an innovative environment of participatory practices. It is this background of participatory practices shaping the structures and procedures of the analyzed housing programmes. Is Surakarta’s Governance Recognized as an Example for Other Cities? Solo’s new political style has gained international attention. The interviews revealed that officials of other Indonesian cities have shown interest in Solo’s policy and have visited the city to learn from Solo’s experiences. The presence of UN-Habitat further disseminated the story of Solo’s policy and mayor Jokowi was invited to interna‐ tional conferences. This international attention cumulated in the selection of Solo as the venue for the third Asia Pacific Ministerial Conference on Housing and Urban Development (APMCHUD) in 2010, where housing issues and ways of achieving a sustainable urbanization were discussed (APMCHUD 2010). Furthermore, the city’s policy was awarded by the selection of the mayor as a candidate for the ‘world mayor 2012’, where he won the third place (Hove 2013). The success of Solo’s ‘new polit‐ ical style’—or is it Jokowi’s political style?—reappears in Jokowis personal success. After he managed Solo, he was elected governor of Jakarta and finally President of Indonesia.

References APMCHUD (2010) The Solo Declaration. Asia Pacific Ministerial Conference on Housing and Urban Development. Surakarta. http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/8508_7813_ Solo_Declaration.pdf. Accessed 06 Oct 2012 Astuti W, Prasetyo DA (2014) Model of community-based housing development (CBHD) of Bedah Kampung Program in Surakarta Indonesia. Procedia Environ Sci 20:593–601. doi:10.1016/ j.proenv.2014.03.072 Hove T (2013) Iñaki Azkuna, Mayor of Bilbao, Spain awarded the 2012 World Mayor Prize. http:// www.worldmayor.com/contest_2012/world-mayor-12-results.html Phelps NA, Bunnell T, Miller MA, Taylor J (2014) Urban inter-referencing within and beyond a decentralized Indonesia. Cities 39:37–49. doi:10.1016/j.cities.2014.02.004 Widianingsih I, Morrell E (2007) Participatory planning in Indonesia: seeking a new path to democracy. Policy Stud 28(1). doi:10.1080/01442870601121320

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Appendix A

Indicators Used for Generating a ‘Slum Map’ for Solo City (cf. Sect. 6.4.3)

(a) Households with public WC This indicator was used as a representative example for UN-Habitat’s indicator ‘inadequate access to sanitation’. Although the usage of a public toilet does not necessarily mean inadequate access, it indicates a slum area to a certain degree. Only those households have to rely on public toilets which cannot afford to have their own. Two indicators are available for each of Solo’s RT units: (1) ‘households with public WC’ and (2) ‘households with private WC’. After analysing the frequency distribution, it was decided to use indicator (1), as it was considered superior with respect to its statistical characteristics and distinguishes far better the sample areas from the whole city area. It was decided to use 30% as a threshold, as this value includes the standard deviation (Mean – SD = 30) and represents most of the sample areas.

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 C. Obermayr, Sustainable City Management, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49418-0

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(1) Households with public WC Entire urban area (all Rts) Mean: 15,8

Standard deviation 24,0

n=2669

1.000

750

500

250

0 0

20

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Households with public WC (%) Sample area Mean: 56,5

Standard deviation: 26,4

n=100

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Frequency

Frequency

1.250

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Households with public WC (%)

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(2) Households with private WC Entire urban area (all Rts) Mean: 68,1

Standard deviation 29,2

n=2669

Frequency

600

400

200

0 0

20

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Households with private WC (%) Sample area Mean: 34,5

Standard deviation: 25,7

n=100

25

Frequency

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Households with private WC (%)

(b) Households using public wells This indicator was used as a representative example for UN-Habitat’s indicator ‘access to water’. Although the usage of public wells does not always indicate a slum area, the existence of such sub-standard housing units nearby is likely. Three indicators are available for each of Solo’s RT units: (3) ‘households using public wells’ (4) ‘households using private wells’ and (5) ‘households

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using pipe water’. After analysing the frequencies and histograms, it was decided to use indicator (3), as analyses of the frequencies suggested a less satisfactory distinction between sample area and whole city for indicator (4) and (5). The threshold was chosen at 6%, as this value includes most of the sample points (Mean – SD = 6).

(3) Households using public wells Entire urban area (all Rts) Mean: 12,6

Standard deviation 20,3

n=2669

Frequency

1500

1.000

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0 0

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Households using public wells (%) Sample area Mean: 35,4

Standard deviation: 29,4

n=100

25

Frequency

20

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0 0

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Households using public wells (%)

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(4) Households using private wells Entire urban area (all Rts) Mean: 42,5

Standard deviation 33,8

n=2669

400

Frequency

300

200

100

0 20

0

40

60

80

100

Households using private wells (%) Sample area Mean: 26,8

Standard deviation: 22,5

n=100

25

Frequency

20

15

10

5

0

0

20

40

60

80

Households using private wells (%)

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100

Appendix A: Indicators Used for Generating a ‘Slum Map’ …

178

(5) Households with access to piped water Entire urban area (all Rts) Mean: 35,5

Standard deviation 31,1

n=2669

400

Frequency

300

200

100

0 0

20

40

60

80

100

Households with access to piped water (%) Sample area Mean: 25,1

Standard deviation: 21,8

n=100

25

Frequency

20

15

10

5

0 0

20

40

60

80

Households with access to piped water (%)

[email protected]

100

Appendix A: Indicators Used for Generating a ‘Slum Map’ …

179

(c) Households with land certificate This indicator was used as a representative example for UN-Habitat’s indicator ‘unsecure tenure’. The sample points showed a wide variation of households with and without land certificates. Thus, a low value of families with certificate does not necessarily classify this area as slum and vice versa. However, it certainly hints at such an area, as pointed out by UN-Habitat and numerous other scholars. To include this indicator despite its wide distribution of frequencies, only those RT units were chosen, where 5% or less of the households possess a land title. (6) Households with legal tenure Entire urban area (all Rts) Mean: 76,3

Standard deviation 31,6

n=2669

1.200

Frequency

1.000 800

600 400 200 0 0

20

40

60

80

100

Households with legal tenure (%) Sample area Mean: 42,4

Standard deviation: 39,2

n=100

40

Frequency

30

20

10

0 0

20

40

60

80

Households with legal tenure (%)

[email protected]

100

Appendix A: Indicators Used for Generating a ‘Slum Map’ …

180

(d) Population density This indicator was used as a representative example for UN-Habitat’s ‘overcrowding’. The assumed correlation of slum areas with high density of population, however, may be problematic, as also high apartment blocks with middle-class housing units fall into this category. Luckily such areas only rarely exist in Solo.

(7) Population Density Entire urban area (all Rts) Mean: 168,3

Standard deviation 139,9

n=2669

500

Frequency

400

300

200

100

0 0

400

200

600

800

1.000 1.200 1.400

Population density (people/ha) Sample area Mean: 383,4

Standard deviation: 216,1

n=100

Frequency

30

20

10

0 0

200

400

600

800

Population denisty (people/ha)

[email protected]

1.000

Appendix A: Indicators Used for Generating a ‘Slum Map’ …

181

The sample points showed that the observed slum areas are a lot denser populated than other parts of the city. The comparison of the two histograms, however, shows a large overlap of the distribution of the two datasets, making it difficult to distinguish them. Contributing to this overlap, a threshold of more than 200 persons per hectare was chosen. (e) Poverty degree This indicator was used, as it incorporates many dimensions of poverty (quality of housing, income, education etc.) and is used by the Indonesian government to detect poor neighbourhoods. Although UN-Habitat is not using poverty for their definition of slum areas, it is regarded as a good hint for slum districts, as it goes beyond an infrastructural classification of slums. The values for the sample points showed a huge difference for the whole city, making the distinction between the datasets very easy. To catch most of the sample area, it was decided to use >17% as a threshold, as this value includes the standard deviation (Mean – SD = 17).

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Appendix A: Indicators Used for Generating a ‘Slum Map’ …

182

(8) Degree of poverty Entire urban area (all Rts) Mean: 15,4

Standard deviation 13,6

n=2669

500

Frequency

400

300

200

100

0

0

20

40

60

80

100

Degree of poverty (%) Sample area Mean: 28,3

Standard deviation: 10,9

n=100

15

Frequency

10

5

0

0

20

40

60

Degree of poverty (%)

[email protected]

80

100

Appendix B

The Original Questionnaire Used for the Household Survey (n = 52) in the New Settlement in Mojosongo

ANGKET (Questionnaire) Penduduk di Relokasi

Informasi (Information) Orang yang menanyai: Interviewer: Tanggal, jam (Date, Ɵme): Nomor (Name):

Saya Mahasiswa Geografi dari Austria. Saya membuat PeneliƟan tentang Program Pemerintahan “Relokasi” dengan dibantu mahasiswa UNS. Angket ini anonim. Terima kasih untuk membalas pertanyaan yang berikut. I’m a student of geography from Austria. With the help of UNS students I perform a research about the program Informasi ‘Relocasi’ Umum of the city government. This questionnaire is anonym. Thank you for answering the following questions.

1. Umur(Age) ________ 2. Jenis Kelamin (Gender) 3. Agama (Religion)

Islam

L (M)

P (F)

Katholic

Protestant

Hindu

Buddhist

Dll (other):____________ 4. Pendidikan (Education)

SD

SMP

5. Berapa jumlah ruang yang ada di rumah anda? How many rooms does your house have? 6. Berapa luas tanah punya anda (m²)? How much land do you own (m²)? 7. Berapa jumlah anak Anda? How many children do you have?

SMA

PT

__________

__________ __________

8. Apakah anda punya KTP? Do you have a KTP (idenƟty card)? ya, Mojosongo yes, from Mojosongo

Ɵdak, saya Ɵdak punya KTP ya, saya punya KTP di Pucang Sawit no, I do not have a KTP yes, I have a KTP from Pucang Sawit

ya, saya punya KTP di daerah yang lain: ______________________________________ ___________________________________ _ Kecamatan / Kabupaten, Kelurahan / Desa yes, I have a KTP from another region Sub-district / District, Quarter / Village

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 C. Obermayr, Sustainable City Management, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49418-0

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183

Appendix B: The Original Questionnaire Used for the Household Survey …

184

9. Apa kegiatan sehari-hari Anda dan keluarga yang Ɵnggal di rumah Anda? What activities do you and the other persons in your household carry out each day? Siapa? Who?

Kegiatan / Pekerjaan? Activity / Occupation

Di mana? Where?

Menulis anggota keluarga yang Ɵnggal disini. (Contoh: ayah, anak etc.) Write down the names of the family members living in this house. For example: father, child etc.

Menulis pekerjaan atau kegiatan anggota keluarga yang Ɵnggal disini. Write down the occupation or activity of the family members living in this house.

Menulis di mana anggota keluarga melakukan pekerjaan atau kegiatan. (Kecamatan/Kabupaten dan Kelurahan / Desa) Write down in what area the family members carry out their work or activity. (Kecamatan / Kabupatan and Kelurahan / Desa)

10. Berapa pendapatan per bulan keluarga Anda? How much revenue does your family have per month (Rupiah)? < 800.000

800.000 – 1.500.000

2.500.000-5.000.000

>5.000.000

1.500.000 – 2.500.000

11. Apa pengeluaran terbesar keluarga Anda seƟap bulan? What are the biggest expenditures of your family per month? AkƟvitas Activity

Pengeluaran per bulan Expenditure per month

1 2 3 12. Perbaikan yang anda buat di rumah? (Bisa diisi lebih dari satu) What improvements did you make at your house? (It is possible to mark more than one) dinding plester (plaster the wall)

dibangun lampiran bangunan (constructed an dibangun beranda (constructed a porch)

annex to the house)

dibangun parƟsi/sekat (constructed a partition) perkerasan dasar (concrete at the floor) meletakkan ubin (tiles at the floor) atap baru (new roof) dll (other) ____________________________________________________

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Appendix B: The Original Questionnaire Used for the Household Survey …

185

13. Barang apa saja yang ada di rumah Anda? (Bisa diisi lebih dari satu) Which of the following goods do you possess in your house? (You can mark more than one) Kulkas (refrigerator)

Mobil (car)

Sepeda Motor (motor cycle)

AC

Sepeda (bike)

Radio/pita/cd (radio/tape/cd)

Mesin Cuci (washing machine)

TV

Video, dvd

Kipas angina (fan)

Penanak nasi (rice cooker)

Handphone (mobile)

14. Berapa lama Anda Ɵnggal di Pucang Sawit sebelumnya? How long did you stay in Pucang Sawit prior to the relocation? 20 years) 15. Di mana Anda Ɵnggal sebelumnya Pucang Sawit? ___________________________________ Kecamatan / Kabupaten, Kelurahan / Desa Where did you stay before Pucang Sawit? Sub-district / District, Quarter / Village

16. Apakah Anda puas dengan… Are you satisfied with… 16.1 …kualitas rumah anda? …the quality of your house?

ya yes

sedikit slightly

kurang less

Ɵdak no

16.2 …tempat rumah anda? …the location of your house?

ya

sedikit

kurang

Ɵdak

16.3 …sanitasi? …sanitation?

ya

sedikit

kurang

Ɵdak

16.4 … penyediaan air? …the water supply?

ya

sedikit

kurang

Ɵdak

16.5 …penyediaan listrik? …the supply of electricity?

ya

sedikit

kurang

Ɵdak

16.6 …pembuangan sampah? …garbage disposal

ya

sedikit

kurang

Ɵdak

16.7 … rumah secara keseluruhan? …the house as a whole?

ya

sedikit

kurang

Ɵdak

16.8 …POKJA Relokasi ya …the working group ‘relocation’?

sedikit

kurang

Ɵdak

ya

sedikit

kurang

Ɵdak

16.9 …Pemerintah kota …the city government?

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Appendix B: The Original Questionnaire Used for the Household Survey …

186

17. Apakah Anda bisa berparƟsipasi dalam… Were you able to participate in… 17.1 …pemilihan lokasi untuk pemukiman? ya …the selection of the location of the settlement?

sedikit

kurang

Ɵdak

17.2 …pemilihan rumah di pemukiman? ya …the selection of the house within the settlement?

sedikit

kurang

Ɵdak

ya 17.3 …pemilihan tentang strukutur rumah? …the appearance and structure of the house?

sedikit

kurang

Ɵdak

kurang

Ɵdak

18. Apakah Pemerintha Kota memperƟmbangkan Permintaan anda? Did the city government consider your request and wishes? ya

sedikit

19. Apakah baru (Mojosongo) atau tempat lama (Pucang Sawit) lebih baik? Is the new (Mojosongo) or the old (Pucang Sawit) place better for living? tempat baru (the new location)

tempat lama (the old location)

20. Perbandingan antara kedua daerah: Di mana (…) lebih baik? Comparison between the two regions: Where is/was (…) better? Pucang Sawit

No.

(…)

20.1

Ukuran rumah Size of the house

20.2

Kualitas rumah Quality of the house

20.3

Transportasi Transportation

20.4

Sanitasi Sanitation

20.5

Air Water

20.6

Biaya hidup Living costs

20.8

Pembuangan sampah Garbage disposal

20.9

Tempat ibadah Places of worship

Mojosongo

Sama Same

Tidak tahu I don’t know

21. Apakah masalah di pemukiman baru? What are the main problems in the new location? Sanitatasi (Sanitation)

Banjir (Flooding)

Transportasi (Transportation)

Sampah (Garbage)

Penerimaan oleh tetengga (acceptance by the neighbours)

dll (other)___________________________________________________________________

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Appendix B: The Original Questionnaire Used for the Household Survey …

187

22. Jika Anda memikirkan tentang program relokasi pemerintah, maka apa yang Anda pikirkan tentang… If you think about the government’s relocation program, then what do you think about…

No.

22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5 22.6 22.7 22.8 22.9

Kata Word

Ya, sangat Yes, very

Ya Yes

Sedikit Slightly

Kurang less

Tidak no

Tekanan Pressure Kebutuhan Necessity ParƟcipasi Participation Ketaatan Obediance Kesedihan Sorrow Kesempatan Opportunity Keuntungan Luck Ketakutan Fear Cemburu Envy

Terimaa kasih atas bantuan anda !! Thank you for your help!!

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Sangat Ɵdak Not at all

Tidak tahu I don’t know

Glossary

Adat Tradition or custom often having the force of law Bahasa Indonesia Indonesian language Bengawan Solo River defining Surakarta’s eastern boarder Bretton Woods Institutions World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Bupati Head of district administration (Kabupaten) Camat Head of sub-district administration (Kecamatan) Desa Village HABITAT I First conference on human settlements in Vancouver 1976 HABITAT II (‘city summit’) Second conference on human settlements in Istanbul 1996 Kabupaten District, has the same legal status as a city Kampung A neighbourhood of families often used in the sense of a village sometimes also used as a synonym for an Indonesian slum settlement Kecamatan Sub-district of an Indonesian city Kepala Keluarga Head of the family (usually the father) Kelurahan Quarter of an Indonesian city Ketua RT Chief of a Rukun Tetangga (RT), elected informally, voluntary activity Ketua RW Chief of a Rukun Warga (RW), elected informally, voluntary activity Konsorsium Solo Local NGO. Kota City Kraton Seat of the sultan

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 C. Obermayr, Sustainable City Management, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49418-0

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189

190

Glossary

Krismon Abbreviation for Krisis Monetar—monetary crisis referring to the Asian crisis Lurah Head of a quarter (Kelurahan) administration Masyarakat Community Musrenbang Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan—Multi-stakeholder consultation forum for development planning Perwali Peraturan Walikota—Mayor regulation Pokja Working group often temporarily established for one-issue members often from the LPMK Rukun Tetangga (RT) Smallest administrative unit, usually consisting of 10–20 households Rukun Warga (RW) Second smallest administrative unit, usually consisting of 5–10 RTs

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