coalition-building practices, government policy partnerships, and ...

COALITION-BUILDING PRACTICES, GOVERNMENT POLICY PARTNERSHIPS, AND SECTORAL IDENTITIES: THE CASE OF TWO COALITIONS FOR STREET & WORKING CHILDREN IN UGANDA

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by Timothy James Lowther Malcomson Department of Sports and Education Brunel University May 2006

II

THESIS ABSTRACT This thesis examines how distinctive approaches to building coalitions, and the attitudes of CSOs and government towards each other these reflect, influence policy outcomes. It uses two examples of coalitions in Uganda, exploring how each coalition and partnership building approach is bound to discourses around street children and sectoral (op)positioning. From a constructivist ontological position, this research examines – through observation, interviews, texts, shared personal histories and feedback – how meanings are constructed around streetism and flows of power and accountability within coalition building and partnership practices with government. It is equally concerned about what specifically these meanings refer to. I explore how ideas and practices of multiple accountability and knowledge democratization help clarify the often-amorphous notion of coalition ‘voice’. Informed by critique of contemporary Western proposals for civil society/state institutional order, the thesis examines social, cultural and postcolonial understandings of how coalition and government’s discrete or enmeshed sectoral positioning influence policy-making processes and mediate ideological ‘difference’ in Uganda. In terms of this thesis’ contribution to theory building, I draw attention to complex flows of power within both formal and informal coalition structures and procedures, poorly reflected in other research. Understanding such complexity is necessary for conceptualizing a model of ‘enlightened’ configuration. I also show how perception of institutional and notional sectoral identities influences patterns of partnership interaction within Kampala as larger and Jinja as smaller urban centres. I show how in Uganda such perceptions tend to be expressed in terms of multiple, competing and intersecting postcolonial discourses. I argue that coalition practices that are enmeshed within local cultural and associational patterns of less sectorally-defined governance in Jinja, have gained considerably greater concessions in policy and practice than ideologically discrete and autonomous non-government defined practices in Kampala. The thesis, therefore, contributes to deeper theoretical understandings of how coalitions’ formation and evolution, over time, may be located within cultural, social, historical and postcolonial identities. Finally, this thesis contributes to understanding the practice of constructivist methodological approaches, emphasising the role of shared histories as part of meaning construction. Key words: coalition, government partnership, (in)formality, civil society, postcolonial, street children and Uganda

III

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The evolution of this thesis from original thought to completion inevitably emerged from personal experience over many more years. My acknowledgements, therefore, necessarily and wholeheartedly extend to family, friends and colleagues who have inspired, encouraged, supported and accompanied me from spotty teenager to art student; from young man searching for meaning to middle-aged PhD student ruminating over twenty years work, friendship and learning in the UK, the Netherlands, Uganda, Kenya and Brazil. Acknowledgements, therefore, can only ever prove inadequate. Nevertheless, I would like to particularly thank my supervisor, Dr. Simon Bradford, for being always encouraging, frequently illuminating and constantly enthusiastic. As ideas crystallized into ever longer and ‘denser’ sentences, Simon had the patience to see the wheat within the chaff. I would also like to thank other Brunel staff for guiding me through the often-complex research process and Brunel University for financial assistance to cover course fees and my research ‘feedback’ visit to Uganda. My thanks are also extended to Ben Kulaba and Michael Kitamirike, as Chairperson and Coordinator of Jinja Network, and Andy Williams, as Chairperson/Coordinator of the InterNGO Forum in Kampala, for welcoming me and accompanying the research process over many months of 2004/2005. I thank all other respondents and friends in Uganda who were so open about their experiences, giving wise and insightful counsel about coalition-building and local governance. I also thank Mill Hill Missionaries who inspired me and with whom I worked as ‘lay missionary’ with street children in Kenya, Brazil and Uganda over nearly twenty years. With awareness of the usual critique of donor agencies, I would also like to thank Terre des Hommes Netherlands who, unlike so many other organizations, believed enough in the value of process over output to support Jinja Network from idea to organization. It is because of the opportunity and privileged position Terre des Hommes and my coalition colleagues gave me, as initial coordinator and chairperson of Jinja Network, that this insightful line of inquiry became possible. I dedicate this thesis to my father who died at the good age of eighty-two years old at the end of 2005.

IV

Table of Contents Chapter One:

Introduction........................................................................................... 1

1.1

Context of the research project ...................................................................... 2

1.2

Research parameter and research questions ................................................. 4

1.3

Positioning the research.................................................................................. 5

1.4

Contribution to theory-building ..................................................................... 6

1.5

Summary of chapters...................................................................................... 8

PART ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW - THE COALITION, GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP AND STREET CHILDREN IN GLOBAL AND LOCAL CONTEXTS ........................................................................................................................................ 11 Chapter 2: Street children: local spaces for policy ‘realism’ between political discourse and ethnographic deconstruction ................................................................................... 11 2.1

It’s all in a definition ..................................................................................... 11

2.2

Street children: shifting paradigm and intransigent typologies................... 12

2.3

Street children and realities of context......................................................... 14

2.4

Policy-making: government and NGO commonality and disjunction ......... 18

2.5

Contextual programming ............................................................................. 24

2.6

Concluding remarks ..................................................................................... 27

Chapter 3: Notions of civil society ................................................................................ 30 3.1

The origin and evolution of the notion ‘civil society’................................... 30

3.2

Civil society as a notional ‘space’ ................................................................. 33

3.3

Contemporary definitions of civil society as ‘institution’ ............................. 37

3.4

Usefulness of the notion of ‘civil society’ in African contexts....................... 40

3.5


Chapter 4: Global governance, development and the NGO.......................................... 47 4.1

Governance and partnership: poverty eradication and 47

macro-economics

4.2

The NGO the GRO and civil society: whose interests do they represent?... 54

4.3

The NGO and grassroots activism: managing multiple ‘accountabilities’ .. 58

4.4


Chapter 5: Coalitions: diversity, power and partnership with government................... 63 5.1

Networks, coalitions and their rationale ...................................................... 64

5.2

Understanding diversity, power and structure in coalitions ........................ 68

5.3

Partnership with government and the ‘democratization’ of knowledge...... 76

5.4

Concluding remarks: CSO coalitions as generators of change .................... 84

V Chapter 6: Africa: reconfigurations of the state and ‘space’ for civic engagement ..... 87 6.1

Reconfiguring African identity and the nation-state ................................... 87

6.2

Reconfiguring power in African states......................................................... 94

6.3

African states: spaces for civil society engagement...................................... 97

6.4

Concluding remarks ....................................................................................100

PART TWO: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO RESEARCHING MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES IN JINJA AND KAMPALA .............................................................102 Chapter 7: Methodological perspectives ......................................................................102 7.1

Research questions.......................................................................................103

7.2

The research process: constructivism, social practices and positionality ...106

Chapter 8: 8.1

Research Design....................................................................................114

Criteria for case study selection ..................................................................115

8.2 Reflecting complexity: coalitions and their member organizations and self reference 116 8.3

Methods employed in collecting data ..........................................................120

8.4

Framework of data analysis and presentation ............................................126

8.5

Generalisability ............................................................................................130

8.6

Ethical considerations ..................................................................................131

8.7

Limits to research design .............................................................................133

8.8

Concluding thoughts ....................................................................................134

PART THREE: FINDINGS FROM JINJA AND KAMPALA .....................................136 Chapter 9:

Policy-making spaces in Uganda’s ‘no-party’ participatory democracy.138

9.1

Uganda’s political evolution since 1986.......................................................138

9.2

Pluralism and political evolution.................................................................142

9.3

The citizen, the State and spaces for engagement .......................................143

9.4

Civil society, the state & policy-making spaces...........................................146

9.5 Street children, coalitions and government’s policy development and divergent action in Uganda ......................................................................................151 9.6

Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................154

Chapter 10: Experiences of coalition building – Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum (INF) .......................................................................................................................................156 10.1

Notes on presentation and initial analysis of findings.................................157

10.2

Coalition building and membership in the Inter-NGO Forum ...................159

10.3

Forum cohesion: informal coordination, consensus and ‘advantage’........171

10.4

Resources: narratives of advantage and mistrust.......................................176

10.5

Concluding remarks ....................................................................................186

VI Chapter 11: Experiences of coalition building – Jinja Network..................................188 11.1

The origin and evolution of Jinja Network .................................................188

11.2

‘Sectoral blur’: strategic and ‘naturally occurring’ membership...............191

11.3

Ideological conflict and experiences of ‘inter-sectoral’ blur .......................193

11.4

Formalization of Jinja Network ..................................................................202

11.5

Summary of Jinja Network’s coalition building experience .......................214

Chapter 12: Coalition partnership with government: influencing policy-making in Kampala and Jinja ........................................................................................................217 12.1

Kampala Inter-NGO Forum and government partnership ........................217

12.2

Jinja Network and government partnership...............................................243

PART 4: THEORIZING EXPERIENCES OF COALITION-BUILDING AND GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP-BUILDING IN UGANDA .....................................268 Chapter 13: Formality and informality in Jinja Network and Forum’s experiences of coalition-building ..........................................................................................................268 13.1

The Inter-NGO’s Forum’s ‘informal’ approach to coalition-building .......270

13.2

Jinja Network’s ‘formal’ approach to coalition building ............................274

13.3

Social interaction networking, communication and accountability ...........276

13.4

Some concluding remarks on ‘coalition building’ in Jinja & Kampala......281

Chapter 14: Partnership-building with government in Jinja and Kampala.................285 14.1

Political environments of competing government institutions ....................286

14.2

The Forum and Kampala’s competing government institutions.................290

14.3

Jinja Network and Jinja’s competing government institutions ..................292

14.4

Partnership-building: coalitions navigating government institutions.........293

14.5

Kampala and sectoral ‘(op)positioning’ ......................................................296

14.6

Jinja and ‘sectoral blur’...............................................................................298

14.7

Some concluding comments: Negotiating policy and partnership ..............306

Chapter 15: Conclusion...............................................................................................309 15.1

Coalition-building as praxis and process ....................................................310

15.2

Forging effective partnership with government and influencing policy .....314

15.3

Theorizing CSO coalition building and partnership building with government....................................................................................................318

15.4

Constructivism and the research process: Personal histories and complexity in ‘meaning’ construction .............................................................................327

15.5

Implications of the research for theory building and praxis .......................331

15.6

Limits of the research ...................................................................................334

15.7

Further areas for research...........................................................................334

REFERENCES .............................................................................................................336

VII

List of Figures Figure 1.1: Figure 9.3: Figure 9.5a: Figure 9.5b: Figure 11.1: Figure 11.3: Figure 14.6a: Figure 14.6b: Figure 14.6c: Figure 15.2: Figire 15.3:

Uganda and the location of Kampala and Jinja …………………………… Ugandan local government structure ……………………………………… Kampala timeline – legislative & policy frameworks and government & Forum action ………………………………………………………………. Jinja timeline – local government & Jinja Network action ……………….. CAC’s model of service development & networking in Jinja ……………. Integrated approach to JN Transit Centre ………………………………… Types of knowledge on street children & ‘streetism’ entering public policy spaces ……………………………………………………………………… Jinja’s sectoral identities and sectoral ‘blur’ between policy-influencing and –making spaces & processes …………………………………………. Assumptions within transference of Jinja Network knowledge system to local council ‘political’ spaces through its ‘multi-sectoral’ politicians ....... ‘Embedded’ and coalition- and partnership-building spaces and line of problematic transfer of coalition policy-influencing knowledge …………. Tensions between formal and informal congifurations in coalition building that proposes socio-structural transformation ……………………………..

3 144 152 153 188 200 302 303 304 318 319

List of Tables Table 3.3: Table 5.2: Table 9.5: Table 10.1a: Table 10.1b: Table 10.2: Table 11.2: Table 11.4: Table 12.1:

Inclusive and exclusive notions of ‘Civil Society’ ……………................... Forms and characteristics of social reform coalitions …………………….. Total ‘full-’ & ‘part-time’ street children in Jinja & Kampala by year …… Characteristics of respondents’ organizations: the Inter-NGO Forum, Kampala ………………………………………………................................ Characteristics of respondents’ organizations: Jinja Network, Jinja ……… Membership/attendance of Inter-NGO Forum – December 1997 till June 2004 ………………………………………………………………………. Local government held positions for JN’s ‘non-government’ member representatives ……………………………………………………………. Comparison of frequency of JN general meetings July 2001 till June 2004 ……………………………………………………………………………... Government attendance at Forum monthly meetings – Dec 1997 till June 2004 ……………………………………………………………………….

40 73 151 154 155 163 192 209 223

List of Appendices APPENDIX 1: Ugandan Local Government Structure ................................35252 APPENDIX 2: Schedule of questions for Coalition membership ..............35353 APPENDIX 3: One-page summary of research project presented to respondents......................................................................................................3566 APPENDIX 4: Some examples of JN’s policy-making and advisory encounters, and programming for street children with government.....3577

VIII

Glossary ATC ACRWC CBO CSO DPSWO Forum IFI IMF INGO ISP JMC JN KCC MGLSD NGO PRGF PRSP Streetism UNCRC

Assistant Town Clerk African Convention on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Community Based Organization Civil Society Organization District Probation and Social Welfare Office(r) The Inter-NGO Forum International Finacial Institution International Monetary Fund International Non-governmental Organization Inter-sectoral Partnerships Jinja Municipal Council Jinja Network Kampala City Council Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development Non-governmental Organization Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (World Bank) Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Street children and poor urban community’s socio-economic interactions with the street as survival strategy United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child

Chapter One:

Introduction

In order to expand our understanding of street children and ‘streetism’ within policymaking processes, this thesis examines two particular experiences of building coalitions and partnerships with government in Uganda. It explores how the Ugandan coalition and partnership experience is bound up and impacted, but equally throws light upon much broader continental and global discourses on the state, civil society, ‘democratization’ and ‘good governance’. Since the end of the Cold War and southern Africa’s Apartheid struggles in the early 1990s, new patterns of global strategic and economic governance have forced African states to ‘reconfigure’ themselves or be excluded by the new framework of aid and loan conditionalities. At times smacking of imposition of a Western tripartite framework of societal-institutional order (i.e. state/business/civil society), civil society organizations (CSOs) have been championed by multi- and bi-lateral agencies as ‘catalysts for democratic reform’ (Howell, 2000:12). Within these new ‘development’ orthodoxies, civil society is seen as the vehicle for countervailing authoritarian tendencies of the state and as an arena for the citizen’s participation in the development process (James, 2002:3). Some Africanist scholars, on the other hand, argue that African state reconfiguration is equally fixed within its own social, cultural and ethnic conditionalities that are largely misunderstood or ignored by the West (e.g. Brown, 2003). In many African states, therefore, desire for pluralism competes with traditional ethnic or religious power orthodoxies in what Mbembe (1992a:5) describes as a ‘… baroque style of political gamesmanship’. Emerging patterns of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa (and, indeed, elsewhere), therefore, often look very different from the proposed international ‘blueprint’. ‘Baroque’ style resistances to such a blueprint, moreover, may well spring as much from postcolonial political discourses on African, Asian or Latin American’s1 ‘right to control’ such change (Kodesh, 2001: 541) as from their desire to preserve governing elites’ political privilege.

1

Indeed, quite apart from the obvious African examples of Zimbabwe and Uganda, just such political resistances to perceived cultural, political and socio-economic bullying by the United States appear to accompany Venezuela and Bolivia’s present processes of state ‘reconfiguration’.

2 Added to its traditional ‘service delivery’ function, therefore, the African NGO – as the preferred civil society institution for multi- and bi-lateral agency funding1 – is now seen as the vehicle through which to put pressure on the state for policy reforms and ‘democratization’ (James, 2002). The NGO is encouraged to occupy the new spaces that state ‘democratization’ is presumed to offer it. However, equally there is a growing consensus that, despite the NGO’s particular celebrity status with donors, it should be more emphasised as merely one amongst a great diversity of civil society organizations (World Bank, 2003a; Hudock, 1999; Uphoff, 1995). Criticism of NGOs’ traditional accountability deficits to their grassroots constituencies (e.g. Uphoff, 1995) has, moreover, meant that increasing interest has turned to the Civil Society Organization (CSO) coalition as co-operative expression of civil society interests. Africanist scholars, however, question the appropriateness and intention in ascribing a Western ‘civil society’ institutional framework to very different African associational contexts (e.g. Clayton, 1998; Mbembe, 1992a see Chapter 3). African governments, furthermore, remain suspicious of the intention and, at times, the adversarial posture (James, 2002) that underpins such shifts of institutional order. These national and international ‘development’ and governance discourses appear to have both framed and partly defined Kampala and Jinja’s experience of coalition-building and partnership building with government. In terms of the two Ugandan coalitions studied within this thesis, influencing government’s understanding of street children and streetism (and thereby influencing policy and intervention) is very much informed by the degree to which state and civil society interconnect. Themes around ‘democratization’, ‘accountability’, and cultural appropriateness of Western ‘sectoral-institutional’ order (i.e. state/business/civil society) are not only seen to influence how the coalition forms and sustains itself, but also how the coalition understands its relationship to the government as ‘partner’.

1.1

Context of the research project

This thesis examines two selected Ugandan coalitions in two distinctive urban centres whose principle focus is street children: the Inter-NGO Forum in Kampala, and Jinja Network (see Figure 1.1, below). With particular attention to contemporary theory building on street children and streetism, this thesis explores these coalition-building and

1

That the southern NGO should assume its legitimacy to ‘civil society’ status is much contended. I explore this in Chapters 3 and 4.

3 government partnership-building contexts and experiences. It examines how each coalition’s formation, its growth and its ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ structural and procedural configuration, redraw or merely reproduce assumed ‘government-like’ power orthodoxies – which the developmentally ‘enlightened’ coalition is supposed to challenge.

Figure 1.1: Uganda and the location of Kampala and Jinja

Equally implicated, however, are strong or weak ‘civil society’ identities within distinctive African urban environments in which the coalition evolves. Whereas Kampala is a large city of 1.2 million people, Jinja is a relatively small town of 80,000. Understanding underlying patterns of influence on both coalition configuration and government partnership, therefore, requires understanding of these urban associational patterns. The strong sectoral identity of Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum is perhaps underpinned by the institutional presence of many international organizations that promote such distinctions. In Jinja, on the other hand, NGOs are few, small and indigenous. Boundaries between government and non-government become blurred (e.g. Brock, 2004). Indeed, Uganda’s (until February 2006) unique indigenous model of ‘no-party’ democracy is based on the assumption of citizen participation1. Whilst not a feature of Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum, within the overflows between citizenship and governance, Jinja Network’s many NGO and

1

At least, this is the core of the Movement’s philosophy and rhetoric.

4 grassroots representatives equally take on multiple government and non-government identities.

1.2

Research parameter and research questions

Throwing light upon productive coalition advocacy approaches to policy-making for street children remains the principal background interest of this thesis. Although the two principle foci for this research project are not specific to street children policy-making, they nevertheless only make sense when explored within this context. Framed by street children discourses, therefore, the research examines: 1. coalition-building and its ‘entrenchment’ in orthodox power hierarchies or ‘enlightenment’ as socio-structural practice, and 2. distinctive Ugandan approaches to influencing street children policy outcomes through coalition engagement with government. The first research focus examines how choices of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ structures and procedures intentionally or inadvertently impact how power is exercised and dispersed within each coalition. In the light of coalition-building’s ‘shadow’ side (e.g. de Mann, 2004; Gilchrist, 2004), I also examine ideas of coalition-building as ‘enlightened’ sociostructural enterprise. I touch on ideas of ‘multiple accountabilities’ and ‘knowledge democratization’ and how these might help make sense of the usually amorphous notion ‘voice’ with coalitions. The second research focus is framed by the assumed efficacy of the contemporary international civil society/government/market framework of African urban institutional order. It examines how each coalition interacts with government within policy-making spaces that are availed them. I examine Kampala’s autonomous ‘outsider’ model and Jinja’s enmeshed ‘insider’ model of government engagement. I explore what influences these emergent patterns of engagement, and how such patterns have impacted policymaking processes and outcomes for street children and streetism. Examining policymaking outcomes for street children in both Jinja and Kampala, strong focus is placed upon exploring how the coalition approaches achieve compromise or accommodation between NGO and government’s distinctive ideologies and interests. In the weaker ‘civil society’ urban institutional context of Jinja, the thesis also examines the role of sectoral

5 blur1 (Brock, 2004) and the individual’s multi-sectoral identities in mediating the assumed adversarial nature of sectoral (op)positioning2. Finally, I consider the potential for using more culturally defined associational contexts for productive policy outcomes through coalition- and partnership-building and I examine its limitations. The two overarching sets of research questions flow from the research parameters that I outline above. One set addresses ‘coalition building’ and the other ‘policy-influencing partnerships with government’. The two principal research questions are: -

What form of coalition configuration constitutes an ‘enlightened’ model that could effectively pursue socio-structural transformation? Jinja Network and the InterNGO Forum will be examined to answer this question.

-

Which coalition approaches to forging NGO and Ugandan government policymaking partnerships for street children yield the most positive partnership results? A comparison between the insider/enmeshed approach of Jinja and the outside/discrete approach of Kampala will address this question

In chapter 7 I sub-divide these two questions, for example to focus specifically on ideas around ‘formality’ and ‘informality’, accountability, sectoral identity, street children in Uganda, ‘democratized’ spaces, policy-making partnerships and ‘sectoral blur’ (see Section 7.1).

1.3

Positioning the research

The very idea that each coalition can opt for an ‘enlightened’ approach to coalitionbuilding as ethical or rational3 ‘choice’ implicates coalition actors in both constructing and applying different meanings to such social phenomena. In the light of experience and further reflection upon the implications of such choices, therefore, the social actor is drawn to constantly make revision to such meanings. And thus coalition-building, partnershipbuilding and, indeed, the research process itself, all spring from the interplay of socially 1

Because many stakeholders take on multiple identities as citizen, politician and businessperson, attributing distinctive and clear sectorally-defined representational status becomes problematic as such sectoral distinctions ‘blur’. 2 That is, where NGOs are seen to adopt the assumed institutional function of civil society as ‘outsider’ critic of government. 3 Although ‘rational choice’ theory would argue from a more ‘positivistic’ perspective.

6 situated realities, whose meanings are constantly being both completed and in a state of revision (Bryman, 2001:16-18). From a constructivist ontological perspective, therefore, my knowing the diverse meanings applied by coalition members and government officials – e.g. to street children, partnership or the legitimacy ascribed to actors’ agency – depends upon how I have been able to engage with and participate in processes of cooperative ‘interpretation’. This research methodology, therefore, examines – through observation, interviews, texts, shared personal histories and feedback – how meanings are constructed around streetism and flows of power and accountability within coalition building and partnership practices with government. In order to fully address the research questions, the approach is equally concerned about what specifically these meanings refer to.

1.4

Contribution to theory-building

Hay & Richards (2000) suggest that what is missing in literature on coalitions is theory on network formation, evolution, transformation and termination as practice and process. This research does precisely this. It describes how Inter-NGO Forum and Jinja Network’s experiences of coalition formation, evolution and transformation, bind them to their own historical, cultural, political, economic and social particularities of context. How the coalition understands, interprets and constructs relationships to government is bound to these same particularities of context. That they are bound to such contexts, and how this does or does not inform and determine coalition- and government partnership-building, itself allows the research to inform broader theory on coalition-building as practice and process. Indeed, most research into coalition building has been undertaken from an organization theory perspective that tends towards pursuit of ‘good practices’ definitions that mainly emphasize the positive outcomes of coalition building, largely over simplifying complexity. Whereas de Mann (2004) broadly outlines the usefulness of acknowledging hidden costs for networks of business organizations, this thesis extends considerably the analysis of complexity bound within social, cultural, historical and postcolonial understanding of the hidden costs of coalition-building. Perspectives within organization theory tend towards ‘good practice’ analyses that largely underplay the complexity of how power and accountability flow within formal and informal coalition spaces. The thesis argues that, rather than apply an ‘either/or’ framework of coalitions as formal or informal structures, it is far more productive to understand them in terms of complex systems of both formal and informal dynamics that need to be both acknowledged and managed. The

7 presence or absence of each formal or informal configuration has a potential for entrenching or challenging existent hierarchies. In acknowledging such complexity, I am able to locate the tensions inherent within coalition-building as ‘enlightened’ sociotransformational practice. This research also offers the academic and practitioner deep descriptive analysis of formation, evolution, and transformation of the coalition as practice and process. What emerges is a ‘historicity’ that binds coalition-building practices to much broader ‘development’ and African ‘state reconfiguration’ and postcolonial discourses that are often ignored. The acknowledgement of such bounded systems in itself advances theory on coalition building as process and practice. The research proposes a potentially productive ‘entrenched’ framework for coalitionbuilding and government partnership outside Africa’s larger cities. Analysis of Jinja Network’s experience suggests potential value in engaging African associational formations within coalition-building practices, where autonomous non-indigenised ‘institutional’ civil society configurations appear inappropriate. Acknowledging the influence of ‘sectoral blur’ on coalition-building practices, this thesis suggests benefits to the practitioner of engagement with actors’ multiple identities (as citizen, political leader, and trader) in mediating apparently entrenched ideological positions. Such opportunities, I conclude, are more likely to occur in smaller urban centres where relationships are less defined by sectorally defined autonomous institutional blocks. This thesis presents a research process that exposes the reader to often complex tensions between the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997, p.127) within the construction of meaning in complex social, cultural and postcolonial environments. The thesis perhaps clarifies a constructivist approach that acknowledges the researcher as a creative part of how meanings are co-constructed together with informants. Focusing only on coalition ‘rights-based’ advocacy practices in the large cities of Africa tends to ignore broader longitudinal processes that begin with children and family migration from village to smaller urban centres. With greater contemporary interest in ‘preventive’ and ‘poverty reduction’ strategies, therefore, examining potentially productive coalition approaches to influencing policy for street children in smaller urban centres, such as Jinja, is long overdue.

8 Finally, this thesis contributes to understanding the practice of constructivist methodological approaches to exploring the processes and practices of partnership work and coalition building particularly, emphasising, within meaning construction, the role and value of shared histories (see Section 15.1).

1.5

Summary of chapters

The way the thesis chapters are presented follows my own narrative logic. They are presented in four parts. Part One is the literature review, Part Two presents the research design, Part Three the findings for Jinja and Kampala coalitions and their initial interpretation and analysis, and Part Four the analysis of and conclusion that binds the two coalitions to claims on generalisability. To give an overview of the thesis narrative, I summarise the content of these parts and chapters below. Part One is the literature review that acts to create a string of theoretical narratives around which the methodology and research questions have been allowed to crystallise and gain greater clarity. Chapter 2, as the context for coalition and partnership building, examines historical and contemporary discourses on street children and streetism. It shows how street children’s social identification as ‘victim’ or ‘villain’ betrays the distinctive ideological meanings applied to them and their ‘rehabilitation’ by NGO and government actors. Looking from a ‘sustainable livelihoods’ perspective, contemporary interest falls on a ‘Child & Youth Friendly Cities’ framework. This proposes that more productive policy outcomes might be found in mainstreaming street children into a broader policy framework that rationalises sustainable ‘survival’ strategies for much larger urban populations. Chapter 3 explores contemporary interest in the notion civil society. It looks at critique of its institutional application as new development orthodoxy, and the social, cultural and economic baggage the notion bears. The chapter also looks at critique of the appropriateness of such institutional order in African associational contexts. Chapter 4 looks at the role ascribed to civil society within new patterns of global governance and loan conditionalities. It examines ideas of inter-sectoral partnership

9 (ISP) and the NGO as the multi- and bi-lateral agencies’ preferred institutional civil society partner. It also looks at the NGO’s traditional accountability deficits. Chapter 5 examines the contemporary popularity of the CSO coalition as ‘embedded’ institutional expression of civil society1. It looks at factors proposed as necessary for the coalition’s success as organization, government partner, and as site for the ‘democratization’ of knowledge. Chapter 6 looks at the processes of African state ‘reconfiguration’ since the early 1990s. It examines postcolonial contexts and perspectives around how changes are connected to historical, cultural, ethnic and economic conditionalities that are seldom taken sufficiently into consideration by the new global development orthodoxies. Part Two is presented in two chapters. Chapter 7 outlines the ontological, epistemological and methodological stance of the research project. Chapter 8 outlines the research design and explains the criteria for choosing Jinja Network and the Inter-NGO Forum as case study. I also present the research methods that were employed, discuss the research’s potential for generalisability and explain the research project as ethical practice. Part Three contains four chapters that present findings and their initial analysis, drawing out descriptive ‘particularities’ for Jinja and Kampala’s experiences. Chapter 9 is designed to give the reader the necessary insight into Uganda as context for coalition- and partnership-building practices by contextualising previous discussions from Part One (e.g. explaining Ugandan state ‘reconfiguration’ in the mid-1980s, the concept of ‘no-party’ democracy, and the spaces these have availed the coalition). Chapters 9 and 10 present the findings and initial analysis of the Inter-NGO and Jinja Network’s experiences of coalition-building, and Chapter 12 their experiences of building policy partnerships with government. Part Four is the final section that binds the particularities of the two coalitions to their claims on generalisability. Its two principal themes refer to the original two principal research questions: “what constitutes ‘enlightened’ coalition-building practice?” and

1

Described as advantage through cooperative ‘interdependence’, embeddedness is contrasted to the competitive advantages pursued by the discrete organization (Witt & Meyer, 1998).

10 “what

constitutes

effective

coalition

policy

partnership-building

practices

in

Ugandan/African contexts?” In Chapter 2, which follows this introduction, I explore theory and discourse on street children. Coalition-building experiences in Jinja and Kampala only make sense because they are responses to NGO and government understandings of street children as ‘problem’. Chapter 2 particularly helps the reader understand what distinctive ‘NGO’ and ‘government’ ideological discourses might imply for coalition-building and government policy partnership-building practices.

11

PART ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW - THE COALITION, GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP AND STREET CHILDREN IN GLOBAL AND LOCAL CONTEXTS

“Bawulúlá ísandhá: yeerabírá (abáaná) ába Nábúmbúlí”

One who destroys the dried banana leaves forgets the children of the spider (Lusoga proverb)

Chapter 2: Street children: local spaces for policy ‘realism’ between political discourse and ethnographic deconstruction Despite an acknowledged movement away from simplistic generalisations in street child specific academic literature (e.g. Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003; Panter-Brick, 2002), wider discourse is still awash with unsupported claims that link street children with societal malaise. The street is characterised as a ‘fall-out’ zone for AIDS orphans, the refugee child from zones of conflict, dysfunctional abusive families, or perhaps just delinquent children and youth. This chapter therefore examines these various discourses on street children in terms of their potential impacts on policy-making and programming for local government. With much contemporary programming emphasis placed on a ‘rights-based’ approach, this chapter discusses and critiques this in the light of a ‘realism’ proposed by both ‘sustainable livelihood’ and ‘child/youth friendly cities’ discourses. I conclude with a brief examination of the potential space for civil society coalitions to engage local government in ‘repositioning’ policy and programming – underpinned by a radical re-evaluation of their dominant ideological discourses on both street children and much larger populations of urban and rural poor children.

2.1

It’s all in a definition

The most used definition of street children, made popular in UNICEF texts (e.g. Taçon, 1991), makes a distinction between children ‘on’ the street (i.e. working and visible, but living at ‘home’ with their families) and children ‘of’ the street (i.e. ‘street living’

12 unaccompanied children for whom the street is the primary focus). Although various refinements have resulted from an ever-growing body of ethnographic research1, and although, as Ennew (2003) seems to imply, its lack of clarity makes it an unworkable framework for policy development, this typology has remained remarkably resilient in NGO and government policy forums. Indeed, the working definition adopted by the Government of Uganda (MGLSD, 1999) – ‘Full-time’ and ‘Part-time’ street children – is merely a thinly disguised rewording of this typology. Although the idea of ‘simple problems generating simple solutions’ is clearly popular with government policy-makers, ‘thin’ definitions such as these do little more than decouple street children from the complexity of local social, cultural, economic and political context that is broadly acknowledged in contemporary academic street children literature (e.g. see Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003; Panter-Brick, 2003) – which, on the other hand, might well be the resource strapped policy-maker’s intention (Malcomson, 2000:31). Judith Ennew (2003) complains that definitions used in many international aid agency policy frameworks have also not ‘matured’ from the Latin American model upon which they were based. Perhaps evolving from a mixture of the liberation theological imagery and Marxist interpretation (e.g. see De Venanzi, 2003) of the enlightened citizen battling the repressive state, the street child is characterised as protagonist and the street as a battleground. Thus, the figure of the street educator, popularised by what Ennew sees as ‘a particular reading of Paulo Freire’ (e.g. 1982), became a project ‘prototype’, facilitating this heroic struggle2. Street children are in consequence, she laments, called to bear the symbolic weight of adult political agendas. As a result of this enduring mythology, the government, aid agency and local NGO’s agenda has often been served by a bi-polar portrayal of street children as victims or villains, aiming to engender powerful emotional overtones of pity or hostility (Aptekar 1988) to support bi-polar policy approaches.

2.2

Street children: shifting paradigm and intransigent typologies

Ironically, Williams (1992a) observes, coining the term ‘street child’ was an attempt to liberate the ‘homeless’ urban child from pejorative labelling. Instead, imprecise generalisations have tended to box large clusters of poor urban children into a street child 1

For instance, Dewees & Klees (1995) add a categorisation ‘in’ to denote intermittent contact with family, while Lusk & Mason (1993) add the category ‘children of street families’. 2 By way of illustration, I received an email recently from a project in Guatemala City called ‘Bringing Hope to the Hopeless – The Street Revolution’.

13 discourse that has predominantly divorced them from broader social, cultural, economic and political themes. Various attempts to re-package street children as ‘homeless’ or as a ‘child in especially difficult circumstances’ (e.g. UNESCO, 1999) have tended to merely muddy further the existing confusion by universalising imprecise descriptors (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003). However, despite the intransigence and political convenience of ‘popular’ typologies, a ‘paradigm shift’ in the academic sphere of the late 1990s (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003; Panter-Brick, 2003) has brought a growing inter-disciplinary focus to street children discourse that moved away from trying to universalise the child’s contextually ‘specific’ experiences of the street. Ennew & Swart-Kruger note, in particular, fresh ethnographic insights of ‘time and space’ brought by geographers such as Beazley (2003) and Young & Barrett (2001) to street children research, which allows the literature to break away from, at times, a near obsessive psycho-social preoccupation with ideas of dysfunction, pathology and psychological breakdown. Lucchini (1996) uses Giddens’ theory of structuration with Weberian concepts of social construction of meaning (see Giddens, 1984) to explore and connect elements of ‘time and space’ to street children ethnography. Hence, for example, Invernizzi (2003) argues that children and parents' views and practices regarding work and socialisation in the streets of Lima become embedded in the realities of survival in the urban shanty. Rather than referencing themselves to abstracted societal norms, they give a context-bound (i.e. evolving ‘survival’ use of urban spaces as part of growing up) understanding of the ‘child’s best interest’ which might be at considerable odds with the views and practices of government and aid agencies. Child agency in constructions of meaning, entrenched in questions of power and disempowerment, also starts to enter into the field of rights. Implicit in such research are such questions as ‘shouldn’t street children – conducting their own ‘survival’ interactions with the urban environment – have as much right as anyone else in giving and sustaining meaning to their world of the street’ (e.g. Young & Barrett, 2001; van Beers, 1996). In most societies and cultures, claims for a diffuse right to give meaning inevitably sit uncomfortably with conservative tendencies to reproduce power-referenced ‘values’. Indeed, Levi-Strauss (1949) suggests that any morally powerful identity cannot exist without reference to the ‘other’. As the majority of local street children NGOs in

14 developing countries are charitable religious foundations, credit can certainly be given to Ennew & Swart-Kruger’s (2003) assertion that both NGOs and governments seem to work through public discourse using oppositional frameworks strongly flavoured with moral indignation. And hence, for both government and NGO, home becomes contrasted to the street, social with anti-social, moral with amoral, domestic normality with street deviance. And thus, though mostly vanished from scholarly writing, for ‘popular’ discourse the dubious notion of a deprived street child is located opposite normality, a notion that persists in both policy and project design. Distancing themselves from the real world of the ‘pre-intervention’ street child (Malcomson, 2000), programmes set out “ … to bring children's behaviour and lifestyle in line with public perceptions of social hygiene, or what is normative and appropriate in childhood” (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003). Less politicised reference to Freire’s (1982) educational theories on the relationship between street children (educandos) and project worker (educador) criticises such directive and value-laden approaches, characterising them as ‘banking’ methods – simply reproducing all the social and cultural contradictions and conceptual hierarchies they purport to resolve (Malcomson, 2000).

2.3

Street children and realities of context

Critical academic literature, some dating back to the early 1990s, argues that the term “street children” is problematic (e.g. Williams, 1992a; Dallape, 1996). Catherine PanterBrick (2003) provides us with four objections that I have already hinted at above: “First, it is a generic term that obscures the heterogeneity in children’s actual circumstances. Second, it does not correspond to the ways many children relate their own experiences or to the reality of their movements on and off the street. Third, it is imbued with pejorative or pitying connotations. Fourth, it deflects attention from the broader population of children affected by poverty and social exclusion. Indeed, ‘street children’ is a construct that reflects various social and political agendas.” (Panter-Brick, 20031) Any clarification of street children’s contexts and realities that draws across cities, countries and continents, therefore, runs the risk of universalising them and blurring ‘categories’. However, if such different experiences cannot also reference themselves to broader environmental contexts and domains of meaning, policy-making for street children (e.g. on education, health, employment, training, etc.) is, indeed, doomed to remain

1

This citation is taken from a web-based e-journal and therefore has no ‘page number’ (see ‘References’).

15 ‘unworkable’. Perhaps with this contradiction in mind, it is necessary to read with a ‘local government policy-makers eye’ recent academic literature that discusses broad themes such as risk and resilience, street children’s contextual and gendered interaction with their environment, and street children as manipulating and giving multiple meanings to the street or to ‘home’.

2.3.1

Risk, resilience and street child agency

Boyden (2003) asserts that the way risk is perceived in different poor urban communities, and the strategies they employ to manage it, is strongly related to culture (perhaps understood as dynamic rather than static). It is probable, she suggests, that different approaches to child rearing will have different outcomes in terms of the ability of an individual to overcome adversity. Street children (across all categories) seen through the lens of a largely exported Western notion of childhood (Ennew, 2003) – for example, through UNICEF or UNHCR – are generally perceived as having fewer survival strategies available to them than adults, and this is understood to be a source of vulnerability. Boyden argues that, in practice, the reverse often applies. “Children commonly have far more options open to them than do adults, simply because societies [in developing countries] tend to be less prescriptive about children's tasks and roles.” (Boyden, 20031) Street child resilience, therefore, can be understood in both contextually constructed cultural identities, and their ability to engage actively and creatively with their situation, adopting constructive approaches to the management of risk (Boyden, 2003), even though unmediated by adults. Contemporary street child focused literature generally acknowledges that street children are active in constructing their world, and that their world cannot be distinguished by a simplistic division between ‘home’ and ‘street’, but is rather located in a diversity of what Lucchini calls ‘domains’ – which include both public and private spaces (such as state institutions, trading centres, parks and cinemas), government and NGO/Church programmes, as well as groups of street working adults (such as street educators, market vendors, ‘street adults’, etc.). Rather than simply determined by what is on offer, these domains may well be chosen based on their different social, cultural, spiritual and economic meanings for street children (Beazley, 2003; Young & Barrett, 2001).

1


16 Indeed, as Boyden (2003) points out, sometimes a diversity of interventions become an integral part of children's coping strategies, but not necessarily in ways imagined or intended by the government or NGO/Church agencies. Manipulating their environment becomes entwined with manipulating their identities, tailoring them to what Ennew and Swart-Kruger term ‘the skills of impression management’. Using a biblical metaphor, street children ‘give to Caesar’ what belongs to Caesar. The complex network of temporal or spatial ‘domains’ (e.g. a place to eat, another to sleep, and another to rest and play) provides street children with many Caesars and therefore the spectre of multiple identities – often giving a false impression that street children are without resources (e.g. Hecht, 1998; Young & Barrett, 2001; van Beers, 1996). In the same way, ‘home’ may well become more associated with the child’s intimate ‘domain-based’ social network than family location (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003), and the family structure – determined by the realities of ‘streetism’ as part of changing community survival strategies in urban shanties – looked at as ‘new and different’ rather than being characterised by ‘breakdown and dysfunction’ (Rizzini & Butler, 2003). However, Ennew & Swart-Kruger (2003) also caution that it would be false to assume that these identities are merely playfully benign constructions. Relying on their ability to survive in adversity and exploitation, street children are also “ … forced to internalise either negative constructions of themselves as victims and delinquents, or positive images as heroes at liberty” offering resistance only through manipulation of these images. Although much of it lies outside the scope and space of this thesis, it is necessary to acknowledge just some other areas of ‘risk’ for street children’s well-being that are also discussed in various literature (some to which I shall return later), for instance taking into consideration: o structural forces at different local and global levels that limit the options available to street children (e.g. Thomas de Benitez, 2003; Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003), o cultural (e.g. Aptekar & Heinonen, 2003; Ennew, 2003; Dallape, 1996; Rizzini, 2001) and gender specific (e.g. Hannson, 2003; Aptekar & Heinonen, 2003) nuances to these options,

17 o health and informed ‘risk behaviour management’ in the light of HIV/AIDS (e.g. Evans, 2002; Rajani & Dudrati, 1996)1 and substance abuse (e.g. Scanlon et al., 1998; WHO/PSA, 1997; NIMHANS, Indian Institute), and o context specific learning and flexible educational programming for street children (e.g. Leonardos, 1995; Malcomson, 2000; Arlin Mickelson, 2000).

2.3.2

Obscuring cultural contexts

African street children discourse that gives due weight to cultural norms that often oscillate between social, economic and spiritual traditions of rural conservatism and urban adaptation, are thin on the ground (Ennew, 2003). As seen earlier, much contemporary scholarly street children discourse is either locked in to a rights-based framework or into notions of the ‘street child’s world’ with inter-weaving identities, “… based on different contexts and people with whom they interact on the street, [which] means that at different times the children will act on the fundamental value of individual survival, but at other times they must rely on the interdependence and solidarity within [their] social group.” (Beazley, 20032) Although acknowledging it should not be read this way, such ‘street-centric’ studies (perhaps read with policy-making in mind) give a certain impression of street children being disengaged from broader cultural contexts, somehow seeing the complex community ways of doing things as merely aisles in a supermarket of domains. However, as we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, without constantly reminding ourselves not to merge categories, we can quickly get a distorted impression of the number of street children who are completely divorced from their families and communities. They are relatively few (Butler & Rizzini, 2003), and totally out of proportion to the prime attention given them in literature that addresses the poor urban child. And, as Lucchini (1996:169) notes, there are relatively few children who distinguish themselves from others by having the street as their exclusive point of reference. Instead, Aptekar & Heinonen (2003) observe, street children’s reference is predominantly squalid and overcrowded urban environments, typical for many large African towns and cities, that homogenise the way children are socialised. Over time this cultural and economic socialisation and adaptation becomes a norm for large portions of African 1

Although Ennew & Swart-Kruger (2003) are not convinced that academic researcher claims that HIVAIDS orphans are swelling the street population are sufficiently tested. 2 This citation is taken from a web-based e-journal and therefore has no ‘page number’ (see ‘References’).

18 children and youth. And, as we noted at the beginning of this chapter, individual spatial and temporal narratives of what the Ugandan government calls the ‘full-time street children’ can allow manipulative policy-makers to either obscure or demonise the day-today realities of a much wider urban population (which, in the context of Uganda, can equally include AIDS orphans or refugee from Sudan, Congo, Rwanda or Uganda itself). In this way governments can legislate away the adaptive options available and necessary to the child and his family for urban survival. Thus, a rights-based requirement for compulsory schooling can easily undermine the family’s ability to sustain itself economically.

2.4

Policy-making: government and NGO commonality and disjunction

There are a variety of expected influences on the policy-maker for street children at local government level. The interplay of politics, culture and economics both constructs how the child is perceived and feeds off this perception in providing for or excluding the poor urban child. Thomas de Benitez (2003) identifies six interacting barriers that keep street children in extreme poverty and excluded from mainstream society1 - inclusion often being the implied rationale for intervention. Here I briefly try to both summarise and modify them to include the multiple categories I have so far discussed. For Thomas de Benitez, street children are: 1. characterised as ‘out of place’, separated from the usual rules and protective norms of society; 2. they are vulnerable to abuses and dysfunctions of the juvenile justice system. Falling prey to legislation that restricts use of the street, children are more likely to come into conflict with the law, and are less able to defend themselves once in the system; 3. they have less probability of being able to access education because of the social, cultural and economic condition they and/or their family live in; 4. they have greater exposure to health risks and less access to health services; 5. although earning money is essential for the child and poor urban family’s survival, the child’s work is always ‘informal’, is sometimes illegal, tends towards exploitation and can be hazardous because it nearly always lies outside the scope of protection guaranteed by more formal arrangements; and 1

Thomas de Benitez (2003) applies these six barriers specifically to the ‘homeless’ street child.

19 6. because of stigma, lack of appropriate documents and the sporadic nature of employment,

the

‘homeless’

street

child

finds

problems

in

renting

accommodation. The possibility that street children (again I use this term in a broader sense) can be characterised as ‘out of place’ seems curious considering the demographics of such cities as Kampala. Kampala’s population is 1.2 million (UIA, 2004), and if we assume similar trends to Uganda as a whole, we can estimate an approximate population of 403,000 children, with 55% of them having dropped out of primary school before completion of grade 5 (UNICEF, 2003). Despite Uganda’s acknowledged progress in many areas, with estimates of 21% of urban children involved in child labour (UNICEF, 2003)i – perhaps because of the fact that 82% (UNICEF, 2003) of the general population of Uganda live on less than $1 a day – arguments that deny Uganda’s need for the urban child’s economic agency in sustaining family livelihood, and the pervasiveness of Thomas de Benitez’s barriers, are clearly delusional. The tendency for official literature to describe diverse categories as ‘street child’ (e.g. including ‘out of school children’) might also be a matter of political convenience, serving other agendas (Malcomson, 2000). Thus, the irresponsible capture of large populations of poor urban children under a generic banner ‘street child’ (Ennew, 2003) – and their characterisation as a disease needing to be eliminated (Bibars, 1998) – allows local and national-level politicians and policy-makers to focus on restrictive laws on ‘streetism’ rather than address structural issues that lock the poor urban child and his family into a cycle of poverty. Thus, Beazley’s (2003) characterisation of the state/street child relationship can translate into a broader context. “In the eyes of the state and dominant society, these children are seen to be committing a social violation, as their very presence contradicts state ideological discourse on family values and ideas about public order. Such an offence justifies the ‘cleaning up’ of children from the streets, arrests, imprisonment and, in some extreme cases, torture and extermination.” (Beazley, 20031) On one side, the ‘generic’ street child of popular discourse no longer becomes distinguished from the criminal (Bibars, 1998). On the other side, the more populous poor urban child is ingested into the generic designation street child – and is therefore also 1


20 stigmatised and characterised as ‘out of place’. However, Ennew & Swart-Kruger (2003) also draw our attention to global and national ‘post-Cold War’ structural and political realities and pressures on developing countries that impact ‘cash-strapped’ government policy on street children (again in the widest sense). African state reconfiguration in the 1990s (see Chapters 3 and 5) makes many policy options unworkable or beyond the capacity of government and policy-maker. In these conditions, cloaking a government’s inability to create even basic conditions for survival of the urban poor becomes a mechanism for its own survival. Like street children, the government’s ‘skills of image management’ allow it to prioritise resources to service its own framework of interests by portraying some sectors of society as more deserving than others1. This process inevitably interacts with the growing leverage and effectiveness of both business and civil society interest groups in jockeying for advantage on African policy agendas (see Chapter 6).

2.4.1

Reactive and protective responses

Thomas de Benitez (2003) places government responses to street children in three categories: protective, reactive and rights-based. What she calls ‘reactive’ and ‘protective’ responses follow on from the specific portrayal of the ‘street child’ discussed earlier. The rights based approach frames itself by various interpretations of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC).

Reactive responses to street children The ‘reactive’ approach, Thomas de Benitez argues, portrays street children primarily as a threat or potential threat to public order and safety. A key policy manifestation is the use of the juvenile justice system, using laws on ‘vagrancy’ or, in Uganda’s case, the offense of being ‘idle and disorderly’ as a way to clear the streets and punish offenders for the common good. Policies of ‘rounding up’ and threats of the custodial option are used to frighten children off the streets and are, Thomas de Benitez suggests, symptoms of ‘authoritarian populism’, “ … draw[ing] on particular prejudices and discontents to attract support and legitimacy.” (Thomas de Benitez, 20032) Stuart Hall et al. (1978) place a Marxist light on these dynamics, suggesting that the mass media also tend to collude with governments to reproduce ‘ideological’ interpretations of 1

Chapter 3 examines Foucault’s assertion, “Power [is] tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself” (Foucault, 1978:86) 2 This citation is taken from a web-based e-journal and therefore has no ‘page number’ (see ‘References’).

21 reality (in this case, criminalizing street children) to serve the interests of the ruling class in countries living through political chaos or economic decline. To frighten the children off the street in such countries, initiatives tend to be repressive and corrective (though perhaps clothed as ‘rehabilitation’ in custodial institutions) and frequently stray outside the obligations towards the child under the CRC – often because of inadequate and inappropriate staffing and resources in such institutional responses (Bibars, 1998). However, there is considerable evidence that after custodial sentences homeless children return to the streets more alienated from society, since, despite the increased threat, neither individual nor structural problems that led to their use of the street are not addressed (e.g. Wernham, 2004). Bibars (1998) also sees a certain parallel between government and traditional religious care, which he characterises as based on the two principles of isolating the children from the society, and paternalistic methods of directing and raising them. The street in traditional religious care is reviled as ‘polluting’ the child, and hence, “… the overwhelming tendency is to force children to sever links with their street support networks, and to regard their experiences on the street as bad or worthless.” (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 20031) Protective responses to street children The focus of the protective approach, Thomas de Benitez (2003) argues, is on resolving ‘individual’ problems for ‘individual’ children, rather than on addressing the structural causes we discussed earlier. Focus is on socialising the child into dominant societal childrearing institutions (such as the ‘formal school system’, child care centres, or back into the child’s original home environment) rather than questioning whether these institutions are appropriate for the child’s specific context (e.g. Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003; Malcomson, 2000:45; Leonardos, 1995).

2.4.2

Rights and sustainable livelihoods

Rights-based approaches, Eyben (2003) suggests, come from three particular streams of thought and practice, which are debated and contested in both state and agency policy statements. One is based on implementation, monitoring and evaluation of legal frameworks set out in UN conventions and covenants (such as the Convention on the 1


22 Rights of the Child). Another stream is an outgrowth of countless local, national and international social, cultural and political struggles and debates inspired by autonomous movements demanding participation in decisions affecting their lives. The third strand is what political scientists describe as an historical evolution from ‘clientelism’ to ‘citizenship’. Eyben suggests that there is a growing acknowledgement in development agencies, that rights should address a holistic understanding of well-being. Thus, addressing the child’s right to education should also address the structural conditions (such as those mentioned above) acting as barriers to such opportunities. However, rights cost money! As much as challenging the political economist’s sense of prudent fiscal management, it also creates highly charged and partisan debate on what rights should have both priority and resources1. The aid agencies have, therefore, begun to acknowledge that rights-based approaches have inevitably to switch from a technical to a political understanding of development. Thus, acknowledging the messy and complex dynamics of competing for social and political advantage, agencies now accept that substantial change cannot be rushed (Eyben, 2003). At the radical extreme, as we have already noted, rights-based approaches focusing on the ‘homeless’ street child, may propose the child’s right to choose to live on the streets, or that street children should be seen as the protagonists of social transformation (e.g. De Venanzi, 2003). At a broader socio-structural level, the rights-based approach is seen as a fundamental framework for discourse on the ‘collective street child’, including him or her in the category ‘urban poor’ and re-coupling him or her with other dominant themes touching the lives of a broad mass of poor urban children living in adversity (e.g. Catherine Panter-Brick, 2003). As Ennew and Swart-Kruger (2003) put it, for rights-based approaches “the social problem is transferred to violation of rights, and the solution is to develop rights-based programming”. Rather than seeing children as clients of welfare systems, rights-based approaches emphasize their rights as citizens with equal entitlements to other citizens, and the state’s obligation to provide them (Eyben, 2003). However, they also concede that there is as yet little consensus on how to frame workable policies around claiming these 1

Thus, for instance, priority given to providing services to ‘full-time’ street children would inevitably bring questions about whether a cash-strapped government should invest considerable resources in so few children.

23 rights – especially as lack of response from the North to claims for a legally binding right for global distributive justice (including claims to aid, debt relief and fair terms of trade) seems to undermine any spirit of global developmental reciprocity. Nevertheless, at a more pragmatic project-based and research level, attention is given to street children inclusion in design and programming (e.g. Van Beers, 1996) 1 – in the spirit of Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child2. Other programming argues, whether explicitly of implicitly, for legitimisation of the street as a free zone in which street children can shop-around for services tailored to their own interests (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003). Critique of the rights-based approach points out that the very idea of street children (or, indeed, any urban poor) making the law work for them as much as it does for the elite assumes a much bolder project of re-distributive power than contemporary models of governance can provide. Neither, Eyben argues, does it consider how understandings of entitlement are very much tied to multiple perspectives that are shaped by real individual struggles within very distinctive social, cultural, economic, political and religious narratives. In the context of this critique, Eyben (2003) contrasts rights-based approaches to sustainable livelihoods approaches. Though both are about claims and entitlements, he points out, “Rights approaches have tended to start from a normative position as to what peoples’ entitlements should be while sustainable livelihoods approaches look at what is happening on the ground and the presence or absence of assets or entitlements.” (Eyben, 2003:3) And thus, discourse on the ‘street child’s’ entitlement to education in Kampala is inevitably tied, not only to the provision of ‘affordable’ schooling, but also to a whole complex package of formal and informal urban contexts, that will often give contested cultural, social and economic understandings of the relevance of such entitlement for the urban poor. Addressing the child’s rights, Bartlett (2004b) points out, “may require a better understanding of their concerns”.

1 Henk van Beers did much work on Participatory Action Research (PAR) approaches with projects in Kenya in the mid-1990s. 2 Article 12 (1) reads “ States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child”.

24 Though perhaps contrasted starkly here, interestingly, many initiatives (whether government or civil society) do tend to exhibit varying degrees of all three approaches to street children – reactive, protective and rights-based. And hence, programming for street children can also become skewed by contested and even contradictory claims for protective or emancipatory rights.

2.5

Contextual programming

We might conclude that local government policy-making and programming for street children, in the light of the complexity we have pointed to in the previous discussion, should be seen to address multiple perspectives, not least of all the child’s, if it is not to sink into the reactive or protective moulds (see above). Indeed, it has to engage in a discourse on rights and entitlements that, at the same time, gives realistic weight to the interconnection of multiple domains of adversity, and the way street children, urban and rural populations proactively interact with and manipulate these in pursuit of sustainable livelihoods. Any programming that pursues agendas that do not take these interconnections seriously may simply end up reducing or restricting the survival options available to street children and their urban or rural family – which should equally be understood as rights.

2.5.1

Mainstreaming street children: the ‘child/youth friendly city’

Of growing contemporary interest to proponents of integrative policy-making is the notion of the ‘child/youth friendly city’. As an out-growth of discourse on ‘Women in Development’ (WID) and ‘sustainable livelihood’ approaches, the notion’s apparent concern is to reconfigure rights-based discourse, making it less oppositional by integrating childhood and youth concerns into a holistic approach to urban policy-making and planning. Bartlett (2004b) sees this approach as avoiding policy processes that see the ‘specificity’ of claims for not only street children but also children and youth in general, that relegate them to a status of one of many ‘tiresome minority add-on concerns’. “A source of frustration with regard to many of the efforts to give attention to children’s issues is their ‘add-on’ quality. At times these initiatives are presented almost as an ornamental addition to the ‘real’ work of local government, rather than an integrated response that attempts to make children and young people a more visible component of this real work.” (Bartlett, 2004b1)

1


25 This requires a level of awareness of child and youth concerns on the part of all planners, practitioners and policy makers. It demands mainstreaming these concerns in policy thinking and, therefore, also demands for a reflexive acknowledgement in policy forums of how in fact all policy-making impacts children and youth and their rights. Such integrative approaches, Ennew (2003) argues, should take into account three levels of causal analysis: immediate, underlying and structural. She summarises these causes as: o at the immediate level – the reason why a child may leave home and go to work or live on the streets (e.g. because of a sudden drop in family income, loss of support from an adult family member due to illness, death or abandonment; or an episode of domestic violence); o at the underlying level – contexts of

chronic impoverishment, cultural

expectations (e.g. the idea that a boy should go to work on the streets as soon as he is able), desire for consumer goods or the ‘lure of bright city lights’; and finally o at the structural level – consideration of factors such as development shocks, structural adjustment, regional inequalities and social exclusion (Ennew, 2003).

2.5.2

Contextual challenges to policy-making and programming

Bartlett argues that, within the ‘child/youth friendly city’ discourse, demands on local government can meet with far more resistance than is true for specific and simplistic ‘fix it’ programming for the most visible and identifiable street child/youth (which is usually configured as ‘corrective institutionalisation’). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, a certain reflexive ‘realism’ that results from such holistic policy approaches may only underscore relative desire or capacity of local government (particularly in developing economies) to resource children and youth, or alternatively endorse and facilitate the survival options for street children and their families (as discussed earlier). Such endorsement would necessarily have to modify state ideological discourse on family values and ideas about public order that criminalizes the ‘street’ (see Beazley, 2003; Ennew and Swart-Kruger, 2003; Bibars, 1998). Rather than characterising the street as the antithesis of child livelihood, Ennew and Swart-Kruger argue, “… [the] spatial element can be employed in the construction of solutions. The requirement is to let go of the constructed necessity to remove children from the ‘dirt’ and danger of the street environment, and the assumed asocial chaos of their relationships.” (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 20031)

1


26 Programming should thus, they argue, see the ‘street’ as the common denominator, rely on the children's own agency, and respect their time. Programmes should use spaces that accommodate street children’s own understanding and interpretation of their environment by, for example, accommodating and facilitating street-based employment, and learning (e.g. Boyden, 2003; O’Kane 2003; Bibars, 1998; Malcomson, 2000) – even if this does challenge international conventions (O’Kane, 2003). Indeed, Ennew & Swart-Kruger (2003) observe, life and livelihood skills may be more usefully learned on the street rather than in formal education “… marked by teacher abuse, rote learning, and isolation from society at large” (see also le Roux, 1998; Williams, 1992) The real challenge for civil society organizations engaged in such integrative policy approaches, however, is also to assist the policy-makers find ‘achievable’ solutions that address – at least to some degree – security, welfare, and rights outcomes (Thomas de Benitez, 2003) that do not dislocate street children (used in the broad sense) from their livelihood context – e.g. through institutional responses (e.g. Malcomson, 2000; Bibars, 1998). However, although specific initiatives are inevitably programmed for (and indeed required for the most vulnerable street population), Bartlett (2004b) argues that the outcomes aimed at should not be located within the specific programming itself, but rather be located in “changing awareness of children that ideally [programmes] inspire”. Participatory engagement with the street, urban and rural poor populations will inevitably challenge the social, cultural and economic assumptions of not only local government but also ‘representative’ civil society organizations (we look at these in terms of power and contested legitimacy in the following chapters). Specifically African perspectives of such ‘populations in adversity’ may well challenge unhelpful reproduction of dominant discourse that underpins unsustainable social, cultural, religious and economic configurations. Using Fabio Dellape’s call for contextual programming (from a too distant past), Ennew (2003) argues, what is still needed for Africa is an African approach “… based on the people's traditions, religions and superstitions” (Dallape, 1988:111). This will inevitably interplay with, but be perhaps fundamentally ‘different’ from dominant cultural, social and religious frameworks – as proposed by both local and global elites (including, O’Kane [2003] suggests, international conventions). This new discourse should be situated within

27 existing social and cultural context, and use local resources whether possible – including drawing on the local population itself (e.g. Boyden, 2003). Such contextual policy-making and programming, however, might well compromise the ‘rights’ framework which Eyben (2003) suggests gains acceptance in policy-making because of its ‘international’ imperative – and acceptance of which is usually predicated to international agencies giving resources. After all, it is clear that “… many municipalities around the world are hard pressed – short on resources and capacity, subject to multiple pressures, and averse to undertaking anything that does not have proven practical benefits.” (Bartlett, 2004b1)

2.6

Concluding remarks

In Chapter 2 I have looked at how history, location, politics, economics and culture all apply meanings and values to how society, government, NGOs and, indeed, children themselves (Young & Barrett, 2001) view street children’s interaction with urban spaces. Street children continue to be portrayed by government, NGO and, indeed, international rights-based frameworks as either victims or villains (Aptekar 1988). This is despite growing academic acknowledgement that children’s complex movement and engagement within the street (Young & Barrett, 2001) should be seen more as the prime sustainable livelihood option for large urban populations in much of the developing world (Eyben, 2003, p.3). Within the CSO coalition’s proposal to reconnect government policy to sustainable livelihoods options, therefore, James (2002) argues that engagement with local government should be seen more in terms of a mutual and proactive search for practical and achievable policies and programmes than merely as rights-based critique. In this chapter I have looked at how two levels of analysis of street children are proposed for both government and ‘CSO Coalitions’ for such engagement: o a global child-focused analysis which acknowledges how large populations of children and their families – often ignored by local and global elites’ dominant political, cultural and economic discourses – live in adverse situations in which they

1


28 are obliged to proactively manipulate and give new meanings to their environment as part of a sustainable survival strategy, and o a specific ‘street child’-focused analysis which – because it generally references itself to the imperatives of the global analysis – acknowledges how street children proactively manipulate and give changing meanings over time to different urban and rural domains as contributing to a sustainable survival strategy for themselves and, often, their families. If such policy and programming is to ensure that street children are both included at levels of planning and practice, programming has to acknowledge the complexity of context, the limited resources of local government in developing countries, and the imperative of allowing children and communities to mobilise their own resources. This might well mean that government and elites have to endorse social, cultural, and economic behaviour, activities and spaces that they have so far restricted through legislation (and endorsement of international conventions) or social, cultural and religious codes of practice. Such global repositioning – through mainstreaming child and youth concerns in policymaking processes – requires local government, international agencies, and CSOs to radically re-evaluate their own dominant ideological discourse. However, rather like attributes ascribed to street children by Young and Barrett (2001), the potential for exploitation of such space, Mbembe (1992) suggests, depends on the CSO Coalition’s ability to ‘improvise’ with local government (and, he suggests, at times ‘connive’). Acknowledging the multiplicity of political agendas, acquiescence to global repositioning can only ever be a slow process of effecting changing awareness of street child contexts – often implying conflict (O’Kane, 2003). Practical solutions to apparently intractable problems, Bartlett (2004a) suggests, might have to rely on ‘trying out’ community-focused solutions, where initially, at least, policy is inspired by practice, not the other way round. For civil society coalitions to engage local government effectively, repositioning may have to be via the back door, relying on ‘attention-grabbing initiatives’ but within a cohesive global strategy (Bartlett, 2004a).

The findings of this thesis, however, show that ideological discourses on the street child are bound to quite distinctive sets of interests. These might be as much to do with

29 government resistances to an implied loss of control of agendas, resistances to ceding too much space for critique within new and emerging forms of social, cultural and political interaction between the citizen and state in Uganda, and the manipulation of action on street children by local elites as political ‘display’ of getting tough on what is portrayed as urban malaise. These diverse sets of conditions, and the way the coalition often limits its response to them, are seen to impede potential challenges on dominant ideological discourses on street children, and therefore impact the ‘voice’ of the coalition pursuing change. In order to sufficiently examine the two coalitions, therefore, it is necessary to explore the contexts that cause the two coalitions to form and evolve, but also the internal coalition and external social, political, and cultural environments that impede the articulation of coalition ‘voice’. To do this, the following two chapters (Chapter 3 and 4) explore, first, contested notions, contexts, and spaces for civil society (especially in its African context), and, second, how the agendas of multi-lateral, bi-lateral and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can both impact and dominate global and local discourse. Chapter 5 subsequently goes on to explore the CSO Coalition as a popular contemporary vehicle for both challenging and engaging in governments’ policy discourse. Finally, Chapter 6 looks at diverse reconfigurations of African states following the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of Apartheid in South Africa in the early 1990s. The Chapter further explores the growing leverage civil society is claimed to have gained on governments through international pressure towards programming ‘democratization’ and good governance in national planning – both of which are predicated on multi- and bi-lateral funding and refinancing of debt.

30

Chapter 3: Notions of civil society Since the end of the Cold War and southern Africa’s Apartheid struggles in the early 1990s, new patterns of global strategic and economic governance have applied ‘good governance’ and ‘democratization’ conditionalities to aid and loan flows to Africa. In this new global ‘institutional’ blueprint, the civil society organization is often promoted as the “… catalyst for democratic reform” (Howell, 2000:12)1. Quite apart from its traditional service delivery function, therefore, the NGO – as multi- and bi-lateral agencies’ preferred ‘institutional’ expression of civil society partnership – has been ascribed the task of countervailing authoritarian tendencies of the state. African state ‘reconfiguration’ is presumed to avail civil society with new ‘democratic’ spaces for the citizen’s participation in the development processes (James, 2002:3). But, what is civil society and what underlying assumptions define it? This chapter begins by exploring the historical evolution of the notion civil society. It then examines the idea of civil society as a ‘notional space’ with attention to ideas expressed by social capital theory and around power. By considering contemporary cultural, economic and ideological ‘institution’ baggage applied to the notion, the chapter also examines contemporary critique of civil society’s centrality within the new global governance framework. The chapter finally looks at Africanist critique of the emergence and aggressive promotion of civil society as ‘institution’ in African contexts bound by quite different associational formations.

3.1

The origin and evolution of the notion ‘civil society’

Although the term ‘civil society’ clearly draws its ideas from the notion of citizenship in the Greek city-states, its lucidity as an intellectual construct is mostly acknowledged to have initially surfaced during the changing pattern of relationships between the state and the citizen during 17th to 19th century European and American history.

3.1.1

Civil society and the Enlightenment th

In the 17

century, the growth of institutions of private property and the spread of

urbanisation began to move wealth out of the exclusive sphere of state patronage. Exercise of power was therefore shifted into two separate spheres, the ‘political’ and ‘non-political’. With independent exploration of knowledge and polity came the emergence of the notion ‘civil society’ as a separate domain from the state. 1

Howell refers to this specific civil society function ascribed by USAID.

31 Early modern theorists like Hobbes and Locke treated civil and political society as part of the same ‘civilizing’ ordering of the world away from a ‘state of nature’. Reason, the primary currency of Enlightenment thinkers, was contrasted with ignorance, superstition, and uncritical acceptance of authority, all felt to have dominated the Middle Ages. This new civil/political order bound the individual to rules that limited individual rights, on one side, but equally bound civil/political society to mutual respect for others’ rights, on the other side. Although in these early discourses civil and political societies were seen as indistinguishable and reinforcing each other, there was now an implied limit to the state’s exercise of power. Locke believed that the fundamental justification for a state's existence had to be found in its ability to protect the citizen’s rights to liberty, life and ownership of property better than individuals could on their own. If it failed to do so, citizens had the right to find other rulers. For the classical political economists of the 18th century, societal needs were seen as defined by economic exchange and a complex division of labour. In a rational pursuit of self-interest within a market, Adam Smith suggested, a pattern of production develops that results in social harmony. Hegel, writing in a different tradition from the liberals, clearly distinguished what we now call ‘civil society’ as a combative force between the individual and state. The domain of civil society, according to Hegel, was characterised by the individual striving for the fulfilment of their private needs, and the resultant tension and conflict with the state. Within the typical dialectical process (later coined ‘thesis, antithesis and synthesis’), he argued, the initial citizen proposal for change is first rejected by state, later returning as a modified proposal that synthesised the two positions. For him the ‘synthesis’ from this interface between the citizen and the state was all part of an historical maturation. Clearly, underpinning Enlightenment thinking was the revolution in technology and science and the emergent middle class’s need for the state to sanction its accumulation of wealth. Religious Protestantism also argued that conscience was the preserve of the individual rather than the state. Although the state was able to preserve law and order, Lewis (2001) points out, growing boldness of expression, which was underpinned by the wealth of the new middle class, meant that it was unable to control emergent beliefs. Brown (2000) therefore argues that the notion ‘civil society’ emerges from the Enlightenment’s cultural and historical specificity, looking to harmonise existent tensions between the state, the market and the citizen.

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3.1.2

De Tocqueville and Gramsci and contemporary notions of the function of ‘civil society’

In the 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville is commonly seen to have further defined the notion of civil society. His standard work ‘Democracy in America’ (1835-1840) focused on the associational life in 19th Century United States. With specific interest in the organizational rather than political context, he drew attention to the positive structures of volunteerism, community spirit and independence outside the state. Although lamenting its apparent erosion through state intervention in education, social security and healthcare, he saw this civil activism as having the role of creating ‘equilibrium’ in relation to the individual, the state and market (see Tandon & Mohanty, 2000; and Lewis, 2001, pp2). However, most present day notions of civil society resemble that of Antonio Gramsci in the early part of the twentieth century. Contrary to previous conceptions of civil society (characterising it as everything outside the domain of the state), Gramsci introduced a distinction between the state, basic economic structures and civil society. He argued that civil society, as an arena separate from state, is a space in which ideological hegemony is contested. In this thinking there is the recognition that civil society organizations represent diverse attitudes that challenge or uphold existing order. For Gramsci, the state has legitimacy only when ‘force’ is balanced with ‘consent’; where the two are interdependent and moderate each other (Lewes, 2001, p.5; Showstake Sassoon, 1982; Martinussen, 1995). The idea of ‘consent’ of the governed is very topical in contemporary political discourse. As I already noted, ‘consent’ for Locke was characterised by the legitimisation of the ‘state’ as carrying out its dual role of protecting the individual, but minimising interference. For Max Weber, ‘consent’ was the result of a process of bourgeoisie manipulation (some coercive) in order to achieve the legitimisation of a pre-existing social order. This is similar to what Gramsci later calls ‘passive revolution’ in which the state rather than society is the protagonist for change. Within the idea of a ‘third way’ Gramsci proposes a notion of ‘consent’ that avoids the excessive exercise of state power. He proposes the idea of the ‘intellectual’ helping to articulate the ordinary citizen and therefore linking the governed, the world of production and the political realm. This was necessary, he argued, for collectively creating a new organization of knowledge.

33 The notion of ‘civil society’ largely fell into disuse after Gramsci. However, it was rediscovered and given new contemporary relevance by dissident intellectuals in Latin America and communist Eastern Europe engaged in anti-totalitarian struggle in the 1970s and 80s. The movements that sprang from such dissent began to represent citizen aspirations with the intention of democratizing the state, and creating fundamental freedoms and liberties. In such a formulation, civil society began to be equated with the process of democratization in political structures and systems we see promoted today (Tandon & Mohanty, 2000; Lewis, 2001; and Centre for Civil Society, 2003).

3.2

Civil society as a notional ‘space’

However, critics argue that contemporary notions of ‘civil society’ should not necessarily be seen as beneficent. Contemporary promotion of ‘civil society/state/market’ ‘institutional’ order, they argue, is imbued with multiple layers of ideological, political, strategic and economic ‘self’-interest. Western interests’ hidden strategic and economic intent appears frequently betrayed by its reactions to ‘different’ democratic governance options taken by ‘different’ cultural or religious associational formations (e.g. in Iraq, Venezuela or Bolivia). That multi- and bi-lateral agencies persist with a rather skewed notion of civil society, van Rooy (1998) adds, suggests an ‘analytical hat-stand’ of convenience upon which development policy makers can hang or impose their own ideas about politics, governance, and market liberalisation. Perhaps echoing van Rooy’s idea of civil society as notion rather than an entity, Moulten & Anheier (2001) refer to it as a sort of public/private ‘welfare space’. Friedman (1997), on the other hand, sees it to function as a ‘space for contestation’ within democratic spaces and processes. Widely divergent positions – some decidedly ‘undemocratic’ – only become truly representative, he argues, when they emerge from a democratic framework. The types of interaction between the citizen and the state and the spaces in which it might happen, therefore, are seen as of greater importance than the institutional form they take. Indeed, Fenton argues strongly that it is not institutionalisation that gives power to the notion of civil society: “Perspectives on civil society proliferate … and it is arguable that the term functions most powerfully as an idea – a means of thinking about the limits of authority and freedom, or the nature of association.” (Fenton, 2000, p.151)

34 Underpinning this interface of different players, therefore, are key issues of power, consent, and trust that, in traditional liberal political theory, give legitimacy, not only to ‘civil society’ in its institutional/associational form, but to government itself. Tonkiss et al. (2000, p.9) see civil society and trust as ‘moral resources’, or what Seligman calls ‘symbolic credit’. It is an asset for gaining associational support, goodwill, time and money. Thus, civil society cannot be equated with the street children project, or the diverse organizations contained within the two coalitions being investigated in this thesis. Rather, Seligman (1992) argues, civil society’s significance is as a ‘lubricant for action’ that results in associational behaviour – and therefore creates such institutions.

3.2.1

Social Capital

Much contemporary interest in this conceptualisation of civil society as ‘credit’ falls on the notion ‘social capital’ made popular in the 1990s by Robert Putnam. In terms of international development, some proponents argue that social capital theory is the cuttingedge of development discourse (e.g. see Fukuyama, 2000). For some of its critics, however, it is seen merely as ‘another’ theoretical coat-stand upon which multi-lateral financial institutions and Northern official bi-lateral organizations might hang those same old contentious development ‘investment’ policies for the South (e.g. see Morrow, 2001). Borrowing its terminology from economics, social capital theory sets out to develop previous attempts to explain how relationships generate and influence social and economic behaviour. Various theorists suggest, therefore, that social capital can be analysed, quantified – and possibly even induced – using expressions such as ‘investment’ and ‘accumulation’. Three scholars are widely accepted as the founding fathers of the concept: Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam. Coleman sought to develop an interdisciplinary social science that could marry both sociological and economic perspectives. He drew on the ideas of Becker (1964) and rational choice (or ‘action’) theory – promoting the idea that all human behaviour follows from the individual’s pursuit of self-interest. Assuming an ‘individualistic’ model of human behaviour, social interaction is therefore seen only in the sense of exchange (Field, 2003, p.21). Solidarity within networks, Coleman argues, is only possible because membership gives rise to both material and symbolic profits. Maintenance of social capital, therefore, requires individual (or collective) investment strategies aimed at transforming contingent relationships (e.g. neighbours, co-workers or kin) into a usable short or long-term currency. Obligation becomes part of the investment and is understood as capital for future withdrawal – a sort

35 of ‘collective banking’ for the security of individual ‘self-interest’ (see Coleman, 1994, p.302). In the late 1990s, Putnam (from a political science background) popularised ‘social capital’ theory within the political and policy-making establishments of Bill Clinton’s United States and Tony Blare’s United Kingdom (see Field, 2003, p.72-73). However, whereas Coleman’s attention is drawn towards the importance of family and kinship relationships as the core of ‘social capital’ networking, Putnam’s was drawn towards what he portrayed as the considerably greater value in shared membership of ‘secondary’ associations (e.g. civil society organizations). Like de Tocqueville, Putnam sees volunteerism and sociability as counterweights to the excesses of corporate power and social apathy. Putnam therefore focuses more on the opportunism within weaker ‘bridging’ ties, rather than what he sees as unproductive determinism of close family ‘bonding’ ties (Putnam, 1993a, p.43; Misztal, 2000, p.119). Social capital’s popularity, John Field (2003) observes, is connected to contemporary perceptions that emerge from “… an erosion of habit and custom as the basis for human behaviour, a blurring of boundaries between public and private spheres, and explosion of means of communication.” (Field, 2003, p.8) For its proponents, social interaction, conceptualised as ‘capital’, can therefore be understood as a helpful heuristic tool in trying to bring clarity and analytical order to the complexities and vagaries of contemporary life. Bourdieu’s interest in social capital (a term he is accredited as inventing), on the other hand, draws from the Marxist traditions of understanding ‘capital’ as privileging social reproduction for the benefit of an elite. Cultural capital strategies, he argued, allow elites to ensure a ‘reproduction’ of advantages for the next generation (Field, 2003, p.16), and thus institutionalise inequality (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.119). In the social economist’s attempt de-clutter complex social systems, critics of social capital theory argue, Bourdieu’s understanding of the ‘hidden’ instrumentality of social capital as an efficient asset for social reproduction, has largely been ignored (e.g. see Field, 2003; Phillips, 2002; Hulme, 2000; Portes, 1998; Morrow, 2001).

36

3.2.2

Power

Although perhaps widely acknowledged as a potentially useful heuristic contribution to social analysis (Morrow, 2001), criticism of civil society and social capital’s appropriation within international development persists. Scholars and policy-makers express considerable concerns about proponents’ intentions for civil society and social capital. IFI1 loan conditionalities that promote civil society, critics argue, are implicated in manipulation of national behaviour with the purpose of creating a new global institutional order. Whose interests does such manipulation serve? they ask (e.g. Hulme, 2000; Chambers, 1997). Central to these criticisms, therefore, are diverse ideas around power and its exercise. Power is seen as fundamental to the nature of both ‘notional’ and ‘institutional’ civil society spaces, and of action within them (McGee; 2004). It draws the political scientist or sociologist to frame questions around who participates, who wins, and who loses in civil society-state, and state-IFI encounters. Power is a highly contested concept, understood in social theory, policy analysis and political science in often quite conflicting ways. A view that grows largely from political science and sociology focuses principally on decision-making and key decision-makers in policy processes. It asks the questions posed above: who participates, who wins and who loses. However, this view has been criticised as approaching power as too linear a concept. To make sense of how Kampala and Jinja’s institutional expressions of civil society2 function, therefore, it is necessary to examine both overt and more hidden ways in which power relations work to exclude certain issues or actors (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2003; Gaventa, 1980). Thus, I later look at how ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ structures and procedures act to exclude certain member organizations from participation in decision-making in Jinja and Kampala’s coalitions. Indeed, Chapter 14 looks at how Uganda’s government understandings of civil society, and NGO actors’ appropriation of its institutional character, might be implicated in the coalition’s exclusion from policy-making for street children in Kampala. Other views of power, drawing particularly from Foucault, look at how power is dispersed through networks of discourses that govern people’s thoughts and actions (Foucault, 1977, p.32). In this way of thinking, power is inseparable from knowledge. To exist, a body of knowledge requires

1 2

That is, international finance institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. For instance, expresses as Jinja Network or Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum.

37 “… a system of communications, records, accumulation and displacement which is in itself a form of power and which is linked, in its existence and functioning, to the other forms of power” (Foucault quoted in Sheridan, 1980, p.283). Foucault describes this dependent relationship between power and knowledge as ‘power/knowledge’. Looked at in terms of power/knowledge maintaining itself by ‘techniques’ and ‘disciplines’, Foucault (1978, p.86) argues that its toleration is based on its success in hiding a substantial part of itself. Just like Beazley (2003) and Young & Barrett’s (2001) contribution of new spatial and temporal understandings of street child ethnography (mentioned in Chapter 2), work by Cornwell (2002) examines issues of power and difference in shaping spaces for participation in development. To Cornwall’s idea of ‘spatial’ power, Hayward (1998) adds the imagery of ‘boundaries’. Power, therefore, might be understood as “… the network of social boundaries that delimit fields of possible action.” (Hayward, 1998, p.2) Indeed, with the rapid expansion of the internet for communication and transaction, how power is exerted as knowledge, space and boundary, or as ‘symbolic’ or ‘capital’ exchange, becomes ever more mind-boggling.

3.3

Contemporary definitions of civil society as ‘institution’

So far I have spent considerable time looking at civil society as ‘notional space’ – whether this be seen as ‘developmental aspiration’ (Seckinelgin, 2000a), as ‘moral resource’ (Tonkiss, et al., 2000, p.9; Putnam, 1993a), as a ‘lubricant for action’ (Seligman, 1997), or as ‘social capital’. Analysis of civil society applied to coalitions and policy-making processes for street children in Jinja or Kampala, however, makes little sense without reference to its ‘institutional’ expression. Dahrendorf (in Tonkiss et al., 2000) applies distinctive characteristics to each:

•

Civil society as ‘notion’ – is to do with competing ideologies or beliefs (and the relationships of power these represent), and

•

Civil society as ‘institution’ – is to do with structural and organizational capacity (and the mechanisms and capacity to exert and hide the exertion of power).

38 The idea of partnership of individuals or groups has somehow to address these two characteristics. If a partnership is contingent on the creation of mutual benefits, Dahrendorf argues, the sustainable ‘institution’ must either have the organizational capacity to deliver, or, as Harriss (2002) claims of civil society, hide its incapacity to do so. Seligman (2000, p.14) points out, however, that the tensions between bounded ‘managerial techniques’ and notional freedom will inevitably be problematic: “ … the Achilles heel of any social movement is its institutionalisation, which – one way or the other – must be through the state and its legal (and coercive) apparatus.” (Seligman, 2000, p.12) The growth of any voluntary organization creates considerable complexity in the interface of ‘notion’ and ‘institution’ and the conflict this presents to its board members, beneficiaries and staff. Perhaps its greatest conflict, however, is the interface of ideological identity and the roles that have been ascribed it by a global reconfiguration of state/citizen relationships. The voluntary organization has now been labelled ‘civil society’ and is supposed to reconcile itself to almost irreconcilable competing attributes “ … as incubators of civic virtue; as a model of activity promoted by neoliberal ‘reforms’ to the welfare state; and as sites where non-market rationalities remain possible.” (Fenton, 2000, p.153) Institutional civil society, therefore, takes on a variety of equivalent names that represent competing attributes. The most common alternatives are the ‘third sector’ (as opposed to the ‘public’ and ‘private’ sectors) (e.g. in Uphoff, 1995; Kendall, 2000; and a body of work from the International Society for Third-Sector Research) and the ‘voluntary sector’ (e.g. Anheier & Kendall, 2000; Deakin, 2000). Other terms that are used are ‘non-profit sector’ (Morris, 2000; Pillay, 1997; Deakin, 2000), the ‘sphere of everyday associational life’ (e.g. Pillay, 1997), the ‘membership sector’, ‘collective action sector’, and the ‘between sector’ (e.g. Uphoff, 1995), to mention but a few. Clearly each term reflects a specific critical intention of civil society to which each author wishes to draw attention. Using the above as at least equivalent terms, the following short definition of institutional civil society is most commonly applied. Civil society is, “… the population of groups formed for collective purposes primarily outside of the state and marketplace.” (van Rooy, 1998, p. 30)

39 Another common characteristic applied in literature is that civil society exists only ‘beyond the household’, that is, civil society does not include the individual or the family (Pillay, 1997; Lewis, 2001; Howell, 2003). However, this apparently simple framework begins to get fuzzy under further scrutiny.

3.3.1

Civil society: exclusion/inclusion debate

Many authors define civil society by means of exclusion. As I mentioned earlier, Putnam (1995b) sees a wide cultural context for civil society but insists that associational dynamics should crosscut ties of kinship and patronage. Clayton (1998) points out that literature often attaches ‘ideological values’. Thus, Friedman is able to suggest that ‘space’ between the family, the market and the state is a space of democratic contestation and mobilisation (quoted in Pillay, 1997, p.4). Excluded, therefore, should be groups “… who don’t actively engage with state but are inward looking or parochial in attitude.” (Chazan, 1994, p.256) To be excluded, therefore, are fundamentalist religious groups, ethnic associations and local traditional organizations’. Pillay (1997, p.5) proposes that there should be a separation between ‘civil society organizations’ and ‘political associations’ as the first’s intention is to influence policy, while the second’s is to attain representation in the levers of power. Uphoff (1995), on the other hand, objects to the routine inclusion of NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) who he places as a sub-set of the private sector because they share similar characteristic hierarchic organizational structures. Literature from multi- and bi-lateral agencies argues that civil society organizations are essentially about promoting and benefiting from “… globalisation and the expansion of democratic governance” (World Bank, 2003a, p.iii). Definitions of civil society from an ‘inclusive’ perspective, on the other hand, acknowledge a much more complex and less partitioned pattern of institutional engagement between the citizen and state (e.g. Clayton, 1998, p.6). From a Latin American perspective, Béjar & Oakley (1995) suggest that NGOs, acting as capacity enhancers and mediators, often represent the same essential values as Grass-roots (membership) Organizations (GROs). Opening wide this associational space, Béjar & Oakley happily include cooperatives of small businesses, savings and credit schemes, trade unions, and unemployed and ‘working’ children who use NGOs for capacity building or representation. Examples of inclusive and exclusive definitions of civil society can be seen in Table 3.3, below.

40

Table 3.3: Inclusive & exclusive notions of ‘Civil Society’

However, in opposition to the excluding ‘ideological’ value-based position, we do not see the proposal of a ‘value-free’ understanding of civil society but instead a notion that acknowledges the complexity of associational life and diversity of representational groupings. Indeed, with rapid technological advances in means of communication and transaction, not only might civil society be seen as associational context that potentially crosses boundaries of state and market, but also that crosses continents in the form of ‘virtual communities’. Clayton (1998, p.7) suggests that the broader task for social analysis of civil society organizations, is therefore to “… understand the complex ways, both formal and informal, in which groups interact with each other and with the state”.

3.4

Usefulness of the notion of ‘civil society’ in African contexts

David Lewis (2001) argues that much anxiety has surfaced, not only at the diffuse and overarching meanings being applied to the notion civil society in development circles, but in the way it is becoming the central policy trajectory imposed on Southern governments and NGOs by multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies. Comaroff & Camaroff (1999) point out that this anxiety stems, to a large degree, from the assumption that “… it is new and free from baggage”. Looking at the notion’s various historical ‘rebirths’, Lewis (2001) suggests that the ‘re-remembering’ of civil society may be accused of being ‘selective’. In terms of how the concept is played out in non-Western contexts, Lewis draws our attention back to civil society’s two distinctive traditions described earlier in this chapter. One is the Gramscian Marxist tradition that focuses on how society plays out and establishes relationships of ‘power and subjugation’. The other is a Tocquevillean ‘preservationist’

41 tradition that focuses on its value as a societal resource essential for building and sustaining societal principles of ‘good governance’, ‘democracy’, ‘accountability’, etc. Questioning whose interests are really being served, Lewis argues that the Tocquevillean tradition frames African policy approaches by the multi- and bi-lateral agencies “ … playing down or ignoring the more conflictual implications of the Gramscian version” (Lewis, 2001, p.4). The tensions between these two ideological positions frame the fundamental question ‘in what way can civil society be said to relevant to Africa?’ A variety of answers are placed before us, each representing a position that grows in familiarity from our discussions earlier in this chapter. Lewis (2001) presents us with two tendencies in the promotion of civil society that he locates at opposite ends of the spectrum: the ‘universalistic prescriptive’ and the ‘Western exclusivist’ perspectives.

3.4.1

A ‘universalistic prescriptive’ perspective

Lewes (2001, p.4-6) argues that, within a ‘universalistic prescriptive’ perspective, civil society is seen as integral to a highly desirable grand world project of building and strengthening democratization. Harbeson (1994), citing the past frustrations in attempting to transfer a multi- and bi-lateral donor worldview, argues that “ … civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable statesociety and state-economy relationships, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago.” (Harbeson et al., 1994, p.1-2) Harbeson’s (1994) interest is in filling this developmental gap and establishing ‘ground rules’ within which development can be economically and politically controllable. For Harbeson, the state is understood as the binding, organizational principle of the political order (see Lewis, 2001, p.5). It is in the arena of the state that authoritative allocation of social values takes place and the duty of the individual, group and organization to participate in defining the “ … basic rules of the game by which social values are authoritatively allocated” (Harbeson et al., 1994). Civil society is therefore seen as necessary part of rule setting. Capacity building of civil society organizations (together with voter education, election monitoring, etc.) is presented as an integral part of the official donor policy package.

42

3.4.2

Western ‘exclusivist’ perspective

The Western ‘exclusivist’ argument sees transfer of a Western institutional model of civil society as doomed to failure because it has little meaning in the context of African associational life (e.g. see Maina, 1998; Mamdani, 1998), which “ … hardly ever resemble[s] institutions of civil society known to Westerners” (Sogge, 1997). Mugambi (1996), moreover, is suspicious of the intentions behind Harbeson’s proposal. ‘Why now?’ Mugambi (1996) asks, "Why, [is] there an interest in democratization during the 1990s, rather than during the 1960s? It seems that western nation did not believe Africans needed democracy in 1960, but did in 1990." (Mugambi, 1996, p.10) Democratization, Mugambi argues, was not seen as an issue during the Cold War period. Ideological interests were served at the expense of the interests of ordinary Africans. Now, Mugambi points out, the idea ‘democratization’ arrives as a package of post-Cold War jargon, which also includes ‘privatisation’, and ‘liberalisation’. Whose power is really being promoted, he asks, when " ... ordinary Africans have no guarantee that this time the sponsors of these campaigns will not change their minds when their interests are not satisfied or secured." (Mugambi, 1996, p.213) Civil society as a project that appears to primarily serve ‘Western interests’, or that makes too many demands on ill-equipped state apparatuses (Lewis, 2001, p.6), Mugambi (1996, p.213) argues, might be as much doomed by the vagaries of historical opportunism as their ideological predecessors. Mugambe is not alone in his suspicions of a new development paradigm that appears to help legitimize “ … profoundly anti-democratic transnational politics” (Ferguson, 1998, p. 3-4; see also Fine, 2001; Harriss, 2002). It makes national governments more pliable by caricaturing a misleading vertical state/society opposition, as a pretext for changing power relationships (Lewis, 2001, p. 7). This vertical caricature portrays civil society as a set of so-called ‘grass-roots’ NGOs combating the excesses of state. However, the scale, capacity, and ideological stand that NGOs need before being seen favourably as ‘partners’ means, in reality, that they are (or become) far from ‘grassroots’ organizations. The NGOs transnational nature and its access to outside resources often gives such NGOs a horizontal power relationship to national governments in developing countries, which is quite out of proportion to their claims of legitimate representation. Their interests are also commonly perceived as serving ‘outsiders’ (Ferguson, 1998).

43 However, the ‘Western exclusivist’ and ‘universalistic prescriptive’ perspectives can very much be seen at the opposite end of the spectrum. Such polarised positions were beginning to be challenged by those envisaging a resultant ideological, political and economic paralysis.

3.4.3

The ‘metamorphic’ perspective

Lewis’ (2001) third perspective, an ‘adaptive prescriptive’ perspective, sees a ‘usefulness’ in the notion ‘civil society’ in Africa only in as much as it is able to accommodate and adapt to an African formulation. Rather than give up on the principles the notion of civil society represents as a project, this position argues, this reformulation of the notion to African contexts needs to acknowledge that there are organizations that don’t fit the ‘universal’ model (because they are based on kinship, tradition, or other formations of association) (also see Pillay, 1997). This ‘middle way’ requires a retreat from the Western preoccupation with ‘rights’ and ‘advocacy’, Maina (1998) argues, and is instead to focus on ‘activities’ that include ‘self-help’ groups (rather than ‘registered’ organizations). The presence of these groups, he argues, represents an acknowledgement of the limit African people recognise in the efficacy of the state, on one side, and is the site within which future leaders can emerge. Gabriel (2003) includes in civil society ‘activities’ community consultation in specific development projects and thematic forums (e.g. on HIV/AIDS, corruption, human rights, etc.) at the local level. Such new approaches, Edwards (1998) argues, must recognise African civil society as a process of self-definition. Such negotiation of ‘institutional’ and ‘notional’ norms would also acknowledge kinship, tradition and religion as sites of association in which, for example, little distinction is made between ‘empirical’ and ‘mythological’ society (Kuhn, 2002, p.7; Mugambi, 1996). Lewis (2001, p.9) also points out the constantly metamorphosing nature of African state/civil society relations. These already play themselves out, for example as a negotiation of tasks and resources between local governments and local NGOs. However, the central problem to such extension of associational context for civil society, Lewis points out, is the extent to which the term retains meaning. A second argument for this ‘adaptive’ position is the need to acknowledge that civil society is neither ‘new’ to Africa, nor does it come ‘without baggage’. Civil society is part of Africa’s history as it has been implicated in colonial history in terms of both domination and resistance. Identification of sites of associational life was very much the organising

44 principle of colonial administrations, Mamdani (1996) and Harrison (2002) argue. Mamdani therefore proposes that we put the grand ‘emacipatory’ project to one side and look critically at the complex cross-fertilisation of both European and African civil society. However, for Mamdani (2002) the value in such critical review is in uncovering the intentions of such processes. The colonial (Mamdani, 1996; Harrison, 2002) and African (Mamdani, 2002; Harrison, 2002) manipulation of sites of association and the power relationships they represented was used as a controlling mechanism for domination (both colonial and postcolonial). However, seeing much of the civil society debate simply playing out the old domination/resistance, and universalistic/particularistic debates, Mamdani (1996) prefers instead to move towards seeing how the various values that might be unpacked from the term ‘civil society’ interface positively with existing civil society activity in Africa. The interface of civil society as notion and institution in this ‘metamorphic’ perspective becomes one of dynamic tension. To have meaning in an African context the notion ‘civil society’ needs to be unpacked. Historical, political, economic, colonial and cultural contexts and their underlying hierarchical assumptions and self-serving intentions need to be ‘exposed’. Without this the notion just becomes a new ‘cloaking’ mechanism for a continued playing out of a much older game of domination. Instead the notion should become a set of contested and transparent values that makes as many demands on Western as on African proponents. If, going back to the original Enlightenment duality of state and private citizen, the principles of civil society are about the citizen challenging the excesses of state and market, civil society as a global project must surely address these excesses globally. Transparency, of course, is problematic for the exercise of power and domination. However, as Foucault reminds us “Power [is] tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. Would power be accepted if it were entirely cynical?” (Foucault, 1978, p.86) On the other side, the cultural specificity of African institutional norms within which civil society ‘values’ have historically, and still do play themselves out, brings cultural meaning to the notion civil society on one side, but runs the danger of extending the associational net so wide as to become ‘un-useable’, on the other side. The implied civil society principles (whether ‘democratization’ or ‘freedom’) perhaps have to find cultural expression through a constant renegotiation of culture-based institutional norms, on one

45 side, but also encouraged to develop notional space through which to negotiate culturebased and ‘universal’ societal values.

3.5

Concluding remarks

In this Chapter I have looked at the historical evolution of the notion civil society, its contemporary cultural, economic and ideological ‘institutional’ baggage, and critique of the emergence and aggressive promotion of civil society and civil society organizations as distinctive ‘institutional space’ in African contexts bound by quite different associational formations. Contemporary notions of civil society that are promoted within new development orthodoxies appear to only selectively remember the diverse historical shades of meaning with which the concept of civil society has been imbued over time. Its persuasive reinvention as democratic force for claiming universalistic values of democratization, or collective self-interest as ‘social capital’, appears to have paid scant attention to historical application of sociological analysis such as by Gramsci or Bourdieu. Analysis of civil society institutions, therefore, has often insufficiently acknowledged that they are deeply permeated by power orthodoxies that tend to surreptitiously reproduce themselves. Questions about the appropriateness of the notion civil society within an African associational context are therefore critical for the analysis of Jinja Network and Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum. In Chapter 3 explored criticism of what many portray as civil society’s hidden economic, strategic and colonial baggage and its rootedness in Western cultural traditions. However, I equally examined how the concept’s value as notion and institution within African contexts outside the big cities, appears to lie in how it is located as indigenous expression. Indeed, the findings of this thesis show that within a Ugandan context of evolving social, cultural and political order (specifically since the establishment of a ‘no party’ state configuration, and its shift to multipartyism in 2006), the legitimacy of ‘autonomous’ civil society space is contested. Local village council configurations of ‘strong democracy’ (Barbar, 2004), at least within Uganda’s ruling party’s (i.e. the Movement’s) rhetoric, leave little room for ‘autonomy’ but instead are purported to create a synthesized space of state and citizens’ economic, social, cultural and political interdependencies. Therefore, how the NGO and coalition of CSOs locate themselves within this economic, social,

46 cultural and political order, even if only a discursive reality, is critical not only to their proposals for change but for their very survival. In this context, I examine the new African forms of indigenous civil and political order that have emerged since the early 1990s in Chapters 6 and 9. However, before this, in the next chapter – Chapter 4 – I examine in greater detail the ideas underpinning promotion of the NGO (as donors’ preferred civil society institution) within the new development framework. How NGOs and coalitions assume institutional and notional identities to challenge state discourse on street children, and the degree to which they can be said to be accountable, are critical themes running through and underlying the findings of this thesis.

47

Chapter 4: Global governance, development and the NGO Through the 1990s international development focus, previously centred on the state and the market, broadened into a more interconnected view in which society’s associational realm was seen to have a more critical role (James, 2002). It is within this worldview of interdependence that contemporary interest in international development circles falls on a search for developmental ‘cohesion’ between the state, the market and civil society. This chapter begins by looking at the often-divergent interests and strategic positioning within global development frameworks and inter-sectoral partnerships (ISPs), as exemplified by the recent World Bank/civil society partnership. The second part focuses on various manifestations of the NGO as the ‘favoured child’ of international development. I explore frailties in its ‘downward’ accountability and organizational structure that lead critics to call into question its legitimacy as an institutional expression of civil society. Although acknowledging critique of the orientation of contemporary thinking about development, the chapter ends by looking at the NGO’s (in)capacity to manage the multiple demands placed on it for accountability and ‘democratized’ representation.

4.1

Governance and partnership: poverty eradication and macro-economics

Clearly World Bank literature reflects its own institutional and notional hierarchies to expressions of civil society. Although we explored many of these thematic hierarchies in the last chapter – for instance, as spaces to challenge undemocratic and poor value governance – we are drawn to ask yet more critical questions in the context of this thesis. Do civil society and multi-lateral agency or government partnerships work in setting policy and what is the impact of multi-agency alliance building? An answer to these questions will give some indication of the potential impact these policy-setting hierarchies have on towns like Jinja and Kampala.

4.1.1

World Bank and civil society partnerships

Clearly, there are few institutions that are more the brunt of development critique than the World Bank. However, the vehement socio-economic critique of the 1970s and 1980s structural adjustment programmes – more recently by heavyweight economists, such as

48 Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen (1997) – has forced the Bank to seek a societal ‘nod’ of approval. As the Bretton Woods Project1 put it “Unofficially, the Bank has no choice but to seek endorsement from increasingly powerful civil society actors to boost the legitimacy of its lending activities.” (Bretton Woods Project, 2003a) From 1992 until 1999 the Bank undertook a capacity building programme with civil society organizations (CSOs) in a process it called ‘mainstreaming’2. The idea was to enhance participation in the Bank’s operations and policy dialogue. The final phase of ‘mainstreaming’ civil society participation (which started in 2000) is intended to ‘deepen and mature relations and address more political concerns’ (Bretton Woods Project, 2003a). However, the Bretton Woods Project argues, lack of success in this seven year ‘mainstreaming’ process may come from a mixture of civil society’s unwillingness to ‘buy into’ the Bank’s global project, on one side, and the Bank’s fear that policies ‘will not be endorsed’ and might therefore compromise its ability to ‘control’ the agenda, on the other side. As the Bretton Woods Project charges: “Despite the participation rhetoric, the bank turned its back on two of the most innovative multi-stakeholder processes, the World Commission on Dams (1997-2000) and the Structural Adjustment Participation Review Initiative (1997-).” (Bretton Woods Project, 2003a) In Chapter 3 we mentioned Harriss (2002) and Fine’s (2001) characterization of the World Bank’s adoption of the notion ‘social capital’ as a World Bank ‘cloaking’ mechanism for its true global economic project. That the UN has linked the implementation of its muchheralded ‘Global Development Goals’ to approval of the World Bank loan process by national governments, Neville Gabriel (2003) points out, raises suspicion that there is a much grander ‘cloaking mechanism’ in operation. Gabriel suspects that “ … the drive to multilateral policy coherence epitomised in the Monterrey consensus [is] a co-option of the UN into the Washington consensus framework rather than the incorporation of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO in UN frameworks.” The suspicion that the Bank is now beginning to control the social agenda, Gabriel (2003) points out, has led many CSOs to reject the Monterrey consensus as ‘not our consensus’. Indeed, the legitimacy of the Bank’s civil society partners – apparently very ‘select’ and

1

The Washington-based World Bank watchdog institution. By the term ‘mainstreaming’ the World Bank means the incorporation of NGO models into its official policy framework (Frits Wills, 1995).

2

49 very ‘hand-picked’ – has also raised many an eyebrow. A strategic forum created by the World Bank’s Joint Facilitation Committee (JFC) included an invitation of only 14 civil society organizations. The selection of civil society representatives, the Bank admitted, “ … did not represent all the world’s civil society organizations … [however] … their presence was meant to reflect the diversity of those groups and to provide critical perspectives.” (cited by Bretton Woods Project, 2003a) We will look at these civil society partnerships later, but clearly this ISP ‘caginess’ is a two-sided coin. Indeed, for both the World Bank and its civil society representatives the question remains as to whether the relationship should be seen as a ‘milestone’ of Bank evolution or a ‘millstone’ of divergent interests. We are forced to ask the inevitable question: does this UN and World Bank marriage of convenience fulfil its claim to be propoor?

4.1.2

Reconfiguring global social policy

In 2003, Africa paid $14 billion in debt service and received a net $14 billion in development aid1. Six of Southern Africa’s fourteen countries are recognised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). As a substantial burden of debt is ‘inherited’ from former dictators or regimes that were deemed strategically useful (and economically profitable) by donors during the ‘Cold War’ period, debt legitimacy is contested. Loan facility for HIPCs, Gabriel (2003) also complains, focuses on ‘debt sustainability’ rather than poverty reduction and is premised on a structural adjustment conditionality framework. The 1990s strategy to rename and restructure the IMF and World Bank’s macro-economic implementation programmes, Gabriel (2003) argues, has done little to change traditional underlying attitudes predicating social policy to the mainly illusory ‘trickle down’ effect of economic growth. Perhaps predominantly as a cosmetic measure, the ‘Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility’ (ESAF), is now renamed the ‘Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility’ (PRGF). However, to ensure adherence to this ‘structural adjustment’ macroeconomic framework, country level Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have now to be presented and approved as a condition for HIPC debt relief (Mulikita, 2002). 1

2003 World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 13 April 2003. See www.worldbank.org

50 Nevertheless, the IMF and World Bank argue that integrating PRSPs in macro-economic policies encourages budgets that are more ‘pro-poor’. PRSPs, they insist, emphasise “ … good governance by promoting transparency and accountability, and improving the management of public resources; and ensuring domestic ownership of poverty reduction interventions.” (Mulikita, 2002) Whilst welcoming an apparent linguistic ideological shift in World Bank and IMF approach to sustainable development, Mulikita (2002) nevertheless points out that, as a ‘new’ paradigm it still tends to overemphasise the same macro-economic structural adjustment processes of the 1970s and 1980s, and still ‘without addressing the negative impacts on least developing countries generated by globalization’. Gabriel (2003) argues that, in linking PRSP with PRGF, the multi-lateral development discourse has taken a much more cynical turn, “The international development discourse at the turn of the millennium about ‘trade not aid’ is shifting to ‘aid for trade’.” (Gabriel, 2003) As country strategies, PRSPs are intended to create a sustainable budget framework (in terms of sustainable loan repayment) that both fulfils the UN’s Global Development Goals and the macro-economic objectives set out by the PRGF. The PRSP is basically an externally driven initiative (Mulikita, 2002). Despite its noble claims, Gabriel (2003) laments that case study after case study in the region points to the incompatibility between PRSPs and the PRGF1. Because the blueprints for PRSP processes are provided by the IMF and World Bank (as is approval), Gabriel argues, governments tend to develop PRSPs according to what they think will be acceptable. As well as reinforcing the macroeconomic framework, this also tends to negate World Bank claims of ‘national ownership’ and constrains adaptability to local needs (see also Edwards & Gaventa, 2001). The linking of PRSPs and PRGFs also makes attainment of the UN’s Millenium Development Goals equally unattainable, Gabriel (2003) argues. He outlines four primary reasons for this. Firstly, PRGFs are linked to a fixed return on commodities whose prices are perennially unstable. Secondly, budgets are cut during national economic crises due to financial instability and sharp currency fluctuations caused by large inflows and outflows 1

AFRODAD (2003) ‘Africa’s Experience with the PRSP Content and Process: Synthesis Report of Ten African Countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia’, AFRODAD PRSP Series, July 2003.

51 of external funds. Thirdly, inappropriate import liberalisation policies, which are tied to aid, have led to reduction in employment. And finally, there are progressively more severe cutbacks in social service expenditures arising from structural adjustment programmes, as well as the ‘user-should-pay’ principle. Rather than social development strategies being framed within a globally agreed economic compact, Gabriel (2003) argues, “ … the global socio-economic policy consensus should align itself to primary social development needs”.

4.1.3

Policy agendas: civil society participation and techniques of ‘consultation’

In a World Bank policy resource paper, Wolfensohn (1996) draws attention to the flip side of what is seen as a desirable civil society consultation processes. The World Bank, he argues, embraces such notions as ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ (Wolfensohn, 1996), which “… almost become a new mantra or panacea for redressing inequalities”. However, the question remains as to whether the Bank’s real intention is ‘redressing the inequalities’. Does the Bank’s faltering project to include civil society players in policy processes betray another of the Bank’s ‘shadow-sides’? Steve Rayner (2003) characterises such vertical cooption as managerial ‘control techniques’ that have the tendency to become the antithesis of the very democratic principles they purport to encourage. "It seems that the discourse of participation is essentially a managerial discourse, perhaps, even more narrowly, a crisis management discourse masquerading as a theory of democracy." (Rayner, 2003) If the Bank’s need is apparently to ‘control’ the policy agenda, the other flip side is the perceived need for greater input by so-called civil society ‘experts’ as a solution to the problem of democratic participation in World Bank, national and local policy processes (see Hems & Tonkiss, 2000, p. 10). Indeed, much literature proposes an enhancement of ‘expertise’ through capacity building (e.g. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2001; Mulikita, 2002; Gabriel, 2003). State reticence, Mulikita argues, is coupled with civil society’s incapacity to engage state institutions, “The business sector and civil society are not able to participate fully in the consultative process because they are marginalised by their governments … however, effective participation also needs the necessary knowledge, information, and skills.” (Mulikita, 2002) Rayner (2003), however, characterises the consequence of such logic as the ‘democratization of expertise’. What is needed, Rayner argues, is a ‘democratization of democracy’. To create a governance discourse, he argues,

52 “ … we might begin by contrasting the concepts and practices of participation with a term that seems to have fallen out of favour in the last 30 yeas, that is ‘mobilisation’.” (Rayner, 2003) ‘Mobilisation’, Rayner argues, builds on the idea of ‘solidarity’ rather than technocratic ideas of ‘risk’. It both seeks to challenge ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge, and champions value-based contestation. It also addresses complex social and cultural contexts, not through scientific mediation, but by activist anticipation of authentic social choice. Also, as if to satisfy the technocrat’s desire for outputs, its adequacy is based on outcome as much as process. Most literature, on the other hand, portrays processes of interaction between state and civil society, whether it be called ‘active participation’ or ‘mobilisation’, as more complex. Both civil society and business are characterized as ‘marginalised’ because they lack the capacity to engage multi-lateral and national policy institutions in a common technocratic language. It seems that civil society is damned for participating in World Bank policy processes, and damned for not participating in them. Capacity building of civil society organizations to engage in World Bank and IMF social policy processes does seem to imply a vertical relationship. However, although one has to equally acknowledge a level of necessary complexity in global governance processes, it appears that engagement is not only limited by lack of capacity. Mulikita (2002) argues that there is a deliberately complex and inaccessible policy language that almost seems designed to bamboozle civil society and business. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2001) – a development and democracy research forum – suggests that this apparently deliberate complexity masks rather a ‘comfortable’ closed accountability process between borrower governments and the World Bank and IMF that seems designed to keep civil society out. Clearly, ‘lack of capacity’ might well work as a mantra simply to prevent civil society from gaining too much influence over policy processes. However much we are persuaded about complexity of policy processes and the capacity needed to access them, little effort is required to expose the pervasiveness of the power relationships that sustain the deeply imbricated nature of economic and political injustice. Discursive inclusion in local social policy processes is only part of the solution. The economic processes that generate inequality, that then fragments along different dimensions of space, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and social class also needs

53 to be addressed. Turning these objectives into a truly altruistic global project, Perrons & Skyers argue, means “ … challenging and changing the current model of economic and social organization.” (Perrons & Skyers, 2003, p. 282).

4.1.4

ISPs and ‘virtuous’ space for development

Ivan Illich & Majid Rahnema’s (1997) critique of the dominance of an externally generated macro-economic order in the Third World argues that there is no more space for virtuous development. As Illich puts it “Commitment to progress has extinguished the possibility of an agreed setting within which a search for the common good can arise. Techniques of information, communication and management now define the political process, political life has become an empty euphemism.” (Illich & Rahnema, 1997, p.109) For most development academics research has now become ‘applied research’ through acquiescence to the notion that ‘development’ is somehow synonymous with ‘improvement’ – or has perhaps more recently become ‘fixing what we broke’. The development worker is, thus, dedicated to ‘improving’ the lot of common folk. For Illich cultural ‘hybridity’ is the space in which ‘development’ is simply one among many discourses1. It is to be contrasted with just a remnant of what is left of an alternative, what Illich (1997, p.112) calls “ … a mini-space in which we can agree on the pursuit of the good”. However, Illich has apparently given up on a viable space for ‘negotiating’ something grander than a ‘macro-economic’ world promised by the pervasive neo-liberal order. In many ways Illich’s gloom is justified. We do tend to equate ‘doing well’ in development circles with achieving goals set by the global agenda: fresh drinking water, access to a hospital, universal primary education, eradication of child labour, etc. What Illich seems to overlook, however, is the desire to ‘improve’ and often the apparent willingness to do something about it – even though seen as victims of the seductive though illusory promises of modernity. We remember Foucault’s argument that power is only tolerable on condition that it “ … mask a substantial part of itself” (Foucault, 1978, p.86). The ability to rectify economic 1

The notion ‘cultural hybridity’ used by Bhabha (1997) is explored more in Chapter 6 of this thesis.

54 and power injustices, perhaps, rests on civil society’s potential for ‘unmasking’ the global ‘domination’ of neo-liberal politics. To ‘unmask’ the ever more subtle techniques of domination, however, would also imply understanding them implicitly. Inevitably we return to the necessity of civil society to develop the capacity to know and ingenuity to influence development policy processes. The capacity gap, as has already been pointed out, is still to be addressed – whether it be in the expertise to ‘unmask’ techniques and policy processes (e.g. Gabriel, 2003; Mulikita, 2002) or the capacity to present an organized and representative democratic ‘solidarity’ (Crook, 2001).

4.2

The NGO the GRO and civil society: whose interests do they represent?

That the NGO assumes such a representative role of civil society is, however, contentious. Lack of NGO’s downward accountability and its ‘business-like’ character, critics argue, makes its right to claim that it acts as an agent of ‘democratization’ questionable (e.g. Jaime, 2000; Hudock, 1999; Uphoff, 1995). Nonetheless, literature unanimously acknowledges that multi- and bi-lateral agencies see NGOs as key players in their ‘development through democratization’ plans for the South – as Edwards & Hulme (1995) put it “NGOs are seen as the ‘favoured child’ of official agencies and something of a panacea for the problems of development.” (Edwards & Hulme, 1995) Clearly, NGOs’ complex upward (e.g. with government and multi-lateral agencies) and downward relationships (e.g. with local communities) and generally the multiple shapes and sizes of non-profit organizations brings us to the same contested claims for legitimacy we saw discussed for the ‘notion’ civil society in Chapter One. Hudock’s (1999) simple definition of the NGO perhaps bears testimony to this link. NGOs are, she says, “ … those organizations outside the realm of government, and distinct from the business community.” (Hudock, 1999, p.1) The multiple terms used for non-profit organizations in literature also reflects this complexity – e.g. such terms as ‘non-governmental organization’ (NGO) is subdivided into Northern NGO (i.e. NNGO, NGDO or INGO1), Southern NGO (i.e. SNGO) and Intermediary NGO (e.g. often applied to a Southern NGO that mediates between the Northern NGO and grassroots organizations). These are usually contrasted with 1

NNGO = Northern NGO, NGDO = Non-governmental Development Organization, and INGO = International NGO.

55 membership organizations which are referred to as ‘grassroots organization’ (GRO) or ‘community-based organization’ (CBO). Whereas the GRO might be characterised as community, neighbourhood or occupational (e.g. trade union or community saving group, etc.), Martens (2002) characterises NGOs as “ … formal (professionalized) independent societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level.” (Martens, 2002) However we subdivide them, the last twenty years has seen an explosion in both the numbers of NGOs worldwide and their access to the decision makers in both North and South. Their advocacy roles have expanded and they are seen by official multi- and bilateral agencies as having a necessary function as legitimising agents in national and international debates on policy and practice. This twenty years’ growth is less to do with an expansion of local initiative or voluntary action, Edwards & Hulme (1995) argue, than with what Robinson (1993) referred to as the ‘New Policy Agenda’ – roughly understood as a cross-agency ‘post-Cold War’ policy consensus driven by a the twin belief in neoliberal economics and liberal democratic theory. However, the considerable official funding has also left NGOs with the dilemma of sustaining a community identity on one side, whilst dealing with both its celebrity status and organizational growth, on the other side. This problem is sustained, Edwards & Hulme (1995) note, by the relative incompatibility of delivering the agenda’s twin economic and political objectives. Critique of this ‘New Policy Agenda’ warns that cooptation of NGOs for ‘service delivery’ might at the same time compromise vital independence necessary for ‘holding the government to account’. Indeed, whereas in 1988 Hellinger et al. warned of the dangers of a creeping political ‘corruption’ of the NGO’s mission of social transformation, twelve years later, Jaime (2000) complains that “They are losing their capacity to engage in critical analysis and propose global solutions; to react to or seize the political initiative; or to situate themselves on the cutting edge of those social and political processes in which new approaches and potential solutions might be found.” (Jaime, 2000) Is there a way to avoid the corrupting influence of co-option into Northern agendas and seeing the NGO’s grass-roots base eroded? Eade (1993, p.161) maintains that development of NGO systems of performance-monitoring, accountability and strategic planning are essential to “ensure that a line remains drawn between transparent compromise and blind

56 co-option”.

Assessing

good

performance

of

both

‘service

provision’

and

‘democratization’, however, is difficult. Studies that rely on a cost-benefit criterion tend to focus on projects that promote economic development. Other internal evaluations, Edwards & Hulme (1995) point out, tend not to be released or, if they are, resemble propaganda rather than reveal rigorous assessment. In terms of ‘service provision’, they argue, growing evidence suggests the NGOs do not perform as well as assumed in the past. They are not beacons of efficiency, costeffectiveness, sustainability, flexibility and innovation, nor hubs of popular participation. Development coordinated by the NGO tends also to be patchy, reaching out in some areas but leaving others untouched. Edwards & Hulme therefore argue that “ … very careful management is needed to avoid a fall-off in quality when NGOs scale-up service-provision to cover large populations.” (Edwards & Hulme, 1995, p. 7) As the NGO grows in size, Edwards & Hulme argue, it is prone to compromise both independence (e.g. through being donor lead) and values that are grounded in grassroots activism. Organizational ‘scaling-up’ tends to lead to bureaucratisation, less consultation with the target communities, which in turn results in the reduction of the NGO’s critical reflection and interest in ‘learning’. Hashemi (1995) similarly argues that both growth and increasing acquiescence to the donor’s agenda, has also led away from ‘conscientisation’ to ‘service-delivery’. Hashemi draws from Paolo Freire’s conclusions that “ … the awakening of critical consciousness leads the way to the expression of social discontents precisely because these discontents are real components of an oppressive situation.” (Paolo Freire, 1970, p.18) For Hashemi, therefore, withdrawal from the role of ‘conscientisation’ is responsible also for the retreat from the NGO’s vital role of addressing structural contexts for sustaining poverty and injustice. Evidence of NGOs promoting large-scale structural change through ‘democratization’, on the other hand, is as difficult to come by, as it is to assess. Apart from the practicalities of organizational scale, Jaime (2000) argues that the NGOs’ inability to both lobby at national and international levels and maintain grassroots activism is indicative of a deeper distinction between the concept and processes of ‘development’ on one side, and ‘democratization’, on the other side. If there is not a mutual reinforcement between the two

57 (the idea that ‘democracy is a tool for arriving at human development’), he suggests, neither will prosper. Edwards & Hulme (1995) suggest two principle reasons why this ‘mutual reinforcement’ has not happened. Lack of impact in the national policy arena, they suggest, is usually because of both the state’s unwillingness to compromise their policy control and NGOs’ failure to develop effective strategies to promote democratization – both at national level and within their own organization. Where success is claimed, it is contingent on what Heinrich (2001) refers to as an ‘enabling external environment’ – where “ … the state and other external actors play crucial roles in determining the window of opportunity for these activities”. Whereas Heinrich’s research assures us of an ‘enabling’ political environment for the democratizing role of NGOs in South Africa, Dicklitch (1998) complains that, in Uganda, apart from the NGOs’ own limitations, the government’s “ … democratic promise is impeded by inhospitable structural conditions, historical legacies, regime restrictions … ” (Dicklitch, 1998, p. 3). Though it is difficult to draw conclusions about the impact of NGOs on macro-policy, there is greater evidence of success in ‘micro-policy reform’. Both NGOs and GROs have been shown to influence both governments and official agencies where they form a collective front – helping to establish activists on human and political rights (especially at grass-roots level), promoting micro-policy reform, and promoting ‘education for citizenship’ (e.g. see Edwards & Hulme, 1995; Friedmann, 1992). Van Rooy (2000), seeing the NGO evolution as an historical process, also sees reason to laud the NGO sector for “ … raising the equity stakes, improving the quality of overseas development aid, fostering Southern NGO work at the international level and organising quick and effective humanitarian assistance.” (van Rooy, 2000) These achievements, she implies, are usually overlooked in the rush to condemn the NGO’s frailties. However, that the NGO, GRO or civil society organization coalition can claim accountability to grassroots activism, Edwards & Hulme (1995) point out, is often the central justification it uses for its existence.

58

4.3

The NGO and grassroots activism: managing multiple ‘accountabilities’

For the donor who links development outcomes with demands for ever more sophisticated models of ‘upward’ accountability, the task of ‘applying community contexts to systems, rather than systems to community contexts’1 becomes ever more complicated. Therefore, management of growth whilst retaining values grounded in grassroots activism, Edwards & Hulme (1995) argue, must depend on the NGO’s enlightened attitude towards and practice of ‘accountability’2. The demand for increased accountability grows with the organization. Multiple donors mean multiple accounting and, perhaps inevitably, results in an NGO prioritisation of who is to be accounted to. Accounting tends to remain an ‘upward’ process (i.e. to donors or institutions wielding authority), as NGOs are not formally accountable to their beneficiaries. GROs, on the other hand, are assumed to be accountable to their membership, showing themselves more representative and responsive to the needs of rural poor (Bebbinton & Thiele, 1993, p.21). However, more recent evidence of GRO scaling-up (Hudock, 1999) points out that, by appropriating poor models of NGO practice, they too run a danger of turning their members into ‘beneficiaries’. While much organizational practice is borrowed from business models, Powers et al. (2002) argue, there are key elements missing. Whereas businesses have a built-in ‘downward’ accountability structure (e.g. ‘customer complaint’ procedure), there is a ‘disconnect’ between the ‘customer’ and organization for most NGOs. “[The NGO] may provide inadequate and at times appalling ‘service’ to marginalised individuals and communities without any repercussions. As long as the donors are satisfied, the organization can continue not only to operate but also to grow, thrive, and expand.” (Powers et al., 2002) Edwards & Hulme (1995) argue that the Northern NGOs are probably the least accountable, appearing under little obligation, especially towards their beneficiaries. Avina (1993) divides NGOs’ accountability into short-term ‘functional accountability’ (e.g. for resources, their use and impact), and long-term ‘strategic accountability (looking at wider impact on the social, political and economic environment). While donors often 1

For example, Powers et al. (2002) argue for an NGO application of a ‘bottom-up learning’ (BUL) model. Accountability understood as “ … the means by which individuals and organization report to a recognised authority, or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions.” (Edwards & Hulme, 1995:9)

2

59 oblige NGOs and GROs to be efficient at functional accountability, Powers et al. (2002) argue, donors are generally unenthusiastic about supporting a long, dialogical, peoplecentred ‘strategic’ process because it may not produce an immediately, measurable and ‘predictable’ impact (see also Long, 2001). Greater donor dependence, therefore, might lead to a reduction of both quality grassroots activism and the vital flexibility that such a dialogical approach demands. It might equally ignore the human person as protagonist of processes of grassroots activism, rather than an end product. However, even ‘successful’ NGO downward accountability in complex community contexts is not without its problems. Rather than seeing ‘democratization’ of the NGO organizational structure – through ‘downward’ accountability – as the answer to developmental ‘success’, Powers et al. (2002) note that it creates an organizational dilemma. Empowering poor communities, giving them voice, and developing selfgovernance skills, they argue, creates a direct accountability link, which may in the end threaten the organization’s method of operations, focus, mission, and vision. Once the community has voice, it can question or reject the organization’s operational choices. In other words, the NGO faces a conflict of interests – succeeding at its mission of ‘community empowerment’ could threaten its existence. On the other hand, because the dominant ‘community voice’ does not necessarily mean a ‘democratic voice’ (especially if it reproduces culturally gendered hierarchies), there is also a danger that, through acquiescence to this dominant voice, the developmental baby is thrown out with the bath water. Self-preservation, therefore, tends to make the NGO take a cautious approach to empowerment, usually preferring to err on the side of ‘upward’ accountability. Seen in this way, Powers et al. (2002) proposal of ‘formal feedback loops’ – rather like a ‘customer complaints’ procedure – might perhaps equally be applied as a model for ‘managing’ downward accountability. In this way ‘cunning’ might be added to what Hudock sees as the three key attributes of the NGO in the 21st century, ‘innovation, solidarity and humility’. Truly challenging community structures that maintain social, economic and culturally sustained inequalities, however – without giving space to new hybrid hierarchical structures – remains problematic. Indeed, in terms of societal ‘reproduction’ of the exercise of power, Kamat (2002) argues that we should see no difference between ‘civil society’ and ‘state’1. Mercer (2002), however, sees another 1

See Kamat’s (2002) discussion of the Gramscian idea of ‘hegemony’ within the context of the development paradigm.

60 problem in the NGO’s grand project of ‘democratization’ that has perhaps a stronger cultural contextuality than Kamat’s argument. Civil society’s given role of ‘democratization’, she argues, is often framed by the liberal democratic pursuit of legitimising the state. This, she suggests, is problematic because it “ … legitimizes a normative (western) worldview against which the successes and failures of NGOs, states and civil societies are judged.” (Mercer, 2002) The very language of the debate (‘strengthening’, ‘weakening’ and particularly ‘civil society’), she argues, betrays a normative view on how democratic development ‘should be done’. A more reflexive political understanding of the local NGO and GRO, with strong and complex traditions of community embeddedness, she suggests, might support a more fruitful developmental process-oriented approach. Challenging embedded community associational contexts with ‘outsider’ models of governance should not always be assumed a good thing. Which ever the NGO’s perspective on challenging embedded structures, Hudock (1999) points to governments’ nervousness at civil society’s participation in challenging establish policy processes “ … since their presence potentially alters the political landscape, as NGOs empower groups to make claims on government and demand increased and better access to public services.” (Hudock, 1999) Some evidence demonstrates that, in still nascent democratic political contexts, if the NGO enters what the government sees as its own sphere of control, it runs the danger of being accused of subversion (e.g. James, 2002; Dicklitch, 1998; Karim, 1995). Similarly, intersectoral approaches that are born of the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) might well merely act as managerial mechanisms to reduce NGO participation to mere ‘tokenism’ whilst, at the same time, demand greater ‘official’ upward accountability of the NGO1. Similarly, Powers et al. (2002) argue, the NGO-beneficiary relationship can reflect the same ‘tokenism’. Facing the uncertainty of rapid change in donor interests, local NGOs might rhetorically embrace (and dubiously account for) community-based selfdevelopment in order to secure ongoing funding. Thus, decisions are made that privilege the organizations’ self-preservation rather than privileging specific community interests. In manipulating NGO structures and processes, donors’ organizational interests are often also seen to take primacy. Bryer & Cairns (1997) suggest that, rather than applying a topdown managerial approach to funding, local sensitivity to extremely complex contexts 1

With an implied reduction in downward accountability.

61 should also determine the NGO’s roles and responses. After all, many emergencies that NGOs address, they point out, are products of global political schemes in which donor organizations may equally be implicated by intervention or neglect. To stay ahead of the game in an increasingly sophisticated world of development funding and mechanisms of accountability, therefore, seems to require the NGO to maintain flexibility to ‘negotiate’ its way between the always-complex, often-conflicting and sometimes-unpredictable demands made on it.

4.4

Concluding remarks

In Chapter 4 I have examined the NGO as the bi- and multi-lateral communities’ favoured institutional expression of civil society – as such communities pursue inter-sectoral partnership with the state and market – but also as an institutional expression that is frequently criticized for its inability to address multiple accountabilities. As the ‘favoured child’ of the donor institutions, the NGO has perhaps been seen as the most coherent expression of civil society with whom the bi- and multi-lateral community feels it can ‘do business’. However, its right to claim that it acts as an agent of ‘democratization’ is often undermined by the NGO’s lack of downward accountability and its ‘business-like’ character. Nor are NGOs the beacons of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, sustainability, flexibility and innovation, or hubs of popular participation, as assumed in the past. In the increasingly competitive world of funding since the end of the Cold War, the expanding NGO often tends towards organizational preservation at the expense of ‘democratization’ through grassroots activism. Management of growth, whilst retaining values grounded in grassroots activism, Edwards & Hulme (1995) argue, must therefore depend on the NGO’s enlightened attitude towards and practice of ‘accountability’ in its multi-directional forms. Thus the NGO has to be aware of and account for the multiple external factors that influence the outcome of its work. In this way, long-term positive results are rightly seen as contingent on wider environmental linkages (i.e. cultural, social, political, and economic) and the organizations’ ‘virtuous’ sophistication in managing power dynamics that underpin such linkages. Because the NGO has often been unable to demonstrate its performance as ‘virtuous’, there has been growing interest in the Civil Society Organsiation (CSO) coalition as a broader embodiment of civil society interests. But do CSO coalitions – such as the two

62 explored in this thesis – represent a more ‘virtuous’, representative and accountable expression of civil society? Indeed, many of the narratives running through the data collection in this research touch on coalition and government respondents’ perceptions of exactly these deficits. Respondents’ concerns are expressed about how power flows within coalitions, and between coalitions and government policy spaces, tend to determine how agendas and issues are constructed, who constructs them, and how they are often poorly articulated within partnership with government. The following chapter – Chapter 5 – therefore examines both the characteristics of the CSO coalition but also the debates around its potential as a vehicle for ‘democratization’ of the policy-making processes, spaces and knowledge (McGee, 2004) through partnership with government.

63

Chapter 5: Coalitions: diversity, power and partnership with government Since the early 1990s, many parts of Africa have unarguably seen a dramatic movement away from the bwana mkubwa (the ‘big man’) political leadership1 towards a greater political pluralism (see chapter 6). With this pluralism and its messy evolution in many Eastern European and Southern societies, Covey (1995) argues, “ [civil society] … is drawn toward a more active policy-influencing role as more political space opens for people’s voices in public affairs”. (Covey, 1995, p.167) Despite a certain pre-eminence given to the NGO by many international multi- and bilateral institutions, there is a growing consensus that it should be seen as merely one among a great diversity of civil society organizations (e.g. see World Bank, 2003a; Hudock, 1999). Increasing interest in the past two decades, therefore, has turned to the CSO coalition as a vehicle for the cooperative expression of multiple civil society interests. However, if, as with the NGO, the primary role ascribed to the CSO coalition in Africa is to call the state to account, so too are the challenges to the coalition’s own organizational democratization and accountability (James, 2002; Covey, 1995). The CSO coalition’s relative representational advantage over the ‘scaled-up’ NGO, nevertheless, is in its ability to “ … bringing together a diversity of experience and competence into a unified voice” (James, 2002, p. 38). Its challenge, as we saw with the NGO, is to build an effective policy-influencing organization in order to shape positive policy environments (Covey, 1995, p. 167) but equally to advocate for institutional characteristics necessary for ‘propoor’ transformation. For the CSO coalition, as a melting pot of diversity, therefore, “The promise of democracy becomes a reality … when groups (especially marginalized sectors of society) participate effectively in the market-place of competing interests.” (Covey, 1995, p. 167) Clearly no single organization has access to all the knowledge required to challenge dominant ideological discourse (Brown, 2003; Powell, et al., 1996) on the poor urban child and his family living in adversity (see Chapter 2). The creation of knowledge systems for fostering sustainable development must be carried out in notoriously complex and 1

For example, multi-party elections have seen the departures of presidents Moi in Kenya and Nyerere in Tanzania, and the end of the Apartheid era in South Africa.

64 uncertain circumstances with relevant information dispersed among many actors, and thus CSO coalitions become important actors in such processes of knowledge assimilation (Brown, 2003, p.4). However, as I shall point out, the ability to assimilate and process diverse and apparently divergent perspectives, depends very much on both the capacity and the choices coalition members make in determining the type and evolution of the coalition environment. The following two sections link the various ideas of governance and power through which coalition formation and maintenance is facilitated or hindered. They also critique the notion of partnership between the CSO coalition and government that is assumed to reflect “… particular demands on citizenship [by government] and for citizenship [by citizens]” (ODPM, 2004). Because the ideas and implications expressed by such notions of partnership often ignore the problematic side of both formal and informal contractual relationships, I begin by looking at how literature on networks and coalitions helps inform us about processes and internal dynamics that inevitably bind issue-based coalitions to local and national centres of power.

5.1

Networks, coalitions and their rationale

Although in the majority of literature various alternative terms for coalition are often used as equivalents – such as alliance, network, or even forum (as is the case for one of the Ugandan case-studies in this thesis) – Meek (1992, p.1) tries to refine what he sees as distinctive in the following typology: o Networking – is the process of sharing information between agencies. These agencies may or may not have common goals; o Collaboration – is the process of agencies sharing information and resources to achieve common goals; o Coalition or alliance – is a group of organizations collaborating under a formal structure for a common purpose to be more efficient and effective; and o Partnership – is an association of agencies or organizations working together to eliminate needless competition. In Meek’s typology networking and collaboration are understood as ‘processes’ in the formation of types of relationships across organizations, and coalitions, alliances,

65 networks or partnerships understood as the type and structure of the relationship itself (although usually without any universal agreement about differences between these terms). Although acknowledging that the term ‘network’ in Europe has the same meaning as ‘alliance’ in the US and UK, for Koleva et al. (2002), a network denotes a ‘connection’ (or process), which has, in principle, neither formalisation nor the necessity of common vision, objective or task. An alliance (or coalition), on the other hand, implies some form of contractual ‘authority’, which decides upon who is to be included and who excluded (although Koleva et al. insist this contract is usually incomplete – i.e. it does not contractually bind one partner organization to another in law). However, rather than focusing solely on the degree of contractual formality, Ashcraft (2002, p.1) sees collaborations (i.e. the process of coalition, alliance and partnership formation) – involving jointly developed governance structures, authority, accountability, and shared resources with an eye on the mutual benefits that are assumed to accrue – as developments of relationships gained and sustained through networking processes. Therefore, although the creation of a coalition is an important strategic option, such options are not possible without understanding the centrality of the social networks that both create and sustain them (e.g. Ranjay, 1998; Gilchrist, 2004). Helpful for this thesis, Meek, Ashcraft and Gilchrist do seem to share in common the idea that, on one side, networks are ‘informal’ relationships, and on the other side collaborations, coalitions, alliances and partnerships are ‘formal’ relationships, underscored by some degree of contractual authority implied by such formality. The rationale behind the coalition as a strategic option, according to business management theory, is characterised by the diametrically opposed worldviews of seeing competitive advantage identified from either the discrete (independent) or embedded (interdependent) position (Witt & Meyer, 1998). Understood from the embedded position, “… collaborative advantage involves developing synergy among organizations toward the achievement of common goals” (Huxham & MacDonald, 1992), goals organizations are more likely to achieve together than alone (Ashcraft, 2002). A discrete organization, on the other hand, will be characterised both by its independence and its marginalisation, which makes it more susceptible to volatile situations (Cukier & Zohar, 2002), but also characterise it as somehow ‘out of touch’ with the overarching changes to governance structures in a global context (Witt & Meyer, 1998).

66 From a community development ‘social capital’ perspective, contemporary literature sees the need for networking and collaboration within and across public, private and voluntary sector boundaries, as a vital component for developmental success in terms of community action and mobilization (Wildridge et al., 2004, p.3; Gilchrist, 2004; Meek, 1992). Advantages to the coalition member, they suggest, can include: o learning – access to information, creativity and innovation; o cooperation – access to resources, ideas, joint activities, and problem solving; o support and solidarity – in challenging bad practice/policy, helping in crises, and campaigning; o empowerment – through having a collective voice, developing alternative perspectives, and influencing policy-making; o managing conflict – by anticipation, mediation & resolution of such conflict; and, o developing joint initiatives – across sectors, and through overcoming the barriers of suspicions and prejudices (e.g. see Lyford, 2001; Gilchrist, 2004) The rise of the coalition has been particularly visible among civil society organizations, in part, Brown (2003) argues, because so many of them are small, narrowly focused, and limited in their impacts. The growing acceptance of connecting with other like-minded organizations is essential in fostering ‘social learning’ that creates multi-perspective knowledge systems vital for sustainable development1. Such critical knowledge systems, Brown (2003) suggests, should also address the gulf between the North’s focus on technical sophistication on governance structures, and the South’s sophistication about power inequalities and social transformation. The tensions between the two foci are evident within what Mattessich, et al. (2001) propose as necessary for successful coalitionbuilding.

5.1.1

CSO Coalition attributes towards success

Mattessich, et al, (2001) identify six broad categories of influence on the success of coalition formation and evolution, which I both present and develop as follows: 1. The environment – the extent to which there is both a history of community relationship building and a supportive political and social climate, and to which opinion leaders and funders can feel sufficiently confident to lend their support 1

For discussion on the notion of sustainable development for ‘street child’, see Chapter 2.

67 (Ashcraft, 2002). There is also the importance of coalition adaptability to changes in social, economic, religious, cultural and, in particular, political environments (Heaney, 2004). 2.

The characteristics of members – which includes the trust, respect and commitment members show to each other and the coalition formation processes (Gilchrist, 2004; Wildridge et al., 2004; Ashcraft, 2002). Here the member should acknowledge the synergy of personal and collaborative goals that might require both negotiation and compromise (Ashcraft, 2002). Wildridge et al. and Gilchrist argue that members propensity to ‘trust’ is the central key to sustaining a coalition.

3. The process and structure of coalition governance – where the collaboration is able to adapt itself to accommodate new opportunities and changing environmental conditions. At an early stage the direction (including vision and objectives), criteria for selection, and the roles, rights and responsibilities of all members should be clearly articulated and understood, as such clarity impacts the capacity of the coalition to generate new ideas and perspectives (see Brown, 2003; Gray, 1989). Brown (2003) also emphasizes the importance of decisionmaking processes and patterns on maintenance of trust. Through such processes, differences are handled, key choices are made, and new perspectives synthesized. 4. Communication – both formal and informal lines of communication are fully developed and utilized and characterised by openness and frequency of interaction between

group

members

(which

inevitably

includes

a

cohesive

social

interaction/networking). Wildridge et al. add to this the ability of the leadership to both digest and understand ‘meanings’ behind communication (e.g. if one assumes communication is a manipulative process, what are the intentions?). 5.

Purpose – the clarity and ownership of vision and goals, and the extent to which they are different from those of participating organizations (Ashcraft, 2002), though relevant and attainable (Wildridge et al., 2004), are all critical perspectives for member organizations. However, as Wildridge et al. point out, although visions and goals are relatively easy to articulate “… common sense” (2004, p.5) in strategic positioning (and therefore organizational repositioning) is still difficult to achieve.

68 And finally, 6.

Resources – this category refers to the extent to which the collaboration has sufficient financial, human and in-kind resources to achieve its goals. Implicit to this category is the need for skilled leadership and mediation to guide the coalition. Successful collaboration leaders, Ashcraft (2002, p.3) argues, have “… strong interpersonal skills, a keen sense of purpose, and an ability to clearly articulate the vision”. Leadership’s ability to identify, acknowledge, articulate and, as a consequence, ‘mediate’ difference, is seen as prime ‘boundary-spanning’ resource by a number of writers (e.g. Gilchrist, 2004; Wildridge et al., 2004, p.7).

Success in persuading member organizations about the potential advantage of strategic collaborative rather than specific individual positioning, Huxham & MacDonald (1992) argue, is largely dependent on whether it is possible to tip the perceived balance of advantages over disadvantages inherent in the six categories outlined above. It is therefore useful to explore some of the tensions implicated in the coalition- building exercise.

5.2

Understanding diversity, power and structure in coalitions

Many scholars suggest that diversity across social, economic and academic divides strengthens CSO coalitions (e.g. Covey, 1995; Gilchrist, 2004). This diversity gives wider representation at multiple levels, and a greater spread of the competencies essential for engagement with government institutions. Although success might mean uniting disparate interest groups (JUPRP, 2002, p.2), representational diversity makes ‘coherence’ and ‘cohesion’ problematic. Covey suggests that the complexity of diverse interests, participation and balance of power among members (e.g. Taylor, 2000; Covey, 1995; Ranjay, 1998), at the same time “ … reflect[s] the challenges inherent in forging alliances across groups which differ in wealth, class, culture and resources.” (Covey, 1995, p.169) And thus, the CSO coalition, James (2002, p. 4) observes, takes on a “challenging, volatile and paradoxical organizational form”. Unlike ‘normal organizations’, he argues, it is inherently unstable, and becomes increasingly difficult to coordinate as it grows in size, geographic reach and functional diversity (also see Brown, 2003, p.16). The different coalition members bring with them differences in social identities, social change

69 ideologies, and programme strategies. In the insecure world of ever changing donor policy trajectories, the bigger CSO coalition members also find themselves in competition with each other for external financial resources, recognition and legitimacy (see Ashman, 2001, p. 4). In this demanding environment it becomes difficult to forge agreements whilst, at the same time, maintaining a balance between bottom-up and top-down accountability, representation, and legitimacy. The positive side to this diversity, James argues, is that competing interests also make the CSO coalition more responsive to the changing social, political and economic environment in which it engages. Indeed, he argues, “ … [its] very existence arises from a perceived opportunity or threat from [its] environment” (James, 2002, p.4). This chameleon-like character, Ashman (2001, p. 14) contends, means that boundaries between organizations and their environments are often fuzzy. Coalition agendas, structure and activities also tend to change over relatively short periods of time. And thus, the CSO coalition’s structures and organizational style and strategies, James (2002) contends, will have to be different from those most commonly employed by CSOs (e.g. NGOs, GROs, etc.). That CSO coalitions are voluntary, Poeschka & Chirwa (1998) argue, means that emergent organizational and ideological orientation is negotiable. However, as already mentioned, such negotiation takes place in a highly charged environment that embraces structural change, on one hand, but is entrenched in power orthodoxies, on the other. In Africa, understanding of the interplay of perceived opportunities or threats between the coalition member organizations’ representatives, and between the CSO coalition and the state, is critical and a matter of survival. What Brown (2003) calls the ‘sophistication’ of people’s understandings of power relationship in contemporary African social and political processes, underpins civil society and state interaction. This, Brown (2003) points out, is often lost to the outsider. Clearly, how the coalition deals with conflict such differences generate is critical. Brown (2003, p.16) points to a number of options for the member organization (or its representative) and coalition partner: o withdrawal – that reduces conflict at the cost of less engagement, o escalation – that might achieve victory but at the expense of future good relationships,

70 o accommodation – that preserves relationships at the cost by ‘bypassing’ important differences, o compromise – that builds agreement by sharing costs, and o synthesis – that integrates different positions into innovative perspectives Longevity and the quality of social learning the coalition generates will depend on which of these options becomes the tendency for coalition member organizations. Underpinning these choices is the character and relative position of authority of the member organization or its representative him/herself (recognizing that this can also be highly gendered)1, the coalition leadership’s capacity to facilitate the creation of a shared institutional base for managing differences constructively (Brown, 2003, p.16), but also cultural dimensions implicit in, for instance, African understandings of difference and its specific ways of dealing with conflict within sophisticated layering of power relationships.

5.2.1

Expertise, capacity building and disenfranchisement

Many CSO coalitions, James (2002) argues, have no option but to both advocate for social change and build members’ capacity at one and the same time. Capacity building, he argues, should be seen as part of the coalition leadership and donor’s role in grassroots mobilization. Lack of ‘strategic’ skills is a major limiting factor for CSO coalitions at all levels. A low educational level, even among key staff and project managers, often means they only understand the complexities of the issues they are fighting for superficially (Fisher, 1994; Ritchie, 1995). Lack of analytical skills also contributes to a scarcity of new, innovative and creative ideas. This weakness of theoretical insight, James argues, is also compounded in many African countries by the lack of local policy research institutions to assist the coalition partners understand environmental influences that are wider than the sum of specific projects’ experience. Project-based strategic thinkers, he laments, are snapped up by international NGOs, undermining further the coalitions’ ability to both analytically process knowledge but also to generate it. As Edwards & Gaventa (2001) argue, “ … in a world of highly contested and contestable evidence, NGOs [and CSO coalitions] must ensure that their messages carry weight and authority.” (Edwards & Gaventa, 2001, p. 256)

1

The relative advantage an organization gains by its position of centrality within a network of relationships has become a popular focus for ‘social network analysis’.

71 However, from another perspective, Castelloe & Watson (2000) argue that the coalition’s task of emancipatory capacity building has to address the educational and skills divide between both CSO coalition members themselves and their beneficiaries, and therefore be explicit in its goal of ‘Participatory Change Process’1. Change processes, they contend, should be based on fostering expertise within the community, training members to articulate their own priorities. However, seeing women’s disenfranchisement as socially and culturally embedded, Nagar & Raju (2003) suggest that such capacity building of coalition leadership often merely reinforces pre-existing social hierarchies. Within the context of global structural change, the need and desire for intermediary power brokering and ‘expert’ mediation between grassroots groups and government or donor organizations perhaps becomes inevitable, Nagar & Raju appear to acknowledge. In challenging knowledge systems, coalition processes of reflection, questioning, debating, re-charting and reclaiming cannot completely escape processes of referral to the ‘professional’2. This referral inevitably brings with it both real and perceived power inequalities3. As Nagar & Raju lament, in ‘professionalization’ of the institutions of change, “… [the] importance of the workers have shifted in favor of those who can sell the NGO to funders, rather than those who can really connect with the people in the ‘project areas’ in terms of their languages, struggles, and issues.” (Nagar & Raju, 2003, p.10) That coalition ‘professionalisation’ tends towards reproduction of power inequalities perhaps contradicts its centrality as a new and contemporary institution of ‘governance’ fixed on “… a more dispersed notion of power and authority based on pluralism” (Taylor, 2000, p.1022). However, if substantive change is sought in the way knowledge is constructed and contested, what perhaps are needed are local participatory situational analyses facilitated by the specialist intermediary (JUPRP, 2002, p.2) who is equally able to bridge technological and ideological gaps inherent in CSO coalition membership.

5.2.2

Coalition ‘Formality’ and ‘informality’ within the complexities of social transformation

By exploring the definition of the term at the beginning of this chapter, we have suggested that the coalition comes into being when informal networking of information (e.g. within 1

What others call ‘participatory action research’ (e.g. van Beers, 1996) Normally understood as the institutionalised expression of the ‘expert’. 3 For example, gaining greater salaries, privileges, and influence. 2

72 social processes of relationship-building between multiple actors) becomes a collaborative process of also sharing resources between specific organizations (i.e. financial, material and human) in pursuit of specific mutually agreed outcomes. What is implied is that partnerships within social networking require few formal structures. The coalition, on the other hand, requires some degree of formalized structure to coordinate ‘strategic planning, service commissioning and/or service provision’ (Wildridge et al., 2004, p.5) – which are then converted into advocacy and awareness campaigns, projects, or training. Cuckier & Zohar (2002) observe that the degree to which the coalition becomes formalized depends on the commitment of its members to short or more long-term responses1 to the social, economic or political environment2. From a complexity theorist’s perspective, local ‘nested’ coalitions (Taylor, 2000) should value informal dynamism more than ‘institutional’ stability in addressing the acknowledged complexities of social transformation3 (e.g. Gilchrist, 2004; Cuckier & Zohar, 2002; Taylor, 2000). Focus should therefore be on accessibility and adaptability across social, economic and political boundaries. Unfixed dynamism, Taylor (2000, p.1022) argues, allows the local coalition to more effectively receive, interpret and act upon information from diverse sources – as part of a process of ‘transformative’ democracy (Eschle, 2000). Clearly, benefits and drawbacks of formal stability on one side, or informal adaptability on the other side, pull the coalition in a number of directions. In Table 5.2 (below), Cuckier & Zohar (2002) suggest some of the trade-offs on either side. According to this scheme, the more formal structure is more likely to provide a more ‘credible’ presence. For instance, in the Ugandan context, if it is registered with the government as a community development organization, the coalition is able to have its own bank account, receive government support and benefit from official ‘partnership’ agreements. On the other hand, the informal structure may allow for the type of risk-taking or confrontational initiatives that might necessarily compromise the contractual ‘orthodoxies’ of registration and coalition ‘credibility’ with government. Indeed, Tarrow (1994) warns against turning this fluid and

1

Responses can be either informal, short-term ‘collaborative issue-specific’ responses, or formal, long-term ‘coordinated institutionalized’ responses. 2 Gray (1989:15) distinguishes between network processes of collaboration (‘a temporary and evolving forum for addressing a problem’), co-operation (informal arrangements to achieve reciprocity) and coordination (‘formal institutionalized relationships’). 3 For social transformation, Gilchrist (2004:90) sees a necessity of placing the coalition ‘on the edge of chaos’ (i.e. teetering on the edge of total social deconstruction) buffeted between conservatism and anarchy.

73 adaptable space of contestation (what he calls a ‘free space’) into a permanent ‘institutional’ space1.

Table 5.2: Forms and characteristics of social change coalitions (from Cukier & Zohar, 2002)

On the other hand, Misztal (2000) and Gilchrist (2004) argue that even if the coalition’s interests are in social and structural change, institutional informality can hide rather than confront the inevitability that even informal relationships themselves contain pockets of power that are difficult to unmask or challenge. The shadow-side of informality, they point out, is that it can become a “… smokescreen for the strong or the lucky to establish unquestioned hegemony over others” (Gilchrist, 2004, p.9). Moreover, even for the most social transformation-minded coalition, access to resources and ‘institutionalising’ some degree of organizational and ideological coordination and autonomy are likely to produce some form of compromise ‘formal/informal’ governance structure (Ranjay, 1998). As Lowndes (2001) point out, rather than an ‘either/or’ choice, partnerships tend to move through life cycles, adopting different configurations at different stages – “… looser and more like networks at the beginning and end, more formal in the planning and delivery stages” (Taylor, 2000, p.1028). Taylor also suggests that setting up parallel structures might permit both formal and informal involvement as circumstances determine. However, as Wildridge et al. (2004, p.7) point out, successful coalitions will keep their focus more on processes and outcomes than structure and inputs. Getting the governance structure right for the specific coalition, therefore, becomes a balancing act fraught with dangers. As Jonathan Taylor puts it, “… Building the institutional capacity to hold these tensions and spaces will be a delicate operation. It will require new forms of knowledge and ways of knowing, new skills and new structures—skills in mediation and conflict resolution and structures, which can live with the complexity of 1

I discussed the notion of civil society as ‘contested space’ in Chapter 3.

74 communities and communicate across boundaries. It assumes organizational dynamism, with structures capable of adapting to circumstances.” (Taylor, 2000, p.1022) Indeed, Misztal (2000, p.229) argues that society can only create and maintain the conditions for cooperation and innovation where it achieves an optimal balance between the informality and formality of interactional practices.

Partnership and membership criteria Decisions about with whom to ally oneself in both coalition and public policy debates can determine the coalition’s success in advocating both its position (i.e. as a ‘legitimized’ voice) and potentially the shape of public policy. Coalitions selecting the wrong partners (e.g. through weak membership criteria or poor choice of political allies), Heaney (2004, p.21) points out, can quickly undermine coalition cohesion. On the other hand, well- and strategically chosen partnerships with local leaders and within the coalition itself can allow a coalition both leverage on policy-making processes (Heaney 2004, p.21) and greater representation of beneficiary interests (Gilchrist, 2004). Absence of good strategic criteria for partnership and collaboration, may well lead to missed opportunities, and diminishing trust and creative interaction with actors ‘who should be natural allies’ (Heaney, 2004, p.23). Gilchrist (2004) also notes the importance of adaptability of partnership criteria to longitudinal social, cultural, economic and political environmental changes (e.g. during periods of regional crisis, change of leadership or stakeholder focus). Heaney (2004, p.21) also emphasizes the dynamics of ‘conscious’ change, where members make and break internal and external partnerships, or merely maintain old partnerships for ‘old time’s sake’.

Leadership and mediation It should have become obvious so far that the key role of the leadership (also described in various literatures as ‘mediator’, ‘intermediary’, ‘boundary spanner’, and even ‘entrepreneur’) is to act as ‘bridging agent’ between diversity. However, whilst enabling others to establish mutual goals and reconcile differences, s/he must also manage the coalition’s own organizational interests and priorities (Covey, 1995, p. 180). Leadership, as a consequence, has to be strong and central (Cullen, 1999; Covey, 1995), in order to react quickly and decisively to a change in the environment. On the other hand the CSO coalition should reflect the same ‘decentralised’ leadership and participative decisionmaking approach that it demands from grassroots mobilization or partnership with

75 government (van Tuijl & Jordan, 1999). To these functions, Wildridge et al. (2004, p.7) add the roles of ‘knowledge managers’ (e.g. educating partners about each other to redress fractures in relationships due to real or perceived conflicts of interest), ‘performance investors’ (creating a focus of common mission but also articulating consequences of under- or non-performance), and ‘organizers’ (creating events and spaces to engage members in collaborative learning and action). Gilchrist (2004), writing from a community development and social capital perspective1, focuses more on the intermediary’s function of horizontal (e.g. between similar people and organizations) and vertical (across power, economic, cultural and economic boundaries) relationship building (or ‘networking’). These functions include: providing information and suggestions, making introductions, acting as ‘go-between’, helping people overcome problems (practical, political or psychological), and helping people make links and work together. Adapting to diverse and sophisticated environments, the intermediary needs the ability and versatility to operate appropriately and conduct appropriate interaction within multiple settings (Gilchrist, 2004, p.56). In terms of both administration and social learning, s/he (or perhaps more appropriately ‘they’) should also have the facility to interpret and transmit information across boundaries, using appropriate formats towards specific targets and ends. Therefore, as the central ‘charismatic’ binding figures, the leadership also becomes the hub of considerable power and influence. As Streck observes, “A handful of individuals with the right leverage and powers of persuasion can create a common vision and convince important actors to throw their weight behind an issue.” (Streck, 2002, p.6) Crucially, in order to create the cohesiveness in activities and relationships, the leadership should be good organizational administrators, but also seen as egalitarian, non-partisan and motivated only by the desire to eradicate a particular social, cultural or economic injustice, and the gendered ‘institutional’ inequalities and prejudices that sustain them. Dynamic and charismatic, the leadership also needs to be able to inspire and mobilise a movement to challenge established structures and systems (although, as Gilchrist points out, social change is not necessarily a function or aspiration of coalitions). The dual challenge of mobilising ‘arguments’ as well as people (Covey, 1995, p. 167) requires a clear delineation of the roles of the executive leadership and an agreed framework for its powers. These twin leadership qualities should allow a balance between quick action, and the more time 1 From a UK Community Worker perspective and her interest in chaos theory, Gilchrist’s interest is more on the ‘unfixed’ dynamism of networking than ‘institutional’ dynamics of coalitions.

76 consuming representation that legitimises both the leadership and the coalition (James, 2002, p. 39).

5.3

Partnership with government and the ‘democratization’ of knowledge

Critics in the 1980s and 90s argued that the model of liberal democracy being promoted in African contexts – emphasising state withdrawal from society, development and market forces – lacked the consultative, deliberative and participatory policy-making processes that would hold the state and market accountable to the poor (McGee, 2004a, p.3). However, with the impact on World Bank thinking of such influential1 critique as the 1997 DFID White Paper ‘Eliminating Poverty: A challenge for the 21st Century’, the idea of the ‘virtuous state’, balancing economic liberalisation with the promotion of good governance and ‘participatory’ democracy, began to be emphasised in IFI development discourse. Rather than merely passively allowing market dynamics to determine distribution of resources, the virtuous state would now “… support economic arrangements which encourage human development, stimulate enterprise and saving, and create the environment necessary to mobilise domestic resources and attract foreign investment” (DFID, 1997, p.12) Through the PRSP2, McGee (2004a, p.3) argues, the World Bank accommodated (or ‘determined’, as some critics would argue) this new state role proposed within the DFID paper. However, as McGee points out, the PRSP, in promoting a more ‘participatory’ (or ‘partnership’) approach to policy-making, is underpinned by three critical assumptions. The first is the assumption that governments are willing and able to follow the World Bank’s rationale of ‘pro-poor’ policy priorities. The second assumption is that non-state actors are willing to adopt the potentially conflicting dual functions set them of both engaging in state policy processes and ‘auditing’ state power and performance. And, finally, the assumption that a country like Uganda has a political and cultural environment that easily facilitates citizens’ open engagement with the state. The frailties of many of these assumptions will be looked at later in this chapter and also in Chapters 5 and 8. However, we begin by looking at notions of state/civil society ‘partnership’ and ‘participation’, such as those proposed by in the PRSP, which offer a very wide interpretation. 1

‘Influential’ in the sense that it prompted a change in World Bank discourse to include participatory research approaches and qualitative data in ‘pro-poor’ policy-making processes that frame PRSPs. 2 That is, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – see Chapter 4.

77

5.3.1

The meaning of partnership

With no apparent universally accepted definition, ‘partnership’ comes to mean “… different things to different people under different circumstances.” (Wildridge et al., 2004, p.5). Lowndes (2001, p.2) describes it as “… a variety of arrangements with different purposes, time-scales, structures, operating procedures and members”. Common to the definitions are the same processes, structures and relationships for networking, collaborating and coalitions that we have already discussed earlier. However, clearly the context and intention of a specific partnership with government will determine its particular configuration – whether it be ‘strong democracy’1 or mere tokenism. Nevertheless, building inter-sectoral partnerships for a coalition, Streck suggests, may typically combine, “… the voluntary energy and legitimacy of the civil society sector with the financial muscle and interest of businesses and the enforcement and rulemaking power and coordination and capacity building skills of states and international organizations.” (Streck, 2002, p.4) Partnerships between coalitions and government are predicated on the rationale “… alone, no one sector – government, business, or social – can meet the needs of family, children, and community” (Frances Hesselbein, quoted in Ashcraft, 2002, p.1). The two preceding chapters outlined the dominant international development discourse on government/civil society partnerships as very much an imperative for particular demands on citizenship (by government) and for citizenship (by citizens) (e.g. ODPM, 2004). Focus has therefore shifted from a linear to a multi-dimensional interconnectivity, Streck points out, “… from intergovernmental activities to multi-sectoral initiatives – from governance at the international level to governance across different levels, and from a largely formal, legalistic process to a less formal, more participatory and integrated approach”. (Streck, 2002, p.1) Rather than relying on existing sluggish and hierarchical structures, Streck argues, international problems may need to be addressed by the relative speed and effectiveness of flexible and integrative networks. As we have also noted in previous chapters and will explore further in Chapter 6, for many developing countries, INGOs or domestic NGOs with international support, have become 1

This idea, expressed by Benjamin Barbar (revised edition 2004) in the 1980s in his book of the same name, places key importance on citizens’ participation on political issues. It is contrasted with the political ‘aloofness’ expressed in idea of ‘thin democracy’, which sees the citizen as uninterested and ill-equipped to participate directly in political decisions.

78 the principal suppliers of many social services once assumed to be the state’s responsibility. For much of Africa, government’s role is reduced to coordination and regulation of these programmes – and even this role is often minimal (Villalón, 1998). Such a situation, Huxtable (1998, p.282) observes, can make government and coalition partnership an uneasy affair. Indeed, with shrinking international development assistance through the 1990s and traditional state bureaucracy often not equal to the rapidly changing demands on it (Streck, 2002, p.1), many African states have now become dependent on well-resourced INGOs or local CSOs for maintaining the social ‘safety net’ that keeps the population at least minimally acquiescent. Although this might allow the state to re-channel its resources into programmes it sees as giving greater political return, the CSO, Huxtable (1998) argues, nevertheless gains some leverage with which to press its demands on the state (see Chapter 6). However, if vested interests of social and political elites are threatened too dramatically in less open political regimes by protest and advocacy approaches to policy reform, Covey (1995) warns, this may lead to a dangerous backlash. And yet, the CSO coalition’s pursuit of national and local ‘pro-poor’ policy development, Cullen (1999) contends, must assume at least some degree of confidence in the desire of government to bring about political and social change. And this state desire for ‘strong democracy’, which would ideally be based on values rather than state sovereignty, is most likely, McRae (2001) argues, to coalesce around the coalition of state and non-state actors1.

5.3.2

The ‘politics’ of partnership and policy-making

However, we should not assume that the dynamics of partnership and participation follow the logic of virtue. A sentiment that seems to permeate a UK Government guide to citizens’ participation in local government (ODPM, 2004) policy processes is that ‘the citizen is from Venus and local government from Mars’. Attitudes of mistrust between the citizen and government ‘officialdom’ are highlighted as follows. Whereas the ‘ordinary citizen’ sees local government’s bureaucracy as unresponsive and inaccessible to all but the educated middle-class (and middle-aged), the guide points out, local government fears unrealistic public expectations and the ‘slowing down’ of decision-making through long

1

McRae also uses the term ‘network’ to emphasise perhaps a more informal partnership suggested by Streck.

79 processes of consultation. Whereas the local government sees the public as disinterested, the public claims to be uninformed about opportunities to participate in policy processes and preoccupied with more pressing day-to-day concerns. Interestingly, being written principally for a local government audience, much space is given in this guide to ‘techniques’ of involving the citizen (e.g. complaints and suggestion schemes; service satisfaction surveys; opinion polls; interactive web sites; community plans/needs assessments; citizens’ panels; focus groups; citizens’ juries; etc.). The critical reader may take away the sense that local government is being urged to choose from a variety of techniques to suit only how much it is willing to ‘give away’ for the sake of the mantra of ‘citizens’ participation’1, rather than its commitment to ‘strong democracy’. Indeed, Raynor (2003, p.169) asks if this mantra of citizen ‘participation’ is merely implicating social science in a celebration of the triumph of technique that in reality moves us further from true participation of an informed citizenry. "It seems that the discourse of participation is essentially a managerial discourse, perhaps, even more narrowly, a crisis management discourse masquerading as a theory of democracy." (Raynor, 2003, p.169) However, on the other side, where citizens’ involvement in policy-making is weak or dominated by specific interest groups, the degree of public representation in participatory processes in local government also becomes problematic (see Chapter 3). This interplay of diverse interests participating or not participating in policy agendas will also clearly be highly contextual to specific localities, cultures and political configurations2. Cullen (1999) emphasises that ‘legitimacy’ given to coalition’s engagement in policy reform is strongly predicated to its issue-based expertise. However, as we have already mentioned, the pursuit of policy-making inclusion through ‘expertise’ runs the danger of undermining the value placed on addressing grassroots ‘experience’ of structural inequalities (Rios, 2000). Covey describes this governance dilemma in the following way: “Arguments that call the attention of the policy-makers, call for ‘expert’ knowledge of both the issue and the decision making processes; while public outcry and protest action that constrain decision-makers’ power, call for an active and organized grassroots constituency.” (Covey, 1995, p.170)

1

We are also reminded of Foucault’s observations on ‘techniques’ in the exercise of power, discussed in Chapter 3. 2 In an African context, these diverse interests are explored further in Chapter 6.

80 However, both Fisher (1994) and Covey (1995) seem to accept that mediation is necessary between grassroots ‘experiential’ and government ‘technical’ policy platforms. Both see its local expertise and stated mission of social transformation as placing the Southern NGO (see Chapter 4), and therefore the Southern coalition1, in the ideal position for this mediation (see also Ritchie, 1995). Moreover, Fisher (1994) also observes that this type of mediation is more likely to succeed in specific issues and advocacy areas in which the coalition’s member organizations are the prime service providers – and upon which they therefore inevitably have greater political leverage. Apart from issue-based expertise, Cullen (1999) sees the coalition’s legitimisation as government ‘negotiating’ partner also based on its ability to propose both workable and acceptable alternative policies. A seminar report from the Harvard based ‘Jobless Urban Poverty Research Programme’ (JUPRP, 2002, p.2) proposes three strategies to accomplish this task. First, it is necessary, it suggests, to present a concrete issue as a clearly defined problem whose solution seems feasible. Second, advocates must find attention-grabbing ways of selling both the solution and the rationale behind it to both politician and public. And third, advocates must continually connect these coalition issues to other topical issues and events that hold the public’s attention. However, as we cautioned in Chapter 2, such a ‘sales pitch’ might equally run the danger of entrenching superficial and false interpretations of complex social phenomena for both the government and public. More worryingly, unless very carefully managed, such an approach might well compromise the vital processes of ‘social learning’ within the coalition (Brown, 2003), subduing the potential for alternative perspectives and perhaps marginalizing members with a difference of opinion. Despite obvious partisan and divergent division of interests, many scholars stress the need to also link local issues to regional perspectives (e.g. JUPRP, 2002, p.2). However, as mentioned earlier, considerable analytical skills will be called upon in interpreting on one side, the impact of national or regional decisions at a grass-root level, and on the other side, applying local insight to national and regional levels. Once again, and despite its obvious dangers, we are drawn to conclude that the coalition needs support of the ‘experts’ from the worlds of academia, politics, and business, for social, economic and political interpretation of its environment. 1

The likelihood of success is enhanced, Covey (1995) argues, if academics, church leaders, etc also support specific issues.

81 As an extension of this idea, ‘interest group’ literature observes that coalitions use either ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ approaches to influence policy decisions (e.g. Binderkrantz, 2004; Maloney et al., 1994). The idea behind the ‘insider’ approach is to gain privileged access to decision-making processes through support from politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders. The ‘outsider’ approach, on the other hand, focuses on gaining political leverage through secondary channels (e.g. mobilizing public concern through the media). Anne Binderkrantz (2004) observes that ‘idealistic’ coalition approaches are more likely to use ‘outsider’ indirect approaches, where high profile action might also have the function of attracting and maintaining membership. However, she also points out that groups will often adopt both approaches, navigating between direct, close interaction with decisionmakers but also mobilisation and using media to put pressure on them.

5.3.3

Legitimising knowledge, actors and policy-making spaces

McRae’s (2001) optimism about the intentions of the ‘virtuous state’, mentioned earlier, should not be understood to necessarily simplify the policy-making task. McGee (2004a, p.6-7) echoes Streck’s concern that ‘pro-poor’ policy-making should not be seen through the ‘fiction’ of a linear set of assumptions about actors and policy processes1. More realistic policy-making dynamics, McGee suggests, may be understood from the complex interplay and manipulation of three interlocking aspects, ‘knowledge’, ‘actors’ and ‘spaces’.

Knowledge Today, McGee (2004a, p.11) argues, knowledge typically enters public spaces in three forms before it is either legitimised or shelved as a basis upon which policies are decided. ‘Official knowledge’ is primarily generated through national survey-based statistics. For official knowledge household consumption remains the basic unit for measuring relative well-being of the citizen within the PRSP framework – to which, for instance, the Ugandan government still predominantly pegs its claims of success. ‘Poverty discourses and narratives’ are another form of knowledge. These McGee (2004a, p.15) characterises as ideologies that are constructed and self-perpetuated, rather than being ‘natural’ or ‘selfevident’. These are perhaps best illustrated by the bipolar narratives we discussed in Chapter 2, characterising street children as a ‘criminal’ or ‘victim’, resulting in quite distinctive ‘rehabilitation’ narratives. Narratives, such as these, tend to simplify complex 1

McGee characterises linear models of policy processes as a bureaucratic default fiction.

82 processes and therefore appear to present straightforward options for policy-makers. The third form of knowledge is ‘experiential’. Seen in this thesis as ‘street child experience’ – perhaps in the form of anecdotal narratives about street child behaviour and rehabilitation approaches that work – this qualitative knowledge tends to be characterised as ‘impressionistic’, and is therefore is often quickly excluded from policy processes. However, McGee (2004a, p.5-7) cautions, the extent to which knowledge can claim to be evidence is necessarily mirrored against internal and external political ‘demand and supply’ dynamics (e.g. focused on advocates whose single-mindedness generates ‘evidence’ and whose agenda is advanced), and the administrative and research capacity that both generates and interprets evidence. Nor can we assume, he argues, that consensus is possible on what constitutes legitimate and valid evidence.

Actors We have already discussed in Chapter 3 the fact that the notion ‘civil society’ is a highly contested one, as, indeed, is the claim of civil society as a category of associational life in an African context1. However, rather than dwell on placing diverse actors into sectoral categories, Brock (2004, p.46-47) defines a broader and more diffuse framework of agency, networking diverse and sometimes ‘difficult to label’ actors. In African societies, she observes, “A single actor can not only engage in multiple spaces (labelled state, or civil society) or publics (labelled civic, or primordial2) but can also adopt a subtly different identity in each.” (Brock, 2004, p.46-7) These actors interconnect through a global to local set of policy-making dynamics, along what Brock et al. (2004) describe as a ‘policy-making slice’. However, the co-construction and normalising of the notion ‘civil society’ by powerful actors for countries like Uganda, Brock (2004, p.47) argues, also acts to ‘disconnect’, de-legitimise and, therefore, invite only certain configurations of non-government actors (e.g. based on financial clout, gender, education, religion, ethnic background, etc.).

1

This is also discussed in greater depth in Chapter 9. Osaghae (2001) argues that, at least in Nigeria, people differentiate between ‘civic’ business, which is associated with corrupt and undeserving state governance structures, and ‘primordial’ or community business, which is framed by strict codes of conduct. 2

83

Spaces McGee (2004a, p.17) argues that policy-making often wrongly assumes that filling ‘knowledge gaps’ leads in a logical progression towards problem-solving. Rather than being ‘voids’ and ‘neutral’, he argues, these gaps are spaces crowded, not only with contested and contestable moral values and preconceptions, but also unequal institutional and individual power relationships, and with political and social imperatives and their associated cultural and historical time frames. Policy spaces, therefore, representing multiple points in time and space in a policy process (some of which have transformative potential), are “… actual observable opportunities, behaviours, actions and interactions … which includes social and political forces and temporal dimensions that shape the institutions and practices within which [the various actors] operate.” (McGee, 2004a, p.16) Given the complexity that such interactions and knowledge encounters induce, policy processes may occur at several different levels and moments, with different outcomes. McGee (2004a, p.25) argues that policy informed by evidence, rather than driven by politics, demands a greater ‘democratization of knowledge’. This requires the inclusion of a greater diversity of knowledge as evidence, and invitation of a wider network of actors to policy-making spaces. However, assuming ‘pro-poor’ civil society actors’ willingness to accept such invitation, participation should also imply a degree of ‘self-organization’ (McGee, 2004, p.25) and proactive strategic positioning – what Brock (2004b, p.102) calls the ‘politics of influence’ – rather than mere tokenism (i.e. the ‘politics of presence’). Such characterisation of diverse policy-making actors and multiple spaces perhaps not surprisingly echoes Young & Barrett’s (2001) framework for understanding street children’s spatial and temporal interaction with urban environments (see Chapter 2). Just as street children survive through assuming different identities for different interactions in different spaces, McGee (2004a, p.13) argues that ‘talking the talk’ of dominant government and donor agencies’ discourses and narratives gives far more potential for influencing policy processes than disparate voices making divergent claims. However, as Gaventa (2004, p.279) observes, inclusion of a broader representation of ‘multistakeholders’ is also problematic. The clarity of “… which stakeholders are to participate, to engage with which tasks, at what level, and with what legitimacy …” he argues, is in no way self-evident. The greater dynamism of diffuse knowledge, actors and spaces perhaps

84 becomes more inclusive but is, nevertheless, more chaotic and messy. Nor, crucially, can we assume that key groupings of policy actors – whether they be government, donor, or civil society – are homogeneous or accountable to other actors within policy-making spaces. Indeed, we are reminded of Raynor’s (2003, p.169) critique of the rhetoric of ‘partnership’ and ‘participation’, which, he argues, merely represents ‘management discourse masquerading as a theory of democracy’ – which can be manipulated to the advantage traditional power actors (Gaventa, 2004, p.280). Brock’s (2004, p.46-7) acknowledgement that actors in African policy-making spaces often hold multiple identities that span sectoral boundaries, also acts to further blur clarity of representation and accountability.

5.4

Concluding remarks: CSO coalitions as generators of change

In Chapter 5 I have looked at the CSO coalition as multi-representational civil society institution that locates itself within tensions that might, on one side, reproduce the same accountability deficits of NGOs’ structures and processes. Alternatively, through opting for socio-transformative structures and processes, and partnership with government, the CSO coalition might explore its potential to challenge hierarchies of actors, knowledge and spaces, and foster critical learning within policy making processes. Learning that enhances the awareness, capacities and actions of social systems, Brown (2003) argues, will become ever more critical in societies that face rapid changes in an increasingly interdependent world1. In as much as they are both willing and have the competence2 to embrace ‘difference’ and create institutional arrangements to enhance its potentially new and creative insights (Brown, 2003; Streck, 2002), CSO coalitions can play critical roles in such learning processes, “ … both as the advocates of social values and unheard interests and as sources of social innovation to respond to unmet needs” (Brown, 2003, p.17). To these ends – although principally coalescing around a shared vision and solidarity – the coalition’s governance structures, processes, and accountability should reflect the values they purport to represent (van Tuijl, 1999). 1

Similar to Brown’s (2003) conceptual framework for ‘social learning’, mentioned earlier, in Alsop’s (2004) definition of power as multi-layered and multidimensional, empowerment also emerges as a complex process of raising individual and collective consciousness, identifying areas of desired change, and making change happen. 2 James (2002: 38) cautions that there is a danger that the CSO coalition becomes lost in the detail or extend their operation outside their strategy and capacity and “ … soon end up doing nothing well and achieving very little”.

85 Equally, through responding to both opportunity and invitation to engage with government as partners and participants in policy processes, CSO ‘street child’ coalitions should proactively seek to represent the diversity, not only of their distinctive members’ interests, but also the way different types of knowledge are articulated as coherent and legitimate ‘evidence’ that might strategically advance the interests of a wider population of ‘street’ children (see Chapter 2). However, even if they are not just ‘managerial techniques’ (Raynor, 2003, p.169), such ‘multi-stakeholder’ spaces can be messy, with confusion about roles and responsibilities (Gaventa, 2004, p.279). For both ‘pro-poor’ CSO coalitions and local government, therefore, much is required to ‘re-engineer’ traditional systems of governance to respond to these ‘new flows of power’ (Taylor, 2000, p.1030) and ‘new flows of knowledge’ (McGee, 2004)1. Despite the pervasive rhetoric on inter-sectoral ‘partnership’ in national and international discourse, Taylor suggests that there is still too much evidence of top-down control to be optimistic about structural change. Indeed, cleverly constructed techniques of ‘participation’ (De Marchi, 2003) frequently only thinly veil the pervasiveness of traditional tensions between state aspirations and those of ‘pro-poor’ coalition representation. However, as nuclei of existing organizations and expertise around which social movements and learning can emerge and coalesce (Camach, 1998), the CSO coalition’s strength is its flexibility (Ashman, 2001, p. 14) to ‘manipulate’ opportunities and ‘negotiate’ threats. Thus it might proactively shape strategic possibilities for influencing policy-making processes (van Tuijl, 1999b). From a more pragmatic perspective, Ritchie (1995) argues that, rather than seeing its role in terms of a tool of social transformation of global processes – over which African government and common citizen alike have little control – the coalition should see itself more from the understanding that “… most people are trying to find the best possible way to adapt and deal with (globalisation), rather than to fight and change it” (Ritchie, 1995, p.525). The CSO coalition, therefore, appears to unavoidably operate between such pragmatism and ideological aspiration. Ideas of manipulation, improvisation, negotiation and, indeed, ‘connivance’ keep reappearing throughout this thesis and were evident in coalition practices and processes during the data-collection. Depending on how the meaning of each term is constructed, manipulation, improvisation, negotiation and connivance are proposed for coalitions as 1

What Foucault refers to as ‘power/knowledge’ – see Chapter 3.

86 ways with which to engage with governments that are often characterised as using just such ‘techniques’ in retaining coherent – though not always virtuous – control of African postcolonial, post-Cold War and post Apartheid states. The following chapter – Chapter 6 – looks at the variety of ways African states are adjusting to the dramatic socio-structural changes in their relationship to the West and what this implies in terms of how they construct new relationships to their citizens, and how the citizen – or, indeed, Jinja and Kampala coalitions – might manipulate, improvise or negotiate new postcolonial, postCold War and post Apartheid relationships with the state. For a decade and a half, dynamic processes of state ‘reconfiguration’ have made some considerable changes in African political environments following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Apartheid. Although state legitimacy in Africa can no longer be sufficiently explained away by the rhetoric of strategic alliances1 and ideology of ‘postcolonial’ resistance, traditional bureaucratic institutions and political elites still appear remarkably resilient (Villalón, 1998). Chapter 6, therefore, both explores these broader African processes of state reconfiguration and identifies new and evolving state/civil society relationships and partnerships in which potential spaces emerge, or are ‘engineered’, for CSO coalitions to engage government in social learning about street and working children. Through these emerging spaces, processes and relationships, dominant discourses may be challenged and the processes and outcomes of policy-making influenced.

1

Perhaps characterized by ‘blank cheque’ East/West strategic alliances that propped up post-independence regimes.

87

Chapter 6: Africa: reconfigurations of the state and ‘space’ for civic engagement In Chapter 3, through such writers as Mamdani (1998) and Harriss (2002), we noted a fierce critique of the form and intention of applying the ‘Enlightenment’ notion to civil society in an African context1. Instead, they argue, we should acknowledge how different cultures, religions, histories and political ideologies contextualise civic activism, often quite at odds with the apparent hard edges of Western ‘secular’ socio-economic rationalism. We also noted how African social, economic and political realities are often framed by a synthesised rather than compartmentalised worldview in which associational contexts might have to be interpreted in terms of ‘socio-cultural activity’ rather than distinctive institution. Looking at the cooperative processes of developing appropriate policies for street and working children in Jinja and Kampala, interaction between African states and CSO coalitions is clearly central to this thesis. This chapter and Chapter 9, therefore, explore their nature and potential for meaningful engagement. This chapter begins by examining what characterises the post-apartheid African state at the beginning of the 21st century, and forty years after many African countries won independence. I discuss a variety of postcolonial and Africanist discourses that help us critically understand contemporary political environments and configurations of state power and domination in Africa. The last part of this chapter explores the space such political reconfiguration opens for the civil society organization (CSO) coalition to proactively negotiate social (and political) advantage.

6.1

Reconfiguring African identity and the nation-state

As we have seen in Chapter 4, many are the claims of a post-Cold War global victory for neo-liberalism (e.g. see Pollock et al., 2000), and often promised is a philanthropic ‘African renaissance’ through the new AU and NEPAD2 institutions (e.g. Cheru, 2002). There are, however, recurrent critical concerns in the world of international development, postcolonial theory and Africanist scholarship about not only who is pulling the strings of the African ‘notional communion’ but also what are the limiting factors to its configuration

1

E.g. Muhlmann (1962) describes the perception of Enlightenment ‘rationality’ in terms of a culturally hierarchical order of 'cultured folks' (Kulturvolker) and 'nature folks' (Naturvolker). 2 The ‘African Union’ and the ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development’.

88 – whether as pan-Africanist projection, global neo-liberal project, or merely as a far less generic contemporary process of African nation-state reconfiguration.

6.1.1

Postcolonial discourse

Benedict Anderson (1991) portrays the nation as an ‘imagined’ political community – imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will only know and feel bound to membership through acquiescence to a ‘notional’ or ‘imagined’ communion. Postcolonial theorists’ arguments about whose narratives dominate the African political community seem, at first sight, to diverge considerably. One strand places Africans within the nation-state as the object of an ongoing ‘subjugation’ predicated on contemporary global manifestations of previous colonial processes of domination (e.g. Appiah, 2003). The moral and political challenge of postcolonial society, according to this position, is subordinated to or situated within a modernity whose character is largely causally attributed to colonial intervention. Through colonialism, Appiah (2003) argues, a new narrative was ascribed to Africans. Drawing from Said’s theory of ‘orientalism’1, Appiah argues that this continuing convention of ‘third party’ story telling (i.e. Westernised discourse about Africa) has largely stripped Africans of their own authentic identity, leaving them instead with a mere “ … parody of narrative with no connection to their lived experience”. However, some critics complain that such claims of postcolonial theory over indulge in a rhetoric of anti-colonialism that acts to obscure more appropriate analytic questions concerning forty years of dubious postcolonial governance – very much connected with ‘lived experience’. As Burke writes, “The moral outrage, which suffused most Africanist historical and anthropological writing about the apartheid state, is largely absent when it comes to postcolonial African misrule.” (Burke, 2003) For Burke, ‘postcolonial’ literature, with the emphasis on the ‘colonial’, lacks the reflexivity needed in framing proper critical analysis of a post-apartheid Africa. Mandela’s release from Robben Island, he implies, drew a line under the uni-focused grand narratives of political ‘resistance’ and ‘liberation’. In their place should come more intimate narratives framed by “ … more abstract questions of meaning and struggle vested in the household, the local community or the generalities of cultural life” (Burke, 2003). Rather 1

Edward Said argues that, not only has Western scholarship usurped the legitimacy to write on behalf of the non-Westerner, but Western scholarship takes on its own legitimising logic into which Third World scholars feel obliged to assimilate.

89 than acting as ‘proselytisers’ for African authenticity – which often papers over the authors own vested political interests (e.g. see Kimball, 2001; Huxtable, 1998)1 – postcolonial studies, some critics argue, should focus on social injustice upon which the critique of the global system finds its foundation (e.g. Castro-Gomez, 1998). However, rather than one position negating the other, other postcolonial theorists do see longer, more complex, but also more proactive processes of assimilation incorporating differing past and contemporary socio-cultural narratives (which includes the ‘colonial’), binding the past to the future (e.g. Bhabha, 1997; Mbembe, 1992). Rather than grand claims for pan-African homogeneity – often the rallying point for the African diaspora – the ‘postcolony’ should not be seen as one coherent ‘public space’, nor as an overarching organizational principle, but rather as a “ … plurality of ‘spheres’ and arenas, each having its own separate logic yet nonetheless liable to be entangled with other logics when operating in certain specific contexts.” (Mbembe, 1992, p.25) Mbembe sees postcolonial dynamics determined by ‘improvisation’ rather than merely grand narratives based on the tragedy of slavery, colonisation, and apartheid. The distinctive ways in which ‘postcolonial’ identities are multiplied, transformed and put into circulation through political ‘improvisation’, he suggests, are also typified by a tendency to excess and a lack of proportion – claims I now explore a little further.

6.1.2

Configuration and reconfiguration of African States

This theme of ‘improvisation’ is echoed in African political theory. Survival of African states since independence, Villalón (1998) argues, has depended on different emphases of similar behavioural traits across the continent. Clever manipulation of Cold War strategic alliances, and a propensity for wealth extraction (wherever it be got!), has provided the ruling elites with both personal wealth but also resources with which to negotiate political advantage. African states predominantly became over-extended, centralised institutional power-bases from which, in a form of self-serving patronage, states had powers to reward their supporters with positions and resources that could be “… converted into sources of private accumulation” (Villalón, 1998, p.13).

1

Huxtable (1998) cites Mugabe’s withdrawal from his programme of promoting women’s rights, which he began to see as a threat, claiming it moved away from what is ‘authentically’ African.

90 However, many of these survival strategies that had sustained African states and their elites since independence, political observers point out, were bankrupt by the late 1980s and early 1990s. With the end of Cold War patronage and the decreasing prices of exportable commodities on the world markets, these strategies became unsustainable and condemned by their own inherent contradictions. As Young put it, “ … battered by economic decline and weakened by political decay, the African state faced narrow choices; political opening was no longer an option but an obligation” (Young, 1994, p.230) And what was this political opening? The late 1980s and early 1990s brought on the unstoppable ‘tide’ of change characterising what Villalón & Huxtable (1998) refer to as Africa’s ‘critical historical juncture’. As we saw in Chapter 3, a call to ‘democratization’ (Villalón, 1998, p.3) – or as some called it ‘good governance’ (e.g. Hyden & Bratton, 1992) – began to be tied to both international loans from the IFIs1 and bilateral assistance (Mulikita, 2002). Governments were driven to take on unpopular economic reforms, which, at least in the short term, brought hardship felt by much of the population, and granted opposition groups more latitude to challenge them for control of the state. We have already had a look at these ‘global reconfigurations’ in chapter 4. However, in the context of the African nation-state, critics argue that the unifying call to ‘democratization’ that has permeated both international assistance and domestic political rhetoric, though clearly an important variable, somehow misses the point. Villalón & Huxtable (1998) point out that multiple other variables both define past configuration and predict the characteristics of emerging ‘reconfiguration’ of the state in Africa. Most significant differences among countries, Villalón (1998, p.5) argues, are not in terms of how democratic states are, but in how state structures and institutions manage (or, as Mbembe puts it, ‘improvise’) a stable political and social order within the context of changing domestic and international environments. Indeed, Villalón (1998, p.5) argues that, comparing Somalia, Uganda, Zaire and Zimbabwe in terms of their relative degree of democracy, tells us little about their political dynamics nor how they have managed to maintain social order since independence. State capacity, he contends, “ … emerges as an alternative to, and potentially more significant dimension than democracy for the comparative study of African political systems” 1

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have become a sort of formal contract of expenditure distribution of World Bank loans.

91 (Villalón, 1998, p.6). Indeed, reconfiguration of political systems in different African countries remains dependent on distinctive cultural, ethnic, geographical and leadership contexts that are limited by history and, Huxtable (1998, p.279) points out, will themselves limit the choices available to the elites into the future.

6.1.3

Reconfigured elitism or African renaissance?

What seems curious, Villalón and Huxtable observe, is the apparent durability of some form of state institution as a site for managing political and civil order in Africa. Despite enormous domestic and external pressure faced by the elites of sub-Saharan African countries in recent years, rather like chameleons, most have found some way to shore-up some entity that is generally recognised as ‘the state’. As Huxtable comments, “If a universal law of politics exists, it is that those in power strive to stay in power. There are few examples of African heads of state willingly relinquishing power to anyone other than a hand-picked successor.” (Huxtable, 1998, p.284) However, the post-Cold War international environment provides these elites with little room for manoeuvre. They have three primary constraints, he argues. Firstly, because the debt/export ratios of most countries have become unmanageable, African states are dependent on IFIs (in particular the World Bank, and IMF) to finance balance-of-payments needs in the short term and to help refinance and restructure external debt in the middle and long terms. Secondly, they have few discretionary funds with which to invest in economic development that would help legitimise the state. And finally, this same lack of finances blocks the potential to provide benefits to win over potential domestic rivals. Indeed, these siege conditions would create political uncertainties in any country. In the early 1990s Thabo Mbeki’s reawakening of the grand narrative of pan-Africanism under the flag ‘African Renaissance’, can perhaps be seen as a curious embrace of globalised (or ‘globalising’) liberalism, on the one hand, and a post-colonial commitment to resist on the other (e.g. Cheru, 2002; Ahluwalia, 2002). Embracing globalisation, Cheru argues, requires a ‘decolonisation of the African mindset’. On the other hand, resistance, as we have seen in postcolonial theory, implies a challenge not only of structural injustices within globalising processes, but also the feared loss of African authenticity (e.g. see Diagne, 2002) through a Western global socio-economic ‘re-colonisation’. Critics of authenticity bound to politics of resistance, however, claim that, rather than expecting authenticity of ancient traditions to address contemporary problems, authenticity is found

92 through allowing the future to continuously give new meanings to the past and present (e.g. Nuttall & Michael, 2002, p. 7; Diagne, 2002; Cheru, 2002). Therefore, the postcolonial search for authenticity that is ‘uniquely African’ (e.g. Ahluwalia, 2002), Donham argues, is misguided: “ ... identity is never simply a matter for the collective self; it involves, as well, interpellation by others, located in various and potentially contradictory positions.” (Donham, 2003) The end product of these two apparently incompatible narratives, one of ‘global liberalism’ and the other of ‘postcolonial resistance’, seems encapsulated in the constantly stalling application of the ‘African Peer Review Mechanism’1. As the voluntarily applied ‘code of conduct’, NEPAD is supposed to make declarations on the state of country-level democratization and ‘good’ governance through this review mechanism. However, Zimbabwe is the most often used example to illustrate the problem in reconciling these distinctive worldviews. Opposing any international condemnation of Zimbabwe, South Africa’s foreign minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was reported to have said in February 2003 that South Africa would ‘never criticise Zimbabwe’ (Bond, 2003). Indeed, the world is still waiting to see if the African Union is merely a repackaging and renaming of the largely ineffectual OAU or is able to begin reconciling the anomalies of proclaiming acquiescence to globalisation on one side, and practising postcolonial resistance on the other.

6.1.4

‘Techniques’ of reconfiguration

Although the two forces, ‘global democratization’ and the ‘African political establishment’, have been characterised as uneasy bed companions, Huxtable (1998) points out that the political elite in Africa has been able to turn some of the external and domestic pressures into political capital. He notes by way of example that, as Mugabe has seen little political advantage being generated, he has turned away from his previous progressive position on women’s status. Instead he has mobilised and advocated support for what he terms ‘authentic African culture’ – presumably the type that supports his presidency. Similarly, political elites attempt to manipulate the symbols of ethnicity, clan ties, and religion to bolster their support. In his provocative case study of the western Lake Region, 1

Mokoena (2003) gives a breakdown of intended objectives, outlining a APRM approved document entitled, ‘Declaration on Democracy, Political, Corporate and Economic Governance’ (p.7)

93 Mamdani (2002) argues that the struggle for resources and political support is framed by an intersection of ethnic identity and the artificially created ‘single’ political community. This creates the distinction between ‘resident’ and ‘non-resident’, where ‘residency’ becomes equated with ‘citizenship’ to which is added the entitlement to enter the struggle for access to scarce resources. Thus, Mamdani argues, an historical synergy between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ is replaced by rights to access and share resources for the ‘resident’ and withdrawal of these rights for ‘non-resident’. Examples of manipulation of ethnic and religious identities abound throughout the continent. This continental crisis of citizenship, Mamdani argues, becomes predicated to either ‘survival needs’ or elitist greed1. However, the longer-term consequence of such policies, Huxtable (1998) observes, tends to lead to deterioration rather than strengthening of state capacity to maintain social and political order. Manipulating the legitimising processes of democratization has been employed by various African regimes through the 1990s. As well as orchestrating ethnic tensions in Kenya’s Rift Valley, President Daniel Arap Moi’s regime employed ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics to great effect for many years. When in 2002 the opposition finally agreed on a joint electoral strategy under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), they won a landslide victory over KANU – eleven years after KANU reinstated a multi-party system. SAPs and PRSPs, as tied World Bank and IMF blueprints for national expenditure, have also given incumbent regimes some unexpected room for developing political capital. SAPs have to a certain extent allowed African states to withdraw from many of their welfare functions. International funding under the SAPs has also forced governments to develop new incentives for farmers (such as tax breaks) giving the political elite a growing rural support base that is easily mobilised during elections (Huxtable, 1998, p.287). However, not all changes can be turned into political capital. For Villalón (1998, p.8) the African ‘critical juncture’2 signals both a significant departure from the past political order and a moment in which diverging evolutionary paths define themselves. The door for political and social critique of the state institution has opened and cannot easily be closed again. The interplay of democratization rhetoric with specific national histories, ethnic, 1

Mamdani sees the Rwandese genocide tied to political pressures emerging from withdrawal of the right of residency for thousands of Banyarwanda who had been settled for generations in Uganda. 2 Villalón (1998:8) characterises Africa’s critical juncture as “… a pivotal historical moment signalling both a significant departure from past conditions and a moment that defines diverging evolutionary paths from roughly similar sets of conditions”.

94 cultural and religious identities, and the specific players themselves, demarcates possible choices that are likely to shape both state and state-society relations for a significant time to come. Rather than asserting an easy optimism about the democratic potential of African state and civil society, Boone (1998, p.137) instead sees a continued potential for political manipulation and mobilisation of identity-defined forms of associational life that can be extremely ‘undemocratic’. It is to these evolving spaces for state/civil society interaction that we now turn.

6.2

Reconfiguring power in African states

Maturing postcolonial narratives, after forty years of political, social and cultural improvisation since independence, Werbner (1996) argues, should no longer be boxed in by pre-colonial and colonial formulations. Instead, Mbembe asserts, the postcolonial individual’s relation to power collapses into the baroque style of political gamesmanship “ … in which everyone indulges”. ‘Connivance reigns’ in a promiscuous relationship between what Mbembe (1992a, p.5) refers to as the ‘commandement’ (i.e. the broad authority and domination that succeeded colonial authority) and its target. Rather than the ordinary citizen confronting authority and domination, he suggests, they ‘toy’ with it, allowing the highly gendered postcolonial symbol of domination, the ‘bwana mkubwa’1 (whether it be Mobutu, Bokkasa, or Mugabe), to stand “ … midway between consensus and coercion” (Werbner, 1996, p. 2). This baroque postcolonial political ‘connivance’ should not be confused with Foucault’s notion of the ubiquitous exercise of power, which, Bhabha (1994) argues, ‘negates’ the potential to construct meaningful social and cultural identities. Nor, Werbner (1996) argues, should this ‘connivance’ be characterised by Gramsci’s notion of ‘hegemony’ (with, for example, the bourgeoisie being equated with a global capitalist logic). Instead the postcolony, they argue, should be seen within the context of distinctive postcolonial realities of multiple arenas, fluid identities and positional relations of power. All are seen as subject and object of a negotiable construction of the state and citizen. Postcolonial identity, Bhabha (1994) suggests, is a product of “ … negotiation rather than negation”. Indeed, within this fluid baroque world Mbembe describes, one wonders where the state might be located. Through the 1990s, Werbner argues, the capacity of African states to manage social and political order as a coherent centralised authority has diminished. In its 1

A Kiswahili term meaning ‘big man’.

95 place has evolved what Werbner calls ‘quasi-nationalism’. In disparate local power clusters, elites develop modes of local resiliency, claiming possession of moral and political agency – wresting a generalised cultural assertion of social identity from the centre, “ … [as] if energised by a myth of being prior to the nation-state, of revenging old scores left as unsettled from ancient hostilities, quasinationalism is nonetheless made in and by the struggle for power and moral authority in the nation-state.” (Werbner, 1996, p. 12) The task for the quasi-nationalist, therefore, is to purify the quasi-national identity. To these ends, “ … actions, extreme as they may be, seem to fulfil this purifying and cleansing objective” (Werbner, 1996, p. 13). However, Werbner argues, this ‘new’ Africanised construction of identity through improvisation and connivance, and the elite’s claim to represent or broker power, bring with them doubts about dubious civil society claims that notions such as ‘representation’ and ‘belonging’ can exist independently of their relation to power. For Mamdani a state identity clarifies itself only to the extent that a centralised government can find legitimisation and extension through courting local political elites. An ‘improvised’ system of symbolic gestures of deference, material transactions of fealty and homage-making are the ‘return’ for devolved power. In this way, Bayart (1993) argues, local elites are able to construct an ‘imagined’ identity of the collective self that can be used and negotiated. De Boeck (1996) presents such dynamics as a form of organic indigenous democratization process, where local populations are able to ‘reappropriate’ power within the collapsing state. Such contemporary indigenous processes of ‘reappropriation’ of power, Werbner (1996) and van Dijk & Pels (1996) argue, implicate not just ‘warlords’ and ‘kings’, but also witchcraft and ‘born again’ Christianity in this improvised ‘toying’ for relative advantage.

6.2.1

Negotiated power, cultural trajectory and development

With an apparent fragmentation of many nation-state boundaries1, and an obvious relationship between development, culture and history, Chabal (1996) suggests that there is no longer an international development consensus on whether to invest in centralisation or decentralisation of power. Confusion about the cultural context within which development ‘does not’ happen has even led Axel Kabou (1992) to the provocative title to his book 1

And even the ‘collapse’ of state in Somalia and Congo.

96 ‘What if Africa refuses to develop?’1 The title frames an apparent fracture between values of the donor as ‘developer’ and those of the recipient as ‘object’ of development. Thus, confusion is based on donor (mis)understanding of the “ … nature of economic dependence, the relationship between mentalities and technological development, the primacy of ‘display’ over investment and the role of political leadership in economic development.” (Chabal, 1996, p. 53) In terms of mainstream international development, limited epistemological reflection, Ranger (1996) observes, has meant that too much attention has focused on honing Africa’s administrative and political centre, and too little attention paid to the disruption caused by ‘narrowing the religious, social and economic worlds of Africans’. ‘Postcoloniality’, Bhabha (1997) argues, should confront the grand global neo-liberal project, as a salutary reminder of “ … the persistent ‘neo-colonial’ relations within the ‘new’ world order and the multinational division of labour”. Critique of the apparent monolithic Western framework of international development – or what Pollock et al. (2000) call ‘deformed’ development – however, concludes that the contemporary metropole is apparently able to live quite comfortably with its own narrative amnesia. What, therefore, might the alternative configuration to the grand ‘democratization and good governance’ project of development look like? Harrison (2002) examines postindependence Mozambican political processes of mainstreaming traditional and quasitraditional symbols of local authority. He argues that, in the absence of perfect models of local governance, “ … it is difficult to imagine how issues such as democratization and decentralization can possibly be addressed without somehow involving lineage authority”. (Harrison, 2002) We shall look at Uganda’s own model of ‘non-party democracy’ in Chapter 6. However, questioning the international emphasis placed on ‘democratization’ perhaps brings us fullcircle back to Villalón’s (1998, p.5) assertion that state evolution in Africa should be less fixated with the degree of democracy states display, and more focused on “… how effective state structures and institutions are in terms of maintaining a stable political and social order”. Clearly this frame of reference equally brings with it central issues about

1

At the same time, Friedman (1995: 22) argues that the Third World intellectual (as a socialist, radical, feminist or minority) has brought the complexity of the post-colonial hybrid to roost in the heart of contemporary Western society, undermining its apparent epistemological homogeneity.

97 how ‘donor’ countries maintain and benefit from North/South inequalities, and how this contributes to the fragility in political and social order in Africa. Promoting political and social order is clearly not just about democracy!

6.3

African states: spaces for civil society engagement

Respect and deference to authority and power are central to traditional African societies (James, 2002) – something the colonial powers were able to buy in to and manipulate to their advantage (Mamdani, 2002). As a consequence, the ‘hybrid’ identity (Nsamenang, 2000)1 of state authority in Africa has two peculiar characteristics. On one side, because it has an imprecise reference to traditional models of governance, much African state machinery is a ‘hand-me-down’ of colonial domination techniques of governance. On the other side, it is extremely resistant to what it perceives (or is able to characterise) as ‘externally’ induced appropriation of its powers (see Mamdani, 2002). These twin characteristics have made the transition to what is perceived as ‘externally driven’ democracy problematic (as seen most overtly in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe). Although recently we have seen considerable regional movement towards democratic pluralism, the habit of political domination still proves difficult to kick: “Politics is still used as a tool for intimidating others, particularly the ones who hold different views and opinions.” (Poeschka & Chirwa, 1998, p. xi) Cultural resistance to the influences of change, however, runs deeper. Cammack (2001) and James (2002) both draw attention to the powerful African cultural force of ‘jealousy’ – a pervasive hostility towards a neighbour, clansman, or ethnic ‘other’ seen to enjoy advantage. The consequent perceived fear of punishment or sabotage, they argue, impedes openness of information and freedom of action seen to give advantage. This fear of speaking out and taking responsibility flavours interaction and initiative in village, community, office and development project. Kodesh (2001), on the other hand, does not see in these ‘sticking points’ expressions of reluctance to change traditions. Indeed, he draws attention to an historical African agency that embraced change but also controlled it:

1

For Nsamenang (2000) African history is characterised as a series of different cultural tributaries (e.g. the African, the Arab, the European, modernity, etc.) whose confluence produces a ‘hybrid’ cultural identity rather than one subjugated to any single cultural event – for instance ‘colonialism’.

98 " ... long-term continuity proved compatible with active change, and the process of renovating political traditions persisted during the early colonial period." (Kodesh, 2001, p. 541) Much historical frustration in African communities and politics, therefore, is not because of change itself, but in the fact of not being allowed to manage it1 (also see Chinua Achebe in Ehling, 2003). Acknowledging these fears in both national and local political contexts, and the way the CSO alliance can work around these, promotes or impedes successful alliance building. On a local and national level, therefore, the extent to which a CSO coalition is able to participate in policy-making depends on both the coalition’s ability and aptitude to access government offices but also the government’s willingness to build partnerships. This in turn might depend on political pluralism, the degree of decentralisation and the vagaries of the local political climate. However, even where opportunity to intervene presents itself, local government in Africa is not used to being challenged. Perceived criticism of the state leads to accusations of CSO partisanship, politicking or promoting ‘outside’ values (especially when funded from outside) (James, 2002). On the other hand, ‘outside’ advocacy and fear of losing control are not the only forces pushing African states to dig their heals in. Derman (2003) notes that African states “ ... begin from the notion that government knows best”. This pervasive attitude, Derman (2003) argues, tends to treat local knowledge in the same dismissive way, leading to the accusation that African governments act just like former colonial powers. However, there is equally a tendency to specifically demonise African governments for their attitudes of resistance to civil society ‘intrusion’ without acknowledging it as a more generic characteristic of state/civil society interaction – after all, didn’t we equally note a similar World Bank resistance to meaningful civil society partnership in its own institutional setting (see Chapter 4).

6.3.1

Political leverage and ‘synchronised’ socio-political processes in civil society/state interaction

The onward march of the rhetoric of ‘democratization’, ‘good governance’ and ‘civil society partnership’ has had a dramatic impact on African political and cultural landscapes. The 1990s, Huxtable observes, has seen an irrepressible rise of associational groups to 1

Kodesh (2001) looks at the meeting of tradition and modernity in the Baganda kingdom during the period of early colonialism.

99 challenge the status quo throughout Africa, gaining considerable leverage on governmental decision-making. “Groups that the state could once ignore – either because they were too weak actively to challenge the state or because their leaders had been coopted into support for the status quo – have begun to propel their concerns more effectively onto the government agenda.” (Huxtable, 1998, p.281) The state’s declining ability to co-opt potential rivals with material benefits, has resulted in increased demands for access to state decision-making processes. However, as Huxtable (p.288) points out, far from always benefiting ‘democratization’ processes, economic liberalisation can also act as a detrimental influence on CSOs in two ways. Firstly, as associational groups depend on the state for many resources, externally imposed structural adjustment gives the state legitimacy in reducing funding to groups that challenge the status quo. Secondly, SAPs decrease the state’s capacity to offer resources. Thus, while civil society’s ability to influence government increases, the government’s capacity to address many societal needs through partnership with civil society organizations is declining. In terms of development sustainability, moreover, the degree to which externally supported NGOs are able to exert financially induced influence on government policy making may well also be a cause for concern. The emphasis on ‘material’ benefits, however, is not the whole story. Pro-democracy groups, women’s groups, etc., focus as much on symbolic and moral issues as on economic matters. The potential for mobilisation around this cocktail of issues, Huxtable argues, gives considerable political leverage. However, opportunities for engaging government in policy development are equally dependent on the CSO coalition’s capacity, aptitude and perceived legitimacy to do so. Institutional strength and the perceived legitimacy of the CSO coalition participation, Covey (1995, p. 167) argues, determine relative success of inclusion in political systems long dominated by elites.

Multi-sectoral ‘civic-political activity’ However, perceived as a less confrontational space within which associational groups are supposed to negotiate social and political advantage, it may well be helpful to conceive of more synthesised processes of multi-sectoral ‘civic-political activity’ – or ‘connivance’ as Mbembe (1992) called it – rather than assuming an ‘oppositional’ nature of civil

100 society/state interaction (Lewis, 2001, p. 7)1. Perhaps Kassimir is referring to this logic of ‘civic-political activity’ when he observes of Ugandans, “[They] are members of a variety of social networks and draw upon multiple social identities in their struggles for survival and mobility. This became a refined social logic during the years of instability, and has been enhanced by the NRM’s tolerance and encouragement of these associations.” (Kassimir, 1998, p.237) However, the flip-side to such a logic, Nyang’oro & Shaw (1998, p.63) argue, is that social movements run the danger of losing autonomous power when ‘formalised’ partnership and legitimisation comes at the cost of becoming ‘incorporated’ into the state as a ‘quasicorporatist arrangement reminiscent of the past’. Without retaining autonomy by pursuing non-binding ‘interdependences’, there might be greater potential for political manipulation of ‘identity-defined’ forms of associational life that, as Boone (1998, p.137) argues, can be extremely ‘undemocratic’.

6.4

Concluding remarks

Chapter 6 is the final chapter in Part One of this thesis. In this Chapter I have examined the impact of Western demands for new flows of power on African states in the 1990s – following the end of the Cold War and Apartheid eras – and social, historical, cultural and postcolonial critique of such demands. More broadly, Part One of this thesis has explored a very wide body of theory on contemporary global economic and social development trends predicated on notions of ‘democratization’ and ‘good governance’. The realignment of the post-Cold War and postApartheid world has forced an irrepressible process of state reconfiguration in which there is considerable space for political leverage for civil society organizations (Covey, 1995, p.167). However, these processes of state reconfiguration differ greatly in both content and direction from one country to the next, and are as much determined by their own particular cultural, social, political and economic histories, as by the political elites’ relative capacity to maintain control of national social and political spheres. In this context, Chapter 6 has examined African state trends of acquiescence and resistance to this new imposition, often framed by postcolonial mistrust about intentions behind the West’s proposal for new flows of power and trade and who should control such change. 1

We remember the critique of the notion ‘civil society’ in an African context from Chapter One.

101 Critics have also questioned many of the cultural assumptions in applying Western notions of liberal democracy in African contexts. Western contemporary obsessions with the promotion of ‘democratization’ and ‘civil society’ in Africa, critics point out, do not take sufficient account of its assault on national stability and cohesion as disparate interest groups (many profoundly ‘undemocratic’ and ethnocentric in their interests) compete for influence over the weakened state. The character and role of emerging associational groups in shaping the direction of politics and development, therefore, are under much critical debate and scrutiny. While some see new ‘civil society’ groups as ‘the’ vehicle for a virtuous process of democratisation (e.g. Harbeson, et al, 1994), others characterise them as ‘opportunistic’ or ineffectual (e.g. Fatton, 1992). Within a ‘baroque style’ political environment, therefore, the success with which Jinja and Kampala coalitions (as the focus of this thesis) are able to negotiate social and political advantage may well depend on how they are able to rationalise external support, ‘improvise’ with limited local resources, and ‘connive’ with government towards some mutual and reciprocal accommodation. How the Forum and Jinja Network locate themselves in relation to this baroque political environment – by either engagement or withdrawal into more sectoral defined identities – and what these decisions imply for partnership options and the influence they generate, is very much the interest of this research. With such location inevitably come questions of power differentials between the state and civil society associational groups and, indeed, within the coalition membership itself. Part Two of this thesis (which follows Chapter 6) describes the context of the research project, its design, its methodology, its methods and its evolution as constructivist enterprise.

102

PART TWO: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO RESEARCHING MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES IN JINJA AND KAMPALA

“Ékíkúboná olúuyí olúlálá: kikwîtá kálaadhágázó” The unknown spirit kills you when you least expect it (Lusoga proverb)

Chapter 7: Methodological perspectives This thesis focuses on a considerable complexity of issues that weave between contending notions of civil society, the multi-lateral global development paradigm, legitimacy and accountability of NGOs, civil society coalition building, and street children. However, each notion, paradigm and institution takes on new meaning when prefixed by the word ‘African’. Said’s (1976) notion of ‘orientalism’ (see Chapter 6) challenged the assertion of the ‘disinterested’ Western researcher – indeed, heralding the much broader assertion that the researcher cannot but ‘colonise’ their subject (Fine et al., 2000). The ethnographer’s authority remains under assault today (Behar, 1995, p.3; Gupta & Ferguson, 1997, p.16) in qualitative research, in what Denzin & Lincoln (2000, p.17) describe as a crisis of representation, legitimisation, and praxis: “ … [where] the author’s ethnographic report is a reversed mirror image of his own ethnocultural ideal” (Vidich & Lyman, 2000, p.41) It thus becomes necessary to consider some of the tensions thrown up when confronted with issues of ethics, authorship and validity in the context of this African case study. This chapter therefore makes repeated reference to my own considerable historical engagement in the two coalitions that are the case study, and considers the potential this past and present engagement has for both facilitating the research process as a co-operative venture, but on the other side, for stepping over the line that favours the autobiography over the biography – allowing my own engagement in the issues to ‘over’ manipulate (or ‘colonise’) and determine the respondents’ own constructions. Reflexivity, a reference loop to key informants, and multiple methods creating a ‘chain of evidence’ (Yin, 1994, p.34) will play the roles of mediating between biography and autobiography.

103 Clearly the notion of the ‘other’ (also alluded to in Chapter 6) as research partner, has to be considered. The ‘other’ may be understood as a dialogic and reflexive relational context for the researcher in which a strong sense of self-identity is critical (which is discussed later on). In terms of ‘otherness’, making the purpose of the inquiry and its potential implications for the case study contexts explicit also has ethical implications. Such implications must be acknowledged both within this thesis and as context for negotiation with the research participants in Jinja and Kampala. This chapter then sets all these contextual understandings within a constructivist framework before moving on to explore how the case study and ethnographic strategies link this constructivist framework to the methods employed in the inquiry process and the way in which these are analysed and interpreted. The preparatory thinking behind this thesis took place over the three years I co-founded, chaired and coordinated Jinja Network using a participatory action research approach (described in further detail later on). I therefore consider the thesis both a ‘time out for reflection’ but also see its intention as preparation for a later return to action research. I find myself absorbed, at a humble and inadequate level, in what Christians (2000) refers to as the ‘sacred epistemology’ which “ … commits the researcher to the values of empowerment, shared governance, care, solidarity, love, community, covenant, morally involved observation, and civic transformation.” (Christians, 2000, p.34)

7.1

Research questions

Throwing light upon productive coalition advocacy approaches to policy-making for street children remains the principal background interest of this thesis. Although the two principle foci for this research project are not specific to street children policy-making, they nevertheless only make sense when explored within this context. I relation to differing constructions and deployment of street children discourses, therefore, the research examines: 1. coalition-building and its ‘entrenchment’ in orthodox power hierarchies or ‘enlightenment’ as socio-structural practice, and

104 2. distinctive Ugandan approaches to influencing street children policy outcomes through coalition engagement with government. The two sets of research questions are as follows:

What form of coalition configuration constitutes an ‘enlightened’ model that could effectively pursue socio-structural transformation? Jinja Network and the Inter-NGO Forum will be examined to answer this question.

How do the two coalitions’ ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ structures and procedures reconcile, manage or merely reinforce ‘difference’ in terms of perspectives, capacities and status, and the exercise of power?

How and to what extent do such coalition structures and processes address multiple accountabilities?

What is the impact of accountability deficit in the two coalitions?

How is knowledge managed and ‘democratized’ within coalition building practices and how might it be understood as coalition ‘voice’?

How does strong or weak sectoral identity (i.e. as ‘civil society’ or ‘government’) impact coalition-building practices and the coalition’s understanding of its relationship with government?

What is the impact of urban institutional characteristics on sectoral identity and coalition-building practices? And finally,

How do the Inter-NGO Forum and Jinja Network coalition-building practices help in expanding theory about coalitions?

Which coalition approaches to forging NGO and Ugandan government policy-making partnerships for street children yield the most positive partnership results? A comparison between the insider/enmeshed approach of Jinja and the outside/discrete approach of Kampala will address this question. About Street Children and streetism

How do Uganda’s NGOs and government understand street children as ‘problem’1?

To what extent are different NGO and government ideologies and approaches to street children and streetism reconciled or reconcilable as policy?

1

What does such reconciliation or accommodation look like?

Understanding, of course, that the ‘problem’ identification of street populations is socially constructed.

105 About government ‘democratized’ spaces

What is the reality behind the government’s ideological rhetoric about the citizen’s inclusion and local ‘democratization’ in local governance?

To what extent might government inclusion in coalition-building processes build on such government rhetoric and therefore enhance the coalition’s potential influence on policy-making?

Do ‘democratized’ policy-making spaces exist, what do they look like, and how have Kampala and Jinja coalitions made use of them?

About obstacles and resistances to policy-making partnership

What obstacles and resistances between government and NGO are ascribed to failure in policy-making partnerships?

About sectoral identity and ‘sectoral blur’

How do urban institutional characteristics impact sectoral identity?

How does strong or weak sectoral identity impact NGO and government attitudes and approaches to partnership in policy-making processes?

The first research focus examines how choices of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ structures and procedures intentionally or inadvertently impact how power is exercised and dispersed within each coalition. In the light of coalition-building’s ‘shadow’ side (e.g. de Mann, 2004; Gilchrist, 2004), I also examine ideas of coalition-building as ‘enlightened’ sociostructural enterprise. I touch on ideas of ‘multiple accountabilities’ and ‘knowledge democratization’ and how these might help make sense of the usually amorphous notion ‘voice’ with coalitions. The second research focus is framed by the assumed efficacy of the contemporary international civil society/government/market framework of African urban institutional order. It examines how each coalition interacts with government within policy-making spaces that are availed them. I examine Kampala’s autonomous ‘outsider’ model and Jinja’s enmeshed ‘insider’ model of government engagement. I explore what influences these emergent patterns of engagement, and how such patterns have impacted policymaking processes and outcomes for street children and streetism. Examining policymaking outcomes for street children in both Jinja and Kampala, strong focus is placed upon exploring how the coalition approaches achieve compromise or accommodation between NGO and government’s distinctive ideologies and interests. In the weaker ‘civil society’ urban institutional context of Jinja, the thesis also examines the role of sectoral

106 blur (Brock, 2004) and the individual’s multi-sectoral identities in mediating the assumed adversarial nature of sectoral (op)positioning1. Finally, I consider the potential for using more culturally defined associational contexts for productive policy outcomes through coalition- and partnership-building and I examine its limitations.

7.2

The research process: constructivism, social practices and positionality

Critical reviews of the earliest twentieth century ethnographers’ claims to rigorous scientific objectivity (such as Malinowski or Radcliffe-Brown) point to what Ryen & Silverman (2000) refer to as a ‘colonial methodology’. This so-called ‘objectivity’ was characterised by its complicity with imperialism and its belief in cultural monumentalism and timelessness2 (Vidich & Lyman, 2000; Rosaldo, 1989). Through the 1970s and into the ‘crisis of representation’ of the mid-1980s3 the certainties of the ‘disinterested’ ethnographer – as the product of ‘empirical science’s hegemony’ as Clough (1992, p.8) calls it – faded away. In their place was the acknowledgement of the objectivist complicity with colonialism (Said, 1976), and cultural arrogance underpinning ideas that fixed rituals and customs structured social life, and that ethnographies should be seen as monuments to culture. Indeed, any serious claims to the researcher being the ‘disinterested’ observer have long been rejected within critical and interpretive theories. In their place was the assertion that the researcher speaks from a particular class, gender, racial, cultural, and ethnic community perspective, which configures and reconfigures the world in the light of his or her own personal biography. In this way, as a method of enquiry, Denzin & Lincoln assert, writing the research report moves through a series of often autobiographical reflections which, through draft and redraft, makes fieldwork and writing part of a singular process, moving qualitative research in new and critical directions (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p.17). No longer is such inter-activity dismissed as ‘subjectivity’ that undermines objective truth. Instead, constructivism and participatory phenomenological models encourage a shift towards social transformation (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p.174), rather than restrict research validity to mere interpretation.

1

That is, where NGOs are seen to adopt the assumed institutional function of civil society as ‘outsider’ critic of government. 2 Making necessary the preservation of cultural ethnography as a museum piece. 3 What Denzin and Lincoln, (2000:18) call the ‘fifth moment’

107

7.2.1 Constructivism and responsibility Reflecting this implied responsibility towards social transformative methodologies, the constructivist perspective, like feminist and critical perspectives, calls for a continual critical ‘reframing’ of notions of reality that are more able to reflect the way culture, society, economics and power influences the perception of it (see Mcphee & Bronstein, 2003). Hence, in a constructivist perspective, the ‘accountable’ inter-sectoral partnership (ISP) is called to engage in networking and coalition activities that critically examine ideas of power and powerlessness, accountability and models of governance that reflect ‘enlightened’ responses to such ideas (e.g. see Dominelli, 1989, p.305–306). Such responses entail an ethical position; a responsibility in which the researcher acknowledges the constraints of power of his or her position in relations to others. Rather than seeing the ‘scientific’ task of sociologists and social scientists as analysis of the ‘objective’ nature of a given social problem and its solution, the constructivist believes that criteria for judging either ‘reality’ or validity are not absolute (Bradley & Schaefer, 1998). Instead ‘reality’ is derived from community consensus regarding what is ‘real’, what is useful, and what has meaning (Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Blumer, 1971, p.300). Logically, Mcphee & Bronstein (2002) therefore argue, the study of the ‘sociology of knowledge’ requires that we deal not only with the empirical positivist variety of ‘knowledge’, but also with the processes by which ‘any’ given body of knowledge comes to be socially constructed and presented as ‘reality’ (Berger & Luckman, 1966, p.3). Exploring this relationship further, Gusfield (1981) argues that the concepts of ‘ownership’ and ‘responsibility’ are central to the configuration of a ‘social problem’. Ownership, for Gusfield, refers to a group’s ability to create and influence the public’s definition of a problem, recognizing however that not everyone has equal power and authority to define such realities. “The ‘owners’ or identifiers of the problem are generally seen as credible, trustworthy, and influential. These owners of the problem are pivotal in constructing the ‘facts’ of a social problem.” (Mcphee & Bronstein, 2002) However, Mcphee & Bronstein argue, in the domain of human service it does not necessarily follow that those who own the problem will also accept the political responsibility for eradicating or solving the problem. While people do not openly advocate for the maintenance of conditions that clearly cause certain groups to suffer, the fact

108 remains that the existence of such conditions often furthers the political influence of nonaffected groups.

7.2.2 Ideas of ‘otherness’ within the research process Research approaches that propose social transformation depend upon a strong but secure sense of both ‘self’ and ‘other’. Perhaps for this reason the action researcher feels unease at postmodern deconstruction of the researcher’s positional identity within the research process. Deborah Kerdeman (1999) helps explain this unease by contrasting Gadamer’s (1993) hermeneutic idea of ‘otherness’ with Derrida’s postmodernist account of difference. Gadamer (1993, p.295) sees otherness as a coexistent tension between familiarity and strangeness – the idea that ‘otherness’ derives from the familiar and ultimately returns to it in a movement that has come to be known as the ‘hermeneutic circle’. For the postmodernist, Eagleton (1983) argues, difference is always operating within the dialogical moment “ … scattered or dispersed along the whole chain of signifiers ...” (Eagleton, 1983, p.128). From the postmodernist position, therefore, reading the text and documenting the signifiers “… [is] like tracing this process of constant flickering”. The postmodernist meaning, in as much as it is ‘present’ at all, Kerdeman argues, can only be said to have meaning “ … by virtue of being deferred in the continuous play of difference” (1999, p.228). The ease with which ‘otherness’ slides into objectification with the postmodern perspective, Harvey (1989, p.299) suggests, is an important lesson we can learn from Derrida. However, unless we can find a strong and secure identity within ourselves, Harvey argues, a strong sense of the other will degenerate into a weak sense of the others (cited in Kerdeman, 1999, p.228). Search for socio-transformational positionality within this research, therefore, must not only identify ‘authentic’ narratives but needs to go on to position them in terms of what makes sense within the researchers own acknowledged understanding of hierarchies of development.

7.2.3 Power and postcolonial stance Vidich & Lyman (2000) assert that ethnography based on empire-building was based on the assumption of ‘non-positional’ or ‘disinterested’ Western scientism, the desire to contextualise experience, and a willingness to interpret theoretically what they have observed. These beliefs, they argue, supplement the positivist tradition of complicity with colonialism, commitment to monumentalism, and the production of timeless texts – and thus, qualitative researchers became implicated in these systems of oppression (LadsonBillings, 2000). In a postcolonial understanding of the research process, however,

109 acknowledgement of the Western researcher’s strong sense of both ‘self’ and ‘other’ imbues him/her, as raconteur, with both a colonial and colonising flavour (Said, 1976; Fine et al., 2000) – an understanding that invites the conclusion: “The age of value-free inquiry for the human disciplines is over.” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p.19) However, rather than bound to cultural and historical specificity, Chabal (1996) argues that inquiry in Africa must be guided by broader processes of analysis rather than the clearly flawed exclusivity of ‘internal audit’1 and dubious positional claims to ‘authenticity’, which is defended by countries such as Zimbabwe. These broader processes of analysis of the particular, both colonizing and being colonized, he suggests, will help reveal “what is ‘African’” and therefore, what ‘otherness’ implies in comparative terms (ibid., 1996, p.51). Seen in this way, the researcher cannot avoid influencing the research environment, as he or she is “… bound within a net of epistemological and ontological premises which – regardless of ultimate truth or falsity – become partially self-validating” (Bateson, 1972, p.314 quoted in Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p.19). If the qualitative ethnographic researcher is prepared to accept this inevitability, Vidich & Lyman argue, he or she may proceed “ … liberated from the weight of historical consciousness, relieved of the anxiety of influence …” (2000, p.56) and, consequently, open to a ‘dialogical embrace’ (Tedlock, 2000, p.460). I bring this discussion back to my own situation as researcher in Uganda. In order to arrive at what was ‘real’, what was useful, and what had meaning (Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Blumer, 1971, p.300), it was necessary for me to acknowledge as much as possible the exercise of power – by both others and myself – within the research process. Rather than merely focus on the questions: who participated, who dominated and who was dominated within processes of inquiry, a less linear understanding of the exercise of power had to acknowledge both overt and more hidden ways in which power relations within the research process might have, for instance, favoured one set of narratives over another (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2003; Gaventa, 1980). Foucault points out that power is dispersed through networks of discourses that govern people’s thoughts and actions (Foucault, 1977, p.32). In this way of thinking, for both the respondent and the researcher, knowledge is bound to systems of communication, and processes of recording, accumulation and reflexivity within both the inquiry and response – which, in turn, are linked to other forms 1

In Chapter 6 I drew attention to broad criticism of how NEPAD’s ‘African Peer Review Mechanism’ fails to criticise leaders’ misdeeds, seeing such as undermining ‘post-colonial’ solidarity.

110 of power (Foucault quoted in Sheridan, 1980, p.283). Indeed, power exercised over what or who is different (Cornwall, 2002) and set by social, historical, cultural, economic and political boundaries (Hayward, 1998, p.2) inevitably shapes fields of possible inquiry. Positionality that acknowledges such flows of power between familiarity and difference is therefore critical.

7.2.4 Insider/outsider positionality: reflexivity within multiple realities, personal histories and (co)authorship The concept of constructivism describes this process of ‘reality construction’ (Watzlawick, 1990, p.132) in which what is construed as ‘real’ often reflects one or more dominant social, political, cultural or economic angles (Berlin, 1996). However, as is shown within the data and its analysis within this thesis, what are constructed as authentic accounts of reality may also shift and contain multiple meanings as such constructions are applied to different relationships between respondent and different people and contexts to which respondents give meaning (Silverman, 2001, p.113). To these representational constructions Chawla (2006) applies a temporal dimension, where positionality is seen to change and is called to take into account multiple shifting identities over time. Thus, diverse constructions and revisions of meanings within reality construction imply that agreeing fixed definitions not only becomes problematic but may also obstruct the processes of meaning-making itself. The organization and presentation of such constructions, therefore, is not solely about engaging with respondents in co-authorship of emergent debates (i.e. the ‘what’ of research) but also about reflecting complexity in both how respondents construct such debates and how such constructions tend to determine or challenge diverse conclusions (i.e. the ‘how’ of research) (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997, p.127) over time. Within a constructivist understanding of the research process, therefore, texts, observations, interview responses and researcher reflexivity are understood as ‘active’ sense-making processes, making fixed constructions of what is real always problematic (Silverman, 2001, p.95). As co-founder and participant of both coalitions being studied within this research, my personal historical ‘rememberings’ (or ‘insider’ knowledge) become an essential research tool.

Such ‘rememberings’ allowed me to not only find linkages between diverse

narratives, but also to locate and bind such narratives within shared histories. Personal ‘memories’ and shared histories, therefore, have allowed me a much greater knowledge platform for affirmation, challenge and analysis of emerging meanings – often a problem

111 for the researcher as ‘outsider’. Such histories have also allowed me, as researcher, to identify where positions and perspectives that have been expressed by respondents depart from those historically ‘remembered’ by me– and find out reasons for this ‘forgetfulness’ or omission. In terms of trans-cultural research, many ‘native’ ethnographers (Chawla, 2006; Bolak, 2006) – a term that might describe ethnic, cultural, relational or professional identities – refer to the value of insider/outsider positionality within the research process. Chawla (2006) refers to interaction between the researcher and co-participant in terms of ‘eligibilities’. The figure of the researcher may well shift as the researcher and coparticipants’ different personal, professional and cultural experiences of each other change during the fieldwork. In my own experience of the research process, Tim as researcher was experienced differently to Tim as friend or Tim as ex-coordinator/chairperson of Jinja Network. The movement between these identities and eligibilities, and the spaces that were seen to be appropriate for each, also emerged as friendships were renewed (Stehlik & Chenoweth, 2005)1, cultural familiarity or difference was explored further, or new professional insights were gained by both the co-participant and me. Chawla (2006) describes these dialogical movements, moments and spaces (Russell & Kelly, 2002) as ‘positional travels’ that are ultimately shaped by the many participants who populate them. Indeed, the positionality of what is often portrayed as an ‘insider/outsider’ binary distinction is complex. The value of ‘insider’ positionality in my fieldwork was in its potential to extend the set of eligibilities and insights based on familiarity. ‘Outsider’ value in the research process was in its potential to understand tensions inherent in ‘familiarity’ and ‘difference’ (Parameswaran, 2001). In my own experience of outsider/insider positionality, boundaries of familiarity and difference, and the distinctive roles between interviewer and interviewee, were often blurred (Russell & Kelly, 2006). Shared histories in my own fieldwork added depth by mediating respondents’ social, cultural, historical or structural omission or manipulation – their feed-back and development allowing both the participant and me to articulate, affirm or even challenge inconsistencies in each other’s meaning constructions as part of the ‘focused interaction’ process (Gubrium, 1997, p.117; Denzin, 1970, p.133). Within such shared histories, through processes of reflexivity, both researcher and respondent assist each other in practices of articulation of multiple and shifting meanings and identities over time. Apart from pre-research ‘rememberings’, 1

The role and value of friendship in the research process, Stehlik & Chenoweth (2005) point out, are rarely acknowledged.

112 constructions shift as different questions begin to bind distinctive ideas together. Both the how and what questions attach themselves to space and time, giving the research process a weakly defined beginning and ending.

7.2.5 The tensions inherent with a constructivist approach One of the limits associated with such a constructivist approach is its potential inability to always identify, locate and anchor shifting constructions of reality and what they might refer to – at times making the ‘what’ aspect of the research difficult to pin down. Also difficult to resolve within my particular ‘insider/outsider’ approach are the tensions between respondents’ and my own ‘personal rememberings’ (or ‘insider’ knowledge) within meaning constructions. There was always a tension between balancing validation of my own ‘rememberings’ of what was real for my informants. Although Tedlock (2000, p.460) refers to this interaction as a ‘dialogical embrace’, it nevertheless means that I had to keep feeding doubts about the balance of authorship back to respondents. Such reflexivity also allowed both the research participant and me to ask our-selves important questions about our assumptions and what personal, historical or professional experiences influenced these (Russell & Kelly, 2006). For example, the fact that some Jinja Network participants within a feed back session were able to acknowledge themselves as representing multiple sectoral positions opened up very interesting discussions about why this was so and why others felt they could not. This was achieved through constructions and reconstructions of different positions that are available to both the participant and me (Day, 2002). It was also evident within such dialogical moments with research participants that both participants and I were alerting ourselves to what allows us to see and what inhibits our seeing (Michalowski, 1997). On a more pragmatic side, where a transcribed response might have multiple levels of meaning that reference themselves to multiple narratives, transcriptions are at times difficult to code. Linked to the problem of ‘anchoring’ shifting meanings, tensions between specific narratives and multiple shades of meaning also carry into the use of such transcribed responses to illustrate specific emergent meanings throughout the thesis. Again, feed back from participants had, as much as possible, to validate such a selection. However, despite such tensions, the overwhelming value of this constructivist approach becomes evident as one reads through the findings and their analysis. Through processes of acknowledging multiple and shifting identities and (re)constructing positionality, I was

113 far more able to be open to diverse explanations, communicate their conclusion, validate their point of view, and examine issues from the perspectives of both myself and the coparticipants – contributing to the participants’ and my shared consciousness of difference (Albert, 2005). Rather than weakening the coherence of ideas, each positional and narrative revision was seen to add new reflexive insight and lucidity to a core set of ideas around which the narratives flow.

114

Chapter 8:

Research Design

Keeping in mind the complex and contextual meanings applied to coalition- and partnership-building as social phenomena, the use of different methods helps serve to clarify such meanings. It identifies different prisms through which the phenomena might be potentially viewed (Silverman, 1993). Therefore, I have used triangulation, as a combination of methods used to study the same phenomenon, as a way in which I might enhance the validity and the reliability of the study as ‘authentic’ account (Yin, 1994, p.90). However, within a constructivist understanding there are inevitably ‘multiple’ authenticities as the research moves through its various stages of co-authorship towards completion. Criteria for judging reality or validity, therefore, has to acknowledge tensions between what I regard as an ‘authentic’ account of coalition-building in Kampala or Jinja, and the different and occasionally contradictory accounts of ‘authenticity’ presented by different coalition respondents (Lincoln and Guba, 2000, p.167). The variety of methods I have used, therefore, cross-reference each other at a variety of different levels of access and analysis. The research questions (defined in the previous chapter), my ‘personal history’ with the coalitions, and the theoretical framework set out in chapters one to five of this thesis, initially established what methods would be most appropriate for gathering data. They also establish where and from whom such data might be most productively found. Methods proposed included the semi-structured interview, document analysis, observation, and ‘feedback’ sessions and workshops. Despite having worked out considerable detail in the research project design and schedule prior to arrival in Uganda, various decisions had also to be revised during the fieldwork itself. These were often based on following up important new insights that emerged from the data collected, or from adopting a flexible approach to an at times unpredictable research environment. As Angrosino & Mays de Pérez (2000) point out, participant interaction will always be a tentative process that requires continuous revisiting, re-‘testing’ and redefinition. The researcher and the ‘researched’ (rather like Freire’s ‘educador’ and ‘educando’1) will go through numerous ‘change’ processes during the course of the research project, where “… behaviours and expectations of each other are part of a dynamic process that continues to grow.” (Angrosino & Mays de Pérez, 2000, p.683) 1

As a truly transformative experience, Paolo Freire (1970) sees the pedagogical processes blurring such distinctions.

115 Described below are the case study criteria, the data collection methods, processes involved in analysis and presentation, and the ethical framework underpinning this whole research process.

8.1

Criteria for case study selection

My considerable knowledge of and interest in both Jinja Network and Kampala Inter-NGO Forum, brought me to choose them as case studies out of both ‘intrinsic’ and ‘instrumental’ interest. Stake (2000, p.436) makes a distinction between three types of case study. In the ‘intrinsic interest’ case study the researcher’s interest is to better understand the particularities of the chosen case, with no explicit interest in theory building (although, Stake contends, the researcher might do just that). The intention of inquiry for the ‘instrumental’ case study is mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalisation. The case is of secondary interest, playing merely a supportive role, and acts to facilitate our understanding of something else. The case may be seen as either typical or untypical of other cases. Stake calls the third type of case study, which corresponds with my own choice, the ‘collective ‘case study. Extended to several cases, Stake sees this type of case study as primarily ‘instrumental’, in that “ … [the different cases within a case] are chosen because it is believed that understanding them will lead to better understanding, perhaps better theorising, about a still larger collection of cases.” (Stake, 2000, p.437) However, this typology, Stake warns, plays mainly a heuristic function because the researcher simultaneously has several interests, the particular and the general. There is no line distinguishing ‘intrinsic’ case study from the ‘instrumental’, he argues, rather, a “ … zone of combined purpose separates them” (Ibid. p.440). The two cases I have chosen, one coalition in Jinja and the other in Kampala, have some similarities in structure and the pursuit of positive change for street and working children. But they also have substantial differences in their relationships with government, in the composition of membership, and in the urban environments, which sustain street children populations. For this reason, and in pursuit of a ‘deeper and richer ’ understanding, I realise that any interpretations that move from the particular to the general (perhaps with reference to cases mentioned in the literature review), must be both emergent from the instances of Jinja and Kampala rather than ‘tested’ against previous theorising (Yin, 1994, p.25), but also demonstrate sufficient ‘scientific’ research rigour.

116 The following are the principal criteria for my case study selection: •

A ‘relevance’ criterion – both coalitions (see definition in Chapter 5) included in this case-study have a primary focus on street children

•

A ‘personal history’ criterion – I had been a participant or in a leadership position in both coalitions, therefore o It was easier and quicker to gain access to member organizations and their representatives and coalition documents; o I had considerable experience and knowledge of street children in Uganda; and o I was familiar with social, cultural, political and economic urban environments in Uganda having lived there for seven years.

•

A ‘difference’ criterion – each coalition has distinctive experiences of building coalition structure and processes, and a different approach to ‘partnershipbuilding’ with government. Each was also in a distinctive urban centre.

•

A ‘location and culture’ criterion – the coalition were both in southern Uganda. Their choice relates to my own research interest in the particularities of ‘Southern’ and more specifically ‘African’ coalitions.

•

A ‘social responsibility and transformation’ criterion – my research should: o Be of help to the two coalitions; o Its findings should help inform the ‘southern’ coalition- and partnershipbuilding ‘practitioner’; and o Its findings should inform and improve my own praxis.

8.2

Reflecting complexity: coalitions and their member organizations and self reference

Before examining emerging narratives about the experience of coalition- and partnership building in Jinja and Kampala in Chapters 10 to 13, it is necessary to describe how I have chosen to use the term Non-Government Organization (NGO) as an inclusive term of reference to and self-reference of coalition members, which, nevertheless, acknowledges the complexity of scale, capacity and wealth reflected within such narratives.

8.2.1 Constructivism and Non-governmental Organizations In chapter 4 I examined the complex and multiple definitions that are applied to nongovernmental agencies. Commonly, multiple subdivisions into NNGO, INGO, SNGO, Intermediary NGO, or even CBO and GRO refer themselves to location, scale, governance

117 or the organizations’ relative resource base. They also refer to how different authors perceive such organizations as ‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’ institutional expressions of civil society (see Chapter 3) that bind themselves in varying degrees to upward (e.g. to the donor) and downward (e.g. to the street child as beneficiary) processes of accountability.

Org. Code

Estimated resource base*

Claimed (c)/observed (o) Street child programming focus

No. of staff

Type of governance

2k

$100 - $200

Rural school sponsorship (with street children?) (c)

1

One person CBO organization

3k

$3,000 - $5,000

Shelter & Non-formal school (o)

7

5k

$25,000 - $40,000

Rural orphanage for Kampala street children

7

6k

$20,000 - $50,000

Orphanage and school sponsorship (o)

10

Indigenous Evangelical church based NGO with Board Indigenous Evangelical NGO with Board Indigenous NGO with Board

7k

$80,000 - $150,000

Orphanage and school sponsorship

>15

8k

>$250,000

>30

9k

$25,000 - $50,000

Adolescent Reproductive Health Capacity-building for street children (o) Shelter, school sponsorship, reintegration & reunification home (o)

11k

$50,000 - $100,000

>15

12k

>$250,000

13k 14k

$5,000 - $7,000 >$250,000

Shelter, school sponsorship, reintegration & reunification home (o) Shelter, training, school sponsorship, reintegration & reunification (o) Shelter approach (under construction) (o) Shelter, Drop-in facility, training, school sponsorship, reintegration & reunification home (o)

16k

$3,000 - $5,000

7

Indigenous CBO with Board

17k

>15

Indigenous NGO with Board

18k

$100,000 $150,000 $10,000 - $15,000

7


19k

$40,000 - $60,000

School sponsorship and community youth training (o) Community youth training and health work with street children organizations (o) Shelter, training, school sponsorship, reintegration & reunification home (o) Shelter, training, school sponsorship, reintegration & reunification home (o)

>10


5

>30 1 >15

Indigenous church based diocesan foundation Ireland based INGO International Evangelical Church based NGO – Expat Headed Indigenous NGO with Board Indigenous NGO with Board – Expat Headed Indigenous NGO with Board Church based NGO registered as UK charity – Expat Headed

*These broad estimates are based on observed and/or claimed assets (e.g. buildings, vehicles, office & training equipment), services and the estimated costs for maintaining these.

Table 8.2a: Characteristics of respondents’ organizations: the Inter-NGO Forum, Kampala

Interestingly, although primarily refering to themselves as NGOs many organizations in this research have CBO rather than NGO legal status. The legal distinction in Uganda is broadly one of entitlement to certain tax exemptions and a reflection of the organization’s required resources to exploit such entitlements. However, an examination of the organizations that make up the membership of Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum or Jinja Network shows how attempts to construct non-legal organizational categories such as NGO, CBO or GROs often fail to reflect organizational and relational complexity. The following two tables (8.2a & 8.2b), therefore, refer to specific characteristics of organizations that make up the Inter-NGO Forum and Jinja Network.

118 As one follows the respondents’ construction of multiple narratives, the logic of categorisation based on differing affiliations, locations, scale, governance structure or the organizations’ relative resource base is often challenged by much more subtle meanings respondents apply to their perceived, experienced or desired relationship to other individuals and organizations within the coalition, to the government or, indeed, to street children as beneficiary. A particular strength of the constructivist methodology adopted in this thesis is that it enables us to engage with the subtle and sometimes hidden ways in which these definitions are formed, reformed and used by different actors. Org. Code 1j 2j 3j

Estimated resource base

4j

$6,000 $10,000

5j

$6,000 $10,000

6j

-

7j 8j

$0

9j

-

$0 $0 $80,000 $100,000

-

Claimed (c)/observed (o) Street child programming focus Child Rights Advocacy Child Rights Advocacy Drop-in facility, non-formal education, school support, training, reintegration & reunification home

No. of staff 1 1 12

Networking and implementing thematic rights-based approaches to ‘at risk’ children through local NGOs, CBOs & local government Drop-in facility, training, non-formal education, reintegration & reunification home Coordinating networking, shelter facility, and other Jinja Network programmes Child Rights Advocacy Implementation & informing municipal policies on street children Government policy maker on street children

4

6 1 -

Type of governance Para-governmental agent Para-governmental agent Regional programme of Indigenous Evangelical NGO with Board Regional office of Africa wide indigenous ‘NGO' membership organization Church-based CBO under diocesan umbrella Jinja Network Employee coordinator Para-governmental agent Assist. Town Clerk for Social Welfare Deputy Mayor of Jinja Municipal Council

Table 8.2b: Characteristics of respondents’ organizations: Jinja Network, Jinja

Although most respondents from the Forum tend to apply the term ‘NGO’ to their organizations, therefore, Table 8.2a (above) shows not only the breadth of relative wealth of different organizations but also differing values they apply within distinctive street children programming that might or might not be bound to resources, location, scale or, indeed, whether they are a religious or secular institution. As the narratives will show, these meanings are also constructed and reconstructed from a variety of often shifting relational perspectives. For example, for organization 5j, in Table 8.2b (above), both terms (NGO and CBO) seem to be used as organizational self-references. The choice of one term over the other for respondent 5j, for example, appears dependent on specific emphasis that particular narratives place on the organization’s relational proximity to diverse beneficiaries, seen as

119 ‘community’, or other member organizations. Perhaps strangely, reference to the organization’s ‘closeness’ to street children does not seem to engender similar distinctions of CBO or NGO. The member organizations of Jinja Network are of considerably greater diversity than Kampala’s Forum (see Table 8.2b, above). Only three of the respondents’ member organizations can be said to be organizationally non-governmental – that is, having nongovernmental governance and financial resources. Three members are municipal divisional representatives of village-level ‘Child Rights Advocates’ volunteers under local government coordination. These I have termed ‘para-governmental’1. There are also two municipal government coalition members; one referred to as a ‘technical’ officer (the Assistant Town Clerk for Social Welfare) the other as a politician (The Deputy Mayor). Many of the narratives that emerge from Jinja Network respondents reflect the historical evolution of its membership but also the consequences of relationships between government, para-governmental and non-governmental members. The distribution of resources, and the access to and governance of such resources, reflected in both tables, are critical issues for both coalitions. In terms of how organizations refer to themselves, therefore, throughout the thesis I choose to use the term NGO as a broad descriptor of organizations that have or see themselves as having partial or complete automous organizational identity to local or central government. How these organizations construct and manipulate their distinctive non-governmental identities will emerge from the various narratives presented in the following chapters. Indeed, how respondents apply multiple meanings to their own or other government or non-government institutions and identities means that it is necessary to occasionally live with tensions between shifting meanings that are at times difficult to anchor into any one specific definition. This is an inevitable – and indeed important – aspect of constructivist methodologies.

1

The Child Advocate (CRA) is a village-level volunteer or his/her volunteer divisional representative. Although coordinated by Jinja Municipal Council, CRAs have no ‘official’ local government status but instead presumed to act as advisors on children ‘between’ local government and villagers.

120

8.3

Methods employed in collecting data

The data collection and analysis follows what Yin (1994, p.78) describes as a ‘chain of evidence’ validity principle. This, he explains, describes the ‘…explicit links between the questions asked, the data collected, and the conclusions drawn’. However, clearly, the questions and initial tentative conclusions go through considerable reflexive ‘revision’ processes as new evidence emerges. The data collection design is specific for each method and will therefore be described for each. The methods and specific sources of evidence are described below.

8.3.1

The semi-structured interviews

My schedule of questions, in Appendix 2, clearly reflects how I constructed and structured my own pre-interview narratives. My interests in choosing the semi-structured interview approach, however, is in its appropriateness for exploring not only what respondents’ narratives confirm, contradict or expand my own, but also how the respondent constructs and prioritises such narratives – what Holstein & Gubrium (1997, p.121) refer to as ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions. In terms of the interview schedule itself, I ensured that there was consistency between the research questions and interview questions. Questions were arranged in thematic blocks that mostly coincided with theoretical analysis that preceded the fieldwork. The interviews were carried out over a two-month period at the beginning of my four-month block of field research in Uganda. Ghauri et al. (1995, p.66) point out that the semi-structured interview requires a great deal of skill on the part of the interviewer. The researcher is required to be ‘craftsman’ rather than simply ‘scientist’. Fontana & Frey (2000, p.660) present a useful framework of ‘dos and don’ts’ for interviewing. Stressing the importance of presentation and location, they emphasise the researcher’s need to be aware of: o ‘proxemic’ communication – that is, the use of interpersonal space to communicate attitudes; o ‘chronemics’ communication – that is, the use of pacing of speech and length of silence in converstation; o ‘Kinetic’ communication – that is, the role of body movements or postures; and

121 o ‘Paralinguistic’ communication – that is, variations in volume, pitch and quality of voice. Denzin (1997, p.19) also stresses the importance of the relationships of class, race, gender, and ethnicity between the researcher and respondent. These, he points out, will inevitably “… shape the process of inquiry, thereby making research a multicultural process”. Kitzinger & Miller (1992) also warn against interview approaches that have either preconstructed or spontaneous ‘social problem’ prompts. In both question schedule and prompts, therefore, I tried to allow meanings to emerge in exchanges that first clarified and deepened what the respondent had told me and then cross-checked this against his/her other answers (Silverman, 2001, p.119). As with all other data collection and analysis, Kvale (1996, p.88) points out, this process of cross-checking has to be continual rather than merely at the end of the production line. He applies six quality criteria for assessing the success of the interview: 1. That the respondent’s answers are ‘spontaneous, rich, specific and relevant’; 2. That the interviewer’s questions are short and the interviewee’s answers longer; 3. That the interviewer follows up and clarifies the meanings of the relevant aspects of the answers; 4. That what is being presented and how it is presented is to a large extent interpreted by the interviewer throughout; 5. That the interviewer attempts to verify his or her interpretation of the subjects’ answers in the course to the interview; and 6. That the interview is ‘self-communicating’ – that is, the story is contained in itself and hardly requires extra descriptions and explanations. Fontana & Frey point out, however, that a growing number of scholars feel that most indepth interviews are ‘unethical’ because they are by their very nature manipulative. Much contemporary social science understanding of the validity of the interview, therefore, stresses its role as a ‘negotiated’ mutual construction of texts by both interviewer and respondent (Sherman Heyl, 2001, p.370; Hodder, 1994, p.713; Fontana & Frey, 2000, p.663). However, it equally points out that, if the interview is to carry ‘purpose’ – where the interviewer’s interest is in answering his/her own questions and selecting the specific respondent to answer them – it cannot but be manipulative (Silverman, 2001, p.90). Some contemporary ideas around validity and authenticity of the interview, therefore, connect it

122 to broader ethical considerations of how it may be ‘useful’ as much to the respondent as to the interviewer (Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Blumer, 1971, p.300). I attempted to make many of these connections myself. Through ‘feedback workshops’, co-authored narratives were fed back to the coalition as working coalition ‘reports’. This approach stressed seeking permission both at coalition level and with the individual respondent and ensuring the respondent had considerable control over how such narratives might be used by the coalition itself (see later descriptions of ‘feedbacks’ and ‘ethical considerations’). The Interviews I had envisaged interviewing all member organization representatives (i.e. those with responsibility for coalition networking). However, because of its fluid membership criteria and unpredictable attendance, respondent selection criteria had to be developed for the Inter-NGO Forum based on their frequency of attendance and participation within a two year period preceding the interview. This second criterion allowed for the important inclusion of organizations that had stopped participating in coalition activities. From sixtyone ‘members’ indicated as present at the Forum’s monthly meeting over its seven-year existence1, only twenty-five fit my criteria. The interview schedule was pre-tested on coalition staff and other individuals peripheral to the coalitions, and modified accordingly. However, further modifications had also to be made during interview implementation – e.g. by dropping a descriptive section and various questions that either made the interview too long or where I felt the same information could be obtained outside the interview. Although ‘face-to-face’ interviews lasted approximately forty-five minutes, some were shorter and a few lasted considerably longer (or were carried over into another session). With many organizations located considerable distances from each other, the sites for each interview depended upon what was most ‘practical’ for the respondents. Whereas I was able to meet most respondents in central Jinja in the context of a ‘working lunch’, I had to travel between one and thirty kilometres to diverse organizations’ sites in and around Kampala. However, this did give me further knowledge about the organizations with which I was not previously familiar.

1

Attendance at monthly meetings was the criterion applied to ‘membership’.

123 The interviews were conducted in English1. As each interview relied on open questions, I both allowed a period for setting the respondent at ease and tape-recorded each interview, taking very brief accompanying notes. Each recording was then transcribed. Questions related to thematic areas, such as ‘Coalition Members’ Expectations’, ‘Who Participates’, ‘Feelings of Success and Failure’, ‘Conflict and Coalition Management’. Responses to open questions occasionally crossed over such themes. This was allowed to happen as it was seen to be part of the contextual and layered way the respondent constructed his/her responses. However, a question that seemed to have been previously answered was nevertheless asked again within its specific thematic framework to see if a response would potentially add new layers of meaning. My own coded observations about the interaction were later added at the bottom of the transcribed record of the interview. Summary of interviews: •

Inter-NGO Forum member representatives: o 19 interviews of 25 scheduled

•

Jinja Network member representatives: o 10 interviews of 12 scheduled

•

Government officers: o District Probation and Social Welfare Officer, Kampala City Council o The Deputy Mayor, Jinja Municipal Council o The Assistant Town Clerk for Social Welfare, Jinja Municipal Council

(The interview schedule is presented in Appendix 2).

8.3.2

Documents and literature

Silverman (2001, p.129) makes clear that documents should not be seen as true or false statements but as depictions of socially constructed ‘realities’. In this sense documents are seen, rather like archaeological artefacts, as part of ‘material culture’ (Hodder, 1994, p. 703). Of particular interest to the researcher, therefore, is how documents might give insights into social processes that brought them about. As finding these insights relates to how the documents are analysed, I shall describe this in more detail in the section on ‘interpreting documents and texts’ later in this chapter. However, clearly such a framework of understanding equally determined what type of documents I felt would achieve such

1

Although English is Uganda’s national language, I was vigilant about potential problems for some respondents. Even though most proved to be fairly fluent in English, where I felt it necessary, considerable attention was paid to rephrasing questions until I was satisfied they were understood.

124 insight. The reader should therefore keep this ‘purposive’ framework in mind when considering my choice of specific documents. During my fieldwork in Uganda a variety of documents were examined and some bought or copied (or downloaded from the internet once I had returned to the UK). The documents fall into three principal categories: coalition documents, government documents, and academic/non-academic literature on Uganda’s social, economic, political and cultural environments (especially those that are not available in the UK). The purpose for collection of each type of document was based the following criteria.

Coalition documents Documents were sought that gave specific types of insight into experience of coalition-building and partnership-building with government. However, as I shall also explain in more detail later, the absence of coalition documents from which to draw data was understood as potentially of equal significance to coalition narratives1. Coalition documents included: o Coalition ‘minutes’ – e.g. the record of monthly coalition meetings from both Kampala and Jinja allowed considerable insight into historical processes and influences on coalition formation and evolution. It also gave me insight into who attended regularly, what structures and processes evolved, and which organizations were seen to participate in these ‘coalition’ processes and activities; o Strategic, planning, concept documents – e.g. these gave considerable insight into levels of formal behaviour but also, by cross-referencing it with interview data, which organizations interests seemed to be most addressed (to give but one example); and o Constitutions, rules and regulations – e.g. that might describe the degree of formal/informal structures, behaviour, privileges and sanctions, but also act as indicators or processes that brought such formal behaviours about.

Government documents I acquired relevant policy and legislative documents that referred directly or indirectly to citizen participation in local and central government policy-making processes, and the ‘street child’. These gave me insights into broader national ideological discourses. 1

However, it should be noted that, generously, all coalition documents were made available to me.

125 These included the 1995 Constitution, the 1997 Local Governments Act, the 1997 Children’s Act, and the Ministry of Gender’s practice guidelines for work with street children. Also various national and regional data were collected from government webpages that reflected, for instance, government narratives about citizen and NGO participation (whether state, president, or Movementist) that might support or be different from policy and legislative documents. Internet-based reports to international organizations were also a useful source of national policies and national and local demographic indicators.

Academic and non-academic hard-copy and web-based literature on Africa/Uganda Many useful press-cuttings, and archive searches on the New Vision and Monitor newspaper websites allowed considerable cross-referencing of coalition, government and public narratives about street children, NGOs, and local and central government. Other books, research papers, reports from diverse national and international organizations were also examined. These supplemented and cross-referenced local coalition, government and public discourses and narratives with diverse national and regional ones. Because Uganda will be unfamiliar to most readers of this thesis, some of this is presented as ‘contextual’ data in Chapter 9. With the now concluded multiparty elections (held on 24th February 2006), some political contexts may have substantially or subtly changed. However, this change is in the nature of the research process and a tension between continuities and discontinuities is inevitable.

8.3.3

Observation, participation and journaling

Barbara Tedlock (2000, p.465) describes the more traditional ethnographer’s notion of ‘participant observation’ as an oxymoron. It implies, she argues, simultaneous emotional involvement and objective detachment. Instead we should see a more dialogical process of ‘observing participation’. Indeed, Hammersley & Atkinson (1983) point out, we cannot study the social world without being part of it. And, in this sense, all social research is a form

of

observation

and participation.

Reporting is

both biographical and

autobiographical. Rather like the research interest of this thesis itself, important to this research project’s methodology are the micro-political exchanges and verbal encounters between coalition members, government officials and me as ‘insider/outsider’.

126 Observation played an important part over the 4 months of field research with the two coalitions. Observations about ‘participation’ in the monthly coalition meetings were written into a journal alongside biographical, autobiographical and contextual observations that accompanied interviews, informal exchanges, and examination of documents. The aim, to gather firsthand information about social processes (Silverman, 2001, p.14), was explored in terms of ‘quiet’ observation in monthly meetings, but equally as a dialogical and multi-layered process. My journal became like a Kurt Schwitters ‘collage’ (what he termed ‘Merz’) of observations of disparate fragments that take on dialogical relationships to each other and to outside experiences brought through other data or my own social, cultural, professional selves (e.g. Angrosino & Mays de Pérez, 2000, p.675) ‘over time’. Despite providing only partial and selective fragments of lived and observed realities, they nevertheless fix these realities in a form that can be read, considered, selected and rewritten (Emerson et al., 2001). These ‘fragments’, with awareness of tensions between their etic (based on my observations) and emic (based on observations of those being studied) analytic constructions (Silverman, 2001, p.227), became an integral part of narrative construction, both informed by and informing interactive processes of data collection and analysis.

8.4

Framework of data analysis and presentation

Silverman (2001, p.119) points out that, there is a degree of artificiality in separating analysis of interviews from other texts. After all, the mere act of transcribing an interview turns it into a written text. However, Silverman makes the distinction between interview text that has become recorded through the intervention of the researcher, and other text that has not.

8.4.1

Analysis of interviews

I had already established a principal coding framework within the structure of the interview schedule itself (Kvale, 1996, p.189). This allowed me to remain focused on the research question, but equally refer back to the original text whenever contextual crossreferencing was necessary. However, its complexity equally meant that I had to do the transcribing myself to avoid later problems. From its first coded whole-text arrangement in Microsoft Word ‘Tables’, I extracted statements that represented emergent ideas but equally eliminated superfluous material and distinguished between the essential and nonessential (Kvale, 1996, p.192). These emergent ideas were subdivided into clusters under emergent thematic headings, and arranged in Microsoft Excel workbooks. Such detailed

127 coding required considerable care to ensure that a balance was maintained between creativity and rigour (Ghauri et al., 1995, p.96). From these clusters of themes principal and subsidiary narratives began to emerge which then were arranged and developed into a more coherent structured story. Through the process of informally or formally presenting this structured story back to the respondents, dialogic co-authoring of the story begins to apply further validity and authenticity to it. Although these processes allowed the narratives to gain some degree of interpretation, as single data set the narrative underwent deeper and more speculative textual interpretation that referred itself to other data sets (i.e. the documents, observations, literature) and broader theory. Kvale summarises this whole process as: 1. condensation, 2. categorisation, 3. narrative forming, and 4. interpretation. As the interview narratives were transformed and structured into text, therefore, they became equally subject to textual interpretation. I now present these processes of text ‘interpretation’.

8.4.2

Interpreting documents and texts

The ethnographer’s interest in documents is not so much whether they contain true or false statements but with the processes through which such documents depict ‘reality’ (Silverman, 2001, p.128). Documents are ‘social facts’ in the sense that they are produced, shared and used in socially organized ways. Although they are ‘accounts’ of coalitionbuilding events, what they cannot do alone is constitute evidence of coalition organizational routines or decision-making processes (Atkinson & Coffey, 1997, p.47). Indeed, meanings are expressed as much in non-linguistic forms than in the document’s specific narratives (Hodder, 1994, p.714). Hammersley and Atkinson (1983, p.142-3, cited in Silverman, 2001, p.129) outline the types of questions the researcher should ask him/herself, which I have collected into 4 groupings: 1. How are texts written and who writes them? 2. How and why are they read, on what occasions and with what outcomes? 3. What is recorded or omitted and what is taken for granted?

128 4. What is taken for granted about the reader and whom must the reader know to make sense of them? For example, the list of member organizations and contact people in Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum was extracted from the list of organizations recorded as attending its monthly meetings. As some organizations had only attended once, and others had not attended for some years, there was some confusion about who should be included on my list of interviewees. Therefore, quite apart from the ‘minutes’ of monthly meeting’s value as historical documentary, they were able to give me considerable insight into what constituted the category ‘membership’. Also of great value to my textual analysis with transcribed interview texts, documents, and other textual sources, was Rowbottom’s (1977) framework for analysing social institutional statements. Rowbottom argues that statements take on four distinctive levels: 1. Manifest statements – these are what Rowbottom (1977, p.42-45) also calls “official enacting statements”. They take on ‘authoritative’ status by virtue of having claim to general and formal sanction (e.g. those contained within Jinja Network Constitution); 2. Assumed statements – these are ‘personal’ views about coalition structures and processes that are often quite different from those expressed in manifest statements. They are expressed by an individual actor about his or her own interpretation of the social and structural nature of each coalition – and also adopted by him/her as the premise for action and interaction within each coalition, or, indeed, withdrawal from it; 3. Requisite statements – these are frequently interspersed with assumed statements and are proposals of how things ‘ought to be’ if they were arranged differently and ‘better’ (Rowbottom, 1977, p.43); and 4. Extant statements – these statements refer to ‘the situation as revealed by systematic exploration and analysis’. An example would be Kampala Inter-NGO Forum’s research report on the government’s Kampringisa street children rehabilitation programme. Although, purporting to reveal truths about the programme, Rowbottom (1977, p.45) points out, in reality the distinction between such speculative and assumed analysis is not always a clear one.

129 Applying Rowbottom’s framework of analysis gave a good structure through which I was able to establish sub-categories of coding for both interview transcripts and document texts. It also helped in the extraction of ‘material cultural’ interpretation of narratives and clarified how these might be ‘fed back’ in the form of usable report.

8.4.3

Research participant ‘feedback’

The use of feedback encounters between researcher and the research participant was understood to serve two primary functions: testing the research data and ‘extraction’ of new data from participants, on one side, and ‘feeding back’ analysis into Jinja and Kampala coalitions as social change institutions, on the other side. In terms of ‘extraction’, Silverman (2000, p.211) portrays feedback encounters with research participants as part of a more general process of ‘testing’ how well we are performing our research skills1. The purpose of the feedback, Meyer (2000, p.180) suggests, is to extract the participants’ perspective on the research data and incorporate their responses as new data in the final research report. Within such an encounter, she asserts, the onus is on the researcher to make his or her own values and beliefs explicit so that any biases are evident. The ‘social change’ function of the feedback encounter is most fully developed within theorizing on action research (e.g. Hopkins, 2002; Titchen & Binnie, 1993), social analysis and social programme evaluation (e.g. Greene, 2000; Rowbottom; 1977). Greene (2000, p.981) outlines the dynamics of social programme evaluation where research encounters function to address priority policy and practice questions of diverse social actors2 rather than abstract theoretical questions of the academic community – although one presumes the feedback should answer both. Elliott (1991) points out that the researcher’s role in feedback is predominantly as ‘outsider’, and is therefore a subordinate one. The feedback’s purpose is, therefore, to support and facilitate the ‘insider’s’ reflective practice without damaging the unity of the coalitions’ constituent parts, rather than imposing a hegemony of specialist expertise on the practitioner. Elliott’s argument, Titchen & Binnie (1993) point out, is that the ‘outsider’ helps the ‘insiders’ to achieve an integration of practice and research activities. Although the ‘change agent’ is inevitably an ‘insider’ in the social

1

Other encounters are, for instance, between the researcher and his supervisor, fellow students and wider academic community. 2 Such as, Jinja and Kampala’s coalition member organization representatives.

130 setting1, Titchen & Binnie (1993, p.860) see the relationship between the researcher and change agent as a critical one. In what they describe as a ‘double act’ model of action research, they see a value in the ‘insider’/’outsider’ team being of ‘one mind’. Rowbottom clarifies the researcher’s ‘outsider’ role in social analysis of institutions. The role of social analyst, he argues, is not to offer or advise particular solutions based on his/her own beliefs, values or objects, but rather to “… tease out formulations of various institutional models which would be requisite given certain constraints and needs” (Rowbottom, 1977, p.145). Any changes to the institution will depend on what Rowbottom refers to as ‘key figures’ in the social setting who agree to collaborate in the research endeavour. The ‘insider’ therefore, he argues, should be of an analytic cast, seeing the research endeavour as experimentation in social settings rather than simply a ‘problemsolving’ activity. However, Hopkins (2002, p.51) acknowledges that an often justified criticism of ‘action research’ style feedback is the impression that it is a “… deficit model of professional development” – i.e. something is wrong and needs to get fixed. Indeed, the lack of time was the clear weakness in my own feedback approach as it limited potential for effecting a ‘double act’ approach (Titchen & Binnie, 1993). With these functions and their limitations in mind, therefore, I used both continual individual feedback with key research participants (particularly the coordinators), and organized three group feedback sessions. The final two group sessions involved half-day workshop feedbacks finishing with lunch. The Kampala workshop had twenty-two participants from the Inter-NGO Forum, and Jinja Network 15 participants. With a participant audience in mind, two fifteen-page reports were also written, one for Jinja and the other for Kampala, and distributed to each participant. Each presented narratives that corresponded to my presentation of data and their initial analysis.

8.5

Generalisability

Extremely complicated patterns of analysis of the data occurred over nearly a one-year period. Identifying, and co-authoring sub- and principal narratives involved processes of both thick description and comparison that often competed with each other. Stake (2000, p.444) argues that comparison competes with learning about the ‘particular case’. Although described as a ‘grand epistemological enterprise’, he warns that comparison can

1

The ‘key’ people in Jinja and Kampala were the coalition coordinators/chairpersons.

131 obscure case knowledge that fails to facilitate comparison. The particularity, therefore, competes with its generalisability. The thesis narratives that emerge from such variable analysis, therefore, try to allow both the particular and more generalisable patterns to stand ‘awkwardly’ side-by-side. This choice mainly springs from my desire to show often-uncomfortable tensions between narratives that appear to conform to more abstracted patterns, and their particularities that prevent them from such comparison. This is supposed to both assist the reader to make connections to theory, but also caution him/her in doing so. Having said this, both the data and analysis of Kampala and Jinja are often compared in order to emphasise difference, which is an equally valuable and trustworthy source of knowledge. Such presentations and analyses, however, should equally reflect my “ … respect and curiosity for culturally different perceptions of phenomena; and empathic representation of local settings – all blending (perhaps clumped) within a constructivist epistemology.” (Stake, 2000, p.444) In terms of linking emerging narratives to theory at both the research design and analysis stages, helpful is Donald Campbell’s (1975) idea of ‘pattern-matching’. This occurs where several pieces of information from the same case may be related to some theoretical proposition. At the research design stage, my intimate knowledge of both coalitions to be investigated helped me to make such connections. This also happened at different stages of the processes of analysis where I felt it necessary to bind narratives together.

8.6

Ethical considerations

My ethical practice in this research project reflects the guidelines set out in the British Sociological Association’s Statement of Ethical Practice (BSA, 2002). Multiple responsibilities address the researcher’s professional integrity and obligations but also issues of power and integrity in the relationship between researcher and research participants. One of the principal interests of this research, as set out in my criteria for selection of Jinja Network and Kampala Inter-NGO Forum as case study, is to help each identify what might hinder and what might facilitate coalition and partnership development. I describe this interest in terms of ‘social responsibility and transformation’. I have already given the reader considerable descriptions of the co-authorship procedures I adopted, the ‘feedback workshops’ and the respondents’ control over what was to be done with the feedback report. However, perhaps it is useful to also briefly mention my

132 attention to seeking permission at each phase of the process. This permission-seeking was based on the following procedures that roughly corresponds with Silverman’s (2001, p.271) guidelines for informed consent:

Initial permission-seeking Initially I sought permission for the research through the Chairpersons and Coordinators of each coalition. I sent a brief email outline of the research aims and questions. By mutual agreement, permission was also sought from the member organizations at their monthly meeting before I could commit myself to the study. Collective permission-seeking in coalition monthly-meetings On arrival, and before commencing research activities, I attended each coalition’s monthly meeting. To each member organization’s representative I provided a letter of introduction from Brunel University’s Department Education, and from Jinja Network Coordinator (which I requested in Jinja on arrival from the UK). I also provided each with a one-page summary of the aims, objectives and research questions (Appendix 3). These were explained in detail and the floor was opened for questions and clarifications. Respondents in Kampala debated between themselves how the research would benefit them before all agreeing to the research1. I guaranteed the principle that respondents could choose ‘anonymity’ of authorship within interviews if they so wished. Individual permission-seeking The respondent had considerable control over the setting for the interview. Before the interview began I again briefly explained the research concept (i.e. in Appendix 3) and the choice of ‘anonymity’ of authorship by means of referring any sensitive attributable contributions back to them personally. Before the interview began, I also briefly ran through the interview schedule structure and its relation to the research concept and asked if this was acceptable. Because much of the interview data referred to ‘problems’ that individuals or groups had with management and governance structures and procedures, I decided that it would be most appropriate to refer to respondents by codes rather than names (e.g. ‘6j’ refers to

1

Although, in principle, both coalitions had agreed to the research, many of the respondents in Kampala had not attended the earlier permission-seeking meeting.

133 organization 6 in Jinja Network). However, how the research analysis was fed back to the collective group had to take into consideration a number of important ethical principles. In terms of a posture of ethical ‘proportionate reason’1 (Gula, 1989, p.273), Stake (2000, p.447) argues that usually what the research adds to theory building is unlikely to outweigh hurt caused to research participant who is exposed. Clearly the reports and session feedbacks that were critical of governance and management would be likely to cause discomfort to the leaderships of both Jinja and Kampala coalitions. However, the research’s purpose of ‘deep description’ to facilitate coalition growth, that had been negotiated and agreed upon by leadership and respondents from the beginning, was also at stake. Gula presents us with two other ethical criteria that offer greater assistance in such decision-making. The second criterion is that no less harmful way might exist to protect the value of such a report to the purpose of enhancing coalition-building in Kampala and Jinja. In the case of such a report, the third criterion argues that its feedback should not undermine its potential value in demonstrating potential areas of change that had clearly been requested by the majority of coalition members. Such decisions, Angrosino & Mays de Pérez (2000, p.693) point out, should be based on the researcher’s experience and intuition rather than trial and error. As the qualitative researcher is a guest in private spaces, Stake (2000, p.447) points out, ‘their manners should be good and their code of ethics strict’. Indeed, as the leadership appeared broadly aware of undercurrents of opinion on coalitions’ governance structures and procedures, the reports and their contents were presented, but with attention to considerable sensitivity, manners, and mediation.

8.7

Limits to research design

There were some variables over which I had little control. Whilst most respondents in Kampala were directors of their respective NGOs, some respondents were staff representatives with little decision-making power. This meant that opinions about the control of power in coalition formal spaces were not always from respondents of equal organizational status, and were inevitably different from directors from the same organization. However, these experiences are both acknowledged in the later presentation of data and are, anyhow, part of the coalition experience of the dispersed nature and exercise of power.

1

That is, does the research value outweigh the individual harm it might cause?

134 I was also not able to examine as many local government records referring to street children from Jinja Municipal Council and Kampala City Council (KCC)1 as I would have liked. Having said this, the Assistant Town Clerk for Social Welfare (as Chairperson of Jinja Network) made explicit the link between Jinja Network and municipal policy-making and planning for street children (see Chapter 15). In Kampala, too, examination of other documents gave considerable insights into government policy and programming in Kampala. And finally, the lack of time was the clear weakness in terms how the research could be fed back in order to qualitatively impact change in the two coalitions. Ideally an action research ‘double act’ approach would have linked me more effectively with coalition coordinators, chairpersons or executive committees as key ‘insider’ change agents over a much longer period (Rowbottom, 1977; Titchen & Binnie, 1993).

8.8

Concluding thoughts

In Chapter 8 I have presented a detailed account of my research design. I have considered a set of criteria for the case study selection and presented multiple methods that that I have applied to achieve what Yin (1994, p.78) calls the ‘chain of evidence’. I have detailed my framework for data analysis and presentation, explored tensions implicit and explicit within the thesis’ specificity and its generalisability, examined the ethical implications of the research process and discussed limits to the methods I have chosen. Despite such detailed preparation for and analysis of my field visits, however, the reality of turning up for an appointment with a government official in Kampala after six unsuccessful attempts, and being given only an ‘impatient’ fifteen minutes to ask semistructured questions, is what a methods chapter can never quite convey. There are many other frustrations in trying to be disciplined and methodical in an often-unpredictable research environment. Indeed, according to Spiro et al. (1987), most personal experience of data collection, analysis and co-authorship is ill-structured, and neither pedagogically nor epistemologically neat. Much of my research had, therefore, also to be done ‘on my feet’ and spontaneously. One feedback group session was sprung on me during one monthly coalition meeting once the chairperson saw that other topics had been exhausted.

1

Having said this, a consistent concern expressed by one NGO/CBO organization, which developed its programmes through local government structures, was precisely that there was extremely poor record keeping at local council level.

135 However, within such dynamics, trying to work method into occasionally chaotic environments becomes itself part of a reflexive social research process. As ‘bricoleur’ (see Chapter 7), therefore, methodical adherence to principles of validity, reliability, confirmability, trustworthiness and data dependability (Yin, 1994, p.33) become expressed as much by social mannerism and posture (what Stake calls ‘good manners’ and personal ‘code of strict ethics’) as by procedural inflexibility. Within such mannerism and posture, Greenwood & Levin (2000) argue, the scholar expresses responsibility to do work that is socially meaningful and socially responsible. I now proceed to Part Three of the thesis. Chapter 9, which follows, acts as a bridging narrative between the literature review and the findings and analyses presented in Chapters 10, 11 and 12. It presents the reader with the necessary insights into Uganda’s ‘indigenized’ processes of state reconfiguration, which equips the reader with the necessary understanding of the political, cultural, economic and ethnic contexts to processes of CSO coalition building and partnership building with government. Without this bridging chapter the findings and their analyses would be difficult to follow.

136

PART THREE: FINDINGS FROM JINJA AND KAMPALA

“Galí mw’îfúba: gamanhíbwá mwénégo” The one who owns it knows the strength of the chest (Lusoga proverb)

The review of literature, in Part One of this thesis, explored a very broad body of theory on contemporary global economic and social development trends predicated to notions of ‘democratization’ and ‘good governance’. It also examined African state trends of acquiescence and resistance to this new imposition, often framed by postcolonial mistrust about intentions behind the West’s proposal for new flows of power and trade and who should control such change. Critics, we saw, also question many of the cultural assumptions in applying Western notions of liberal democracy in African contexts. Western contemporary obsession with the promotion of ‘democratization’ and ‘civil society’ in Africa, critics point out, does not take sufficiently into account its assault on national stability and cohesion as disparate interest groups (many profoundly ‘undemocratic’ in their interests) compete for influence over the weakened state. Outside the larger urban centres, the Western notion ‘civil society’, in as much as it can be applied in Africa at all, refers to associational formations very different from the West’s. However, equally, since the early 1990s space has opened up to new forms of engagement between the citizen and government in many African states. We concluded that, within this ‘baroque style’ political environment, the success with which the CSO coalition – focusing on street children – is able to negotiate social and political advantage may well depend on how it is able to rationalise external support, ‘improvise’ with limited local resources, and ‘connive’ (to use Mbembe’s expression) with government towards some mutual and reciprocal accommodation. However, with such processes inevitably come questions of power differentials, and the ‘democratization’ of knowledge and actors, between the state and civil society associational groups, and within the coalition membership itself. Chapter 9 begins Part Three of this thesis, acting as a bridging narrative between the literature review and the findings and analyses of specific experiences of coalition formation and evolution in Kampala and Jinja in Chapters 10, 11 and 12. It presents the reader with an insight into historical, cultural, economic and ethnic influences on Ugandan state reconfiguration since the mid-1980s. It explains how many of the discourses on civil society, the state, and the new international development paradigm have been ‘indigenised’

137 within Uganda’s distinctive Movement system of national and local governance under President Yoweri Museveni. Most of all, Chapter 9 equips the reader with the necessary understanding of the Ugandan political, cultural, economic and ethnic contexts without which the findings and their analyses in Chapter 10 to 13 would be difficult to understand. Chapter 10 begins with a short reminder of how I present and analyse the data as a constructivist process. This is followed by presentation and initial analysis of the coalition building experiences of Jinja Network and Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum in Chapters 10 and 11. In Chapter 12 I present the data on Jinja and Kampala’s experiences of partnership building with government and its initial analysis. Of great importance throughout the coalition and partnership building narratives in Chapters 10 to 12 are the emergence of diverse narratives about street children in Kampala and Jinja. These street children narratives give specific and very pertinent context to the often hidden costs and conflicts within coalition and partnership building, perhaps referred to too infrequently within literature. At the end of this chapter I therefore locate the emergence of the two coalitions within their historical timelines of emerging national and international policy frameworks and central and local government tendency to diverge from such frameworks.

138

Chapter 9:

Policy-making spaces in Uganda’s ‘no-party’ participatory democracy

9.1

Uganda’s political evolution since 1986

Despite claims for Western-styled ‘democratization’ as the only framework for African development, Uganda managed to develop and sustain quite a different and, until the February 2006 multiparty elections, resilient model of ‘no-party democracy’. The international community’s apparent reluctance to interfere with this ‘no-party’ model until the run up to the 2006 elections might well be attributed to Uganda’s status as one of those all too rare sub-Saharan examples of relative economic success, partly induced by the IFIs’ structural adjustment imperatives (Hanson & Twaddle, 1998, p.7). Its supporters had promoted the Movement as a legitimate ‘indigenised’ form of democracy more suitable to African cultural contexts. Until the 2006 elections, however, critics had insisted that such rhetoric had done little to obviate the reality that ‘no-party democracy’ conformed to all the criteria of the single-party state, so much a characteristic of Africa’s post-independence political landscape (Oloka-Onyango, 2000, p.59). On the other hand, others acknowledge that, despite its apparent lack of ideological coherency (Mugaju, 2000, p.142), the Movement’s ‘no-party democracy’ had made a considerable contribution as a transitional process towards the 2006 elections. It advanced, they argue, a more inclusive democratic culture from the jaws of Uganda’s turbulent political history (Kabwegyere, 2000, p.103; Barya, 2000, p.39; Mugaju, 2000, p.8). Indeed, contemporary Ugandan discourse on multiparty ‘democratization’ has to be located within its history of important and dramatic ethnic, economic, and political processes over the past twenty-five years that have reconfigured the National Resistance Army (NRA) from guerrilla force in 1986, into the Movement as ‘no-party’ democratic state institution in 1995 (Hanson & Twaddle, 1998, p.4), to the Movement as elected party in a ‘multi-party’ political system in the 2006 elections. Getting inside the competing arguments for and against multipartyism over decades, however, helps us contextualise the considerable tensions between the liberal model of democracy favoured by the international community, and the threat such a model might pose by re-igniting national conflict based on ethno-political and religious interests. The Movement blamed past multi-party competition for Uganda’s turbulent post-independence history. A unifying ‘no party’ system would, the Movement claimed, avoid sectarianism in a Ugandan context whose political aspirations had little in common with the West’s

139 promotion of neo-liberalism (Museveni, 1997, p.16). ‘No-partyism’ would, therefore, espouse “… typically African values of solidarity, reconciliation, seeking a general consensus of all and keeping peace and togetherness without fragmentation.” (RU, 1993, p.210) Rather than being based on the citizen’s historical experience of sectarian ‘winner takes all’ politics – with patronage underpinning individual advancement1 – Movement politics was promoted as ‘non-partisan’. It was, the Movement insisted, based on ‘individual merit’, and as an all-inclusive participatory process to include hitherto disadvantaged groups such as women and the rural population. It is in the reality behind the Movement’s claims of emerging popular and participatory democracy (Museveni, 1997), and how this mutates as a post-2006 expression of governance processes, that we locate emerging and potential spaces for civil society engagement with the state in Uganda. A brief review of Uganda’s turbulent political evolution since independence, therefore, will perhaps give us a better understanding of some of the issues at stake before we investigate these spaces further.

9.1.1

Uganda’s ethno-political and religious inheritance

Manipulative British colonial ‘divide and rule’ policies of privileging the economic and political elite of the south, whilst investing in a military elite from the north2 (Kayunga, 2000, p.109), clearly contributed strongly to shape the dynamism of post-colonial political configuration in Uganda. From its inception as an independent state in 1962 various regional and religious alliances formed to resist the real or perceived privilege of the south – particularly the Baganda (Southall, 1998, p.254; Behrend, 1999). As a result, Kasfir (1998, p.51) argues, claiming power for competing ethnic and ethno-religious groupings became the central enduring factor in Ugandan post-independence politics3. However, Mugaju (2000, p.8) argues, the history of competing ethnic and regional elites privileging their own interests and undermining pluralistic principles, predates by far the 1

Perhaps, one might argue, equally typical African political ‘values’. After all, many of the contemporary leaders who promote these ‘values’ were part of these past regimes. Mugaju (2000:8) also argues that political patronage typifies pre-colonization governance systems. 2 Particularly as a colonial ploy to counter the growing demands for power from the southern political elite after the Second World War (Kayunga, 2000:109) 3 Uganda therefore can be seen to share many of the dynamics of African post-independence state formation described in Chapter 6.

140 colonial period. The 1962 multi-party elections, he contends, were extracted from an indigenous political landscape representing a multiplicity of competing patriarchal precolonial political systems, rather than being based on any democratic principle of ‘sovereignty vested in the people’. The hurriedly modelled politics of representation at Uganda’s independence in 1962, Mugaju (2000, p.15-20) argues, merely presented the Ugandan citizen with a parody of a multi-party democratic system. The various political parties that sprang up in the 1950s were more concerned with religious and sectarian power positioning than with any universal principle of suffrage. With political parties representing ethnic and religious interests, Mugaju argues, “… the Ugandan political landscape lacked the basic democratic culture of compromise, tolerance, fair play, the rule of law and constitutionalism as well as traditions and practices at all levels of society which are indispensable to the proper functioning of a multiparty parliamentary democracy.” (Mugaju, 2000, p.9)1 Regional elites created their own narratives of ‘ethno-religious’ authenticity, and wove these into real, imagined or invented regional grievances, erupting in a culture of militaristic political violence (Behrend, 1999). Kayunga (2000, p.125), however, tries to decouple the narratives that try to justify the violent wrestling of privileges back by a northern elite (what he calls the ‘men of violence’) from what he characterises as genuine regional marginalization. Rather than proposing any coherent ideology, he argues, armed rebellion in the north and west (such as that of the Lord’s Resistance Army and the People’s Redemption Army, respectively) is merely a symptom of the move of military power from the northern armies of Idi Amin, Milton Obote and Tito Okello to the south. For the men of violence, he argues, the current vitriolic rhetoric of democracy is merely a vehicle to fan the fires of historical, economic and regional narratives of grievance that are supposed to legitimise these acts of violence. Therefore, lasting peace, Kayunga (2000, p.125) concluded in 2000, must find a way to institutionally address these grievances. Following the patterns of party and ethno-political claim and counter-claim in the build up to the 2006 elections, Kayunga’s analysis of regional marginalisation perhaps remains just as pertinent today.

1

It is interesting to contrast this characterisation of ‘traditional’ values with Museveni’s.

141

9.1.2

Economic imperatives and political resistances

As noted earlier, the end of the Cold War had as powerful an impact on Uganda’s economy as it had on other African states. In the early years of the NRM government (between 1986 and 1990) there had been a desire to bypass trade tied to the highly prescriptive IFI structural adjustment conditionalities. To achieve this the NRM developed a highly innovative ‘barter’ economy based on exchange of Uganda’s primary goods for Libyan oil and Cuban and Yugoslavian manufactured goods. However, this closed arrangement could not be sustained after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Hanson & Twaddle suggest that this left only two options for the Ugandan government, “… accepting the advice offered by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Paris Club quickly, or accepting it less quickly” (Hanson & Twaddle, 1998, p.7). The unequal relationship experienced in these early days of the 1990s, they argue, persuaded Museveni of the political advantage of changing from one of the IFI policy’s biggest critics in the mid-1980s to becoming their most ‘eloquent’ supporter by the mid1990s. This clever courting of the international donor community through the 1990s – who seemed desperate to claim at least one sub-Saharan example of successful structural adjustment – allowed Museveni much greater leeway to balance what he saw as dual national interests. On one side, market prudence has allowed him to reap the economic advantages of considerable external investment. On the other side, economic success has enabled him to resist international pressure to ‘rush’ multi-party democratization processes, avoiding, as he sees it, descent into ethno-religious sectarianism (Kasfir, 1998, p.50; Museveni, 1997, p.3). Uganda’s rhetoric of pro-poor structural adjustment appears to convincingly echo that of the international donors’1 (Hanson & Twaddle, 1998, p.9). It is enshrined in Uganda’s ‘pro-poor’ Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)2 as a condition of debt repayment assistance. However, critics argue that budgetary priorities are still too heavily skewed towards maintaining an army in the north, and an over-heavy ‘poor-value-for-money’ public administration (e.g. UDN, 2003, p.2). Although much international pressure has been put on optimising state revenue by improving tax duties and collection, and adding VAT, it has proved a delicate political balancing act. On one side, there is a felt political vulnerability in collecting and allocating meagre resources for the social sector (Hanson & 1

Glowing reports from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on Uganda’s socio-economic performance can be found at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/40/32411656.pdf. 2 This is merely a re-naming of Uganda’s version of the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP).

142 Twaddle, 1998, p.10)1. On the other side, there is the imperative to hold at arms length the influence of political disintegration in many of Uganda’s neighbours in the Great Lakes region (Behrend, 1999, p.195)2. After all, peace and security are inevitably the most rudimentary currency of livelihood sustainability3, even if it is unequally distributed.

9.2

Pluralism and political evolution

It has been the competing pressures to achieve meaningful and coherent pluralism through ‘decentralisation’ and the maintenance of national cohesion in the face of insurgencies – whilst at the same begrudgingly embracing multipartysim and maintaining economic growth – that hold the Movement government at a permanent ‘critical juncture’. Whilst acknowledging its original value in creating relative political and economic stability in the late 1980s, many critics of the Movement’s historical rhetoric against political ‘pluralism’ saw it as having metamorphosed into a pretext for stifling ‘autonomous’ political space in order to preserve advantage for the Movement’s political elite (e.g. Tripp, 2001, p.126; Shelton, 2004, p.19). President Museveni’s inner circle had undermined any pretence of ideological coherency, they argue, “… treat[ing] ‘movement’ democracy as a resource for power rather than as an institution that intended to outlive their government.” (Kasfir, 2000, p.75) On the other hand, even many critics of the Movement acknowledge that space has opened up for political, social and economic critique at a local level, which has moved the democratization process forward for the ordinary citizen (Kasfir, 2000, p.76; Hyden, 1998). “The very fact that the country adhered to the principles of broad-based consultation helped legitimised politics after the many years of earlier alienation [of the citizen].” (Hyden, 1998, p.118) Through the repeated practice of ‘popular democracy’ within the Local Council system of governance, the ordinary citizen has gained “… intimate and repeated experience” with democratic forms of participation (Kasfir, 2000, p.76). This has, Kasfir argues, allowed Ugandans to practise democracy in their own communities far more intensively than in almost any other sub-Saharan African state. Adhering to a degree of democratic habit, he 1

For instance, there was much political capital in cutting taxes paid by the highly visible motorcycle taxi drivers who are prone to vent their pleasure or disdain very visibly. 2 Indeed, through the 1990s and beginning of this century civil war (and Ugandan intervention) has wreaked havoc in Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and Burundi, and kept northern Uganda in a state of permanent chaos. 3 For a discussion on the impact of ethno-religious conflict and development in the North of Uganda, read Behrend, 1998.

143 adds, has meant that the Movement system has undoubtedly consolidated a culture of democracy, even though it has failed to preserve its ‘no-party’ model. As a staging point, anchoring a culture of democracy to participatory practices, Kabwegyere argues, “… the involvement of millions of people directly or through their representative in discussing public affairs at all levels of the LC [local council] system has certainly done a lot more to enhance the process of democratization than was ever achieved under multiparty politics” (Kabwegyere, 2000, p.103) On the other side, any tendency towards suppression of the ‘dark forces’ of multi-party sectarianism, Mugaju (2000b, p.142-3) warns, might inadvertently lead to the future emergence of a political Frankenstein. The question still remains unanswered, ‘… has sectarianism abated in the past 19 years of Movement governance or does it simply remain bottled-up as in Tito’s Yugoslavia?’ Who and what emerges, or is prevented from emerging as political opposition over the next five years of Uganda’s experiment with multiparty democracy will go a long way to answering this question.

9.3

The citizen, the State and spaces for engagement

Whether or not the Movement has any ideological cohesion, the anchor to its claims for participatory democracy is the ‘Local Council’ (LC) system. The Movement (known before 1995 as the ‘National Resistance Movement’) established the model of local councils during its ‘bush’ war in the early to mid-1980s – at the time calling them ‘Resistance Councils’. These were elected by universal suffrage at village level as a way of mobilizing support during the armed resistance against the second Obote regime. It was adopted as the model at a national level when the Movement took power in 1986, and revised into the Local Governments Act in 19971 (Saito, 2000, p.3). The provision of greater local policy-making powers in the Local Governments Act was also supported by the IFIs in their pursuit of government decentralisation through the 1990s. The core rationale of the Movement’s policy of decentralisation follows that of the ‘no-party’ narrative: that because spaces at lower levels of government “… lie in arenas within reach of the citizens”, more feelings of ownership should therefore be expected (Brock, 2004c, p.134). These spaces, Brock argues, therefore take on both geographical and political meanings – purporting to locate and foster a culture of popular democratic participation and accountability at village level through the Movement (with the system of 1

Following from the administrative principles set out in Chapter 12 of the 1995 Constitution.

144 local councils as its vehicle). However, Saito (2000, p.4) points out, decentralization in Uganda has taken on a compromise between ‘de-concentration’ and ‘devolution’, where transfer of administrative powers to district government (which begun in 1993) has included only a partial degree of ‘autonomous’ status. Figure 9.3 (see also Appendix 1), on the following page, illustrates Uganda’s decentralised government structure. In general, LC5 (i.e. representing district level) and LC3 (i.e. representing sub-county or municipal ‘division’ level) take on central importance in terms of setting taxes, collecting revenue and delivering services. They, therefore, also benefit from considerable institution building processes. LC2 and LC4, on the other hand, have become relatively unimportant ‘administrative’ levels of government (Saito, 2000, p.3). The village level local council (LC1), on the other hand, is portrayed as the focus of participatory democratic processes. De Coninck (2004, p.68) points out that, because the LC1 village level government structure provides for popular representation and responsibility in relatively small clusters of households (i.e. between 5 and 50), it is also mandatory for the citizen to belong to them. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in Movement discourse participation has been seen as a single ‘all-embracing’ political framework based on individual merit (Barya, 2000, p.29-31). In this way, participation in both political and community development are seen as necessarily passing through the LC system rather than bypassing it (Dicklitch, 1998a, p.152). This is particularly relevant to our discussion on ‘autonomous’ spaces for civil society later on.

(Source: Adapted From Brock et al., 2004) Figure 9.3: Ugandan Local Government Structure

145 However, there is little agreement on how successful Uganda’s decentralisation within the LC system has been, or how much devolution would be appropriate without risking nationally cohesive governance1. De Coninck (2004, p.69) argues that the politics of the LC system have gravitated more recently towards a ‘command structure’ character for central decision-making. Mitchinson (2003, p.241), on the other hand, contends that any deficiencies with decentralisation governance are more due to the inadequacy of resources (which remain largely dependent on the whims of external donors) and the [in]capacities of local authorities to implement their tasks. Schneider (2003, p.iii) suggests that an optimum model for social and economic progress should separate these two functions, balancing ‘political centralisation’ to allow broad political objectives, on one side, while promoting

local

social

and

economic

development

through

‘administrative

decentralisation’, on the other. However, considering the highly political nature of social and economic development, and the newly acquired spaces for oppositional politics within multi-party local government, one would anticipate that any suggestion of withdrawal from broader politics would be greeted with considerable suspicion. The LC channel is not a straightforward one at many other levels too. Many observers point out that traditional hierarchies are able to manipulate the ‘rules’ of participation in local councils to their own advantage (e.g. Brock, 2004c, p.153). Indeed, although one third of elected councillors are required to be women, under Article 11(e) of the 1997 Local Government Act (UG, 1997), the very gendered power hierarchies of social, cultural and political elites to which citizens and councillors feel pressured to defer, are much more difficult to legislate for (De Coninck, 2004, p.68; Saito, 2002, p.24; Mugenye, 1998; Trip, 1998, p.131). However, Mills & Ssewakiryanga (2002, p.24) are critical of too aggressive a Western ‘outsider’ critique of women’s progress within what is after all a relatively new democratic framework. Instead they insist that an approach to gender issues, indeed to democratization processes, should be based on the ‘Ugandan’ principle of consensus building rather than ‘outsider’2 preference for conflict. Inclusion of women through affirmative action, Saito (2002, p.24) argues, does challenge undemocratic and insensitive practices by providing a space and opportunity for more gender-sensitive ‘pro-poor’ programming that ‘slowly’ informs the culturally entrenched hierarchies. And ‘slowly’ women and men are able to negotiate appropriate masculinities and femininities in response to an emerging democratic culture (Mills & Ssewakiryanga, 2002, p.397). 1

For instance, whose interests the populist pursuit of FEDERO (i.e. a federal system) would serve is still a highly contested ethno-political debate. 2 Referring to the ‘insider/outsider’ discussion in Chapter 5.

146 Interestingly, the processes of ‘enmeshment’ between civical society and local government at district level, described earlier, is less obvious at the centre. Kampala, as Uganda’s capital city, is the seat of central government and the centre of IFI and NNGO activity. Kampala, Brock (2004b, p.105) observes, therefore tends towards interaction between ‘distinctive’ civil society and central government actors, within specific spaces of ‘invitation’, all instigated by government. However, as De Coninck (2004, p.68) points out, such an array of participatory methodologies at the centre, such as ‘budget conferences’ or ‘sector working groups’, seem to have made relatively limited impact on the power relationships shaping these structures. As Brock points out, “The less powerful internalise their position, severely restricting their power to act; and the more powerful internalise theirs, thus ensuring the perpetuation of their relatively influential positions.” (Brock, 2004c, p.152)

9.4

Civil society, the state & policy-making spaces

9.4.1

‘Grassroots’ civil society & the state

The diverse experiences of Uganda’s LC system and the dynamics of decentralization, already mentioned above, seem to imply that political and development ‘participation’ is a long-term learning process for all stakeholders, whose views are not necessarily in agreement over the process. As previously mentioned, while some observers of LC governance processes argue that there is an entrenchment in traditional hierarchies, others note a ‘slow’ rational and ideological evolution away from the political culture of domination – both within government structures and between the government and the citizen (Saito, 2000, p.3). As we also mentioned earlier, under the mantle of the Movement anti-sectarian discourse of an ‘all-embracing’ political framework based on individual merit (Barya, 2000, p.2931), popular associational life has tended to have been absorbed or co-opted within the local council governance system. Autonomous associational activity is therefore perhaps construed as either an intrusion upon the legitimacy of the LC as expression of ‘popular democracy’, or politically subversive (e.g. perhaps by challenging the authority and privileges of local elected elites). Particularly outside Kampala, this has brought much grassroots civil society popular activity under, not only local government coordination, but also, critics argue, effectively under the political control of both the Movement and local elites. Because of this, and despite considerable external investment in generating and

147 supporting an autonomous civil society – to promote a vibrant pluriform political system and hold the government to account (Brock et al., 2003, p.21) – political space for civil society organizations, they suggest, has become considerably more restrictive than in many other African countries (Ssewakiryanga, 2004, p.92-4: Tripp, 2001, p.126). On the other hand, Saito (2000, p.27) optimistically suggests, ‘mobilizing’ and ‘coordinating’ (rather than ‘co-opting’)1 civil society activity through elected local councils gives an opportunity to strengthen social and economic development coordination and therefore builds a ‘strong’ and responsive state2. However, it would also be wrong to characterise local government as omnipresent or the citizen as unable to create his or her own ‘non-LC’ spaces. As Dicklitch (1998a, p.150) points out, with poor funding and minimal training, government is often unable to pursue even its minimum coordination and monitoring tasks. Moreover, Tripp (1998, p.131) observes, the citizen is usually quite able to navigate between engaging the state where it seems appropriate (e.g. for registration of a self-help project), and ‘disengaging’ into newly created ‘autonomous’ development spaces so as not to allow local village politics to usurp gains for predominantly ‘male’ political advancement.

9.4.2

The CSO and the state

Brock, et al. (2003, p.22) note that, while the importance of CSOs in developing ‘propoor’ programming is acknowledged by the Ugandan government, partnership is almost exclusively understood in terms of ‘service delivery’ rather than ‘policy influencing’ – a point emphasised in previous chapters. Although this might partly be explained by the CSO’s tactical retreat from what might be construed as ‘politically’ volatile space (Tripp, 1998, p.131; Dicklitch, 1998a, p.3), as mentioned above, Brock et al.’s (2003) study of Ugandan CSO attitudes also suggests that their focus on improving quality action is seen by many CSOs as easier than becoming involved in ‘political abstraction’. Furthermore, ‘good practice’ service delivery is itself seen as an important influence on local government behaviour. However, importantly, service delivery sub-contracted from government is seen by many CSOs as a crucial and competitive source of income for sustaining their activities (see Chapter 4), and inevitably securing stable employment (Brock, 2004b, p.97). Although weakening a coherent – and as IFI discourses would

1

Perhaps understood as two perceptions of the same process. As an illustration of what was discussed in Chapter 6, Saito observes that the Ugandan citizen’s withdrawal into subsistence farming during the political turmoil of the past had given rural associational life strength, further diminishing the relevance of the state for the citizen. 2

148 suggest, ‘critical’ – civil society ‘voice’, few CSOs seem willing to endanger the potential for gaining government mediated resources (and political ‘goodwill’) by overstepping the assumed rules of patronage (also see Chapter 6). Dicklitch (1998a, p.149-55) also points out further ‘political’ restrictions on CSO activity enshrined in the 1989 NGO Registration Statute. She notes with suspicion that in its provisions it established an NGO Registration Board under the Ministry of Internal Affairs rather than the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development – implying, she suggests, a greater concern for ‘security’ than ‘development’. The ministry is charged with the registration, renewal and approval of programmes, as well as monitoring and guiding their activities. Section 14(4), obliges NGOs to carry out operations in consultation with the District development committees. However, Dicklitch also concedes that their powers are characterized more as de jure than actually carried out in practice. “The government simply does not have the resources adequately to monitor and control NGOs. Regulation and control tend to be haphazard and not very effective, resulting from a lack of resources and incompetence rather than a lack of desire to control the activities of NGOs.” (Dicklitch, 1998a, p.150) Perhaps what Dicklitch fails to adequately note is that the 1989 NGO Registration Statute was also established at a time of recovery from considerable national political and economic chaos1. Nevertheless, her observations do reaffirm the previously implied contention that the state sees CSOs as potential advocates of ‘outside’ agendas, and whose representational legitimacy is at times questionable. Such statutory provision also allows targeted threats, particularly to political and human rights organizations, to establish boundaries over which criticism of the state should not step. Using politically charged language, Nkwenge observes, the government is able to ‘encourage’ (perhaps a euphemism for ‘bully’) political rights pressure groups to adopt an “… educative role in human rights, rather than being … pressure group[s] …” and also not to “… misuse their forum for political gains” (Nkwenge, 1992, p.3). However, perhaps it is also misleading to overemphasise the CSO and LC relationship as always one of domination and intimidation with the local council portrayed as villain in depriving the CSOs of spaces they presume to be rightly theirs. Critique of the apparent restricted space within the Movement system seems often based on the assumed principle that advocacy should necessarily be ‘autonomous’ and from the ‘outside’. Indeed, in 1

Indeed, as I had lived in Uganda between 1986 and 1990, I remember it well.

149 criticising the negative impact of an apparent CSO culture of dependency on state and international donor patronage, Dicklitch describes most Ugandan CSOs as, “ … inward-focused, small, relatively young, dependent on foreign donors for their survival, apolitical, and weak on NGO co-ordination.” (Dicklitch, 1998a, p.153) Because of this, she argues, they do not offer a strong, autonomous power source that will help keep the regime accountable, or provide firm grounding for the development of a democratic civil society. However, such grandiose a project for the CSO in Uganda (particularly outside Kampala) does perhaps smack of social and political transformation predicated to two principal contested ‘outsider’ assumptions that we have mentioned before. Firstly, such arguments assume the existence of flourishing and innate democratic values that can somehow be disconnected from Uganda’s sectarian political, social and ethnic experience since independence. Such arguments can seem almost to take on a Western proselytising tone centred on the autonomous ‘individual’ who is both distinct from the political arena – and perhaps also unconstrained by social and cultural spheres – and somehow separated from centuries of ideological formation. Whilst acknowledging criticism that the Movement elite has become more interested in self-perpetuation than bound by the ideology of ‘democratization’, one can at least partly sympathise with the Movement’s sensitivity to any CSO’s aggressive and ‘blinkered’ promotion of outside agendas. Secondly, and very much related to the first, is the assumption that civil society in Africa can be a distinct sector. Indeed, for the CSO, both Dicklitch and Tripp seem to insufficiently acknowledge what Edwards & Hulme (1995, p.221) refer to as the ‘myth’ of autonomy.

9.4.3

Inter-sectoral ‘blur’: actors and identities

Indeed, as has been amply noted in chapters 2 and 5, many Africanist scholars question the appropriateness of basing national ‘pro-poor’ socio-economic policy frameworks, such as Uganda’s PEAP, on the assumption that they are addressing two distinct sectors (e.g. Clayton, 2000; Azarya, 1994, p.96) – state and civil society – “… where the boundary between the two is sometimes blurred and sometimes non-existent” (Brock, 2004, p.45 & 2004b, p.95). Brock points out that in Uganda development actors at district level often wear different sectoral hats at different times, “… with many actors in local processes of planning and politics having more than one identity, being simultaneously active in government, in civil

150 society, as well as in their geographic and social constituencies.” (Brock, 2004b, p.97) Indeed, rather than seeing Ugandan ‘inter-sectoral’ dynamics bound by norms, rules and practices of formalised and discrete spaces, Brock suggests that we should locate them within “…the broader social dynamics of the ‘everyday’ spaces which exist alongside, overlap with, and ‘push in on’ policy spaces.” (Brock, 2004c, p.137) Allen (2002) notes a broader process in Uganda of what he calls ‘enmeshment’ of state and civil society, which arises from the tentacular structure of the Movement model of local councils. Indeed, as Dicklitch (1998a, p.150) points out, national policy intends there to be a complementary relationship between the CSO and local council, deepening the citizen’s relationship to the state – which, however, inevitably also makes greater demands on the CSO’s ‘enmeshment’ rather than its autonomy. With a very ‘every day’ pragmatism, rather than focusing on ideological incompatibility, the LC will often look at the CSO to resource and implement local ‘pro-poor’ policy, and the CSO often rely on the LC as a source of local mobilization (e.g. for workshops). On the other hand, and perhaps equally as pragmatic, where local elites manipulate the local council processes to their own advantage, inevitably the impetus for CSOs to ‘enmesh’ themselves within the government system, which is seen not to act in the citizen’s interests, will also diminish considerably (Tripp, 1998, p.131; Brock, 2004b, p.97). It is perhaps the idea of political ‘goodwill’ and the Movement’s insistence on ‘selfcorrection’ that Dicklitch mistrusts. Cooptation of civil society association, in the guise of ‘participation’ and ‘mobilization’, she complains, serves the purpose of political and social control. Furthermore, she adds, service provision emphasis has pushed the CSO to become more ‘reactive’ to immediate material needs of poor communities – filling in gaps where state-initiated service provision has lapsed or did not exist – than ‘proactive’ in reshaping the socio-political structural environment that impedes ‘pro-poor’ development (Dicklitch, 1998a, p.149). However, even if ‘bureaucratised’ under a different name, perhaps these are the tensions in the exercise of governance power that are in no way peculiar to the Ugandan state. Moreover, as pointed out in Chapter 6 and earlier in this chapter, Dicklitch’s restricted analysis of Ugandan civil society and state partnerships as ‘resourcedriven strategy’, inevitably overlooks or ignores the broader social and political dynamics that underpin negotiations for such ‘service provision’ partnerships (Brock, 2004c, p.137).

151

9.5

Street children, coalitions and government’s policy development and divergent action in Uganda

Many of the previous discussions about central government’s tendency to a ‘command and control’ approach to governance are reflected in government street children policy making and resource management in both Kampala and Jinja. We now locate within two timelines the emergence of such national and international policy frameworks, government’s apparent divergence from such frameworks within programming for street children, and the emergence of the two coalitions, their participation in policy making processes and their responses to government’s divergence from such policy frameworks. Adopted by both the Government of Uganda in its Practice Guidelines (MGLSD, 1999) and subsequent research (e.g. FOCA, 1999; Malcomson, 2002), the terms ‘full-time’ and ‘part-time’ street children may be understood as substituting the two UNICEF categories of children ‘of’ and ‘on’ the street. I use these terms throughout this thesis to add specificity without the confusion UNICEF’s use of such prepositions often causes. Between Uganda’s first national survey of street children in 1992 (Munene, 1993) and research in Kampala in 1999 by FOCA (FOCA, 1999) and in 2002 in Jinja by CAC (Malcomson, 2002) we are able to get a good impression of the degree to which streetism, in terms of both ‘full-time’ and ‘part-time’ street children, has increased in the two urban centres (see Table 9.5, below).

Town Jinja Kampala

Date of Survey 1992 2002 1992 1999

Category of street children in Kampala & Jinja* Total Full-time Street Total Part-time Street Children Count Children Estimate 24 176 49 359 138 1,012 300 2,200

% Increase 104% 117%

*Figures are adjusted to estimates of full-time street children being approximately 12% of the total (UN, 1996)

Table 9.5: Total ‘full-time’ and ‘part-time’ street children in Jinja & Kampala by year

Although coalition and government policy-making documents and interview responses in Kampala and Jinja mainly focus their interests on problematizing ‘full-time’ street children, the total number, as shown in Table 9.5, is estimated at only approximately twelve percent of the total figure for street children. With figures of forty-nine for Jinja and three hundred for Kampala, therefore, Butler & Rizzini’s (2003) observation that

152 ‘full-time’ street children are given attention quite out of proportion to their numbers would apparently ring true for the coalitions and government in both urban centres on which this thesis is focused. The two timelines, presented here (see Figures 9.5a & 9.5b), locate the adoption of national and international legislative and non-legislative frameworks for street children, government policy, government actions on street children, and coalition evolution in both Kampala and Jinja. The relationship between the evolution and adoption of such legislative and non-legislative frameworks and how and why government implements specific street children actions outside such frameworks is central to how coalitions and government apply meanings to their often uneasy relationship. Such actions are observed to run counter to what NGOs have interpreted as ‘agreed’ sets of policy norms between government and themselves. The government, on the other side, portray such divergent actions as authentic ‘bounded’ local or national social, economic, cultural and political responses.

KAMPALA TIMELINE KEY UNCRC = United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ACRWC = African Convention on the Rights and Welfare of the Child KCC = Kampala City Council Kampringisa = Kampringisa National Rehabilitation Centre MGLSD = Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development Figure 9.5a: Kampala timeline – legislative & policy frameworks and government & Forum action

I will go into greater detail about the contents of Figures 9.5a and 9.5b in the chapters that follow. However, broadly, discussions for Kampala centre around how central government’s Kampringisa initiative appears to run counter to norms for child welfare set

153 out in the ratified United Nations Convention on the Child (UNCRC), the African Convention on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), and the Ministry of Gender’s (MGLSD) own 1999 ‘Practice Guidelines for Working with Street Children’. The MGLSD guidelines were intended to act as a framework for a government policy document to be produced in 2001/2002 – a document still not presented for approval. The centralization of power, resources and planning on central rather than local government also appears to run counter to the provisions of the 1997 Local Government Act – a product of Uganda’s 1995 ‘new’ Constitution – that gives such functions to district and divisional levels of local government. Kampala City Council’s (KCC) ‘master plan’ was an attempt to both develop a district plan and secure the resources that eventually were given to central government’s Kampringisa initiative. There is no mention of KCC’s ‘master plan’ after Kampringisa had been approved by central government. Most Forum NGO members appear to have preferred a working relationship with MGLSD technical officers rather than what is characterised as an ‘authoritarian’ KCC. Much of the discussion around ideas of partnership with government refers to how the members understand the Forum’s positioning and responses to Kampringisa. It also focuses upon how respondents understand the structures and relationships between the citizen and diverse central and local institutions of state.

JINJA TIMELINE KEY JMC = Jinja Municipal Council CAC = The author’s NGO that initiated and supported Jinja Network for 3 years JN = Jinja Network CBO = Community Based Organization Transit Centre = A night shelter for street children built as a collaborative initiative between NGOs and Jinja Municipal Council Figure 9.5b: Jinja timeline – local government and Jinja Network action

154 Responding intitially to the threat of closure of its principal street children NGO (see Figure 9.5b, above), discussions for Jinja focus upon how Jinja Network has evolved from an initiative supported and resourced by a support NGO, CAC, to develop less sectorally defined relationships to local government – culminating in adoption of a joint paper on strategic collaboration. However, like Kampala, from local government’s divergence from this perceived agreement on collaboration through its apparently ‘populist’ 2003 street children round-up, emerge discussions about problems inherent in binding ideological ‘difference’. Diverse interpretations of Jinja Network’s unpredictable relationship with local government, often located within the ruling party’s (i.e. the ‘Movement’) discourse and practice of governance, emerge in the following chapters. The two timelines for Jinja and Kampala (show above) should be used for reference in the following chapters that present considerable detail about the Forum, Jinja Network, and the history of the government’s legislative and governance approaches to street children. I shall not therefore further pre-empt such discussions here.

9.6

Concluding Remarks

In Chapter 9 I have explained how – through historical, cultural, economic and ethnic influences – many of the discourses on civil society, the state, and the new international development paradigm have been ‘indigenised’ within Uganda’s distinctive Movement (i.e. the ruling party) system of national and local governance under President Yoweri Museveni. Chapter 9 has acted as a bridging narrative between the literature review and the findings and analyses of specific experiences of coalition formation and evolution in Kampala and Jinja in Chapters 10, 11 and 12, without which the findings and their analyses in Chapter 10 to 13 would be difficult to understand. Processes of state reconfiguration in Uganda over the past twenty years have been bound within the much broader global and continental framework of analysis, which I presented in Part One of this thesis. The rationale behind the National Resistance Movement’s ‘indigenised’ model of economic liberalisation and democratization within a ‘no-party’ system, however, was the imperative to pull Ugandans away from the ethno-political and religious sectarianism that continues to ravage the Great Lakes Region. Both this rationale and the manipulation of structures and procedures of Local Councils by local elites have meant that CSOs are caught in an often-conflicting space in which they are meant to be enmeshed within local government, and yet local government sees them as a potential

155 threat. Brock points out, therefore, that attempts to reform policy spaces by occupying positions of dissent in contemporary Uganda will “… need to involve coalitions of more and less powerful actors in critical reflection about the way that they work.” (Brock, 2004c, p.153) Such processes are likely to be slow as new relationships between powerful individuals and new, but traditionally excluded, councillors (such as women and youth) and civil society groups negotiate new roles and intersecting interests. How the two coalitions for street children have understood and therefore worked within ascribed and improvised new roles, as a longitudinal process, is explored in the next three chapters. In the following three chapters – Chapter 10, Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 – the reader will recognise many of the analyses presented in Chapter 9 as they re-emerge in specific coalition and government partnership-building narratives from Jinja and Kampala. However, each narrative also enriches and gives context to these analyses by interweaving them with the complex politics of street children policy-making (see Figures 9.5a & 9.5b). These narratives explore first the evolution of both coalitions as reactions to their problematic relationships with local government, but then also how each coalition engages with local government to influence policy-making spaces and processes.

156

Chapter 10: Experiences of coalition building – Kampala’s InterNGO Forum (INF) In Chapter 5, I borrowed the framework of Mattessich et al.’s (2001) six broad categories of influence on the coalition-building experience to examine what factors scholars have suggested contribute towards the success or failure of coalitions. To remind ourselves, these categories are: The environment in which the coalition emerges and continues to function, Characteristics of the member organizations, What members understand as the purpose of the coalition, Processes and structures of the coalition, Norms of communication, and Resources that promote member organizations’ growth and sustain the coalition’s structures and activities. I also looked at where, within coalition structures and processes, the exercise of power – through, for example, the interplay of difference, expertise, and degrees of formality – is seen to open or close spaces, playing to the advantage or disadvantage of specific actors and their agendas. In examining the two coalition-building experiences I therefore present evidence on how some of these dynamics emerge and play themselves out. Acknowledging very distinctive urban contexts and coalition building responses, I look first at the Inter-NGO Forum’s experiences in Kampala in this chapter, and second at Jinja Network’s in chapter 11. In terms of initially locating the two coalitions within Uganda’s unique ‘political’ environment, Chapter 9 examined the Movement’s system of local councils as a dominant social, cultural, and political environment, proposing various explanations about how the state intends the citizen to interact with it. However, clearly a degree of intersection will emerge where, for instance, the diverse ‘characteristics of the member organizations’ for each coalition themselves influence the social, cultural, and political environment and, indeed, themselves become environmental. These next two chapters (i.e. Chapters 10 and 11), therefore, present contributing factors to Jinja and Kampala’s coalition-building experience (see Mattessich et al. categories above) as they emerge from their specific urban contexts and define the spaces, the actors’ interactions, and the type of knowledge that becomes privileged. These chapters then act to inform Chapter 13, which looks at

157 evidence of both government and coalition expressions of partnership, and how these appear to influence policy-making processes for street and working children in Jinja and Kampala.

10.1

Notes on presentation and initial analysis of findings

Before moving on with an exploration of the diverse ‘statements’ that principally constitute the data of this thesis, it is first necessary to restate the theoretical framework that locates different levels and intentions of statements and how I have chosen to use and interpret them (see Chapter 8). In analysis of these two coalitions distinctive statements made by individual interview respondents, or presented through coalition documents, appear to understand and give meaning to their coalition’s social and structural dynamics in quite different ways. Manifest statements, what Rowbottom (1977, p.42-45) calls “official enacting statements”, take on ‘authoritative’ status by virtue of having claim to general and formal sanction (e.g. those contained within Jinja Network Constitution). Assumed statements, on the other hand, will be a ‘personal’ and present often quite different views expressed by an individual actor about his or her own interpretation of the social and structural nature of each coalition. Such views, Rowbottom suggests, are adopted as the premise for individual action and interaction within each coalition, or, indeed, withdrawal from it. However, there is a frequent point at which assumed statements become metamorphosed into proposals of how things ‘ought to be’ if they were arranged differently and better. These are referred to in social analysis as requisite statements (Rowbottom, 1977, p.43). Manifest statements will tend to be derived from the two coalitions’ documents. Assumed statements, on the other hand, as personal interpretations of coalition building and networking experience, mostly derived from my copious interview transcriptions. However, there will inevitably be a degree of cross-over. For instance, the minute from a monthly meeting can be the recorded position of one contributor, a collective resolution of all participants or, indeed, a position of a dominant individual that masquerades as a collective position. However, the way one document is given ‘authority’ or simply acts as a commentary, which may or may not be contested, is based on its context within formal or informal coalition structures. For example, whereas the minutes for monthly meetings within the informal structure and processes of Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum tend to act primarily as record-keeping, minutes in Jinja Network have also become ‘authoritative’ statements, referencing themselves to formal and binding ‘constitutional’ decision-making

158 processes, as defined by its constitution. Quite apart from any degree of validity I might give one statement over another, it should also become very clear, as you read on, that there is no consensus on the definitive nature of either coalition amongst their diverse members. Temporal and reflective changes to their values and actions, in any case, continually alter and redefine the social and structural reality of each coalition. However, my interpretation of an over-arching set of narratives must also acknowledge that each coalition will have some degree of definite reality that is independent of the view of any individual respondent. In these findings chapters I use ‘statement’ boxes in which I place sets of related statements from both interviews and documents to support the principal narratives of each chapter. For the sake of anonymity, the interviewees’ names have been coded as numbers and are suffixed with the letter ‘k’ or ‘j’, referring to Kampala or Jinja. However, clearly ‘stand alone’ interview statements can not adequately reflect the multiple emotional contexts and textures that are carried through the interview as a whole, nor, indeed, the relationship of the respondent to the centre or periphery of the coalition building and networking process. Also spending too much time in deep analysis of such contexts will, inevitably, obscure the statements relationship to more overarching and multifaceted narratives. I choose, therefore, to use such statements as merely some among many, but whose coherency as ‘stand alone’ statements act as ‘illustrations’ to support what I interpret as the dominant binding narratives with which Kampala and Jinja coalition respondents present me. The following two chapters, therefore, both draw out and try to interpret the diverse narratives, clustering them into their own dominant coalition building themes, which I believe express the multifaceted manifest, assumed, and requisite nature of coalition discourse in Jinja and Kamapla. I also use frequent references to coalition relationships with government, despite the fact that these narratives are not presented in any depth until Chapter 12. This is done so that coalition social and structural dynamics presented in these two chapters are given context within the more over-arching sets of narratives, and, as a consequence, become both more accessible and generalizable to the reader. Clearly, Kampala and Jinja coalitions also present us with two very different experiences and contexts for coalition building and networking. Within these two chapters, therefore, rather than binding narratives to a restrictive theoretical framework (such as Mattessich et al.’s), I have allowed each coalition’s very own distinctive narratives to take the lead. Such

159 narratives will determine which approach is appropriate to the task of analysis in later chapters. What do naturally emerge in this approach, however, are narratives that the reader should begin to recognise as common experience of coalition building that is responded to in very different ways each coalition.

10.2

Coalition building and membership in the Inter-NGO Forum

10.2.1

The Forum’s origin emerging from its interaction with government

In December 1997 eight NGOs coalesced into the Inter-NGO Forum (referred to popularly as the ‘Forum’). It was a collective response to what they characterized as ‘frustrations’ with Kampala City Council (KCC) and ‘vulnerability’ that members had felt as individual NGOs. Previous KCC initiated and headed consultations were experienced as bureaucratic displays of ‘authority’, delay and postponement (see statements in Box 1). Box 1: Statements relating to NGO experience of KCC encounters a)

“… part of that [i.e. the decision to create a coalition] was a sort of (.) frustration with: with er [KCC] organization, (.) er, being called to meetings that: where people were not at/, (.) and having to wait for hours on end for meetings to happen. (.) And also a sense: I think probably an historic sort of (.) suspicion or fear of authority. (.) And being called to a meeting at the City Council headquarters (.) carried with it a certain amount of (.) concern and: and:and feeling of being (.) \monitored and: in a fairly authoritative way.” (INF Interview 14k/F1)

b)

“… other than getting blastings (short laugh) from KCC, and the Probation Officers and whatever, we: (.) on being misunderstood, we do not really have a good working relationship with them yet.” (INF Interview 19k/F1)

c)

“Because in many times, NGOs view government as one who is er (.) one with the stick\, (laughs) one who is coming to kill them. Eh/? As a policeman\.” (INF Interview 17k/F1)

Meetings and ‘task forces’ were also seen to be dependent on outside donor resources and diverse and contradictory political pressures. When funding dried up or political pressure diminished, as in the case of the KCC’s ‘master plan’ for street children in 2001 (INF

160 Minute 04/01-4), so too did both the KCC-initiated meetings and the activities they had intended to generate. Perhaps suggesting the intention of ‘keeping NGOs on the back foot’, encounters with KCC were also characterized by respondents as more confrontational than constructive, where NGOs would be collectively ‘blasted’, threatened with ‘discipline’, or ‘monitored’. In these ‘invited’ spaces, therefore, KCC bureaucracy was often experienced as ‘authoritarian’ and therefore engendered NGO feelings of suspicion, fear and frustration. Box 2: Statements relating to government criticism of NGOs a)

“[Traditional mistrust of government]… stems from this feeling of (1.0) being er (.) categorized as er (.) briefcase organizations or as organizations who, for some bizarre reason, want children to be on the street" (INF Interview 14k/F1)

b)

“Forum meetings and (.) airing their views and other thinking that (.) well, we are refusing the children to get off the streets, because eventually when they get off the streets then we will be out of jobs/. So, there was a lot of misunderstanding” (INF Interview 19k/F1)

c)

“Well, of course the er er when you look at their [NGO] vision, they want:they want to help the children. The approach: the approach is different [to] ours.” (KCC Interview Gk/2.b.5)

d)

“For them they [the NGOs] were purely (.) on, you know, talking to the children in the street, convincing them to leave the street. You know, that’s: that humble handling of the children, (1.0) forgetting that (.) they: there’re children on the street who are just there because they are beyond parental control.” (KCC Interview Gk/2a.2.3)

Many respondents perceived government as portraying NGOs in a negative light – as selfserving and ‘briefcase’1 organizations, wanting to keep street children on the street as a kind of job insurance (see Box 2, statements a and b). Considerable traditional differences in proposed methods and ideologies for street child rehabilitation have also tended to contribute towards considerable tension between government and the NGOs. Whilst the government appears to look for quick and total removal from the street, NGOs focus on 1

This is an expression used commonly in Uganda to describe bogus organizations that draw funds from donors to support non-existent programmes. Perhaps a more updated twist to this expression would be ‘laptop’ organizations.

161 what they describe as much slower ‘child-centred’ processes (see Box 2, statements c and d). Clearly these two distinctive positions have a heavy bearing on the way the government and coalition interact. How these ideological discourses emerge and play themselves out, however, will be presented in much greater detail and with greater clarity when considering coalition partnership-building experiences in Chapter 12 rather than here. Government commitment to collaborations in Kampala is seen as generally too easily swayed by the vagaries of ‘popular’ political focus and donor funding. Collaborations were also framed by KCC’s ‘authoritarian’ bureaucratic tendencies that too readily made judgements based on generalized criticism of NGOs’ methods, ideology and probity. As a result, the Forum has largely, and perhaps understandably, withdrawn from all but what it considered ‘necessary’ engagement with KCC. (for instance, in fulfilling the conditions set for official NGO registration at the individual level, or responding to official KCC requests as the Forum1), instead favouring engagement within what it saw as less bureaucratic spaces that opened up with central government.

10.2.2

Membership and informal structures and procedures

Because of members’ experiences of government bureaucracy, the Forum was said to have deliberately adopted an ‘informal’ approach to coalition building. I shall draw attention to various emergent understandings of ‘informality’ and ‘formality’ later in this chapter. Box 3: Statement about the intention of Forum ‘informality’ a)

“And we really got talking (.) and:and said ‘well let’s just meet at one of our: one of our places’. And Tigers Club offered to host those, erm, early meetings that we had. (.) And we set out ground rules, erm (.) which /kind of suited everybody’s erm, felt needs at the time that we wouldn’t: we wouldn’t be formal, we wouldn’t (short ironic laugh) sort of /waste time by setting up a kind of formal way of talking, always having to address each other through the chair and (.) that kind of thing. We just wanted it to be erm, relaxed but very: but focused meeting that dealt with very practical issues.” (INF Interview 14k/A2)

1

For instance, KCC occasionally asks the Forum to investigate dubious NGOs and their practices or give statistics about street populations and street children rehabilitated by NGOs.

162 However, in the context of the political environment from which the Forum emerged, the Forum coordinator’s statement in Box 3 (see statement a), below, does at least give us some insight into how he constructs meanings and conditions for ‘informality’.

Box 4: Statement about membership criteria a)

“… there is a time actually we: we asked them [i.e. the Forum leadership/coordination] that er (.) ‘what’s the criteria (1.0) of er membership?’ Because we were not told such things/. (.) Some of us just came, we (1.0) knocked at the door, we just entered and (.) became members and (.) just come in. But then, you know, you find some people are (.) maybe looking after orphans, then they tell you, ‘shall we also be accepted in the Forum?’ (.) So, do we only go on the street, or we embrace all vulnerable children?” (INF Interview 13k/3.3.5)

Meetings would be on ‘home turf’ and the interaction ‘relaxed’ and practical, avoiding guarded discussion flowing through the deferential authority figure of the chairperson. These he contrasts to experiences of KCC’s bureaucratic approaches to meetings, portrayed as remote and intimidating. This avoidance of ‘formal ways’ (see Box 3a) becomes a strong characteristic of not only of Forum structures and procedures, but also of the dynamics associated with becoming a member1. Even from its earliest meetings in 1997/8 Forum membership has been primarily determined by organizations ‘turning up’ at the coalition’s monthly meetings rather than any explicit membership criteria – that is, apart from an implied broad orientation towards working with street children (see Box 4). An infrequently updated list of organizations attending meetings is drawn from the minutes, (which includes their telephone number, address and contact person), and is then presented as the INF ‘membership’2. This apparent absence of explicit restrictive or strategic membership criteria has meant that, whereas a considerable quantity of organizations have become members (i.e. have been added to the list), others have been dropped from this ‘membership’ list because of a long period of non-attendance at the monthly meetings. This modification of the list appears more as a ‘common-sense’ decision not to habitually repeat names of organizations that have long since dropped-off, 1

However, as we shall see later, the ‘style’ of the meetings do take on a formal character – with a chairperson, predefined agenda, etc. – perhaps as a response to the growth in membership. 2 A list was initially presented to me of 25 organizations, five of which were not included in the research because they had ‘turned’ up at the Forum monthly-meetings only once.

163 rather than any decision to exclude. In this informal arrangement, an organization may well be registered as a member as the result of a single attendance at a monthly meeting where, for instance, it merely attends to find out about the Forum. Eighteen organizations attended meetings in the first year (1997/98), rising to thirty-two in 2002 and thirty in 2003. Table 10.2, below, shows that a total of sixty-one (n=61) organizations have attended meetings since the Forum’s inception in 1997, with 41% appearing only once or twice and 59% attending three or more times.

Organizations who: Attended Meetings (members?) since 1997 Attended only 1 or 2 times Attending 3 times or more Selected as interviewee for this research*

No. 61 25 36 25

*Attending at least 3 times, and at least once between Jan 2002 and Jun 2004 Table 10.2: Membership/attendance of Inter-NGO Forum – December 1997 till June 2004

Of twenty-five organizations that I selected for this study, twenty-two (n=22) attended meetings between January 2003 at June 2004 (i.e. three did not), and thirteen organizations (i.e. 52%) attended at least half of these meetings. We can therefore perhaps suggest that these thirteen organizations that regularly attend the Forum’s monthly meetings make up its cohesive core-group. The diverse reasons for other organizations dropping-off are explored later.

10.2.3

Diversity of the Forum member organizations

Although the nature of issues appearing in the minutes of the monthly meetings implies a heavy bias towards ‘full-time’ street children issues (see Box 5), there is nevertheless considerable diversity in the twenty-five member organizations selected for this research (see Table 10.1.1). Respondents to the semi-structured questionnaire invariably referred to their own or other organizations as ‘well-resourced, bigger, older and more experienced’ organizations, on one side, and ‘lesser-resourced, smaller, newer and less experienced’1 organizations, on the other side. It follows therefore that there is a considerable diversity in terms of organizations’ institutional characteristics, their activities and therefore their priorities.

1 Although there is clearly ‘difference’ in terms of the member organizations’ quality of service provision to street children, it is not implied in the dichotomous distinctions made here.

164 Having conducted seventeen of my nineteen interviews at the member organizations’ sites, and having been given a tour of many of these, it was interesting to observe that, while most organizations claim to be working with street children, only three are clearly primarily focused on the ‘full-time’ street child1. Other member organizations cater for diverse categories of ‘vulnerable’ children, as day centres or residential care centres. Other organizations again are ‘community development’ youth- and child-focused organizations, operating primarily within a specific community and in a particular location in Kampala (with three respondents’ organizations, which I was also able to visit, located 20km or more from the city). While the biggest two member organizations have assets running into hundreds of thousands of dollars2, the two directors of the smallest ‘one-man’ organizations appear barely capable of providing resources even for their own table. Interestingly, the ‘full-time’ street child targeted specifically by only three organizations interviewed, takes up the lion’s share of minuted discussions in the Forum’s monthly-meetings. Understandings of why there is this bias are looked at later.

10.2.4

The ‘purpose’ of the Inter-NGO Forum

From the analysis of documents and interview transcripts, there are apparent differences in what different member organizations emphasise as the functions of the Forum. There are also strong differences in opinion about which functions ‘should’ take precedence. For example, while many organizations agree that the Forum should pursue funding opportunities, there is considerable divergence in opinion about who and what should benefit and what priority it should be given. A 2001 Lweza Workshop report, and a funding proposal based on the report, appears the only ‘exclusive’ Forum authoritative statements that set out clear purposes and strategies. The significance of these two documents is not that they particularly clarify the Forum’s purposes and strategies, but that they were shelved almost as soon as they were produced. Although these two documents were referred to by three respondents who attended the workshop, they appear to be unknown and unread by all other respondents. There are also other sporadic and short ‘purpose’ statements recorded at monthly meetings. However, these always appear incongruous in the context of the many other agenda points with which they compete.

1

A government definition adopted by NGOs as a generic descriptor, the full-time street children are “… those without contacts with their family who spend day and night on streets and verandas and actually view the street as their ‘home’” (MGLSD, 1999:2). 2 The INF coordinating organization, Tigers Club, for instance, had assets of over £200,000 in 2002 (Project website).

165 Interview respondents, therefore, lack clarity about which set of Forum functions is supposed to bind its member organizations together. It is evident, moreover, that informal Forum governance and procedures has tended not to produce authoritative strategic and definitional reference points. Perhaps for this reason there was an obvious anxiety in many respondents about this lack of clarity (e.g. see statements a and b in Box 5). Box 5: Statements on confusion about Forum purposes a)

“I used to go and attend that Inter-NGO Forum. But if I was just come here, even me I would just have been like that, ‘why are we here?’” (INF Interview 3k/D4)

b)

“They [i.e. membership rights and responsibilities] may be in place but we need to know\.” (INF Interview 13k/E8)

Without clear or known authoritative reference statements, therefore, newer Forum member organizations and new staff in older member organizations tend to receive statements about the diverse ‘purposes’ of the Forum in the form of oral tradition. In the monthly meetings I observed that the shifting emphasis of such oral presentation depends on who the informant is. Indeed, without clearer and authoritative reference points, the complexity and subtleties of statements about strategies and definitions tend also to compete with and be swallowed up in other narratives (e.g. about government activities and attitudes and NGO reaction to these). As we shall see, what then emerge are often: Disconnected statements of purpose that have to be drawn from diverse documents, and which seem to be unclear about their ‘authoritative’ (or manifest) status, A fragmented knowledge of Forum ‘purpose statements’ for newer organizations and new staff of older organizations, who find problems identifying ‘official enacting’ statements (see Box 6) through which to be clear about what is being proposed and pursued, and A sense that even statements of purpose within documents tend to be constructed with different emphases for different interest group clusters, rather than being unanimously agreed focal pursuits (even if meetings are broadly acknowledged to bear the rituals of consensus-building). Within the interviews, therefore, statements of purpose tend to reflect confusion about what the Forum purpose ‘is’ and what they propose it ‘should be’. Responses also tend

166 naturally to cluster around ‘purposes’ that the respondent considers being relevant to their own organization’s needs.

Forum ‘purposes’ emerging from interviews and ‘informal’ documents Between December 1997 and June 2004 – the month this field research was completed – a variety of either explicit or implicit Forum purpose statements emerge. I draw these from three types of documents: my interview transcriptions, minutes of monthly meetings, and the Lweza workshop report and a project proposal. These purposes and their meanings are as follows:

Solidarity and relationship building Three clusters of ideas emerge for solidarity and relationship building. The first set of ideas has a strong ‘social capital’ characteristic. It is centred on building ‘friendships’ that function to pool and share know-how (and to a lesser extent ‘resources’1) around common aspirations for building organizational capacity (see ‘Knowledge-building’, below). This refers either to the organization itself (e.g. to provide funds for paying staff or advice on registration) or to the organization’s relationship to the child on the street or within a project. The second set of ideas focus on feelings of vulnerability. They are centred on the notion of solidarity offering some form of protection for both street children and the organization. The most common vulnerability mentioned relates to the NGO dependency on official government approval, despite its poor historic relationship. The third set of ideas is centred on the assumption that many NGOs are stronger than one. This again seems to draw from feelings of vulnerability over the Forum’s ‘outsider’ advocacy2 approach within a political context that is not amenable to it. In this context Solidarity, therefore, seems to imply that the fear of a ‘back-lash’ implicit in independent NGO criticism of government is somehow buffeted by the assumed power of the collective NGO.

1

A few respondents link solidarity with ideas of mobilizing ‘common’ resources (see below), however, they are not too specific about which resources they are referring to (see the section Funding & Resource Mobilization) 2 The ‘outsider’ notion of collaborative advocacy emphasizes NGOs’ independent status from which to criticise government effectively. Such criticism is seen to need a ‘strong voice’ from a cohesive coalition of NGOs.

167 Advocacy and linking with the government Diverse ideas emerge for the purpose ‘advocacy’. One focuses on countering the NGOs’ poor press by promoting member organizations’ ‘good’1 work to both the government and the public. Another idea was to advocate for broader strategic accommodation between the Forum, government and society at large. However, considering the poor relationship with KCC, these ideas were fuzzy and were expressed more as ‘wishful thinking’. For many respondents advocacy was equated with presenting a strong critical voice to challenge government deficit. However, various respondents reported that opportunities to express the Forum’s critical ‘voice’ tended to be limited. Invitations into government policy spaces, they pointed out, were usually to ‘rubber stamp’ rather than ‘challenge’ government policies and programmes. Two rather different notions of ‘voice’ link themselves strongly ideas of downward accountability. Forum members, working directly with street children, saw themselves as a conduit for the street child’s voice in government and public forums2. Primarily by means of ‘anecdote’, they saw themselves educating government and the public about the causes and dynamics of ‘streetism’, and of the nature and concerns of street children themselves. Forum awareness of how street children also cleverly and divisively manipulate representations of one NGO to another leads us to the final manifestation of a Forum collective ‘voice’, one that functions to make street children aware that NGOs communicate and collaborate with each other. This has the apparent intention of encouraging street children to more positively understand collaborative approaches, and more positively portray the diverse programmes offered by Forum members to outsiders3.

Knowledge building Whether it be Forum members, the government, the public, the international arena, the academic or, indeed, street children, knowledge-building as a ‘purpose’ is portrayed as having the function of emphasizing the learning and teaching dimension

1

Despite implying that working practices were ‘good’, various respondents also acknowledged that the work of a number of NGOs outside, and one or two within the Forum, gave credible cause for government criticism. 2 Although programmes like GOAL Uganda’s Baaba Project allows street children themselves to sensitise the public on street children issues, there is no inclusion of the street child in Forum structures and procedures. The idea of being a ‘conduit’ does, therefore, raise questions power and representation. 3 This assumptive narrative takes for granted NGOs’ unanimous desire for non-competitive stance on street child populations, which other interviews suggest is not the case – perhaps raising questions about the how realistically diverse, and often hidden understandings can be represented by a ‘collective’ voice.

168 of these different speakers and their audiences. However, it should be noted that street children’s own ‘voice’ appears absent in Forum and government policy-making environments. In the Forum’s relationship to government, knowledge tends mainly to be seen as a tool of criticism. It is employed, responses often seem to imply, for putting pressure on the government to change practices in the light of NGOs’ anecdotal narratives that illustrate where government assumptions about street children and ‘streetism’ are at fault. Knowledge building tends to be less stressed as a cooperative strategic process between government and the NGO within the policymaking arena itself. Between Forum member organizations, on the other hand, knowledge-building is seen to strongly influence strategic decisions made at individual organization level. Many respondents placed great emphasis and value on drawing upon and adding to knowledge that informs both their organizational orientation (e.g. allowing organizations to tailor their service provision to needs – especially at the ‘start-up’ stage), and their social work and managerial skills in working with street children (e.g. especially in areas of behaviour management and models of rehabilitation and resettlement).

‘Good-practice’ accountability and audit Two respondents also suggest that, in informing organizations about what are appropriate practices with street children, this Forum-level knowledge-building should also bind member organizations to ‘good-practice’ accountability to both the Forum and to local government whose monitoring and guidance is frequently characterised as inadequate1 and therefore poorly informed. Though this ‘audit’ function was mentioned by two respondents, the implications of such a function on relationships between leadership whose task it presumably would be to implement the ‘audit’, and member organizations that would find themselves scrutinized, was not. Another aspect of accountability relates to the Forum response to generic criticism about the assumed negative impact NGOs have on street child dynamics (e.g. the frequent claim that NGOs encourage ‘streetism’ through ‘handouts’). On one side, the respondents adopt a largely defensive stance by emphasising their intention of providing evidence of good rehabilitation and resettlement practices (e.g. minutes of monthly meetings record a rather inadequate attempt to collate statistics on Forum member

1

Many respondents, however, also acknowledge that, rather than being wilful negligence, heavy workloads and inadequate resources inevitably hamper local government’s ability to implement effective monitoring and evaluation.

169 organization’s monthly resettlement of street children1). On the other side, there is also acknowledgement that the Forum ‘should’ analyse its members’ impact on children in Kampala’s urban environment. There is little evidence, however, to show this form of analysis is done.

Cooperation in individual street child cases Two related ‘practical’ ideas coalesce around this purpose. The first places emphasis on what was referred to as ‘case-work conferencing’, where attention is focused on different NGOs’ ‘common experience’ of the same street children. This purpose appears to respond to the acknowledgement that some children manipulate similar services offered by different organizations to their own advantage (e.g. by claiming multiple ‘resettlement packages’ at different times offered by different organizations) therefore undermining the intention of rehabilitation and resettlement methods employed by organizations2. Alternatively, a child might be assisted by referral or exchange of specialized knowledge on working methods.

Fund-raising and resource mobilization Respondents propose two functions for the purpose funding and resource mobilization: funding or securing opportunities for funding for individual member organizations, and securing resources to cover costs and joint activities of the Forum itself. On the whole, the extent to which a member organization is well resourced or poorly resourced tends to determine which of these two outcomes is more highly valued. For the small indigenous organization, which clearly struggles to survive3, there is a clear expectation that the Forum either itself secures funding for them, or helps them to secure funding for themselves. The large and well-resourced indigenous NGO, on the other hand, tends to propose resource mobilization for collective benefit. All responses seem to emphasize that resources should be sought from outside the Forum. Although the purpose fund-raising and resource mobilization is stated as just one of the many purposes, the apparent lack of attention paid it by Forum leadership is the greatest cause of controversy and discontent for interview respondents. 1

Statistics gathered on monthly resettlement of street children are only recorded for organizations attending the monthly meetings. 2 Although avoidance of such ‘duplication’ is cited as a prime concern for this purpose, one respondent suggested that multiple organizations in some contexts gave the street child a choice in selecting the ‘parts’ that they felt suited their specific needs that also change over time (e.g. see Young & Barrett, 2001). 3 I visited two organizations run by volunteer ‘directors’. One director appeared to depend on funding contributions to put food on his own table, while the other had at least some security by supporting herself through teaching in a local school.

170 Although most consistently mentioned by interview respondents as a Forum ‘purpose’, it is strangely difficult to extract statements that make any ‘authoritative’, definitive or strategic commitment to pursue funding opportunities. Despite relatively authoritative statements of purpose that emerge from the Lweza Workshop, and although there is some early evidence of initially moving these proposals forward – such as the funding proposal – by mid-2002 the strategic initiatives these documents heralded had been put on hold. Under considerable political pressure the Ministry of Gender (MGLSD)1 launched its own much-acclaimed and much-criticised initiative on 2nd May 20022. Its purpose was to remove all of what it termed ‘orphaned children’ (apparently used as a euphemism for ‘street children’) from the street, and to rehabilitate them at the National Rehabilitation Centre (known popularly as ‘Kampringisa’). Acting as a holding centre, it was envisaged that the children would be resettled home from there (Jacob et al., 2003, p.10). Although I shall look at this in greater detail in Chapter 11, it is worth pointing out here that this initiative and responses to it, had very much dominated Forum meetings and activities up till June 2004, when this field research was carried out. The ‘deferment’ of various initiatives proposed at Lweza (especially concerning more formal governance structures and processes), and the dominance of the government initiated Kampringisa programme in Forum discourse, has generated strong critical themes carried into most interview responses. Although there was some defence of the Forum’s informal governance structure, many respondents argued that, without the help of more formal procedures to both determine and evaluate priorities, purposes favoured by dominant organizations tended to be emphasized while others were neglected. Other respondents emphasized the ‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’ character of power imbalances. The perceived need to formalize governance structures and processes followed a more ‘common-sense’ acknowledgement of growth in both Forum membership and diversity. The desire was expressed to better represent clusters of interest that crystallise around very different sets of priorities. Diverse obstacles to the Forum’s cohesion seem to emerge from the gaps between what respondents desire of the coalition and what they actually get. The role of ‘informality’ in frustrating Forum clarity and limiting respondents’ ability to determine what priorities are 1 2

The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, to give it its full title. Janet Museveni, Uganda’s First Lady, had been strongly involved in pushing for government intervention.

171 set and who sets them emerges as an important one. Ideas of government ‘bureaucratic positioning’ frustrating coalition aspirations, appear to be mirrored by the Forum’s apparent preference for advocacy as ‘outsider oppositioning’. To understand how coalition ‘cohesion’ works, therefore, it is necessary to examine what acts as an obstacle to respondents’ feelings of cohesion (de Mann, 2004). We now turn to this.

10.3

Forum cohesion: informal coordination, consensus and ‘advantage’

My criteria for the selection of Forum organizations to be studied meant that I included some respondents whose participation has either ‘dropped off’ temporarily or ceased altogether. From the interviews with representatives from these organizations, and from those still attending, emerge narratives about how both external factors and internal Forum dynamics are understood to restrict individual or organizational participation. This is perceived to both limit some representatives’ potential to determine both governance and agenda priorities and, for some, contributes to their withdrawal. Box 6: Statements about external factors influencing participation a)

“In fact since then we have really been participating. (.) Except for this year, since January, its simply because of er (.) uncertainties within [our organization] itself.” (INF Interview 11k/A1)

b)

“For us we saw, (.) education to the children (1.0) is a priority to (.) networking. (.) So, when TdH says that (.) [we] will help you in er (.) formal education – primary and secondary – (1.0) for us we saw that as a priority. (.) Networking comes a little bit off now.” (INF Interview 11k)

However, rather than solely placing blame on Forum structures and processes, respondents identify a variety of other organization-level factors that they attribute to a member organization’s withdrawal or passivity. Being ‘busy’, or relying on ‘volunteers’ rather than paid staff1 within one’s own organization, are the most frequently mentioned obstacles to participation. However, these reasons are often also accompanied by other diverse statements about a member organization’s internal dynamics, its attitude to networking and/or its attitude and experience of the Forum itself. For example, whilst one respondent blames ‘uncertainties’ within his organization for reducing his attendance at

1

One respondent pointed out its own ‘voluntary’ staff have to pay for their own transport to and from Forum meetings.

172 Forum’s meetings and his participation in its activities, the same respondent also claims that ‘networking’ has diminished as one of his organization’s priorities (see statements a & b in Box 6, below). Moreover, in later statements he also expresses deep dissatisfaction that Forum has put all its attention on its response to Kampringisa and, because his organization does not contribute resources, he feels he can less legitimately contribute towards agenda setting. Rather like the ‘egg and chicken’ it is difficult to be categorical about which factor sparked which reaction. However, as this respondent’s organization gives him responsibility for ‘networking’ with the Forum, the external organizational attitudes are inevitably linked to the respondent’s own attitudes and experiences of the Forum. In another example, a ‘director’ respondent was highly critical of the fact that ‘directors’ no longer attended Forum meetings but instead send ‘representatives’ (see statement ‘a’ in Box 7). This, he argues, diminished the Forum’s potential for making important binding decisions. However, he equally admitted that his own organization was also doing just that. Box 7: Statements about external factors influencing participation a)

“…the directors used to attend in the beginning. And when time came, after realising a few things, they (.) tended to drop out. They delegated to their assistants. It went down to the social workers. And then they started sending in just representatives.” (INF Interview 18k/E4)

b)

“I have different things that I have to do, (.) that might pull me away from the Forum, but I value being there\. So, what I have done within my organization is that I have set up a department for networking. Yeah\. And I have recruited a networking officer. So that, every time I go for networking activities, I go with him.” (INF Interview 19k/C5)

There is an obvious link between the respondents’ own attitudes and experiences of the Forum and his or her organization’s decision to withdraw either partially or completely. However, equally, the degree to which an organization does or does not commit itself to ‘mainstreaming’ coalition-building and networking as an organizational priority, quite independently of its experiences of the Forum, is clearly an important determinant on Forum cohesion (Statement ‘b’ in Box 7 illustrates such a priority taken by director 19k).

173 The organization’s choice of sending a director or merely a representative to attend Forum meetings, or its choice to give education a greater priority than ‘networking’, may well be influenced by the experience of coalition-building dynamics within the Forum, but they are nonetheless strategic options taken by the member organization itself. Nevertheless, how member organizations’ positive or negative attitudes towards coalition building are formed and managed within the Forum, as we shall see, is perhaps a greater critical determinant to its cohesion.

10.3.1

Qualities, attributes, dynamics and interpretation of ‘advantage’ in the Forum

As we have already mentioned in relation to funding, different respondents prioritise very different purposes to which they apply very different sets of values. It follows that respondents also attach different interpretations and judgements to the Forum structures and processes that are understood to strategise (even if ‘informally’) and implement activities in pursuit of these purposes. When asked directly ‘who makes decisions in the Forum?’ most respondents initially portray the discussion and decision-making spaces created by these ‘informal’ structures as neutral and consensual. Critical narratives that emerge in response to many other questions, however, suggests otherwise (see Box 8, above). Factors and attitudes that determine which individual or organization is advantaged and which purpose is prioritised within these spaces, as well as what meanings different respondents give to such advantage, inevitably influences respondents’ feelings of satisfaction or frustration with the Forum. As diverse critical narratives within each single interview begin to intersect, it becomes clear that these feeling, in turn, become an influence on whether a respondent chooses to proactively or merely passively engage with such spaces or, indeed, withdraw altogether. But let us examine in more detail which Forum qualities, attributes and dynamics are portrayed as giving advantage to one individual or organization over another and what meanings respondents give to attributes and dynamics that are assumed to give advantage. Respondents identified many different personal and organizational attributes that were perceived as giving one individual or organization greater status within the Forum and therefore greater influence in determining which agendas and purposes take precedence. The most frequently mentioned are the organization’s size, its age, its experience working

174 with street children, and its commitment to the Forum. The notion of commitment, however, is given very different expression and values by different respondents. We have already mentioned the influence an organization’s strategic commitment to the principle of coalition-building and networking is likely to have on its attendance of Forum meetings and activities. In statement ‘a’ in Box 9, however, respondent 6k applies her own values and interpretation to attendance at Forum meetings and activities, suggesting that less attendance and less effort imply less commitment. Box 8: Statements about dynamics in Forum monthly meetings a)

“For me I feel, once you get there, its like you’re all similar. (.) But the hierarchy will come in too, who pushes what … It is a selection, depending on issues.” (INF Interview 8k/E4)

b)

“The atmosphere is always good. Were you to express, it is just a question of raising up your hand and then present your issues. But the problem is (.) you can’t bring in something different with what is being debated today, (.) eh/? So it’s like, if you are talking about, ee: about milk and honey today, for you, you come and say (.) aah, you think of goats. So you must talk about the milk and honey, you see?” (INF Interview 11k/E2)

c)

“I think this: I must be very clear in that (2.0) the way how we all meet (1.0) somebody might be having a burning issue that may not come out with it.” (INF Interview 11k/E1)

The consequence, she implies, is that such an organization may be seen as unreliable and therefore should be taken less seriously. On the other hand, respondents 2k and 13k (see Box 9, statements b & c) suggest that, where there is no formal ‘audit’ for decisions and decision-making processes (e.g. in the form of formal research, evaluation and planning), such absences might equally be interpreted as veiled protest. They may just express frustration with the Forum structures, processes and, indeed, the ‘seriousness’ one organization is given over another1.

1

Indeed, we already noted that absences also result from external influences.

175 Box 9: Statements about commitment and absence a)

“Commitment comes in because (.) er: (.) first of all it could be in simple cases like attendance. (.) So, meaning that if you don’t attend frequently you are left /out. That comes er automatic. […] Then if we have an activity tomorrow, then you may not be involved (.) fully\. So that means like you are put least (.) in a:in a: when a task comes out. (.) You are put least because you are probably unreliable, to go on and do this task\.” (INF Interview 6k/E4)

b)

“That’s mainly the problem. You need to be aware at least/ (.) at a certain level. Because even Andy would have done this/ [referring to the research interview approach] (.) you know\ (.) meeting organization (2.0) on individual basis and (2.0) share. Interview each individual one/, (.) you know.” (INF Interview 2k/B5)

c)

“[…] there’s a certain friend I had there [in the Forum] – I’ll not mention the name – but she was saying, (.) for us we:we’re small projects, it’s like we: we’re not taken seriously with something/.” (INF Interview 13k/E3)

The diverse reasons for not attending meetings and other Forum activities, these narratives suggest, should therefore merit investigation rather than be ignored. Lack of such investigation, these narratives imply, also signifies the ‘lack’ of seriousness given to the concerns of organizations that absent themselves. Even if respondent 2k’s proposed solution to such shortcomings is unrealistic1, these two interpretations of why an organization absents itself and what interpretations are given to this absence, do perhaps illustrate the complexity in applying any single coherent meaning to Forum dynamics.

10.3.2

Expertise, personality and charisma as advantage

Perhaps it is inevitable that leaders of organizations that have established themselves at the forefront of work with street children in Kampala over a number of years are also people with ‘strong’ and ‘charismatic’ personalities, and considerable wealth of experience and expertise. Such characteristics, some respondents point out, inevitability place people at the forefront of the Forum (Box 10, statement ‘a’ & ‘b’). Combining these characteristics with a personal commitment to voluntary leadership roles, respondent 9k argues, imparts leadership with biblical-like authority (Box 10, statement ‘c’).

1

After all, the Forum coordinator is a volunteer who also acts as executive director to Tigers, an INGO.

176 One would assume that the more a person is able to combine these attributes, the greater the authority such a person would attain within the Forum’s discussion and decisionmaking spaces. However, what emerges from various interview narratives is that this logic of ‘inevitability’ is complicated in many ways. Whereas a director has decision-making authority for a member organization, a representative often does not. Indeed, despite the strong Christian Evangelical character to Forum membership, different respondents react to respondent 9k’s implied ‘prophetic’ logic – that the bigger, older, and more experienced organizations necessarily bring greater and common ‘benefit’, and therefore should have greater authority – in very different ways (see Box 17b). Box 10: Statements about personality and leadership a)

“But [who talks in meetings] also depends on the personalities there: some of us are [short laugh] really /loud [laughs again]. And some of us feel that we really have something to say on everything\.” (INF Interview 19k/C3)

b)

“… with core people very vocal, leaders like, you know Tigers is obviously, it is, you know everyone just mentions Andy and Tigers, and it’s an established, it’s an old project, it’s been running for a long time, he’s a very (.) you know, strong character, so obviously he is going to be at the forefront.” (INF Interview 3k/D4)

c)

“But they give more as we others. (.) So they have more authority. Of course. It’s good. (.) It’s biblical [laughs]” (INF Interview 9k/E4)

In terms of who should and who does assume greater influence in the Forum, many narratives suggest individual or organizational advantage is gained in much more subtle ways. The degree of influence, these critical narratives appear to emphasize, is strongly linked to which organizations control the Forum’s ‘informal’ resources and how they are used. Because these narratives on funding and resources touch on all Forum dynamics – linking structures, procedures, and personal attributes – accountability is inevitably called into question.

10.4

Resources: narratives of advantage and mistrust

The multiple narratives that emanate from the theme funding and resource mobilization appear to take on a tentacular form, binding distinctive narratives about power, wealth, scale, informality, influence, and advantage, to what initially appear as unconnected

177 Forum structures, procedures and activities. Earlier on I mentioned that, for most small indigenous organizations, funding is not only of central importance but, indeed, for many is stated as the principal reason for joining the Forum. However, from both interviews and research feedback discussion1, the Forum leadership’s reticence not only to pursue but also to engage in discussions about funding is plain (see Box 11). Box 11: Statements about ‘smaller’ NGOs’ frustrations about funding a)

“Because, as I told you earlier, I was disappointed because there was:there were no avenues (.) on funding, on what/. Nobody would tell how they are maybe being funded. We would discuss other issues but not that bit\.” (INF Interview 13k/B5)

b)

“And the area where we’ve reached the exchange of a: of a (2.0) of erm (.) of er opportunities (1.0) it’s also been there but not so: so much as we expected\.” (INF Interview 6k/A2)

Clues to why such reticence exists emerge in a variety of statements critical of what some respondents assume to be ‘some’ smaller organization’s misguided intentions2. Statements in Box 12 (next page) illustrate the level of suspicion that three respondents from better-resourced organizations place on ‘some’ smaller lesser-resourced organizations. Statements ‘a’ and ‘b’ accuse such organizations of only joining the Forum to get resources whilst, or so it is implied, dismissing all the other purposes as far less important. Statement ‘c’ links these suspicions about smaller organizations to ‘underground’ rumblings of discontent, suggesting that many of their critical positions about governance merely cloak these organizations’3 real desire for gaining remunerated leadership positions4. However, statement ‘a’ in Box 13 (next page), also from a respondent from a large NGO, suggests that part of the bigger organizations’ equally ‘cloaked’ concerns might stem from worries about losing control of both leadership and their influence on setting the Forum agenda. Which ever narrative might ring true for

1

When I mentioned funding as a big concern during a feedback session at the Forum monthly meeting, during my original 2004 research trip, the coordinator appeared to almost bully the participants to accept his view point that the Forum should keep away from funding (Field Journal 1). 2 These criticisms come principally, though not exclusively, from respondents from larger organizations. 3 The respondents implied that this ‘problem’ was only a characteristic of ‘new’ organizations to the Forum. 4 Interestingly, one director of a smaller indigenous organization stated clearly that he was pursuing a share of the leadership ‘power’ (INF Interview 16k/E4). Most of the rest of the interview responses focused on funding and mistrust of the Forum leadership’s handling of what he characterised as ‘common’ resources.

178 ‘some’ organizations, most respondents appear equally critical of the Forum leadership’s lack of pursuit of external funding opportunities, whether as support for individual member organizations or the Forum structures and activities. Box 12: Statements about mistrust of smaller organizations’ intentions a)

“Depending on the way one perceives/. You know, you may be coming to the Forum thinking you are: probably you’re going to get a pen, or a pencil, or some money and then you go back. The main fact that you are sharing ideas, you may not value that, (.) you see? That’s the problem. (1.0) Each one’s perception. What do you gain? (1.0) What do you expect? (.) Then after a little ‘what are you going to get?’ (.) So if one expects money for whatever, that’s unfortunate.” (INF Interview 12k/E1)

b)

I’ve said, ninety percent of what we have become has come from the forum. But if somebody still has that thing – and I found him in the Forum – that ‘what are we benefiting from the Forum?’: I mean resources: money, whatever.” (INF Interview 19k/D3)

c)

“But not er [discontent] not sounding. It’s more of like underground. It’s more like er (.) you know, when you misunderstand me\. And you want to say, ‘I meant something which I didn’t (.) mean’. And that’s where: a few groups who joined later (.) had certain expectations, er, meaning (.) the expectation in terms of (.) jobs or responsibilities, like I would want to be given a responsibility [that] goes with remuneration, for example.” (INF Interview 6k/E1)

Without more structured financial arrangements in the Forum (e.g. a strategic financial plan and a financial committee), these critics argue that those who have ‘informal’ control of the forum resources are perceived to illegitimately influence Forum structures, processes, activities and agendas. These critics see such control as illegitimate even though the resources are provided by such dominant organizations. The Forum’s Kampringisa Support Team is perhaps the clearest example of these subtle (and not so subtle) dynamics at work. Acting as a holding centre, Kampringisa National

179 Rehabilitation Centre had offered woefully inadequate care provision to street children from Kampala1. Box 13: Statement about ‘bigger’ organizations’ fear of losing dominance a)

“So, some of those bigger ones [organizations] have perhaps felt threatened as well by the bringing together of lots of smaller NGOs. So, they might have felt, like they didn’t have the kind of dominant position that they hoped they would have. And I think that’s probably an area which we could have addressed much more proactively and much more constructively, but we simply just were not able to through lack of time and resources” (INF Interview 14k/D2)

The Support Team was created by the Forum to offer service support to the government, who only accepted the offer reluctantly. The Forum leadership negotiated access for a team of experienced social workers, teachers, and counsellors for three days a week on a six-month trial period. A report commissioned in June 2004 (after the initial period was completed) outlines the resources required for maintaining the Forum initiative, which includes: all transport costs for four staff, and all equipment for providing psycho-social, medical, educational, cultural and sports support for approximately 150 children and youth (INF, 2004, p.6-7). The report estimates the annual costs of maintaining its services at USHS 19,044,000 (approximately £6,350). Although the idea of seeking external funding for this Forum initiative was occasionally discussed, all resources between February 2004 and my research feedback trip in March 2005 were being covered by Forum member organizations on a ‘pay as you can’ basis. Although acclaimed as a great success as a support initiative for children in Kampringisa, the often ‘hidden’ strain generated on internal Forum cohesion is emphasized strongly in numerous interviews. These tensions arose from the interlinked impact of overt or tacit demands for resources to support the Team, the processes of selecting Support Team leaders, and the apparent all-encompassing nature of the initiative.

10.4.1

Pressure to contribute resources

Once there was agreement for access, putting the Kampringisa Support Team together and developing appropriate programmes appears to have absorbed the majority of the Forum’s time and efforts. The core of the Team’s development relied on what the Coordinator 1

Kampringisa is looked at in greater detail as an example of Forum-government partnership in Chapter 11.

180 refers to as ‘key’ people in this process (see Box 14, statement ‘a’). The key people’s task was to coordinate one of the three sub-groups. As there was no funding from the Forum itself, and from how various respondents define key people’s prime tasks, such ‘key’ people had to provide their own resources and personnel to develop and sustain each subgroup’s activities (Box 14, statement ‘c’). Box 14: Statements about ‘key’ people & resources a)

“… occasionally there are bigger decisions. Erm, normally to do with specific issues, such as Kampringisa. And those would be joint/, I mean, I think (.) the /key NGOs have been part of Kampringisa (.) have either (.) made decisions within a Forum meeting or (.) at Kampringisa.” (INF Interview 14k/C1)

b)

“… the Kampringisa Support Team, (.) it came when the team was already there. (.) They had called the meeting. (1.0) It wasn’t for the whole InterNGO Forum. (1.0) Mm there I felt left out.” (INF Interview 2k/C1)

c)

“We were not included (.) and we can’t blame any\. First of all it was voluntarily, and the resources: whoever accepted to lead the delegation had to: to do something on behalf of the network. In the end he had at least to put in some resources, (1.0) of which it was personal or from the NGO. (1.0) We felt left out, whereas the strength of doing anything, we had it. But in the process we realised we are not able.” (INF Interview 18k/C4)

d)

“I mean (1.0) people:as people complain before, (1.0) you know? The NGOs which are well-off (.) they are the ones putting such, such, such. I mean, when you look at the Support Team, the NGOs which are on, they are well-off. So, we the (indistinct word) which are low, we feel: I mean, I personally feel left out: that’s the only moment I feel left out\.” (INF Interview 2k/C1)

Perhaps understandably, considering the logistics of the task at hand and absence of independent Forum funding, organizations that were able to offer these resources were selected to lead each sub-group. However, these leadership ‘common-sense’ assumptions that link resources to ‘key’ leadership positions, register in very different ways with different respondents. For some respondents, the ‘informal’ processes and procedures, which enabled selection based on

181 an organization’s wealth, were perceived as illegitimate. In statement ‘c’ (Box 14) respondent 18k – the director of a founding organization with a good track record in programming for street children – concludes that resources rather than skills and experience had been the principal criterion for the selection of sub-group leaders. Some respondents attribute certain consequences to the gap between leadership’s assumptions in allowing ‘natural’ selection of leaders based on wealth, and smaller organizations’ feelings of being bypassed in such ‘informal’ selection (Box 14, statement ‘c’ & ‘d’). This disenfranchisement, they argue, has led to passivity in Forum meetings and activities, and to the withdrawal of two founder organizations. Respondent 11k describes what he characterizes as ‘unspoken’ pressure to contribute resources to the Kampringisa Support Team (Box 15, statement ‘a’). Respondent 6k (Box 15, statement ‘b’) observes that offering resources and personnel, and the implied commitment of doing so, takes on a competitive quality. Under such pressure, these respondents observe, those who are unable to compete feel left out (Box 15, statement ‘c’ & ‘d’), feel less able to participate in the Forum as equals (Box 15, statement ‘b’ & ‘c’), or feel an erosion of self-worth and value in the Forum (Box 15, statement ‘a’). Such feelings inevitably have their impact on participation in the Forum meetings and activities. Respondent 11k uses a Luganda proverb to describe his inclination to passivity in Forum meetings and activities born of his inability to contribute: “Atalina sente, tafumita lindazi.” (He who has no money, cannot pick the pancake) (INF Interview 11k/E4) If an organization is unable to contribute resources to the Forum, he explains, then what legitimacy has it to determine the Forum’s agendas - the only point of sitting at Forum meetings is to listen, absorb information and be quiet. Clearly such evidence cannot indicate categorically the impact of resources on all organizations’ participation in the Forum. Withdrawal and passivity are also more likely to arise because of a combination of factors, even if resources play an important role. Indeed, as respondent 13k points out, although she is unable to participate in Kampringisa, it is still possible for her to feel contentment ‘represented’ by someone else (Box 15, statement ‘d’).

182 Box 15: Statements about pressure to put resources into the Forum a)

“Because you feel: Andy himself saying, ‘put in fuel, full tank for to and fro. And KIN, you don’t have something to contribute?’ Then you know how you feel? You are over stretching … Andy is a very jolly and (indistinct) man, he never says that\ (.) but as human beings, you really feel you are cheating those people.” (INF Interview 11k/E2)

b)

“… there is a tendency when we do that: and we seem to be competing, mm/?, for the first position and second position, and later on that kills the whole motivation. (.) Because if I am least, then I know like, that can interpret to mean:to mean like, I’m:I have less participation, I have less to put in the:the Inter-NGO Forum.” (INF Interview 6k/E4)

c)

“Because (.) there is a certain friend of mine, it:it’s a young NGO coming up with a youth programme and AIDS and what/ (.) said, ‘Steven, no/. (.) But these people are saying now Kampringisa. That means (.) you have to have resources, you have to have transport (.) to go to Kampringisa. That means if I don’t have, (.) then I am not worthy (.) to (laughs) be in the Forum’. So the guy pulled out. He never pulled out but he has (.) \dull participation. Just knowing that the:the:the members there, those with established NGOs have money.” (INF Interview 11k/E3)

d)

“We feel we are part of whatever is going on. Because right now some of us failed to go to Kampringisa, but then the door was open. It’s us who now failed to go, because of other reasons. Then whoever goes, they come back and report. And we feel we are part of the whole thing. (.) If some people have gone there then we feel we have gone. Mm\.” (INF Interview 13k/C4)

However, Kampringisa has been the central Forum activity for such a long period1, dominating the Forum agenda and making continual demands for resources from all organizations. One can only conclude that the self-effacing feelings of ‘cheating people’ by not contributing (Box 15, statement ‘a’), or feelings of disenfranchisement, are likely to have been reproduced at each monthly meeting. Kampringisa’s demands on the resources of member organizations, though, are not the only bone of financial contention. 1

Although the Support Team had only been operational for 6 months prior to the research, negotiations for access had been ongoing for approximately two years, and four organizations had been involved in Phase One (see Chapter 11) for this period. Reports and updates of these dominate much of the minutes of monthly meetings.

183

10.4.2

Narratives of misappropriation and rumour

We have already mentioned that some bigger and better resourced organizations in the Forum register their mistrust at what they characterize as some smaller organizations’ wish for ‘personal’ remuneration. On the other side of the coin, respondents from some smaller organizations and, indeed, also some bigger organizations, register their mistrust of the Forum leadership’s accountability. Because it is evident that unaccounted resources are being used for forum activities1, despite claims that there are no resources, respondent 2k (from a poorly resourced organization) suspects that there are finances which he should be entitled to know about (Box 16, statement ‘a’). Respondents 16k and 17k claim that the Forum’s name has been misused to gain funding for individual organizations during their European funding drives (see Box 16, statements ‘b’ & ‘c’). A number of related issues emerge from these narratives of ‘misappropriation’ that suggest they have probably more to do with mixture a of envy and criticism than necessarily the veracity of these specific claims themselves. Envy because of the comparative wealth displayed by bigger organizations, and criticism of how such wealth is seen to give privilege within the Forum’s ‘informal’ structures and processes. All three statements in Box 16 make it plain that their authors are ‘suspicious’ of misappropriation rather than having any specific facts. Whereas statement ‘a’ begins with “…I was talking with some of these …”, statement ‘b’ begins with “… reports came out that …”, and statement ‘c’ contains “…as I understand …”. The full interview context of these statements, and how one critical statement seems to link in with other, leads me to conclude that, through ‘informal’ communication between some organizations, dissatisfaction also appears to mutate into ‘rumour’. As statements ‘a’ and ‘c’ make plain, interpretation may be fed by lack of formal information from the Forum leaders, but is equally fed from the flow of ‘informal’ information between organizations themselves. As respondents 2k and 16k admit, “… we don’t know” if these allegations are true. However, it is equally clear that ‘unchallenged’ rumour also contributes to lack of Forum cohesion.

1

Although soda is traditionally given to guests, it is nevertheless a luxury item. A crate of soda used at Forum meetings would also cost the equivalent of three days wages for a skilled builder, carpenter or electrician.

184 Box 16: Statements about leadership and accountability a)

“But recently I was talking with some of these organizations: the leaders\. I might be, (.) it’s Tigers Club\ (1.0) they give us a bottle of soda\. (1.0) Tigers Club: I mean the Forum is not yet funded\. (1.0) And they were asking how (2.0) I mean, how the coordinator (2.0) accounts that: I mean/ (.) so maybe there is some funding somewhere, when we don’t know\.” (INF Interview 2k/B5)

b)

“… reports came out that some people were going to Europe and they er (.) claimed that ‘we: we represent, we are coordinating, we are doing this and that of: of all NGOs’, (.) then er mobilising resources. But resources were not er (.) competently what:/?(.) shared. I mean: I mean ‘equitably’. So that somehow discouraged.” (INF Interview 17k/A2)

c)

“There is no transparency in the Forum so there’s a very big weakness, (.) whereby, as members, we are entitled to have (.) all the adequate information. Because, as I understand, […] those at the top are not using us. Yeah\. Maybe to get money. […] I don’t /know. You’d better look behind that, (.) but again, since you are trying to do some research, you get that information.” (INF Interview 16k/C3)

d)

“Tigers Club (.) is the brain child for the Inter-NGO Forum. […] And they themselves (.) from the Tigers budget (.) all those monthly [meetings]: have it in their budget (.) to bring us all together. (1.0) And then what happens later on: now that the fire has caught on and we (1.0) have er good inter-relations between the organizations and there’s good attendance: quite good attendance/.” (INF Interview 19k/E3)

Three out of the four organizations registering suspicion of leadership misappropriation have stopped attending Forum meetings and activities (even if temporarily). Respondent 19k (Box 16, statement ‘d’), who is a ‘key’ person from a bigger organization, believes resources are injected into the Forum through the good will of the coordination organization, which in turn, she observes, stokes the fires of Forum cohesion. Demands on ownership, control and entitlement to the Forum’s ‘informal’ resources (i.e. accountability), therefore, appears to be linked to erosion of trust in the people, structures and procedure that are seen to privilege ‘other’ organizations over one’s own.

185

10.4.3

Representation, accountability and envy

The narratives of ‘misappropriation’, discussed above, raise other important points. The coordinator acknowledges that there is inevitably a conflict of interest in maintaining two organizational identities. Although he acts as ‘volunteer’ leader within the Forum, as NGO director/employee he must inevitably give considerable priority to the welfare of his own organization. Descriptions of what the Forum has achieved, however, do not always make this distinction clear. Whilst he claims Forum participation in producing the Practice guidelines for work with street children in Uganda (MGLSD, 1999), the booklet accredits only his own and another three big member organizations that were involved. It also makes sense that fundraising visits to Europe inevitably focus on the survival of one’s own organization. However, that the Forum leadership appears to have succeeded in securing considerable resources for their own organizations1 but have secured none for others, has obviously fuelled resentment and suspicion of more general misappropriation of real or ‘imagined’ resources. Box 17: Statements about ‘envy’ a)

“/You know, (.) the hierarchy controls itself (laughs): let me say that. It controls itself because, you know, if your organization is well off, you park your car there: some organizations we don’t have cars\. We come, sometimes you come from very far, you come, you know, where these days they have really worked on the roads. The other days the road had dust\. You come when the dust is all over you, you are sweating/.” (INF Interview 2k/C3)

b)

“Yeah, even the managers themselves (.) whereby they don’t even give chances to other people (.) on the /Forum. (.) Yeah, because they are always the coordinator, (.) for ever and ever and ever. (.) It is very bad so (.) there should be a kind of er (.) sharing power. Yeah. With other people.” (INF Interview 16k/E4)

Although it is difficult to quantify, the role that ‘envy’ may play in generating narratives of misappropriation should also to be acknowledged. Two statements seem to give some indication of smaller and lesser-resourced respondents being ‘envious’ of resource rich individuals and their organizations. In statement ‘a’ (Box 17), by way of illustration of his relationship to ‘hierarchies’, respondent 2k juxtaposes the image of the ‘well-off’

1

And two international ‘expenses-paid’ workshop invitations.

186 organization arriving at a meeting in a car, while he arrives on foot, covered in dust and sweat. In statement ‘b’ (Box 17), respondent 16k, whilst making his point about ‘informality’ perpetuating leadership, implies that others (including himself1) wish to share ‘power’. The expression ‘power’ was not used by any other organization to described desired relationships within the coalition (i.e. as a requisite statement). His use of the word seems to imply a degree of envy on not sharing such an elevated position. However, despite the possible role of ‘envy’ and the acknowledgement that ‘some’ smaller organizations’ interests are primarily for ‘personal’ gain, claims of advantage or misappropriation are seen to be inseparable from the advantage that ‘informal’ structures and procedures are seen to give bigger and better-resourced organizations. The deficit of Forum accountability through such informality, therefore, is seen to give rise to such narratives.

10.5

Concluding remarks

This chapter (i.e. Chapter 10) has looked at the steps, the processes and the choices made for coalition building structures and procedures in Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum. It has traced the emergence and explored the reasons for the explicit and tacit flows of power that determine who participates and who gains advantage. The ‘informality’ of the Inter-NGO Forum’s structures and procedures emerges as the dominant narrative that intersects most respondents’ critique of coalition-building experiences. Informality appears implicated in the lack of authoritative definition of members’ rights and roles. Although it claims to avoid ‘government-like’ bureaucracy, it nevertheless is seen to create its own hierarchies. Despite apparently providing an unrestricted space for diverse organizations to enter (i.e. become members), the space is clearly not neutral and appears constantly manipulated by ‘informal’ processes. Space is therefore characterised by its unequal distribution of power. Leaders appear to succeed in avoidance of mechanisms and procedures through which informality-bestowed advantage (e.g. based on organizations’ wealth) might be challenged. Narratives describe evident mistrust between lesser- and greater-resourced Forum organizations. However, both seem to agree that the Forum’s pursuit of resources, and of a more formal and strategic governance configuration, are central to sustaining their continued interest in, and commitment to the Forum.

1

His ambition to attain a position in the Forum leadership was made plain in the context of the whole interview.

187 Although perhaps not emphasised sufficiently in this chapter, many respondents also express strong feelings of satisfaction at how the Forum has facilitated relationships of friendship and solidarity in a hostile NGO environment, critical organizational ‘learning’, and some opportunities for referrals and resource sharing between organizations. However, how coalition configuration is seen to address concerns about multipleaccountabilities in Jinja Network’s more ‘formal’ coalition building spaces, emerges as a central theme in the next chapter. Narratives around Jinja Network’s less clearly bounded identification as ‘civil society’ also act as another important heuristic contrast to Kampala’s experience. These two themes become central to the theoretical discussions that evolve in later chapters.

188

Chapter 11: Experiences of coalition building – Jinja Network 11.1

The origin and evolution of Jinja Network

Jinja, as a much smaller urban centre than Kampala, presents us with a very different social and political environment for coalition building. Jinja Network appears to have drawn much more proactively (rather than ‘reactively’) than Kampala from these distinctive environmental factors in the elaboration of its present more ‘formal’ design. Established in May 2001, Jinja Network evolved in its first two years largely under the support and facilitation of an independently financed and run project: Complementary Articulation and Capacity-building Project (CAC). This had been set up specifically to assist a variety of previously existing organizations to develop and enhance their street and working children services. CAC’s concept for enhancing services to street and working children is presented in its working programme model in Figure 11.1, below. Quite apart from whether the model reflects what actually happened, of interest is the inclusion of a considerable diversity of networking relationships within the initial conceptualisation. Political (e.g. local government) and social (e.g. NGOs and GROs) stakeholders are both included in patterns of articulation, discussion, and dissemination that give form to a potential networking configuration (CAC, 2000). As a model developed through a one-year participatory action research approach with Jinja-based organizations themselves, CAC’s model acted as prototype to what later became Jinja Network’s approach to coalition building.

Figure 11.1: CAC’s model of service development and networking in Jinja

189 Such patterns, respondents suggest, were instrumental in breaking down considerable ignorance and misunderstanding between stakeholders. Interview claims, and diverse CAC and Jinja Network research reports, suggest that before Jinja Network:

There was often little or no interaction between the diverse NGO and GRO service providers in Jinja (CAC, 2000, p.3);

The Municipal Council was mostly unaware of the existence and methodologies of Jinja-based service provider organizations (CAC, 2000, p.3);

Citizens’ and politicians’ attitudes and responses to street children were primarily based on scare mongering media reports about Kampala and Nairobi’s street children, rather than upon experience within Jinja itself (Malcomson, 2001); and

Perhaps fed by ignorance and media-fed fear outlined above, Jinja Municipal Council had a negative attitude towards ‘non-government’ responses to street children.

Indeed, prior to Jinja Network the relationship between NGOs and local government in Jinja had been similar for that in Kampala. Government respondent 10j recalled that feelings of vulnerability about what it felt it could not control mostly determined government reaction to street children NGOs. The most obvious manifestation of this response was a 2001 municipal closure order placed on the only NGO service provider to for younger street child in Jinja, claiming that it encouraged ‘streetism’1. Jinja Network’s emerging configuration, therefore, appears strongly influenced by relationships formed through CAC’s participatory action research approach, as an independent non-service provider organization. CAC also provided funding for the coalition’s administration and coordination in its first two years. It also prioritised its own withdrawal and hand-over. These factors appear to have strongly influenced the rapid evolution of formal governance structures and processes between 2002 and 2003. JN’s considerable generation of research papers, reports, evaluations and discussion papers (primarily by CAC as its coordinating body) in its first two years of operation, is also revealing about its leadership’s strategic approach to coalition building.

1

Despite obvious ideological differences explained later, problems had begun for the NGO when its founder had accused some municipal officers of setting up two ‘brief case’ organizations to benefit from WFP food distributed through Jinja Municipal Council.

190

11.1.1

Inter-sectoral strategy setting and opportunism

JN’s broad strategic and ‘inter-sectoral’1 approach becomes apparent from the minutes of its earliest monthly meetings. Its second meeting not only proposed invitation to two new ‘strategic’ members – one from a Jinja-based CBO, the other the Town Clerk of Walukuba Division with close affiliations to one NGO (JN Minute 06/01-3c) – but also lays out a time-table of three-monthly meetings with government policy-makers. Avoiding previous tendencies to engage in ‘media battles’2, these meetings with policy makers would, “…describe the successes and failures within the current service approach to the street and working child in Jinja, […] emphasise the value of a complementary approach, […] [and monitor and disseminate] social trends for street and working children/youth […] at both project and global level.” (JN Minute 06/01-3g) However, perhaps the most significant event that enhanced JN’s strategic multi-sectoral approach was the 2001 ‘informal’ invitation to the monthly meeting, and invitation to membership, of Jinja Municipal Council’s (JMC’s) Assistant Town Clerk for Social Welfare. With his charismatic mediation and political ‘guidance’ membership was later extended to, and accepted by a variety of ‘key’ government officials. Through these new lines of ‘government’ and ‘non-government’ communication, a major seminar was organised and co-hosted by Jinja Network and the municipal council. The seminar’s primary focus was on promoting dialogue and developing a working relationship on child marginalisation and ‘streetism’ between local government and ‘nongovernment’. Re-emerging within a strategic plan, the seminar’s focus group recommendations and other members’ concerns were reproduced as four key Jinja Network activity areas: 1. Networking and Coordination – focusing on coalition governance; 2. Community Participation, Awareness & Contribution – focusing on community awareness and mobilization on street and marginalized children; 3. Children and Youth Services – focusing on supporting and augmenting psychosocial services for street and marginalized youth and children; and 4. Local Council Training and Awareness – focusing on village and parish-level training (JN, 2002, p.2).

1 2

That is, ‘government’ (or ‘state’) and ‘non-government’ (or ‘civil society’?) The ‘media battles’ appear to refer to the experiences of the NGO threatened with closure.

191 Of particular interest is how most outlined activities are enmeshed within the government’s ‘local council’ system of governance1. For instance, community focused seminars on child and parenting rights and responsibilities, in key activity area ‘2’, would be conducted through support and collaboration of local village and parish councils. In key activity area ‘4’ local councils would benefit from training on implementation of the 1996 Children’s Statute. Focus would be placed on creating ‘child friendly’ bylaws, which would include the co-optation of their community ‘para-governmental’ Child Rights Advocate2 when issues of children were discussed (discussed in greater depth in Chapter 12). Key activity area ‘1’, on the other hand, focuses on processes of coalition formalization in preparation for CAC’s withdrawal. It details the formal governance configuration necessary for lobbying for, and handling funds to support both the coalition administration and implementation of its key activities, outlined in key activity areas 2, 3 and 4.

11.2

‘Sectoral blur’: strategic and ‘naturally occurring’ membership

The multi-sectoral orientation of JN perhaps also provides some insight into the apparent ease with which it has been able to work with ideological difference implied by ‘nongovermental’ and ‘governmental’ distinctiveness. With formalization, conditions of membership – which had emphasized the ‘hands-on service-provider’ – focused more on broader ‘strategic value’3. Each cluster of organizations, described below, emphasises its ‘strategic value’ selection criteria for JN.

11.2.1

NGO member organizations

Four NGO member projects work directly with street and working children. One focuses primarily on ‘full-time’ under sixteen year-old street children, another on street youth and young commercial sex workers. The other two4 NGOs act as support organizations, one developing HIV/AIDS and ‘sexual reproductive health’ clubs and activities, and the other providing activity support and capacity building services (Malcomson, 2001a, p.9).

1

See Appendix 1. Also Jinja Network members, the role and position of Child Rights Advocates will be explained later. 3 Other conditions included institutional inspection and approval by JN, and the stipulation that any new NGO/CBO member should be registered with the district government and/or the ministry (i.e. MGLSD). 4 GOAL-Uganda has a membership status in both JN and Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum. 2

192

11.2.2

CBO member organizations

There are two CBO member organizations (i.e. having a ‘membership’ character). One works through local government, NGO/CBOs, schools and local leaders throughout Jinja district to address such themes as ‘child labour’ and ‘child abuse and neglect’. The other is a community-development collaboration of three local village councils (Malcomson, 2001a, p.9).

11.2.3

Para-governmental ‘Child Rights Advocate’ (CRA) members

The CRAs are para-governmental village-level volunteers. Trained by UNICEF and JMC in implementation of Uganda’s 1996 Children’s Statute, the CRAs are key mediators of grassroots knowledge, on one side, and JN’s community and local government strategies (outlined as key activity areas 3 & 4), on the other side.

11.2.4

Local government ‘technical’ and ‘political’ members

Until March 2003, membership included two government ‘technical’ officers who represented children and youth at municipal and district level. However, membership later included the Deputy Mayor and municipal Youth Council Chairperson who were understood to bring ‘political’ legitimacy to the coalition. However, despite an apparent strategic balancing act to determine equitable sectoralideological orientation, the overlapping of JN’s ‘political’ and ‘civil’ membership is far more complicated than the above categorization would suggest. As Table 11.2, below, illustrates (see below), five of the nine JN ‘non-government’ member representatives are also elected politicians at different levels of local government.

Table 11.2: Local government held positions for JN’s ‘non-government’ member representatives

193 Such sectoral ‘blur’ may perhaps be partly explained by the more small-town character of association in Jinja. With only two street children service-provider organizations, Jinja has much weaker sectoral-institutional identities. A less sectorally entrenched notion ‘street child’ therefore emerges for other ‘non-government’ organizations. However, for local government and some NGOs within JN, sectorally entrenched notions of ‘street children’ and ‘streetism’ still persist. It is therefore important to gain some degree of insight into how wearing different sectoral hats – e.g. as social worker, NGO director and politician – might impact the entrenched ideological positioning within JN, and to what extent this might impact its cohesion and strategic evolution.

11.3

Ideological conflict and experiences of ‘inter-sectoral’ blur

At a half-day research feedback workshop1, many respondents suggested that, rather than confusing them, taking on many different roles helps their own ideological orientation. It enhances, they claimed, more strategic and holistic understanding and positioning, whether at coalition level (i.e. as JN) or as an individual within government or ‘non-government’ organizations2. Indeed, tensions and conflict appear most pronounced between the more sectorally defined NGO3 and local government, upon whom ideological and methodological ‘compromise’ about street children policy-making and programming makes the biggest demands. How these demands manifest themselves is best illustrated by examination of the two most conflict-generating activities approached by JN – the government ‘round-up’ of street children, and operation of JN’s street children Transit Centre. The local government policy discourse around ‘round-ups’ illustrates not only JMC’s ideology about ‘streetism’, but also why government portrays NGOs as offering inappropriate services. In the three statements in Box 18, a government ‘political’ respondent makes a very strong link between street children and criminality –street children are portrayed as a ‘danger’, becoming ‘thieves’ as they grow.

1

The workshop was held at Kimasa community hall in March 2005. It should be noted that the ‘non-governmental’ organizations, mentioned here, are not JN’s ‘NGOs’. 3 For instance, seeing its primary role as countervailing local government action. 2

194 Box 18: Statements on government attitudes about street children a)

“The most serious one and the general one (.) is that (1.0) we see street children (1.0) their stay on the street (.) as a potential danger.” (JN Interview 9j/F1)

b)

“Then the other thing: we think […] the chance for them to be exploited by criminals (.) is high. Criminals can use them (.) aa to (1.0) to:to:to rake where they can steal: or to: even to enter though small holes into people’s house.” (JN Interview 9j/F1)

c)

“We see that here is potential danger. (.) And of course when they grow a bit, their: they can currently become: they can become thieves: the chances are higher than in a normal home. (.) So that’s our problem with street children.” (JN Interview 9j/F1)

Portrayed as urban danger, street children are therefore understood to be legitimate targets for arrest and removal to a holding centre. My own previous research in Jinja (as CAC) observes that, because the media reinforces such discourse about street children, ‘streetism’ becomes a popular political football. The ‘round-up’ of street children becomes a very easy tool through which local government in Jinja makes a popular political ‘display’ of solving criminality (Malcomson, 2001). Such displays, one respondent observes in statement ‘a’ (in Box 19), demand that street children are removed from the street both ‘quickly’ and ‘totally’. The NGO ‘drop-in’ centre approach, on the other hand, as we see in statement ‘b’, is observed by government as mollycoddling street children ‘within the street’ and therefore merely acting to encourage ‘streetism’ rather than ‘solving’ it. From a political viewpoint, respondent 9j emphasises in statement ‘c’ that any approach to street children that does not also provide nighttime shelter is “… creating a problem”. More ominously for NGOs claiming a degree of methodological independence, he goes on to suggest that such an organization is “… doing a disservice to [the] nation”. Although the minutes of the Resident District Commissioner’s ‘security’ meetings1 with JN generally acknowledge the good work of NGO rehabilitation methods, mere ‘drop-in’ facilities – where the child returns to the street at night – are described as insufficient and

1

Organized by JN, these are two-monthly meetings of NGO/CBOs, government and security officers chair by the Deputy RDC.

195 inappropriate1. However, equally local government ‘round-ups’ also come in for criticism from the security agencies (e.g. the police, DISO, etc.). As the minutes note, “… though security agencies mounted some round ups in Jinja, not much was achieved because street children who were netted in these operations were only made to do some little work and released back to the streets.” (JN Minute Security Meeting 02/04) Box 19: Statement about government attitudes about street children NGOs a)

“I think some in the government who don’t understand ways of handling the street children. So they tend to run things like rounding-up: they want them out of the street within a week, within a day.” (JN Interview 7j/F7)

b)

“[…] the children would come to these NGOs, would be given lunch (.) and in the night they would be released on the street. So that the negative fears of the Council, in this way, would not be addressed (.) because the children would still be susceptible to being mishandled, being recruited by the criminals. They would still be susceptible to adopting the other ugly habits. So the council was feeling that we are not doing enough. What they [the NGOs] were doing was instead encouraging more children because they would give comfort. (.) during the daytime (1.0) and there to encourage more to come.” (JN Interview 9j/F1)

c)

“Anyone who wants to handle street children doesn’t take them in (.) is doing a disservice to this nation (.) because finally when these children grow they will outgrow the:the:the assistance of the NGO and they will still be a problem\. Our argument as Council is that if you can’t handle children with them inside (.) then don’t touch them\. Because you are creating a problem.” (JN Interview 9j/F4)

In acknowledging a need for some form of nighttime accommodation for street children, and in acknowledging poor results yielded by ‘round-ups’, two broad strategies emerge from these meetings that recommend: 1. Creating an integrated ‘security’ and ‘social welfare’ rehabilitation approach – in which government would commit itself to linking ‘round-ups’ to services offered by NGOs and other ‘welfare’ service providers, and 1

Who makes this claim is not clear from the minutes.

196 2. Establishing a ‘Transit Centre’ (night and weekend sheltered accommodation) – to which NGOs would commit themselves to refer ‘full-time’ street children. Both strategies would make most demands for methodological adjustment from both the established government political practice of ‘round-ups’, and the long established NGO street child ‘drop-in’ centre practice, which sees the street as the desirable principal site of rehabilitative efforts. Perhaps it also becomes inevitable, as we make comparisons between the various strategic and conflict narratives, that from each document that proposes ‘strategic’ compromise problems linked to such compromise later emerge. Within a proposed action, government and NGOs’ critique of each other’s ideological position, therefore, tends to become obscured. What becomes central to this ‘less problematic’ process of ‘strategic’ compromise, therefore, is agreement on creative new actions that do not intrude too far onto NGO and government ideological and methodological territory. This approach, the logic goes, avoids the types of conflict that had marred NGO and government relationships before the birth of JN. The imperative to avoid conflict is strongly emphasised by a senior JMC politician: “We wanted to avoid conflict. It was very, very important that we join up so that we avoid conflict.” (JN Interview 9j/A1) However, the imperative to ‘avoid’ conflict by defining compromise positions equally obscures, over-simplifies and underplays the resilience of established government and NGO ways of doing things, and resistance to the implied change to established practices1. Where strategic actions make no demands on organizations – i.e. by either not being implemented or by not requiring methodological compromise – conflict is avoided. However, where strategic plans are implemented that demand often ‘unforeseen’ organizational compromise, resistances emerge that often appear to be expressed indirectly through accusations about other organizations, criticism of governance processes, denial of being part of the agreement, etc. The following examples, about JMC ‘round-ups’ and JN transit centre, demonstrate these processes at work.

1

For instance, one NGO places emphasis on ‘non-institutionalisation’ of the street child, which they appear to interpret as ‘direct resettlement’ home rather than providing ‘accommodation’.

197

11.3.1

The ‘round-up’: demands ‘on’ government ‘by’ NGOs

Minutes of a 2002 JN ‘Security Meeting’1 and a JN discussion paper2, were adopted as working papers for both local government and JN. Rather than seen as ends in themselves, government ‘round-ups’ would instead be linked to rehabilitation opportunities offered by NGOs. Interestingly, perhaps acknowledging a ‘concession too far’, there appears to be a starting assumption about the inevitability of the local government’s ‘security-based’ round-up approach. Therefore, to reconcile local government and NGO perspectives, the paper binds local government’s imperative that all ‘full-time’ street children should be off the street3, to the NGO imperative that this be linked to referral to existing ‘good practice’ and sustainable rehabilitation programmes. What are addressed, therefore, are the methods and intentions of the ‘round-up’. The paper proposes that the round-up be linked to an integrated multi-stakeholder initiative to ‘manage’ streetism. The round-up, therefore, would make systematic referral to existing programmes and services, on one side, and be used to reduce the street’s attractiveness to street children, on the other side (Malcomson, 2003, p.1). The compromise concept was based on the following principle: “The street is an illegitimate space for children to live and grow up where there are appropriate alternatives.” (Malcomson, 2003, p.1) However, a local government ‘round-up’ followed these resolutions that neither consulted with ‘non-government’ service providers, nor made referrals afterwards. The minutes of JN’s monthly meetings document the ensuing animated debate. Defending the action, government official 8j argues in statement ‘a’ (see Box 20) that the round-up approach had been agreed within the 2003 working document by all JN members. However, he merely refers to consultation with, and referral to ‘non-government’ service providers as “… among other content in the document”, apparently ignoring such core principles which were understood to bind the round-up to welfare outcomes. The other members of JN draw JMC’s attention to this, arguing that, according to the agreement, “… the exercise of rounding up, screening and making referrals […] to [JN Transit Centre4] or to Kampiringisa should be participatory with all service providers taking part.” (JN Minute 02/04-4)

1

This is a two-monthly meeting with the Deputy Resident District Commissioner (RDC) and security organizations. 2 From June 2003, the paper was titled, ‘Programme for the removal, rehabilitation and resettlement of fulltime street children’. 3 Although the paper refers to ‘full-time’ street children, interviews and documented statements show that local government also applies this imperative to ‘part-time’ street children. 4 This was the street children night shelter built and operated by JN in 2003.

198 Despite this JN rebuke, a second round-up in March 2004 followed the same pattern. So why is JMC so insistent on retaining unilateral control of the round-up? Box 20: Statements about JMC justification for unilateral ‘round-ups’

a)

“[The JMC representative] said the rounding up was agreed upon by members during the last security meeting with the Deputy Mayor. The document compiled by Tim was supposed to be distributed to members. He said among other content in the document are the short term approaches to street children in Jinja town and include the Kampiringisa issue.” (JN Minute Executive Meeting, 10/03-3)

b)

“The Chairperson called on members to appreciate that the number of street children had reduced after the Swoop and that the General public appreciated […] the rounding up.” (JN Minute Executive Meeting 02/04-3)

c)

“[M]ember organizations expect far more (.) from government than:than we can provide. (1.0) Em for instance (2.0) they expect that if:if we are: have to have round up of street children, we have to give them advance notice which might not necessarily be possible.” (JN Interview 8j/F3)

d)

The fact that we have a bit of independence, this decentralisation of powers, and what have you, means that a local head of a municipal council could actually ask an NGO to not operate. They have the right in recommending something like that. So there was need: the local NGOs needed us if they was to operate comfortably.” (JN Interview 9j/F1)

Government statement ‘b’ (see Box 20) perhaps hints at the importance local government places on public opinion, where the ‘round-up’ becomes, at least partly, a ‘populist’ political display. There is also explicit reference to ‘authority’ and ‘control’ unencumbered by concessions to ‘NGO’ constituency. Statement ‘c’, therefore, emphasises the importance local government places on not having to bind itself to NGO agendas. In statement ‘d’ government politician 9j emphasises local council’s ‘authority’ to control and impose sanction on the NGO, with the parameters of acceptability firmly set by the local government ‘bylaw’ rather than by national guidelines1.

1

Here there is an interesting gap between what is established as ‘good practice’ in the Ministry’s guidelines for work with street children and what JMC local government insists to be ‘good practice’. We look at this in Chapter 11.

199 In Chapter 12 I explore how different local government administrative units compete with each other for politically bankable gain, within highly contested ‘decentralised’ spaces. Within narratives of ‘authority’ and ‘control’, therefore, municipal and divisional government appear to occasionally act independently of each other. What is understood as agreement with LC4 municipal government in JN spaces, therefore, does not imply agreement with LC3 divisional government. Clearly, within JN’s multi-sectoral approach, the exercise of power and the way it may be challenged (e.g. through binding government to NGO agency), is a highly complex web of intersecting interests and agendas, of which street children’s welfare appears merely a single thread. However, equally relationships of ‘authority’ and power exerted by local government outside JN will carry considerable weight in both binding and undermining coalition cohesion within.

11.3.2

Transit Centre: demands ‘by’ and ‘on’ NGOs and local government

Apparently amicable agreements among JN member organizations on developing a night shelter, have later equally proved problematic during their implementation. As JN’s flagship project, the ‘Transit Centre’s’ (i.e. night shelter’s) conceptual strength appears to be how it tries to address all stakeholders’ interests. It takes into account local government’s desire to have a ‘night shelter’1 but also tries to make it ‘complementary’ to the existing services provided by NGOs (in line with the 2003 working paper). Figure 11.3, below, illustrates the ‘transit centre’ model. The concept proposes that NGOs persuade children off the street through ‘street work’. At the same time, government makes the street less attractive by conducting referrals through sporadic ‘round-ups’. If direct resettlement home is not possible for government or NGO, the child is referred to the ‘transit centre’. However, the child continues to commute to the NGO ‘drop-in’ centre on a daily-basis in order to receive psycho-social and educational support. The NGO accompanies the child’s progress through the transit centre from which he/she is resettled home directly, or – based on a three-month limit and emphasising community-based rehabilitation – through ‘foster-care’ or a ‘peer-headed household’ if more time is needed for the resettlement.

1

Although, the dominant government prefers the idea of a Kampringisa styled ‘holding centre’.

200

Figure 11.3: Integrated approach to JN Transit Centre

However, based on the type of criticism of the ‘transit centre’s’ implementation, it becomes clear that the model overplays the assumption that interactions both within and between agencies are focused primarily on street child outcomes. For example, as the principal street children NGO, project 3j is also the principal gatekeeper for the ‘transit centre’. However, there is considerable evidence from interviews, documents and statistics1 that referrals are done reluctantly. Referrals, evidence suggests, are understood to compromise the project’s ideological intentions by exposing the children to nonevangelical approaches, and by demanding change to its long established organizational model that emphasises non-institutionalisation. Although much evidence also justifies concerns about how well the Transit Centre is managed, resistance to referrals and organizational support perhaps says as much about ‘3j’s’ wish to control street children rehabilitation and the street children agenda2, as the frailties of the Transit Centre itself. Clearly, the purpose of this research is not to test the veracity of claims of poor management. However, what becomes plain is that approaches that make ideological and methodological demands on government and ‘non-government’ organizations’ control of the street children agenda, equally tend to generate considerable resistances.

1

I did a statistical breakdown of flows of children in and out of the Transit Centre over a two year period. For example, although children walking each day to CRO through the town centre from the ‘transit centre’ was established as a major problem, organization ‘3j’ was reluctant to discuss alternatives that would place the children in local schools and therefore outside CRO’s educational, ‘spiritual’, and psycho-social system. 2

201

11.3.3

Conflict mediation and consensus building

How consensus building and conflict are mediated, therefore, is obviously an important component in JN’s cohesiveness. Ideological positioning and resistance inevitably throw up heated debate through which each position is contested. JN’s chairperson, however, describes such ‘hot potatoes’ as necessary to JN’s task of development. “… conflicts are ok. In any development situation you must have conflicts because […] you are destabilising the status quo and therefore creating a fluid situation [in which] people will not be amused. But in the process […] you create a better situation, […] a better equilibrium. But […] what I know is that we have had our ups and downs but we have been able to sort them out.” (JN Interview 8j/E1) All respondents describe decision-making through a ‘hot potato’ debate in terms of consensus building. However, further scrutiny of how respondents interpret ideological and strategic position setting as a consensus building exercise reveals numerous claims of manipulation through ‘interest alliances’. While the coordinator describes representatives of ‘3j’ and ‘5j’ as guarded and secretive, respondent ‘12j’ believes ‘5j’ to be undermining inter-agency cooperation with the street children agenda. While ‘4j’ and ‘3j’ see the ‘charitable’ culture of ‘12j’ undermining the ‘proper’ financial accountability of JN, ‘12j’ fears a plot by ‘4j’ and ‘6j’ to wrest financial control. Respondent ‘3j’ believes there to be an alliance between the coordinator, ‘8j’, and ‘4j’ for control the street children agenda, by undermining the confidence of 3j’s donor1. So, from where does most of this fear and anxiety come? JN has developed and implemented ambitious plans for street children and created new structures and procedures to accomplish these. An organization’s adaptability and its space for compromise, however, are restricted by what respondent 8j refers to as its “… limited mission”. The ‘transit centre’ and ‘round-up’ narratives show that considerable pressure has been placed on individual organizations to step over their ideological and methodological boundaries. Where compromise is forced, seen not to be reciprocated, or is not mediated well, it runs the danger of undermining trust, as the principal coalition building block, replacing it with a mixture of fear and anxiety. JN’s constitution gives the chairperson the task of mediation. His role as government officer, however, also implicates him by association to his own organization’s resistance to change and its nonreciprocation. 1

Interestingly, JN, 3j and 5j have the same principal donor who now sees them as a strategic unit.

202 Box 21: Statement about JN conflict and mediation a)

“In our case (.) the one we had was very unfortunate: this time it was the Chairman himself who had ee … But in ordinary terms you’d expect the Chairman to (laughs) … But this time around it was from the top/ (laughs again). (1.0) We just found our selves a few hot minutes (still smiling) then (.) people sobered up…” (JN Interview 2j/E2)

And yet, government respondent 9j makes plain, government demands ideological and methodological change from the NGO (on occasions using veiled threat). As statement ‘a’ (Box 21) points out, where the chairperson’s position becomes undermined by local government ‘round-up’ mentality (by association), mediation in JN then becomes problematic. Why have such problems arisen after a number of years of relatively harmonious consensus building? The answer appears less to do with growing demands on individual organizations, than how coalition building is accomplished. JN’s ‘formalization’ has fundamentally changed its governance structures and processes. These have altered how networking is done, how relationships are built and maintained. It is to these issues we now turn.

11.4

Formalization of Jinja Network

Earlier I mentioned that one of the principal four activity areas pursued within JN’s threeyear strategic plan1 of action was ‘Networking and Coordination’. Between August 2002 and March 2003 JN underwent considerable processes of structural ‘formalization’. It changed from unregistered coalition, which was coordinated and chaired by a single ‘nonservice provider’ organization (i.e. CAC), into a district registered CBO, steered by an elected ‘Executive Committee’ of member organizations and coordinated by an employee. The transition required recruitment and training of a coordinator-employee, writing of a ‘JN constitution’, promotion of JN and lobbying for support and funding. Handling external resources required accountability mechanisms that were acceptable to donor organizations and government. Thus, JN were required to open a bank account, implement financial mechanisms and procedures acceptable to donor organizations, and register with the District Community Development Office as a CBO. Two new staff members were also 1

This strategic plan was for a 3-year period, coinciding with its funding proposal.

203 recruited for the ‘transit centre’ and JN secured an office in the centre of town from which the coalition would be coordinated. Initially, CAC continued accompanying the formalization process in an advisory role: helping set up the transit centre, training the new coordinator and ‘transit centre’ staff, and supporting and advising the newly elected Executive Committee. Only after CAC had withdrawn in September 2003 do the various positive and negative effects of these considerable changes emerge.

11.4.1

Experiences of formalization

There is no doubt that both before and after formalization JN has been successful in finding support from government, local communities, donors and many member organizations for its diverse advocacy, sensitisation and service ‘gap filling’ initiatives. As well as the building, equipping and staffing the Transit Centre, JN has coordinated an international youth exchange with the Ministry of Gender, helped renovate two youth centre buildings, provided financial backing to re-energize village-level Child Rights Advocates, and provided one youth centre with solar power, a television and other leisure and income-generating facilities. Interestingly, many of these activities are enthusiastically not only attributed to JN, but also claimed by the participating organizations as their own. There is evident merging of local government and ‘non-government’ planning and evaluation for street children within Jinja Network’s 3-year plan of action. Local government, therefore, finds itself organizing and participating in ‘doable’ JN initiatives that address street children and streetism. These include a series of five radio talk shows on marginalized children, sensitisation workshops with village councils, providing Universal Primary Education opportunities for Karamajong ‘part-time’ street children, and a sensitisation workshop with Jinja’s Muslim leaders on the impact of alms giving on parttime street children populations. Formalization processes have, therefore, allowed both a greater legitimisation of JN and its activities within the local government and community environment (evidenced by its ability to engage them) and institutional stability and capacity to collectively handle and distribute resources (evidenced by the initiatives mentioned above). However, as a coalition, JN is clearly not just about the services it provides, but about how it is able to bind these into the diverse ideologies, methodologies and needs of its member organizations. Respondents’ claims that the process of JN formalization enhances commitment, clarity and accountability, are challenged by much evidence to suggest that it has done the opposite. To locate where cohesion is under threat, we perhaps have to look

204 to the changes to structures and processes that distinguished JN as an ‘informal’ coalition in the past, from those that characterise it now.

11.4.2

The politics of leadership and the limits to ‘coordination’

Perhaps the most obvious shifts have been in the status and the practice of JN coordination as it moved from CAC to a JN employee in mid-2003. CAC had emphasised ‘relationship building’ processes within its cooperative Participatory Action Research1 approach (CAC, 2000, p.1). A degree of charismatic leadership clearly is demonstrated by CAC’s ability to forge relationships between distinctive government and ‘non-government’ organizations. Being a support organization (rather than service provider), CAC also appears to have been relatively unthreatening – it was neither competing for funding nor beneficiaries. It was able to offer capacity building assistance to JN organizations, based on a wide expertise in street children programming2. So, in what ways is the new coordination different? One obvious change is in the ‘status’ of the coordinator, who is now an employee rather than coalition member of equal status to other members. What the coordinator experiences and interprets as an employer-employee power relationship, and how he reacts to this, perhaps underscores a much deeper set of influences on how coordination happens. In statements ‘a’ and ‘b’, in Box 22, the coordinator describes his experience of feeling sidelined in decision-making. He describes what he interprets as contradictory demands made of him: to contribute to coalition building, on one side, but not to ‘intrude’ on members’ space, on the other side. The Transit Centre gives an example of how this contradiction manifests itself. One NGO Executive Committee member criticises the coordinator for not taking a leadership role in managing ‘good practice’ outcomes. However, manipulation of the Transit Centre’s operation by another Executive Committee member, the coordinator (as their employee) feels, prevents him from doing so effectively. Statement ‘a’ also introduces another important observation. Being ‘favoured’ by particular members of the Executive Committee is seen to be necessary in developing a 1

Participatory Action Research (PAR) is based on Freirean principles of stakeholders’ co-operative ‘coconstruction’ of problems and their solutions. 2 This assistance included both organizational development and setting up new strategic and funding partnerships.

205 more influential position. In this complex relationship between the coordinator and JN’s diverse members, the implications of being seen to curry favour by some but not others needs to be explored a little further. Box 22: Statement about coordinator’s relation to JN’s Executive Committee a)

“I attend the meeting (1.0) err but […] at times you find that being (.) an employee/ (1.0) y:you may have something to contribute […] but then you may not have the fora. You may you may not be listened to […] unless you are favoured by one member or two of […] the board. […B]ut other members of the board may say (.) this is the decision. Whereas as an employee it can pinch, […] you have to make it conceal a bit.” (JN Interview 6j/C3)

b)

“[NGO ‘3j’] has always tried to ensure that somehow […] you shouldn’t even contribute (.) or you should contribute though you have not contributed: um/? (1.0) You have done work but you have not done any work/.” (JN Interview 6j/C4)

Inevitably, some JN members will favour the coordinator more than others, whether this be for personal or professional reasons. However, where the coordinator’s relationship is perceived to be too skewed towards particular organizations, and is suspected of giving advantage, it may compromise the coordinator’s position. For example, after JMC’s ‘round-up’ of street children in September 2003, the coordinator was requested to accompany JN chairperson – a representative of JMC – to put pressure on NGO ‘3j’ to cooperate in ‘sorting them [i.e. the captured street children] out’ (reported in interviews with respondents 3j, 8j & 6j). The coordinator’s perceived close association with the chairperson’s role as JMC officer (even if done inadvertently) inevitably compromised his non-aligned position. The coordinator’s position as employee within such a dynamic obviously presents various conflicts of interest. Indeed, the coordinator’s dilemma in both examples is how to equally promote distinctive organizations’ interests whilst, at the same time, conforming to his ‘employee’ status under a coalition executive hierarchy. Unless managed well, such a contradiction has the potential to undermine coalition cohesion. However, other parallel narratives also implicate other factors. In managing JN’s Transit Centre, the coordinator is clearly handicapped by his lack of expertise and experience in street children programming. However, equally frailties in the Transit Centre might be blamed on the ‘management committee’ of expert members who are supposed to

206 direct the coordinator, but clearly don’t. As was the case in Kampala, another narrative appears to implicate ‘envy’. Box 23: Statement about envy and undermining coordinator’s position a)

“I came to learn that […] some members were interested in another person [becoming coordinator … ] and that person didn’t make it. […] So a person has that eventuality: either you fail and such that it is a reason to talk to that other person who told them that was]” (JN Interview 6j/C4)

Statement ‘a’ in Box 23 describes a suspicion that subtle plays of power seek to undermine the coordinator’s position, because it is a remunerated position sought by another. There is also the possibility that certain distinctive ideologies and methodologies are simply ‘irreconcilable’. Another narrative suggests that the coordinator lacks the personal ‘charismatic’ qualities of CAC. All of these factors may well play their part in weakening JN cohesion. However, the dominant narrative, which may indeed explain why many of these ‘suspicions’ emerge, implicates the coordination’s shift away from ‘relationship building’ and ‘relationship sustaining’ as a core coalition-building approach.

11.4.3

Communication: from ‘relationship building’ to ‘bureaucratic’ practices

As mentioned earlier, CAC adopted a PAR approach to networking (CAC, 2000, p.1). This approach stresses process as a basis of co-constructing new strategic alliances. If we look back at CAC’s model of service development in Figure 4, processes of articulation, dissemination and discussion are necessarily achieved through building relationships. Building and sustaining relationships between different stakeholders, their environments and the different types of knowledge and values each represents, becomes the foundation upon which collective action takes form. Influenced by Freirean pedagogical theory (CAC, 2000, p.1), the model also presents this as a reflexive process where the critical learning is constantly referred back to new and expanded stakeholder environments and new types of knowledge and values. In JN’s files, there is considerable evidence of this model being followed by CAC. Relating Jinja organizations to the government policy guidelines (MGLSD, 1999), a research document studies each organization’s methodology, making analysis of its target population in relation to the whole ‘marginalized’ child population in Jinja (Malcomson, 2001a). There is also research about media and public attitudes and experience of street children issues in Jinja (Malcomson, 2001). In terms of project

207 ‘articulation’, CAC also assisted three organizations to develop project brochures, as well as developing a series of discussion papers on making ‘good practice’ connections between organizations1. Box 24: Statements about changes to JN’s networking approach a)

“I feel bad\. [laughs] I’ve enjoyed my part that were interacting: before that it was as if we had this free air […] where you would meet up with colleagues and er (.) breathe […] how people go off for an evening and discuss how the day has been. Not in a way of really rumour-mongering but saying ‘I’m having this challenge’, (.) I really enjoyed that\’. […] And also fun/ (.) you know. The Mbuzi Club.” (JN Interview 3j/D2)

b)

“[Coordination] has weakened because it’s not like your time: you’re handling it\. (2.0) Cause you were doing so many things personally\.” (JN Interview 7j/E6)

c)

“And again it goes back to: (.) to:to what:/?(.) to information. (.) Because it’s not a question of praise, but I remember what you [i.e. the interviewer as JN’s CAC coordinator] used to do when you were the coordinator, (.) you’d reach everybody’s door. You’d make sure somebody finds out. (.) Maybe that’s not happening now.” (JN Interview 2j/D2)

The narratives about change to new bureaucratic ‘office-bound’ approaches, presented in the statements in Boxes 24 and 25, emphasise the coordinator’s departure from ‘informal’ relationship building approaches. CAC’s ‘informal’ approach, statements in Box 24 recall, had been characterised by ‘personal’ and ‘friendship’ based relationships in which JN spaces and encounters were seen as safe, non-threatening, ‘fun’2, and with considerable ‘sharing’. Statement ‘b’ (in Box 24) reasserts the value of the ‘personal’ approach and statement ‘c’ connects this to CAC’s ability to keep all organizations within JN’s information loop. CAC’s emphasis on networking as a process – with stress on ‘relationship building’, personal contact and, as respondent ‘2j’ points out, ‘reaching everybody’s door’ – is 1

Such as, facilitating the Transit Centre sub-committee to propose a model of good practice, and developing the 2003 working paper through synthesising discussions between JN and the District Commissioner’s Office. 2 In describing leadership qualities, respondent ‘5j’ emphasises ‘humour’ as necessary for networking. (JN Interview 5j/E6).

208 contrasted in Box 25 with what respondent ‘2j’ refers to as an ‘office approach’. Instead of visiting JN membership ‘personally’, he complains, even invitation to meetings is by letter, which is delivered by a messenger (see statement ‘a’). Narratives, therefore, express concern about a communication gap between the present coordinator, perceived to be absorbed in ‘unknown’ office duties (see statements ‘b’ and ‘c’), and the member organizations. Box 25: Statements about JN’s ‘formal’ bureaucratic approach a)

“Some things he has not actually lived up to our expectations. Mm. He rather: tends to: for example, these meetings, I don’t see him personally come out to say: he’s using more of the office approach: just find somebody to take a letter.” (2j/E6)

b)

“And the office\. I don’t know exactly what they do in the office/. Or what techniques are there: what programmes are there/.” (JN Interview 7j/D3)

c)

“The people we put in offices (.) are just too busy (.) at times. […] They have got very many other duties to carry out. […] Now we are a bit cut off. […] For us these general meetings we get information\. I even believe for the past 4 months I have not had any meeting.” (JN Interview 7j/D3)

d)

“Because I have not seen circulars that come from there. The meeting: apart from the meeting. (.) If: (.) is it a year now? (.) If it is a year now he would have collected some (.) some other things and call us together, we share.” (JN Interview 5j/A4)

Not only does respondent ‘7j’ complain of being cut off from the flow JN information, he also points out that JN’s monthly ‘General Meetings’, the principal JN space in which information should be shared (JN, 2003, p.9)1, are also infrequent. Table 11.4, on the following page, backs up this claim of a reduced frequency of JN General Meetings to which all organizations are invited, which corresponds to the hand over of JN coordination2.

1

The JN General Meeting is the ‘supreme policy making body’ according to JN’s Constitution (JN, 2003:9). 2 Although five Executive meetings are recorded for the year 2003 till 2004, these were only for the five executive committee members, and were poorly attended.

209 Respondent ‘5j’ in statement ‘d’ (Box 25) adds to this list of what she sees as communication failures. Apart from the infrequent meetings, she points out, no information flows between the ‘leadership’1 and membership, even in the form of circulars. Period in Years

No. of General meetings*

Jul 2001 till Jun 2002

9


10


2

*Count based on minutes of meetings, then corroborated with JN coordinator Table 11.4: Comparison of frequency of JN general meetings July 2001 till June 2004

Such an apparent weakness in communication across JN membership, perhaps explains many other problems JN has experienced in sustaining cohesion. Indeed, if there is little ‘personal’ contact (e.g. through the coordinator’s visits to organizations and their representatives), little official communication (e.g. through circulars), and only very infrequent General Meetings, how do member organizations get information and how are conflicts resolved? Box 26: Statements about implications of failure in JN communication a)

“[The fun and friendliness has] gone out, as I told you. Some, we are hearing a lot of aah (.) unsatisfaction from members: from members of the network: how finances are being handled for example\. (.) How some activities are being implemented and so on. So it’s: those kind of things, it’s like kill: bring up to suspicion: people like: because there is a lot of suspicion you go to a meeting and people are on their guard. This never used to be there. They would be on their guard and you have to be very careful what you say because it may be misinterpreted because somebody is on their guard and are ready to capture (.) anything, and interpret it in their own way.” (JN Interview 3j/D2)

b)

[Interviewer question: ‘And are these problems between organizations resolved?] As I told you, that now that our meeting are no longer there we don’t know exactly […] Because we would have gone through the [problem] in our meeting.” (JN Interview 7j/E1)

1

‘Leadership’ refers to the Executive Committee.

210

The implications of communication breakdown for JN cohesion are made very plain by respondent ‘3j’ in statement ‘a’ (Box 26). In the place of an environment where ‘friendly’ and ‘fun’ relationships are given great value, the respondent says that she ‘hears reports of dissatisfaction’ about how the coalition is coordinated. With little ‘official’ or ‘personal’ communication from the coordinator, reports on activities, processes of decision-making, and accountability are discussed ‘informally’ between clusters of member organizations, with the limited information they have at their disposal. Limited knowledge may then be misinterpreted. With little information to challenge such rumour, reputations are given that perhaps reflect partisan opinion and, unchallenged by the free flow of other forms of communication, appear to gain the legitimacy of truth. Suspicion replaces hard earned trust and ‘official’ communication within meetings becomes ‘guarded’. As the meetings become scarcer, respondent ‘7j’ argues, so too does the ability of resolve conflict (see statement ‘b’ in Box 26).

11.4.4

Knowledge in coalition-building processes, and narratives of ‘duty’

The CAC model (see Fig. 3) and the research CAC carried out between 2000 and 2003, appear to set the coordinator’s prime task as ‘knowing each member organization intimately’. This was seen as essential for representing members’ interests by integrating their knowledge into a broader environmental framework, from which strategic possibilities might emerge. Ideological and methodological sensitivity can only come through intimate knowledge of JN organizations and their representatives. According to CAC’s model, this broader framework of knowledge needs to be acquired, discussed and disseminated between member organizations. Such processes are encouraged and mediated through the coordinator’s interaction with the coalition’s members (CAC, 2000), for which purpose he is employed. Limited knowledge of what is likely to underpin member organizations opinions, therefore, is likely to limit ‘appropriate’ representation to the outside world and, more importantly for coalition cohesion, between member organizations themselves. Appearing to treat one position more seriously than another will clearly undermine such cohesion, creating an environment of suspicion and fear. Indeed, for the coordinator, favouring one specific perspective over others is likely to also skew knowledge of Jinja as a complex environment of intersecting interests, limiting understanding of what might generate JN’s strategic possibilities.

211 Where the member organizations feel suspicion (e.g. that one organization’s interests are favoured over others), fear of self-disclosure (e.g. perhaps because of JMC’s threat of sanction) or inequality of representation (e.g. where JMC characterisation of street children as ‘criminal’ appears to dominate), it is perhaps likely that they either wholly or partly withdraw from proactive participation1. Implementation of initiatives such as the Transit Centre, which depends on inter-agency cooperation, therefore becomes problematic. What happens to the coalition-building project when member organizations’ relationships, which had been based on ‘the personal touch’, ‘friendship’, and ‘trust’, are now based on suspicion, fear and feelings of not being represented fairly? Box 27: Statements about JN initiatives as ‘duty’ a)

“… at times they like to go out of commission:I don’t know\. (.) that they fail to do their work:you know/?”(6j/B3)

In statement ‘a’, in Box 27, the coordinator acknowledges the partial withdrawal of some organizations. However, rather than seeing the problem located in a failure of trust, he instead sees it as a failure of ‘duty’. This narrative of ‘duty’ appears also in JN’s 2004 Transit Centre evaluation report (JN, 2004, p.3). One recommendation reads, “The Children could be looked after at the T/C [Transit Centre] without necessarily going to [organization ‘3j’]. Here the committee called for cooperation from [‘3j’]. The committee says that teachers, and Social Workers from [‘3j’] would be moving to T/C to offer their services to the children.” In a half-day research feedback workshop in March 2005, one participant declared that had it not been for JN’s intervention, organization ‘3j’ would have been closed down by JMC. As a consequence, he seemed to imply, ‘3j’ should feel obliged to fulfil its ‘duty’ in supporting JN initiatives2. Perhaps the implementation of JN Transit Centre initiative, which had been agreed upon by various member organizations, does also carry with it an implied ‘duty’. However, rather than promoting a networking environment, narratives of ‘duty’ do tend to also run parallel to narratives of obligation and ‘sanction’. For organization ‘3j’, one sanction may be JMC’s threat of project closure; another is ‘3j’’s

1 2

This, indeed, was the case with organization ‘3j’. My Field Journal 3 notes.

212 expulsion from JN’s Executive Committee for poor participation – which appears to have been done in July 2005 (JN Email to me, July 2005)1. From our previous discussion, it becomes clear that weaknesses in JN’s cohesion may be attributed to many more influences than the ‘formalization’ of JN’s governance structures alone. Weaknesses may equally be partly attributed to the coordinator’s training that may not have stressed sufficiently the importance of networking as a process; or to failure in JN’s membership to give the coordinator sufficient direction; or perhaps the coordinator and leadership’s own emphasis on a particular organizational ‘style’. Weaknesses may be also partly attributed to intentional or inadvertent interest alliances that court or undermine coordination; or, indeed, to the coordinator’s own capacity or aptitude in ‘relationship building’ across diverse organizations. There is also more recent evidence of donor manipulation of strategic action planning across three JN organizations, which has caused some controversy2. So, if ‘formalization’ has not been seen to specifically enhance the networking ‘process’ of binding diverse ideologies and methodologies, what functions do respondents see it contributing to JN?

11.4.5

How has ‘formalization’ benefited Jinja Network?

Claims that ‘formalization’ gives member organizations clarity, establishes boundaries, and holds them to account, prove questionable in the light of the experiences described above. Indeed, making one member organization’s ideology and approach ‘accountable’ to another, seems inevitably to guarantee that ‘toes are stepped on’3. Blockages to effective coalition building caused by this ‘stepping on toes’, weaknesses of networking communication (e.g. meetings and circulars) and the consequent climate of suspicion and fear, described by respondent ‘3j’, perhaps also place a big question mark over claims that formalization can bring greater ‘efficiency’. Indeed, as the coordinator also points out, expecting too much – such as the demanding governance roles ascribed to the Executive Committee members – will inevitably lead to the falling short of expectations and potentially conflict born from this. However, ‘formalization’ is seen to serve what respondents perceive as the very important symbolic and practical functions of legitimising JN with local and central government. Registration with Jinja District, respondent ‘4j’ points out, gave JN the legitimacy 1

However, having initially withdrawn, organization 3j returned to JN under new management in late 2005. JN email correspondence with me in July 2005. 3 This was an expression that was used in the 2005 research feedback workshop. 2

213 necessary for JMC technical officers and politicians to join its membership. For respondent ‘5j’ (see statement ‘a’, Box 28), belonging to JN – as an organization recognized and legitimised through ‘partnership’ with both local and central government – elevates its member organizations to ‘serious’ service providers, in the eyes of government, rather than ones looking merely for their own financial gain. Respondent ‘2j’ (see statement ‘b’, Box 28) observes that, as a divisional Child Rights Advocate member of a ‘formalized’ JN1, he is invited by divisional leadership to speak on children’s issues in the divisional policy making forum. Respondent ‘5j’ (statement ‘c’, Box 28) also argues that ‘formalization’ of government partnership within JN gives a level of continuity in relationships with government departments, even though an officer may be changed. Respondent ‘2j’ (statement ‘d’, Box 28) also notes that JN’s formal registration and its partnership with government within JN membership, protects its member CBOs and NGOs from their traditional vulnerability to local government interference. Box 28: Statements about ‘formalization’ as legitimacy a)

“We are able to go to the ministry […] as a CBO operating on children, […] and [having the] recognition that we are in for the helping of the children, but not only to think, ‘that NGO that comes looking for money’. (1.0) So I think [formalization] has an impact.” (5j/E9)

b)

“Participation you can now find, even at division level. You can find the Chairman [saying …], ‘we have an official of Jinja Network here. Can you say something?’ So, registration, that formalisation of relationship has really been very useful.” (2j/E9)

c)

“These [government officials] who support us may be there today and tomorrow they are not there, and then they come out and say ‘what are they doing?’ (.) Then you have something to say but, (.) ‘this is what we did and it was formalised and some people signed’, then quickly they come back to their minds.” (5j/E8)

d)

So (.) [negative government interference] eases. (.) They don’t even bother you a lot, they just know ‘this is from the transit centre’, ‘yes, this is from the Jinja Network’, ‘yes’ because already they know there’s something in existence and (.) the official position.” (2j/E9)

1

Both in the legal sense and as an organization seen to ‘partner’ divisional government.

214 Formalization of government partnership within JN is also observed by respondents ‘6j’, ‘8j’ and ‘10j’, to give JN a degree of ‘gate-keeping authority’ in monitoring and approving new ‘street children’ initiatives that have sought registration to operate within Jinja municipality. New organizations seek approval from JMC’s Assistant Town Clerk for Social Welfare – who is also the JN chairperson. Of no less importance for implementing JN’s considerable and ambitious plan of action, formalization is seen to give great advantage in gaining the confidence of donors. JN’s report for the financial year ending in March, 2004 shows that its activities are funded to the tune of approximately a 44 million shillings (approximately £14, 200). It has also acquired property estimated at approximately 23.5 million shillings (JN, 2004a).

11.5

Summary of Jinja Network’s coalition building experience

This chapter (i.e. Chapter 11) describes how Jinja Network has historically developed. Jinja Network has located its maturation within less bounded social and political spaces and processes than Kampala. However, processes of strategic formalization of the coalition have proved problematic in addressing emerging concerns for (in)dependencies and accountability deficits. Formalization appears to cover many areas of Jinja Network such as the development of formal criteria for ‘strategic’ membership and the strategic plan of action. In its approach Jinja Network has displayed ‘strategic’ intent from its beginning, not only determining strategic criteria for its membership but also in acting opportunistically to exploit political spaces and potential alliances as they presented themselves. Typical of this opportunism was the offer and acceptance of membership for the Jinja Municipal Council’s (JMC) Assistant Town Clerk for Social Welfare (ATC/SW). The ATC/SW then became the conduit through which Jinja Network was able to develop multi-sectoral partnership from within, binding NGO, CBO and JMC approaches to street children – at least within JN’s strategic planning process. Problems with formalization in Jinja Network appear linked to the withdrawal of ‘informal’ processes of relationship building and sustaining. Many of the problems of

215 communication deficit appear also to link in with a deficit of ‘knowledge’ gathering, discussing and disseminating as part of relationship building and reputation promotion. However, there appear to be inevitable tensions that are located within the intersection of demands made on organizations within the coalition building project, and resistances to ideological compromise. Boundaries also exist for the coordinator between common coalition space and specific members’ space, making it problematic to find a balance between collaborative mobilisation and ‘stepping on toes’ by demanding too much compromise from apparently entrenched member organizations’ positions. However, making previously ‘independent’ NGO and government action dependent on and accountable to other organizations and sectors has proved problematic. Distinctive ideological and methodological approaches have proved resilient. For instance, local government seems loath to give up its independent ‘round-up’ of street children, which acts as a political display of getting tough on criminality – even though this goes against its own JN agreement for a coordinated NGO welfare response. Likewise, even though JN Transit Centre was constructed as an agreed short-term ‘night’ referral house for full-time street children1, NGOs have had equal problems:

giving up the principle and practice of the seeing the street as a legitimate space for rehabilitation of ‘full-time’ street children (even where the Transit Centre offers an alternative space), and, like the government,

giving up some degree of ‘independency’ in their methodological approach to street child rehabilitation.

Recent decline in the cohesiveness in Jinja Network may be partly attributed to this apparent resistance to ideological and methodological inter-dependency. However, equally, within ‘formalization’ of JN in March 2003, a shift in how coalition building is done has contributed to the apparent declining ability of JN to mediate between divergent organizations’ positions. With formalization, the previous ‘informal’ PAR relationship building approach of JN’s initial coordinating agency, CAC, gave way to a more bureaucratic ‘office-bound’ approach of a ‘coordinator employee’. The decline in the ‘personal’ approach has also been accompanied by a reduction in the flow of information between JN and member organizations, and a decline in meetings and meeting attendance, 1

The NGOs were part of the initial research into both its feasibility and its ‘good practice’ methodology.

216 which are described by both JN’s1 authoritative documents and interview responses as necessary for mediating conflict. For these reasons, and because the non-communication is assumed by a number of members to hide a degree of conspiratorial bias, a climate of suspicion, apprehension and ‘rumour’ has led to further guardedness and even withdrawal by some members from the few meetings that are convened. Although perhaps not recognised by the Executive Committee as such, the recent expulsion of one NGO member from the committee that was also perceived to be accompanied by threat of local government action against it, does present the danger of coalition building beginning to model itself on principles of ‘duty and sanction’ rather than forging and sustaining relationships of ‘trust’, ‘friendship’, and ‘fun’ that were claimed to have bound diverse organizations together initially. Interestingly, however, there is evidence that organizations whose representatives wear multiple ideological hats – being, for instance, both representatives of civil society organizations and local government officials – and some local government ‘technical’ officers (i.e. not ‘politicians’) find the accommodation of apparently conflicting ideological and methodological positions less problematic. Although ‘formalization’ – such as registration with the district, the writing of a constitution, the election of an Executive Committee, the opening of a bank account, etc. – appears to have added little in the way of mediating ideological and methodological conflict, it is, nevertheless, experienced as serving an important symbolic and practical function of legitimising JN with local and central government, and by doing so also elevating the status of many of the smaller member organizations, giving them greater access to and influence on local government policy-making spaces (which we examine in greater depth in Chapter 12). Also of great importance, formalization has given JN access to donor support, which often demands it. An interesting link between the previous chapter on Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum and this on Jinja Network is the degree to which many of the complaints about accountability to member organizations appear to have been resolved within Jinja Network’s more ‘formal’ configuration, despite many of the frailties of communication. The main complaint of the Forum, how resources are informally controlled appear not to be so in relatively formal accounting procedures in Jinja. 1

For example, Jinja Network Constitution.

217

Chapter 12: Coalition partnership with government: influencing policy-making in Kampala and Jinja As seen in the last two chapters, both coalitions acknowledge the importance of their relationship with government. Registration and good relationships with key government officials are understood as necessary for legitimisation of the NGO in a political environment hostile to the street children NGO. However, each coalition has chosen very different approaches to developing a more robust government relationship, with very different results. The Forum’s leadership appears to have chosen an arm’s length approach, preferring to define the Inter NGO Forum in terms of an autonomous NGO ‘voice’ advocating for street children. Jinja Network, on the other hand, has chosen to pursue street children advocacy by binding government within its coalition- and partnershipbuilding processes. This chapter, therefore, explores how, first for Kampala and then for Jinja, these attitudes and approaches determine the types of relationship that each coalition develops with government, and how these relationships are seen to impact government perception and programming for street children. Of particular interest is how the coalition’s configuration and its sectoral (op)positioning are seen to influence access to policy-influencing spaces. Also examined are national and local patterns of governance in which ‘decentralisation’ competes with ‘command and control’ dynamics for political control of the street children agenda. I examine what impact this might have for street children policy-influencing option in later chapters.

12.1

Kampala Inter-NGO Forum and government partnership

12.1.1

Obstacles to partnership: NGO perception and experience of local government, political manipulation and Forum ‘informality’

As illustrated in Chapter 11, inevitably partnership building between NGOs and government involves confronting the many issues of ideological and methodological difference. However, it is necessary to explore further what these differences are in the context of Kampala. I do this by describing the perceived obstacles to partnership as they emerge from both interviews and the diverse Forum and government documents. Having done this we may then go on to examine to what extent both the Forum and government have been able to find accommodation for these differences and furthermore been able to invest in exploration and pursuit of mutual strategic possibilities.

218 In Chapter 10 respondents describe Kampala’s abrasive political environment for NGOs to which NGO coalition building is claimed to have been largely motivated. Respondents paint a picture of being summoned to consultation meetings in which NGOs’ activities were often portrayed as an obstacle rather than a help to urban order1. The NGOs’ different understanding of streetism and, therefore, different proposals for street children’s rehabilitation, were included in such criticism. Government appears impatient at the NGO’s ‘humble handling’, or ‘gentle persuasion’ of street children, who it characterises as ‘stubborn’ and ‘out of parental control’ (see Chapter 10, statement ‘d’ in Box 2). Government’s impatience, government officer ‘Gk’ appears to argue in Box 29, is with the NGOs’ approach that appears to give street children the choice of whether or not to stay on the street. Box 29: Statement on government characterisation and proposal for street children a)

“But there are those ones who are just stubborn saying, ‘for us we are going nowhere’. So that there the government has to come in with:with (1.0) reasonable force. Just to pick them up. (1.0) Pick them up, put them in a certain institution and then talk to them.” (Government Interview, Gk/2a.3)

The government, ‘Gk’ argues, sees such an approach as inappropriate for what it calls ‘hardcore’ street children. Government’s portrayal of street children as ‘deviant’, therefore, appears to act as justification for street children’s forced removal to Kampringisa National Rehabilitation Centre (which seems to act principally as ‘holding centre’2). Such narratives of deviance and criminality appear to act as an apologetic smoke screen for government welfare departments who are placed under considerable political pressure to quickly remove the child from the street. Indeed, the Ministry of Tourism and other ‘high ups’ (meaning the President’s Office) are accredited with forcing the Kampringisa programme through. This follows previous patterns of street ‘clean-ups’ that, for instance, accompanied Bill Clinton’s 1999 Uganda visit.

1

For instance, several mentions were made of just such a condemnation by the Hon. Mukwaya, in 1999 (e.g. INF Minute 02/99-2). 2 Apart from services provided by the Forum, Kampringisa’s ‘rehabilitation’ task has always been problematic.

219 For the sake, therefore, of tourism and superficial displays of ‘urban order’, political pressure for immediate removal of street children was seen to override the Ministry of Gender’s own street child working guidelines (i.e. MGLSD, 1999)1. Under such political pressure, respondent 17k appears to argue, the Forum’s welfare concerns of street children is seen of secondary importance (see statement ‘a’, Box 30). Box 30: Statement on impact of political pressure on the street children agenda a)

“And the problem like the NGO Forum has not impacted is because the problems of street children (.) is not necessarily the Ministry of Gender issue\. It has many political: social connotations. (.) So sometimes the political convention may overweigh, (.) and then it makes the Forum looks as if it has no …” (INF Interview 17k/F6)

Indeed, remembering what he interprets as the Forum’s helplessness at trying to influence appropriate action for street children during pre-Kampringisa consultation meetings with the Ministry of Gender, respondent ‘14k’ recalls, “We weren’t being asked to come in and dispute the necessity to remove children from the street, immediately, by force. We weren’t in a position to contest that. The ministry was feeling under tremendous pressure and shared very openly with us the letters that had come from various (.) /extremely high offices […] right to the top. And they were, you know, under pressure to do something fast.” (INF Interview, 14k/F6) The government emphasis on quick and straightforward solutions during its Kampringisa exercise was also seen by NGOs, experienced in street children rehabilitation, to promote inappropriate and impractical social work approaches. NGO respondents note that, during the first phase of Kampringisa, the rapid resettlement of street children to their homes appeared to be understood by government as a logistical rather than welfare problem. It was based on the assumption that street children just needed to be delivered home. There was little acknowledgement of the complex psycho-social and economic factors that might have caused the child to run to the street in the first place (e.g. see Box 31).

1

The legal framework for the charge ‘Idle and disorderly’, the only charge that could be made, remains a controversial one to be applied to street children. The children therefore remain under lock and key in Kampringisa without being charged for any offence. There are also accounts of one or two children having been incarcerated at Kampringisa for over two years! (Notes from informal discussions, Field Journal Number 3)

220

Box 31: Statements about government approach to resettlement a)

“KCC and government […] tend to address the symptoms (.) of this problem, (.) and leave the root causes. (1.0) The thing needs, like multi-sectoral (.) approach. (.) You know/? It’s not a matter of taking these children out of the street and take them to the community (.) without addressing (.) the problem why they left the /community. So if you can’t just deal with one aspect. (.) The thing will again come back.” (INF Interview 6k/B1)

b)

“[T]here is an assumption that still exists that (.) any child on the street (.) can be resettled back to his or her family. […] [T]here are certain situations where you cannot take a child back to: that would not be in the best interests of the child to be reunited with their relatives because they are subject to gross (.) abuse. [… We should not allow] ourselves to slip back into the comfort zone that some of those assumptions allow us, you know, ‘all children can be resettled, so let’s just take them back to their villages’” (INF Interview 14k/F6)

In anther example, KCC’s 2001 ‘master plan’ for street children proposed District Welfare Committees as referral conduits for resettlement of street children. Such supervision would fall on the District Probation and Social Welfare Officer. However, the District Probation office was widely acknowledged to be under-resourced, working with a minimal staff on an unrealistic workload, and with the incapacity to even monitor existing NGO service provision1. In such strategic thinking, therefore, government apportioning of responsibility tends to more service a bureaucratic notion of good planning than it does the capacity of such an office to implement its responsibility2. In both examples, Forum respondents argue that what looks well designed on paper is clearly inappropriate for taking on the psychosocial and structural challenges of resettlement – where, for instance, the child’s home is unable to support the child, the child does not wish to return home, or there is evidence of extreme abuse (e.g. see statement ‘a’ and ‘b’, Box 31).

1

As we shall see later, the majority of respondents complain that, after registration, there are no visits by local government to monitor their programmes, despite commitment in its Practice Guidelines document to do so ‘… at least twice every year’ (MGLSD, 1999:15). 2 This gap between planning and possibility is perhaps what has also plagued implementation of the Kampringisa project from the beginning.

221

12.1.2

Influence of Forum ‘informality’ on partnership with government

The competitive way government partnership has traditionally been approached by NGOs also appears an obstacle to broader Forum-level partnership with government. In statement ‘a’ in Box 32, respondent 17k points out that partnership with government is only made with ‘individual’ NGOs who are considered competent for implementing a specific government programme. Box 32: Statements about government preference for ‘individual’ partnership a)

“That one is there [i.e. partnership-building]: its now between individual (.) NGOs than:than everybody. Like, we have a very strong partnership with KCC. KCC funds our health programmes in the slums, funds our seminars, (.) [and] invites us for meetings. Partnership is more on the problem area (.) than the groups. If they know this NGO is very good at:at health programmes, substance abuse, they work with you. But they don’t work with everybody.” (INF Interview 17k/F1)

b)

“The partnership with government (.) erm meant that they came first (.) to me as coordinator of the Inter-NGO Forum (.) and asked me to list (.) those NGOs which (.) they felt (.) erm (.) were credible, (.) they felt were (.) erm were actually doing the work that they were claiming to do, (.) erm (.) and who could be incorporated into the Kampringisa programme.” (14k/F1)

b)

“Government is selective with a few chosen NGOs … They have really realised that (.) the leaders of the Forum and some other development organizations, are the ones who benefit a lot (.) from the government programmes, the partnership with the government and so on\. So, for them they feel that (.) coming every month and sharing your experience, that is wasting your time (2k/B5)

Being a recipient of government funding, 17k appears to support government emphasis on neither working with everybody, nor with groups. Following the same logic, respondent 14k describes how he, as Forum coordinator, responds to specific government requests for collaboration by selecting and then proposing ‘credible’ Forum organizations – in this case, for phase one of the Kampringisa programme to resettle street children to their homes.

222 All this is presented as very practical and commonsensical for both the government and the coordinator as informal leader of the Forum. Government, on one hand, with all its logistical problems preventing effective monitoring of existing services, has to expend less effort in determining the ‘credibility’ of organizations through which to implement its programmes, and therefore also to whom it channels its funding. On the other hand, with his intimate knowledge of the capacity and ‘credibility’ of the Forum’s member organizations, the coordinator is able to determine which is matched to the government service provision criteria. However, in statement ‘c’, respondent ‘2k’, from one of the smallest member organizations, complains that such an arrangement only benefits the leading Forum organizations – perhaps mirroring the dynamics of power imbalances at work in the Forum structures and practices as described in Chapter 10 (even if inadvertently). Indeed, the Forum’s ‘informal’ partnership building approach with government seems to present a general credibility problem for the smaller organization in its pursuit of government support. For the smaller ‘grassroots’ organization, financial and organizational accountability mechanisms are often ill fitted to stringent government demands. Nor does the Forum’s ‘informal’ structure and lack of strategic orientation give it the option or capacity of becoming a conduit of such resources. Not only does the Forum lack robust and accountable procedures and mechanisms for handling and disbursing resources, but also it appears to lack the intention to do so. The Forum’s lack of criteria to control which organizations it allows membership is also seen to contribute towards this ‘credibility’ problem. For example, I observed that one small member organization continually matched his target population to new sources of funding rather than for any particular fixed welfare objective. If the coordinator should include such an organization in government partnership opportunities, therefore, the Forum’s claim to promote ‘good practice’ becomes compromised, its credibility with government undermined and government’s critique of NGO practices validated1. To preserve credibility, therefore, resource-based partnership building with government has remained principally at the discretion of the coordinator. Rather than seeing such opportunities in the context of potentially broader coalition strategies, the coordinator ‘informally’ hands them on to ‘competent’ individual organizations (inevitably being 1

It should be noted that many other respondents also questioned this one organization’s intentions and therefore ‘credibility’.

223 better resourced). In this way, the coordinator is able to avoid the necessity to address the Forum’s credibility, accountability and strategy-setting deficits. Its reputation is therefore retained by informally distributing partnership opportunities only to bigger and better resourced member organizations.

12.1.3

Government reluctance to develop ‘formal’ partnerships

There is also considerable evidence to show that the government has been equally reluctant to enter formal partnership arrangements with the Forum. Table 12.1, below, shows the number of times government officials have responded to the invitation to attend Forum monthly meetings. Although, in the Forum’s monthly meeting of April 2001, KCC declared its commitment to attend all Forum meetings “… to enter discussions with them [i.e. NGOs] about the best way forward” (INF Minutes 04/01-4), this was the last time KCC attended. In fact only one other government officer has attended since.

Governmental designation

Total

Year (attendances)

attendances Community Liaison CPS

1

1999 (1)

Juvenile Welfare Services (KCC)

1

1998 (1)

Kampala City Council

1

2001 (1)

Ministry – either DED or PCY reps.

5

1997-99 (4), & 2001 (1)

Ministry – Street Children Desk Officer

1

2002 (1)

Total government attendances

9 (last attendance = 2002)

Table 12.1: Government Attendance At Forum Monthly Meetings – Dec 1997 Till June 2004

This reluctance is also mirrored in government’s apparent resistance to more formal partnership arrangements for Kampringisa. As part of Kampringisa’s Phase One, four Forum NGOs, selected by the coordinator, had been given some government resources to resettle street children during the first few months of operation. These resources were quickly exhausted and resettlement has largely dried up. Despite children being detained for long periods, in breach of the government’s own child welfare legislation, the government appears reluctant to consider a referral arrangement with the Forum. Statements in Box 33 reflect respondents’ frustration that government does not formally acknowledge the Forum’s considerable support for Kampringisa through its Kampringisa Support Team. The Forum’s assistance is clearly necessary. According to many ‘informal’

224 reports from both Forum and government respondents1 (in both Kampala and Jinja), without Forum support the government rehabilitation centre would remain bereft of even the most basic welfare provision. Box 33: Statements about government resistance to formal partnership a)

“Kampringisa was part of it, because it’s like: (.) its like we were chasing wind. (1.0) It’s like you’re trying to do something, yet those people (1.0) they are not recognising what you are doing/; (.) they are not appreciating it (.) and they are hostile\. (INF Interview 13k/D3)

b)

“It’s like (.) we are forcing the government on certain Kampringisa issues and a: the government is (.) a little bit hard, (.) you know? (INF Interview 11k/A4)

c)

“That partnership is not smooth really. Yeah, because er our:it’s like maybe the Kampala Inter-NGO Forum \imposing itself on government (laughs).” (INF Interview 13k/F1)

One contributor to the Kampringisa Support Team describes conditions in the following way: “[…] because (.) the:there were moments when there was no running water; there were moments when the clinic wasn’t working; there was not medicines to look after the children; there were some few deaths: I think two deaths (.) of malaria. You know, the clinics didn’t even have er (.) basic (.) er medications like Panadol. (.) And er the children were not going to school: there were no desks in the classrooms. You know/, and yet government, through the office of the First Lady, (.) rehabilitated the place to become really, really nice. (.) But, although the place was really nice, we had children who were dressed in rags, children who were waking up in the morning and just /walking and: really/ being on the streets in one way or another, because they were idle, they had nothing to do.” (19k/E1) However, despite the services the Forum’s Kampringisa Support Team was able to bring to improve conditions for the child, respondent ‘13k’ observes (see Box 33), pursuing recognition and acknowledgement of the necessity of Forum assistance in effective rehabilitation services in Kampringisa is like “chasing wind”. Respondents ‘13k’ and ‘11k’

1

One government official ‘unofficially’ described to me how after about six months children had had to raid local villages for food because it had not been budgeted for at Kampringisa by government (Field Journal, No. 3).

225 complain that the Forum appears to be ‘forcing’ or ‘imposing’ the Forum on a reluctant government. So why this resistance? Box 34: Statements about government resistance to formal partnership a)

“Because many people have been: many other organizations, big organizations have been: are sending some funds, you know, towards Kampringisa. But very little has been done to change the place and, you know, even for the welfare of the children. So, I think they feel bad when they see other people coming in to (.) fill those gaps that they should have filled a long time ago.” (13k/F1)

b)

It’s like […] they actually don’t want the outside world to know that we are doing something in Kampringisa, though it is very positive. Maybe they feel we are doing what they should have done and maybe failed to do/.” (13k/F1)

In Box 34, respondent ‘13k’ suspects that any acknowledgement by government of NGOs’ provision of basic services at Kampringisa would be perceived by government as equally an acknowledgement of its failure and inability to make such provision itself. Various other respondents also suspect that the government has been discreetly negotiating funds for the services already being provided by the Kampringisa Support Team, with the aim perhaps of reasserting its control1. There are also accounts about how initially there had been considerable political competition within government for control of Kampringisa’s 155 million Uganda shillings2 start-up budget (Jacob et al., 2003). Although this thesis has neither the capacity nor intention to test the veracity of such claims, it can nevertheless acknowledge NGOs’ suspicion that government’s reluctance to officially recognize the Forum Support Team may partly spring from a desire to control the Kampringisa programme and its resource inputs, on one side, and its fear of being exposed for its poor service provision for street children within Kampringisa, on the other side. Clearly, Kampringisa is a very specific type of ‘partnership’ arrangement with its own complex of dynamics and politics that are seen to determine who controls its agenda and why. It may nevertheless be indicative of the broader exercise of political control that might act to impede the partnership building processes. Indeed, rather than refer themselves solely to Forum frailties, many of the previously discussed ‘obstacle’ 1 2

More corrupt intentions were also suspected by some respondents. Approximately £50,000.

226 narratives are to do with government reluctance to adapt itself to environmental conditions necessary for broader partnership opportunities. Adaptation would, after all, inevitably require the ceding of a degree of government control over both processes and spaces in which government and ‘non-government’ engage. Box 35: Statements about Forum registration a)

“For us, once you are registered, (1.0) as an NGO, (.) you’re registered as a CBO. Because before you have this kind of registration, you must satisfy certain conditions. (.) Once you are registered we feel you are competent enough to come to:to a real service. (1.0) And: we:we: definitely the InterNGO Forum: you know we have got to work the structure.” (Government Interview Gk/2b.1)

By way of illustration, in statement ‘a’ in Box 35 a KCC officer respondent emphasises that non-governmental agencies should conform to local government procedures, rules and regulations – what he terms ‘working the structure’1 (statement ‘a’ in Box 35). His demand, therefore, is that partnership-building configures itself to a bureaucratic framework predetermined by notions of local government order. The reality of scant resources and overloaded departmental responsibilities means that the government itself is often unable to work within its own ‘notional’ framework – set out in the 1997 Local Governments Act (UG, 1997, p.116)2 and 1995 Children’s Statute. Forum respondents see this as an imbalanced demand. Whilst going through arduous processes of annual registration with central and district government, many respondents appear frustrated that government does not fulfil its monitoring and evaluation task for the NGO. The Forum’s registration with KCC, therefore, appears to Forum leadership as either an unnecessary duplication of existing individual NGO registration of questionable value, or to serve some more hidden control or income generation purpose. On one side, the Forum’s reluctance to register with KCC may undermine the seriousness in which it may be taken. On the other side, however, KCC’s apparent equal reluctance to engage an ‘informal’ Forum is no less a factor in limiting the potentially productive partnership-building possibilities with the NGO and CBO community. As we have seen, the nature of the distribution of resources through the Forum, and the lack of a broader strategic framework for street children at

1

Even though Kampringisa clearly does not! This falls in the Act’s Second Schedule, ‘Functions and services of government and local government’, Part 2:5. 2

227 district level, is as much about government reluctance to explore such possibilities with the Forum as it is about Forum structural deficits.

12.1.4

What is sought in partnership-building with government

However, the importance of a broader framework for ‘working government structures’ to address the social and structural influences on child marginalization is stressed consistently by all Forum respondents. Box 36: Statements about local government authority over the Forum a)

“Er like I told you at the beginning, (.) you need the blessing (.) of the people (.) to have your programmes succeed. And as I told you, people in Uganda (.) listen so much to the structures: the local council structures. (.) So you cannot do […] without them. (.) You have a very strong support and a strong ground (.) if you work with them.” (INF Interview 8k/B6)

b)

“I think it’s dangerous not to. I think if we operate in isolation, then […] we sort of come across all kinds of (.) \pitfalls.” (INF Interview 14k/F5)

Emphasising what she sees as the essence of such processes, respondent 8k appears to suggest that ‘the people’s’ approval and support of social welfare programming is intimately interconnected to ‘local council’ approval and support (see statement ‘a’ in Box 36). Her reference is clearly to ideological principles promoted by Uganda’s Movement system of village-level democracy. Within Movement discourse, the ‘people’s’ consent is strongly associated with local council authority and representation1. However, whether or not it is driven by NGO2 demands on government or the local and central government demands on the NGO community, the imperative to seek formal approval, and the pressure on the NGO to engage with government, respondent 14k goes on to argue, is nevertheless largely determined by the NGO’s own “[…] understanding [of] the social and political climate we’re working in.” (INF Interview 14k/F5) Respondents

present very different understandings of Kampala’s political climate within

which the Forum operates. Most respondents’ narratives about government partnership do, 1 2

For this ideological principle of local democratization within the LC system, refer to Chapter 9. However, the idea that the NGO can represent ‘civil society’ is contested (see Chapter 4).

228 however, acknowledge the Movement system of local government as potentially offering multiple types of space and opportunity for civil society engagement. Further inspection of why the Forum leadership chooses to take only a selective and fragmented approach to engaging in such spaces, therefore, will perhaps give us further insight into the particularly complex dynamics of partnership building between government and the Forum in Kampala.

12.1.5

Working ‘which’ local government structures?

Considering its founder organizations’ past experiences of ‘bullish’ local government treatment1, and government’s negative characterisation of the general NGO community (even if partly justified), the caution with which the Forum leadership2 approaches government engagement is perhaps understandable3. However, respondents’ narratives about obstacles and opportunities for partnership building also appear to frequently implicate specific and very distinctive levels of government and their institutions, applying very different meanings to each. Because of the very different character and experience of government institutions, therefore, the Forum appears to have made specific choices about which to engage with, and which to avoid, within the complex strata of central and local government in Kampala. These choices seem to have been based partly on Forum’s ‘understanding’ of specific functions ascribed to different levels of government4, but also the Forum leadership’s understanding of who they assume has both the power and the knowledge to control the street children agenda in Kampala (and Uganda). However, without any apparent coherent Forum strategy, choice seems also to have been strongly influenced by very basic currencies of relationship-building: ‘personableness’; nonbureaucratic ‘accessibility’, and the Forum being taken seriously. For this collection of reasons the Forum leadership appears to have chosen the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) with which to build its working relationship whilst, at least till now, excluding Kampala City Council (KCC). The respondents’ statements, in Box 37, appear to reinforce their principal reasoning for this emphasis on central government.

1

KCC’s bureaucratic authoritarianism of the late 1990s has been mentioned earlier. Partnership building at Forum level is reported to principally go through the Coordinator alone. 3 Indeed, the threat of government closure of the project in Jinja, mentioned in chapter 11, is mentioned in the Forum minutes (INF Minute 01/00-1). 4 That is, within the framework of the 1997 Local Governments Act. 2

229 Box 37: Statements on difference between local and central government a)

“Erm, there were times when we had contact with KCC but it was never very (.) straightforward and we probably didn’t invest enough time […] Erm, /so I think (.) er, some of that stems from […] this feeling of (1.0) being er (.) categorised as er (.) briefcase organizations.” (14k/F1)

b)

“[At] the Ministry level, we have had […] the (.) person who sits on the street children desk, Mr. Sam Acou. (.) He’s very interested in what we are doing\. (1.0) He’s very interested: he knows/ (.): you know like as government it is: at Ministry level they serve (.) everyone. You know? But at least Sam is always there. He’s always available, his desk is (.) available and (1.0) kind of like, he gives you an ear/. Then when you find him out of office, you can still talk about work/. (.) And because he knows his importance, his role (.) to us.” (19k/F6)

c)

“Because government is a very wide body. It has very many sectors, (.) whereby we NGOs […] we follow in those sectors. And I think (.) each NGO might fall in more than one. When we deal with children there is the Children’s Desk, youth, when it is gender, you fall there. When it is er (.) handling a local issue, you go to the local authorities, (.) you go to KCC. (1.0) There is: er when it is registration, there is Justice Ministry, (.) there is when you have to process a few things” (18k/F5)

Although respondent 14k acknowledges the desire to develop better relationships with KCC (as district-level local council), in statement ‘a’ he describes contacts, laced with the experience of bureaucratic ‘authoritarianism’ and accusations of impropriety, as “… never very straightforward”. By contrast, in statement ‘b’, respondent 19k paints a very different portrait of the Ministry’s Street Children’s Desk officer, Sam Acou. He is described as “… very interested in what we are doing”, “…always available”, “… gives you an ear”, and “…knows his importance [and] his role …” for the NGO community. In statement ‘c’, respondent 18k gives us further insight into the Forum’s choice of Ministry over KCC as the principal target of partnership building. The Ministry, he appears to argue, gives clarity, or ‘straightforwardness’, to the pursuit of discussions about street children. Indeed, whilst KCC’s District Probation and Welfare Officer, as is obvious by his title, is given multiple other tasks, the Ministry has a dedicated ‘street children desk’. It would therefore,

230 according to respondent 18k’s ‘understanding’ of government functions, be more appropriate to engage with the Ministry on street children issues. Respondents also ascribe far more ‘positive’ action on street children1, which also involves the NGO community, to the Ministry than to KCC. Respondent 14k gives an example of this, “… we’ve also joined forces with the government [i.e. through the Ministry](.) erm to launch the practice guidelines … And that was followed up by further workshops after that to produce the training manual that sits along side the practice manual. And this is (.) the kind of recommendations that were coming from (1.0) from the Ministry erm (.) but had been developed and designed with the help of the NGO community.” (INF Interview 14k/F1) However, in Kampala’s ‘decentralised’ political environment, theoretically both central and local government should have very distinctive roles and powers. That central government has assumed control over the ‘local’ street children agenda through its Kampringisa programme is somewhat confusing. Central government’s role, as defined by both Article 176 or the Constitution, and Schedule Two of the Local Governments Act, is to ensure that “… functions, powers and responsibilities are devolved and transferred from the Government to local government units in a co-ordinated manner [and] to ensure peoples’ participation and democratic control in decision making [within the Local Councils]”. (Schedule Two, Part 1:2) Part 2 of the same schedule goes on to define the functions, powers and responsibilities transferred to KCC. These include district planning, local government development planning, co-operative development, social rehabilitation, probation and welfare, street children and orphans, and youth affairs. The district council is also given considerable powers to make by-laws2 and tap local sources of revenue in pursuit of its responsibilities (Article 39, 1997 Local Governments Act). It is therefore perhaps somewhat surprising that the Ministry rather than KCC should have implemented the Kampringisa programme. Having now come to dominate both street children policy and practice in Kampala, the Kampringisa programme was clearly focused on removing Kampala’s street children

1

‘Rough treatment’ meted out by law enforcement officers during municipal ‘round ups’ is the respondents’ most commonly stated KCC action – although a number of larger organizations doing face-toface work with street children suggest this has become less so of late. 2 So long as these are consistent with the Constitution or any other law enacted by Parliament, and are approved by the Attorney General.

231 (Jacob et al., 2003)1. It was acknowledged as the Ministry of Gender’s answer to considerable political pressure from the Ministry of Tourism, through the President’s Office. Under the same pressure, and apparently having partly withdrawn from its initial engagement in the Kampringisa plan, KCC had come up with its own alternative ‘master plan’ for street children in April 2001 (e.g. INF Interview 14k/F1)2. Although ostensibly still part of KCC’s district plan, the plans for the designated district ‘Transit Centre’3 in Nsumba (in Mukono District)4, appears to have been shelved once it was clear that external resources and political support would go to central government for its Kampringisa programme5 (Jacob et al., 2003). Kampringisa is therefore Kampala’s principal street child intervention, around which KCC and the NGO community now have to adapt their own approaches6. Although the Ministry’s control of Kampringisa suggests potential scope for an integrated approach to programming for resettlement, it nevertheless appears to reduce any urgency for the Forum leadership to develop partnerships with KCC. Rather than be guided by the political imperative to engage in a ‘participatory’ model of decentralised government, the Forum leadership appears to have chosen the relative ‘straightforwardness’ of engagement with the Ministry. By choice, therefore, leadership is able to avoid the ‘non-straightforwardness’ of KCC (Box 37, statement ‘a’). This, of course, should not deflect from the fact that the bureaucratic ‘bullishness’ of KCC approaches to NGOs and CBOs also clearly does not encourage participatory practices. Indeed, the complex interplay of powers and functions between central government and the KCC, as exemplified by the setting up of Kampringisa programme, and the complexity it adds to the Forum’s choices in identifying appropriate government institutional targets for partnership building, may be confidently added to the list of ‘obstacles’, described earlier in this chapter. That central government has seized control of the street children agenda in Kampala suggests frailties in the government’s own approaches to transitional ‘decentralisation’. The social and political environment in which the Forum has to

1

Even though it is designated a ‘national’ programme. Even though all Kampala’s street children would be targeted under Kampringisa. 3 This is, a 3-month staging shelter for resettling children back to their homes 4 The project, run by Fr. Bwenvu, lies some 40kms south-east of Kampala City. 5 Perhaps it is also not insignificant that the Mayor of Kampala (and therefore LC5 Chairperson) at that time was also a staunch opponent of the Movement system of government (numerous newspaper reports of that time make this quite clear). 6 Government official, Gk, described KCC’s present role as “street surveillance” and then ‘Kampala-based resettlement’ from Kampringisa (Government Interview Gk/2a.2) 2

232 determine which institutional partnership makes the most sense, therefore, becomes somewhat more complicated. The degree to which the Forum partnership focus should be influenced by the Kampringisa programme, whose long-term sustainability is questionable (Jacob et al., 2003, p.22), is not at all clear. Nevertheless, ascribing respondents’ various desired relationship-building outcomes with government institutions that either have the mandate, or have assumed the function and capacity to deliver, we may more clearly define where longer-term institutional partnerships might more productively lie. Although these broad strategizing processes have not happened within the Forum itself, matching individual respondents’ desired outcomes with government institutional partners, may at least provide indicators to the Forum’s more productive future trajectory.

12.1.5

‘Partnership’ (op)positioning and a ‘wish list’ of outcomes

However, such a ‘matching’ exercise should also be seen in the context of the respondents’ own ‘political’ attitudes towards acquiescence or opposition to a Movementist LC system of governance (see Chapter 9). This system is perceived by some respondents to have the character of manipulating both the mode of participation1 in policy-making processes and the spaces themselves2. Thus, not only does government bureaucratic behaviour influence attitudes to government engagement, but also respondents’ distinctive way of thinking about the political configuration of local government institutions. As a consequence, different respondents present very different models of relationship-building and policyinfluencing approaches they believe the Forum should adopt. Respondent 12k proposes a broad approach that binds specific demands on government to a broader socio-economic analysis of Kampala. Recognising that NGOs need also to develop more holistic and strategic advocacy for vulnerable children and their families in Kampala, she sees need for the Forum to engage in Local Council planning processes as the most appropriate ‘structural’ approach that “… ensure[s] democratic participation in, and control of decision making …” (Local Governments Act, 1997, Section 2c). From a more ‘outsider’ perspective, respondent 14k argues, in statement ‘a’ in Box 38 (below), that ‘nongovernmental’ organizations should see their value in their ‘non-governmental’ approach to policy-making spaces. The government, he argues, should equally acknowledge and ‘not feel bad’ that its lack of resources limits its control over street child programming in Kampala. Although this relationship may ideally be mutually supportive and based on constructive ‘dialogue’ – with NGOs providing the ‘real life’ anecdotal context for policy1

For example, respondent 14k observes that during the initial discussions on Kampringisa, “… we [i.e. the NGOs] weren’t being asked to […] dispute the necessity to remove children from the street, immediately, by force!” (INF Interview 14k/F6) 2 The reluctance of government officials to attend Forum meetings is but one of many examples.

233 making – the ‘non-governmental’ should, he argues, nevertheless remain distinctive from government. Respondent ‘17k’ takes this distinctiveness of the two sectors a stage further in statement ‘b’ by arguing that the Forum should focus on becoming a powerful organization to which the government is compelled to turn for consultations. The Forum, he argues rather ominously, should be like a ‘force of lawyers’. Contrasting itself to respondent 12k’s idea of submitting the Forum to a political environment that is predetermined and controlled by the Movement LC political system, his proposal seems to come from a conviction that political and bureaucratic ‘authority’ needs to be challenged from ‘outside’, by making the Forum an alternative, and perhaps oppositional institutional force whose power is to be reckoned with. Box 38: Statements on ‘outsider’ approach to Government partnership a)

“I mean, ‘non-government’ has to remain ‘non-government’ but it can take on a very lively (.) erm, beneficial dialogue with government (.) and that will inform both. And I think it’s really: the NGOs need to acknowledge that they cannot operate without: outside the system or in isolation from the government and government policy.” (INF Interview 14k/D3)

b)

“[The] government is not bothered. And also er (1.0) I think the Forum also (1.0) erm has not been able to marshal:mobilise (.) the:the:the members (.) er in a way: in a way that the Forum could be seen as a force\ (.) which needs to be consulted\. Like er the force of lawyers, like er we have lawyers, we have the body. Like we talk of other groups, which really have to be consulted.” (INF Interview 17k/F4)

However, whether the adopted approach should be one of the ‘citizen’ participating in ‘Movement’ LC spaces, or powerful ‘outsider’ advocacy to challenge what respondent 17k perceives as government’s Movementist socio-political control of policy-making spaces, many of respondents’ proposals for ‘general’ or specific outcomes for engagement are very similar. What they want from government are resources; politico-environmental and policy guidance; proper control and monitoring of ‘good practice’ within the NGO sector; and political recognition and support of NGO ‘good practice’ work with street children. It is useful to have a brief exploration of each of these to see; first, what is proposed and, second, to which government institution’s responsibility and capacity such proposals fit.

234 The pursuit of resources As pointed out in Chapter 10, the pursuit of funding is expressed as one of the principal purposes for smaller organizations’ membership of the Forum. The assumption is that the Forum becomes a ‘credible’ institutional context for them to pursue resources they would be unlikely to be considered for on their own. However, because of the Forum’s lack of any strategizing document to determine specific and agreed objectives to funding input, the demands and expectations on government from respondents remain very ‘unspecific’. Such demands, in the absence of strategic programming, and the general negative characterisation of NGOs by local government, are therefore received with considerable suspicion by both central and local government. Moreover, the NGO’s function, government respondent Gk argues, should be to put resources into service gaps in government social welfare programming rather than seeking to divert scant existing resources. Political and policy guidance Other respondents look to central government and KCC for greater guidance through the dense politics, legislation and policy of local and central government, or through national and international developments on street child programming and residential care (e.g. INF Interviews 14k/F2 & 19k/E5). As one respondent complains, “You know, there are policies out there that we don’t even know exist, (.) but government knows because they are the ones that made them\. And if you go against policy, for whatever reason\, somehow you will get a clog: somehow you will get a hold, (.) because government will come flying with the policies in your face, and tell you, ‘look (.) we have /policies’.” (INF Interview 19k/E5) Although the MGLSD’s ‘Practice Guidelines for Work with Street Children in Uganda’, theoretically places the primary responsibility for such guidance on KCC’s Probation and Social Welfare Officer (MGLD, 1999, p.10), it becomes clear from all responses that, whether through capacity or intent, guidance is either sketchy or completely absent. Monitoring and ‘good practice’ audit and quality control Respondents’ opinion that government does its registration and monitoring of NGOs poorly is also mirrored within the alternative NGOs’ report to the UN on the government’s implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Uganda, which states: “… [T]here are over 70 NGOs involved in street children [in Uganda] and these are not well coordinated and monitored by the government.

235 Government does not seem to have control over these NGOs who all apply different approaches to the problem, many of which have been proved to be ineffective.” (UCRNN, 2003, p.47) The Local Governments Act gives responsibility for the monitoring and control of ‘good practice’ within the NGO/CBO sector to KCC as district, but also to the NGO Board at the Ministry of Gender (MGLSD). Both are also responsible for registering NGO/CBOs, ensuring that they fulfil the government criteria for ‘good practice’ service provision. As mentioned in Chapter 10, the reasons for ‘some’ Forum organizations’ pursuit of government monitoring and ‘good practice’ audit and quality control seem to be fourfold. First, despite having the responsibility for both registering and monitoring NGOs – which respondents argue are done poorly – the government uses ‘poor practice’ as its main generic criticism of NGOs. Fairness to the NGOs who desire to do their job well and look for government guidance, respondent 19k argues, demands that ‘someone’ from government should take this task more seriously. Echoing the frustrations of several other respondents looking for affirmation of their good intentions, she reasons, “Now, if the guidelines are there and the rules are there, and no-one is coming to monitor and see, some of us might just want to make sure we stay on the right line because that’s what we want to do.” (19k/E2) The second reason for this demand on government comes mostly from respondents from ‘better established’ Forum organizations. Because the Forum has no formal membership criteria and code of conduct, respondents point out, Forum leadership is unable to control ‘good practice’ within the coalition. Government monitoring, they seem to suggest, should guarantee NGO ‘good practice’ within the Forum, which the leadership cannot. The implications for the Forum, even if such monitoring were possible, are clearly not thought through. Perhaps closely related to the first, the third reason for demanding government monitoring is the respondents’ desire for government acknowledgment of, not only the intentions, but the hard work many NGOs put into Kampala’s social welfare environment and affirmation of a job well done. And finally, the fourth reason seems to be respondents’ general desire for the government to be as demanding about its own accountability in performing its responsibilities – especially in its research and data collection on programming for street children – as it is with the NGO sector. Based on such an approach, respondent 18k suggests, policy can reconfigure itself to “… achieve the goal in the best way” (INF Interview 18k/F2). However, respondent 17k cautions that, because of fear of what government might do with such openness and many NGOs’ own poor

236 accountability, the ‘natural’ tendency for many is secrecy and anonymity (INF Interview 17k/F1). So far I have drawn considerable attention to the numerous obstacles to partnership building with government in Kampala. These obstacles, I have suggested, are also implicated in choices the Forum leadership has made in which government institutions are, or are not targeted. However, through its implementation of the Kampringisa programme, the Ministry of Gender (MGLSD) appears to have seized control of the street children agenda in Kampala, apparently against the spirit of government’s commitment to ‘decentralising’ such authority to KCC, set out by the 1997 Local Governments Act. The Ministry’s Kampringisa approach equally compromises street children’s rights set out in the 1997 Children’s Statute (UCRNN, 2003) and an implied agreement between government and NGOs on programming for street children set out in the 1999 ‘Practice Guidelines’. These government dynamics appear to complicate the Forum leadership’s decisions on which government institution it ‘should’ target. Analysis of what respondents want out of partnership with government, however, suggest that much greater emphasis ‘should’ be placed on KCC. Despite its unhelpful bureaucratic posturing, KCC is Kampala’s intended monitoring and coordinating institution for street children, set out in the 1997 Local Governments Act. It is perhaps precisely because the implementation of its role is so weak that the Forum should target KCC. Having looked at the ideological, political and institutional contexts for Forum choices for government partnership building institutions, and having seen what respondents ‘want’ from partnership, we now turn our eyes to what Forum and government partnership building has ‘actually’ achieved for street children in Kampala.

12.1.6

Forum impact on government action and policy-making in Kampala

What might have struck the reader by now is that both government ‘action’ and programming for street children, and Forum responses to this, appear reactive rather than born from reference to any medium or long-term strategic coherency. There are numerous clues to this socio-political culture of reactivity in the respondents’ diverse narratives. As we mentioned earlier, Kampringisa appears a rapidly put together programme reacting to pressure from the Ministry of Tourism to remove children from the street, rather than emerging from any well thought out child-focused strategic programming. Such external political pressure, that is seen to determine action taken on street children, is seemingly

237 born of the idea that ‘streetism’ is an impediment to the desired promotion of Kampala as an ‘ordered’ urban social and economic environment. Government attempts to create this illusion by removing ‘undesirable’ street populations, respondent 8k observes, “[…] normally happens at a time when Uganda is expecting visitors (.) or when somebody is visiting the town: an important person. […] It’s like it’s not a planned: something pre-planned that ‘we should help these children get off the street’.” (INF Interview 8k/B5) However, rather than being invited to the conceptualisation of such ‘reactive’ government initiatives, the Forum seems compelled to either react to these initiatives off its own back (e.g. by airing their discontent in the newspapers) or is called upon by government to react by offering personnel, resources or referral support. Whilst it appears government would prefer to implement such highly visible programmes as Kampringisa without NGOs, respondents 2k and 17k seem to imply in Box 39, the realisation that it has neither the resources nor the expertise, compels government to reluctantly include NGOs, who are acknowledged to possess both (see statement ‘a’). Box 39: Statements on ‘reactive’ engagement with Government a)

“Government doesn’t have enough money to resettle children/, government doesn’t have enough money to buy food/, government doesn’t have qualified staff/, (.) so they are saying ‘please come, come’.” (INF Interview 17k/F1)

b)

“[L]ike the project I was talking about in Kampringisa. The government tried alone and failed. So, that’s when the government called in the Forum\.” (INF Interview 2k/F7)

c)

“[M]any times there is a feeling in government that […] NGOs don’t do the way government do it. So, […] the pattern there is very, very rude\ (laughs). […] Because not many times the government pick interest to invite NGOs (.) to contribute to policy. Even if they do, […] they don’t do it formally, they do it, you know, as a rubber-stamping type of process.” (INF Interview 17k/F1)

d)

“Government is beginning to appreciate, but many by circum: being forced by circumstances but not in a formal way, saying ‘let’s work together’.” (INF Interview 17k/F1)

The government’s attempt to implement Kampringisa’s Phase 2 by itself – that is, by setting up a psycho-social, educational, and healthcare environment conducive to

238 rehabilitation and resettlement of street children – has only underlined its apparent ineptitude at such tasks (see statement ‘b’). Indeed, although not ‘formally’ acknowledged by government, the welfare provision of the Kampringisa programme appears largely propped up through Forum intervention and resources (INF, 2004). In other situations, too, the Forum is seen to do no more than ‘react’ to demands made on it by central and local government. On one occasion the coordinator was asked by KCC to organize monitoring and surveillance of the behaviour of an ‘unregistered’ evangelical church, bussing children in and out of Kampala on an imported London double-decker bus. On another occasion, the Forum was asked by KCC to mediate in a dispute that threatened to tear a Forum member organization apart. And, as we mentioned before, the Forum coordinator had also been asked by the Ministry of Gender (MGLSD) to select Forum organizations that had the capacity and credibility to implement initial resettlements in Phase one of Kampringisa. Though perhaps all these ‘reactions’ have been valuable, none has been at the initiative of the Forum. Indeed, respondent 17k argues, even the Kampringisa Support Team is merely an NGO ‘reaction’ determined simply by the fact that the NGOs’ own children had been sent there. So, apart from implementing diverse tasks set it by government, has the Forum had any impact on government policy-making processes themselves?

12.1.7

Forum influence on policy-making

Before Kampringisa, the Forum’s ‘informal’ partnership with the Ministry had been rather narrowly defined by its advisory and promotional role for the impressive Practice Guideline for working with Street Children in Uganda (MGLSD, 1999) and its accompanying training manual. However, with the Ministry’s apparent reluctance to follow up the guidelines with a policy document1, the Practice Guidelines document has lacked authority in terms of determining a national approach to street children. Indeed, it is a document that has, in any case, been superseded (and perhaps undermined) by the ministry’s Kampringisa programme, which now defines Kampala’s approach to street children (Jacob et al., 2003). Referring specifically to Kampringisa, the NGOs’ alternative report to the UN on implementation of CRC in Uganda makes note of this, stating that, for

1 Article 98 of the Local Governments Act states that Government Line Ministries have the function of developing policies as they apply to Local Government (UG, 1997, Article 98:1a).

239 street children “… no clear policy has led to controversial interventions” (UCRNN, 2003, p.57). Box 40: Statements on ‘influence’ of Forum on policy-making a)

“I think the Forum specifically has become (.) is become a presence, there’s an awareness we exist erm (.) by government, (.) which hopefully will mean we are (.) either referred to or called upon to provide (.) information erm (.) before policies are: and approaches are discussed.” (14k/F6)

b)

“The impact is just on gathering information and experience, because these policies are not just made out of the blue, they are made out of information that is got from (.) the organizations that are working with the children.” (19k/F6)

c)

“That show (.) on how [the Forum is] able to influence (.) government on policy; (1.0) I think this one has been at a very low (indistinct word), and erm (.) this could be (.) from the point of informality. So, if it had been formalised perhaps (.) it could have been in the right direction. As of now, I don’t think they can make an impact.” (17k/F6)

Indeed, some respondents claim that the Forum has had no impact at all on central and local government policy-making processes. Respondents 14k and 19k, in Box 40, however, argue that the impact is one of ‘presence’ which hopefully might be called upon to comment upon government proposals. Interestingly, respondent 14k notes that referral to this knowledge and expertise occurs ‘before’ policies and approaches are discussed, rather than being integrated into the policy-making spaces and processes themselves (see statement ‘a’). In order for government to reinforce its control over such spaces, respondent 13k suspects that such an informal input ‘before’ formal policy-making processes happen allows government to re-brand Forum knowledge as its own. As she puts it, “[I]f there is anything positive, even if it is done by the Inter-NGO, they want to take the credit.” (13k/F6) However, despite these, at times, ‘wishful’ claims, there is very little evidence that the Forum is presenting any specific policy proposals. Indeed, without the guidance of definitive statements (e.g. in the form of a strategy paper) it is at times very difficult to identify exactly what attitudes, approaches and proposals the Forum is representing at all.

240 In the interviews, various respondents present very different attitudes to Kampringisa – some strongly in favour, some against. Also very different approaches to engaging government are proposed by different member organizations, and attitudes to the pursuit of funding are highly contested. Respondent 18k presents just one example of such divided opinion. “We had one issue, which were those during the rounding up. (2.0) The Forum was somehow divided (.) in two sections. We had division of issues, that is, others wanted police to round them up, (.) to use force. Others said we should look for other (.) friendly approaches, (.) others suggested that maybe we involve ourselves.” (18k/E1) Although one might argue that such diversity and contestation of opinion over attitudes, approaches and proposals is by its nature part of coalition-building processes, there is nevertheless no strategic document that appears to bind any ‘agreed’ position on anything. The ‘voice’ that the respondents were so quick to promote as the symbol of the Forum’s interaction with government, is apparently unable to present a coherent framework of attitudes, approaches or proposals to government (e.g. in the form of a Forum strategic document). This ‘informality’, respondent 17k concludes in statement ‘c’ (in Box 40, above), is the Forum’s prime obstacle to impacting government policy-making spaces. Indeed, if one looks deeper at many of the ‘government partnership-building’ claims made for the Forum, it becomes clear that they might more accurately be claimed by individual bigger and better resourced organizations. For both the Ministry’s Practice Guidelines and Phase 1 of Kampringisa programme1, government selected individual ‘professionalised’, ‘well-resourced’ and ‘credible’ organizations, rather than the ‘Forum’ itself, for each collaborative exercise. Indeed, there is mention of the Forum in neither the ‘Practice Guidelines’ nor the accompanying ‘Training Manual’ documents, but instead acknowledgement of only individual contributors and their organizations. This perhaps underpins claims by some smaller organizations that the Forum serves individual rather than collective benefit and kudos. For the member organization, collaborative work with government, as respondent 11k points out, tends to be more focused on their own individual organizational needs. Although such beneficiary organizations appear to argue that such partnership should be claimed as ‘also’ Forum partnership, non-beneficiary organizations appear unconvinced. Moreover, few of these actions appear to have been bound into a coherent Forum strategy on street children in Kampala. 1

Organizations were chosen to resettle children home for the first few months only.

241 Although the Kampringisa Support Team might be presented as one example of collective strategic initiative, it is nevertheless fraught structural and ideological problems. Not only is its strategic value as response to Kampala street children contended within the Forum itself but, as pointed out in Chapter 10, the considerable resource demands made on Forum organizations are seen to also exclude participation of most smaller organizations. As the principal Forum initiative it also appears to put all the Forum’s strategic eggs into one basket.

12.1.8

Some concluding remarks on Forum and government partnership-building and policy-making Kampala

I began this exploration of the opportunities for partnership-building in Kampala by drawing attention to emergent obstacles. Implicated were KCC’s bureaucratic bullishness and the more general government portrayal of street children, streetism, and the NGO community as ‘problem’. Broader political manipulation of the street children agenda, furthermore, gave rise to the Kampringisa initiative to remove such children from the street. Central government’s ineptitude in implementing a ‘good practice’ institutional welfare environment for street children within Kampringisa, however, seems framed by a more general gap between government planning, which aims at ‘bureaucratic neatness’, and real capacity. Control of the street children agenda, moreover, appears to implicate much broader central government resistance to ‘decentralisation’ of governance, demanded by the 1997 Local Governments Act. Resistance to Forum proposals for a more formal relationship therefore seems to emerge from a twin tendency towards government ‘command and control’ and fear of exposure of poor implementation of government’s own policy framework for street children. Informal Forum structures and procedures, which were seen to privilege the interests of bigger and better-resourced organizations in Chapter 10, reappear in the Forum’s partnership narratives.

Government partnership,

which has

included resource

disbursements and considerable kudos, is mostly seen to bypass what are deemed as smaller ‘less credible’ member organizations. However, the lack of mechanisms for handling, disbursing and accounting for resources within the Forum merely reflects the Forum leadership’s lack of desire for the Forum to be a conduit for resources. Even if this is a choice based on preserving Forum reputation, it nevertheless creates considerable power imbalances for smaller member organizations. Because of poor accountability,

242 unequal representation and incoherent strategic ‘voice’, the ‘informal’ Forum has also to put up with a considerable imbalance of power that favours the government. Forum informality also presents a ‘credibility’ problem for a governance environment that favours NGO partnership only within local government’s bureaucratic protocol. This acts to limit potential opportunities for government within more ‘informal’ NGO/CBO institutional arrangements and approaches. The tolerance of an unregistered Forum, however, might equally be interpreted as a convenient bureaucratic and political mechanism for keeping the Forum on a back foot whilst, at the same time, allowing government to draw upon its expertise and resources without compromising government control. Selected Forum member organizations are therefore merely called in to ‘rubber-stamp’ (see statement ‘c’ Box 48) action that has already been decided upon by government. Forum engagement with government, therefore, might be characterised as ‘reactive’. Although the Forum leadership might interpret engagement in Kampringisa as a foot in the door, which potentially leads to a more meaningful partnership in the future, it is nonetheless a reaction “… forced by circumstances” (see statement ‘c’, Box 48). Moreover, Kampringisa currently appears to represent the Forum’s only partnership engagement with government. Gaining little leeway, the Forum’s commitment to rigorous engagement, especially with KCC, is primarily expressed in terms of ‘wishful thinking’ for the future. We therefore now turn to Jinja Network to further explore similar ‘partnership-building’ themes approached in very different ways. Rather than the deferment and reactivity of Kampala, Jinja Network allows us to examine what might face the Forum should it decide for a more strategic and ‘embedded’ partnership-building approach. Indeed, despite the clear differences in Jinja Town’s social, political and demographic environment, Jinja Network’s experience allows us to examine the ‘what if’ scenario for much of the Forum respondents’ partnership-building wish list. We are able to examine to what extent these approaches may contribute to more ‘meaningful’ partnership-building that addresses Kampala Forum’s interest in ‘good practice’ audit, resource mobilization, and government support of the NGO/CBO sector. We also examine to what extent Kampala’s experience is merely mutated and reproduced in a slightly different form.

243

12.2

Jinja Network and government partnership

Many of the obstacles to partnership building with government that were described for Kampala are also very much present in the historical narratives of coalition-building in Jinja. However, they are confronted very differently by Jinja Network. Indeed, separating distinctive narratives on coalition-building and partnership-building for Jinja is problematic precisely because Jinja Network (JN) has tried to bind the two processes together within a single set of structures and procedures. It is therefore useful to examine to what extent this binding exercise has succeeded or failed to address obstacles or, indeed, to what extent it becomes a catalyst for the emergence of a new set of obstacles. To these ends I shall explore JN’s experience of, and approaches to local government bureaucratic and political ‘bullishness’. I shall explore how informal or formal coalition structures and procedures are seen to influence partnership-building but also become ‘reconfigured’ by the demands made by distinctive ‘sectoral’ interests. Moreover, by allowing the evidence to question the assumption of sectoral ‘distinctiveness’, I shall look at how organizations’ multiple sectoral identities (or what I called inter-sectoral blur in Chapter 11) have created different spaces, possibilities and constraints for policy-making and programming for street children in Jinja. Finally I shall explore evidence of the impact but also the limits of JN’s coalition- and partnership-building with government on the policy-making spaces and processes at diverse levels and institutions of government. The quantity of documents produced by Jinja Network also gives us indications of a very different approach to coalition-building and government partnership-building. In the absence of documents produced by Kampala’s Forum, I had to rely heavily upon interviews to identify underlying Forum narratives. Jinja Network, on the other hand, presents large quantities of documentary material in the form of minutes, evaluations, strategic plans, research, and reports to its principal donor organization. Although this in itself presents merely ‘other’ evidence to identify and explore both dominant1 and contrapositional partnership-building narratives, it nevertheless draws our attention to an inherent reflexive and strategy-setting culture within JN. This perhaps becomes in itself a strong contributing factor to partnership-building processes and experience – even if later documents are mainly attributed to donor demands for accountability2.

1 2

Containing what Rowbottom (1977) refers to as ‘enacting’ statements. Not necessarily ‘accountability’ to donors in the financial sense.

244

12.2.1

Interpreting and responding to the demands and opportunities for engagement with government

So that I do not repeat previous analysis of Jinja Network (JN), I begin this exploration of JN’s experiences of coalition- and partnership-building with government, and its impact on policy-making spaces and processes, by briefly reminding the reader of some of the conclusions from Chapter 11. We noted that Jinja Network (JN) had formed partly in the shadow of a Jinja Municipal Council (JMC) closure order on the principal street children service providing NGO in Jinja. In attempting to counter JMC by courting strong oppositional alliances of its own, the NGO had only acted to further antagonize politicians to entrench their position. With this experience in mind, therefore, JN minutes record a commitment from the beginning to a very different NGO/CBO approach to government. From its earliest documents JN proposed not only engaging with local government but also allowing government membership in the coalition itself1. A principal purpose for JN’s interaction with government was to “… emphasize the value of a complementary approach” (JN Minute 06/01-3g) to the street children agenda in Jinja. We also noted that various government ‘technical’ and ‘political’ officers accepted membership to JN as strategic coalition- and partnership-building opportunities presented themselves. However, we equally noted how the politics of government ‘decentralisation’, on one side, and sectorally-bound ideological entrenchment, on the other side, had made some concessions within specific programme implementation problematic2. Many concessions, however, appear to have been mediated through participatory coalition-building approaches (what I termed ‘social interaction networking’) that emphasised informal relationship building. However, a shift to more contractual and ‘bureaucratic’ approaches to coordination, and a parallel reduction in social interaction networking, is seen to have increased conflict based on mistrust between member organizations. However, focusing solely on ‘conflict’ within negotiations between at times entrenched ideological and methodological positions, places too much emphasis on partnershipbuilding’s ‘problem’ status. Of much greater value to the analysis of partnership-building with government, respondents seem to unanimously agree in this chapter, is how mediated

1

Such membership was initially envisaged only for government ‘supporters’ of NGOs and their concerns for street children. 2 I mentioned the entrenched government ‘round-up’ and NGO rehabilitation methodology as examples.

245 conflictual processes have ‘changed’ how policies and interventions are collectively thought out and enacted. However, change is not a quick and easily quantifiable outcome. As respondent 4j points out, “[…] change is gradual. You can’t expect a bigger change in attitude in one day or two days.” (JN Interview 4j/F1) With a focus more on ‘change’, therefore, it is useful to explore how relationships between government and the NGO/CBO sector have come about, and what values government and NGO/CBO respondents attach to these relationships and the policy-making and interventions that they generate.

The ‘politicisation’ of membership: ‘working the government structures’ Echoing statements by other respondents, 2j argues that the binding of government and NGO/CBO aspirations for street children within a single coalition is simply a question of being prudent. As he puts it, “[Y]ou have to buy the relationship. You [need to] get looking for some rapport with the leaders before you can put anything on the ground. (.) I think it was just a wise idea: that the network had to do that.” (JN Interview 2j/F5) However, rather than experiencing government as either ‘straightforward’ or as a cohesive ‘whole’, documentary and anecdotal narratives about the experience of alliance building reveal demands for considerable ‘learning’. Such learning is not only about which government official has a particular welfare function proscribed within local government bureaucracy, but also about the institutional politics of interest and control that can often over-ride specific welfare interests and ascribed functions of welfare officers1. The dynamics and intentions influencing specific JN ‘strategic’ decisions about which particular government officials to invite, therefore, is in itself quite revealing about these ‘learning’ processes. For example, JMC’s Assistant Town Clerk’s (ATC’s) early opportunistic invitation to JN membership, followed quickly by the District Probation Social Welfare Officer, respondents observe, was envisaged as serving a strategic JN objective. As civil servants responsible for enacting municipal and district policies and programmes, these officers would offer JN’s NGO and CBO members an influential conduit into the heart of local 1

We are reminded of the political use of street children ‘round-ups’ described in Chapter 11.

246 government thinking and programming for the ‘street’ child in Jinja1. Indeed, on the surface a relatively simple interplay of government and NGO exchanges emerges in different respondent narratives. Behind pursuit of “… harmonization of […] planning and work methods” (JN Interview 8j/A1) through JN, government respondent 8j comments, lies government’s desire to tap the resources and technical capacity of JN’s NGO/CBO member organizations to define street children ‘issues’ and propose ways to handle them2. Government is also seen to benefit from this technical and resource input by association. In statement ‘a’ in Box 41, below, JN’s government respondent 8j explains how this works. Highly visible and jointly implemented JN programmes – such as the Transit Centre, community sensitisation through the Child Rights Activists, and a series of radio ‘live chat shows’ on child marginalization in Jinja – have permitted greater community understanding of the breadth and complexity of ‘streetism’. Government input in planning, financing and implementation within JN has allowed government to claim these as their own achievements. This, he explains, allows government to become less defensive3 in its responses following accusations of not addressing its responsibility4. Box 41: Statement on JMC addressing community demands through JN a)

“The other thing that we have been able to do as a network (.) on issues of street children, which has enabled the community to see the issue in a broader sense. (2.0) Instead of saying, ‘what is the council doing about the street children\?’ they have now appreciated, actually, the issue is much broader than the council. […] I mean the NGOs has helped us to (.) to focus on the problems and er to provide solutions.” (JN Interview 8j/F3)

In return government membership would bring with it the ‘authority’ that comes with implied government approval of JN. Government respondent 9j also emphasises the importance to government of the NGO/CBO community ‘working government structures’ within such an arrangement. He describes the process and its legitimacy as follows,

1

The term ‘marginalized’ was integrated into JN’s name to reflect broader identification with multiple conditions, from which ‘streetism’ is merely one. It also better describes the diverse target populations of different organizations. 2 Acknowledging local government’s limited capacity to do either. 3 For example, by blaming NGOs for attracting street children. 4 And, one would have imagined, reduced the need for the exaggerated political displays of addressing the street children ‘problem’ through ‘round-ups’. However, complex issues of competing political interest are discussed later.

247 “[I]n our case, one of the members [of JN] is this (.) Assistant Town Clerk in charge of social services. And he makes a report every two months to the Social Services Committee, which is the working committee of Jinja Municipal Council\. And therefore the information enters the system very comfortably and legally\.” (JN Interview 9j/F2) However, although, as we shall see later, considerable collaborative work has, indeed, been supported by JMC and a generally good ‘partnership’ relationship has been established, certain limits to the ATC’s ability to influence the ‘political’ stratum of the municipal council began to emerge fairly early. Willingly accepting the task of persuading JMC to lift its closure order on NGO 3j, given him by JN’s November 2001 general meeting, we trace an extended narrative through the JN minutes over several months about the ATC’s inability to deliver1. In another example, some JMC youth councillors demanded control of the coordination and resources for the JN coordinated 2002 International Youth Exchange, despite participation of the ATC and District Probation and Social Welfare Officer. Despite what appears a difficult exchange over a period of two months following the International Youth Exchange, the minutes of January 2003 record a meeting between JN representatives and youth councillors in which the youth expressed the desire to participate in JN as elected political leaders. The minutes go on to record the following JN meeting’s resolution as follows: “In order to preserve the balance in the network by not overloading it with political duplication, but also to include both political and youth interest groups, it was agreed to invite as members the Deputy Mayor [and] the Jinja Municipal Youth Council Chairperson.” (JN Minute 01/03-2b) In this extended exchange, therefore, it is clear that considerable ‘learning’ happened, allowing JN members to acknowledge and give due weight to the distinctive ‘technical’ and ‘political’ dimensions of ‘partnership-building’ arrangements with local government in Jinja. As a strategic accommodation, therefore, JN decided to allow for such complexity within its membership. In my interview with the ATC in June 2004 he acknowledges that having political representation in JN, now “… makes it easier for us to have decisions taken [by JN] adopted by the council” (JN Interview 8j/A4). Indeed, JN’s ‘learning culture’, as partly a product of government and NGO/CBO partnership building, has also given rise to other ‘sector spanning’ opportunities, that I previously alluded to in Chapter 11. These are worth exploring a little further.

1

Although, I add, the order was lifted some considerable time later.

248

Sectoral blur: negotiating new ways of ‘working government structures’ In delivering community sensitisation about street children in Jinja, the minutes of the JN meeting of November 2001 (the second attended by the ATC), emphasises the importance of using existing community structures. JN’s March 2002 seminar with local council, however, acknowledges inherent weakness in governance for marginalized children at village level. The seminar focus groups pointed out that the village councils, on the whole, do not know their roles and powers to address child vulnerability at their community level1. They acknowledge poor awareness of, and access to rights-based information that village councils felt should be available to them. Moreover, even if such information were available, they argued, the village council – made up of ‘untrained volunteers’ – would be incapable of relating legislative frameworks and policy documents to their own communities (JN & JMC, 2002). On the other hand, in 2002 each village purportedly possessed a UNICEF and JMC trained volunteer children’s rights advisor, coordinated through the municipal Social Services Office. Having been commissioned by the municipality in 1997, most ‘Child Rights Advocates’ (CRA) had become inactive and unknown within the communities they purportedly served because JMC had not been actively supporting their work. Following a meeting called by the ATC – and understanding their potential importance as ‘paragovernmental’ trained volunteers to act as training agents and village and divisional council advisors – the three divisional CRA coordinators were invited to become JN members in June 2002. Their envisaged role, set out in minutes of JN meetings over a three-month period, was to assist JN to set up and facilitate village meetings on such themes as ‘parenting’. They would also become monitoring agents of village level activities and needs. In return JN and JMC would periodically train them, enhancing their skills and knowledge and, where organizational interests converged, support CRA workshops. To institutionalise these functions, JN’s 2002 strategic plan proposes integrating CRAs into divisional and village level policy-making in an ‘ex-officio’ advisory role, brought in where policy issues are understood to impact children in the community (JN, 2002). I will look at how successful the CRAs have been in this proposed role later on. However, what

1

Set out in Schedule Two of the 1997 Local Governments Act.

249 is of interest here is how, within the apparently flexible configuration of local governance1 – dependent as it is on political ‘volunteerism’ and meagre resources – the distinctions of what is of government and what is not begins to blur and, to a certain extent, becomes negotiable. Indeed, identity of the three divisional CRAs as either mobilized ‘citizenry’ or para-governmental agent is difficult to determine. CRAs are commissioned by JMC, are community volunteers proposed and ‘mobilized’ by their local councils, and are politically engaged as local councillors (see Table 5 in Chapter 11). Their identification as representatives of the interests of ‘civil society’ or ‘political society’ (i.e. government) is therefore difficult to determine even within JN2. Interestingly, successful negotiation of the CRAs’ participation within policy-making spaces at village and divisional level, respondent 2j observes, appears greatly dependent on, not only the CRA not making financial demands on local government, but also his/her ability to channel resources from JN into his or her community (e.g. through community sensitization workshops). Respondent 2j describes the role of resources in negotiating accommodation in local council spaces, “Local government here can listen to us at a different angle. (2.0) Because basically at the beginning […] they were seeing us as a problem. (.) You know you train a lot people and then you can’t support them. So you find them really a thorn in the flesh or something like that. Every time somebody arrives you say ‘what are we going to do?’ […] So now that they may not after all have to think about the funding to see what we can put in, so they will kind of accommodate us more easily.” (JN Interview 2j/F4) Indeed, other representatives of JN member organizations also have multi-sectoral identities. Respondent 4j is both the local implementing officer of an Africa-wide child rights CBO, and the Speaker of Jinja Central Division (LC3). Rather than only being a politician for ‘personal’ reasons, 4j claims he is able to pursue policy-making at divisional level as both politician and ‘developer’: “[…] as a politician being in the network, […] it exposes me to so many dynamisms with the community, and it helps me to understand the community better (.) than I would be told. When one talks about this, (.) actually I understand what it is, its magnitude, the problem around it and perhaps the best way (.) to handle it. And I think that would be (.) the benefit for all of us as politicians! (JN Interview 4j/F1)

1

Village level government is unpaid employment (although press reports sometimes implicate local officials in money-making scams) (Field Journal 3). 2 One respondent notes that CRAs’ political identity is seen at times to manipulate JN agendas and resources.

250 The degree to which the CRAs and 4j are able to bind their multi-sectoral identities within local government politics is difficult to know. However, from interview analyses of ideological and methodological positioning based on sectoral identity – for instance, with the controversy surrounding the ‘round-up’ and JN Transit Centre, described in Chapter 11 – respondents with multiple identities seem far more able to accommodate divergent positions. Their ‘development-mindedness’, described by respondent 4j, located both at the core of local government structures and of JN, also appears to open up potentially influential policy-making spaces and processes for both – potentially making local government more ‘developmental’ and JN more ‘political’. However, in considering the pervasive force and function of both the government and NGOs’ ‘us and them’ ideological positioning that I described in Chapter 111, one should not overemphasize the influence of multi-sectoral identities in policy-making spaces and processes. One should equally not overlook other important influences on JN’s institutional attitudes and structures in opening up existing policy-making spaces and, indeed, negotiating new ones.

Partnership and JN’s ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ configuration In Chapter 11 I pointed out that, despite its important symbolic and political value, ‘formalization’ of JN’s governance structures and processes has not particularly contributed to cohesiveness between diverse member organizations2. Indeed, at times we have noted quite the reverse. More rigorous interest in holding member organizations to account has at the same time raised concerns about how power is distributed. Respondents express concern about which organization exerts power, which determines ‘task’, ‘duty’ and ‘sanction’, and upon which organization it is exerted. On the other hand, nor is it apparent that ‘formalisation’ has been demanded for government participation. On the contrary, government’s partnership and collaboration in many of the activities we have discussed so far – such as, the joint LC sensitisation workshop, establishing the street children Transit Centre, joint radio ‘live talk shows’, etc. – pre-date these structural and procedural changes3. Moreover, nor would it be prudent to suggest that, before its registration with the District Community Development Office, or development of a constitution and election of an Executive Committee, JN was an ‘informal’ arrangement. Indeed, in examining when and why local government accepted 1

For example, experienced as currency for government political ‘populism’ and NGO institutional inflexibility (see Chapter 11). 2 For example, that it gives members greater clarity and direction, and delineates clearer boundaries. 3 Which only occurred between February and May 2003.

251 JN invitation to membership, it is necessary to examine broader dynamics than changes to JN’s governance structure alone. In Chapter 11 I emphasised the clarity of JN’s strategic orientation. In this chapter I have also observed JN’s political astuteness and its willingness to mutate its approach to accommodate the political peculiarities of local government. Clearly, the capacity to do both has depended to a large extent on the propensity, strategic vision, and flexibility – and, at times, considerable ‘risk’ – of leaders from both local government and JN’s NGO/CBO member organizations1. ‘Formalisation’ as a contributing factor to coalitionand partnership-building in Jinja, may therefore better be understood as the processes through which leaders have been able to configure and then reconfigure JN’s strategic identity. Formalization may be understood as strategic adaptation that more clearly binds the interests of different institutions by focusing on where interests might most productively intersect. With this idea of coalition ‘formalization’, the production of a large output of research, concept, and strategic planning and evaluation papers takes on a far more significant role than registration with government, the election of an executive committee, and the opening of a bank account. Instead, governance structures should perhaps be more seen as enhancements or, indeed, impediments to processes that lead to greater conceptual and methodological clarity. That government has been prepared to participate in these ‘learning’ and ‘shaping’ processes2 has clearly been of great importance to the evolution of JN and what respondents claim is its influence on local policy-making spaces. But how influential is JN? To answer this it necessary to explore to what extent these claims of influence are, in reality, demonstrable. If such influence is demonstrated, we may then look critically at how the street children agenda in Jinja has moved forwards.

12.2.2

The impact and limit of JN on policy-making processes

Accessing and creating policy-making spaces Based on local government’s ‘focus group’ analysis of itself, Jinja Network’s 2002 donor report on its ground-breaking workshop with JMC describes frailties in local government approaches to marginalized children that JN sets out to address though its initial 3-year strategic plan. Local government participation in addressing child vulnerability, it claims,

1

There are clearly many other influences such as the 2002 elections that brought in a new council and Mayor. 2 Even if largely dependent on the personal commitment of the ATC.

252 “[…] is often marked by poor definitions and mechanisms for identifying community issues and often poor knowledge and understanding of national and international policy frameworks, as well as the powers, roles, legislative framework decentralisation has afforded them at village level.” (JN, 2002c, p.3) ‘Local Council training and awareness’, therefore, becomes one of JN strategic plan’s four principal focus areas. This would, the report promises, focus on building both local government leadership and communities’ capacity to “… identify child and youth issues within their villages and explore community mechanisms to address these” (JN, 2002c, p.6). So, what evidence is there that partnership with government – both within and outside JN – has, indeed, influenced local government and community thinking about the marginalized ‘street child’ in their midst, and therefore the policies that determine their approach and programming? To what extent has JN inspired a fundamental change in the way NGOs and CBOs engage with government in existing policy-making spaces and processes in Jinja, or indeed inspired the ‘creation’ of new ones? And, if spaces are accessible to JN’s NGO and CBO community, how are they seen to address and confront divergent government and NGO approaches to street children? The answers to these questions, as we have already implied from earlier discussions, are neither simple nor straightforward ones. We, therefore, examine how answers to these questions emerge from an intricate web of intersecting narratives describing processes, people and interests, and how NGO/CBO and government partnership within JN has been able to engage, manipulate and reconfigure these. Perhaps not surprisingly, respondents claim that resources play a major role in both accessing existing spaces and creating new ones. We noted earlier that the ATC had mentioned ‘tapping’ NGO/CBO resources as one of his principal reasons for joining JN. We also noted that CRA invitation to some local government policy-making spaces was also dependent on both bringing resources (e.g. for workshops) and not making resource demands. However, the imperative to not make resource demands of government does not seem to be an absolute. A crude measure of JN’s impact on Local Government programming for street children, is its ability to tap scant government resources for its diverse programmes. This seems to have become possible because, through the Assistant Town Clerk, there has been an apparent fusion of JN and municipal action planning for ‘marginalized’ children. This has also, therefore, bound JN’s resource demands with those of Social Services. Such demands appear to gain legitimacy, as government respondent 9j put it, because they “… enter the system very comfortably and legally” (JN Interview

253 9j/F2). Under the following sub-headings, therefore, I collate and summarize some of the intersecting factors that have helped JN’s agendas to ‘comfortably enter the government system’. These factors have bound and extended dispersed knowledge of streetism in Jinja and therefore bound the people, processes, strategies, attitudes and interventions that are acknowledged to have moved the street children agenda forwards.

Connecting JN and municipal planning processes In reading through JN minutes, its strategic plan and its various concept papers, it soon becomes clear that JMC’s Assistant Town Clerk (ATC) is able to reassess and extend JMC’s Social Services planning strategies and options within JN. Such fusion of planning is understood to ‘add’ opportunities through collaborative action, which would otherwise not be available to JMC. These might then be promoted as JMC social service action to the JMC’s Social Services Committee. For example, training CRAs in community intervention and monitoring for street child used input of NGO expertise and resources. JN’s Transit Centre for street children was able to do the same. However, it also provided the opportunity, through the ATC, to connect street children intervention to JMC’s innovative ‘urban poverty reduction’ housing programme, called C3F (which is sponsored by DFID1). Both land and building resources were made available through C3F for JN to construct the Transit Centre.

Binding the ‘street child’ agenda to broader themes It also becomes clear from JN’s literature output, and the inclusion of the Transit Centre in C3F programme, that JMC and JN’s planning has managed to connect the street children agenda to broader themes and government programmes addressing children’s rights or community vulnerability2 - previously assumed to be unrelated. For example, in order to address concerns for the ‘part-time’ street children3 from the Karamajong migrant community in Masese4, the ATC has negotiated the promotion of a Karamajong teacher to the position of deputy headmistress of a local primary school. This is understood as a strategic promotion to encourage interest among Karamajong parents. The ATC has also negotiated 1

A description of the DFID sponsored C3F can be found at http://www.c3f.org.uk/ One of the CRA facilitated workshops I attended during my field research engaged youth, village councillors and community leaders from a Mpumudde Sub-Parish in the analysis of child/youth vulnerability, including ‘streetism’, within their communities. 3 The MGLSD’s term for children who find employment on the street but return to their homes at night. 4 One of Jinja’s shanty communities. 2

254 free schooling for four hundred Karamajong children under the government’s Universal Primary Education programme, negotiated free school porridge through the WFP, and provided the children with uniforms and exercise books through the Mayor’s charity1. By binding street children to broader themes of child vulnerability, JN and JMC Social Services Office have also been able to provide a broader analysis of ‘streetism’ that has allowed local government to frame a ‘doable’ targeted response to the ‘part-time’ street child (such as the Karamajong child) that has eluded it when the child is treated as a separate ‘add-on’ and ‘nuisance’ category.

‘Voice’ and presenting ‘doable’ solutions Isolated from broader analysis, government’s ‘pre-JN’ understanding of street child programming had been its largely ineffectual ‘round-up’2 and blaming NGOs’ welfare approaches for encouraging streetism. Proposals that have been generated through government and NGO/CBO interaction in JN, therefore, have been seen as fresh strokes on a largely blank canvas (we explore this in terms of ‘attitude change’ later). Enthusiasm – or perhaps, at times, merely ‘toleration’ – of JN’s analysis of street children in Jinja, government respondents 8j and 9j point out, is based to a large extent on its ability to present ‘do-able’ solutions that are accepted as moving the street children agenda forwards. Intervention with Karamajong street children, radio phone-ins and JN’s Transit Centre, have all proved ‘do-able’. Despite JN’s criticism of traditional government approaches to street children, the linking JN analysis of streetism to proposals for ‘do-able’ interventions appears also to have given coherence to JN’s ‘voice’.

Multiple government identities ‘Decentralised’ government, as described in Schedule Two of the Local Governments Act (UG, 1997), places the task of identification of child vulnerability, and the creation of local mechanisms for monitoring and addressing it, in the hands of Jinja’s fifty-two municipal village (LC1) and three divisions’ (LC3) local councils. Therefore, focusing too strongly on policy and programming at LC4 municipal level has not always been helpful. It has occasionally prevented 1

Although it has faltered as a scheme because it has failed to address family need for the child’s economic agency, it has nevertheless deepened understanding of the complexity of the community’s needs. 2 In JN’s 2003 concept paper, mentioned earlier, the ‘round-up’ is criticised as not being ‘rehabilitative’ but rather hankering to poorly defined political analysis (Malcomson, 2003:2).

255 JN from more closely identifying with the more dispersed nature of governance and power within Jinja’s village and divisional councils. However, JN’s membership of CRAs and other NGO/CBOs representatives who hold political and advisory roles within village and divisional councils (see Table 5 in Chapter 11) appears to have added a degree of ‘insider’ advocacy for street children in many policy-making spaces and at many levels.

Political awareness, engagement and exchange I previously mentioned that, in binding JN and JMC planning processes for street children, government is able to make greater claims on and displays of addressing ‘streetism’ in Jinja. CRA respondent 2j, himself aspiring for divisional leadership, describes the value he believes government officers and politicians attach to such associations, “So now it gives [government people] a very clear position. They win respect from the community that they can have attention to such situations with the children and disadvantaged parents. So they are seen with ee (.) much more better eyes than before. Because whatever we do we can’t say we are doing it alone. Every good little thing the community see, they will say we are doing it together with the ee (.) local leadership. (.) The Mayor is aware, (.) the town clerk is aware. (1.0) It puts them in a better [light].” (JN Interview 2j/F6) Indeed, the membership narratives, from earlier in this chapter, demonstrates JN’s willingness to learn about and strategically engage with such complex local government political and structural dynamics.

Charismatic and visionary leadership However, to become integrated into coalition strategies, learning equally requires strong leadership and the capacity to manage and structure dispersed knowledge. Charismatic individuals have had to inspire and shepherd the coalition-building exercise and marshal strategic cohesion and creativity. Whereas the importance of CAC to the broadly strategic set-up stage of JN is made clear in Chapter 11, this chapter has emphasized the centrality of JMC’s Assistant Town Clerk to JN’s local government partnership-building experience. As a government ‘insider’ he has been vital in helping JN to navigate the often-obscured power and interest clusters within diverse spaces and protocols of municipal and divisional government.

256 Binding JN and JMC policy-making and planning for street children, he has mediated JN’s entrance into JMC’s policy-making spaces and processes. I have, therefore, presented considerable evidence to demonstrate the binding of municipal and NGO/CBO strategic planning and policy-making for street children within JN. We move this exploration of JN on by examining its impact on qualitative change for street children in Jinja.

The impact of JN partnership-building on knowledge and attitudes within policy-making processes Appendix 4 lists just some of JN’s encounters with government that are recorded in minutes, reports and interviews. Although the list of encounters and their outcomes is impressive, it cannot sufficiently reflect conflict between entrenched government and NGOs’ ideological and methodological mindsets that frame such encounters. Considering the narratives of ideological positioning, therefore, to what extent have such encounters and programming really qualitatively changed the way local government thinks about street children and streetism? Box 42: Statements on ‘change’ in government thinking on street children a)

“Even those of the government they were seeing those children all the time but they were not minding. So they were also learning if they see a chance quickly they want to do.” (JN Interview 5j/E2)

b)

“The other thing that we have been able to do as a network (.) on issues of street children (.) which has enabled the community to see the issue in a broader sense. (2.0) Instead of saying, ‘what is the council doing about the street children\?’ they have now appreciated actually the issue is much broader than the council. I mean the NGOs has helped us to (.) to focus on the problems and to provide solutions.” (JN Interview 8j/F3)

Most NGO/CBO, CRAs and government respondents acknowledge that there have been some changes to government thinking on street children. However, there is also an apparent reservation about too big a claim. Many political statements to the press still doggedly blame street children for urban disorder. Nevertheless, respondents suggest that factors that have allowed new ‘compromise’ ideas to enter government policy-making and

257 programming ‘comfortably’ are themselves indicative of change processes. In statement ‘a’ (Box 42), NGO respondent 5j suggests a link between the government’s past lack of ‘apparent’ opportunity and capacity for strategic programming and its ‘apparent’ indifference to street children. Where JN has provided ‘do-able’ opportunities for strategic policy-making, respondent 5j argues, the government has responded. In statement ‘b’ government respondent 8j describes change processes for both government and the community in defining problems and finding solutions for street children through partnership-building and policy-setting dynamics within JN. The community has now a broader understanding, he argues, that permits neither the simplistic definition of street children (e.g. as ‘criminal’) nor, therefore, simplistic blame for his or her presence on the government. Government respondent 8j goes on to emphasise that change generates expectations of yet more change and improved programming. In another statement, he also suggests that government involvement in ‘do-able’ programming is itself a catalyst for government’s evolving understanding of the complexity of street children’s need. Effective programming, he concludes, has to address multiple ‘emergent’ concerns that are located both in the community – what he calls ‘ “…[those small domestic problems] which push the children to the streets” (JN Interview 8j/A3) – and that are expressed by street children themselves. “[W]hen we started we thought that children were staying on the street because they had no night shelter. (.) But when we put the night shelter in place (.) we found out that it is not only lack of night shelter but we had their views. (2.0) They know what they wanted. (1.0) When we started the transit centre (2.0) of course one of the […] guidelines there was not to use drugs (.) and, of course, since some of the kids were addicted they had to run away from us. (.) Now, we are seeing that we cannot effectively handle the street children problem without handling the drug aspect as well.” (JN Interview 8j/A3) CBO respondent 4j also claims that such ‘do-able’ programming, and therefore the ‘new’ knowledge it brings government, has changed the attitude of ‘even the Deputy Mayor’, as historically the most vitriolic critic of NGO-styled programming. “I think many things are changing […] from the level of attitude. Though some people are just rigid. [B]ecause, like I would take an example of the Deputy Mayor, even now, much as he has his personal theory about these street children, but all the same, at one time he gets (.) convinced that sincerely what is being done is worth [it]. There’s no any other alternative,

258 much as originally they were so rigid and said, ‘no! no! this can’t be’.” (JN Interview 4j/F1) Even the ‘round-up’, he goes on to expand, is now more focused on “…taking responsibility for the [street] child” rather than merely engaging in populist displays of ridding Jinja streets of criminality. Now, he claims, “… they’re using more or less a social welfare approach” 1 (JN Interview 4j/F1). Such attitudinal change, he points out, must be understood as a slow process. The government’s part financing of diverse JN initiatives and its claims that these are ‘municipal’ initiatives2 are perhaps also indicative of government’s approval of JN’s present partnership configuration. However, it is also clear that the principal ‘street children’ NGO organization feels uncomfortable with the government and other member organizations’ broader analysis of which future programming framework should be seen to move the street children agenda forwards. The Deputy Mayor’s approval of existing JN programming for full-time street children and his proposal for future development is put forward as follows: “In fact if we continue this way and even expand: last time I was with some of these NGOs, we were working out a system where we could expand and put up a bigger facility (.) so that we can take in more children3. (.) And I think that is the way forward\.” (JN Interview 9j/F2) However, his idea of putting up a ‘holding institution’ for 100 street children does suggest that much political thinking, such as forcibly removing street children from the street, has changed little. However, different JN government representatives present different responses and analyses. With a street population of only approximately 30 ‘full-time’ street children below the age of sixteen (CRO, 2002), 8j, as JMC ‘technical’ officer, questions the appropriateness and sustainability of a holding centre. He also acknowledges that such an approach would be unlikely to address a much broader analysis of ‘streetism’. Government involvement in JN’s ‘do-able’ street children programming does appeared to have deepened ‘some’ government officers’ understanding of the social, economic and cultural complexity of ‘streetism’. It has challenged the comfort of simplistic assumptions and responses of previously dominant political and public discourse. However, 1

Although the ‘round-up’ narratives appear to contradict this statement, the ‘round-up’ as political display is ‘quietly’ not supported by government ‘technical’ officers. 2 Indeed, government members’ interviews responses frequently use the first person plural ‘we’ to describe JN initiatives. 3 The proposal he mentions was floated in JN’s 2003 concept paper.

259 government’s urgency to ‘solve’ streetism equally underscores much broader and escalating demands on it to address ‘new’ social, economic and cultural needs. The next section, therefore, looks at Jinja’s experience of both the ‘limits’ of government’s capacity and willingness to respond to JN’s partnership demands, but also the emergent limits to JN’s capacity and legitimacy to further embed itself in policy-making spaces and processes.

Limitations to partnership-building with Government Some limits to what might be expected from partnership building processes in Jinja have already been touched upon. Despite considerable evidence that JMC and JN have bound policy and programming approaches to street children, there is equally evidence of at times entrenched and ‘self-interested’ methodological and ideological positioning. Neither NGO nor government politician appear willing to cede too much of their own specific ideological or ‘political’ areas of control of the street children agenda in Jinja. How successfully these distinctive interests are addressed and mediated within JN is clearly dependent upon the coalition’s governance structures and its approach to assimilating and managing knowledge about members’ interests. Much has therefore depended upon ‘how’ coalition relationships are developed and maintained. ‘Formalization’ of JN governance structures and procedures, however, resulted in more bureaucratised ‘office-bound’ approaches. These have largely replaced the more ‘personal’ relationship building and sustaining approaches of social interaction networking. Poor communication is assumed to hide organizational bias and has therefore reduced trust in coalition governance and increased ‘hidden’ informal communication in the form of rumour. The reduction of ‘personal’ relationships has reduced JN’s potential to mediate and manage the potential conflict of distinctive organizations’ interests. This chapter has also hinted at a number of other factors that are also seen to limit both the government and the NGO/CBO’s capacity and willingness to respond to greater demands on partnership. We now look at some of these factors in greater depth.

‘Decentralized’ government and decentralized ‘exchanges’ We noted differences between JN’s two government representatives in their analysis of street children and their needs in Jinja. This creates somewhat of a problem for JN in determining a coherent government position. Similarly, focusing JN’s advocacy on Jinja Municipal Council appears not to have taken sufficiently into account the dispersed nature

260 of ‘decentralised’ political power. Against the background of competing interests within distinctive government administrative units, how JN’s ‘message’ enters government spaces and processes ‘comfortably and legally’ is therefore still problematic. That JN collaborated with JMC rather than with specific divisional councils, respondents 2j and 4j point out in Box 43, has meant that its proposals have been taken up and owned only by divisional councils who see themselves sufficiently benefiting within municipal contexts. As the only JMC division not to benefit directly from the International Youth Exchange1, respondent 2j argues, Walukuba Division has felt sidelined. Box 43: Statements on ‘exchange’ demands for government partnership a)

“[W]hen this programme from the (.) exchange came, (.) there was no direct benefit for Walukuba. So, that thing remained in them as if they had been sidelined like that.” (JN Interview 2j/F1)

b)

“All this politics! (2.0) For example we failed (.) to have the centre: I mean the youth centre at Jinja Central. (.) And they have not taken off yet ‘cause of some (.) politicking around\. […] Just because others wanted to claim that they would be the one’s and the other also.” (JN Interview 7j/D2)

In another example, a dispute between JMC and Jinja Central Division leaders about who should be seen to sign the contract with the Ministry of Gender (MGLSD), handing management of Jinja Central Division’s youth centre to JN, has blocked JN’s youth centre development programme since November 2002. JMC collaborative policy-making and programming for ‘street children’ and streetism, therefore, cannot be assumed to gain divisional support without benefiting the developmental or political interests of divisional elites directly.

JN’s ‘politicians’ and their limits In statement ‘a’ in Box 44, respondent 1j emphasizes JN’s successful access to important information at divisional and village levels of local government through Child Rights Advocates. However, for respondent 4j (see statement ‘b’), the problem for JN remains, less extracting knowledge from divisional and village-level councils, than getting its own message across. JN’s reliance on both government and ‘non-government’ members who

1

Mpumudde benefited from the kudos of building the Transit Centre and Jinja Central from renovation of its youth facility.

261 hold various political offices to advocate on JN’s behalf to both JMC and divisional level government has proved problematic. Box 44: Statements on ‘selling’ JN’s message to government a)

“As CRA, [my] importance [is in] the information that I give to the network [that] strictly concerns that particular area that I come from, whereby other organizations cannot easily penetrate through. Other groups they cannot come but, as a CRA, we have CRA at various […] villages. Definitely what I have down there I bring to Jinja Network. (JN Interview 1j/A5)

b)

“I think the issue’s even the level of articulation and ability to put messages on board. It varies from one individual to another. And then another aspect is attitude. What attitude does somebody actually have towards this kind of element? Do we even appreciate what individual organizations are doing? Because I hear sometimes over the radio that CRO they are still energizing thieves. And this was the Deputy Mayor who is a member (.) who (.) me I personally felt he was …” (JN Interview 4j/F1)

Respondent 4j argues that advocacy approaches based on politicians selling JN’s position to local council depends too much on: •

the individual’s capacity to articulate JN’s position,

•

the individual’s attitude to JN’s position, and

•

the individual’s response to perceived political threat or opportunity in: o ‘selling’ JN’s position to influence council’s attitudes, or o not selling it to avoid the political dangers of drawing attention to oneself by contradicting dominant political positions.

While 4j points out that, as ‘politician’ and ‘developer’, he feels both able and inclined to articulate JN’s position, and therefore challenge dominant opinion, he argues that other JN members are not. As he puts it, “Unfortunately in some circumstances you find that, much as we have these politicians on board, when they go to their councils they don’t talk about the network (.) and what the network is doing (.) so that the other councillors would appreciate the role of the network in the community.” (JN Interview 4j/F1)

262 Indeed, in statement ‘b’, respondent 4j points out that, despite the Deputy Mayor’s membership of JN, he promotes his own interests by criticising street children NGOs in the media rather than elaborating upon JN’s collaborative approach to ‘streetism’. However, as previously emphasized by respondent 4j, rather than expecting too much too quickly from JMC, attitude changes should be accepted as happening much more slowly. As historically one of Jinja’s most vocal political critics of the NGO ‘welfare’ approach to streetism, the Deputy Mayor’s invitation to membership may well act as a litmus paper to indicate the degree to which JN has impacted dominant political discourse. On the other hand it might also present a considerable risk to which type of knowledge and discourse becomes privileged in determining JN’s approach to intervention with street children.

Frailties in JN’s ‘indirect’ approach to local government engagement Rather than entering existing policy-making spaces ‘directly’, JN has chosen what 4j calls an ‘indirect’ approach that mostly bypasses spaces and processes of consultation outlined within the 1996 Local Governments Act. Although JN uses politicians to advocate on its behalf at the full council-level, and has created new spaces and locations for meeting district leadership1, its potential for influencing how divisional councils engage with street children policy-making at grassroots level, 4j argues, is limited. JN’s future strategy should be to engage with existing government policy-making spaces and processes, he contends, and therefore strengthen JN’s claims of legitimate representation through the policymaking ‘chain’. Two local government spaces and processes are mentioned as of particular relevance. JN should influence what the divisional social worker drafts as the divisional social welfare budget proposal, 4j argues. As a grassroots strategy, JN’s proposals might then be presented to the Social Service Committee within this draft. Government respondent 8j proposes a second important space and process to which NGOs and citizens are invited, the municipal Budget Conference. Its purpose, he explains, is to both present what has been achieved in the previous year and ‘ask for views’ for the coming year. Such grassroots agency, they seem to argue, might also be seen to add further community context to JN’s approach. It would generate further insight into how JN might mainstream its ‘special interest’ programming into broader community analyses of ‘streetism’ through local government. Indeed, JN government respondent 8j draws particular attention to the limited impact of the ‘special interest’ advocacy approach, which is favoured by some

1

Such as JN’s ‘Security Meeting’ with the RDC’s office.

263 specialist NGO service provider organizations. Local government, he points out, sees its ambit in much broader terms. “Government has its own mission and also the CBOs have their own missions. Government organs [are] not like other NGOs because, for us, we have the task of local government which is more than the network.” (8j/A4) On the other hand, respondent 4j points out, in the competitive environment of local government favoured Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) approaches – where government consults the ‘wananchi’ (i.e. the ordinary citizen) about their priorities for local capital development through general village-level meetings – issues of ‘special interest’ tend equally to get pushed to the back burner. Furthermore, even if such an approach would potentially avoid conflict of interests at municipal or divisional levels, one might assume that the political elites’ interests are equally ‘privileged’ at village level. Despite his critical proposals for engaging in local government created and maintained spaces, respondent 4j admits that JN has achieved considerable success through its ‘indirect’ approach. As he puts it, “Access to services, access to politicians; that the whole area of access is sort of opened up” (JN Interview 4j/F1) However, although local government leaders appear willing to offer an ear to the growing demands placed on it for social and economic structural intervention, government respondent 8j points out, government’s capacity to respond is nevertheless limited. Despite boasting a considerable advance in addressing educational needs for Karamajong ‘parttime’ street children, he admits, “Now that we have taken them to school, there’s a gap\. But we don’t have the capacity to handle that gap\.” (8j/B5) The gap 8j refers to is local government’s capacity to ensure that ‘part-time’ Karamajong street children’s economic activity is not a ‘necessity’ for family survival in an urban environment in which the Karamajong are widely acknowledged as socially, culturally and economically marginalized1. Indeed, although JN has been able to boost JMC’s ability to analyse and programme for ‘streetism’ in Jinja – such as the Karamajong ‘part-timers’ – the capacity of government officers to handle the new workloads JN demands of them is

1

This is clear enough from the considerable government and NGO/CBO programming to address their marginalized status.

264 also, just like Kampala, severely hampered by staff shortages and extremely limited resources1. Indeed, acknowledgement of just such limited local government capacity perhaps draws our attention to both the value, necessity and ‘centrality’ to JN of the ‘extra’-ordinary input and commitment of JMC’s Assistant Town Clerk. With clearly such a high dependency on his ability to mediate government and NGO positions, the ATC’s recently gained promotion out of JMC may well mean that JN has to rely on greater commitment of other key government officers and politicians within its ranks at a time when cohesion within its more ‘office-bound’ approach is still fragile.

12.2.3

Summary of JN and government partnership-building experience

Perhaps the most notable characteristic of JN’s partnership-building experience with government in Jinja has been its capacity to learn from Jinja’s political environment and to use such knowledge to its own advantage. Making accommodation for civil servants, politicians and other ‘para-governmental’ agents within JN membership has permitted NGOs and local government to calibrate both JN and, to a certain extent, JMC’s Social Services Office’s aims, objectives and strategies in programming for street children. JN’s historical ‘formalization’ processes may therefore be most productively understood as the processes through which JN’s members have chosen to configure and then reconfigure JN’s strategic identity to more clearly bind the intersecting interests of different government and non-government institutions, rather than be measured by the crude evolution of its governance structures and procedures. Apart from JN’s political ‘astuteness’, various other factors are seen to have contributed to these accommodations. In terms of clear added value and benefit ‘exchange’, JMC’s Assistant Town Clerk perceived the opportunity in accepting JN’s membership invitation for JMC to gain NGO expertise and resources by binding much of the cash-strapped Social Services’ planning processes for street children to JN’s. This, NGOs, CBOs and CRAs feel, has added to their ‘authority’ and legitimacy to influence such processes. Such joint processes have also broadened local government understandings of social, cultural and economic contexts for streetism, permitting both JMC Social Services and JN to bind

1

For instance, the entire budget for youth development in Jinja Central Division for 2002/03 was reported to be a mere Ushs 6 million (approximately £2,000) (Research Journal 3)

265 street children to existing programming for vulnerable children and their communities rather than treating him as an ‘add-on’ and ‘nuisance’ category – for which government has traditionally made scant social welfare provision. Although JN analysis has been critical of traditional local government portrayal and programming for street children and streetism, it has, nevertheless, been seen positively by some and is tolerated by other politicians, by offering ‘do-able’ alternative welfare programming, which JMC is also able to claim as its own. The centrality of the Assistant Town Clerk for JN’s access to diverse units of local government, to promote community-centred analysis and programming for streetism by local leadership, has been considerably enhanced by individual JN member’s multiple civil and political identities – both representing NGO/CBO and local government interests. This is said to have permitted a natural absorption of JN representatives and their developmental priorities into local government structures. Multiple identities are also seen to have increased the potential to negotiate greater JN access to policy-influencing people and spaces. Such access might further bind multiple and intersecting development and political interests. To what extent JN has colonized government thinking, or government has colonized JN thinking is difficult to ascertain. Different government representatives in JN show very different insights and analyses of streetism from very different ‘technical’ and ‘political’ perspectives. By removing street children, JMC’s politicians still seem very set on putting an end to what it still uncritically maintains is the correlation between streetism and criminality. JMC’s ‘technical’ officers, on the other hand, seem much more willing to accept a much more complex analysis that acknowledges social, cultural and economic causality. Claims of influencing local government thinking on streetism by JN’s NGO/CBO and CRA members are, therefore, cautious. They seem primarily based on ‘technical’ officers’ enthusiasm for, and politicians’ toleration of joint JMC and NGO/CBO strategy setting, programming and implementation exercises. Although politicians’ toleration of such approaches may be based on perceived political gains in claiming something is being done, it might equally be based on the acknowledgment of local government’s incapacity to resource politicians’ preferred alternatives1. Indeed, politicians still doggedly defend the prerogative for conducting uncoordinated ‘round-ups’ as relatively low cost displays of getting tough on criminality, which is broadly accepted as 1

Earlier we mentioned the Deputy Mayor’s interest in a large Kampringisa-styled holding centre.

266 having little benefit for street children. Acknowledging limited impact on such populist displays, NGOs and CBOs claim of change might, therefore, be more productively located within the collaborative processes through which JN sets strategy and plans and implements agreed programmes. The dispersed nature of demands, interests and power in ‘decentralized’ units of local government has made negotiation of access to dispersed policy-making people, spaces and processes, without clear political rewards for each, problematic. JN’s approach of depending on its politician members to articulate and ‘sell’ JN’s position is also perceived as limited by the politician’s capacity to do so, his/her personal attitude towards such a position, and his/her response to perceived political threat or opportunity in contradicting dominant political positions. Two respondents therefore propose an additional approach that would further ‘embed’ JN’s position and proposals within existing local government ‘grassroots’ spaces and processes for civil society consultation. However, JN’s demands on government are equally framed by government’s limited capacity to influence broader social, cultural and economic contexts to which JN’s analysis of streetism draws attention.

12.2.4

Some concluding remarks on experiences of government partnership-building and policy-influencing

Despite certain similarities in why Kampala or Jinja’s NGO/CBO community should feel it necessary to bind their interests within a coalition, each presents a very distinctive experience of building coalition and government partnership. Different ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ approaches to government are seen to have opened or closed policy-making spaces and processes to the coalition. However, equally each coalition experience of building partnership with government reveals insights into how and why distinctive central and ‘decentralized’ local government compete for control of the street children agenda. Applying the lens of theory on coalitions and Inter-sectoral Partnership (ISP) building to Jinja and Kampala’s particular experiences, the following two chapters deepen and broaden the initial analysis already presented in Chapters 9 to 11. In Chapter 13 the impact and functions of dynamics of ‘formality’ and ‘informality’ on how power is distributed within the coalition will be examined in terms of multiple accountabilities and the ‘hidden’ costs of coalition building. For the two coalitions’ experience of partnership building with

267 government, Chapter 14 looks deeper into the government discourse and practice of ‘decentralisation’ and availing ‘democratized’ space to the citizen in policy processes. I further examine the context and impact of sectoral identity on coalition-building and forging partnership with government. I also look at how coalitions’ experiences are illumined by ideas of the exercise of power within ‘knowledge’, ‘spaces’ and ‘actors’, and how these might determine the coherency of coalition ‘voice’.

268

PART 4: THEORIZING EXPERIENCES OF COALITION-BUILDING AND GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP-BUILDING IN UGANDA

“Ekízíbú: tíkibááku ’mpendá”

A problem does not come in a straight line (Lusoga proverb)

Chapter 13: Formality and informality in Jinja Network and Forum’s experiences of coalition-building In Chapter 5, Mattessich et al. (2001) presented us with six influences on coalitionbuilding processes: the ‘environment’, characteristics of members, process and structure, communication, the clarity of ‘purpose’, and access to and control of ‘resources’. As we saw in Chapters 9 and 10, through the dynamic interplay and intersection of each of these influences on Jinja Network and the Inter-NGO Forum, different meanings and intentions are applied to each coalition’s choice of structural and procedural configuration. Cukier & Zohar (2002) also make distinctions between coalitions’ ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ structures and procedures (see Chapter 5, Table 5.2.). Informal coalitions may be characterised, they suggest, as small, naive, flexible, marginal, adaptable and risk-taking. ‘Formal’ coalitions, on the other hand, are characterised as large, bureaucratic, stable, sophisticated, and riskaverse. However, if one were to try pigeonholing each coalition in these terms, one would perhaps struggle with the numerous contradictions. For example, on one side, sitting through monthly meetings of both coalitions, I was immediately struck by the cool formality of the Forum’s declared ‘informal’ approach, where all deliberations seemed centred on the Forum leader/coordinator. On the other side, Jinja Network’s apparently ‘formal’ approach was characterised by a highly animated and, at times, acrimonious debating style that drew in most NGO, CBO and government actors. In Jinja Network meetings, therefore, the chairperson appeared to play a mainly mediating role. Indeed, to understand inherent contradictions in applying Cukier & Zohar’s (2002) framework of ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ organizational arrangements, we also have to take into consideration the shadow side to informality. This can be seen to consciously or inadvertently establish relationships of power and control that may well be ‘sophisticated’

269 in how they act to maintain a status quo of dominant people and their interests (Misztal, 2000; Gilchrist, 2004, p.9; de Man, 2004, p.4). In the same way, more formal arrangements, such as in Jinja Network, might equally be experienced as ‘adaptable’ to changing environments and understandings, and take considerable ‘risks’ in modifying configuration to accommodate such changes. Extolling the assumed virtue of ‘informal’ dynamism over the assumed frailties of ‘formal’ bureaucratic dynamics (e.g. Gilchrist, 2004)1, therefore, does not give sufficient weight to how various actors are seen to control Kampala Forum’s ‘informal’ dynamism, and what they either intend by informal behaviour, or what they inadvertently simply ‘end up with’. In Jinja Network, ‘formal’ bureaucratic behaviour is equally seen to impact how power and control are unequally dispersed between distinctive member organizations. Indeed, while most literature is seen to champion the many advantages of inter-dependent embeddedness that coalition building is seen to bring an organization (Witt & Meyer, 1998)2, de Man (2004) argues that considerable value can be gained from exploring the ‘hidden costs’ of networking and coalition-building. This chapter, therefore, theorises ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ practices of coalition building in Jinja and Kampala. I begin by presenting a critique of the Forum’s ‘informal’ coalition configuration, whose shadow side raises important questions about ‘democratization’ of organizational spaces and knowledge, and what ‘accountability’ does and ‘should’ refer to. Next I present a critique of Jinja Network’s more ‘formal’ coalition configuration that is moving towards more bureaucratic tendencies, which might equally be implicated in a diminishing representation and skewed accountabilities. Within these critiques I explore ideas of how ‘multiple-accountabilities’ might be addressed through formal structures and processes. I also explore the important role informal ‘face-to-face’ encounters play to unlock more concealed dimensions of ‘critical learning’, ‘conscientisation’ and ‘critique’ within coalition-building practices. I examine how, away from more formal and ‘inhibiting’ coalition spaces, face-to-face encounters informally mitigate conflict and function as an informal expression of accountability. These ideas of multipleaccountabilities and what I call ‘social interaction networking’ frame the contention that the coalition optimally operates through an ‘enlightened’ understanding and pursuit of the delicate balance between expressions of ‘formality’ and ‘informality’. 1

Even though she does point out the ‘shadow’ side to informal networking approaches. We remember from Chapter 5 that in organization theory the embedded worldview (inter-dependent) based on networking for collective advantage was contrasted to a discrete one based on independent competitive advantage.

2

270

13.1

The Inter-NGO’s Forum’s ‘informal’ approach to coalition-building

Kampala’s Forum leadership places considerable emphasis on ‘informal’ organizational synergy with ‘like-minded’ organizations, which is widely acknowledged as an important coalition-building process (e.g. Gilchrist, 2004; Huxham & MacDonald, 1992). Indeed, leadership argues that ‘informality’ acts to resist bureaucratic behaviours that are characteristic of authoritarian government. However, leadership has equally appeared resistant, over eight years, to respond to some members’ desire for more ‘formal’ coalition structures1. This is despite considerable coalition growth and the emergence of quite different expectations of its ‘new’ membership. Such resistance has become interpreted by many of them, therefore, as equally resistance to more representative, accountable and challengeable governance. Control on how purpose, strategy, and leadership criteria are either defined or ‘not’ defined at any given time is seen to considerably depend on the Forum leadership’s domination and manipulation of the coalition’s informal structures and procedures2. For example, control of resources is acknowledged, even by the coordinator himself, as the principal determinant on who is included or excluded from agenda setting spaces. Mistrusting the intentions of ‘newer’ and smaller member organizations, the coordinator and larger member organizations informally control what resources are demanded from member organizations whilst limiting what resources are pursued as external support. As a result, the ‘ability’ to contribute resources is seen to privilege wealthier, larger and likeminded organizations’ interests, on one side, and to informally ‘de-legitimise’ effective participation and influence of smaller organizations, on the other side. To illustrate these dynamics, one respondent from a smaller organization cites the following Luganda proverb: “Atalina sente, tafumita lindazi.” (‘He who has no money cannot pick the pancake’) (INF Interview 11k/E4) Paradoxically, although smaller and ‘newer’ organizations acknowledge the leadership’s resistance to allowing them access and control of resources, the possibility of doing so, nevertheless, remains the Forum’s principal attraction.

1 2

Although, he did suggest the need for such structures in the interview. Although, as I mentioned, the formality of meeting spaces allows considerable control for the chairperson.

271 Although theory stresses the critical role that access and control of resources has on how power is controlled and cohesion maintained within coalitions (Meek, 1992, p.1; Mattessich, et al., 2001), other factors clearly contribute to the Forum’s cohesion and continuity for over eight years. Many member organizations appear rewarded and feel ‘protected’ by coalition solidarity and friendship in a hostile political environment for street children NGOs. For many organizations, solidarity born of political vulnerability is, apparently, sufficient reason to maintain membership, despite the deficit in democratized spaces that Poeschka & Chirwa (1998) argue are critical for the survival of such voluntary coalitions. Indeed, as respondent 9k declares, neither do all respondents see democratic participation as necessarily desirable when organizations end up making decisions about issues for which they have insufficient grasp: “…sometimes I don’t feel I have to be a part of it [i.e. decision-making …] because I have not the knowledge to make decisions.” (INF Interview 9k/C4) The evenly dispersed power to determine coalition agendas, implicit in coalition democratization, respondent 9k appears to argue, should not come at the expense of good practice frameworks for street children and streetism that expert knowledge, and, unequal capacity (Cullen, 1999) and moral probity inevitably bring to the coalition. Misztal (2000, p.239), however, points out that avoiding democratic operational boundaries of more formal structures and procedures, is more likely to undermine individual uniqueness and representational legitimacy through the imposition of an artificial equality. This false equality – based on favouring the dominant similar and marginalizing difference in Forum membership – is likely to privilege trust in the personal rather than in the universal (MacIntyre, 1988, p.5). Indeed, in its idealisation of informality, unconstrained by more formal and rational accountabilities, the Forum is in danger of merely replacing one perceived status of subjugation to government with another of its own leadership (Misztal, 2000, p.239). Growing Forum member organizations’ awareness of this subjugation means that, while both newer organizations, and others whose interests coincide with the leadership’s, perhaps still anticipate (or hope for) concrete and clear returns on their investment of time and effort – which Lyford (2001) sees as essential for coalition cohesion – a number of older member organizations do not and have therefore lodged their protest by withdrawal. Clearly, despite the Forum’s expressed interest in grander themes of social and structural change in Kampala, its leadership’s choice of institutional informality appears to conceal

272 rather than confront the leadership’s dominant relationship over others, and the informal mechanisms and discourses that are seen to sustain it. This dominance (whether consciously or unconsciously), hidden within its ‘informality’ discourse1, proves difficult for the ‘dissimilar’, smaller, and lesser-resourced member organizations to challenge (Gilchrist, 2004, p.9; Foucault, 1978, p.86). Nevertheless, in what James (2002, p.4) describes as the coalition’s “… paradoxical organizational form”, the Forum’s ‘informal’ approach appears to continue to attract ‘new’ and retain ‘older’ organizations:

•

who find sufficient concrete returns in terms of feelings of ‘solidarity’ and ‘friendship’ in a hostile environment for street children NGOs, or the benefits of workshops and training offered by the bigger organizations ,

•

whose ‘likeness’ of interests mean that challenging power inequalities is not seen to serve a constructive purpose, or

•

who, perhaps through ‘newness’ or optimism, still feel change to structures and processes, and the opportunities it may offer, is still possible.

However, such a deficit in organizational democratization, James (2002) and Covey (1995) point out, must inevitably impact the Forum’s ‘representational’ status to legitimately make demands of both its diverse member organizations and the government (we look at this later). Indeed, as much as the Forum leadership’s apparent inability to identify, acknowledge, articulate and ‘mediate’ the different interests and expectations of its member organizations, might be understood as a deficit of institutional ‘democracy’, it is equally seen by various scholars as a deficit of its primary ‘boundary-spanning’ resource (e.g. Wildridge et al., 2004, p.7; Gilchrist, 2004). It would also inevitably make social capital analysis based on benign notions of ‘associational exchange’ (Coleman, 1994) and opportunistic social ‘banking’ (e.g. Putnam, 1996; Fukuyama, 2000), far more problematic (e.g. see Morrow, 2001; Field, 2003, p. 1; Portes, 1998, p.2).

13.1.1

Ideas of ‘multiple accountability’

The Forum’s lack of more formal structures and mechanisms that accommodate a more representative approach to membership interests and leadership – such as transparent M&E, collective strategy setting or an elected leadership – is equally seen to restrict what various scholars argue is the ideal of multiple accountability (Edwards & Hulme, 1995, 1

Whose main justifications appear to be avoidance of government-like ‘bureaucratic’ behaviour and prevention of ‘poor practice’ smaller, poorer and ‘newer’ members gaining influence on the agenda.

273 p.221; Jaime, 2000). That the leadership claims to restrict accountability to ‘alike’ member organizations in order to restrict the influence of smaller ‘poor practice’ member organizations1, however, does illustrate the complexity of demands on multiple accountabilities in the context of coalitions. It raises the question of ‘to whom should such accountability be addressed?’ Should it be the member organizations or the child and his/her community whose interests they purport to serve? Indeed, which stakeholder is entitled to claim legitimacy to define who is accountable to whom? The argument for greater Forum accountability, therefore, cannot be seen from a purely functionalist perspective (Ginsburg, 1998) where accountability is attached to a hierarchical corporate model of inputs and outputs. If accountability is understood within a process leading to social transformation, adherence to purely corporate models will inevitably result in accountability contradiction (Tilt, 2005; Powers et al., 2002) that is difficult to resolve. Edwards and Hulme (1995, p.6) emphasise that, although the corporate model might address greater ‘upward’ demands for accountability (e.g. to Jinja Network’s principal donor, or periodic street children statistics to Kampala City Council), what are also necessary are measures of effective performance “… rest[ing] on organizational independence, closeness to the poor, representative structures, and a willingness to spend large amounts of time in consciousness-raising and dialogue”. Indeed, Gilchrist (2004, p.36) identifies potentially malevolent ‘informal’ coalition dynamics in terms of unaudited trading of resources, ideas and favours. Leat’s (1988, p.20) tripartite framework proposes remedying these different deficits in NGO and coalition accountabilities, which Gilchrist refers to, by arguing that multiple accountability should typically: •

give account of what is done and why;

•

take into account the interests of different stakeholders; and

•

account for the use and control of resources.

Such multiple accountabilities, Covey (1995, p.169) argues, are the challenge inherent in forging alliances across groups that differ in wealth, class, culture and resources. Structures and processes that promote such multiple accountability – including making downward accountability demands on poor practice organizations – is more likely to encourage transformative compromise and synthesis across such differences, and diminish the danger of frustrated good practice member organizations lodging protest by withdrawing (Brown, 2003, p.16). The Forum leadership appears to over-rely on the 1

Paradoxically, such organizations continue to be allowed in because of the Forum’s ‘informal’ approach to membership criteria.

274 informal assumption of common values and trust, whilst poorly servicing the tripartite demands of multiple-accountability suggested by Leat (1988, p.20). Skewed in this way, one can perhaps understand why greater degrees of rivalry, mistrust, recriminations and oportunism between distinctive Forum organizations might exist (de Man, 2004; Gilchrist, 2004, p.108).

13.2

Jinja Network’s ‘formal’ approach to coalition building

The Forum leadership’s institutional choices, therefore, are seen to have limited the Forum’s opportunities to communicate across its own ideological and methodological boundaries and come to terms with the complexity of its diversity (Taylor, 2000, p.1022). Jinja Network, on the hand, offers us an insight into how formalization attempts to address such representation and accountability deficits but, nevertheless, has equal tendencies to merely re-create ‘bureaucratic’ manifestations of the same deficits. From its inception Jinja Network appears to have been far more articulate about what it wanted to achieve and how it intended to achieve it. A series of environmental studies, workshops and consultations with diverse local stakeholders appears to have been aimed at gathering and cultivating knowledge with which to collectively formulate a collaborative response – later outlined in its three-year plan of action. At least initially, therefore, ‘formalization’ appears to have been bound to the service of Jinja Network’s processes and outcomes rather than have been a disconnected desire to influence through formal structures and inputs – what Wildridge et al. (2004, p.7) see as a necessary balance for successful coalition-building. JN’s strategic plan attempts to bind diverse NGO, CBO, CRA and government interests and crystallize each into a specific cluster of activities that define four focal areas1. The formation of an executive committee appears to have been intended to serve both the function of replacing the departing founder/coordinator but also was understood as a necessary accountability step for attracting donor resources through which to implement its programmes and activities – as was registration and opening a bank account. Indeed, as Lowndes & Skelcher (1998) suggest, rather than presenting itself as an ‘either/or’ choice, Jinja Network’s gradual formalization of structures and processes may be seen more realistically in terms of a life cycle, where structures and processes emerge from and coalesce around a specific set of ideas and objectives. The coalition, therefore, moves from a looser configuration at its initial knowledge gathering stage to a more formal

1

Interestingly, and perhaps showing JN’s democratic and strategic intent, the planning workshop was facilitated by an invited GTZ technical consultant, Dr. Wolfgang Jessen, from the Ministry of Gender.

275 configuration in its planning and delivery stages (Taylor, 2000, p.1028) – a process of ‘reconfiguration’ that the Forum still appears to be struggling with. Indeed, Chapter 12 examined these formalisation processes in terms of how Jinja Network was apparently able to continually reconfigure itself to accommodate new strategic partnerships, which were seen to arise from evolving understanding of how different units of government and policy-making spaces function. Although we look at this in more detail later, formalization of such strategic relationships through developing new spaces for timetabled meetings, or invitation to membership, are clearly pertinent to what Brown (2003) describes as the South’s greater sophistication about how power relationships work and how they might be challenged or manipulated – which he contrasts to Northern obsession with technical sophistication about governance processes. However, it is perhaps also necessary to see such formalization as a longitudinal process whose structural expression has, over time, been seen to enhance or constrict Jinja Network’s capacity to accommodate or mediate different ideological and methodological orientations. We are, therefore, perhaps drawn to ask ourselves the question, at what point has Jinja Network’s formalization process been seen to have constricted its institutional capacity to mediate these ideological and methodological tensions, and why? Or, as Wildridge et al. (2004, p.7) might have framed it, at what point is Jinja Network’s formalization seen to begin serving its structures and inputs (i.e. making accountability refer to how its structures and programmes are maintained) rather than its process and outcomes1 (i.e. making accountability refer to how its structures and processes are understood to serve the objectives of street child rehabilitation and resettlement)? Or, indeed (though trying not to labour the point), expressed in Jinja Network as a desire for “… activity generated resources rather than resource generated activity” (Field Journal 1)2. Chapter 11 draws particular attention to longitudinal shifts to Jinja Network’s configuration. Jinja Network’s broader strategy to shift to a more formal organizational and governance configuration, in anticipation of the withdrawal of CAC3 in 2003, appears to have created problems to the balance between process and structure. This change was 1

Contemporary academic interest falls on challenging previous obsession with simplistic ‘outputs’ in development. New interest focuses on development of M&E tools to examine transformative ‘outcomes’, “… taking into account unanticipated, long-term and intangible effects” (Wainwright, 2003:26). 2 That is, Jinja Network’s desire that policy and strategy setting processes determine what resources are pursued, rather than the other way round. 3 As both founder/chairperson and coordinator

276 experienced as altering the relationship between key leadership positions, the leadership and members, and, perhaps more significantly, was experienced to alter JN’s approach to coalition-building, shifting from an emphasis on building relationships (i.e. social interaction networking) to more bureaucratic office-bound practices. Although not perceived by most respondents as a crisis in how they feel represented within the coalition, the apparent shift in emphasis of coalition-building as a process and the coalition as a structure – determined by an apparent choice of governance style – has, nevertheless, considerably reduced its capacity to communicate effectively across distinctive ideological and methodological1 barriers. We therefore now look at how the bureaucratic expression of formality might impede the coalition-building process and its transformative potential by examining what social interaction networking is seen to do and what its absence might mean.

13.3

Social interaction networking, communication and accountability

In this thesis I use the term social interaction networking to refer to the process of sharing information and building relationships between organizations (Meek, 1992, p.1) outside the formal coalition meeting spaces2. The term is used to emphasis the ‘personal’ and ‘face-to-face’ nature of building and sustaining relationships. This might emphasise conviviality (pleasure, humour and fun) and empathy. The authenticity of such relationship building, Gilchrist (2004, p.64) points out, acts as the generator of trust, reciprocity, altruism, commitment, sacrifice, tolerance, understanding, concern, solidarity and interdependence. This ‘personal’ is contrasted to the ‘organizational’, where interaction is defined more by formal hierarchies within procedures and more formal lines of accountability (Gilchrist, 2004, p.35). We have already mentioned a reduction in coalition leadership’s emphasis on social interaction networking in Jinja because of the adoption of a more formal ‘bureaucratic’ approach to governance, and in Kampala because of growth in the scale of membership and leadership’s attitude to diversity such growth has brought. It is useful, therefore, to examine what functions social interaction networking appears to have served as a leadership approach within Jinja Network and the Inter-NGO Forum. This will help us understand, therefore, what its absence might mean for the coalition-building process. 1 2

That is, how different ‘understandings’ of the street child generates different ‘rehabilitation’ approaches. These formal ‘meeting’ spaces in both Jinja and Kampala are usually the ‘monthly meetings’.

277 Respondents from both coalitions stress the important function of ‘informal’ social interaction in forming bonds of ‘friendship’ and ‘trust’ as the foundation of the coalitionbuilding process. As Wildridge et al. (2004, p.7) point out, although it is possible to work jointly with little trust between partners, ‘successful coalition are mostly those who develop and, through hard work, maintain a strong level of mutual trust’. That the Forum or Jinja Network’s leadership visits other member organizations – as one respondent put it ‘even to say hello’ (JN Interview 5j) – appears to be interpreted in terms of affirmation of its value and identity as a member. Gilchrist (2004, p.41) suggests that feedback and advice within such interaction contributes to the social construction of the members’ identities, allowing the individual member organization to make judgements about itself in relation to others, and to keep track of its own reputation. Although rotation of meetings around different member organizations is understood by a number of respondents in Kampala as an institutional contribution to this social construction (although largely determined by an organization’s capacity to provide visitors sodas and biscuits)1, it is equally seen by many as merely a translocation of the inhibiting formal processes and spaces of the normal monthly meeting. Brock (2004c, p.153) refers to similar manipulation of spaces through the apparent Ugandan preference for ‘formal’ procedures in meetings. In the case of Kampala, these ‘(in)formal’2 procedures were perceived to privilege managers of better-resourced organizations over smaller organizations or non-managerial representatives. The informal spaces and processes created by social interaction networking in both Jinja and Kampala, moreover, are seen to have provided the option of ‘informal’ enquiry about each organization’s feelings of support or protest that organizations felt more inhibited to express in more formal spaces (i.e. the ‘monthly meetings’). Various respondents saw social interaction networking as part of the coordinator’s essential toolkit to:

•

access, endorse, confirm or challenge rumour and opinion, ensuring that underlying meanings are understood (whether supportive or critical);

1

•

gather and understand local knowledge; and

•

make creative and insightful connections (Wildridge et al., 2004; Gilchrist, 2004).

The capital expenditure on a crate of soda and biscuits, seen as a necessary symbol of hospitality, appears beyond the reach of many of the smaller organizations. 2 That ‘informal’ meeting procedures deliberately or inadvertently restrict participation perhaps blurs the boundaries between formal intention and informal behaviour.

278 Such functions, Gilchrist points out, help leadership to “ … gain an overview of situations and debates, gather useful insights, establish the ‘bigger picture’ and identify disparities” (2004, p.77-78). The ‘informality’ of spaces and processes created through social interaction networking in Jinja and Kampala, therefore, are seen to permit ideas to emerge and allow the coordinator/leader to act as a conduit for their dissemination, evolution, modelling and testing between member organizations. Ideas and positions, therefore, become common (although initially ‘mediated’) knowledge, which allows their authors to table them less problematically in more formal and ‘inhibiting’ agenda-setting spaces than would otherwise be the case. Misztal (2000, p.2-3) points out that even new media of communication cannot offer the same potential for repair, negotiation, feedback, interruption and learning as well as the information and impressions gleaned from ‘face-toface’ interaction. The communication inherent in social interaction networking, therefore, is understood to increase ‘trust’ and encourage representation and mediation of otherwise hidden positions. Interestingly, it has also been seen in both Kampala and Jinja to reduce demands for more ‘formal’ accountability. The ‘informal’ shared insights into evolving coalition thought processes and personalities, between leader/coordinator and member organizations, allows others’ positional peculiarities to be better understood, allaying the suspicion that what has been ‘unknown’ is necessarily implicated in shady acts of manipulation or corruption. Social interaction networking, therefore, is seen to counterbalance the deficiencies of more ‘formal’ bureaucratic spaces and processes (e.g. Cambron, 2001; Hay & Richards, 2000; Brooke, 1999; and Oliver, 1997). The value of such informal interaction, Misztal (2000, p.238) argues, is connected with its ability to enhance our move away from formal accountability and unreflective obedience to regulation to the ethics of responsibility and obligation. However, rather than an either/or institutional framework, Mattessich et al. (2001) argues that effective coalition building necessarily depends on fully developed and utilized lines of both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ communication “… characterised by openness and frequency of interaction between group members”. Indeed, also remembering the shadow side of ‘informality’ described for Kampala’s Forum, the importance of not abandoning formality is in its connection to “… the aspiration of modernity to universalistic inclusion” (Misztal, 2000, p.238). With this in mind, the marked reduction of both ‘formal’ and

279 ‘informal’ lines of communication in Jinja (and to a certain extent Kampala) is therefore of particular concern to its non-leadership member organizations.

13.3.1

Imbalances in ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ approaches to coalition building

In chapters 9 and 11 I mentioned a variety of institutional and human influences on Jinja Network’s move from emphasis on ‘informal’ social interaction networking approaches to coalition-building to more ‘office-bound’ bureaucratic practices. These include:

•

the movement from ‘founder’ coordinator to ‘employee’ coordinator, and therefore the ‘awkwardness’ of his employee status within social interaction ‘networking’ approaches where members remain, essentially, his ‘bosses’. This might also be seen within a cultural context that tends towards deferment to authority (De Coninck, 2004, p.68; Saito, 2002, p.24; Mugenye, 1998; Trip, 1998, p.131);

•

growing demands for more time-consuming formal governance structures, reporting and upward accountability for both the coalitions’ evolving programmes (such as the ‘street children’ Transit Centre) and donor agencies. Satisfying these demands has tended to promote techniques of governance as JN’s most ‘revered’ activity (Nagar & Raju, 2003);

•

a ‘catch 22’ situation, where the members also make greater demands for ‘formal’ accountability because surveillance through preferred ‘informal’ approaches to vertical and horizontal communication (as a mutual mechanism for accessing, understanding, endorsing or challenging more ‘hidden’ attitudes and positions), is seen to dry up under the weight of growing donor and project demands for upward accountability; and

•

the leadership and coordinator’s own (in)capacity, skills, propensity and attitude to social interaction networking approaches.

With the previously discussed framework for understanding the diverse functions of social interaction networking for both Jinja Network and Kampala’s Forum, we can identify some of the consequences for its reduction or absence (for whatever reason) within their various coalition narratives. For example, with the growth in numbers of Forum members and with the more ‘officebound’ approach in Jinja Network, the capacity to develop and sustain relationships of

280 ‘trust’ has tended to become problematic. Social interaction networking has, therefore, become more selective and reserved for ‘kindred’ organizations or individuals. Organizations and individuals who see themselves excluded from such a selective social network have tended to become suspicious that manipulative practices and favours are being exchanged between such favoured organizations (whether true or not). Where frequent ‘informal’ information sharing encounters with the leadership allows the coordinator or coalition leaders’ behaviour to be accounted for, their absence is seen to invite rumour and dissent to develop between more marginal organizations in alternative and more ‘hidden’ spaces. Demands on the time and resources of member organizations are seen to make greater frequency of formal encounters (such as the monthly meetings) impractical and the spaces for open expression of support or grievance inhibiting. In the absence of social interaction networking approaches and the ‘informal’ spaces these create, therefore, such rumour and dissent have less chance to both challenge and endorse dominant positions and attitudes, or, indeed, have themselves challenged and endorsed. As Gilchrist (2004, p.41) points out, in construction of alternative versions of the world, ‘rumour’ and ‘dissent’ may be characterised on one side as ‘subversive’, allowing marginal groups space for ‘risky thoughts and arguments’. On the other side, however, more dominant and ‘mainstream’ groups may equally use more ‘formal’ excluding spaces (such as the monthly meetings) to suppress such alternative perspectives. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, there is a certain ambiguity in how respondents understand representation to function in Jinja Network. On one side, respondents characterise Jinja Network’s formal structures as promoting consensus. However, greater demands have nevertheless been made upon its leaders to develop even more ‘formal’ accountability to compensate for fractures in ‘informal’ information flow between the centre and periphery that had previously been seen to mediate between these different positions. This suggests that formalization has brought ‘less’ representation and accountability. These new demands, in turn, place a greater burden on the limited time and resources available to the coordinator who has to increasingly prioritise ‘formal’ governance accountability between the centre and periphery. This, therefore, is seen to further reduce priority and time given to ‘informally’ uncover and discern concealed feelings of support or protest, which are seen to be inhibited by the hierarchies of more formal spaces and processes. Essential time given for research, the encouragement and development of ideas from members themselves, and the potential for disseminating and testing them, is also lost in greater bureaucratic demands. It is this rational-irrational

281 relationship between formal and informal multiple-accountability that perhaps has been inadequately acknowledged by Gilchrist (2004) (focusing on community worker ‘networking’) and Cukier & Zohar (2002) (focusing on the coalition as organizational structure) in how the coalition is formed and how it is sustained. Edwards and Hulme (1995, p.7) caution that ‘scaling-up’ inevitably tends to lead to bureaucratisation and therefore less capacity to consult with the target communities (be they member organizations, the ‘street child’ or the child’s community). This, in turn, results in the reduction of the coalitions’ capacity for, and interest in critical reflection and ‘learning’. Jinja Network’s focus, instead, begins to settle more comfortably on managing service delivery and its own structures rather than more critical processes of emancipatory ‘conscientisation’ that might challenge the structural contexts (Hashemi, 1995; Castelloe & Watson, 2000) that sustain the need for ‘streetism’ as a necessary community option.

13.4

Some concluding remarks on ‘coalition building’ in Jinja & Kampala

Both Jinja and Kampala coalitions express the wish to change dominant public and government discourse and responses to street children, and the economic, social and cultural structures that are understood to sustain streetism. However, as we have seen, both formal and informal coalition structures and processes might equally be seen to impede meaningful communication and institutional configuration that should function to facilitate multi-representational critical enquiry, learning and conscientisation – or ‘voice’ – through which such change might potentially be achieved. Both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ coalition configurations are seen in their different ways to privilege certain organizations that are either in leadership positions or agree with the leadership’s ideological and methodological positions. The Forum leadership’s resistance to more ‘formal’ structures and processes in Kampala is seen to restrict smaller, lesserresourced and less ‘similar’ organizations’ options and feelings of legitimacy to influence which agendas are given priority. However, ‘informality’ is also seen to restrict the influence of dubious ‘poor practice’ organizations in the Forum, and raise questions about to whom accountability should be addressed – street children and their community or member organizations – and who should determine such accountability. The option of addressing the issue of accountabilities, however, is bound up in the lack of coalition authoritative definitions of purpose, governance, membership criteria and resource

282 management – the clarity of which Mattesich, et al (2001) identify as the building blocks of coalitions. To address multiple accountabilities, therefore, the Forum might need more formal definition of its governance structures (e.g. an elected management committee, membership criterion, or strategic planning). This would challenge the dominance of better-resourced organizations and encourage greater participation of smaller (and some ‘bigger’) member organizations (Heaney, 2004, p.21). It should also embed representation of street children and their communities within ‘transparent’ Forum practices and processes (Edwards & Hulme, 1995, p.7), even if such accountabilities are seen as problematic to donors and coalition hierarchies (Powers et al., 2002). Jinja Network’s more ‘formal’ configuration is seen to give much greater control, access and influence to its diverse member organizations. However, the apparent downgrading of relationship building practices in favour of more bureaucratic ones is seen to have inhibited social interaction networking approaches and the ‘freer’ spaces they appear to create (Tarrow, 1994) – although we clearly have to acknowledge that no space is neutral (McGee, 2004, p.17). Social interaction networking is seen to serve the function of collating and mediating the entrance of local knowledge, opinion, and critique to more formal Forum and Jinja Network spaces. Such knowledge, opinion and critique is seen as necessary for critical reflection and ‘learning’ about how Jinja Network might most effectively and legitimately represent the interests of street children and their communities. Indeed, although difficult to monitor and evaluate (Gilchrist, 2004), Ashcraft (2002, p.1) points out that, rather than emerging from its own formal structures and spaces, coalitionbuilding – involving jointly developed governance structures, authority, accountability, and shared resources with an eye on the mutual benefits that are assumed to accrue – is, in essence, the evolution of relationships gained and sustained through social interaction networking processes. Indeed, the Forum leader’s capacity for effective social interaction networking (even if restricted to ‘like’ organizations) is perhaps the reason why the Forum has been able to sustain a core membership despite an apparent absence of formal governance structures. Jinja Network’s leadership, therefore, might need to rethink its growing ‘office-bound’ approach that appears to privilege ‘knowledge’ of structures and inputs (Nagar & Raju, 2003; Fisher, 1994; Ritchie, 1995) over socially networked relationships. Such informal spaces might permit greater mutual access to and sharing of knowledge that might contribute to critical reflection and ‘learning’ about street children and streetism. Facilitating and mediating the production, collation, processing of such knowledge, and its access into more formal spaces through informal social interaction

283 networking approaches, is also experienced by most respondents to address the causes for many of their demands for greater downward and horizontal accountability. Indeed, if the coalitions see their function to challenge dominant ideologies and structures that are seen to both maintain ‘streetism’ as street children’s principal option, and yet criminalize ‘streetism’ as practice, the leaders of the two coalitions, Wildridge et al. (2004, p.7) suggest, should see themselves principally as ‘knowledge managers’. Leaders, as a consequence, would have to continually question whether adopted coalition ‘style’, ‘structure’ and ‘programmes’ function to optimise uninhibited space into which knowledge can flow vertically and horizontally ‘unhindered’ (Gilchrist, 2004, p.56). Taylor puts this complex task of coalition building in the following way, “… Building the institutional capacity to hold these tensions and spaces will be a delicate operation. It will require new forms of knowledge and ways of knowing, new skills and new structures – skills in mediation and conflict resolution and structures, which can live with the complexity of communities and communicate across boundaries. It assumes organizational dynamism with structures capable of adapting to circumstances.” (Taylor, 2000, p.1022) However, change in both coalitions is likely to be problematic because change will impact different members in different ways. Ceding both organizational dominance, and ideological and methodological independence – and thus diminishing the individual organization’s capacity of to bring its collaborative ‘coalition’ actions in line with its own individual goals1 – is what de Man (2004, p.4) describes as the ‘hidden cost’ of coalition building. The ‘culture’ of pluralism that coalition interdependencies appear to promote will also have to confront more culturally embedded tendencies of ‘safety’ through deferment to authority (De Coninck, 2004, p.68; Saito, 2002, p.24; Mugenye, 1998; Trip, 1998, p.131). Even though the multiple internal and external competing demands on representation and accountability place an almost impossible task on Jinja and Kampala coalition leaderships (Uphoff, 1995), at least awareness of them, Edwards & Hulme (1995, p.223) imply, is likely to help in their management. We now turn to how the distinctive experiences of coalition building in Jinja and Kampala are seen to intersect with other environmental factors to facilitate or impede the potential for partnership building with government. We also explore from a more theoretical 1

As we saw in the conflict about street children ‘round-ups’ and the ‘transit centre’ in Jinja in Chapters 9 and 10

284 perspective how the Forum and Jinja Network’s experience of sectoral identification and positioning is seen to impact distinctive configurations of local and central government, and their policy-making processes and spaces that address street children and streetism.

285

Chapter 14: Partnership-building with government in Jinja and Kampala The two distinctive social and political environments of Kampala and Jinja have presented the Forum and Jinja Network coalitions with very different partnership building experiences and challenges. The findings presented in Chapters 9 to 11 suggest that, in Kampala, the Forum’s opportunities for developing productive government partnership have been limited by: •

an environment of competing government institutions, each with distinctive political identities,

•

an environment in which the frailties in the Forum’s structures, its processes and its coherence as ‘voice’, has made it ‘reactive’ to policy decision-making processes rather than ‘proactive’ in defining and influencing them, and

•

an environment of distinctive NGO and government sectoral identities espousing often ‘oppositional’ and ‘zero-sum’ attitudes to each other.

Such an environment has contributed to extremely limited claims for Forum-government partnership. In Jinja, too, there is a similarity in how government institutions compete between each other to claim ownership for initiatives that might be bankable as political capital – in this case between municipal (LC4) and divisional (LC3) levels – limiting too general a claim of Jinja Network and government ‘partnership’. However, much clearer and more specific expressions of ‘partnership’ and ‘partnership-building’ appear to have emerged from both Jinja Network’s more robust coalition configuration (e.g. its strongly defined strategies, structures and processes) and a generally much less clearly identifiable and pursued sectoral identity. Theorizing these critical themes in ‘partnership-building’ for our two coalitions, this chapter begins by examining the dynamics of government institutions at various local and central government levels as they compete with each other for control over the street children agenda. The chapter then goes on to locate both the Inter-NGO Forum and Jinja Network coalitions within these complex political environments. It examines how robust or weak coalition structures and processes impact the relative coherence of coalitions’ knowledge systems as ‘voice’, and how this ‘voice’ might be interpreted as ‘usable’ capital

286 in negotiating policy processes and their outcomes. Central to all this, however, is an understanding of how the character of the urban environment (e.g. in terms of its proximity to central government, the scale of NGO institutions, etc.) determine ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ government and NGO sectoral identities. This chapter, therefore, discusses the nature of these identities and the impact on both the opportunity for building partnership and on the cultural, social, economic and political forms such partnership might take. Expressed in terms of sectoral (op)positioning and sectoral blur, Kampala’s strong and Jinja’s less clearly defined sectoral positioning pans out into a discussion that illuminates a variety of theoretical discourses on: •

insider/outsider policy-influencing approaches and their ‘shadow’ sides;

•

how notions of civil society and its institutional expression (that some suggest are necessary for its promotion) both impact and are impacted by distinctive African cultural, social, economic and political forms; and

•

how theorizing ‘knowledge’ and ‘voice’ may productively intersect with more holistic interpretations of ‘democratization’ and ‘good governance’.

In the conclusion to this chapter, I revisit post-colonial theories and their critiques, which I discussed in Chapter 6, to see how they might provide a more contextual cultural, social, economic and political armature upon which to drape theoretical narratives about ‘partnership-building’ with government in Uganda.

14.1

Political environments of competing government institutions

From the findings in Chapter 12, we are given an insight into dynamics between competing ‘central’ and ‘local’ government institutions for one of Africa’s larger and rapidly expanding capital cities. Uganda’s Movement ideology, underpinning processes of ‘decentralisation’, predates its emergence as the favoured IFI policy framework of the 1990s (Kabwegyere, 2000, p.103; Kasfir, 2000, p.76). However, as we saw in Chapter 12, despite decentralisation’s constitutional and ideological status, the competing tendency to control from the centre (Coninck, 2004, p.69) creates a complex political environment in which the Inter-NGO Forum operates. Jinja, on the other hand, provides us with insight into how ‘decentralised’ street children policy-processes function within local government, away from the large intrusive institutional presence of central government and the international NGO. Let us now look at each of these environments in greater detail.

287

14.1.1

Government ‘decentralization’ and ‘command structure’ in Kampala

Apart from its own institutional preferences for specific government partners (which we look at later), since its inception Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum has had to focus and then refocus its partnership orientation to accommodate, at times, acrimonious competition between KCC and central government for influence over agenda setting and programming for street children in Kampala. The politico-institutional relationship between centre and periphery emerges from competing pressures to establish meaningful and ‘coherent’ pluralism through ‘decentralisation’, on one side, and guarding what central government appears to portray as necessary ‘coherent’ control from the centre, on the other side. This is what de Coninck (2004, p.69) describes as the ‘command structure’ of Uganda’s Movement system. This has created a strange, confused and contentious mosaic of what is ‘implied’ by Uganda’s policy framework (i.e. to whom legislative and policy documents give the task) and what are ‘assumed’ as the powers, roles and responsibilities for street children policy-making, programming and monitoring in Kampala (i.e. who actually takes control). Through its contentious Kampringisa street children initiative (UCRNN, 2003, p.47; Jacob et al., 2003), central government appears to have seized control of Kampala’s street child agenda – ostensibly in the interest of displays of ‘tourist friendly’ urban order, which it understands the existence of street children and ‘streetism’ to compromise (e.g. Thomas de Benitez, 2003; Beazley, 2003; Malcomson, 2001 & 2003). The Local Governments Act (UG, 1997), however, gives this very responsibility to KCC. In Schedule Two of the Act, KCC is given the task of both monitoring existing programmes, and planning a district level response to street children, ensuring ‘people’s’1 participation and control of decision-making. However, without the capital input of central government’s Kampringisa programme at its disposal, without a coherent and workable alternative, and without much apparent enthusiasm to engage with the Forum to explore non-government partnership opportunities, KCC appears resigned to merely tinker with apparently halfhearted workshop-centred deliberation on street children and streetism. Periodic workshops2 appear to function to apportion unrealistic tasks to KCC’s diverse overstretched and under-resourced child welfare officers. Such tasks appeal more to the display of ‘bureaucratic neatness’ than any real capacity for these officers to carry out such responsibility (e.g. Dicklitch, 1998a, p.150; Mitchinson, 2003, p.241). The Forum appears 1

Expressions of participation are mainly understood in terms of ‘consultation’ at village level through PRA methodologies and at LC4 and 5 levels through ‘Budget Conferences’. 2 The collapse of these KCC coordinated periodic encounters with the NGOs at the conclusion of external funding from WHO or UNICEF, suggests they are principally donor inspired.

288 to also add to these complications by having no apparent strategic plan about which government institutions to engage with and for what specific purposes. For these dual reasons, identifying a long-term ‘coherent’, productive and reciprocating government partner institution has become problematic for the Forum. As a consequence, both central government and KCC appear to have control of both the space and the context for engagement with the Forum, making reference to it merely as a ‘rubber-stamping’ exercise. These spaces function to seek endorsement of government’s own approaches and programmes rather than allow Forum influence upon them. Such encounters, therefore, merely appear to serve the mantra of popular participation, which is promoted as a central tenet of the Movement political discourse (Raynor, 2003, p.169; Mulikita, 2002).

14.1.2

‘Decentralization’ and government institutional tensions in Jinja

The core rationale of Uganda’s ‘Movement’ policy of decentralisation is that spaces at lower levels of government become accessible to the citizen (Brock, 2004c, p.134). This rationale, however, appears to assume what McGee (2004a, p.6-7) describes as a ‘default fiction’, which presumes a linear, cohesively ordered and symmetrically patterned nature for both policy-making and governance processes. In the highly politicised environment of ‘decentralised’ policy-making in Jinja, however, patterns of local government behaviour are far from linear. Individual local leaders appear to seek political capital and other benefits as tangible exchanges, rather than by association to ‘social capital’ abstractions assumed to accrue from broader policy outcomes. Local leaderships’ benefits, furthermore, appear to be pursued and defended as much through vertical resistances to broader policymaking processes and outcomes that are seen to primarily benefit ‘others’1, as by promoting their own local interests through existing governance conduits. For example, a proposed intervention with Jinja Central Division’s youth through a joint Jinja Network and Ministry of Gender (MGLSD) programme faltered, not because it was seen as inappropriate for local youth, but because both municipal (i.e. LC4) and divisional (i.e. LC3) government leaders refused to cede to each other their own politically bankable claims on the initiative, thus leaving the contract unsigned. Similarly, despite the risk of undermining the potential for cohesive broader policies through its interaction with Jinja

1

This perhaps also refers itself to cultural dimensions of ‘jealousy’, mentioned several times by respondents and in Rick James’ (2002) study on coalition success in Malawi.

289 Network1, local government’s public display of getting tough on criminality through the street children ‘round-up’ continues to be jealously preserved by distinctive administrative units of both the municipality and Jinja Central division. For each, the ‘round-up’ is seen as an undemanding government policy option with assumed low risk political return2, and thus political capital not ceded lightly. A second politico-institutional obstacle to emerge from Jinja Network’s experience of partnership building with government was the distinction made between engaging with government as a technical exercise, and engaging with it as a political exercise. In her study of deliberations by local councils in Lira (Northern Uganda), Karen Brock (2004c, p.138) refers to the restrictive rules of engagement for ‘technical officers’ in council meetings – being only ‘legitimately’ referred to for technical clarification. In Jinja too, despite much peripheral engagement, Jinja Network’s own government technical officers’3 reported difficulty in engaging their own district and municipal councillors in analytical debate about street children and streetism. Indeed, finding access to spaces for such ‘political’ debate is seen by respondent 4j as one of the coalition’s most persistent problems. Restriction is seen to narrow working definitions of street children and compromise necessary methodological negotiation and marketing of new ideas and interventions that both challenge but also offer a credible alternative to councillors’ ‘populist’ positions. Nevertheless, emerging from a mixture of political discourse and legislative provision (i.e. Uganda’s 1995 Constitution and the 1997 Local Governments Act) some space and opportunity for coalition engagement with different levels of government has been created, even if mainly experienced in Kampala as ‘display’. How Jinja Network and Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum have been able to make sense of, and locate themselves within competing politico-institutional spaces, and have therefore understood where opportunities most productively lie, has been critical to the partnership building experience of each.

1

The municipality’s breaking of an assumed Jinja Network agreement on a referral rather than political approach to ‘round-ups’ has become a major fissure in the relationship between the municipality and the principal street children NGO. 2 That the municipality and Jinja Central Division carry out different ‘round-ups’, each out of their own political interests, makes identifying institutional targets for Jinja Network advocacy more problematic. 3 That is, the municipal Assistant Town Clerk for Social Welfare and the District Probation & Social Development Officer, for Jinja.

290

14.2

The Forum and Kampala’s competing government institutions

The narratives about the Forum’s relationship with government, emerging from Chapter 12, portray the Forum as ‘reactive’ to, rather than ‘pro-active’ within its political environment. Through fear of entering into a relationship that might be manipulated and domineered by government, the Forum leadership has opted to restrict encounters with government to the occasional exchange of information with the Ministry of Gender’s (MGLSD) Street Children Desk. As is suggested from each officer’s title, doing business with the Street Children Desk Officer is perceived as less bureaucratic and more ‘straightforward’ than with Kampala City Council’s Probation and Social Welfare Officer. For KCC’s poorly resourced and overstretched Probation and Social Welfare Office, street child welfare is just one of many competing ‘social welfare’ agendas. Such arm’s-length exchanges with MGLSD, moreover, appear more ‘straightforward’ because they have made fewer demands of the Forum and to have offered a bureaucratically less volatile, and therefore also a ‘safer’ space (Tripp, 1998, p.131; Dicklitch, 1998a, p.3). However, such arm’s-length engagement, combined with the Forum’s ‘avoidance’ of KCC bureaucracy, has equally acted to constrict its access to policy spaces within government institutions and therefore also the strategic partnership options that may have become available to it. However, Forum members also place value on maintaining distance between themselves and government. They stress the Forum’s autonomous ‘outsider’ identity. Echoing more general claims for civil society, members suggest the Forum functions as a counterbalance to government, acting as a vehicle to limit state power over street children and ‘streetism’ agenda (Mercer, 2002; Kamat, 2002; Biggs & Neame, 1995)1. To counter government’s bureaucratic ‘bullying’, respondent 17k argues, the Forum should be ‘powerful like lawyers’. However, as Cullen (1999) points out, the Forum’s success as a government ‘negotiating’ partner is more likely to be based on its ability to propose both workable and acceptable alternative policies and approaches than its capacity to merely present ‘reactive’ critique. The coherence of the Forum’s ‘voice’, the Harvard based JUPRP (2002, p.2) points out, is likely to depend on the clarity by which it defines street children and streetism as ‘problem’, and through which a proposed ‘solution’ therefore appears feasible. However, as was remarked about the absence of manifest coalition

1

Among other Forum respondents there is a certain ambivalence about the implied (op)positioning in relation to local government of such an approach.

291 statements (Rowbottom, 1977, p.42-45)1 in the previous chapter, ‘informality’ has created a considerable deficit in robust coalition-building strategies, structures and processes that might have provided the Forum with such clarity. As many members feel excluded from Forum agenda setting spaces, there is inevitably little representational coherence that, James (2002, p.38) points out, is necessary for a strong coalition ‘voice’. With an apparently weak and disjointed ‘voice’, the Forum has problems locating itself on the cutting edge of social and political processes in which new approaches and potential solutions to streetism might be found (Covey, 1995, p. 167; Jaime, 2000). Equally, the coalition’s legitimacy to advocate for socio-structural transformation for street children and their communities within such policy environments is undermined by its own governance deficits. The evident resistance of both KCC and the Forum to engage with each other perhaps also ceded too much space for powerful political players, such as the Minister for Tourism, to influence policy on street children. However, the political imposition of Kampringisa’s ‘round up & lock up’ approach has begun to challenge the long-term feasibility of the Forum’s arm’s-length approach to government engagement. As respondent 17k argues, the removal to Kampringisa of the same street population targeted by Forum NGOs has meant that both government and NGO ‘rehabilitation’ approaches have to converge rather than running parallel and independently of each other – even if both see this as an inadvertent and undesirable consequence. At the same time, government’s total control of the Kampringisa programme2 has begun to wane as the programme has grown to depend more and more on the input of Forum resources through its Kampringisa Support Team initiative3. The Forum’s ‘service delivery’ support has propped up woeful and poorly resourced government care and welfare provision in Kampringisa (UCRNN, 2003). However, the incapacity of central government to maintain its independent control of street children programming, respondents have observed, is likely to also make partnership an uneasy affair (Huxtable, 1998, p.282). Losing control also exposes vulnerabilities. The MGLSD has resisted Forum attempts to develop referral linkages with the Kampringisa

1

That is, “official enacting statements” (e.g. such as a constitution or strategic plan) giving the Forum and its members an authoritative framework of rules, regulations, strategies, etc. 2 This had initially been based on a large short-term, though clearly unsustainable capital investment (Jacob et al., 2003) 3 Although, the Forum leadership suspects government is quietly negotiating other external inputs to regain such institutional control of Kampringisa’s programmes.

292 because this would imply government resource and ‘good practice’1 vulnerabilities, which the MGLSD is loath to admit. In Kampala, therefore, the space ceded to the Forum for protest and advocacy is connected closely to government feelings of vulnerability and control, and therefore also the ‘political capital’ government is able to make its claim on (Covey, 1995).

14.3

Jinja Network and Jinja’s competing government institutions

For the reasons explained above, the Forum’s evolution as ‘democratized space’, and its claims to building partnership with government in Kampala can most clearly be understood as ‘projects still to be done’. Jinja Network’s ‘embedded’ approach to partnership building, on the other hand, offers us a window into what opportunities might potentially accrue from more ‘hands-on’ and structurally integrated approaches to partnership with government. On the other side, and of equal value to policy-making discourse, it shows us how proactive approaches might equally reproduce skewed power relationships in another guise. At its foundation in 2001, the acrimonious relationship between Jinja Network’s first NGO and CBO members and local government appeared similar to those described for the Forum and government in Kampala (see chapters 9, 10 & 11). However, Jinja Network’s institutional evolution, adopting an ‘embedded’ partnership approach to government2, appears as much to have challenged the assumed logic of sectoral positioning – that is, pursuing a civil society position that is ‘autonomous’ – as it has been challenged by it. Its potential to confront obstacles to partnership building based on sectoral (op)positioning, which makes Jinja Network’s experience so different to that of the Forum in Kampala, appears to have depended on four principal factors. First, critical learning has clarified Jinja’s decentralised politico-institutional environment for its members, and therefore also altered Jinja Network’s relationship to it. This environment is defined by both a problematic relationship between local government’s ‘technical officers’ and ‘politicians’, and competition between ‘decentralised’ municipal

1

Ostensibly locked up for ‘rehabilitation’ purposes rather than ‘criminality’, we remember, for instance, that many government and NGO reports expressed concern with the frequent absence of even basic health, nutrition and educational provision in Kampringisa (UCRNN, 2003). 2 That is, in which government representation and planning for street children are integrated with the NGOs’ within Jinja Network.

293 and divisional administrative units of local government1 in defining local policies for Jinja’s ‘full-time’ and ‘part-time’ street child population. Second, Jinja Network demonstrates a significantly different approach to Kampala’s Forum by its apparent willingness to both engage with and accommodate the ‘political’ complexity of Jinja’s municipal and divisional government institutions and processes. Third, away from the institutional polarities of Kampala, representatives of Jinja Network’s member organizations often have multiple representational identities – e.g. being both NGO/CBO staff and local politicians. This significantly muddies sectoral definition and therefore also sectoral (op)positioning. And fourth, unlike Kampala’s Forum, Jinja Network has a far more strategic and representative2 approach to defining street children as problem, proposing ‘do-able’ solutions, and marketing these to government and the public – displaying understanding of such activities’ potential exchange value as ‘political capital’. This appears to follow more closely the assumed logic of JUPRP’s (2002, p.2) proposed framework for ‘successful’ political engagement described earlier in this chapter. Before examining the impact of these four factors on policy-making in Jinja, it is helpful to examine them under a broader theoretical lens as environmental contexts that challenge assumptions of both sectoral cohesion3 and what Edwards & Hulme (1995) describe as the ‘myth of autonomy’ for both civil society organizations and government. Indeed, as we shall see, the interplay of these environmental factors also challenges the assumed logic of local ‘non-governmental’ coalitions positioning themselves as ‘outsider’ forces through which to yield policy compromise from government.

14.4

Partnership-building: coalitions navigating government institutions

Unlike Kampala’s Forum, Jinja Network’s response to such a complex political environment has not been to withdraw to less volatile and less threatening arm’s-length engagement. Instead, it appears to have acknowledged such complexity and made accommodation for it within coalition representation and structures. For example, invitation to membership for senior politicians was understood to bring what politicians

1

Distance from Kampala has made both administrative levels relatively free from the central government interference experienced in the capital city. 2 Although it should be stressed that their ‘representation’ within a strategic document does not necessarily imply that there is always agreement upon diverse methodological and ideological positions. Within JN’s strategic plan, some ‘solutions’ are understood as ‘collaborative’ while others are specific to an individual member organization. 3 That is, that government or ‘non-government’ represent unitary ideological blocks.

294 themselves portrayed as legitimate municipal representation that unelected municipal technical officers could not. Invitation to membership of village based para-governmental Child Rights Advocates was also seen by NGO and CBO members as helpful in both gathering vital community knowledge and as a conduit to village and divisional leadership. For local government such an arrangement has allowed for the re-energising of voluntary para-governmental agents who, despite being officially coordinated by the municipality, had been largely neglected1. Engagement of local government politicians also seems to have been largely influenced by the emergence of concrete and do-able coalition initiatives (JUPRP, 2002, p.2). Jinja Network’s street children night shelter (Transit Centre), developed by its sub-committee of government officers and NGOs, emerges as just one do-able low cost project. A creative linking of the initiative to existing government poverty alleviation programmes, was seen to have many advantages. Street children could be included in existing resource disbursement, avoiding the highly competitive scramble for new allocations of meagre government resources (Bartlett, 2004). Politicians and government technical officers could also draw considerable political capital from the project. The government’s resource contributions, through the DFID funded C3F programme, would allow it considerable claims that local government is contributing to street child rehabilitation and resettlement (Bartlett, 2004). Experience of the vicissitudes of running a Transit Centre would also allow a much broader framework for social analysis of street children that would include and potentially influence local government politicians. As we discussed in Chapter 2, such a global framework allows government and NGOs to reconnect street children to broader social, cultural and economic child and community survival contexts (Boyden, 2003; Bartlett, 2004b; Aptekar & Heinonen, 2003). These, in turn, are likely to generate greater understanding of different meanings street children and their communities apply to urban spaces and domains (e.g. Beazley, 2003; Young & Barrett, 2001), and therefore modify polarised ideological meanings and urban myths government and NGOs apply to ‘streetism’ (Ennew & Swart-Kruger, 2003; Bibars, 1998).

1

Before its JN context, the municipality appears to have made no resources available to the government coordinator to both motivate and engage the CRAs within the community for several years.

295 We shall look later at the extent to which these ‘ideological’ meanings have been challenged in Jinja. However, in conscious or inadvertent1 pursuit of such challenges, the fact of such diverse NGO, CBO, government and ‘para-governmental’ membership appears to have given Jinja Network the potential for significantly greater insight into not only how local ‘politics’ function, but also who are the important political players and what are the most effective ways to engage and influence them. Furthermore, such a presence also appears to have given coalition members insights into what existing government programmes, resources and expertise might be most productively and creatively targeted. However, the insights into local ‘political’ processes that allowed such strategic accommodation were gained largely through coalition membership (and later leadership) of the principal municipal technical officer2 for social welfare. Acknowledgement of the value and impact on Jinja Network of the ‘individual’ protagonist within the complex political interplay of ‘technician’, ‘politician’ and ‘decentralized government institution’, is therefore of great importance. As Streck observes, “A handful of individuals with the right leverage and powers of persuasion can create a common vision and convince important actors to throw their weight behind an issue.” (Streck, 2002, p.6) Without the mediation of a ‘disinterested’ champion, Khator (1999) argues, credibility and non-hierarchical positioning in the processes are at stake. However, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, too much focus on a individual protagonist perhaps becomes more of an obstacle to seeing the broader environment from which such individuals emerge and are able to function, by either championing or resisting processes of ‘democratization’3. It is in examining how the charismatic leader binds ideas of leadership to challenging entrenched socio-structural orthodoxies through multiple accountabilities that the practitioner is offered more productive theorizing (we examine this later). After all, such influential ‘insiders’ (Binderkrantz, 2004; Maloney et al., 1994) are located in the overlaps Jinja Network appears to make between discourse on partnership-building and participation within policy processes, on one side, and coalition-building, on the other side. 1

Although these may be claimed as ‘outcomes’ of an embedded approach, Jinja Network respondents had not always predicted such outcomes. Respondents also showed considerably different levels of analysis that was not always reflected in JN’s documentation. 2 That is, the Assistant Town Clerk for Social Welfare. 3 Although leadership in both Kampala and Jinja might be described as charismatic, how power is distributed by ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ approaches demonstrates different meanings applied to governance and leadership.

296 Such an overlap proves illuminating for both. Complex theoretical analyses of policy processes – such as McGee’s (2004a, p.23) framework of spaces, actors and knowledge (see Chapter 5) – potentially find new pragmatic levels of analysis and application within Jinja Network’s ‘multi-sectoral’ experience of coalition-building. Jinja Network’s proactive stance and its focus on the ‘opportunity’ (rather than ‘threat’) that local government embeddedness would bring, has also meant that its diverse member organizations have appeared able to maintain considerable control of the dynamics. We contrast this to the Forum’s ‘reactive’ stance to exaggerated government controlled initiatives in Kampala, which appears to have died or gone awry once external funding had become exhausted. The largely ‘passive’ stance of the Forum may well be based on its conclusion that such fragile and poorly conceived government initiatives merely have to be periodically tolerated while they run their course. Although such passivity is perhaps seen as effective resistance to what the Forum leadership has perceived as the government’s occasional intrusion into the NGO’s ‘independent’ space, such sectoral (op)positioning has impeded the Forum’s potential for influencing government policy-making spaces and processes. Indeed, as Edwards & Hulme (1995) argue, to make use of the new Africa-wide political space that has emerged through the 1990s, the key issue for the coalition is not the preservation of a ‘mythical autonomy’ but the pursuit of new ways to manoeuvre and negotiate within policy spaces more effectively. Understanding environmental and locational contexts to Kampala’s pursuit of monosectoral ‘autonomy’, on one side, and Jinja’s multi-sectoral ‘embeddedness’, on the other side, are clearly fundamental to theorising about the two coalitions’ partnership-building experiences with government. It is therefore necessary to explore emerging autonomous and embedded identities, and partnership configurations – and what these might imply – for which I now develop the notions ‘sectoral (op)positioning’ and ‘sectoral blur’.

14.5

Kampala and sectoral ‘(op)positioning’

Despite some instances of internal ideological and methodological intransigence between its government and NGO members1, Jinja Network’s ‘manoeuvring’ and ‘negotiating’ makes far fewer claims to sectoral ‘autonomy’. Although we have mentioned the contribution of attitudes, coordination skills and governance structures to fostering and 1

The government use of the street child ‘round-up’ and NGO resistance to ceding any component of its own ideological model of rehabilitation to the Transit Centre are the two principal examples are given in Ch. 11.

297 sustaining boundary-spanning relationships in Jinja Network, the avoidance of sectoral (op)positioning may also explain the considerably greater success Jinja Network has demonstrated in both coalition-building and policy-influencing than the Forum. In Chapter 3 we encountered, at times, vitriolic critique of the notion civil society as part of a tripartite ordering of society in African contexts1. Critics of the way civil society is being promoted as a development paradigm see it implicated in the transfer of a profoundly anti-democratic transnational political order, despite its claims to foster democratization and good governance (Ferguson, 1998; Fine, 2001; Harriss, 2002). Lewis (2001, p.7) suspects that the function of promoting such sectoral (op)positioning is to create a caricature of assumed vertical opposition of state and society. This, he suggests, becomes a pretext for powerful outside institutions challenging national power relationships and, in the process, obtaining greater control over them. Problematic relationships between government and a potentially more organized Forum2 in Kampala also appear to emerge from grander social, economic3, and post-colonial themes. The resistances the Forum has experienced from what government appears to interpret as its ‘intrusion’ into central government’s Kamprigisa street children initiative4, therefore, might not be just a product of bureaucratic authoritarian practices or financial and ‘good practice’ vulnerabilities. Whether or not, as some suggest, they are framed within dubious self-serving practices (e.g. Tripp, 2001, p.126; Shelton, 2004, p.19), government resistances to meaningful civil society participation in policy-making in Kampala might equally be seen as its reaction to externally induced (and financed) pressure. Such pressure, postcolonial theory argues, is seen to narrow the opportunities of the Ugandan state to define and control its own social and economic worldview (Ranger, 1996). On the other side, the opportunity of a greater hold on a weakened state may also become an attractive prospect for the NGO. Through a mix of external funding and the flexing of Kampala’s civil society muscles5, therefore, respondent 17k proposes a Forum show of NGO oppositional power “… like [a] force of lawyers” (INF Interview 17k/F4) to force government to change the way it perceives street children.

1

That is, private, public and civil society. As we have noted, the Forum’s Kampringisa Support Team resource input and organization within the government programme shows the early signs that the Forum is beginning to think and act more strategically. 3 We think particularly of the involvement of the Minister of Tourism in pushing for the contentious government Kampringisa street children programme (see Chapter 12). 4 Even if made necessary by government’s limited capacity to run the ‘rehabilitation’ institution. 5 It becomes clear in the interviews that NGOs see themselves very much as representatives of an ‘autonomous’ civil society. 2

298 There is also perhaps a demographic and institutional explanation for sectoral (op)positioning. Kampala has a population of approximately 1.2 million compared to Jinja’s 71,000 (UG, 2002). Kampala is also the centre of national government. It supports the large regional offices of multi-lateral agencies (e.g. UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF and WHO), and of bi-lateral agencies (e.g. DFID, CIDA, DED and USAid). Kampala has also the regional offices of numerous INGOs (e.g. World Vision, Human Rights Watch, Save the Children, and Oxfam) bringing heavy support and influence to local NGOs who promote diverse rights and an invigorated civil society. Under the scrutinizing lens of the international community, therefore, competitive negotiation pits government against nongovernment institution, not only for development aid these international organizations are seen to bring, but also the relative control such aid is seen to bestow each sector. And thus, we find Forum respondents claiming that government is secretly negotiating funding for Kampringisa, with an implied intention of regaining control, but without apparent acknowledgement of the Forum’s considerable contribution of resources and personnel (see Chapter 12). It is therefore perhaps not altogether surprising that the Forum assumes a much greater non-governmental identity than Jinja Network. And although government may ape the superficial and, at times, misleading international rhetoric of civil society participation in its policy-making utterances1 (Twaddle & Hansen, 1998, p.9), the reality of such meaningful opportunities in Kampala proves far more complex for the Forum – even if it were to chose a more proactive approach.

14.6

Jinja and ‘sectoral blur’

However, as Mamdani (1998) argues, such sectoral (op)positioning should be more realistically associated with the transference of the Western institutional order that such international organizations bring to Kampala. This institutional order, Mamdani points out, is seen to carry very little meaning in the traditional associational context for the majority of Africans outside the bigger cities. Although hardly assuming a rural identity, the considerably different demographics of Jinja perhaps means that Jinja Network is not only disposed to display considerably less sectoral (op)positioning than Kampala’s Forum, but equally has a far less defined sectoral character from which to draw. There is no central government vying for institutional advantage. Nor are there multi-lateral, bi-lateral and international ‘non-governmental’ organizations. Compared to the Forum’s membership of

1

However, as the rhetoric of ‘people’s participation’ has been a central tenet of Movementist ideology, it would also be misleading to overstress the international origin of such rhetoric (see Chapter 9).

299 10 sizeable NGOs, with sufficient resources to run vehicles and a full-time staff, Jinja Network can boast hardly one1. The representatives of various member organizations also show a considerably less entrenched sectoral identity. Karen Brock notes in her Ugandan study of various urban local government settings outside Kampala that sectoral boundaries are “… sometimes blurred and sometimes non-existent” (2004b, p.95). Nominal civil society actors, she observes, play political roles in local government, as well as multiple other roles in their geographic and social constituencies (ibid. 2004b, p.97). Table 11.2, in Chapter 11, illustrates similar findings for ‘non-government’ representatives in Jinja Network. Of the representatives of Jinja Network’s nine ‘non-government’ or ‘para-governmental’ (i.e. CRA) organizations, five also have a quite separate ‘representative’ role in local government. Three representatives have political profiles at divisional LC3 level and two within their village LC1 councils2. Indeed, yet another NGO representative was supporting her brother’s candidature for the mayoral office at the time of my fieldwork. These multiple identities appear to ‘blur’ the representational boundaries of government and ‘non-government’ agency. Making claims for an African civil society based on a universalistic perspective3 of ‘institutional order’ (Harbeson, 1994), therefore, appears problematic outside the distinctive institutional order of Kampala (Lewis, 2001, p.7; Sogge, 1997; Maina, 1998; Mamdani, 1998). But what does this ‘sectoral blur’ mean for Jinja Network’s strategic partnership-building and policy-influencing programme? Most respondents claim that their multiple identities present a problem within neither their ‘non-governmental’ nor ‘political’ agencies. The ease with which many apparently live with such multiple identities perhaps reflects the degree to which roles become inter-twined within what Allen (2002) refers to as the ‘enmeshment’ of state and civil society within Uganda’s Movement model of local councils. More generally, it also reflects the less partitioned nature of most traditional African associational contexts (Mamdani, 1998). However, it would equally be misleading to see such associational contexts as necessarily benign. Various respondents note that the distinctive worldview of the ‘politician’ is often 1

And this single NGO’s sectoral (op)positioning had brought it the threat of closure from Jinja Municipal Council prior to its joint founding of Jinja Network (see Chapter 11). 2 For an explanation on Uganda’s local council system, see Fig. 2 in Chapter 9. 3 Refer back to Chapter 3.

300 at odds with the community’s1. Respondent 4j, as a local CBO/NGO representative within Jinja Network and as the Speaker of a municipal division, describes his need to navigate and negotiate the split ideological positioning such identities brings him. He describes his ideological identity within his local government setting as both ‘developer’ and ‘politician’. In his capacity as ‘developer’, he argues, he is able to understand community problems better. As divisional Speaker, he brings this perspective to local government debate, a perspective that, he argues, “…would be [to] the benefit for all […] politicians” (JN Interview 4j/F1). It also becomes obvious from the way in which Jinja Network has been able to identify, access, navigate and negotiate within many local government settings in Jinja, that members’ ‘political’ identities have also generally configured Jinja Network to a more political understanding and approach to partnership-building and policy-influencing processes. Theorising inter-sectoral partnership (ISP) based on separate identities for ‘civil society’ and ‘state’ in the smaller urban sites in Uganda, such as Jinja, therefore becomes problematic. Without the strong sectoral (op)positional contexts of Kampala’s government and non-government institutions2, and also with role and identity ‘bleed’ between what ‘sectoral’ institutions there are, claims for exclusive and autonomous sectoral (op)positioning seem inappropriate. At best, they appear reserved for the few local government and non-government institutions who can at least claim some institutional autonomy through scale or representational ‘authority’3. However, by pinning different value positions to such notions as ‘community’ and ‘government’, respondents still appear to employ distinctive identities, which may potentially shift, in different community and government spaces. Respondent 4j implies that his ideological identity as ‘developer’, rather than ‘politician’, allows him to position himself more strongly on the oppositional side of the policy debate in divisional council meetings. Likewise, respondent 9j positions himself as ‘politician’ in Jinja Network spaces. Seligman (1992) proposes that the use of such distinctive identities also calls upon notions and experiences of authority and freedom that are both imposed upon actors and are brought by the actors themselves to policy spaces.

1 Which makes the dubious assumption, of course, that ‘community’, even though an amorphous entity, is ‘non-political’. 2 That is, that we associated with the national and international configuration of Kampala’s institutions. 3 (Op)positioning, whether government or non-government, inevitably calls upon some form of ‘institution’ as its power base.

301 Indeed, although respondent 4j describes his own ability to bring this different knowledge of the ‘developer’ or ‘community’ to the local council policy debate, he equally acknowledges the inability of other Jinja Network ‘political’ representatives to do the same. The degree to which ‘Jinja Network’ knowledge – portrayed as representing street children and their communities’ experience – is allowed to enter the local council policy spaces (that are distinct from Jinja Network policy spaces) as ‘evidence’, moreover, is seen to be critical for its partnership-building and policy-influencing intentions. Respondents refer to two principal and inter-twining factors determining the degree to which such evidence may enter public policy spaces in Jinja. On one side, they concern themselves with the type of ‘Jinja Network’ knowledge that is available to be presented to the local council policy debate to be legitimised. On the other side, they concern themselves with the coherence and articulation of a Jinja Network ‘voice’ (i.e. in terms of personal or collective capacity, ideological conviction and political ‘clout’) that brings and sells such knowledge.

14.6.1

Knowledge on Street Children and ‘streetism’ as legitimised evidence

McGee (2004a, p.11) proposes three types of knowledge that typically enter public policy spaces before they are either legitimised or shelved. In Fig. 14.6a, below, I adapt McGee’s typology to focus on knowledge about street children and streetism1. One type of knowledge tends to be based on analyses of statistical and survey data or research that are typically produced, or selectively reproduced2, and endorsed by government itself as ‘official knowledge’. Another type of knowledge comes in the form of street children discourses and narratives as constructed and self-perpetuated ideologies. We noted in Chapter 2 that these are often government, NGO and media projections of street children as societal ‘victims’ or ‘villains’ (Aptekar, 1988) or ‘heroic’ protagonists framed by broader socio-political critique (Ennew, 2003). Yet another type is what McGee describes as ‘experiential knowledge’, or what Forum respondents describe as ‘anecdotal’ knowledge. Based on anecdotal evidence of real encounters and work with street children (e.g. the ‘real life’ social, cultural and economic problems encountered during the resettlement of a child home), this is often the most difficult to ‘sell’ to the local council policy-maker unless it 1

This is adapted from McGee’s analysis of ‘pro-poor’ knowledge. A complaint made by Forum respondents is that government selectively reproduces Forum knowledge as its own when it is seen to serve government interests. 2

302 appears to support dominant ideological discourses and narratives (such as an anecdote about ‘pick-pocketing’ that supports the proposal for a ‘round-up’ of street children).

Figure 14.6a: Types of knowledge on street children and ‘streetism’ entering public policy spaces

McGee (2004a, p.5-7) points out that the degree to which such knowledge is legitimised as ‘evidence’ within public policy spaces is mirrored against political ‘demand and supply’ dynamics. Thus, within Jinja’s local council policy-making spaces, strong political ‘populist’, ‘economic’ or ‘welfare’ demand is likely to legitimise only the ideological narratives, selected official knowledge, and anecdote about street children and ‘streetism’ that support each position. The capacity to persuade local government to ‘legitimise’ Jinja Network knowledge, therefore, appears to have depended on its claims to present diverse ‘official’, ‘ideological’ and ‘anecdotal’ knowledge within a coherent and widely endorsed knowledge system1. Legitimisation has also depended on Jinja Network representatives’ capacities as knowledge managers and sales people, their acknowledgement of the ideological efficacy of Jinja Network’s knowledge system, and their political clout through which to contradict existing ‘legitimised’ local council knowledge and the people it is seen to serve.

14.6.2

‘Voice’: multiple identities & capacities selling Jinja Network knowledge

Claims to an effective Jinja Network ‘voice’, therefore, would assume some evidence of the successful transfer and ‘legitimisation’ of a coherent knowledge system to local government in Jinja. There is certainly evidence of such a system being developed within Jinja Network itself. Its research and concept papers, and a three-year plan of action for Jinja have involved a diversity of government, non-government and community stakeholders in binding distinctive stakeholder knowledge into a framework that might be 1

Through the production and evolution of diverse Jinja Network documents (e.g. its ‘concept papers’ and ‘3-year plan of action’), this knowledge system appears to have evolved through negotiation and renegotiation of meanings in what Hall (1997) refers to as processes of encoding and decoding such texts.

303 collectively agreed and acted upon. Through an internal dynamic that calls upon both sectoral (op)positioning and sectoral ‘blur’, therefore, Jinja Network knowledge system seems to involve a fairly coherent framework that appears to bind ‘official’, ‘ideological’ and ‘anecdotal’ knowledge. However, despite such evident ideological compromise or accommodation at coalition level, the transfer of such a collaborative knowledge system to more exclusive local council political spaces of policy debate and decision-making has proved problematic (see Fig. 14.6b).

Figure 14.6b: Jinja’s sectoral identities & sectoral ‘blur’ within policy-influencing & -making spaces and processes

We have previously noted the partial exclusion of government ‘technical’ officers (i.e. civil servants) from local council politicised policy spaces (Brock, 2004c, p.138), who were initially assumed to function as ‘insider’ conduits of Jinja Network knowledge. The entrance and legitimisation of ‘Jinja Network’ knowledge as ‘evidence’ is, therefore, largely underpinned by ‘political’ dynamics within local council spaces. As a marketing and advocacy conduit of its knowledge system, therefore, Jinja Network appears to have partially shifted emphasis from its government ‘technical’ officers to its ‘multi-sectoral’ politicians1 as political ‘insiders’ (see Fig. 6). This new emphasis, however, has yielded extremely variable and unpredictable returns. The assumption that its own political ‘insiders’ can be effective conduits of Jinja Network’s knowledge system relies on a set of three ‘dubious’ parallel assumptions illustrated in Figure 14.6c, below. One assumption is that Jinja Network’s politician representatives are convinced by, and are therefore convincing about the accommodation 1

That is, both government ‘politician’ representatives in Jinja Network, and NGO/CBO representatives who also hold political office in diverse divisional (LC3) and village (LC1) local councils.

304 of distinctive and contentious ideological positions, which are different from their own, within a unified ‘knowledge system’.

Figure 14.6c: Assumptions within transference of Jinja Network knowledge system to Local Council ‘political’ spaces through its ‘multi-sectoral’ politicians

At stake is a collective and cohesive ‘voice’ whose ideological balance is not skewed or corrupted by the coalition politician’s individual ideological bias. Secondly, emphasis on ‘insider’ political agency also relies on the assumption that such ‘insiders’ have the capacity and skills as knowledge managers (Gilchrist, 2004) to comprehend, articulate and ‘sell’ the complex set of ideas that such a knowledge system represents. Thirdly, emphasising such ‘insider’ political agency also assumes that Jinja Network’s ‘politicians’ have the political profile (or clout) within their councils that allows them to challenge existing and possibly entrenched political knowledge. All three assumptions, however, appear ‘fragile’ in terms of praxis. Within local council politicised spaces Brock (2004c) describes social, cultural and procedural mechanisms that act to serve the interests of an established hierarchy by restricting access to only certain types of knowledge and actors – very similar to the dynamics I have described for Kampala’s Forum earlier on. Because marketing Jinja Network’s knowledge system inevitably implies contradicting and challenging such hierarchies, it also carries considerable political risk for the individual politician/representative. This thesis does not focus upon such political risk within Jinja Network’s ‘insider’ approach in any great detail. However, respondent 4j does draw our attention to what he understands as the considerable influence of such constraints on Jinja Network’s sectoral and multi-sectoral politicians to voice and market Jinja Network’s knowledge system within such political

305 spaces1. Diverse interview narratives also give some evidence of this disjuncture between what is assumed of ‘insider’ agency and what actually happens. Several respondents reported the Deputy Mayor (as Jinja Network member) publicly speaking out against other Jinja Network NGO member organizations for what he portrays as ‘unacceptable’ NGO methods of street child rehabilitation that allow the child to remain on the street. Although Jinja

Network’s

NGO/CBO

respondents

suggest that

such extreme

sectoral

(op)positioning, that deviates from what they portray as a more holistic Jinja Network position, is slowly becoming moderated2, the assumption that the Deputy Mayor – or indeed any other Jinja Network ‘politician’ – will voice and market a ‘Jinja Network’ knowledge system that is not compromised by his own ideological and methodological bias is clearly questionable. This inevitably raises organizational and ethical concerns within ‘insider’ and ‘sectoral blur’ spaces and approaches – especially around coalition coherency based on ‘trust’ Evidently, therefore, Jinja Network’s claims of the efficacy of ‘insider’ and ‘sectoral blur’ approaches to influencing local policy-making spaces – as opposed to ‘outsider’ sectoral (op)positioning of Kampala’s Forum – are not as straightforward as they might at first appear. These dynamics are illustrated in Fig. 14.6b (refer back two pages). Although the considerably weaker ‘sectoral’ identity and (op)positioning has perhaps allowed for a greater ‘democratization’ of knowledge and identities within Jinja Network itself, this gain may be considerably compromised and weakened when transferred to the exclusively ‘politicised’ debating and decision-making spaces of local government councils (see blue area). Indeed, perhaps of concern to the proponent of such ‘insider’ approaches is how, rather like chameleons, ‘multi-sectoral’ actors may change or modify their sectoral identities and allegiances according to the ‘developmental’ or ‘political’ spaces in which they find themselves. Rather than born solely of coalition frailties, this changeability is also seen to be largely determined by the interplay of Jinja Network politicians’ own personal issue-based capacities, ideological convictions, and political profiles within the local council policy-making spaces. As we saw in Chapter 12, Jinja Network’s representatives may as much be motivated by political opportunism and ambition (i.e. how they position themselves) as by caution and restraint (i.e. how they get positioned) within local council’s politicised spaces that are marked by the gendered social, cultural and 1

And what this might imply for local government attitude and behaviour towards street children and streetism. 2 Jinja Network documents often mention that one of the coalition’s purposes is to get rid of ‘security’ and ‘social welfare’ paradigmatic polarities by a mixture of compromise and accommodation.

306 procedural constraints that Brock (2004c) describes. For both Jinja Network’s ‘multisectoral’ and local government politician, therefore, much success in the transfer of Jinja Network’s ‘knowledge system’ has depended upon how it is seen to influence and intersect with more personalised and temporal configurations of their ‘political’, ‘social’, cultural and, indeed, ‘sectoral-institutional’ identities.

14.7

Some concluding comments: Negotiating policy and partnership

Representing multiple points in time and space in a policy process (some of which have transformative potential), McGee describes the dynamics illustrated in Fig. 14.6b as “… actual observable opportunities, behaviours, actions and interactions … which includes social and political forces and temporal dimensions that shape the institutions and practices within which [the various actors] operate.” (McGee, 2004a, p.16) Given the complexity that such interactions and knowledge encounters induce in Jinja, therefore, it becomes clear that policy processes may occur at several different spaces, levels and moments, with very different outcomes. Whether identifying with a moral purpose or bending to entrenched political hierarchies, the reality for coalition activity and the (re)configuration of personal identities within policy-influencing and policy-making spaces is likely to reflect a continually modifying ‘hybrid’ of intersecting interests (Edwards & Hulme, 1995) over time. In chapter 6 I noted that various ‘postcolonial’ theorists touch upon this notion of ‘hybridity’. Mbembe (1992a, p.5) describes the relationship between the government and citizen in Africa in terms of a baroque style of gamesmanship “… in which everyone indulges”. This is a promiscuous relationship in which, he declares, ‘connivance reigns’. Within such an environment, Werbner (1996, p.2) asserts, the ‘ordinary person’ is positioned “… midway between consensus and coercion”. Although both Mbembe and Werbner are referring to the ongoing processes of reconfiguration of relationships between Africa’s postcolonial state and its citizens, such an analysis would seem, nevertheless, to help illuminate some kind of conclusion on ‘partnership’ configurations between coalitions and government in both Jinja and Kampala. ‘Getting on’ in the postcolony, Nsamenang (2000) appears to imply, means to some extent accommodating both government’s ‘imprecise’ reference to traditional notions of authority, on one side, and its resistance to what it perceives (or is able to characterise) as ‘externally’ induced appropriation of its

307 powers, on the other. Government reference to ‘doing things legally and in the right way’1 in both Jinja and Kampala (see Chapter 11) – implying the retention of government control of processes, spaces and knowledge – and its evident resistance to the threat posed by the Forum’s ‘autonomous’ sectoral (op)positioning in Kampala may perhaps be interpreted as references to this. Jinja Network’s evolving ‘insider’ and ‘sectoral blur’ approach to partnership building with government in Jinja may, on the other hand, be interpreted as engaging in a promiscuous postcolonial relationship. Indeed, within the multiple and constantly shifting identities in Jinja Network’s sectoral blur we might locate processes of improvisation, manipulation and connivance referencing themselves constantly to ‘imprecise’ notions of authority and authenticity (Donham, 2003; Huxtable, 1998). It is perhaps within the blurred character of Jinja Network’s policy-making space, however, that change might be negotiated less threateningly. Kodesh2 (2001) draws our attention to historical African agency that embraces change but also attempts to keep control of it. Frustration in African politics, Achebe (in Ehling, 2003) argues, is not because of change itself, but in the fact of not being allowed to manage it. In the safer intersecting Jinja Network and other ‘sectoral blur’ spaces, ideas of deference or challenge to authority might at least avoid a felt need of recourse to divisive and threatening sectoral ‘display’. Kampala’s Forum, on the other hand, appears to have limited its choices by locating itself within the myth of sectoral ‘autonomy’ (Edwards & Hulme, 1995). Without acknowledging the need for ‘promiscuity’ in its relationship with local government, it is perhaps inevitable that the Forum restricts itself to the options of either engaging in precarious oppositional critique or wrap itself in the dubious security of withdrawal. My interviews with both Forum members and leaders reveal some form of acknowledgement of this precarious position. Following the imposition of government’s Kampringisa ‘round up and lock up’ rehabilitation approach on Kampala, partnership-building and policyinfluencing, and how the Forum positions itself within these, therefore, appears principally a project yet to find concrete expression. Outside the sectoral-institutional polarities of Kampala these multiple and continually shifting sectoral3 actors and identities, which are illustrated in Fig. 14.6b, are what Bhabha 1

Government respondent 9j implies that legitimacy of advocacy equates to following government procedures, even though the lack of local government capacity and resources make this problematic (Mitchinson, 2003:241; Dicklitch, 1998a:150). 2 Kodesh (2001) explores the meeting of tradition and modernity in the Baganda Kingdom (Uganda) during the period of early colonialism. 3 I use italics here to emphasise that, in understanding diverse and shifting identities in policy processes, the multiple meanings such a term implies in contexts of ‘sectoral blur’ perhaps needs to remain a point of critical analysis.

308 (1997) refers to as products of “… negotiation rather than negation”. However, the ‘shadow side’ of sectoral blur is perhaps evoked by the very expressions that postcolonial theory uses: improvisation, manipulation and connivance. In influencing policy-making and policy-influencing processes, therefore, keeping a grander framework of social transformation has to constantly find new and promiscuous ways to intersect with the sophisticated processes and techniques of governance, losing neither its form nor trajectory. Clearly, also, such a grand framework – promoting the democratization of knowledge, actors and spaces – can only be as strong as the coalition structures and processes that both sustain and mirror it (van Tuijl, 1999).

309

Chapter 15: Conclusion This thesis has set out to explore two principal concerns that had preoccupied me as the founder and former coordinator of one of the two coalitions that are focused upon. As practitioner, the first of these concerns is how theory might throw light upon, or alternatively be enlightened by, the ‘coalition-building’ experiences of the Inter-NGO Forum and Jinja Network (Uganda). Such ‘real-life’ or ‘experiential’ theorizing still remains thin on environmental, cultural and historical influences upon how coalitions form, evolve, and pursue ‘enlightened’ social transformation as praxis and process – especially in African contexts. The second concern of this thesis is how Kampala’s autonomous ‘outsider’ and Jinja’s enmeshed ‘insider’ approaches to partnership-building and policy-influencing both inform and impact the policy-making processes and outcomes involved in addressing concerns about street children and streetism in both Kampala and Jinja. Ignoring longitudinal processes of children and family migration from village to more developed urban centres – that might offer them greater economic return or refuge1 – research has tended to focus on policy-making for street children and streetism only in the continent’s largest cities. With greater contemporary interest in ‘preventive’ and ‘poverty reduction’ methodologies, therefore, an examination of the impact of coalition-building on policy-making for street children in smaller urban centres, such as Jinja, is long overdue. As we have seen in the last two chapters, of particular interest to theory is how the praxis and process of coalition-building, on one side, and of partnership-building and policyinfluencing with government, on the other, are seen to intersect. This thesis presents insights into the distinctive social, cultural, economic and political frameworks that are implicated in both how the Ugandan coalition and government institutions configure themselves and therefore tend to respond to each other. It explores the degree to which these configurations acknowledge, respond to and accommodate distinctive, blurred and shifting sectoral identities2, and what this might imply for building partnership and influencing policy. Contextual examination of coalition building processes, the relationship between diverse and fragmented institutions of government, and how these potentially intersect in partnership-building and policy-influencing processes, may well help the practitioner to make more reliable predictions of the long-term potential impact that distinctive approaches might have. I believe that examining the role distinctive

1

From the north of Uganda the migration of the ‘night commuters’ tends also to be associated with seeking refuge from the LRA armed insurgence. 2 For instance, distinct or merging government and non-government agency.

310 sectoral1, cultural, and demographic identities play in the praxis and process of coalitionand partnership-building, might prove an illuminating avenue for local and global theorizing upon broader discourses about street children, civil society, the postcolonial state, ‘democratization’ and ‘good governance’. To this purpose, I begin by summarizing the findings of this thesis on coalition building and coalition partnership building with government. I then place the findings within broader theoretical discourses on the praxis and process of ‘coalition-building’, and ‘partnership-building’ and ‘policy-influencing’ within Uganda’s postcolonial state reconfigurations. I then explain my constructivist approach, looking at ideas of shifting meanings, positionality, power and eligibilities. I conclude by indicating where the thesis advances theory and by suggesting where potential new areas of research might productively lie.

15.1

Coalition-building as praxis and process

In chapter twelve I examined how coalitions’ choice of ‘informal’ or ‘formal’ configuration is consciously or inadvertently2 implicated in how power is both exerted and dispersed among distinctive member organizations. Thus, Mattessich et al. (2001) six categories of influence upon the potential success of coalition-building3 might equally be stressed as ‘shadow’ factors, potentially used and manipulated by coalition hierarchies in the exercise and control of power (de Mann, 2004; Gilchrist, 2004). Unlike the ‘private sector’s’ relatively straightforward motivation to maximise profit4, application of the idea ‘success’ for the coalition of social welfare organizations will depend upon the tensions inherent in: •

the leadership’s broader or narrower understanding of, and pursuit of personal or organizational self-interest, and

•

the leadership’s more or less ‘enlightened’ and robust notions of, and pursuit of socio-structural transformation.

1

That is, looking at sectoral identities in terms of a tripartite division of state-private-civil society. Some scholars emphasise that ‘inadvertent’ manipulation of power hierarchy is still ‘manipulation’ and is, therefore, just as insidious a deficit to transformative democratization. 3 That is, the environment, characteristics of members, process and structure, communication, the clarity of purpose, and access to and control of ‘resources’ (see Chapter 5). 4 Uphoff (1995) argues, however, that NGOs’ organizational behaviour has too much in common with the ‘private’ sector, to make too general a claim for representation of benevolent socio-structural transformation. 2

311 How the coalition understands and buys into processes of socio-structural transformation as personal and organizational self-interest, therefore, is likely to both determine and become reflected in its choice of structures and processes (Edwards & Hulme, 1995; Drucker, 1990). Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum and Jinja Network have adopted quite distinctive coalition structures and processes. The pursuit of ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ configuration appears to reflect how the coalitions’ leaderships have consciously or inadvertently configured such structures and processes with the intention of retaining coalition control for themselves or ceding it to others.

15.1.1

‘Informal’ coalition configuration

Chapter 13 examines how the ‘informal’ configuration of Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum reflects its leadership’s desire to retain dominant influence on street children agendasetting for both itself and ‘like-minded’ or ‘similar’ organizations. The lack of binding and accountable structures and processes – such as an elected leadership, strategic planning, and robust M&E – mean that there are equally no robust mechanisms through which to challenge decision-making when it is seen to privilege Forum hierarchies. Thus, for example, despite claims that everyone is entitled to participate in formal agenda-setting meeting spaces, legitimacy to do so is predominantly determined by an organization’s contribution of resources. In the formal spaces of Forum meetings, therefore, it is broadly noted by respondents that smaller, poorer and ‘volunteer-based’ organizations that have fewer financial or human resources to offer, or individuals who have no decision-making role about resource allocation in the organizations they represent, ‘keep quiet’. In the context of resources1, the coalition leader/coordinator uses his suspicion of the dubious financial intentions of smaller organizations as a legitimising pretext for not pursuing external sources of coalition sponsorship. In setting coalition agendas, the Forum hierarchy also tends to emphasise its priority for its own target street population, the ‘fulltime’ street child, over the broader categories targeted by other organizations. Perhaps the intended consequence of mobilising resources from within is that a hierarchy of bigger and better resourced organizations retains considerable control over what coalition activities may be pursued, how they are resourced and who participates2.

1

His other areas of ‘suspicion’ are, for instance, smaller organizations’ ‘good practices’ and dissimilar ‘target populations’. 2 It should be noted that there is no explicit criterion for membership that excludes focus on non-‘full-time’ target populations. Heaney (2004:21) argues that defining the criteria for membership of coalitions is critical for their cohesion.

312 Therefore, while Kampala’s Forum may well offer many valuable and tangible advantages to its members1, its coalition structures and practices appear to offer very little as a model of socio-structural tranformation and organizational ‘democratization’.

15.1.2

‘Formal’ coalition configuration

The more ‘formal’ structures and processes that have evolved over time in Jinja Network, on the other hand, are seen to have addressed many of these accountability deficits. From a profusion of communications, concept papers and consultations, the coalition structures and processes appear to have emerged as a long-term plan for coalition democratization and

accountability.

Handing

over

leadership

and

co-ordination

from

its

founder/coordinator to an elected body, its constitution sets out a clear framework of members’ rights, duties, roles and sanctions. An externally facilitated three-year planning workshop2 also culminated in a coalition strategic plan that appears to represent broader community, child and local government concerns, apparently reflecting the diversity of members’ interests. With the evolution of a more traditional ‘organizational’ management structure and growing demands for more formal accountability, however, there are indications that the coalition’s focus has begun to shift to a more ‘bureaucratic’ configuration that more emphasises service to its structures and inputs (i.e. making accountability refer to how its structures and programmes are maintained) than its processes and outcomes3 (e.g. making accountability refer to how its structures and processes are understood to serve objectives of street child ‘rehabilitation’ and resettlement) (Wildridge et al., 2004, p.7; Wainwright, 2003, p.26).

15.1.3

(In)formal’ accountability configuration

Growing bureaucratic focus on structure and process in Jinja Network is experienced as having constricted, rather than facilitated non-contractual expressions of accountability and ‘democratization’ of knowledge that are based on trusting relationships established and sustained through ‘personal’ and ‘face-to-face’ encounters (Gilchrist, 2004; Misztal, 2000, p.2-3; Wildridge et al., 2004, p.7; Meek, 1992, p.1). Implicated in the development of interpersonal trust and establishment of individual or organizations’ reputation, such 1

Such as refuge from government hostility to street children NGOs, leadership friendship and support for ‘like’ member organizations, and a degree of capacity building on ‘good practices’ with street children. 2 This period was linked to the assumed funding cycle of potential donor organizations. 3 In Chapter 13 I noted that new academic interest focuses on development of M&E tools to examine transformative ‘outcomes’ that take unanticipated, long-term and intangible effects into account, rather than relying on simplistic relationships expressed as ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ (Wainwright, 2003:26).

313 face-to-face relationship building1 outside more formal spaces and procedures2 – what I call ‘social interaction networking’ – is seen to be the leader/coordinator’s essential toolkit to:

•

access and process knowledge – that is, endorse, confirm or challenge rumour and opinion, ensuring that underlying two-directional meanings are understood and communicated (whether supportive or critical);

•

democratize knowledge – that is, the coordinator/leader is able to ensure the generation and flow of knowledge from and through multiple spaces and actors by understanding how structures and procedures might hinder the flow of certain types of tacit and explicit knowledge, (McGee, 2004a); and

•

facilitate creative and insightful connections – that is, through access to and dissemination of ‘democratized’ knowledge, there is considerably greater pool of knowledge from which to develop ‘connected’ responses across ideologically and methodologically constructed boundaries (Wildridge et al., 2004; Gilchrist, 2004).

As a vehicle of accountability and democratized knowledge, for the coalition coordinator, establishing and sustaining trusting relationships through these ‘informal’ exchanges requires hard work (Wildridge et al., 2004, p.7). It is therefore essential to make provision for ‘social interaction networking’ in the coalition’s strategic programming and budgeting. Indeed, it might also be prudent to view ‘good relationships’, which have been fostered and sustained, as potentially one of the coalitions’ most productive long-term outcomes. As we have seen in Chapter 13, narratives around Jinja Network’s organizational expansion and its shift from coordinator/founder to coordinator/employee, illustrate how coalition structures and procedures, leadership ideologies, and ‘employee’ status, can begin to impede effective and extensive ‘social interaction networking’. Without ‘social interaction networking’ many ‘informal’ functions of coalition-building are now either brought into ‘formal’ spaces, which are seen to be inappropriate, or neglected altogether. This has tended to slow down coalition responses and make them more rigid and formal. Further, it has ‘de-personalised’ processes of accountability and diminished access to dispersed ‘hidden’ knowledge vital to processes of democratization and effective 1

A number of respondents included such activities as ‘popping in to say hello’ and having fun, as part of ritualised trust building and information gathering. 2 Like Kampala, Jinja Network’s more formal monthly meetings are not seen as appropriate spaces to explore and problematise interpersonal and interagency relationships. Interestingly, Kampala Forum’s ‘informal’ approach to coalition-building appears to use quite formal procedures in monthly meetings that further add to feelings of agenda exclusivity based on access to and control of resources .

314 governance. Ironically, without effective ‘informal’ leadership communication through ‘social interaction networking’, Jinja Network respondents have made greater compensatory demands for ‘formal’ accountability (e.g. more report writing, following new protocols, etc.). This has demanded even more office hours of the coordinator and provided him with less opportunity for more effective, and often less time-consuming ‘informal’ expressions of accountability through ‘social interaction networking’.

15.2

Forging effective partnership with government and influencing policy

In terms of reaching across ideological and methodological boundaries and therefore expanding the potential for negotiating socio-structural change, how the coalition positions itself in relation to government is clearly critical. Chapter 14 makes it plain, however, that complex politico-institutional expressions of ‘governance’ in Uganda make coalition proposals for, and approaches to government as ‘partner’, far from straightforward. Despite its rhetoric and legislative framework supporting principles of local democratization through decentralised government1 (i.e. UG, 1995 & UG, 1997), the government’s politico-institutional environments are nevertheless characterised by a) central government’s tendency to ‘command & control’ domination over districtlevel government2 (Coninck, 2004, p.69) and its ‘politicisation’ of street children in policy-making processes and outcomes in Kampala, and b) competition and friction in Jinja between political elites at LC4 and LC3 administrative levels for claims on policy-making outcomes that might be politically bankable. By central government taking over control of the street children agenda and programming in Kampala, it has effectively usurped district-level government’s administrative policymaking and coordinating function set out in the 1997 Local Governments Act. This has created an ambiguous policy-making relationship between central government, Kampala City Council (as district-level LC5) and the Inter-NGO Forum. The ‘disconnect’ between central and district government appears to be bound in more general Ugandan political patterns. Coninck (2004, p.69) characterises these in terms of the powerful ideological tensions in the Movement’s two principal discourses. On one side the Movement promotes 1 2

For the ‘Local Council’ structure see Appendix 1. That is, Kampala City Council (KCC) as LC5.

315 an indigenous ‘no-party’ form of decentralised popular democracy through its LC system. On the other it emphasises the need for strong centralised governance that is intended to keep Uganda’s historical tendency for political and ethnic fragmentation in check. One suspects that these discursive tensions, as the Movement’s critics are quick to point out, also conceal more insidious and self-serving political intentions (Tripp, 2001, p.126; Shelton, 2004, p.19). Indeed, quite crude expressions of the Movement’s ‘shadow side’ have begun bubbling to the surface in the run up and after Uganda’s first multi-party elections in February 20061. The imposition of the Kampringisa programme as the government’s only legitimised ‘rehabilitation’ framework for street children in Kampala, appears to have also undermined any pretension of participatory processes in policy-making with the Inter-NGO Forum. Respondents have noted what they assume are diverse motives for such a disconnect. The removal of street children from Kampala’s streets through the Kampringisa programme, they note, emerged as a powerful political imperative from prominent figures in the Movement government (e.g. the Minister for Tourism is but one mentioned). In addition, the government’s ‘populist’ portrayal of street children as the principal manifestation of urban disorder, as the basis for such programming, has inevitably proved incompatible with the coalition’s rights-based framework for policy discussion. Also, through poor implementation of Kampringisa – with commonly reported severe institutional deficits in providing welfare and due legal representation for the children (UCRNN, 2003) – some respondents suggest that government’s defensive stance results from fears of ‘being found out’. Respondents suspect, moreover, that acknowledgement of the vital contribution of the Forum’s ‘Kampringisa Support Team’ is downplayed, as the government intends to reassert its control through pursuit of external funding. In reality, such disconnect with diverse administrative units of government in policy-making, and between government and the Inter-NGO Forum in Kampringisa programming, probably betrays a mixture of ideological, political and economic gamesmanship that can probably be applied as much to most urban political elites. However, if pursuit of partnership with government merely focuses on avoiding, confronting or managing government ‘gamesmanship’, which the Forum appears to do, it 1

There are undoubtedly strong ‘political’ overtones to the trial of Museveni’s principal rival, Dr. Besigye (e.g. New Vision, 3rd November, 2005) and the promotion of Taban Amin to Uganda’s security bureau (Sunday Telegraph, 12th February, 2006). On the other side the context for such discourse is the continued LRA insurgency and the broadening claims for political and economic privilege from the Buganda political establishment (e.g. New Vision,18th October 2005 and Chapter 9).

316 is clearly questionable whether there is any productive mileage in partnership-building in Kampala. Having said this, a wider and potentially much more productive theoretical framework, through which to explore and analyse ‘partnership’, emerges from much broader and intersecting coalition narratives in both Kampala and Jinja. How each coalition views and interprets its relationship to government seems to relate less to its experiences of persistent advantage-seeking gamesmanship (which perhaps is merely the nature of government) than from whether it identifies its membership and objectives as strongly or weakly ‘non-governmental’. The contentious idea that Ugandan societal agency might be divided into distinctive ‘sectors’ (Ferguson, 1998; Fine, 2001; Harriss, 2002) is based on the contemporary primacy given to the tripartite ‘civil society-state-market’ construct as a framework for international development (see Chapter 3). What emerges from coalition- and partnership-building narratives in Kampala and Jinja is that such constructs appear to gain considerably greater institutional expression, and therefore ‘notional’ weight, in larger Ugandan urban contexts than in smaller ones (Azarya, 1994, p.96; Mamdani, 1998).

15.2.1

Kampala’s sectoral ‘(op)positioning’

Principally framed by the theoretical underpinning of contemporary development discourse1, therefore, the ‘strong’ separation of sectoral identities in Kampala appears linked to the physical presence and impact of numerous international institutions2 on the indigenous non-government organization’s self-image – and the apparent ‘independencies’ of larger Forum member organizations from government through external support. On the other side, because of their resource dependencies, government institutions find themselves muscled into a conditional international development construct whose principal function, critics argue, seems to be both to challenge established power relationships (Lewis, 2001, p.7) and to transfer Western institutional order to Uganda (Mamdani, 1998). As a self-fulfilling paradigm of development, Kampala’s government and non-government institutions appear to adopt the assumed ‘sectoral-institutional’ opposition of state and civil society (Lewis, 2001). Many of the Forum’s respondents, and in particular its leadership, characterise themselves as representing a ‘non-government’ ideology, whose proposed function is to circumnavigate, challenge or manage government’s policy-making and programming for street children, as one respondent put

1 2

Most organizations’ websites expound the importance of civil society as counter-balance to state power. That is, multi- and bi-lateral agencies and international NGOs.

317 it, “… like a force of lawyers” (INF Interview 17k/F4)1. However, with neither the financial clout of international NGOs nor the institutional coherence of accountable coalition structures and processes through which to propose workable alternatives, the Forum’s (op)positioning approach appears to have achieved very few policy concessions from government at all. Moreover, pursuing non-government sectoral ‘autonomy’ as one of the assumed three pillars of societal order, Edwards & Hulme (1995) argue, is tantamount to pursuing a myth. The government, on the other hand, becomes resistant to critique from the Inter-NGO Forum, seeing it implicated in a more general imposition of new institutional power relationships predicated to the new development ‘sectoral’ paradigm. As Kodesh (2001, p.541) argues, it is not the change to how power is dispersed amongst its citizens that becomes a sticking point – after all, many plaudits of Museveni’s tenure point out that the Movement has achieved a considerable ‘culture’ of democracy through the LC system (Villalón, 1998, p.5; Hyden, 1998, p.118) – but the assumption that diverse external agendas should usurp government’s ‘management’ of such change. Quite apart from questions about government capacities to fix what it sees as the street children ‘problem’, therefore, what emerges is a much broader complexity of factors for government resistance to the Inter-NGO Forum claims of ‘autonomous’ legitimacy to determine how this should be done.

15.2.2

Jinja’s ‘sectoral blur’

Jinja, on the other hand, offers insight into a very different ‘worldview’ and, therefore, a very different set of coalition- and partnership-building options. Although the notion of sectoral-institutional identity (i.e. as ‘state’, ‘civil society’ and ‘market’) still appears a strong discursive framework, in the much smaller urban context of Jinja, the reality of often merging and blurring identities (Brock, 2004) appears much more readily acknowledged. There is no core block of NGOs exclusively addressing the ‘full-time’ street child. Jinja Network’s coalition- and partnership-building has therefore chosen (and perhaps been compelled) to explore the intersections of individual and institutional ‘multisectoral’ identities that reflect a much more diverse set of local government, paragovernment and non-government institutional actors. Many individual representatives of these institutions also carry multiple sectoral identities – as both NGO representatives and local politicians (see Table 11.2 in Chapter 11).

1

We also remember, from Chapter 10, how a proposal for government participation in the Forum, made at the Lweza Workshop, was subtly omitted by the leadership in the drafting of a subsequent proposal for coalition funding.

318

Figure 15.2: ‘Embedded’ coalition- & partnership-building spaces and line of problematic transfer of coalition policy-influencing knowledge

Represented in Figure 15.2 by the colour/label ‘yellow’ (see above), we see how these multiple institutional and representational identities merge in the formal and informal coalition-building and partnership-building spaces that have either been colonised or created by Jinja Network. Its diverse membership, its research and concept papers, and its strategic plan of action, all contribute to the considerable evidence demonstrating how knowledge has been both tapped and generated through interaction of these diverse and multiple identities. The apparent ease with which members navigate between identities – as NGO ‘developer’, ‘youth worker’ and ‘politician’ – appears to heighten the potential that distinctive positions (McGee, 2004a, p.5-7) may be both challenged and hotly disputed, but equally accommodated or compromised. Distinctive ideological narratives and their anecdotal underpinnings can therefore become scrutinised from multiple perspectives. Having multiple identities, respondents argue, permits them to see different sides of a conflict, allowing less ideologically entrenched positions to mediate apparently more intransigent ones. The apparent suppression of multiple ‘identities’ through ‘manipulative’ informality in Kampala’s Forum and its pursuit of sectoral ‘autonomy’, on the other hand, are seen to restrict Kampala Forum’s ‘boundary-spanning’ potential.

15.3 Theorizing CSO coalition building and partnership building with government 15.3.4

Multiple accountabilities and balancing ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ configuration

Evidence from Jinja Network and Kampala’s Forum suggests that, although ‘formalised’ coalition configurations might partly address the structural and procedural accountability

319 deficits implicit in much ‘informal’ hierarchical behaviour, ‘multiple’ accountabilities cannot be addressed by merely expanding ‘formalized’ contractual ways of doing coalition business. The coalition’s strategic potential must also be closely tied to the social relationships that have both created and sustained it (Ashcraft, 2002, p.1; Ranjay, 1998; Gilchrist, 2004). Some of the tensions implicit in enlightened and entrenched formalinformal configurations are illustrated in Figure 15.3, below.

Figure 15.3: Tensions between formal and informal configuration in coalition-building that proposes socio-structural transformation

Both coalition ‘formality’ and ‘informality’ can tend towards reproduction of power inequalities that contradict the coalition’s assumed centrality as a new and contemporary institution of ‘governance’ fixed on “… a more dispersed notion of power and authority based on pluralism” (Taylor, 2000, p.1022). Indeed, as coalitions evolve, critical learning should throw light upon the complexities of what ‘informality’ and ‘formality’ actually do within coalition-building processes, which should hint at the necessary shifts to its optimal configuration. Critical coalition learning and enquiry, therefore, should be illumined by attention to each configuration’s ‘shadowside’ (de Mann, 2004). Clearly, the coalition requires considerable sophistication in its understanding of how these power orthodoxies operate. However, in acknowledging its volatile and paradoxical organizational form (James, 2002, p.4), the coalition that intends socio-structural transformation needs to continually confront and challenge the established ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ structures and processes that are seen to distribute power unequally. The coalition should not mimic the accountability deficits of the muchcriticised NGO, Uphoff (1995) argues, whose charged environment preaches structural

320 change, on one hand, but tends towards entrenched power orthodoxies, on the other. Furthermore, if socio-structural transformation is truly pursued as ‘revolution’ (Chambers, 1995, p.208)1, this continual process of critical ‘re-configuration’ should not only happen within the coalition itself (Taylor, 2000, p.1022) but also between the coalition and the multiple strata of social, cultural, political and economic stakeholders within which it finds its context. In this context, much literature has emerged since the mid 1990s on ‘participatory action research’ approaches that might, for instance, include (street) children themselves in defining coalition policies and agendas, and even inclusion in governance structures (e.g. van Beers, 1996; Willow, 2002; Rajani, 2000; Hart, 2004)2. Leat’s (1988, p.20) proposal of three forms of accountability is helpful in visualizing the demands made of the coalition proposing socio-structural transformation. Such a coalition, he argues, should: •

give account of what is done and why;

•

take into account the interests of different stakeholders; and

•

account for the use and control of resources.

The charismatic characteristics typical of successful coalition leadership (Streck, 2002, p.6), therefore, can only claim potential powers of socio-structural transformation when they converge with the demands for optimal and enlightened ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ coalition configuration and the multiple accountabilities implied by these. Reaching across social, cultural, ideological, institutional, and even theoretical boundaries, by servicing such multiple accountabilities, therefore, is the challenge inherent in the coalition-building project (Covey, 1995, p.169).

15.3.2

Influencing policy-making for street children

Irrespective of its configuration, a prime task of social action or welfare coalitions is to influence government policy making. This research shows considerable evidence about what barriers are created by both coalitions and government that prevent such influence. On the other side the research findings also show considerable evidence about what opportunities might need to be pursued within the complex spaces created by state reconfiguration in Africa since the 1990s.

1

Chambers (1995:208) reminds proponents of ‘revolution’ that they should be aware of tendencies to ‘revolution reversal’, where one set of dominant leaders is simply replaced by others. 2 Indeed, I am equally as aware of the omission of children’s voices in the authorship of this thesis.

321 The evidence of this research shows that the coalition’s poor structural and procedural configuration skews the distribution of power and privileges only certain types of knowledge. Its pursuit of sectoral ‘autonomy’ can cause membership to understand its relationship to government in terms of ‘independency’ rather than interdependency. Its desire to avoid ‘problematic’ engagement with government can lead the coalition to equally avoid dynamic spaces that have the greatest potential for policy concessions. Understanding coalition relationships merely in terms of advantage seeking means that dominant players tend to prefer partnership opportunities that emerge as specific arrangements between the individual NGO and the government’s implementing agency. The leadership’s preference for ‘individual’ member, rather than ‘collective’ member outcomes, betrays tensions between what Witt & Meyer (1998) refer to as ‘embedded’ and ‘discrete’ organizational worldviews. Tensions emerge, therefore, between what dominant and peripheral member organizations pursue as interdependent and independent advantage within the coalition. The degree to which the coalition’s internal and external relationships might be identified as ‘interdependent’, therefore, tends to mirror broader tensions around structural configuration and accountabilities described in Figure 15.2. Hence, the ‘informal manipulative’ configuration is more likely to reflect a ‘discrete’ worldview both within the coalition and between the coalition members and government. It also leads me to conclude that, to establish effective policy or partnership engagement with government, the coalition has to acknowledge partnership and policy in terms of interdependent and embedded ‘advantage’, rather than independent or discrete advantage – both as coalition-building and partnership-building practice. Indeed, the relationship between coalition-building and partnership-building, as both ‘embedded’ or ‘discrete’ practices, is an important one. We have already acknowledged sectoral-institutional differences between larger African urban centres and smaller ones. Jinja Network’s approach to partnership-building and policy-influencing is characterised by both its ‘embeddedness’ and its avoidance of strong sectoral (op)positioning. Despite ‘hotly’ debated key issues about street children programming deficits in Jinja1, coalition respondents agree that robust coalition structures and procedures have led to outcomes that largely reflect the interests of the coalition’s diverse membership.

1

We are reminded of both NGO and government intransigence on specific methodologies and ideologies described in Chapters 10, 11 and 13.

322 Broad-based and ‘do-able’ policy-making and programming However, ‘successful’ political engagement has also depended upon how the coalition has promoted a range of ‘doable’ coalition activities that fill commonly identified service deficits (JUPRP, 2002, p.2). The interdependency of government and non-government agencies in both the formulation and implementation of such ‘doable’ activities leads to a variety of important outcomes. ‘Hands-on’ experience of street children programming has allowed politicians and officers from government welfare and security agencies to reassess previously held positions on street children and streetism. Similarly, ‘hands-on’ experience of government has allowed non-government agencies to reassess how agendas might be most productively embedded in ‘democratized’ Local Council governance structures and policy-processes. The linking of street child to broader processes of childhood ‘marginalisation’1 has also functioned to tie ‘streetism’ to broader community contexts. As well as more widely reflecting the diverse missions of the coalition’s member organizations, the street children agenda has been able to draw from a much broader framework of government child and community provisioning and policy. This broadening of the street children agenda potentially connects the coalitions’s critical learning to contemporary theoretical interest in ‘child/youth friendly city’ discourse. Thus, policymaking for street children becomes less oppositional by integrating its concerns into a holistic approach to urban policy-making and planning. Bartlett (2004b) sees this approach as avoiding policy processes that see the ‘specificity’ of claims for not only street children but also children and youth in general, that relegate them to a status of one of many ‘tiresome minority add-on concerns’. Within such a holistic framework, Ennew & SwartKruger (2003) suggest, government might have to see ‘streetism’ more in terms of its necessity for urban sustainability, as a manageable and managed response to the social, cultural and economic realities for poor urban communities. Although there is some evidence of critical and ‘embedded’ learning, it is slow and its transfer to exclusively government policy-making spaces far from unproblematic (see Figure 15.3).

Limits to an ‘embedded’ model of coalition- and partnership-building Without the strong non-government sectoral-institutional contexts of larger urban centres, Jinja Network perhaps presents us with a compelling model of local coalition and partnership building ‘embeddedness’ that at least attempts to address the generally less partitioned nature of African associational contexts (Mamdani, 1998). By binding itself to 1

This is evident from the strategic plan, the diverse membership, and also Jinja Network’s full name, which is ‘Jinja Network for the Marginalised Child and Youth’.

323 local council governance systems, it also helps add capital to the Movementist rhetoric of accountable and participatory governance, espousing: “… typically African values of solidarity, reconciliation, seeking a general consensus of all and keeping peace and togetherness without fragmentation.” (RU, 1993, p.210) However, just as critics of the Movement point to what they see as its elite’s self-serving tendencies beneath the rhetoric (e.g. Tripp, 2001, p.126; Shelton, 2004, p.19; Kasfir, 2000, p.75), so too should we be watchful of tendencies beneath the surface of the coalition’s rhetoric of benign agency for its diverse member organizations. This research has presented extreme expressions of ideological and methodological positioning1 as examples of conflict within the embedded coalition – e.g. NGOs’ unwillingness to compromise rehabilitation methodology, or the government’s unwillingness to give up ‘populist’ street children round-ups. However, government and the non-government ‘enmeshment’ within coalition spaces, has equally the potential to hide tacit cultural, social and procedural conventions that might equally function to privilege one type of ‘identity’ or ‘knowledge’ over another (Brock, 2004)2. Indeed, as we noted earlier, with its expansion and its growing formalization, Jinja Network seems to have found problems identifying how both new formal coalition behaviours, and the absence of ‘informal’ coalition behaviours, function to strengthen, maintain or disrupt multiple accountabilities. In considering the potential for such a partnership-building ‘embedded’ model, therefore, we might find considerable value in binding it to the framework of multiple accountabilities and ‘enlightened’ configuration mentioned earlier (see Fig. 15.2)3. Despite its claims to the benefits of ‘insider’ government representation (through both ‘politician’ and ‘technical’ officers), Jinja Network’s model nevertheless reveals limits in its ability to effectively transfer its ‘synthesised’ knowledge system – or ‘voice’ – to more

1

Although they clearly use a discursive ‘sectoral’ framework, in the absence of a clear block of institutional (op)positioning (3j’s position appears maintained solely by itself), I am more hesitant to use the description ‘sectoral’ to describe such positioning. 2 Here we can extend the idea of multiple identities to include gender (Tripp, 2001; Brock,2004), childhood, and religion (mentioned as a possible excluding factor in Kampala’s Forum). 3 Ard-Pieter de Mann (2004:22) also proposes a variety of institutional ‘tweaks’ that might address frailties around governance, knowledge, implementation (and change) and the social perspectives of coalitionbuilding. However, equally he maintains that although one may mitigate the problems of underlying tensions in coalitions, one can hardly expect to completely alleviate them.

324 exclusively ‘political’ policy-making spaces. In her study of Uganda’s ‘exclusive’ local council policy-making spaces, Brock (2004) describes such policy-making spaces in terms of their cultural, social and procedural conventions that function to privilege local political elites. Although this thesis does not claim any in-depth analysis of such local council spaces, respondents’ intersecting narratives do, nevertheless, describe how just such conventions exclude both ‘technical’ officers and some politicians. The instances of successful transfer of coalition voice to ‘exclusive’ local council policy-making spaces, therefore, can be said to have depended on the fusion of the ‘insider’s’1 •

skills in understanding and therefore marketing complex and challenging sets of ideas about street children and streetism,

•

his/her elevated political profile within such competitive political spaces, and therefore potential to challenge entrenched ideas, and

•

the degree to which s/he promotes Jinja, Network’s ‘synthesised’ coalition positions over his/her own.

The experiences described by Jinja Network’s ‘insider’ respondents show, however, that the assumption that such a fusion will naturally occur is misplaced. For example, although the Deputy Mayor possesses both the marketing skills and political profile to challenge entrenched local council ideas, he chooses his own advantage over that of the coalition by promoting his own critique of NGOs. Although woman councillor 1j tends towards the promotion of the coalition’s ‘synthesised’ positions, she has neither the marketing skills nor the elevated political profile through which to do it. One can therefore observe that processes of improvisation, manipulation, negotiation and connivance, described as actions necessary for partnership-building with government in the postcolony (Werbner, 1996), are not (as is self-evident by the words themselves) straightforward. These tensions may be looked at from a postcolonial perspective.

15.3.3

Coalition-building, partnership and the state: a postcolonial perspective

In terms of emerging narratives about government and NGO interaction on themes surrounding coalition- and partnership-building and street children, this thesis presents some valuable insights into how the contemporary Ugandan state and its citizens are located within but also draw upon multiple, complex and often contradictory postcolonial discourses on governance and state engagement with the citizen.

1

That is, its politicians and technical officers.

325 Implicit in the Movement’s discourses on what it portrays as ‘authentic’ African governance, which underpins its now modified indigenised model of ‘no-party’ democracy, is the claim of a link between the citizen and the state that largely precludes autonomous action by either (e.g. Tripp, 2001; Shelton, 2004). Claiming the application of ‘typically African values’ (RU, 1993, p.210), evidence shows that the Movement’s tendency from the outset has been to manipulate1, through incorporation into government structures or delegitimisation of their autonomous status, those individuals and institutions that are perceived to have the potential to influence power from outside these structures (Tripp, 2001, p.126; Shelton, 2004, p.19). Perhaps a clever and sophisticated technique of governance, through the discourse of local council democracy the state has been permitted to decouple the citizen’s voice – bound within local governance structures – from that of the less controllable voice of diverse institutions of civil society. It has therefore been able to portray such institutions as at odds with legitimate engagement with the government and, indeed, at odds with the citizen. As the civil society coalition, claiming autonomy from government, sits outside local governance structures, the government is able to characterise it as serving primarily its own interests or those of outside forces, when coalition critical discourse departs from that of the government. From other narratives, however, other themes emerge of the ‘improvisation’ and ‘manipulation’ of resources, which might be used for political advantage for an elite group within the Movement (Villalón, 1998, p.13). Within these narratives, tendencies that claim centralized or counter-claim decentralized authority appear connected more to the control of resources and power than to the competing twin Movement discourses of preventing regional sectarian disintegration (Villalón, 1998, p.5) but promoting decentralization of local government. To justify the seizure of such resources and power, therefore, central government portrays itself as resisting real or imagined ethno-political decentralizing tendencies in local government – with the implication that these are selfserving and challenge the imperative of broader cohesion2. Such claims are also made of the ‘non-government’ organization. The coalition of NGOs is portrayed as a questionable expression of citizenship, whose capacities and wealth illegitimately function to challenge the government’s legitimacy to manage street children and streetism. That central government has usurped planning and action for street children in Kampala from decentralised government, counter to the logic and legislative framework of the 1997 1

Although we should perhaps understand manipulation as a process and product of most forms of governance. 2 The popular call for the autonomy of Buganda under FEDERO is but one context for such claims.

326 Local Governments Act, and its refusal to engage with the Forum to accomplish this, appear manifestations of this tendency. Perhaps best characterised as ‘techniques’ of governance, many respondents within this research appear to claim that political leaders manipulate power and resources by using such claims and counter claims to legitimate representation of the citizen. Similarly, Mamdani (2002) makes reference to the idea of creating a logic of ‘resident’ and ‘nonresident’ as the basis of legitimising power and resources for some but not for others. Mamdani’s category of resident might be equated with the citizen’s permitted voice within government structures (whether central or local). The non-resident, on the other hand, may be generically portrayed by the state as the self-serving ‘outsider’ who challenges the legitimacy of such structures (e.g. the briefcase NGO). Such discourses of resident and non-resident become bound to other discources of resistance to real or invented grievance, which may be called upon as part of manipulative political ‘improvisation’. However, as show by the evidence in this thesis, its claims to legitimately represent the citizen’s interests tend to be undermined by coalitions’ governance and accountability deficits. The coalition’s claim for an autonomous approach equally implies a claim for action outside what the coalition experiences or portrays as inappropriate government policy. Such posturing may well be based on the myth of claims to civil society autonomy (Edwards & Gaventa, 2004) rather than sophisticated understanding of how power functions within postcolonial reconfigurations of state (Brown, 2003) and, therefore, how best to engage with and influence it. What emerge from all these narratives are references to state and citizen interaction that become far too complex for us to make claims that one postcolonial discourse might be validated over another. Instead, rather like Homi Bhabha’s (1997) notion of hybridity (see Chapter 6), we are presented with a set of postcolonial narratives that largely flow parallel to each other, intersecting at different times and in different spaces. On one side such intersections highlight real or perceived relationships of power and resistance. On the other side these same intersections reflect a potential for ‘enlightened’ manipulation. The longer-term consequences of such real or discursive flows are much dependent on the coalition’s ability to see and exploit the spaces that are created by government rhetoric of

327 democratisation and ‘indigenised’ governance. Through local council structures and the apparent culture of democracy, which I believe is at least one of Museveni’s positive legacies for Uganda (at least at LC 1 level), coalition engagement has the potential to influence policy reform – for example, by generating political capital. The ‘enlightened’ outcome of such processes is dependent upon the coalition itself. What Bhabha (1994) refers to as a baroque configuration of political connivance calls upon the coalition to participate in the construction of new hybrid identities that bind the citizen to governance structures and processes. This should allow the appropriation of influence but should equally be bound to multiple accountabilities – which should include the coalition’s membership and street children as beneficiaries, together with reference to local, national and international interests. However, as we see from Jinja Network, how to bind street children issues to dominant local, national and international issues will be far from an easy task for the coalition of divergent interests. However, Jinja Network does provide us with a model of a coalition that tries to exploit these intersecting interests and discourses by suggesting ‘doable’ policy reforms that also create significant levels of political capital. At stake is a synthesized process of multisectoral ‘civic-political activity’ (Lewis, 2001, p.7), somewhat at odds with a Western compartmentalisation of citizen and state interaction. How the coalition synthesizes itself within government structures, therefore, and what degree of critique and challenge are permitted within such synthesis may depend on the degree of sophisticated ‘improvization’ the coalition brings with it (Brown, 2003). Acknowledging diverse interests within coalition-building as an inter-sectoral project, the tension between interdependencies and independencies within coalition interaction with government will inevitably remain problematic, as equally illustrated by Jinja Network.

15.4 Constructivism and the research process: Personal

histories and complexity in ‘meaning’ construction As the early part of this conclusion has focused on the ‘what’ outcomes of the research process, I want now to focus upon the ‘how’ of the research process (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997, p.127). As pointed out in my brief introduction to the use of the term ‘NGO’ by respondents in Chapter 10 (see Section 10.1), meanings shift as such terms are applied to different relationships between respondent and different contexts to which respondents give meaning. Similarly, diverse constructions and revisions of meanings within respondents’ narratives around ideas of flows of power and accountability in coalition and

328 partnership building imply that agreeing fixed definitions with the respondents not only becomes problematic (Silverman, 2001, p.95) but can also obstruct the processes of meaning-making itself. For example, in this thesis terms, such as ‘referral’, ‘networking’ ‘capacity-building’ or ‘collaboration’, were given quite different meaning by different respondents. The value of using such imprecise terms, I found, was in their ability to act as catalysts in exploration of both how respondents’ apply meaning to coalition and partnership relationships and contexts and what such meaning constructions might refer to and, therefore, imply to theory building. The organization and presentation of such constructions, therefore, is not solely about engaging with respondents in reflecting upon emergent debates around coalition and partnership building (i.e. the ‘what’ of research) but also about reflecting complexity in both how respondents construct such debates and how such constructions tend to influence, determine or challenge both their and my diverse conclusions (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997, p.127) over time (i.e. the ‘how’ of research). Respondent and researcher’s reflexivity upon ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions – based upon my ‘insider’ participation in the development of both Jinja Network and Kampala’s InterNGO Forum between 2000 and 2003 – brought a fascinating and, at times, dynamic interplay of familiarity and strangeness. The respondents’ and my ‘rememberings’ become important in identifying where historical positions and perspectives had been ‘remembered’, ‘omitted’ or ‘forgotten’ within narrative construction. For example, I remember the Lweza workshop, in which I participated in 2001, as a significant participant challenge to the leadership’s insistence upon coalition ‘informality’ that largely determined flows of power, accountability and governance within the Inter-NGO Forum. Remembering the importance participants attached to the document at that time, I was able to reflect with the participants upon why newer member organizations’ had no knowledge of the document, explore the symbolic relationship between the ‘shelving’ of the document and the narratives around the withdrawal of some larger organizations, and examine why the Forum leadership only made selective references to the document during the interviews. Such ‘insider’ knowledge allowed me to bring to the research process often much greater depth of knowledge and reflexivity of Kampala & Jinja’s systems, structures and personalities than the individual respondent him/herself (who, for instance, might represent a ‘new’ member organization). Such ‘rememberings’ allowed me to not only find linkages between diverse narratives, but also to locate and bind such narratives within shared histories. This allowed both research participants and I greater scope to affirm, challenge and analyse emerging narratives and the (in)consistencies of the positions they

329 represented (including my own) (Gubrium, 1997, p.117; Denzin, 1970, p.133) – often a problem for the researcher as ‘outsider’. Both the how and what questions bind themselves to space and time. Constructions shifted, I observed, as different interviewer questions began to bind distinctive ideas together by drawing attention to narrative (in)consistencies. Over time initial ideas were ‘fed back’ and revised. Indeed, correspondence with the coalition coordinators about the findings of the research and their implications continues until today, some two years since the feedback workshops in Kampala and Jinja. Temporal and spatial dimensions become over-laid, as do the meanings themselves. The contexts of coalition and partnership building are continually changing and clearly have influence on how the research findings take on meanings, are challenged and take on new meanings. Rather than weakening the coherence of ideas, however, like new linguistic and archaeological insights in exegesis, each narrative revision is seen to add new reflexive insight and lucidity to a core set of ideas around which the narratives flow.

15.4.1

Power and positionality

Rather than merely focus on the questions: who participated, who dominated and who was dominated within processes of inquiry, a less linear understanding of the exercise of power has to acknowledge both overt and more hidden ways in which power relations within the research process might have, for instance, favoured one set of narratives over another (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2003; Gaventa, 1980). For both the respondent and me, knowledge is bound to systems of communication, and processes of recording, accumulation and reflexivity within both the inquiry and response – which, in turn, are linked to other forms of power (Foucault quoted in Sheridan, 1980, p.283). Acknowledging and understanding my own positionality and the way this implicated me in social, cultural, religious and historical flows of power over time was therefore critical. With many Jinja Network members, certain potentially problematic boundaries had been crossed some years before the research began. During one interview a respondent had revealed that their organization had gone into detailed discussion about my ‘Catholicity’ being an obstacle to partnership building in 2000. Although we had crossed over this boundary and had become good friends and colleagues over the years, similar boundaries within coalition building practices had clearly found accommodation of such difference more problematic. Chawla (2006) refers to such bounded interactions between the

330 researcher and co-participant as ‘eligibilities’ that are ultimately shaped by the many participants who populate them. The value of ‘insider’ positionality in my fieldwork was in its potential to extend the set of eligibilities and insights based on familiarity. ‘Outsider’ value in the research process, on the other hand, was in its potential to understand tensions inherent in ‘familiarity’ and ‘difference’ (Parameswaran, 2001). In my own experience of outsider/insider positionality, boundaries of familiarity and difference, and the distinctive roles between interviewer and interviewee, were often blurred (Russell & Kelly, 2006). ‘Eligibilities’, therefore, often had to be negotiated and boundaries responsibly explored. The figure of the researcher may well shift as the researcher and participants’ different personal, professional and cultural experiences of each other change during the fieldwork. In my own experience of the research process, for the participants, Tim the researcher was an added identity that was different to their experience of Tim as friend or Tim as excoordinator/chairperson of Jinja Network, which participants had to review in terms of my eligibilities. The movement between these identities and eligibilities, and the spaces that were seen to be appropriate for each, also emerged as friendships were renewed (Stehlik & Chenoweth, 2005)1, cultural familiarity or difference was explored further, or both the coparticipant and I gained new professional insights.

15.4.2

Tensions inherent with a constructivist approach

However, constant vigilance is essential in identifying shades of often subtle movements between meanings and positionality over time. One of the problems associated with such a constructivist approach is its potential inability to always identify, locate and anchor shifting constructions of reality and what they might refer to – at times making the ‘what’ aspect of the research difficult to pin down. Also difficult to resolve within my particular ‘insider/outsider’ approach are the tensions between respondents’ and my own ‘personal rememberings’ (or ‘insider’ knowledge) within meaning constructions. There is always a tension in balancing validation of my own ‘rememberings’ of what is real with those of my informants. Although Tedlock (2000, p.460) refers to this interaction as a ‘dialogical embrace’, it nevertheless means that I had to keep feeding doubts about the balance of authorship back to respondents.

1

The role and value of friendship in the research process, Stehlik & Chenoweth (2005) point out, are rarely acknowledged.

331 Looking more at the practicalities of transcribing interviews, where a responses might have multiple levels of meaning that reference themselves to multiple narratives, it is difficult at times to code them. Linked to the problem of ‘anchoring’ shifting meanings, the use of such transcribed responses to illustrate specific emergent meanings throughout the thesis has to live with implicit tensions between specific and multiple shades of meaning. However, rather than weakening the coherence of ideas, I felt that, within my constructivist approach, each positional and narrative revision (for instance, through feed back) added new reflexive insight and lucidity to a core set of ideas around which the narratives flowed.

15.5

Implications of the research for theory building and praxis

Theory building is advanced in this thesis in three key areas: coalition-building as process and practice, the role of sectoral identities within partnership building with government, and the application and understandings of constructivism within the research design. I now summarise how I believe theory is advanced for each of these.

15.5.1

Coalition-building as process and practice

Hay & Richards (2000) suggest that what is missing in literature on coalitions is theory on network formation, evolution, transformation and termination as practice and process. By concentrating on such coalition practices and processes, this thesis has given new insights into how coalitions’ members understand, interpret and construct sectoral identities and hierarchies of relationships over time. Influenced by historical, cultural, political, economic and social particularities of context, such identities are seen to inform and potentially determine the structures, processes, choices and sustainability for both building coalitions and developing partnership with government. Most previous research into coalition building has been undertaken from an organization theory perspective. This perspective tends to seek out ‘good practices’ definitions that mainly emphasize the positive outcomes of coalition building. De Mann (2004) bucks this tendency by broadly outlining the usefulness of acknowledging hidden costs for networks of business organizations. However, this thesis gives greater emphasis and detail to the potential benefits for coordinators and leaders of social action or welfare coalitions in acknowledging the impact of complex flows of power in coalitions’ structures, social

332 systems and processes. This is largely neglected within analysis of business-orientated coalitions. In this context, the evidence of this research shows that ‘formalised’ coalition configurations can partly address the structural and procedural accountability deficits implicit in much ‘informal’ hierarchical coalition behaviour. However, within coalition formalization the value of accessing personal member organizations’ spaces tends to be overlooked. Such informal spaces allow the coordinator/leadership to access, process and democratise knowledge. It is from relationships developed in these spaces and the knowledge they generate that coalitions are brought into being and are sustained (Ashcraft, 2002, p.1; Ranjay, 1998; Gilchrist, 2004). Accessing such spaces, through social interaction networking, I argue, is essential for providing the coordinator/leadership and member organizations with critical flows of knowledge, indicators of reputation (Misztal, 2000) and mitigated demands for time-consuming bureaucratic accountability (Misztal, 2000, p.2-3; Wildridge et al., 2004, p.7; Meek, 1992, p.1). Through prioritising social interaction networking as a pivotal coalition strategy, I therefore argue, the coordinator/leadership will have greater capacity to continually assess the impact of (in)formalization on flows of power and knowledge. Through such critical learning, coalition leadership and members may flexibly apply an enlightened, rather than entrenched formal-informal configuration (see Figure 15.3). Based on the evidence, I therefore argue that multiple accountabilities1 are optimally addressed through creating a flexible balance of formal and informal coalition structures and processes.

15.5.2

Sectoral identities and embeddedness: associational formations and partnership building with government

Rick James (2002) warns against the inclusion of government agencies in CSO coalitions. Such inclusion, he argues, tends to generate lopsided power relationships based on their sectoral identities that tend to inhibit one of the coalition’s primary tasks of auditing government. This thesis challenges the assumptions implicit in James assertion. It shows how perceptions of real or imagined ‘institutional’ or ‘notional’ sectoral identities positively or negatively influence both patterns and opportunities of partnership interaction. Such perceptions are influenced by the coalitions’ location in larger or smaller urban centres, and therefore the degree to which coalition members identify with civil

1

That is, giving account of what is done and why, taking into account the interests of stakeholders, and accounting for the use and control of resources (Leat, 1988, p.20).

333 society claims for institutional or notional autonomy from broader social, economic, political and postcolonial associational formations. In the generally less partitioned nature of African associational contexts (Mamdani, 1998) this thesis stresses the value in acknowledging the influence of ‘sectoral blur’ on coalitionbuilding practices and the benefits to the practitioner of engagement with each actors’ multiple identities (as concerned citizen, politician, and entrepreneur). However, the coalition’s sophistication and the time required of actors to both working with power hierarchies and critical knowledge management (Brown, 2003) is often also the coalition’s greatest deficit (James, 2002). Moving knowledge into political spaces, this thesis points out, is inevitably limited by the political insider’s understanding of complex and challenging sets of ideas, his or her profile within the political establishment – which, Brock (2004) points out, can be highly gendered – and the degree to which the coalition position reflects his/her own.

15.5.3

Constructivism and the research process

This thesis shows an adapted approach to how the researcher is able to work with the complexity of addressing how and what questions within a constructivist framework. Rather than merely engaging with emergent debates around coalition and partnership building (i.e. the ‘what’ of research), the organization and presentation of the research is also about reflecting complexity in both how respondents construct debates and how such constructions tend to influence, determine or challenge both their and my diverse conclusions (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997, p.127) over time (i.e. the ‘how’ of research). The thesis shows the importance to the constructivist approach of ideas around power and ‘eligibilities’ (Chawla, 2006). As historical ‘insider’, some eligibilities were historically gained – for example, through friendship (Stehlik & Chenoweth, 2005). As researcher exploring familiarity and difference, on the other hand, eligibilities and power relationships between the research participants and me had to be continually (re)negotiated and boundaries responsibly explored. Though at times difficult to anchor, the complex parallel and intersecting narratives that run through the findings of this thesis are valid and robust products of these processes. These processes are, therefore, of considerable theoretical ‘added’ value to literature on constructivist research methodologies.

334

15.6 Limits of the research Unpicking the complexity of the relationship between the citizen and state in Uganda, examined from multiple postcolonial perspectives, adds considerable clarity to the processes and discourses underpinning coalition-building and partnership building practices with government in Jinja and Kampala. However, apart from documents and literature, greater clarity was limited by the difficulty in obtaining the ‘official’ opinion of all but a handful of government officers. Many government officers who where approached were reticent to ‘officially’ give their opinions. Some considerable ‘unofficial’ insights were, however, gained within informal conversation with some officials about local and central government attitudes and positions – once it had been established that the voice recorder had been left behind. Perhaps the most notable absence in the research is the voice of Kampala and Jinja’s street children. In my original research design I had intended to include street children’s analyses about how they felt their voice had been represented within the coalitions, through the coalitions’ interaction with government, and within specific policies and actions that resulted from such interaction. For both coalitions, however, children had not been included as members. For both coalitions ideas of coherent ‘voice’ and representation were apparently understood as ‘sensibly’ mediated by ‘adult’ voices. Though perhaps useful for drawing attention to this imbalance of power, carrying through with the planned focus group discussions with street children in Jinja and Kampala would have moved the research focus too wide and confused its intentions.

15.7

Further areas for research

A variety of areas for further research emerge from this thesis. Further research might add further generalizability to the conclusions of this thesis in focusing on the role of sectoral blur and ‘embeddedness’ between government and the citizen in mediating ideological ‘difference’ in other smaller urban and rural environments. Developing this role of sectoral blur and ‘embeddedness’, research might also examine further the potential for integration of street children in coalition ‘voice’, where such a voice is understood to reflect transformatory process of multiple accountabilities and the democratisation of knowledge. This area becomes particularly critical in smaller urban centres where institutional and coalition knowledge around issues of streetism is often poor, perhaps dependent on only one or two NGO informants and, within coalitions of

335 diverse members representing diverse ideological positions, often dominated by negative popular characterisation drawn from the media (Malcomson, 2001). At the moment I am exploring this idea within my work in Addis Ababa in terms of the use and development of children centred video documentaries within networking advocacy approaches with government, other NGOs and targeted communities. Research might also explore the potential for transfer of coalition voice, within ‘embedded’ models of coalition such as Jinja Network, to more politically exclusive policy-making spaces. Such inquiry would, for example, extend the ideas explored here of coalition legitimisation and democratised spaces within emerging indigenised forms of governance in Uganda and other African states. Such inquiry might also explore government and non-government interaction in terms of African states multiple use of postcolonial discourses for (de)legitimisation of non-governmental ‘voice’. In terms of developing ‘good practices’, other case studies of how concerns about street children and streetism have been successfully bound to broader community development and poverty reduction themes in smaller urban centres, without obscuring the specificity of needs, would also be of great value to the policy-maker and practitioner. Finally, considering the changes of members, coordinators and leaders in both Jinja Network and the Inter-NGO Forum since the fieldwork for this research was completed, a continuing longitudinal exploration of how the two coalitions react to, and emerge and evolve from such changes would further augment knowledge about how coalitions form, evolve and possibly terminate.

336

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APPENDIX 1: Ugandan Local Government Structure Functions

Local Councils

Level

Municipal status

Central government

Human resources management Rule of law and administration of justice Economic management, including regulation Public financial management Public procurement management Revenue collection Oversight and accountability Public facilities and asset management

Exercise all political & executive powers Provide services Ensure implementation of government policy and compliance with it Plan for the district Enact district laws Monitor performance of government employees Levy, charge & collect fees & taxes Formulate, approve & execute district budgets

State Composed of 56 districts

Local government

Administrative unit

Advise district officers and area member of parliament Resolve problems and disputes Monitor delivery of services

Enact by-laws Approve sub-county budget Monitor performance of government employees Levy, charge & collect fees & taxes Formulate, approve & execute sub-county budgets

Assist in maintaining law, order & security Initiate, encourage, support & participate in self-help projects Serve as communication channel Monitor the administration of projects

District Composed of 35 counties

LC5

LC4

Jinja Municipal Council

LC3

Municipal Division

County Composed of 35 sub-counties

Kampala City Council

Local government Sub-county Composed of 3-10 parishes

Administrative unit

Parish Composed villages

3-10

LC2

Administrative unit

Assist in maintaining law, order & security Initiate, encourage, support & participate in self-help projects Serve as communication channel with government Monitor the administration of projects Make by-laws Impose service fees

Source: adapted

Village Composed of 5-50 households

from Raussen et al., 2001:70)

LC1

353

APPENDIX 2: Schedule of questions for Coalition membership Jinja Network for the Marginalized Child and Youth Interview: e.g. 5pm, at Kakindu Staff Club Name: … (Organization coded as ‘2j’) Organization: … Status: e.g. Jinja Network Member – also LC3 Councillor for Women F.

Coalitions and ISPs 1. Does Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum have partnership with government? Describe briefly what partnerships have been developed. 2. For Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum, what would you normally expect from government ‘partnership’? 3. Who in Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum develops these partnerships? 4. Has your relationship with different people in government changed through membership of Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum? If yes, how? 5. Jinja Network only – Why do you think Jinja Network has chosen to include government membership? a. What would you say are the advantages and disadvantages of this inclusion/exclusion in terms of i. Your organization ii. Other NGO/CBO members iii. The leaders who have become members, and iv. The street and working children themselves? 6. And what do you think is the particular benefit to the government in inclusion? 7. Kampala Inter-NGO Forum only – Do you think it is necessary or desirable to pursue government partnerships, a. If yes, how should this be done? b. If no, why not? 8. In what way do you feel Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum has made a difference to the policies and approaches on street & working children’s issues taken by different levels of government?

Coalitions’ Organizational Characteristics A. Coalition Members’ Expectations 1. When did you join Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum? 2. What were your important personal or organizational reasons for joining Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum? 3. What advantages were you expecting from Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum when you joined? 4. Since you joined, in what ways do you feel that your original expectations: a. Have or have not been met? b. Have changed? 5. What types of contributions do you feel that you bring to Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum (e.g. values, perspectives, resources, information, capacity, strategic thinking, individual or organizational skills, etc.? 6. Do you feel these contributions are utilised and/or valued? B. Coalition and Street and Working Children’s Issues 1. What would you say are the past and present street and working children’s issues that have been taken up by Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum? 2. Do you (and did you) feel committed to these issues?

354 3. Do you feel you personally contribute to these issues within Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum? How? 4. Would you see these issues as ‘your’ issues – if not, who or what do you feel is pushing these issues? 5. What issues do you feel should be taken up but are not, and why? 6. Which organizations/individuals tend to take the lead in setting the street and working children’s agenda within Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum? C. Who Participates 1. Who makes the general decisions in Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum? 2. Are you happy with this arrangement? 3. In what ways do you feel included in decision-making? a. Who or what makes you feel included? b. How do people or organizational processes make you feel included? 4. Do you ever feel left out of decision-making about issues, approaches, etc.? a. Is this your own choice? b. Who or what is it that makes you feel left out? c. Why do you feel this is acceptable or unacceptable? d. Do you think there is a purpose behind you being left out? e. What would make you feel more included? 5. Do you personally attend all Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum meetings? D. Feelings of Coalition ‘Successes’ and ‘Failures’ 1. What do you feel the purpose is or should be for Jinja Network/Kampala InterNGO Forum? 2. Do you feel that Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum has been successful in achieving this purpose? a. Give some examples of what you see as successful activities b. Give some examples of what you see as failed activities. 3. What has disappointed you about Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum? a. Why do you think this is? b. What do you feel could be changed and how would you change it? c. E. Conflict & Coalition Management 1. Have you experienced difficulties or conflict about perspectives, approaches and issues with other member organizations? a. Do you feel these differences have been sorted out? How or why not? 2. Who manages/mediates (or is supposed to manage/mediate) these difficulties/conflicts and are they ‘successful’? Explain your answer. 3. Do you feel you are taken seriously in the coalition or undermined as a person/organization because of gender, education, skills, trust, size, etc.? a. What do you think the reason is for this? 4. Looking at the list of member organizations, do you feel there is a hierarchy of important people, organizations or issues in the coalitions? Why do you think this is and whom do you think controls this hierarchy? 5. What things (e.g. gender, education, skills, trust, etc.) do you feel give an advantage or disadvantage to you, individual people or organizations if there is a hierarchy? 6. Considering all your previous answers about the presence or absence of hierarchies:

355 a. How does Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum ensure equal participation of all members? b. What management qualities do you feel are most needed for managing Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum? Explain your answer. i. Do you feel these qualities are strong or weak in the present leadership? ii. How could they be improved in your opinion? 7. Is there any way Jinja Network/Kampala Inter-NGO Forum has formalised relationships and procedures between members, donors, etc. (e.g. registration, finances, agreements for membership, procedures, etc.)? 8. Do you or would you see formalisation as ‘good’ and ‘necessary’ or ‘bad’ and ‘unnecessary’? Give reasons for your answer. 9. What do you feel has been or would be the impact of formalisation (e.g. registration, finances, agreements for membership, procedures, etc.) on relationships, procedures, participation, etc.? Notes on Interview (Example) Ref. Note

356

APPENDIX 3: One-page summary of research project presented to respondents Tim Malcomson – PhD Research Student, Brunel University (London, UK) Short Research Concept Paper on Kampala’s Inter-NGO Forum and Jinja Network Introduction Jinja Network and Kampala Inter-NGO Forum have both proved to be examples of strong and durable networking for street and working children. This is an area of networking that often proves very difficult because of differences in member organization’s interests, philosophies, understanding of street children as ‘problem’, and methodologies for addressing them. Coalition success might be measured, for instance, by organizations’ ‘experience’ of their own interests and issues being absorbed into, or sidelined by policy-making forums within the two coalitions, and/or within different forms of ‘partnership’ with local, municipal, district and national government. Objective of the Research This research, therefore, has the aim of exploring each individual member organization’s different understanding and experience of being a coalition member, and the different ways the coalition’s organizational structure, and the coordination and leadership, handle the difficult task of either reconciling or managing differences in philosophies, interests, approaches, sizes, skills and capacities, cultural and gender differences, etc. The research also explores the attitudes both the coalitions and government have towards each other, exploring how these enable or hinder productive partnerships. Aim of the Research The aim of this research is to make available a ‘deep’ analysis of how Jinja Network and Kampala Inter-NGO Forum function and are ‘experienced’ by both members and government. As a cooperative analysis of surfacing issues and attitudes, an interim research report can serve as a platform from which both these and other coalitions and government institutions might build or strengthen both coalitions and ISPs in respect of street and working children. Research Questions •

How do member organizations understand ‘success’ and ‘failure’ within structures and approaches of the two coalitions, and how does this relate to their own organizational interests and issues they see as important for street and working children. How do leadership, coordination and coalition organizational factors reconcile, manage or merely reinforce ‘difference’ in terms of perspectives, capacities and status, and the exercise of power.

•

What international, national, and local factors support or hinder development of ISPs between these two coalitions and government in Jinja and Kampala, and, in terms of competing interests, to what extent does the existence or absence of such ISPs facilitate or hinder a intersectoral agreement on policy and social mobilisation approaches for street and working children?

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APPENDIX 4: Some examples of JN’s policy-making and advisory encounters, and programming for street children with government Policy Policy-making and advisory encounters with local government on street children •

4 meetings with Jinja security agencies (DISO, DSB, Police Community Liaison Officer, and the Deputy RDC), out of which has come a ‘technical committee’ to look into coordinating a joint ‘security-social welfare’ approach to street children and youth;

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2 JN evaluation and strategic planning workshops (together with invited LCIII & LCV representatives);

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Monthly meetings of JN government and non-government member organizations (some hosted by divisional councils)

policy--making Training encounters with local government as specific ‘street child’ policy processes •

CRA facilitated workshops with village and parish communities and LC1, LC2 and LC3 leaders on identification and programming for child vulnerability and rights within their communities;

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2 JN and JMC capacity-building workshops on community policy-making, monitoring and programming for child vulnerability with LCI councillors (included with JN planning and financed by JMC).

JN and government government joint programming for ‘street children’ •

JN and MGLSD ‘Programme for Children and Youth’ (PCY) joint development of 2 youth centres in Jinja and Mafubira;

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JN and JMC counselling course for Child Rights Advocates, and NGO/CBOs (financed and facilitated by a JN NGO);

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Agreement for special access to Jinja Municipal Youth Production Unit for vocational training for ‘street’ youth from JN member organizations;

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Street Children ‘Transit Centre’ built and operationalised through joint JN and JMC provisioning and financing;

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JN discussion paper on removal, rehabilitation and resettlement of street child adopted as district & municipal ‘working paper’;

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JN and JMC 10 half-hour live radio ‘chat & phone-in’ shows on street children, child vulnerability and child rights;

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JMC educational provision for 400 Karamajong ‘part-time’ street children included in JN’s strategic plan;

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JN and MGLSD coordinated and JMC hosted ‘2002 Uganda/Germany International Youth Exchange Programme’.