Coherence, Effectiveness and Recognition in EU-East Asia Relations

Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence

Research Briefing Paper

Coherence, Effectiveness and Recognition in EU-East Asia Relations Philomena Murray Director, Contemporary Europe Research Centre, School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Melbourne

Adam Berryman Contemporary Europe Research Centre, School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Melbourne

Margherita Matera Contemporary Europe Research Centre, School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Melbourne

July 2008

Paper for presentation at EU-Asia Relations: A Policy Review Workshop, jointly hosted by The Contemporary Europe Research Centre, The University of Melbourne and The European Institute of Asian Studies, Brussels.

Draft. Please do not cite without the authors’ permission. Feedback welcome

Table of Contents Executive Summary

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1. Introduction

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2. Perspectives on the EU as a Global Actor

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‘Soft’ Power Europe

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‘Hard’ Power Europe

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Moving towards a Smart Power Europe

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3. Critique of the EU as an Interlocutor

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a) Norms and Interests

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b) Policy variance

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c) National interests

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d) Coherence problems in the regional approach

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4. Challenges and Opportunities in EU-East Asian Relations

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Visibility and Recognition

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Smart Power Potential?

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Images and assessments of Europe and Asia and EU-East Asia Relations

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5. Conclusions and Recommendations

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References

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This project is funded by a grant from the European Commission (Agreement number 2007 – 1747/001 - 001), with additional support from The University of Melbourne.

Research Briefing Paper: Coherence, Effectiveness and Recognition in EU-East Asia Relations

Executive Summary Objectives This paper discusses policy issues relating to EU-East Asia Relations. It examines the challenges the EU faces with regard in engaging with the East Asian region – especially key issues of coherence, recognition and effectiveness. It brings an Asia Pacific perspective that an overview of policy instruments and approaches is required. It seeks to examine both how the EU is acting and how it is perceived in the region. It suggests that there is dissonance, firstly, among various EU actors, and secondly, in perceptions of the EU-Asia relation from European and Asia Pacific perspectives. Analysis The EU is perceived in East Asia as having many voices. The challenge for interlocutors is to know which voice is being projected. In policy terms this means the EU is not always clear regarding its desired outcomes and the means to achieve them. Thus the EU is regarded as a challenging interlocutor in terms of: norms and interests; policy variance; national interests; coherence problems in the regional approach. There remain considerable challenges and opportunities in EU-East Asia Relations, relating to: visibility and recognition; the exercise of smart power; and the management of mutual perceptions. Meeting these challenges and making the most of these opportunities requires the effective promotion of greater mutual understanding between the EU and East Asia at both regional and state level. Recommendations •

Coherence: New instruments to facilitate a more coherent and comprehensive policy development are required.

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Awareness and Understanding: Redress the limited awareness of East Asia among some member states. Develop greater European expertise on Asia, to promote understanding and strengthen the relationship

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Rethinking Regionalism: More realistic objectives need to be established regarding Asian regionalism, with limited functional aims pertaining to a common market.

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Re-evaluate ASEM: Concrete steps should be taken to manage expectations and deliver on realistic objectives within ASEM. Consider the establishment of a secretariat and a Asia-Europe adaptation and familiarization process.

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Education and Research Cooperation: Exploit the opportunities available to build on European expertise regarding Asia. Promote increased educational exchanges and research collaboration.

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1. Introduction This paper discusses policy issues relating to EU-East Asia Relations. It examines the challenges that the EU faces with regard in its engagement with the East Asian region concerning the key issues of coherence, recognition and effectiveness. It seeks to bring together an Asia Pacific perspective on these issues and puts forward the argument that an overview of policy instruments and approaches is now required. It seeks to examine both how the EU is acting and how it is perceived in the region. It suggests that there is some considerable dissonance firstly, among the various EU actors and, secondly, in perceptions of the EU-Asia relation from European and Asia Pacific perspectives. It presents a number of observations and recommendations designed to advance policy analysis. This research briefing paper draws on number of sources. It is a follow-up to the International Conference on EU-Asia Relations: A Critical Review, held at the Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC), The University of Melbourne, 27-28 March 2008, sponsored by CERC and the European Institute of Asian Studies, Brussels. The overall aim of this conference was to contribute to the relatively new academic engagement with the EU’s international presence in the Asia by providing a valuable opportunity for a critical assessment of the current state of the EU–Asia engagement. The conference provided a public forum for analysts, empirical researchers and practitioners based in Asia, Europe and the Pacific to come together and engage on matters relating to the nature of EU influence in international affairs – with a particular emphasis on Asia and inter-regional relations.1 This paper also draws on interviews conducted with European Commission officials and a survey of assessments of the EU-Asia relationship carried out with experts from Europe and the Asia Pacific.2 Interviews were conducted with European Commission officials in 2006 and 2007 to analyse the perceptions of EU officials dealing with East Asia. A survey questionnaire3 designed to gather information on how academic experts perceive the EU-Asia relationship was administered in 2006-07 to academic experts in Europe and the Asia Pacific (based in East Asia, Australia and New Zealand). The interviews and survey constitute an attempt to redress the lack of data on elite perceptions regarding EU-

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The conference was funded by a grant from the European Commission Jean Monnet Lifelong Learning Programme (Agreement number 2007 – 1747/001 - 001), with additional support from the University of Melbourne. It was primarily organized and convened by A/Prof Philomena Murray and Dr Fraser Cameron, Senior Adviser to the Europe Institute for Asian Studies in Brussels, with the assistance of Margherita Matera, Milos Vaskovic and Persefoni Gouletsas. 2 The interviews were conducted in Brussels in 2006-7 and the surveys were administered electronically in 2006-7. Philomena Murray would like to thank the Commission officials and experts for their participation. 3 A total of 114 surveys were sent out for written response and 52 received. The survey method adopted involved written replies to a standard questionnaire. The data were entered into a Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences (SPSS) file and analysed using descriptive statistical techniques. The respondent group was academic scholars. They were aggregated groupings of European respondents and Asia Pacific respondents, as appropriate, in order to distinguish differences and variations across responses to different items.

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Murray, Berryman and Matera

East Asia relations. The interviews and surveys highlighted considerable differences in perceptions of regional integration and EU-East Asia relations. It is an accepted fact that, internationally, the EU is an influential trading bloc. Yet its political and economic agendas – and those of its member states – are neither clear nor coherent. Rather, the EU’s approach appears to be characterised by problems of coherence, visibility and effectiveness. There appears to be a mis-match between the EU’s own expectations and capabilities. The European Commission’s 2006 document entitled Europe in the World makes the case that the Member States and EU institutions should work together to address three issues: 1. How to develop and implement European external policy, anticipating future threats and opportunities. 2. How to increase the effectiveness and impact of EU policies and actions, using all available instruments – external policies & internal policies - more coherently and drawing on the particular competences and strengths of member states and institutions. 3. How to strengthen democratic accountability and visibility of EU policies and actions and thus to increase their public acceptance.4 This paper suggests that the EU’s increased visibility in some policies has led to increased expectations of the EU as an international actor. Further, there are questions as to the effectiveness of the EU’s regional approach in East Asia. Is it an effective regional actor and clearly defined regional interlocutor with East Asia? In policy terms, the EU and in particular the Commission - is not explicit regarding the outcomes it wishes to achieve and the means to achieve them. There are also problems in defining East Asia as a region and in defining the EU approach to East Asia. This research briefing therefore posits that some problems in the EU’s current East Asia strategy are due to a lack of policy coherence within the Commission. The EU is perceived in East Asia as having many voices, illustrated by problems of policy inconsistency and incoherence. Europe in the World calls for an increased degree of coherence between the EU and member states – something that is still currently required. The European policy communities also need to deal with the fact that East Asia also speaks with many voices. It can be argued that the EU’s engagement with East Asia – through the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), in development aid, trade facilitation, investment facilitation and humanitarian assistance, for example – does not result in a full return on investment, largely due to a lack of policy coherence, a lack of effective use of policy instruments and

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European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Council on Europe in the World - Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, Brussels, 8 June 2006 COM(2006) 278 Final. Our emphasis.

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problems of visibility and recognition in the region.5 If the EU wishes to pursue a more active policy approach in East Asia, its internal and external policies must be more closely linked; there is a need for increased Council–Commission cooperation (including with individual member states) and for internal Commission coherence. The Europe in the World document states the ‘overall effectiveness and therefore the global influence of the EU depend on optimal use of all available leverage in support of external goals’. The need to review leverage, instruments and coherent strategy requirements in the EU’s approach to East Asia would therefore appear to be pressing. Finally, it is recommended that concrete steps be taken to strengthen coherence of the EU’s policy towards East Asia. It is suggested that a greater understanding of East Asia be promoted within and across the EU member states through initiatives aimed at fostering greater mutual understanding between the EU and East Asia. A re-evaluation of the EU’s emphasis on regionalism is also proposed.

2. Perspective on the EU as a Global Actor In December 2003 the EU’s first security strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World (commonly referred to as the ESS) stated that ‘the European Union is inevitably a global player’6 and that ‘an active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale.’7 Despite these assertions, the basis and effectiveness of EU global reach and influence remains unclear. Much of the scholarly literature analysing the EU’s international role focuses on the distinctive combination of the EU’s political profile, economic strength and limited military capacity, resulting in concepts of normative, civilian, soft and ethical power.8 At the basis of these debates is an attempt to understand the relationship between what the EU is, and how it acts internationally. As the EU is founded on a series of norms, there is an assumption – and often a desire – that these norms will be at the centre of any articulated EU foreign policy. Indeed, ‘soft’ or ‘normative’ power terminology has increasingly been evident in Commission rhetoric, and the spread of core European values to strengthen the international order is at the heart of the EU’s global agenda.

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It is noteworthy that the stocktaking report on measures to increase the effectiveness, coherence and visibility of EU external policies of the Presidency in June 2008 does not refer to East Asia. See Council of the European Union, Stocktaking report: Measures to increase the effectiveness, coherence and visibility of EU external policies, Brussels, 11 June 2008, 10612/08. POLGEN 64. PESC 777. 6 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p.1. 7 Ibid, p.14 8 See for example Ian Manners, ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2), 2002; Adrian Hyde-Price ‘Normative power Europe: A realist critique’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2), 2006; Richard. Youngs, ‘Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU’s external identity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (2), 2004.

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Key criticisms of the EU as a normative actor, however, tend to focus on questions of EU credibility and legitimacy. Despite claims that ‘the increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor’9, the oft cited lack of consistency between the normative presence of the EU and their policy outcomes contribute to a perceived ‘capabilities–expectation gap’.10

‘Soft’ Power Europe As the EU is committed to a regional multilateral approach to upholding its norms, there is a strong tendency to promote this approach – implicitly and explicitly – as the most effective means to promoting East Asian regional stability and interdependent prosperity. Thus the regional multilateral approach itself has become another norm to be upheld and promoted, and is often the default means by which the core objectives are pursued. Javier Solana noted, ‘a key benefit of acting multilaterally is legitimacy, which in turns enhances effectiveness’, and the ESS states ‘our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system.’11 As true as this is, the presumption that other regions will be equally committed to multilateralism and inclined towards regional integration has created unfulfilled European expectations, as seen in the following quote from a Commission official: our Asia strategy has been a bit a function of the integration pace in Asia, which is quite slow and …that explains why we go for bilateral relations…with China…we individualise the countries and we deal with them individually.12 In this view the failure of East Asia to meet European expectations with respect to integration has underpinned a diversified approach to EU-East Asia relations, which encompass heavily normative elements, as well as a range of strengthening bilateral and multilateral engagements on both a state and regional basis. There are nonetheless limitations to this approach, many of which stem from the asymetrical nature of the EU’s engagement with individual Asian states and the resulting tensions. Despite these limitations, and the fact that the EU has been accused of ‘only pursuing ostensibly ‘moral’ policies in Asia’13, in truth the ‘soft’ approach may well be the best suited to an East Asian context: Europeans and Asians are much more comfortable with institutions that shape normative behaviour through consensus and the exercise of soft power. This attitude may reflect their relative weakness in hard-power terms, but it also indicates a preference for resolving differences through consensual negotiation.14 9

A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, p.1. Christopher Hill, 'Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap' in John Peterson and Helene. Sjursen (eds.) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?: Competing Visions of the CFSP, London, Routledge, 1998. 11 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. p.9. 12 Quote from interviews conducted with European Commission offices in Brussels during 2006-07 13 Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Europe is a geopolitical dwarf’, Financial Times, 21 May, 2008. 14 Richard N Cooper, Sino-European Economic Relations, Cambridge: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard Universit, 2005, p. 13, quoted in Benjamin Zyla, ‘Riding the Asian Tiger? 10

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Still, the soft approach is compromised by the lack of concrete functional agreements which bind the parties together, and the lack of EU political and military profile within East Asia. And despite the fact that the EU Asia Strategy is founded on principles of engagement with equal partners,15 according to one official there is no ‘perception of Asia as a partner in the same sense as we would have with the US, and indeed, many of our efforts to build partnership have ended up with pretty hollow results’.

‘Hard’ Power Europe One of the main challenges facing the EU globally are the perceived limitations of the soft power approach. During the 1990s, failure of the EU to end the conflict in the Balkans following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, in particular the Kosovo crisis, highlighted ‘that without making an effort to improve its military capabilities, Europe’s influence and responsibility would continue to be limited’16. This failure helped pave the way for the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the broadening of the EU’s ‘tool-box of instruments’ to include military capabilities. However, the introduction of military capabilities through the ESDP has not resulted in the EU becoming a key actor in areas of hard security. The ESDP has never been about the development of a military force, separate and independent from that of the EU’s member states, but rather reflective of the EU’s intrinsic philosophy – that the use of military force is not about territorial gain or the control of another population, but rather it is ‘about changing the fabric of a war-torn society…[and] the spread of peace’.17 The EU’s own experience in facilitating peace and stability amongst its member states has had a significant influence on how the EU perceives and responds to security threats. Combined with the broadening of security to include areas traditionally regarded as soft security issues such as environmental threats, drug trafficking, organised crime and ethnic tensions, the EU has come to adopt the position that current security challenges (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states; organised crime)18 can neither be dealt with through purely military means, nor unilaterally. While the ESS stated ‘Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’19, the EU’s actual ability to be a crucial player in conflict situations has been limited by a lack of capacity (limited military resources of the EU’s member states) and political will (reluctance of EU member states to back up their rhetoric with action). This has affected third country perceptions of the EU as a key actor How the EU Engaged China since the end of the Cold War’, Current Politics and Economics of Asia, 17 (1), 2008, p. 100. 15 European Commission, Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships, COM (2001) 469, Brussels, 2001. 16 Jean-Yves Haines, ‘ESDP: an overview’ Institute for Security Studies, p. 2, . 17 Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Rule the 21st Century, London, Fourth Estate, 2005, p. 59. 18 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, pp. 3-4. 19 Ibid, p. 1

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in security issues. East Asia is a case in point. Despite recent claims that the relative decline of US importance in the Asian region has ‘opened up a space for more assertive expressions of European soft power in Southeast Asia’20, the fact remains that security is still viewed predominately in hard security terms within Asia, with the US as the key security power. Over the years East Asia has put forward a number of reasons as to why EU contribution to the political and security interests of East Asia have been difficult to achieve. These have included the overall differing focus and approach to the issues of: internal stability, economic development and nation building; terrorism; economic and social development.21 What is interesting to note is that in the recent Presidency Report on the ESDP, the only reference made to Asia was in the context of the EU’s Police Mission in Afghanistan.22 This re-enforces the lack of an EU presence in East Asian security matters.

Moving towards a Smart Power Europe There is general recognition that in order for the EU to effectively act and be seen as a global actor ‘[g]reater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states.’23 This is being reflected through the increasing reference among EU officials to the idea of the EU becoming a ‘smart power’ by ‘combining soft and hard power better in the EU’s external relations by using a whole spectrum of our policy instruments and economic resources. This should be done in a forward looking, consistent and unified way.’24 The challenge however facing the EU is to ensure that this recognition converts into tangible outcomes that help increase the EU’s coherence, effectiveness and visibility in its external relations.

3. Critiques of the EU as an Interlocutor For many observers and interlocutors in East Asia, the impact of the EU in the region remains unclear. The EU, by its own admission, has failed to meet international (and European) expectations in coherence, effectiveness and visibility in their foreign relations.25 The European Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson has recently argued that what is needed is a more coherent and effective EU built around the concept of 'projectionism' not protectionism, meaning the ability to project European interests and 20

David Camroux, The European Union and ASEAN – Two to Tango?, Notre Europe, Studies and Research 65, Paris, June 2008,p. 35. 21 Norbert von Hofmann, ‘How do Asians evaluate Europe’s strategic involvement in East Asia?’, Asia Europe Journal, 5, 2007, p. 188. 22 See European Council Presidency report on ESDP (10415/08), Brussels 16 June 2008. 23 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, p.13 24 Olli Rehn, ‘Europe’s smart power in its region and the world’, SPEECH/08/222, European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, 1 May 2008, p. 3. Also see: Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Union and the World: a hard look at soft power’, SPEECH/07/576, Columbia University, New York, 24 September 2007 and Hugh Richardson, ‘Smartening the EU’s soft power’, Speech to Waseda University, Tokyo, 16 May 2008. 25 Europe in the World - Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, Op cit.

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values globally in the twenty-first century26. The EU is effective at projecting its own interests up to a point. However, these interests may not be fully understood by its interlocutors. This paper suggests that there are concerns with the way the EU projects itself in East Asia. Although the EU is seeking to advance its interests and norms, the reception of these norms and interests within East Asia is not clear. What is also not clear is the EU’s understanding of Asian norms and interests. Perhaps more seriously, the EU’s objectives are not necessarily understood by its own actors – institutions and member states. It has been argued that the policy-making environment of the EU is ‘complex, uncertain and fluid’.27 The EU is admired for its negotiations, its practices and roles of agenda setter and facilitator, so that experienced EU officials are ‘familiar with thinking about informal strategies on agenda setting and solutions to complex multilevel and multi issue negotiations’.28 Depending on the issue, there are degrees of cohesion of EU policy making. These form a range that is pertinent to this paper, as it appears to encompass the EU’s approach to East Asia in all four types, depending on the issue:

each member state pursues its own agenda without meaningful prior coordination with other member states the EU can attempt to convey a single message, through the adoption of common understandings, while allowing for each member state to act separately and have different priorities the EU can act as single entity, speaking with one voice, but with an everchanging messenger, due to the fact that the rotating Presidency has the authority to represent the EU the EU can be a unitary actor whereby the Commission speaks on behalf of the EU – possessing the role of a single messenger.29

The challenge for interlocutors is to know which voice is being projected at which time and in which negotiations and dialogues.

a. Norms and Interests Coherence is at the centre of the apparent contradictions between EU norms and interests, as the EU is presenting an image of itself as a model of global governance, conflictresolution and regional multilateral cooperation in the Asian region. Yet there is a perception among some Asian actors that the EU is motivated by strategic self-interest – and national interest. In addition, there has been little European focus on Asia as a region

26

Peter Mandelson, ‘Europe's openness and the politics of globalisation’, SPEECH/08/64, The Alcuin Lecture, Cambridge, 8 February 2008. 27 Ole Elgström and Mari Strömvik, ‘The European Union as an international negotiator' in O. Elgström and C. Jönsson (eds.), European Union Negotiations – Processes, Networks And Institutions, Routledge, New York, 2005, pp. 117-129. 28 ‘Ibid’. 29 Joakim Reiter, ‘The European Union as actor in international relations – the role of the external environment for EU institutional design’, in O. Elgström and C. Jönsson (eds.), European Union Negotiations – Processes, Networks And Institutions, Routledge, New York, 2005, pp. 148-163.

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until the 1990s. It has been argued by some academics that ‘Asia has historically been the region most neglected by the Union’30.

b. Policy variance The EU does not come across as coherent due to three factors: the multi-actor nature of the EU process; the multi-level processes of governance and policy-making and, thirdly, the internal variations among its policy communities. Interviews carried out as part of this research project suggest that there is considerable lack of coherence in the EU approach to East Asia across policy domains, with little spillover dissemination of information and policy stances among the actors within the Commission. There is little spillover to, and from, member states and EU institutions in seeking to trade with the East Asian region. There is little convergence of economic and political objectives and policy instruments. A disjuncture between national interests and EU interests can result in a difficulty in achieving a pan-EU consensus on EU objectives in East Asia. This is compounded by the fact that there is not a consensus across the EU institutions and within the European Commission. In fact, the Commission does not deal as one unit with East Asia or the ASEM countries as a region, but rather across several parts of Directorates General (DGs) and within DGs. Commission officials have commented on the fact that there are ‘different directorates and different geographical splits, which are not necessarily the most coherent’ and that there is ‘organisationally, bureaucratically in the house [a] split between… different Directorates’. Further, ‘discussions within the Commission regarding a more regionalised approach have not yet yielded results.’

c. National interests In the survey of academic experts, scholars stated overwhelmingly that national interests dominate EU policy towards Asia, particular those of the UK, France and Germany. There is a clear perception amongst Asia Pacific and European experts and some European Commission officials that the member states conduct separate, distinctive and often parallel, but rarely convergent, policy approaches, with regard to trade and human rights, for example. The lack of differentiation between member state and EU approaches was recognized in Europe and the World, which suggests that ‘Member States must consider what is either necessarily or more usefully achieved at the level of the EU’. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the problems of the EU’s East Asia strategy is the dissonance between an EU policy and member states’ interests.31 While the EU aims to present a ‘unified front’, on high profile issues it may not speak as one. This has resulted in third countries viewing the EU as a body that does not have strategic vision on international issues, and therefore not the ideal partner. ‘[A]ccording to several Southeast Asian members, Europe should first of all resolve its own foreign policy commitment and 30

Charlotte Bretherton and John Volger, The European Union as a Global Actor, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 129. 31 See Rubin Wong, ‘Towards a Common European Policy on China? Economic, Diplomatic and Human Rights Trends Since 1985’, Current Politics and Economics of Asia, 17 (1), 2008.pp. 155-182, for examples within the Chinese context of dissonance between EU policy and member states’ interests.

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leadership questions if it wants to be an effective and active partner of the ARF.’32 Studies have revealed that the EU is regarded as internally divided and dominated by national interests in foreign policy.33 Further, interviews and research reveal that Asian countries may prefer bilateral relations with individual EU member states rather than dealing first with the EU as a body. This relates to problems of dealing with the EU as an interlocutor:

The EU is seen to be institutionally complex, difficult to understand and thus difficult to effectively interact with There is a lack of understanding within Asia of Europe and how Europeans think.

Of course, the perceptions of the EU as being difficult to comprehend is not confined to East Asia – many Europeans and other interlocutors also have this challenge. For example ‘most Americans find the EU extremely difficult to acknowledge, recognise, or understand…[t]hey will either seize on the existence of disunity among the EU nationstates and wonder why such disunity exists, or they will be struck by the degree to which national governments are willing to submit to the collective decisions of both other member-states and of the supranational institutions.34 Given the high priority accorded to the US by both East Asia and the EU, US perceptions of the EU may well influence Asian perspectives on the EU.

d. Coherence problems in the regional approach The effectiveness of the EU’s strategy of regionalism needs to be questioned. The EU attempts to project itself as an effective regional interlocutor with East Asia and to project its smart power through strategic objectives that are not clearly agreed on within the Commission. It is not clear whether, if, and how, regional policy outcomes are effectively monitored. One expert surveyed suggested that the EU ‘shows only marginal interest in multilateralism… and is more interested in pursuing bilateral ties, as ‘bilateral ties are easier to pursue because they are more highly based on material interests’. In a sense, regionalism is potentially undermined by the complexity of the EU as well as the diversity of Member States within the EU, (with large member states seeking market access to Asia as a high priority and smaller or newer Member States having little or no Asian expertise, involvement or urgent interests). These factors tend to undermine the EU’s comprehensive regional approach.

32

Norbert von Hofmann, ‘Op cit.’, p. 189. Philomena Murray, ‘An Asia Pacific Response to the European Union: Australian Elite Perceptions’, Asia Europe Journal, 1 (1), February 2003, pp. 103-119.; Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland (eds.), The EU Through the Eyes of the Asia-Pacific, NCRE Research Series No 4, 2007. 34 Alberta M. Sbragia, ‘Seeing The European Union Through American Eyes: The EU As A Reflection Of The American Experience’, European Political Science, 4 2005, pp. 179-187. 33

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4. Challenges and Opportunities in EU-East Asia Relations Visibility and Recognition The EU’s increased visibility in some policy areas – such as trade – in East Asia has not been reflected in other areas, despite successes in development aid, humanitarian assistance, peace agreement monitoring (e.g. the Aceh Monitoring Mission) and foreign policy dialogue. It is not regarded as a coherent political partner by its major interlocutors in East Asia.35 The trade dimension predominates – what is called the pre-eminence of geo-economic over geo-political considerations in the EU-South East Asia relationship.36 The Europe in the World document proposes that the EU become a more visible international actor, yet there is little evidence of any systematic analysis of the perceptions of the policy communities in East Asia. The question of perceptions is therefore fundamental – what is the dominant narrative of the EU and how is it perceived in East Asia? The issue of expectations is important in terms of inter-regional negotiations as much as it is for EU relations with individual East Asian states. In the context of East Asia, what does the EU bring to the table, and what does East Asia want? Is it the same thing or something different? In most parts of East Asia, ‘the EU suffers from an impaired visibility, particularly in the televisions news media … indicating ... that the EU is of limited importance’.37 Further, a recent study suggested that the predominant image of Europe in Asia is centred on the Euro. 38 In a broader context, it has been argued that ‘[m]isperception or ill-informed views of the EU’s global role put the EU at risk of being overlooked or undervalued by third counties with whom the EU is a significant partner.’39 Overall, among the EU’s East Asian interlocutors, the EU is regarded as remote, complex, internally focused and not very interested in Asia. A common East Asian perspective is that the EU is a fragmented market. Tanaka presents the perception of the Federation of Thai Industries that it is difficult to trade with the EU because each country has different demands regarding imports.40 Further, the EU is regarded as bureaucratic, obstructionist and difficult to deal with.41 An Indian expert’s view is that ‘[f]or the most part, the Indian corporate sector continues to perceive the EU not as one entity but as a

35

Toshiro Tanaka ‘Asian Perspectives on European Integration’, in Philomena. Murray (ed.), Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux, Basingstoke: Palgrave, forthcoming, 2008. 36 David Camroux, Op cit. 37 Martin Holland, ‘Raising EU Visibility in Asia’, in Martin Holland, Peter Ryan, Ajojzy Z. Nowak and Natalia Chaban (eds.), The EU through the Eyes of Asia, ESiA, SingaporeWarsaw, 2007, p. 287. 38 ‘Ibid’. 39 Martin Holland, Peter Ryan, Ajojzy Z Nowak and Natalia Chaban, ‘Introduction: The EU through the Eyes of Asia’, in Martin Holland, Peter Ryan, Ajojzy Z. Nowak and Natalia Chaban (eds.), The EU through the Eyes of Asia, ESiA, SingaporeWarsaw, 2007, p. 28. 40 Toshiro Tanaka, ‘Op cit.’ 41 ‘Ibid’.

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conglomerate of states, as result of which the business focus continues to be at the member states level’.42 European national interests can also be understood in terms of the former colonial powers. One Asian expert surveyed reflected on the former colonial relationships’ impact on EU-Asia relations as having a knowledge of the region; familiarity with the economic and cultural terrain that are essential for business and business related practices and the ‘availablity of scholars and scholarship within these EU countries who are familiar with the region and who can shape and influence policy’. A European expert commented on the relationship as informing the sense of priority on the EU side (e.g. UK and India); dictating the use of the appropriate interlocutor (for example, which member state's nationals should you send in a delegation?). One way of dealing with problems of recognition of the EU is through socialisation and dialogue. An Asian respondent to the survey commented on the considerable disparity between the EU’s and Asians’ values and norms, ‘but constant dialogue, particularly through ASEM, may have served to be extremely useful for the process of socialisation between the two regions’.

Smart Power Potential? As a more active actor and even smart power in the region, the EU has a relatively benign image among some elites. One Chinese scholar has argued that the EU ‘has a much better image, though not more pronounced presence, than the US and Japan, which should give it more scope for manoeuvring, and mediating. The EU could, indeed, play a more constructive role in a number of issues Asia is faced with, if it so chooses’. An Indonesian diplomatic perspective is that ‘Europe is finding its pattern of relations and power in international arena. Europe is looking for more soft-power influence to equalize the United States’ hard power’.43 With regard to the potential smart power aspects of the EU’s actorness in East Asia, there is a perception among some Commission officials that the EU is advancing a normative and also a security-related agenda in its engagement with ASEAN. An official sees the EU as advancing the relationship in terms of good governance and climate change and in security-related challenges that are ‘driven by disaster, by poverty’. The case of the interregional EU-ASEAN Peace Monitoring Mission in Aceh in Indonesia and other experiences, are regarded as ‘an example that the EU is trying to become much more of a security partner.’ There is recognition that the EU utilises non-military means:

42

Rajendra. K. Jain,‘India, the European Union and Asian Regionalism’ Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies, 3 (1-2), Winter 2005, pp. 29-30. 43 Bigran Dai, ‘EU’s Role in the Post Cold War Period and Future of Asia-Europe Relations: An Asian Perspective’ Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies, 1 (1), Summer 2003, pp. 83-100. E Prasetyono, [Indonesia] ‘In ASEM in its Tenth Year, Asian Country Report’, March 2006, available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asem/tenth/reprt 2.pdf. Both are quoted in Toshiro Tanaka, ‘Op cit’.

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We don’t have military forces – although there is a growing tendency to becoming more capable and operational in this field –‘ and to attempt to utilise ‘a combination of our instruments… economic instruments, help for refugee return, clearing mines, sending monitors just to save lives…the situation as we have done in Aceh. These are attempts where I think we will try to work further with our Asian partners. In the surveys referred to above, when asked if the EU was trying to promote its own model of regional integration in the East Asian region, a majority of respondents (54%) replied that it was not, though there was a marked degree of difference in the two sets of respondents (Asia Pacific and European). While 44% of European respondents thought that the EU was promoting its model of integration, only 22% of non–European respondents agreed, as seen in Figure 1. Figure 2 illustrates that there is a congruence of views in response to the question as to whether the EU is promoting its norms in the region.

Figure 1: Is the EU promoting an integration model? 50

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Figure 2: Is the EU promoting norms?

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Images and assessments of Europe and Asia and EU-Asia-relations The EU promotes itself as a norm exporter, as a manager of globalization agendas, as the world’s largest aid donor and as a major trade interlocutor; a model of good governance and of regional integration. Do its interlocutors agree? We have seen that the EU’s interlocutors tend to see Europe as a grouping of individual states, presenting a challenge of both visibility and coherence. This fact is recognized by some EU leaders. In February 2008, Peter Mandelson stated: The balance among member states needs to tip some way in favour of a greater capacity to project a coherent European policy internationally where we have decided to act together.44 The Commission is cognisant of the challenges. In the 2001 Strategic Framework, it recognized the problems of mutual ignorance and the sense of distance between the two regions: One element which does not seem to have evolved greatly is the degree of mutual awareness between our two regions, with stereotypes on both sides still casting Europe as introspective and old-fashioned, and Asia as a distant and exotic continent, presenting more challenges than opportunities45. This ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’ presented a significantly broader understanding of both the concept of Asia (Asia-Pacific instead of East Asia) and of engagement with Asia, seeking to establish a ‘sound policy framework’ and to provide for institutional structures for the EU’s relations with Asia over the next 44 45

Mandelson, ‘Op cit’ Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships. p 14.

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decade. The Strategy focused on six dimensions: strengthening EU engagement with Asia in the political and security fields; strengthening EU–Asia two-way trade and investment relations; contributing effectively to reduce poverty in the region; helping promote the spread of democracy, good governance and the rule of law across the region; in turn building global partnerships with key Asian partners (in combating global challenges as well as in international organizations); and, finally, promoting further awareness between the two regions. Asian experts in the survey regarded the EU’s Strategy since 2001 as a ‘more coordinated strategy towards this region’ and ‘taking Asia more seriously but giving more importance to China and India than S.E. Asia’. An Asian expert reflected that in the early 1990s the Asian economies were ‘on the rise or at peak levels and the EU wanted to have a piece of the cake rather than allow the US and Japan reap the harvests of East Asia’. The 2001 Strategy was regarded by other Asian experts as treating Asia ‘as one’; strengthening economic ties, and ‘intending to get more engagement in East Asia such as FTAs, [and other] agreements’. Some Asian experts perceive the EU’s renewed Asia Strategy as being based on ‘economic opportunity, enhancing EU's soft power, promotion of EU's development model, looking forward to a positive global governance based on multilateralism and rule of law’. Another Asian expert regarded the most important change in the EU’s relations with Asia since the mid-1990s, as ‘globalization and absence of effective global governance; economic rise of Asia, China’s fast development’. One challenge is that of priority. Until recently neither Asia nor Europe featured prominently on the other’s radar screen. There is recognition by the Commission of the need to engage more actively with East Asia, as reflected in an official’s comment: ‘I’m not saying we are where we should be, but we have definitely raised our game. There has been a demand for it too, on the Asia side - China in particular has been incredibly demanding of the European Union’. However, several experts are of the opinion that the EU does not really understand Asia. There remain challenges of understanding Asia itself and its many diversities – a fact identified clearly by a Commission official who was interviewed, who recognizes that is ‘more than half the world’s populations, it’s all the world’s great religions, it’s the majority of the world’s ethnicities… So inevitably, I think it is the one great continent of the world which is by far the hardest to define.’ There remains a need for greater clarity of approaches, especially as Asia becomes more important to the EU. An official stated: Europe is positioning itself vis-à-vis Asia at different levels and in kind of a multilayered way. And they are demandeurs, they come to us because they see us as the natural counterpart to them in the world…to a large extent because of our values, because of the commonalities that they see. Yet at the political level, there is not a clear pro-active political agenda. In the views of one official, the political relationship as a European Union is primarily reactive. ‘I don’t

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really think that we have a political strategy at the EU level to engage Asia as all the key EU countries.’ An official regards the ASEM process as the vehicle for this, as a form of multi-faceted engagement: Now, we engage with Asia of course at the political level through things like ASEM … and increasingly, we are trying to engage with Asia through civil society, through links between academia and parliaments. This view is not shared by another official, who, when asked about the important, if any, of ASEM, was very sceptical about ASEM: ‘I think that at the end of the day, what really matters is our relationship with ASEAN, our relationship with China and even some of our bilateral relationships’. Not only do states within Asia differ as to how they perceive EU, within each state there can be differing perceptions on what the EU is and should be within the region. In Japan, there are differing perceptions of the EU between Japan’s political and business elites on one hand and the general public and civil society on the other hand, with the EU consistently ‘slipping of the radar’ of the latter.46 Neither Japan’s NGOs nor trade unions made much reference to the EU at all. The Japan-EU relationship is not a priority of policy-makers or for the public, as the main priority is the relationship with the US.47 In China, amongst the public there is a general lack of positive perceptions of the EU. The political elite and academics see the EU as based on its own interests in global developments: Chinese observations about Europe’s role in the world derives from broader Chinese hopes for developing an international order based on non-hegemony, dispersion of power and regional multipolarity, political equanimity, cultural diversity, and economic interdependence.48 Further, it has been argued that: not only is the EU seen as sharing similar views about the management and the structure of international relations but, and maybe more importantly, the Chinese political elite perceives that there are no structural and foreseeable obstacles to developing such a partnership.49 An Asian expert has suggested that the EU’s 1994 strategy ‘marked an increase in cooperation as a response to Asia's growing economic power’. However, the expert contends that subsequent strategies adopted by the EU ‘appear to show a withdrawal from 46

Natalia Chaban and Marco Kauffmann, ‘‘East is East and West is West’: A survey of EU Images in Japan’s Public Discourses’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 12, 2007, p. 363. 47 ‘Ibid’, p. 381. 48 Roberto Peruzzi, Arlo Poletti and Shuangquan Zhang, ‘China’s Views of Europe: A Maturing Partnership’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 12 (3), 2007, p. 319. 49 ‘Ibid’, pp. 321-322.

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the multilateral process as a response to the 1997 Economic Crisis’ The expert suggests that the EU ‘currently shows only marginal interest in multilateralism (as perceived in the cooling enthusiasm in the ASEM process) and is more interested in pursuing bilateral ties’. It is suggested by this expert that these bilateral ties ‘are easier to pursue because they are more highly based on material interests and are less impacted by more complicated, and less likely to be negotiable, ideational interests’. The concern regarding the EU’s approach as being a combination of regionalism, inter-regionalism, bilateralism and multilateralism, to varying degrees, is evident in this assessment. One Asian expert commented that the future of EU-Asia relations ‘will increase in importance, but also in complexity’ – an apt summary. A European expert commented that the relationship ‘will grow as the volume of trade and FDI between the two regions continues to increase’. He noted, however, that ‘as long as neither region participates in the provision of the other's security the US will remain a much more important partner for both regions than they will be for each other’.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations a. Coherence Research to date, in particular interviews conducted with European Commission officials, has shown that there are significant problems with the development of a comprehensive East Asia policy that is both understood and uniformly adopted by all EU institutions and EU member states. As with many other areas in the EU, the fact that no single area of the EU’s institutional or governance structure is responsible for the development and implementation of the EU’s regional strategy for East Asia has resulted in a disjointed approach towards the region. While the EU aims to present itself as a unified front, the fact remains that it fails to speak with one voice on the international stage. Further, this complexity at the policy level has resulted in the EU being seen as a difficult institution to interact with. Not only do third countries and institutions have to wade through the different – and often divergent - messages and agendas of EU institutions and individual EU member states, they also have to grapple with the complex institutional nature of the EU. The complexity of the EU itself, the growing number of member states through its successive enlargements and the need for institutional reform, have all impacted on the EU’s ability to implement a coherent East Asia strategy. Recommendations New instruments for internal policy coordination need to be developed. Uniformity of policy should be a priority in order to maintain coherence as an interlocutor for East Asia and thereby increase effectiveness and visibility. Consideration should be given to the establishment of an Asian coordination group between the various parts of the Commission and the Council. It is recommended that it is an opportune time to assess the role of the European External Action Service. Is there a more active coordination role for this Service in synchronising EU activities within Asia in order to ensure coherence across policies and member states and sectors?

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b. Awareness and Understanding No individual EU member state has taken the lead on relations with East Asia, unlike in other relationships. With the exception of the UK, Germany and France, and to a lesser extent Italy, who are actively promoting their substantial commercial links with countries in the region (in particular with China), there is little interest or expertise on East Asia amongst the EU’s other member states. The EU’s recent enlargements in 2004 and 2007 have arguably further reduced the member states’ overall interest in East Asia as the focus and specialisation of these newer member states lies in relations with states closer to home such as Russia. Recommendations Identification of key areas in which the EU and its member states can play an active and effective, coordinated role in East Asia need to be clearly outlined and discussed with all actors within the EU. States should articulate their individual position – many member states do not currently have a policy regarding East Asia. To facilitate this, a greater depth of expertise must be developed at both a state and EU level.

c. Re-thinking Regionalism Our research suggests that regionalism is emphasized in two ways within EU-East Asia relations. Firstly, there is a tendency for some EU representatives to promote Europe as a model of regionalism. This builds on the idea of EU legitimacy being derived from a commitment to regional – and global – multilateralism, which in turn enhances EU effectiveness as a global actor. In this sense, the EU positions itself in a leadership role within discourses on global governance. Research suggests that this has only very limited influence in East Asia, where the EU is not often considered an international leader. The second emphasis is on the implicit and explicit encouragement for East Asian regional integration. Implicitly the EU promotes Asian regionalism via inter-regional dialogue (ASEM); explicitly it is encouraged through the promotion of functional cooperation on key issues – predominantly trade. Here, China, with its huge and expanding market, has become a major focus for the EU. There is some sense that the focus on China outweighs broader regional considerations, or that the promotion of regionalism is simply one part of a strategy to manage the key relationships with China, Japan and India. What is important to keep in mind is that the gap between EU rhetoric (emphasis on regionalism) and action (adopting both inter-regional and bilateral mechanisms when dealing with states in the region) re-enforces the lack of coherence in the EU’s policy towards East Asia. Engagement by the EU with East Asia is multi-level (particularly of the EU institutions and the member states) and multi-faceted with political, economic, social, governance and security/conflict management dimensions. The EU is also sometimes perceived in East Asia as a ‘western threat’, which exploits globalization for

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its own interest. The 2006 Trade strategy Global Europe is a case in point, criticized for having an imperial ring to it.50 The emphasis on regionalism and the projection, both consciously and unconsciously of the EU as a model for regional integration is potentially counter-productive. The EU’s lack of coherence in East Asia does not make it a role model; nor is the institutional approach to regional integration likely to be popular in East Asia, where a more open, network based approach is employed to intra-regional cooperation. Indeed some recognition is needed that regionalism can evolve even in the absence of cooperation - it can be built initially on the increased awareness of interdependence. The real prerequisite for a sustained functionalist integration process is conflict transformation and resolution in East Asia. On this front, the Sino-Japanese relationship is the central issue to be addressed before Asian regionalism can be seriously considered. Researchers claim the current prospect for transformation in this relationship is very bleak. Recommendations Any promotion of regionalism ought to be aimed at creating to conditions conducive to functional cooperation between Asian states. The emphasis should be on regulatory cooperation and promotion of a common market and customs union. The normative promotion of regionalism is ineffective due to the lack of shared values throughout Asia. There are therefore clear obstacles to East Asian political integration, and to push EU expectations in this area reinforces the impression that Europeans are out-of-touch with Asian realities.

d. Re-evaluate ASEM The potential benefits of ASEM are clear: an opportunity for Europe to plug into the East Asian Economic miracle; an opportunity for East Asia to reduce economic dependence on the US and Japan; and the ability both regions to cooperate, potentially creating a counter-weight to the US in international affairs. 51 In addition to these realist objectives, ASEM also provides an important forum for political dialogue on a wide range of issues. It is through this process that greater mutual respect and understanding between all parties involved in ASEM can evolve and thus lead to greater cooperation in a number of key areas. Due to the vast diversity within Asia and the differing agenda of Asian and European states, ASEM also provides a forum in which the EU and its member states can identify key partners for specific issues rather than attempting to work with all ASEM members in areas that are of low strategic interest – what one European Commission official has referred to this as ‘mini-lateralism’. But research suggests that there is a perception that ASEM is under-delivering and interviews with Commission

50

European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, GLOBAL EUROPE: COMPETING IN THE WORLD: A Contribution to the EU's Growth and Jobs Strategy, Brussels, 4.10.2006 COM(2006) 567 final 51 Christopher Dent, ‘ASEM and the ‘Cinderella Complex’ of EU-East Asia Economic relations’, Pacific Affairs, Spring 2001, p.34-35.

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representatives revealed a wide range of opinions regarding ASEM, from enthusiastic support to extreme scepticism. Recommendations As an inter-regional meeting, there is, implicit within this process, the symbolic promotion of regionalism which, according to interview data, has raised European expectations regarding East Asian regionalism. The objectives of ASEM should perhaps be more clearly established, in order to limit and manage such expectations. Concrete steps to facilitate this could include the establishment of an Asia-Europe adaptation and familiarization process, including training of diplomats and other negotiators in both the EU and Asia, including the newest members of ASEM (India, Pakistan and Mongolia); the establishment of an ASEM Secretariat; and the promotion of the biannual ASEM gathering as an opportunity to pursue multiple bilateral interregional negotiations between Europe and Asia.

e. Educational and Research Cooperation Most of the research conducted within this project pointed to insufficient expertise on Asia in Europe at both a national and EU level. In order for EU-East Asia relations to flourish in the years to come, it is important to ensure that this is a greater two-way exchange of students and researchers in Europe and Asia. This should be done at both the multilateral and bilateral level, between institutions, governments, research institutions and at the researcher level. Recommendations Appoint an education officer to EU Delegations throughout Asia to coordinate, develop and promote educational opportunities and exchanges. Seek to draw on Asian regional expertise from Australia and the USA, as well as some member states to develop training programs for EU negotiators and diplomats. Actively promote and expand the consortium exchange programs52 that link together European and Asian universities, and strategically commission research through research centres throughout the Asia Pacific region to look at specific aspects of EU-East Asia relations.

Conclusion: Addressing the capabilities-expectations gap in EU-Asia relation The European Commission’s 2001 Asia Strategy set out six objectives by which to strengthen ‘the EU political and economic presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU.’53 This has been only partially achieved. Many of the findings resulting from this research attribute this failure, in general terms, to a ‘capability-expectation gap’ in EU–East Asia relations. The 52

“Coursework Masters Exchange Program in International Relations: A European-Australian Asia-Pacific Nexus (EAAPN)” coordinated by the University of Melbourne and Institute of Political Science (Sciences Po), Paris. It is jointly funded by the European Commission and Australian government 53 Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships, p. 3.

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above recommendations aim to address this gap, by encouraging the strategic allocation of resources to promote a greater understanding between the two regions. Although one could argue that there is coherence in EU-Asia relations within the area of trade, the failure to promote itself in a coherent way beyond this is limiting the relationship’s potential. In many regards the EU has a tendency to promote an image of what it wants to do without ensuring that it has the appropriate instruments and/or capability to ensure that it is able to deliver. The degree to which the EU’s member states are politically willing to actively support and provide the necessary resources to ensure that the EU is able to deliver on its stated objectives is vital. Issues relating to coherence, effectiveness and recognition remain pressing challenges for the European Union.

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