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CIN0010.1177/0920203X16672167China InformationYuan et al.

Article

Zhenjie Yuan

University of Melbourne, Australia

INFORMATION

Confucius Institutes and the limitations of China’s global cultural network

china

China Information 2016, Vol. 30(3) 334–356 © The Author(s) 2016 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0920203X16672167 cin.sagepub.com

Junwanguo Guo

South China Normal University, China

Hong Zhu

South China Normal University, China

Abstract The majority of Anglophone literature tends to portray Confucius Institutes as playing a successful role serving China’s interests in its foreign collaborations. So far, the threat of this institution has been largely stereotyped and even taken for granted. Few scholars question the influence and capacity of the institution on both global and local scales. Relying on cartograms, correlation and national image analyses as well as qualitative studies, this article examines the influence of Confucius Institutes as the institution globalized and localized. This article reports three main findings: (1) the geopolitical influence of Confucius Institutes is uneven in different regions and they are engaged in an ongoing process of geopolitical construction; (2) analyses of correlation with China’s national image show that not only does the influence of the institution vary in regions but also that the project could have a negative impact on bilateral cooperation, suggesting that, contrary to popular thinking, Confucius Institutes have not had a positive impact on China’s global interests; and (3) the capacity of the institutes in everyday operations is systematically limited, reflecting China’s inexperience in managing this global cultural network. Confucius Institutes are generous in making economic concessions but are hesitant during political negotiations, which can be said to mirror China’s patchy performance in economic and political reform.

Corresponding author: Hong Zhu, Center for Social and Cultural Geography, South China Normal University, Room 802, Administration Building, Tianhe District, Guangzhou 510631, China. Email: [email protected]

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Keywords Confucius Institutes, geopolitics, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, foreign policy, soft power Over a decade ago, China launched the Confucius Institute project in an effort to promote Chinese language and culture at an international level. In his oft-cited article, James F. Paradise argues that these institutions can be likened to a Trojan Horse, pointing out that the global network of Confucius Institutes operates just like a ‘giant wooden horse’, carrying out China’s questionable practices of introducing the communist dictatorship’s propaganda in the territories in which they are located.1 Likewise, this project has been labelled as ‘academic malware’2 and thought to engage in ‘cultural crusades’.3 Admittedly, the dominant Anglophone literature tends to view Confucius Institutes as a risk, emphasizing their potential threat to cultural and ideological structures in host societies.4 In this regard, Confucius Institutes, by and large, have been considered to be cultural invaders with ulterior motives, reflecting China’s nuanced strategies for securing its economic and political interests globally. A few researchers have, however, pointed to an overemphasis of the ‘China threat’ and they have begun to explore the actual influence of this project. Robert Albro’s study on the influence of Confucius Institutes in America points out that a governmentsponsored international cultural programme such as Confucius Institutes is likely to exacerbate public debate rather than cultivate positive international relations.5 Falk Hartig compares the joint venture structure of Confucius Institutes in Germany and Australia, arguing that these institutes are indeed a tool of Chinese public diplomacy, but not crude propaganda.6 Responding to criticisms towards this project, Edward McCord pointedly argues that there is little evidence of Confucius Institutes threatening academic freedom on American campuses.7 Moreover, Amy Stambach points to the marginal and powerless standing of Chinese teachers in the American context, particularly in terms of the Confucius Institute’s administrative power structure and funding systems.8 In this sense, the image of an authoritarian Chinese government should not be uncritically imposed onto the Confucius Institute and its branches. The studies cited indicate that the actual influence and capability of the institution remain understudied.9 We contend that further investigation should be made before defining Confucius Institutes as a legitimate threat. Leaning on Hartig’s studies carried out in Germany and Australia, this article presents the actual activities of Confucius Institutes in Canada, America, Eastern Europe and Africa, examining how the joint venture model is realized in various social contexts. Furthermore, unlike Hartig’s studies which focus on the discourses of international partners, this article attempts to present the voices of Chinese staff involved in the project. In addition, in line with Stambach’s anthropological study, which mainly focuses on the political ecologies of China’s foreign partners, this study re-examines the implementations of Confucius Institutes. Here, we will consider the actual joint venture structure and, more importantly, the management tactics employed by the Confucius Institute Headquarters (孔子学院总部/国家汉办, hereafter Hanban).

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Specifically, this article attempts to examine the influence and capability of this project through processes of globalization and localization. The globalization of the Confucius Institute is marked by quantitative fluctuations and an uneven pattern of spatial distribution. Although much attention has been paid to the sociopolitical impact of Confucius Institutes, most of the research (mainly in fields such as international relations and diplomatic studies) is technically deficient in the mapping of the actual geopolitical structure of the institutions worldwide. This article introduces a geographic information system, a computer system for geographical analysis, as a way of mapping the historical geography and geopolitical influence of the Confucius Institute in various regions. Localization can be viewed as the ongoing process whereby the institutes adapt to the particularities of local cultural, financial and political structures. The processes of globalization and localization are mutually reinforcing. Globalization produces demands and challenges for China through locally embedded institutions, while localization directly affects the performance and sustainability of globalization of Confucius Institutes. We further argue that only by combining the continuous and inseparable processes of globalization and localization can the entire ecology of the institutes be delineated and examined. Until now no research has approached this project by focusing on this dynamic. This article raises an important question: to what extent do Confucius Institutes serve China’s global interests? Two subquestions emerge concerning globalization and localization: how much influence have Confucius Institutes acquired on a global scale and does the globalization of Confucius Institutes parallel China’s foreign policies?; and how much administrative, fiscal and personnel management power do Confucius Institutes have in local negotiations? To answer the first subquestion, we will map the globalization of Confucius Institutes through cartograms. We will then compare the chronological growth of the institutes with changes in China’s foreign economic and political policies. Specifically, we examine the correlations between the globalization of Confucius Institutes and China’s economic performances in different regions of the world, aiming to further assess the influence of the institutions on China’s foreign interests. Public opinion about China on a global scale from 2005 to 2015 will also be discussed to provide supplementary evidence to examine the interrelationships between the globalization of Confucius Institutes and China’s agenda concerning its national image. The second subquestion will be addressed through an analysis of the localization of selected Confucius Institutes. We carried out qualitative studies on four Confucius Institutes each in Canada, America, Eastern Europe and Africa,10 in both developed and developing societies. Through these studies, we examined the actual negotiations embedded in the institutions’ adaptations to different social contexts. We first provide a brief literature review on the existing scholarship regarding Confucius Institutes, arguing that further study is necessary for a more nuanced picture of the power negotiations of and within the institutions in the context of globalization and localization. The empirical studies comprise two sections: mapping the globalization of Confucius Institutes and examining the localization of selected institutes. In doing so, we attempt to contribute to the understanding of the influence and power ecology of the Confucius Institute project on both global and local scales.

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Development, criticism and reflection of the influence and capability of Confucius Institutes Over the last decade, the Confucius Institute has shown remarkable success on paper. As of 2015, it has cooperated with local universities and colleges in 133 countries and regions, and operated 491 institutes around the world.11 The Hanban, which officially comes under the Ministry of Education and maintains a close relationship with the United Front Work Department of CPC Central Committee (中共中央统一战线工作部), is committed to providing updated teaching resources and backup services to all branches. The substantial capabilities and significant influence of this project under the supervision of the Hanban have been largely stereotyped. The rapid proliferation of the institutes is paralleled by increasing criticism from China watchers. Unsurprisingly, the criticisms largely centre on Confucius Institutes as proactive agents of the Chinese government, exporting politically correct views about China, facilitating economic expansion, cultivating a benign national image, and thus extending China’s influence globally. First of all, the institutions have been seen as a political apparatus of the Chinese government for the purposes of exporting positive views on authoritarianism and dictatorship.12 Echoing Anne-Marie Brady, Elizabeth Redden argues that the Chinese government believes the folk theories that those who learn Chinese language and culture will develop positive feelings towards China.13 Randolph Kluver states that the threat of this project is more than just propaganda: it is actually a distinctive geopolitical network that has been constructed by the global distribution of ‘Confucian nodes’ wherever Chinese authority has inserted itself.14 In doing so, China is capable of exercising geopolitical power and playing a pivotal role in conversations in foreign countries. Similarly, Don Starr states that the major contention surrounding the Confucius Institute concerns its ‘improper’ influence on teaching and research as well as on industrial and military espionage, which empowers the Chinese global network of surveillance.15 Another aspect is the economic incentives behind the expansion of Confucius Institutes. Brady points out that the very distinction between the Confucius Institute and other equivalent institutes is its strategy of cooperating with universities, which potentially introduces practices of Chinese authority and discrimination to universities, where academic freedom is highly valued.16 The decent subsidies provided by the Chinese government have attracted the attention of universities, especially those experiencing fiscal constraints.17 As Park Jae notes, ‘greed met need’.18 There is a potential risk of concessions on issues such as academic freedom and independence which universities require to acquire the resources they need, especially in an era of declining state funds and growing calls for the marketization of university education in many countries. Admittedly, whether through the media or academic discourse, this project has largely been portrayed as a successful and powerful agent in the service of China’s political and economic interests.19 However, existing scholarship on Confucius Institutes is characterized by two weaknesses. On the one hand, given the stereotype of the ‘cultural thrust’ of Confucius Institutes, many scholars have been quick to overemphasize the institutions’ potential threat and overlook their actual capabilities. On the other hand, few studies have been able to collect first-hand data to examine the actual operation of the institutes. Moreover, the second-hand data now pervasively used by researchers seem incomplete

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and technically incapable of reflecting the actual influence exerted by the institutions in different local contexts. As Anita Wheeler argues, the uncertainty of this project is highly contextualized within negotiations and concessions between the different actors with varying interests,20 requiring further studies through both macro and micro lenses to obtain a nuanced analysis of the capability of Confucius Institutes. There is a constellation of studies which has re-examined the influence and capability of Confucius Institutes through globalization and localization, and findings indicate that their influence is limited, uneven and uncertain.21 Jennifer Hubbert examines the idea of the Chinese state as represented in the classrooms of the institutions in America, stating that Chinese teachers think independently and even move away from the guidelines provided by the Chinese state when they teach abroad.22 Likewise, Peter Schmidt finds that the American directors of Confucius Institutes encourage their Chinese staff to think independently.23 Stambach probes the political ecology of three American Confucius Institutes in an anthropological approach, contending that although portrayed as being in crisis in some cases, Confucius Institutes have been used by host universities to attract extra funding and demonstrate internationalism and multiculturalism. His findings reveal mutual dependencies as well as subtle micropolitics within the project. Hartig has compared the actual practices of the joint venture structure of Confucius Institutes in Germany and Australia. He has observed that the global Confucius Institute network, by and large, is well organized and promotes internal competition, which he contends shows the ‘smartness’ of the Hanban.24 International partners tend to think that the joint venture structure puts them in an inferior position. This is because the Chinese side often gains more benefits than its foreign partners, particularly in terms of funding and quality of teachers. However, Hartig admits that there are weaknesses to his study, namely because he limits his focus to the institutions in two developed countries and largely presents the viewpoints of international partners. Hartig leaves one question unanswered: why do international partners on a global scale continue to run Confucius Institutes even if they are in an inferior position? Future studies should further elaborate the political ecology of Confucius Institutes in different social contexts. By examining the influence and capability of Confucius Institutes, this study aims to synergize both the macro and micro perspectives to present a more complete picture of the power ecology of Confucius Institutes in the face of ongoing globalization and localization. In this article, we attempt to investigate the influence and capability of Confucius Institutes by mapping their chronological expansion and, more subtly, by examining the localization politics of selected institutes.

Rethinking the influence and capability of Confucius Institutes The influence of Confucius Institutes through globalization Current research tends to see the globalization of Confucius Institutes as based on homogenous processes and consequences, largely ignoring the heterogeneous dynamics of Confucius Institutes in different geographical areas. This article utilizes a geographic information system to map the uneven geopolitical influence of Confucius Institutes on

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Figure 1. Growth of the total number of Confucius Institutes.

Source: 孔子学院年度发展报告 2006–2015 (Annual reports of Confucius Institutes 2006–2015), http:// www.hanban.edu.cn/report/, accessed 11 November 2015.

different continents. Furthermore, this article also examines the correlation between the globalization of Confucius Institutes and China’s foreign economic and political performance in recent years. As supplementary evidence, this article introduces public opinion polls about China to evaluate how China’s national image has changed since the establishment of Confucius Institutes. The polls were conducted as part of the Pew Global Attitudes Project from 2005 to 2015 in various continents in which Confucius Institutes were located. Combining the aforementioned analyses, this study examines the uneven geopolitical influence of Confucius Institutes on a global scale and, moreover, the extent to which Confucius Institutes’ globalization parallels the changes in China’s foreign policies in various regions. Reviewing the chronological growth of the number of Confucius Institutes (Figure 1), we see a rapid growth from 2004 to 2007, followed by a stable high growth rate until 2013. However, the pace has slowed down since 2013. We selected the years 2007, 2010 and 2014 to examine the growth in the global network of Confucius Institutes. The cartograms presented in Figure 2 depict the history and geographical distribution of all Confucius Institute branches. These cartograms resize territory according to the proportion of the institute in each country, reflecting changes in the global geopolitics of Confucius Institutes. The cartograms reveal three main trends. First, the scale of institutes is steadily increasing, showing that the ‘Confucius Institutes club’ has attracted more countries into joining the network. In this regard, this project has succeeded considerably in cultivating its global network. Reflecting China’s global economic structure, in 2014 mainland China’s top 10 core trading partners occupied 67.43 per cent of the total area of the cartogram,25 indicating that the globalization of Confucius Institutes parallels China’s economic interests. Furthermore, judging from the deepening colours and expanding territories, North America and Europe are clearly key target areas. Although North America shows significant growth, the expansion in Europe is faster because of increasingly more branches in Eastern Europe over the last five years. As the cartograms show, Europe and America are areas of distinct growth of Confucius Institutes, indicating China’s greater inclination towards these two regions. As Baohui Zhang argues, despite stereotypes and misunderstandings characterizing Sino-US

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Figure 2. The globalization of Confucius Institutes, 2007, 2010 and 2014.

Source: 孔子学院年度发展报告 2006–2015 (Annual reports of Confucius Institutes 2006–2015), http:// www.hanban.edu.cn/report/, accessed 11 November 2015.

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relations, China shows an increasing interest in pursuing comprehensive cooperation with the United States.26 Likewise, China and the European Union have become more interdependent in terms of economic, cultural and security issues; this is especially true in the era of world economic recessions.27 Third, Confucius Institutes underwent extensive expansion in Oceania and East, South East and Central Asia before 2010, but this growth has slowed down in the last five years. One popular explanation lies in China’s recent African and South American turn in its diplomatic strategies. Indeed, the cartograms show that the coastal countries of Africa and South America are regions where Confucius Institutes have proliferated and grown in influence in recent years. The globalization of Confucius Institutes reflects the rising influence of China in reshaping the regional order. Since the foundation of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and The Shanghai Cooperation Organization under Hu Jintao, China has made significant efforts to facilitate cooperation with neighbouring countries. The boom in Confucius Institutes in Asia is a reflection of Hu’s ‘good-neighbour and friend’ policy. However, China’s ambitions seem to be compromised by the increasing conflicts in the South and East China Seas. The recent decline in the geopolitical influence of Confucius Institutes in Asia seems to mirror the increasing risk of political conflicts in this region. The growing number of the institutes in Africa and South America is evidence of China’s expanding interests in these regions. When Xi Jinping came into power in 2013, China tended to strengthen its cooperation with other developing countries, especially those in Africa and South America. As the cartograms (Figure 2) show, the growth of Confucius Institutes in different regions is clearly chronological: Europe and North America are areas where the geopolitics of the institutions shows constant growth. Asia and Oceania are continents in which Confucius Institutes show major influence, although there has been a slight decrease in recent years. Growth in the geopolitical influence of Confucius Institutes in Africa and South America has been rapid. Although the cartograms fail to prove the argument that Confucius Institutes are a proactive vehicle of China’s foreign economic and political interest, they demonstrate that this project is the product and consequence of China’s diplomatic strategies. We suggest that the geopolitics of Confucius Institutes is not only uneven and uncertain globally, but also dynamic. Along with a geographic information system analysis, this article looks at the extent to which Confucius Institutes may contribute to the China’s foreign economic and political interests. Specifically, we examine the correlations between the globalization of Confucius Institutes and China’s foreign economic and political performances between 2004 and 2014. Although it has been widely assumed that the institutes serve as a proactive vehicle to promote China’s foreign strategies in the economic and political realm, only a few studies have shown these correlations. Donald Lien et al. selected foreign direct investment, trade, geographical distance, population and gross domestic product to analyse the impact of Confucius Institutes on foreign regions, contending that the financial performance of host countries can benefit from this project.28 Specifically, Confucius Institutes show a significant positive correlation with China’s exports and its foreign direct investment in developing countries. This supports the argument that Confucius Institutes, especially the branches located in developing countries, have a positive economic impact on their host societies.

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Table 1. Pearson correlations between Confucius Institutes and China’s foreign cooperative performance in different continents.

Asia Africa Europe South America North America Oceania

TEV

OFDI

FCP

TIV

.922**

.930**

.928**

.929**

IFDI .911**

.985**

.666*

.972**

.945**

.960** .954** .952** .983**

.869** .544 .877** .941**

.977** .916** .669* .944**

.894** .970** .943** .951**

.614 .668* –.181 –.279 .346

IT .903** .965** .650* .950** .892** .949**

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Notes: TEV = total export value; OFDI = outward foreign direct investment; FCP = foreign contract projects; TIV = total import value; IFDI = inward foreign direct investment; IT = inbound tourists) Source: 中国统计年检 2004–2014 (China statistical yearbooks 2004–2014), 中华人民共和国国家统计局 (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/, accessed 29 March 2016.

Building on Lien et al.’s studies, this article extends the analytical dimensions to six factors, including outward foreign direct investment, total export value, total import value, gross volume of foreign contract projects, inward foreign direct investment and number of inbound tourists. Unlike Lien et al., who mainly focused on the influence of Confucius Institutes on China’s outward economic strategies, this article employs market and supply dynamics to examine the correlations between Confucius Institutes and China’s inward and outward economic performance. The total export value, outward foreign direct investments and foreign contract projects represent China’s interest on the market side, and the other three factors indicate the supply dynamics. In addition to the other five conventional economic factors, the inbound tourists index was selected because ‘strengthening cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other countries’ is a general principle of the Constitution and By-Laws of Confucius Institutes (孔子学院章程). The inbound tourists index is a reliable factor for measuring the popularity of China among its counterparts and the extent to which Confucius Institutes have formed bilateral relations between China and its partners. Because the first Confucius Institute was founded in 2004, the data ranging from 2004 to 2014 were collected from the China statistical yearbooks and were used for correlational analyses (see Table 1). The data covering the years 2000–3 will also be introduced as reference for comparing China’s economic performance in the years before the inception of this project. The results shown in Table 1 indicate that the development of Confucius Institutes correlates significantly and positively with China’s total export value, total import value, outward foreign direct investment, foreign contract projects and inbound tourists in all continents. Interestingly, the correlation coefficients vary significantly for China’s inward foreign direct investment: a significant positive correlation is found for Asia, a relatively weak positive correlation for Africa, Europe and Oceania, and a relatively weak negative correlation for South America and North America. The analysis indicates that the development of Confucius Institutes in South America, North America and

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Oceania did not effectively help China in attracting inward foreign direct investment from these regions. More specifically, the development of Confucius Institutes in North America shows relatively weak positive correlations with China’s interest in foreign contract projects. This implies that, with regard to the exportation of China’s cooperative projects, the institutes in America are less powerful than those in other continents. Africa and South America, two continents that have witnessed a sharp rise in the geopolitics of Confucius Institutes in recent years, present relatively weak positive correlations for outward foreign direct investment compared to other continents. In this sense, the empirical data show that the development of Confucius Institutes in Africa and South America does not result in stimulating China’s direct investment in these regions. Furthermore, we find that Confucius Institutes show significantly positive correlations with China’s outward economic performances in terms of market dynamics. Conversely, variables on the supply side, such as the inward foreign direct investment, in particular, vary between the different continents. By comparing the average annual growth rate of each variable in the years before and after the Confucius Institute project, we find that, though upward trends can be seen in most selected economic variables in the years 2000 through 2013, the average annual growth rate where selected variables are concerned was, in most cases, weaker between 2004 and 2013 than between 2000 and 2004. The slowing pace of China’s foreign economic interaction is evident, leading us to conclude that this project is limited in its ability to spur greater foreign economic interaction. To summarize, it is worth noting that the argument that Confucius Institutes serve as a vehicle for China’s foreign cooperation policy should not be fully or uncritically accepted. The uncertain and distinctive influence that this project generated in various regions in different periods requires an examination of the institutes in specific contexts. For an indication of changes in China’s international image after the setting up of Confucius Institutes outside China, we looked at the results of the Pew Research Center’s cross-national polls ‘Opinion of China’ conducted from 2005 to 2015. As a supplementary indicator besides the aforementioned economic variables, the data from the crossnational polls provide compelling evidence of how China’s national image has changed in this period. By looking at the data, we can determine whether Confucius Institutes around the world have helped create a positive impression of China. With the exception of Africa and Oceania, opinions about China have largely deteriorated in the past decade. A lower opinion of China is especially pronounced in Asia, Europe and North America. The corresponding figures for the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Spain in 2005 were respectively 35 per cent, 16 per cent, 37 per cent, 42 per cent and 21 per cent. However, in 2015 the figures jumped to 54 per cent, 37 per cent, 60 per cent, 49 per cent and 50 per cent. In terms of national image, we find that, in most continents, opinions about China have taken a dive, an outcome which is contrary not only to the primary aims of Confucius Institutes but also to the dominant argument that these institutes have contributed to China’s rise. While Confucius Institutes have been increasingly established on a global scale, China has largely failed to promote its benevolent image. Taking the foregoing analyses into consideration, we contend that the globalization of Confucius Institutes generally reflects China’s foreign economic and political interests. The general significant positive correlations correspond to the extending areas of influence in various regions as depicted in the cartograms. Furthermore, we have not only

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Table 2. Unfavourable opinion of China in different continents, 2005–2015. Year

Asia

Africa

Europe

South America

North America

Oceania

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

23.8 32.0 33.1 38.7 38.4 36.4 33.4 37.0 39.2 38.7 39.2

– 32.0 17.1 29.3 31.0 22.7 30.0 28.5 22.9 22.6 15.4

31.5 32.8 43.9 52.3 45.7 46.3 41.5 49.1 48.1 49.4 43.6

– – 25.0 31.0 24.0 31.0 37.0 39.0 22.8 30.1 28.4

31.0 29.0 39.0 40.0 39.0 33.5 41.0 38.0 43.3 46.5 45.3

– – – 40.0 – – – – 35.0 – 33.0

Source: Pew Research Center, Opinion of China, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/survey/9/ response/Unfavorable/, accessed 28 June 2016. Cross-national surveys on ‘Opinion of China’ have been conducted yearly since 2005 in 59 countries. The surveys were conducted in developing as well as developed countries in which Confucius Institutes are located. This project is one of the world’s best-known polls on China’s image. The surveys posed the question: ‘Please tell me if you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable or very unfavourable opinion of China’. The label ‘unfavourable’ combines ‘somewhat unfavourable’ and ‘very unfavourable’. The data shown in this table comprise the average value based on the percentage of respondents in the same continent in a certain year who chose ‘unfavourable’.

been witnessing a decline of the geopolitical influence of Confucius Institutes in some regions in recent years, but there are also relatively weak positive or even negative correlations between the development of Confucius Institutes and China’s inward and outward economic collaboration. This indicates that Confucius Institutes are probably not a successful vehicle for generating more foreign economic and political interests for China. Table 2 shows how China’s national image has deteriorated in different continents. As a state-owned international cultural project, the globalization of Confucius Institutes is highly embedded in – and limited and influenced by – a broader context of bilateral cooperation. Confucius Institutes indeed constitute a complementary sector which projects a limited positive and, in some cases, negative influence on various aspects of China’s global interests.

Rethinking the dilemma of Confucius Institutes in shaping local operations In an oft-cited publication, Hartig contended that ‘despite this impressive number, Confucius Institutes are surprisingly understudied, especially in terms of their actual structure, operation mode and activities’.29 We now focus on empirical data which throw light on the joint venture structure of Confucius Institutes in specific contexts. Based on the analytical framework drawn up by Hartig and Stambach, this article highlights three main aspects of the local institutional ecology: administrative structure, fiscal allocation and educator arrangement. We argue that the capacity of Confucius Institutes to spread China’s soft power on a global scale is uncertain and systematically limited. Contrary to

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Hartig’s contention of the smartness of Confucius Institutes, our qualitative study shows China’s inexperience with the setting up of global cultural institutions. We conducted qualitative case studies in four Confucius Institute branches in Canada, America, Eastern Europe and Africa. This study also examines the attitudes and practices of a university in China which provided direct support to these four branches. It is worth noting that though the number of case studies is small, the four selected Confucius Institutes reflect different collaborative models and conditions of the joint venture structure. The cases involved interuniversity cooperation between university and university, as well as university and local government; teachers in each branch were dispatched by the Hanban and recruited from local society. The enrolment of each branch ranged between 200 and 500, and these branches are located in different regions of the world. We carried out semi-structured interviews with Chinese directors and teachers in the four branches using online instant messaging software over the period of July to September 2015. Most interviews lasted one to two hours; they were recorded and subsequently transcribed. We focused on the following questions: How do Confucius Institutes adapt to the local context? What are the roles of Confucius Institutes in terms of local cooperation and negotiation? To what extent do Confucius Institutes further the globalization of China’s soft power? Additionally, second-hand data were collected from the four branches and their respective host university, including archival documents such as regulations and working guidelines, annual reports and plans, reviews of activities, textbooks, curricula, student reports and visual materials such as photos and videos.

Administrative system Hartig provides a nuanced picture of Confucius Institutes in Germany and Australia. He found that although directors share responsibilities, foreign directors generally faced more pressure in everyday operations because there was no clear specification of duties. We observed that in the absence of clear directives from the Hanban spelling out the responsibilities of directors, there were obvious political hierarchies within the administrative system. Foreign directors of Confucius Institutes were generally proactive within the administrative system owing to their better familiarity with and understanding of local laws and social networks. Conversely, the position of Chinese directors was almost always powerless and passive. Each selected Confucius Institute had a council that regulated its day-to-day operations. In the four institutes under study, all the directors were local and the vice directors were from mainland China. The council of each institute held annual meetings to make decisions on key issues, including the size and number of classes, the revision and selection of textbooks, the setting of budgets, and the presentation of year-end figures and financial reports. In this regard, the power structure of the council substantially confirmed the power relations between China and its partners. Although the council comprises the same number of domestic and Chinese representatives from both sides, the power structure of Confucius Institutes varies in different contexts. For the institution in Eastern Europe, the collaboration between both sides was smooth, reflecting the relatively equal positions of both parties. One of the interviewees explained how their administrative system worked:

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The Hanban is just over there; all actual practices are conducted by the two universities. The major issues are decided by the council. Frankly, our local society has a long positive relationship with China; both government and the local people support the Confucius Institute project. In my case, I can’t tell which party is more powerful.30

Our African respondents characterized the daily management of the institute as cooperative. The Chinese party mainly focused on the educational aspects, allowing the foreign party to make decisions on broader issues. Evidently, there was a clear line of duty in the African case. The asymmetric joint venture structure was highlighted by the same interviewee: We independently regulate different parts in everyday operations. Though the right to speak and the power of making decisions concern different fields … the idea of equal positions and the principle of reciprocity [are reflected].31

For the selected Confucius Institute in America, the a priori power of the American officials was highly emphasized. The hierarchy between the American director and the Chinese vice director was clear. One of the teachers contended: We tend to address the Chinese vice director respectfully as ‘director’ to portray the idea that the Chinese vice director occupies the same [position] as the foreign director. However, this is just a part of the culture of ‘face’ in China. The reality is [that] the foreign party obviously posits themselves in the leading position.32

According to Stambach’s research, the phenomenon of saving face indeed exists and even characterizes the general picture of internal politics in American Confucius Institutes. Based on the empirical data on the operational structure of the councils, we found that the administrative systems of the institutes were highly flexible and locally based. Due to the absence of a clear distribution of administrative power between Chinese and foreign partners, a certain hierarchy was adopted in everyday operations. The inferior and limited power of Chinese directors as related by the Chinese informants indicates that the capacity of the institutes was contextualized, constrained and uncertain.

Fiscal system Hartig’s study also paid close attention to the sources of funding in German and Australian institutes. In our study, we looked at the ways in which the funding was used and distributed in selected institutes. Michael Kahn-Ackermann, senior consultant for the Confucius Institute and the former Director of the Goethe-Institut in Beijing, outlined the difference between the Confucius Institute and the Goethe-Institut. He contended that the GoetheInstitut is a German institute in a foreign country while Confucius Institutes are localized institutes. In this sense, Confucius Institutes have to obey the laws in the society where they are based and they must utilize the financial system in their locality, a situation which leads to complex processes of negotiation and compromise.

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By adapting to local fiscal systems, Confucius Institutes submit to China’s foreign partners rather than to China. But according to the Regulations for the Administration of Confucius Institutes Headquarters Funds (孔子学院总部资金管理办法), both parties should share the financial budget of newly established institutes equally. The Hanban provides an annual subsidy according to the annual plan drawn up by the council of each branch. Chinese representatives should feel confident in carrying out pivotal roles in the daily fiscal management. However, in our observations, the foreign parties had control of budgeting and auditing, which to a large extent determined the asymmetric power structure within the institutions. A Chinese director of a Confucius Institute declared that the foreign party has the final say on the money issues. The rights of applying for the subsidy and claiming reimbursement totally belong to the foreign partner. The only thing we can do is adapt to the local financial system.33

The contention of the interviewee resonates with Stambach’s argument that ‘American faculty and staff want to use the Hanban money in their way’. In this sense, foreign parties occupy proactive roles in everyday operations by controlling the allocation of funding. Moreover, the Hanban’s regulations and supervision on money usage are loose. Hao Ping, the Deputy Minister of Education of China, emphasized his concerns over the reckless fiscal management of Confucius Institutes in a public speech in 2010. He noted that all branches must improve their efficiency in the use of funds by establishing a more comprehensive performance measurement system and financial auditing system. He also called for regular audits by a third party from the locality where a particular Confucius Institute is situated.34 This is in sharp contrast to Hartig’s statement that the Hanban only gives ‘a little bit of funding’ to foreign partners.35 One interviewee from the host university disclosed: Generally speaking, if the foreign partner sets up an annual budget of between US$100,000 to US$200,000, it is very easy to get full support from the Hanban … The audit will be carried out by the local university. The Hanban just carries out random inspections.36

In the literature, Confucius Institutes have been attributed with proactive and powerful roles because of China’s enormous fiscal investment. However, such economic investment does not yield corresponding power in the everyday operation of the institutions. Furthermore, foreign universities are users, managers and inspectors of the funds. In reality, the Hanban’s decentralization of fiscal power profoundly limits the power of Chinese parties in Confucius Institutes. This unusual concession constrains the agencies of the Hanban and is responsible for the limited capability of Confucius Institutes in their everyday operations.

Personnel system Chinese teachers and directors are frequently depicted as proactive disseminators of Chinese political ideology and propaganda. However, as ‘middlemen’ between China

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and local host societies, Chinese teachers encounter complex dilemmas. Even though university teachers are arguably the most appropriate candidates for these positions, in recent years the Hanban has tended to recruit teachers from outside the university system. According to one source from a Chinese university, this is because of the declining enthusiasm of university teachers for the project. Unlike teachers serving in domestic projects such as ‘Aid Tibet’ and ‘Aid Xinjiang’, Confucius Institutes teachers receive no extra financial subsidies or political capital for promotion within the cadre hierarchy. The change in recruitment policy not only reflects the declining attraction of Confucius Institutes among China’s university teachers but also poses a potential dearth of qualified teachers in the near future. One interviewee from a Chinese university states that ‘the Hanban dispatches teachers recruited from society to our Confucius Institutes. We are now forced to manage those who are not in our university system.’37 Moreover, teachers sent by the Hanban do not fully meet the developmental needs of Confucius Institutes. Hence, recruiting local overseas Chinese as volunteers has been a popular solution to sustain the expansion of the institutes. In the selected Confucius Institute in Canada, overseas Chinese from local communities have been the main source for Chinese language instruction. The only two Chinese teachers trained by the Hanban were there to supervise these volunteers. However, unlike the official Confucius Institute teachers equipped with professional language teaching skills, the teaching skills of volunteers vary considerably. This introduces a high level of uncertainty to this project. In the absence of a supervisory organization for ensuring the quality of teaching, the teaching activities of the volunteers, teachers or even directors cannot be fully monitored and assessed. Furthermore, the Chinese director of the selected institution in America raised his concerns over the uneven quality (素质) of the Chinese directors of Confucius Institutes. Contrary to the argument that Confucius Institutes inculcate Chinese notions of authority and dictatorship in foreign students, this director gave a different picture, which is that some Chinese directors are likely to emphasize and even exaggerate the negative aspects of China, criticizing the Chinese Communist Party’s authority, environmental pollution and so on. They never tell the world about the positive aspects of China. I don’t think this is so-called critical thinking.38

While overseeing a proliferation of Confucius Institutes, the Hanban seems reluctant to call itself an ‘efficient supervisor’. The booming global network brings with it great challenges, uncertainty and even risk to the Hanban and the Chinese government in terms of personnel and educational management. The controversial personnel structure of Confucius Institutes limits the perpetuation of China’s soft power into local host societies.

The globalization and localization of Confucius Institutes: Do Confucius Institutes mirror and export China’s domestic dilemmas worldwide? Based on qualitative studies, we argue that the Hanban faces unprecedented challenges in managing such a large number of branches situated in various economic, cultural and political contexts. As one Chinese director of the selected institute in America told us:

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Actually, the Confucius Institutes Headquarters does not have a clear strategy. For China, Confucius Institutes are a new phenomenon. China never imagined what Confucius Institutes could become. The only clear aim for Confucius Institutes, as far as I know, is quantity.

In this vein, contrary to Hartig’s image of smartness, Confucius Institutes seem to be an experiment in Chinese foreign policy, demonstrating China’s tentative tactics on foreign issues and implying a certain kind of uncertainty. Based on empirical studies described in the above, we see how the Hanban’s decentralization and concessions resulting from localization strategies systematically affect the ability of Confucius Institutes to serve China’s interests in local contexts. In this sense, this project could be described as ‘high cost and low efficiency’.39 Of course questions could be raised as to why the Hanban made such concessions and what the driving forces were which led to the asymmetric power structure within this project. Based on our observations, we argue that Confucius Institutes employed inconsistent approaches to economic and political cooperation in different locales, which furthered economic collaboration but were conservative in political negotiations. Obviously, China is confident enough to offer financial support to the Confucius Institute project as a symbol of its economic achievements. Investing money in this project has been seen as a testimony of China’s ‘responsibility as a great nation’. One interviewee was of the opinion that the criticisms against the high financial cost of Confucius Institutes were unjustified, contending that compared to the whole of China’s gross domestic product, the Confucius Institute project just costs US$600 million a year. It is a rather small number! Moreover, no matter whether you are poor or rich, you need to do some good things. Even a poor man needs to present a positive image to the public.40

Likewise, financial support has become a way of coping with potential conflicts emerging from local host societies. When asked about managing discontent in the local regions, the Chinese director from the selected institution in Africa clearly pointed to their economic tactics: The Chinese party provides for not only Confucius Institutes but also local society, with the full support of financial, human and material resources, so they [local communities] will not feel unsatisfied.41

In contrast to its openness towards financial investment, Confucius Institutes are rather hesitant when it comes to political negotiations. An interviewee argued that although the Hanban provides financial support, the success of Confucius Institutes heavily relies on the extent to which the foreign parties support us. To put it frankly, setting up an institution in a foreign land is just like appealing for others’ help. We are begging for the collaboration of foreign parties and for them to not raise any conflict.42

All this echoes what Xu Lin, Director-General of Hanban and Chief Executive of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, said in a BBC interview when she was asked about her

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understanding of the political discrimination of Confucius Institutes towards Taiwanese issues and the Falun Gong. She confessed, ‘I feel a little scared. Your [foreign] media representatives always ask me these kinds of political questions.’43 Indeed, unlike their sophistication and confidence in the economic field, Chinese representatives become nervous and restless when pressed on political issues. In response to political conflicts that arise in day-to-day activities, the typical attitude is to ignore the problem or bear with it. The exercise of political power is highly constrained by the actual asymmetric power structure mentioned earlier, which partially induces conservativeness among Confucius Institutes when it comes to political matters. Almost all Chinese educators subscribe to a philosophy of ‘harmony as a priority’ and insist that they do not want to cause conflict. There is a strong sense of self-discipline and self-censorship apparent among the Chinese staff of Confucius Institutes. According to one member of the Confucius Institutes we studied, ‘Our responsibility is to popularize the Chinese language. The Confucius Institute is a cultural institution rather than a political agent. When there is conflict, we try to avoid it.’44 Confucius Institutes try to take more responsibility in economic collaboration and remain as modest as possible on political issues. Though China is capable of effecting a thorough reform of its market economy without political reform,45 the recent economic recession has presented great challenges to China’s political stability. China has begun to rethink political reform, but Beijing remains rather conservative and little progress has been made. Jeanne-Marie Gescher introduces the idea of a risk society to describe the emerging indecisiveness and uncertainty in mainland Chinese society.46 As an experimental foreign policy, Confucius Institutes constitute a global cultural network driven by a sophisticated but banal developmental logic of economic strength. However, Confucius Institutes are conservative in their political adaptation to the local context of the host society. We argue that the cooperative tactics of Confucius Institutes reflect China’s domestic dilemmas, spreading China’s domestic social risk to the rest of the world. In recent years, ‘being a great nation’ seems to be the new slogan of the Chinese communist government. Relying on Confucius Institutes, China is eager to be acknowledged as a ‘peacefully emerging great power’ in the world. Although China is a powerhouse in the global economy, it is still stunted in international political negotiation. The systematically limited abilities and the problems facing Confucius Institutes not only thwart China’s ambitions in soft power exportation, but also cultivate asymmetric power structures in the local institutes and even host society from which uncertainty and instability emerge. Moreover, it is noteworthy that China is exporting its dilemmas of uneven development of economic and political reform to the world through the globalization and localization of Confucius Institutes.

Conclusion Instead of viewing Confucius Institutes as a Trojan Horse, this article attempted to synergize macro and micro perspectives to examine the influence and capacities of Confucius Institutes on both global and local scales. The cartograms, which delineate the historical geographies of the globalization of the institutions, show the uneven geopolitical influence of Confucius Institutes in different regions in the world. Moreover, the geopolitics

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of Confucius Institutes roughly reflect the political turns in China’s foreign policies, which shows that the location of Confucius Institutes is the effect and consequence of China’s global agenda. Furthermore, this article examined the correlations between the globalization of Confucius Institutes and China’s foreign economic and political performances through the dynamics of market and supply. Although the globalization of the institutions generally shows positive correlations with China’s foreign economic and political interests, there are weak positive and even negative correlations between the globalization of Confucius Institutes and China’s performance in terms of foreign direct investment, inward foreign direct investment and inbound tourists. The data show that Confucius Institutes are not a fully effective instrument for promoting China’s foreign economic and political interests. Moreover, as shown by the cartograms, the correlation analysis found that the influence of Confucius Institutes varies from region to region, indicating the importance of specific temporal-spatial contexts. China’s national image declined in the period of the Confucius Institute project. This seems to indicate that despite an increase in the number of Confucius Institutes on a global scale, China has failed to cultivate a benevolent image to the rest of the world. To conclude, this article contends that the general argument in the literature, which portrays Confucius Institutes as serving China’s global interests, should not be accepted without question. Confucius Institutes are an entity that complements China’s foreign strategies, producing both positive and negative influences on China’s foreign cooperation. Similarly, in the Confucius Institutes under study in Canada, America, Eastern Europe and Africa, we also found that the capability of the institutions is systematically limited. The decentralization of administrative and fiscal power profoundly restricts the power of China within the system of collaboration with foreign partners. In addition, the Hanban seems powerless in managing the global network of the institutions, making unusual concessions in the absence of supervision and feedback. These issues produce uncertainty, limitations and even introduce risks to the management of Confucius Institutes and also to their host societies. In the processes of globalization and localization, we see the systematic limitations and passive role of the Chinese partners in the project. This not only challenges the pervasive argument that the Chinese side enjoys more benefits than their foreign partners, but also that Confucius Institutes have been a proactive, powerful ‘cultural thrust’ of the Chinese government. Moreover, this article further contends that Confucius Institutes are confident in economic cooperation but rather conservative in political negotiations and cooperation, mirroring China’s uneven success with economic and political reform. According to Deng Yuwen, an eminent Chinese critic, it was important for Confucius Institutes to undergo a transformation ‘from quantity to quality’.47 He anticipates a risk for Confucius Institutes in their ‘Great Leap Forward’ as they build up a geopolitical network, which may induce resistance or even conflicts among China’s counterparts. In view of the uneven development of Confucius Institutes, we suggest that China might be exporting domestic uncertainty and even risk to the world through collaborative projects such as Confucius Institutes.

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Notes The authors thank Dr Lewis Mayo and Dr Sow Keat Tow for kindly commenting on an earlier draft of this article. They are also grateful to the three anonymous referees for their critical and insightful comments. Funding for this research came from the National Science Foundation of China (Grant nos. 41630635 and 41328002). 1. James F. Paradise, China and international harmony: The role of Confucius Institutes in bolstering Beijing’s soft power, Asian Survey 49(4), 2009: 647–69. 2. Marshall Sahlins, Confucius Institutes: Academic Malware, Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2015. 3. Nick Young, The cultural crusades, New Internationalist Magazine, 1 June 2009, http://www. newint.org/features/2009/06/01/culture/, accessed 20 March 2016. 4. Valerie Niquet, ‘Confu-talk’: The use of Confucian concepts in contemporary Chinese foreign policy, in Anne-Marie Brady (ed.) China’s Thought Management, London and New York: Routledge, 2011, 76–89; Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. 5. Robert Albro, The disjunction of image and word in US and Chinese soft power projection, International Journal of Cultural Policy 21(4), 2015: 382–99. 6. Falk Hartig, Chinese Public Diplomacy: The Rise of the Confucius Institute, London and New York: Routledge, 2016. 7. Edward A. McCord, Confucius Institutes: Hardly a threat to academic freedoms, The Diplomat, 27 March 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/confucius-institutess-hardly-athreat-to-academic-freedoms/, accessed 1 March 2016. 8. Amy Stambach, Confucius and Crisis in American Universities: Culture, Capital, and Diplomacy in U.S. Public Higher Education, London and New York: Routledge, 2014. 9. Allan Sharp, Confucius Institutes adopt a sage approach to cultural understanding, Asian Currents, May 2010, http://asaa.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/asian-currents-10-05. pdf, accessed 10 March 2016. 10. The institutes surveyed in West Europe and Africa were the only branch of the Confucius Institute in the countries concerned. For ethical reasons, no further information about the institute is given. 11. 2015 Roundtable of the Council of the Confucius Institutes Headquarters convened in Qufu, Shandong, 31 July 2015. 12. Falk Hartig, Confucius institutes and the rise of China, Journal of Chinese Political Science 17(1), 2012: 53–76. 13. Elizabeth Redden, Confucius says, Inside Higher Ed, 4 January 2012, http://newscenter. nmsu.edu/Uploads/get/540/websearch_20120104_Confucious%20says.pdf, accessed 10 November 2015; Paradise, China and international harmony. 14. Randolph Kluver, The sage as strategy: Nodes, networks, and the quest for geopolitical power in the Confucius Institutes, Communication, Culture & Critique 7(2), 2014: 192–209. 15. Don Starr, Chinese language education in Europe: The Confucius Institutes, European Journal of Education 44(1), 2009: 65–82. 16. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship. 17. Li Tie, Kongzi xueyuan quanqiu kuozhang: Ruci kangkai shui maidan (The Confucius Institutes are expanding globally: They are so generous, who will pay for this?), 29 January 2010, http://www.fjsen.com/q/2010-01/29/content_2713521.htm, accessed 20 March 2016. 18. Jae Park, Cultural artefact, ideology export or soft power? Confucius Institute in Peru, International Studies in Sociology of Education 23(1), 2013: 1–16.

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19. Ding Sheng and Robert A. Saunders, Talking up China: An analysis of China’s rising cultural power and global promotion of the Chinese language, East Asia 23(2), 2006: 3–33. 20. Anita Wheeler, Cultural diplomacy, language planning, and the case of the University of Nairobi Confucius Institute, Journal of Asian and African Studies 49(1), 2014: 49–63. 21. Jeffrey Gil, China’s cultural projection: A discussion of the Confucius Institutes, China: An International Journal 13(1), 2015: 200–26; Park, Cultural artefact, ideology export or soft power? 22. Jennifer Hubbert, Ambiguous states: Confucius Institutes and Chinese soft power in the U.S. classroom, PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 37(2), 2014: 329–49. 23. Peter Schmidt, At U.S. colleges, Chinese-financed centers prompt worries about academic freedom, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 17 October 2010, http://warpweftandway.com/ images/2010/10/at-u-s-colleges-chinese-financed-centers-prompt-worries-about-academicfreedom-faculty-the-chronicle-of-higher-education1.pdf, accessed 10 October 2015. 24. Hartig, Chinese Public Diplomacy, 188. 25. According to the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Comprehensive Department, the top 10 trading partners of mainland China in 2014 were the European Union, America, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Russia, and Brazil. See 2014 nian Zhongguo duiwai maoyi fanzhan qingkuang (China foreign trade development 2014), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangwubu Zonghesi (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Comprehensive Department), 5 May 2015, http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/Nocategory/201505/20150500961314.shtml, accessed 10 September 2016. 26. Baohui Zhang, Chinese foreign policy in transition: Trends and implications, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 39(2), 2010: 39–68. 27. Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World, London: Allen Lane. 28. Donald Lien, Financial effects of the Confucius Institute on Chinese language acquisition: Isn’t it delightful that friends come from afar to teach you Hanyu?, The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 24, 2013: 87–100. 29. Falk Hartig, Cultural diplomacy with Chinese characteristics: The case of Confucius Institutes in Australia, Communication, Politics & Culture 42(2), 2012: 256–76. 30. Interview 2, 9 September 2015. 31. Ibid. 32. Interview 4, 11 September 2015. 33. Interview 5, 9 September 2015. 34. Jiaoyubu fubuzhang Hao Ping zai di wu jie Quanqiu Kongzi Xueyuan Dahui shang de zongjie jianghua (2010 nian 12 yue 12 ri) (The concluding speech of Hao Ping, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Education at the Fifth Conference of the Confucius Institute Headquarters (12 December 2010)), 16 February 2011, http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=RB808YXYF52 MO81s7RyI03NWOCK1M6EX7r2FhDGQJVqz6CVE6tm2H3jywqGj_roAwT_wkYlZ7ywBrTBSCAUFWoecJiS4vNhs9nRbFDepEZa, accessed 28 March 2016. 35. Hartig, Chinese Public Diplomacy, 167. 36. Interview 6, 27 September 2015. 37. Interview 7, 2 July 2015. 38. Interview 8, 11 September 2015. 39. Gu Cunyan, Kongzi xueyuan zhende daibiaozhe Zhongguo de ‘ruanshili’ ma? (Do Confucius Institutes really represent China’s ‘soft power’?), 17 December 2009, http://culture.people. com.cn/GB/22219/10596758.html, accessed 19 March 2016. 40. Interview 9, 11 September 2015.

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41. Interview 10, 6 September 2015. 42. Interview 11, 2 July 2015. 43. Translated from John Sudworth, Zhuanfang: Hanban zhuren fanbo Kongzi xueyuan ganrao xueshu ziyou (Interview: Director of the Hanban refutes that the Confucius Institutes intervene in academic freedom), BBC [Chinese], 29 December 2014, http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/12/141229_confucius_interview, accessed 16 February 2015. 44. Interview 12, 6 September 2015. 45. Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 46. Jeanne-Marie Gescher, All under Heaven: China’s Dreams of Order, London: Kaduba House, 2015. 47. Deng Yuwen: Zhongguo Kongzi xueyuan de wenti (Deng Yuwen: The problem of China’s Confucius Institutes), 21 January 2015, http://club.china.com/baijiaping/gundong/11141903/ 20150121/19230213.html, accessed 21 March 2016.

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