Cooperation and Competition in Coacting Groups

Journal oj Personality and Social Psychology 1975, Vol. 31, No. 4, 615-620

Cooperation and Competition in Coacting Groups Morris A. Okun and Francis J. Di Vesta Department of Educational Psychology, Pennsylvania State University This investigation was conducted (a) to determine the generalizability of the inverse relation between differential reward structure and group efficiency in high task-interdependence situations from intragroup settings to cogroups, and (b) to compare the distribution of information in groups with equal and unequal reward structures. Reward structures (equal and unequal) were orthogonally crossed with two levels of cogroup relationships (independently and dependency related). The results clearly indicated that competition and cooperation were functions of the reward structures and dependency relationships between cogroups. Furthermore, magnitude of the inverse relation between differential reward structure and group efficiency decreased when groups were dependently related; and the distribution of information was more equal in cogroups with an equal than with an unequal reward structure.

The concepts of cooperation and competition can be used to refer to the orientation of group members or, as in this article, to situational characteristics (Deutsch, 1949). (Obviously, the notions of orientation and situational characteristics are not mutually exclusive since the situational characteristics must inevitably modify the orientation of the group member and become manifested in what is described as "group dynamics.") Thus, a situation is cooperative when the outcomes are distributed equally, that is, when gain by an individual group member contributes to the gain of all group members; it is competitive when the outcomes are distributed unequally, that is, when the gain of one member interferes with the gain of others (see, e.g., Kelley & Thibaut, 1969). Miller and Hamblin (1963; also see Thomas, 1957) concluded from their review of the literature on group cooperation and competition that the effects of these contrastThe research reported in this article is based on a master's thesis by the first author under the direction of the second author, submitted to the Graduate School of Pennsylvania State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Science degree. The authors wish to thank Steven M. Ross who wrote the computer program for analyzing the group efficiency and distribution of information data. Requests for reprints should be sent to Francis J. Di Vesta, Department of Educational Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802.

ing social situations are further influenced by the degree of means or task interdependence. In a high-task interdependence situation, all group members work together thereby assuring that a problem is solved efficiently by the group as a whole. In contrast, a low taskinterdependence situation is characterized by each person performing the, task individually and independently. In its extreme form there is no opportunity for one member to facilitate or impede the efforts of the other persons present. Inasmuch as individuals are not interdependent, this situation is psychologically equivalent to a "nongroup." Miller and Hamblin's (1963) analysis led to an experiment in which they examined the effect of the interaction of outcome distribution by task-interdependence on group efficiency. In high task-interdependence situations, differential reward structure and group efficiency were found to be inversely related. Thus, cooperation was superior to competition in situations in which individual success was dependent on the performance of other members of the group. In low task-interdependence situations, cooperation had no distinctively superior effects; competition and cooperation had similar effects on "group" productivity. Since only single groups were employed in Miller and Hamblin's study, their results relate mainly to situations involving intragroup cooperation and competition. It is also apparent that the presence of one group, in a coaction relation with another group (co-

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groups), may clearly have an impact on the performance of the other group (Vinacke, Wilson, & Meredith, 1964, p. 479). Nevertheless, the nature of this influence is not a simple one and requires an extension of the generalizations concerning intragroup cooperation and competition to more complex settings involving intergroup relationships. The present study was directed to the latter concern: Equal outcome distributions within a cogroup (i.e., all members of a given group receive equal reward) were assumed to influence the adoption of cooperative strategies; unequal outcome distributions (i.e., members of each group receive different rewards) were hypothesized to influence competitive actions. However, the primary purpose of this study was to consider the relationship between the cogroups in order to explicate further the dynamics of cooperation and competition. Thus, it was hypothesized that when cogroups are independently related to one another the external group should have only minor effects, if any, on the social situation created since the reward structure (outcome distribution) for each group remains unaffected. Accordingly, the inverse relation between reward structure and group efficiency attained in a single group setting was predicted to generalize to each of the independently related cogroups. When cogroups are dependency related, the external group can influence the kind of process adopted by the group. Thus, with equal intragroup outcome distribution (i.e., equal reward structures), the result is cooperation regardless of the intergroup relationship since the allocation of rewards dictates only that the productivity of each group be optimized by its respective members. On the other hand, in groups with unequal reward structures the relationship of one group to the other becomes important in determining social interaction. As discussed above, independently related cogroups with unequal intragroup reward structures adopt a competitive strategy analogous to the one created in single group settings. But when such groups are dependency related, members of each group must maximize their gain within their respective group as well as the gain of their group relative to the other

cogroup. This consequence is partially cooperative and partially competitive. It requires a complex strategy if group efficiency is to be maximized: Initially the group member must cooperate with his partners to establish his group's position. Once superiority of the group is attained, he then competes to establish his own position within the group. The employment of this strategy should result in greater productivity of such cogroups relative to other cogroups which have unequal reward structure and which are independently related. On the basis of the rationale above, it was hypothesized that the difference in efficiency between cogroups with equal and unequal reward structures would be significantly less when cogroups are dependently related than when they are independently related. This hypothesis would be supported by a significant effect of the interaction of Reward Structure X Intergroup Relationship on the number of redundant interactions (transactions). The rationale above also implies that, with equal reward structures, members of each cogroup develop cooperative strategies (e.g., teamwork and pooling of information) which facilitate the locomotion of their partners toward a jointly shared goal. Conversely, with unequal reward structures, each member of a cogroup develops competitive strategies (e.g., hoarding of information) which facilitate individual advancement toward a mutually, or partially, exclusive goal. This reasoning suggests that the distribution of information by individuals in groups with equal reward structures is significantly more nearly equal than the distribution of information by individuals in groups with unequal reward structures. This hypothesis would be supported by a significant main effect on the dispersion of information due to reward structure. METHOD Design The overall design of the present experiment was an adaptation of Samuels's (1970) Reward Distribution Model. As used in this study it implied a factorial analysis of variance with two betweensubjects and one within-subjects factors. The between-subjects factors were (a) reward structure (equal and unequal) and (b) intergroup relation-

COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN COACTING GROUPS ship (dependent cogroups and independent cogroups). The within-subjects factor was problems (or trials) since each group solved four problems during the course of the experiment.

Subjects The subjects were 96 students enrolled in an introductory educational psychology course. Participation in the experiment was voluntary. However, differential credit was given toward the subject's final course grade, according to prestated performance criteria, in order to induce treatments.

Apparatus and Materials The apparatus was simply two sets of partitions with three compartments in each. The partitions appeared to have a Y shape when viewed from above. A slot at the bottom of each compartment permitted cards to be exchanged among partners within a group. The information (i.e., numbers) was passed from one group member to another on 3" X 4" cards. Poker chips were used as tokens to represent points earned at given stages of play. Record sheets were provided on which subjects recorded (a) the information received, (b) who the source of the information was, and (c) to whom the information was passed.

Task The task was a modification of one employed by Miller and Hamblin (1963). It required subjects to determine which of 10 numbers, from the series 1 through 10, had been omitted by the experimenter. Each member of a cogroup (triad) knew three of the numbers, each of which was presented on a 3" X 4" card. Since each subject had different numbers, the correct answer could be determined only by sharing information, that is, by passing cards from one player to another through the slots. Play was guided by a constrained schedule in which a subject called for information from either of his fellow group members in a regular order. To permit flexibility in play and to permit the subject to capitalize on whatever information he had about the numbers other players controlled, the subject was permitted the choice of selecting the group member who was to provide the information. A problem was considered "solved" by a group when all subjects within that group knew the answer.

Procedure During each experimental session, subjects were assigned to the two groups by reference to a table of random digits. After each subject was seated at 1 Two experimenters were used, one for each group, to administer the remaining instructions. The second experimenter, trained by the investigators, interacted with groups during the period when the two practice trials were conducted.

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his or her compartment, both the general instructions and a practice trial for learning how to acquire and pass information according to the rules of the game were administered.1 The treatments were then induced by instructions and by manipulations of rewards (number of points earned toward final course grade). The treatments were as follows: Unequal reward-independent. Each time a requesting player received a card which was not pre\iously seen, a poker chip was received from the experimenter. When a player received a card which had been previously seen, the experimenter took a chip from the requesting player. The player in each cogroup who accumulated the most chips at the end of the experiment received 12 points, the person with the second highest total in each group received 10 points, and the player with the lowest total in each group received 8 points. These instructions were intended to induce individual competition among group members. Rewards were distributed differentially among the members of a given cogroup. Furthermore, rewards were assigned independently to each group. Unequal reward-dependent. This treatment was similar to the immediately preceding one except that each subject competed in two ways: (a) against members of his/her group and (b) as a member of a group competing against the other group. The performance of one group, relative to the other, was as much a consideration in the allocation of rewards as the performance of an individual within a group if the performer was to maximize his gain. The player in the better of the two groups, that is, the cogroup which accumulated the most chips, received IS points. The other two players in this group received 10 points. All players in the poorer of the two cogroups, that is, in the cogroup which accumulated a lower total number of chips, received 8 points. Equal reward-independent. In this treatment, each subject competed solely as a member of a group against a criterion. All subjects within each group received the same reward. In addition, rewards were assigned independently to each group. Each time a requesting player received a card which he/she had not seen previously each member of the group received a poker chip from the experimenter. When anyone within a group received a card which he/she had already seen, then the experimenter took a chip from each of the other members of the group. All players in the cogroup which accumulated at least 5$ poker chips received 12 points. All players in the cogroup which failed to accumulate at least SS chips received 8 points. Equal reward-dependent. This treatment was intended to result in one group competing against the other cogroup. It differed from the immediately preceding one by the allocation of rewards. Thus, while all subjects within a given group received the same (equal) reward, the amount of reward differed for the "winning" and "losing" groups. All players in the cogroup which possessed the most chips at the end of all problems received 12 points, while


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all players in the group which had the lower total number of chips received 8 points. Once the subjects in a given treatment understood the rules of play, another practice trial was administered to make certain the rules were employed properly. Then, a total of four different problems were played to solution by all members of both groups within a given experimental session. The number of chips accumulated by each subject and/or group (depending on the experimental treatment) was posted on a blackboard upon completion of each problem. The nature of each interaction between the initiator of a request and the contributor of information was recorded by the experimenter, as well as by each subject, during the course of problem solution. When the experiment was completed, the experimenter announced the final results and awarded points to group members according to the rules under which the subjects in given treatments were participating. An induction questionnaire was administered and a debriefing period followed.

RESULTS Induction Measures An initial analysis was conducted to determine whether subjects in groups with equal reward structures had perceived themselves as engaging in behaviors facilitating intragroup cooperation to a greater extent than subjects in groups with unequal reward structures. Responses to the following three items from the postexperiment questionnaire were used: (a) "To the best of my ability, I attempted to help the other players in my group get the missing number," (where 1 = all the time and S = never); (b) "I tried to pass cards which the other players had already seen," (where 1 = never and 5 = all the time); and (c) "When I passed cards to the other players in my group, I passed cards which helped them" (where 1 = always and S = never). The ratings for the three items, appropriately reversed where necessary, were summed to obtain a measure of intragroup cooperation.2 The analysis revealed that subjects in equal reward conditions (£ — 4.02) perceived themselves to be more cooperative with respect to the other members of their group than did subjects in unequal reward structure groups (X ~ 9.27), J(94) = 15.91, p < .001. 2 Possible ratings ranged from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of IS. Low ratings represented a trend toward intragroup cooperation.

The results of this analysis imply that the manipulations were successfully induced. Group

Efficiency

The effects of reward structure, intergroup relationship, and problems (or trials) on group efficiency, as measured by the number of redundant interactions, were examined by a mixed analysis of variance (see Design section above). A redundant interaction was denned operationally as an exchange of information in which the initiator (requestor) received a piece of information which he had seen previously. Since "dependency related" comprised one level of the intergroup relationship factor, scores of individual groups could not be employed as independent observations. Instead, in this analysis, as well as in the one which follows it, the unit of observation was the pooled scores of the paired groups within a session. The analysis yielded F(l, 12) = 60.17, p < .001 for the effect due to reward structure; ^(1,12) = 26.11, # < .001 for the effect due to intergroup relationship; and F ( 3 , 3 6 ) = S.66, p < .001 for the effect due to problems. The mean redundancy score for the equal reward groups was lower (£ = 4.17) than that for the unequal reward groups (£ = 14.75). The mean redundancy score for the dependent treatments was lower (X — 6.09) than that for the independent treatments (.? = 12.97). For all groups there was a significant decrease in the number of redundant interactions over problems. While these main effects are related to and provide general support for the initial hypothesis, they must be qualified further by the significant (p < .05) interaction between reward structure and intergroup relationship which is graphically depicted in Figure 1. There it can be seen that the difference in efficiency between the equal and unequal reward conditions is substantially less when cogroups are dependently related than when they are independently related. Follow-up multiple comparison tests using Tukey's (Games, 1971) wholly significant difference test revealed that the unequal rewardsindependent cogroups were significantly (p < .05) less efficient than both the unequal rewards-dependent and equal rewards-indepen-

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o INDEPENDENT 2,5 LU

aa: § 5

EQUAL UNEQUAL REWARD REWARD TYPE OF REWARD STRUCTURE FIGURE 1. Efficiency of cogroups as a function of dependency relations and reward structure. (High scores are related to low efficiency and low scores to high efficiency.)

dent cogroups. This finding provides support for the initial hypothesis. Distribution of Information The distribution of information, that is, the extent to which information was shared by group members, was indexed by taking the absolute value of the proportion of interactions in which each subject was engaged and subtracting it from a constant (.67). 8 These scores were algebraically summed across all subjects within a session. The magnitude of the deviation of the score from zero indicated the degree of inequitable distribution of information. The data based on the dispersion index were analyzed via a mixed analysis of vari3 This procedure in no way alters the results. Scores were subtracted from the constant (.67) only to permit the index of dispersion to sum to zero if all group members participated equally.

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ance (see the Design section). Only the first nine interactions, among group members, for each problem were used. Although each group member had been required to complete the task, some subjects were able to retain their clue cards initially because they participated infrequently or because of the strategy they used. Eventually, however, the retained clue cards had to be circulated with the consequence of balancing the overall degree of participation. Accordingly, data for the first nine interactions were chosen as representative of the dynamics involved in the distribution of information. (Although the last half of the total number of interactions might also have been used, the data would have been less conveniently analyzed since different numbers of trials were taken to complete the problems by different subjects.) The analysis of the dispersion index scores yielded F(l, 12) = 19.20, p < .001 for the effect due to reward structure. The mean dispersion index for the equal reward condition was .28 and for the unequal reward condition it was .70. These results provide support for the second hypothesis. In addition, there was a significant decrease in dispersion of information over problems, / ? (3,36) =3.00, p < .05. None of the other main or interactive effects were significant. DISCUSSION The results of this study pointedly suggest an inverse relation between differential rewarding and group efficiency in cooperationcompetition. Cooperation led to more efficient problem-solving activity than competition when participants are engaged in a high taskinterdependent situation. The significant effect of the interaction between reward structure and intergroup relationship indicates that the interpretation of the inverse relation between differential rewarding and group efficiency must be qualified with coacting groups according to the nature of the intergroup relationship. When cogroups are independent, the relation between differential rewards and group efficiency is substantially the same as it is in single groups (see Miller & Hamblin, 1963). Inasmuch as these groups are independent as defined by the reward structure, this result is to be expected. On the

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other hand, the difference in group efficiency between the unequal rewards-dependent and unequal rewards-independent conditions clearly indicates that the magnitude of the relation between differential rewarding and group efficiency is substantially less when groups stand in a dependent relation to one another. The mere presence of another group is insufficient to influence the performance of a given group. It is the relationship between them that determines their dynamics. When cogroups are dependency related, the allocation of rewards to members of one group is dependent on performance relative to the other group. Thus, the results of this study lead to the conclusion that partners of one group must develop sufficient commonality of interest if they are to outperform the members of the other group. In order to attain a common goal, it is necessary that they engage in relatively efficient problem-solving processes. This is the state of affairs which mediates the conflicts of interest facing members of groups in the unequal reward-dependent conditions. Not only must they cooperate with their partners in order to outperform the other group, they must also maximize their personal reward by striving to outperform their partners. The generalizability of the relation between differential rewards and group efficiency in single groups is limited when we consider dependently related cogroups. These conclusions also imply that the efficiency of groups in which outcomes (rewards) are distributed differentially can be increased by introducing elements of intergroup competition into task situations. Cogroups in equal reward conditions were found in the present study to distribute information in a more equal fashion than groups in unequal reward conditions. An examination of the records of play together with the data described in the Results section strongly indicated that partners in unequal reward conditions used the strategy of hoarding their initial information (clues) by passing redundant information. This is a blocking strategy which prevents the other members of the group from achieving their goal. Since partners exposed to the blocking strategy were faced with the

threat of receiving redundant information, it was necessary to decide who possessed the needed information. Then the player might have employed the strategy of engaging the partner with the fewest cards. Other times two members might consort to defeat the remaining player by reducing his supply of cards and increasing the likelihood that the initiator would receive novel information. These particular strategies became sharpened over trials as the subjects learned not only the strategies more precisely but also learned how to implement the strategy to their advantage. In conclusion, it is of interest to note that most investigators in this area of research have attempted to determine the relation between group cooperation and competition on productivity (outcomes). On the other hand, the present study has indicated that an experimental approach is amenable to investigating the dynamics of the groups in terms of the strategies (processes) employed. Clearly, cooperation and competition are not all-ornone processes which apply equally to all situations. They are consequences of relationships among members and between or among groups. Which consequence or combination of consequences is achieved depends, at least in part, on reward structures and dependency relationships. REFERENCES Deutsch, M. A theory of cooperation and competition. Human Relations, 1949, 2, 129-152. Games, P. A. Multiple comparison of means. American Educational Research Journal, 1971, 8, 531565. Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. W. Group problem solving. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook oj social psychology (2nd ed.) (Vol. 4). Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969. Miller, L. K., & Hamblin, R. L. Interdependence, differential rewarding and productivity. American Sociological Review, 1963, 28, 768-778. Samuels, F. The intra- and inter-competitive group. Sociological Quarterly, 1970, 11, 390-396. Thomas, E. J. Effects of facilitative role interdependence on group functioning. Human Relations, 19S7, 10, 347-366. Vinacke, W. E., Wilson, W. R., & Meredith, G. M. Dimensions oj social psychology, Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1964. (Received September 12, 1973)