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In De Anima iii 5 (Ross 1961) Aristotle differentiated between two types of mind; the active mind and the passive mind. After his words, the active mind is the one ...
While every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this book, the publisher assumes no responsibility for errors or omissions, or for damages resulting from the use of the information contained herein. THE MIND PYRAMID First edition. December 14, 2017. Copyright © 2017 Mai Saleh. Written by Mai Saleh.

Preface Before we get in depth with ideas represented in this book, I prefer to give a short account on what I am handling and what I need to transfer to my readers. A lot of scientific terminologies, definitions and theories describe our mind. And a lot of sciences, disciplines, research approaches and valuable findings serve the field of cognition. Yet, the many details here and there, and the various speculations and manifestations need to be gathered in an integrated body that has a definite shape and measurable dimensions. The whole story of how our minds work must be drown as a big picture palatable at the first sight, with detailed features that allow the specialized eye to recognize more knowledge that it seeks. Aristotle mind as introduced in this book is a completely different understanding of Aristotle description of the Active and Passive minds. The use of the concept of hylomorphism is also new. The hierarchical pyramidal shape provided, is an innovative skeleton for cognition. Here I convert this extremely abstract process; cognition into a concrete body; the mind pyramid. Inside this pyramid there are many pathways that link between different compartments. Thoughts travel in its tunnels, get up on its stairs and sleep peacefully in the vacancies, rooms and waiting areas. Thoughts differ in nature, wearing characteristic types of cloth and moving in different paths. Thoughts are alive, they interact, struggle for life and compete to predominate. The world of thoughts is the mind and this mind has firm rules that mange attitudes of thoughts. I need to take you for a journey inside the mind pyramid; the real world of thoughts and the hidden power guiding our behaviors, beliefs and decisions. In the first chapter I am going to tell the idea and main points of the whole story simply and in brief. The next chapter represents a scientifically written manuscript that I tried my best to publish in scholarly journals but in vain. At the end of the book I introduce some of the many controversial and disappointing opinions that I received along my successive 1

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submissions. Hope you find this book interesting and would appreciate to receive your opinions even if it were a shocking one. *******

Introduction to my “Theory of Mind” Hi everybody, in fact I am very anxious to tell you about my theory of mind. Lots of philosophers and psychologists who are far more qualified than me gave their say in this topic. And I think that I benefited from every word I could have ever read with this respect in building my speculation that is clear in my mind to the extent that makes me feel it is the truth behind the excessive efforts of all the great scientists and philosophers all over the years. What do I mean by ‘theory of mind’? When speaking about the ‘theory of mind’, I mean how the external world in represented in our minds. It is well noticed that people differ greatly in translating whatever happens around us. The same actor is the favorite for someone and at the same time is awful for another. The same event is backed by these and offended by those. Culture, knowledge and other psychological and environmental factors play a big role in shaping our beliefs that influence our decisions, but this is not what I am speaking about. I want to tackle individual difference in mental processing that influence our interests, understanding, decisions, motives and dreams. I want to discover the fundamentals of the inner world of the mind that is a unique finger print for each person that is never matched. The key role player here is what is called ‘mental representation’. Mental representation is described a lot, and one of the most simple and sounding approaches is that introduced by Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP). In fact, I was very much inspired by this approach and borrowed some of its concepts in my theory. Again mental representation is the image of the outside in the mirror of our minds. This kind of mirror doesn’t follow the traditional lows of physics in light reflection but follows the mind laws. Hence, there are really some kinds of laws mastering mind, and that is the important thing, and defining these laws is a very important part of my theory of mind. The laws of mind 3

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The first law of mind states that ‘mental representation and concept formation are two sides of a coin’. This means that our mental representations are built up of a number of concepts arranged together to build our gestalt. The gestalt is ‘the meaning whole’ deeply imbedded in the core of our mind influencing our behaviors. And concept formation or conceptual learning in the active process that builds up image schemas or concepts that constitutes the building units of the gestalt. In another work of mine (Saleh, 2014) I described how the gestalt is formed and called it the multi-component image schema and introduced the different types of concepts building the gestalt. The second law of mind states that ‘there are two types of concepts; semantic and descriptive, the former is concerned with abstract knowledge and the latter describes concrete realities’. This law differentiates input data from the surroundings into abstract and concrete. This differentiation helps later on in describing the different types of concepts and mental functions involved in their processing. The third law of mind is saying ‘Thinking and Perception are the main mental functions needed for concept formation’. Here, we speak about Thinking as the way of judgment and decision making and in the coming chapter we explain the presence of different thinking strategies that apply different mechanisms of understanding throughout the process of building concepts. Perception, on the other hand is how we perceive, encode and store data received from the external environment. Perception is crucial for concept formation as it builds up the dictionary of mind with all terms properly defined, sorted and stored for easy retrieval whenever needed. The fourth law tells about that ‘different memory systems work together to form the different types of concepts or image schemas’. With this respect we will find that not all the memory systems are involved in the same task upon building concepts. On the contrary, each type of concept needs specialized memory systems for its construction. For example a visual-semantic image schema needs the corporation between the visu-

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special sketch pad of the working memory with the semantic long term memory (SLM) while the verbal-semantic image schema needs the reversible processing between the phonological loop and the SLM. The fifth law states that ‘people differ in their thinking and perception preferences.’ According to the more easily used memory systems by each person, some mental path ways in thinking and perception are more preferred as a natural lead. This preferential nature decides the extent to which each type of mental image schema is constructed for any perceived event. The sixth law states that ‘the gestalt is the sum of all concepts or image schemas with the proportion of corporation of their different types decided by the preferential predominance in Perception and Thinking.” This point seems a bit confusing, yet it simply says that the gestalt is the combination of all image schemas formed along our life. And since the type of an image schema formed depends on the preferential style in perception and thinking, therefore image schemas differ from one person to another. And according to the most preferential ways in thinking and perception the corresponding schemas formed will constitute a higher proportion in the whole composition of the gestalt for that person than the other types of schemas that are commonly produced by the less preferred styles for him. The seventh law states that ‘the gestalt influence the bottom up regulation in cognition’. This means that WE JUDGE THE UNIVERSE BY THE MIND OF OUR GESTALT.

Aristotle mind and conceptual learning Abstract Concept formation has always been a controversial issue between empiricists and rationalists. The present work aims at narrowing the gap between the different explanations introduced by each school and integrating them in a harmonized structure represented by a hierarchal distribution of mind. Aristotle's mind with its domains; passive mind and active mind, as introduced here, identifies the process of conceptual learning in terms of the intellectual functions; perception and thinking. Passive mind is simulated to perception and is sought to divide attention and direct focus on data from the surroundings, manage encoding of multi modal sensory inputs with the help of the different memory systems, and store final form of conceptual knowledge as gestalt. On the other hand, the Active mind (thinking) is assumed to render acquired concepts meaningful and is claimed to be responsible for image schemas construction and automation. Different memory systems are involved in the distinct mental processes describing perception and thinking. Three different neural symbolic languages of thoughts; visual, verbal and emotional are suggested for information representation. Aristotle's speculations on mind, together with the concept of Aristotle's hylomorphism, in addition to the latest research on memory and learning introduce to the proposed hypotheses. Key words Mental representation, Language of thought, Image schemas, Thinking, Perception, Conceptual learning, Aristotle’s mind, Empiricism, Rationalism, The Intellectual Style Inventory, The Integrated Model of Mind Bach ground Despite, empiricism and rationalism seem to have opposing points of view regarding nature of concepts and mechanisms of their acquisition, yet the present work could offer a bridge that links between the two 6

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schools. It is after Prinz (2005) that Fodor’s (the prominent rationalist) theory of reference is better suited for empiricism. Detailed description of proposed roles of perception and thinking in the process of concept formation as expressed in this work could explain Prinz's words, justify them and render them a fact. Memory and learning are two faces of a coin. Learning is the process of acquiring new information, while memory refers to the persistence of learning in a state that can be recalled later on (Ono 2009). Regarding conceptual learning or concept formation, Locke and Hume -the famous British empiricists- emphasized that concepts are learned (Prinz, 2005). Barsalou (1999) –from the same school of empiricism- was able to provide a descriptive role for the different memory systems serving the process of concept formation. As declared by Prinz (2005), Basalou regarded concepts as temporary and variable constructions in the working memory that are drawn up from large data structures in long-term memory (LTM) in task-sensitive ways. Hence, -according to empiricism- concept formation is a learning process encountered by the working memory and the LTM systems. Another important feature of conceptual learning provided by empiricism and clarified by Barsalou is that concepts are perceptually based and made up from representations indigenous to the senses (Prinz, 2005). Such core tent of empiricism agrees with findings of Basar (2011) in his tentative model of memory, which revealed that processes of attention, perception, learning, and memory are highly interwoven and difficult to distinguish from each others. Thinking –in turns- is another mental process prominently influenced by the way we perceive the world based upon perceptual learning processes (Brand and Markowitsch, 2010). Thinking –according to rationalism- is also involved in construction of concepts. According to Fodor (2004), the main function of a concept is to allow thinking about something through representing.

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In this context, the present work is going to show how the integrated mental functions of perception and thinking carried out by the different memory systems are able to describe conceptual learning in a manner that builds a bridge between empiricism and rationalism. Such a bridge can benefit from the sounding rational of each school and at the same time is justified by recent knowledge from psychology and neuroscience. In this concern, our postulate for concepts could be perfectly described by definition of conceptual learning after the Britannica Concise Encyclopedia which describes it as 'the process of developing abstract rules or mental constructs based on sensory experience'. In light of the provided definition, the present work signifies the 'mental constructs' to be the well-known image schemas (Pass and Sweller 2012) while the perceived 'sensory experience' is considered to be the environmental sensory stimuli from the surrounding. Different thinking strategies are supposed to be responsible for construction of the former (image schemas), and the mental function; perception is proposed to encode the latter (environmental sensory stimuli) in the form of mental languages of thought that allow thinking. In consequence, three hypothetical languages of thoughts; the visual, the verbal and the emotional are introduced that describe information representation throughout the process of conceptual learning in addition to the role of the different memory systems involved. The Aristotelian psychology is not away from our view of conceptual learning. As discussed in "The Four Isomorphic couplets" (Saleh, 2015), the two focal points describing the Aristotelian logic; 'definition' and 'syllogism' -in light of their definitions- are very similar to the functions of 'perception' and 'thinking', respectively in concept formation. After their descriptions, 'definition' and 'perception' are for signifying and identifying things while 'syllogism' and 'thinking' are for judgment and reasoning. Both functions (definition/perception and syllogism/thinking) are essential for learning and take place by the different memory systems. Moreover, the passive and active minds as described by Aristotle as well as his claims for 'perception' and 'thinking' together with his theory

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of hylomorphism could introduce great help in the same concern as detailed later on. Hence, the main objective of the present work is to construct an outside frame for the stepwise process which describes concept formation in terms of perception and thinking. This could be achieved insight of theoretical backgrounds from both philosophy and psychology. Two main claims are introduced and discussed. One is presented through the philosophical framework and states that mind (Aristotle's mind) is responsible for perception (Aristotle's passive mind) and thinking (Aristotle's active mind) where information from the surroundings are converted through the mental processes of perception into thoughts. Thoughts in turns are acted upon by the mental processes (strategies) of thinking to complete the process of abstract conceptualization from the information perceived. The second claim will be justified through the psychological framework and describes how information are to be converted through perception, and the memory systems involved in its functions, into thoughts and suggests three neural languages of thoughts. Such second claim also clarifies the role of thinking and its strategies applied by the different memory systems in shaping such languages and arranging them in the form of mental image schemas that represent the final concept or gestalt. Philosophical Framework Here, we are going to discuss in details the first claim stating that Aristotle's mind is responsible for conceptual learning where processes of perception are performed by Aristotle's passive mind while, Aristotle's active mind is responsible for that of thinking. The concept of Aristotle's hylomorphism, defined after the Britannica Concise Encyclopedia as ‘every natural body consists of two intrinsic principles, one potential (namely, primary matter) and one actual (namely, substantial form)' is of crucial importance in proving our claim. The claim

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The claim to be proved states that mind has a matter and a form. Perception represents its matter and could be described in terms of Aristotle's passive mind. Aristotle's active mind on the other hand, could describe clearly the function of thinking and represents the form of mind in our claim. This is the first horizontal level in the speculation of Aristotle's mind which stands at the top with passive mind and active mind standing at the far two ends (Fig. 1). The second horizontal level as shown in figure 1 is then assumed, which again proposes the presence of a matter and a form for each of passive and active minds. Following Aristotle's description for perception and thinking -denoting both minds respectively- the nature of their matters and forms is speculated. At this level, thoughts play a dual function; they represent the matter of thinking and the form of perception. Whereas, information perceived from external sensory stimuli represent the matter of perception which should be transformed then to thoughts and the different thinking strategies applied on such thoughts represent the form of thinking.

Fig. 1 The first and second hierarchal levels of Aristotle mind

Argument Premise 1: Thinking; is Aristotle's active mind and perception is Aristotle's passive mind

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In De Anima iii 5 (Ross 1961) Aristotle differentiated between two types of mind; the active mind and the passive mind. After his words, the active mind is the one which 'produces all things'. It has its own 'distinct', 'fixed' and 'separate' identity. It is 'superior'; it can apply change but is not changed itself. It is 'deathless' and 'everlasting' as well as being 'unforgettable'. In our hypothesis, we suggest this type of mind, the active mind, to be congruent with thinking after its description in literature (discussed latter in more details). The other type of mind, according to Aristotle, is the passive mind, which is affected by the active mind. Passive mind is 'all things'(all perceived data) which can be 'forgotten'. After Aristotle, without passive mind(perceived data) there is nothing to think about. Therefore we can assume that passive mind is the responsible for perception processes according to the latest findings of empirical research. Premise 2: Passive mind; is the matter of Aristotle mind and active mind; is its form Borrowing the concept of Aristotle's hylomorphism we suppose that the passive mind could represent the matter of Aristotle's mind, and the active mind could be its form. Since, perceived data denoted as passive mind in our claim can willingly serve as primary matter for the process of thinking which is generated by the active mind to obtain an actual form. It should be true, hence, to say 'without this, nothing thinks' as mentioned in DA 430a25 (Ross 1961), which means in our postulate that without the ability of active mind to think there is nothing to do with what one perceives, and without the presence of passive mind (perception) there is nothing to think about (Fig. 2).

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Fig.2 Aristotle mind as described in premises 1 and 2

Premise 3: Thoughts are the matter of active mind and thinking strategies represent its form In De Anima iii 4 and 5, Aristotle approached the nature of thinking (active mind in our claim) and denoted it to be the form reception. For any given thinker S and an arbitrary object of thought O as mentioned in De Anima iii 4, 429a13–18 (Ross 1961): 'S thinks O if and only if: (i) S has the capacity requisite for receiving O's intelligible form; (ii) O acts upon that capacity by informing it; and, as a result, (iii) S's relevant capacity becomes isomorphic with that form.' According to hylomorphism, thinking (S) which denotes the active mind should have a matter and a form. As claimed by Aristotle, thinking (S) is the reception of an 'intelligible form of (O)' by a suitable 'relevant capacity', therefore 'intelligible form of (O)' should be the matter of thinking and the 'relevant capacities' which are made isomorphic to the 'intelligible form of (O)'should be its form. And since the matter for thinking is nothing but thoughts and the relevant thinking capacity could be best described by thinking strategies, then we can assume that thoughts represent the matter for active mind and thinking strategies could represent its form.

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Premise 4: Information is the matter of passive mind and thoughts represent its form As for Aristotle's claims for perception, in De Anima ii 5, 418a3–6 (Ross 1961)for some subject S and some sense object O: 'S perceives O if and only if: (i) S has the capacity requisite for receiving O's sensible form; (ii) O acts upon that capacity by informing it; and, as a result, (iii) S's relevant capacity becomes isomorphic with that form.' Similarly; as we have speculated perception to be the passive mind, therefore it should have -after hylomorphism- a matter and a form. Aristotle's claims for perception assume different 'sensible forms of O' converted by the 'capacity' of perception to a corresponding form that prepares it for 'S's relevant capacity' to act on it. These 'sensible forms of O' could obviously be speculated as the matter of perception. And as we assumed in the previous premise that 'S's relevant capacity' is the form of thinking denoted as thinking strategies, therefore the 'sensible forms of O' should be converted –by the 'capacity' of perception- to the 'intelligible forms of O' introduced previously as the matter for thinking before being acted upon by the form of thinking. Hence, the 'intelligible form of (O)' which is the matter of thinking or thoughts should represent at the same time the form of perception(Fig.3).

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Fig.3 Matter and form of Aristotle's passive mind and active mind as described in premises 3 & 4

Summing up the preceding premises we can claim that mind could be described in terms of perception and thinking where perception is the matter of mind and thinking is its form. At the same time, the former represents Aristotle's passive mind, while the latter is the active mind. This represents the first horizontal level in the hypothesis (premises 1&2, Fig.2). The second horizontal level (premises 3&4, Fig.3) in the hypothesis is then postulated, where information stands at one end denoting the matter of perception and thoughts stand at the other end, representing its form. Again and at the same level thoughts play the role of the matter with respect to thinking, while the form is represented by thinking strategies. In this level, thoughts play a key role and acquire a dual function standing at an equal distance from both ends. Therefore our claim states that: Mind is differentiated into active mind which represents its form and passive mind representing its matter, where the form is thinking and the matter is perception. Again, the form which is thinking has a matter and a form, where its matter is thoughts and its form is the arrangement of these

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thoughts or thinking strategies. Finally, there is perception whose matter and form are information and thoughts, respectively (Fig.1). In the coming section Psychological contributions are going to defend the second claim which completes the speculation concerning conceptual learning and introduces the third horizontal level in the hierarchal representation of mind. The second claim states that external sensory stimuli of different modalities are differentiated upon encoding into semantic and non-semantic impressions. Such impressions are translated into three languages of thoughts upon encoding by the different memory system. Perception -as a mental function- is responsible for the aforementioned processes. As a following step the memory systems apply the thinking processes to construct and/or develop mental image schemas. More than one type of image schemas are produced that differ by the difference of the language of its thoughts and the memory systems involved in their construction. The integration of the various schemas constitute the gestalt which is a multi-component image schema representing our embodied cognition and controlling our beliefs and actions. Psychological framework Perception and Aristotle's passive mind: The three hypothetical languages of thoughts As we claim, perception or passive mind represents the matter of mind. Again perception –as described earlier-has a matter (information) and a form (thoughts). Aristotle mentioned that perception needs an object to be perceived and a subject that perceives. And both; the object and the subject affect the process of perception. In our postulate information gathered from the surrounding, which represents matter of perception could represent the object subjected to the process of perception. Yet, the form of perception which is sought to be thoughts is mainly dependent on the subject who perceives. This could be better illustrated when we follow the concept of hylomorphism and discover more about the matter and form of both information and thoughts.

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Premise 5: Sensory stimuli represent the matter of information, while semantics and non-semantics represent its form According to hylomorphism, information should also have a matter and a form. Its matter is assumed to be the environmental sensory stimuli detected by sensory receptors. Upon receiving these sensory stimuli, the generated sensory signals are encoded and transmitted via neural pathways to specific regions of the spinal cord and the cortex (St. Pierre, Hofinger and Buerschaper 2011) then stored in the Short-Term Sensory Store (STSS). The STSS has the ability to retain impressions of sensory information after the original stimulus has ceased so that they can be further processed. The STSS comprises the iconic memory or vision which lasts less than half a second and the echoic memory which retains an auditory input for about 3–4 seconds. Assuming after Baddeley and Hitch (1974), that encoding of sensory stimuli (matter of information) takes place throughout their model of working memory, therefore, the slave systems under the management of the executive center are the responsible for converting such sensory stimuli into some kind of form which can be further processed. Also, knowing that information from the surrounding perceived by the five senses are encoded either semantically on behalf of their meanings and underlying knowledge, or non-semantically as a sense where the personal experience is encoded as concrete as it is (Demb, Desmond, Gabrieli, Glover, Vaidya and Wagner 1995), we can postulate that such semantics and non-semantics could represent the form of information in our hypothesis (Fig. 4).

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Fig. 4 External sensory stimuli are converted into semantics and non-semantics through short term sensory store (STSS)

Premise 6: Semantics and non-semantics represent the matter of thoughts, while visual, verbal and emotional symbolic languages represent its form Both semantics and non-semantics which represent the form of information could represent at the same time the matter of thoughts which will be manipulated within the working memory to obtain a corresponding form of thoughts. Such corresponding form of thoughts could be described according to the Language of Thoughts Hypothesis (LOTH) (Fodor et al. 1988) as mental languages or symbolic system physically realized in the brain of the relevant organisms. The question now is how information is encoded within the working memory to obtain the different LOTs (forms of thoughts)?

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Visual and phonological encoding of semantic knowledge We have just stated that working memory receives information from the STSS as semantic and non-semantic impressions. Where semantics are abstract knowledge and non-semantics are the concrete personal experience. Starting with semantic knowledge and as for visual perception –in particular- we have what is called informational persistence (David and Yeomans 1868; Greene 2007). This term denotes for the abstract characteristics of the image as well as its spatial location that persists after its physical offset. Informational persistence is visual1 in nature but not visible2 (David et al. 1868; Irwin 3andYeomans41986). This means that it carries a visual vector that differs from the image itself or its visual persistence within the STSS. This visual vector being invisible indicates, in our explanation, that it is not seen by our conscious processing, yet, it should be visible by some other kind of processing behind our awareness. Especially, when we know that this visual non-visible component, according to literature, plays the key role in representing a post-categorical memory store for which visual short term memory (VSTM) -working memory nowadays- can access information for consolidation (David et al. 1868;Coltheart 1980). Therefore, in our speculation, semantic knowledge linked to visual sensory stimuli which represent one kind of form of information (and one kind of matter of thoughts at the same time) could be converted to an invisible visually encoded state that is supposed to represent one form of thoughts (one of the LOTs). This same idea (visual non-visible encoding) is also supposed to be generalized to include semantics linked to any

1.

http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/visual

2.

http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/visible

3.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=Irwin%20DE%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=2943863

4.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=Yeomans%20JM%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=2943863

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external sensory stimulus and is not restricted to visual stimuli in particular. Similarly, we suggest that abstract data and knowledge can be phonologically encoded within the working memory. The phonological loop slave system of the working memory is known to be made up of two portions; the phonological store which acts as an inner ear, remembering speech sounds in their temporal order, and the articulatory process which acts as an inner voice and repeats the series of words (or other speech elements) on a loop to prevent them from decaying. Visually presented language can be transformed into phonological code by silent articulation and thereby be encoded into the phonological store. This transformation is facilitated by the articulatory control process. In our postulate, we propose that in this same way –like visually presented language- abstract meanings and semantic knowledge linked to any kind of stimuli can be encoded by a phonological code within the phonological loop of the working memory. In her lecture under the title 'The structure and functioning of phonological short-term memory' Dr. Susan E. Gathercole emphasized this same idea when she said: 'It should be noted that information may gain access to storage capacity of the phonological loop in one of two ways. The direct route involves auditory input: all spoken language that is perceived gains obligatory access to the phonological store. The indirect route is available for information which is not presented in spoken form, but which can be recoded internally into a phonological code by accessing stored knowledge of its label. Examples of such inputs are the printed forms of familiar words, and pictures denoting objects with familiar verbal labels. For such inputs, the subvocal rehearsal process generates the phonological form, which is then stored in the phonological store in the same way as spoken language inputs. In this way, the phonological loop can be used to store internally generated phonological sequences as well as sequences of spoken stimuli.' Finally, we should never forget the role of Semantic LTM system when we speak about both visual and verbal encoding processes of se-

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mantic meanings and knowledge. The semantic LTM is known to be the memory of facts and knowledge that encompasses both their conscious acquisition and retrieval (Tulving 1972, 2002). Moreover, the role of the semantic LTM in the process of semantic encoding is highly crucial as it depends too much on linking new information to similar old ones. Therefore, in our hypothesis we suggest that semantic knowledge from various sensory inputs which is one kind of form of information represents at the same time one kind of matter of thoughts. Semantic knowledge is converted through visual and verbal encoding within the vasiuo-spatial sketchpad and the phonological loop of the working memory respectively (Baddeley 1986) to obtain a corresponding form of thoughts (the visual and the verbal symbolic languages, respectively) suitable for further cognitive processing (Fig. 5) (see dual-modal presentation of textual information introduced by Shuang Xu, 2005).

Fig. 5 Semantics are converted into visual and verbal symbolic languages through reversible interaction between the vasiuo-spatial sketch pad and phonological loop of the working memory, respectively and the semantic LTM

Emotional encoding of event concreteness Leaving semantics and moving forth to non-semantic data or event concreteness (the other form of information and mater of thoughts), according to Baddeley (2000; Repovs and Baddeley 2006), the episodic buffer slave system holds episodes whereby information is integrated

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across space and time (Eustache and Desgranges 2008). Encoding through episodic buffer has a common multidimensional code that allows it -according to Baddeley- to play a major role in encoding and retrieving information from episodic LTM (Eustache andDesgranges2008). Knowing that the episodic memory is defined as the memory of personally experienced events (Eustache and Desgranges 2008), therefore, the episodic buffer is the slave system responsible for encoding event concreteness as we hypothesize, which is the other kind of form of information as stated earlier. Yet, it is not alone in such a task, but the amygdaloid circuit is reported to participate in the process of episodic event encoding by binding emotionally relevant information during the episodic memory building (Brand et al.2010; Belova, Morrison, Paton and Salzman 2006). This in turn converts such concrete matter of thoughts (and form of information) into a corresponding form of thoughts which is emotionally colored. Such symbolic language of emotions is supposed to rank events according to positive and negative feelings associating them to facilitate further mental processing. According to Tulving, Yes–No recognition tasks are regarded as episodic memory tasks, but, according to literature, they do not correspond to its updated definition (Eustache and Desgranges 2008). In our postulate, such a task is related to procedural memory system which could represent another memory system that encodes event concreteness with the help of the episodic buffer. In this time, procedural memory encodes events in a sequential, ordered manner. A similar valence system of positive and negative ranking for events is used which we consider to be another kind of emotional language. Therefore we can suggest that non-semantic event concreteness, as one kind of form of information and matter of thoughts, is converted by means of the episodic buffer with the help of both the episodic and procedural LTM systems into a corresponding form of thoughts represented by an emotionally encoded symbolic language (Fig. 6).

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Fig. 6 Non-semantics are converted into emotional language through reversible interaction between episodic buffer of the working memory and both episodic and procedural LTM systems

Thus, the concept of Aristotle's passive mind or perception can be summed up as follows: Perception has a matter which is information and a form which is thoughts. Each in turn has a matter and a form. The form of thoughts in our theory is simulated to symbolic languages, where we suggest three different languages. The first is the visual, which represents semantic meanings and knowledge when visually encoded by the vasiuo-spatial sketchpad of the working memory. The second language is the verbal language, where semantic knowledge is phonologically encoded in the phonological loop. Finally, the episodic buffer encodes the concrete personal experience emotionally colored by the help of the amygdaloid circuit to translate it to a third symbolic language, which is the language of emotions. Language of emotions depends on either feelings associating personal experience as the case in episodic memory encoding, or on order and sequence within the event using a Yes/No system as the case in procedural memory encoding for tasks and procedures (Fig. 7).

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Fig. 7 Perception or Passive mind under the concept of hylomorphism

Thinking and Aristotle's Active Mind: The mental image schemas Thinking is mainly influenced by the way we perceive the world around us. In our postulate of mind we suggest that thinking represents Aristotle's active mind which is responsible for manipulating what is stored in the passive mind. In other word, thinking is assumed to be the way thoughts are organized in order to be meaningful. In the last section speaking about passive mind we reached a conclusion that thoughts are finally represented by symbolic languages comprising their form. These languages at the same time, are supposed to represent the matter for thinking strategies. Any language consists of letters as building units, where each letter is distinct from the other. When letters are arranged together they make meaningful words. These words, in turn, are arranged together to give a meaningful sentence, and if the arrangement of the words is changed a sentence with different meaning is obtained. This is quite the case regarding thinking, which tends to introduce a specific meaning to perceived data when represented as languages or form of thoughts (in consistence with LOTH). This takes place by constructing words and sentences

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of these languages representing such thoughts in a specific way according to the different thinking strategies available, and subsequently rendering them meaningful. An image schema first invented by Mark Johnson and George Lakoff (1987) is suggested to be the end product of applying thinking strategies to symbolic languages.

Premise 7: Symbolic languages represent the matter of thinking strategies and image schemas represent their form Mental image schema is a hypothetical mental structure for representing generic concepts stored in memory after abstraction (Pass et al., 2012). Schema construction and automation (Pass et al. 2012) are two processes that could explain how symbolic languages which represent the matter of thinking strategies could be converted into an abstract rule (mental construct) which is the final form of the whole process of conceptual learning by definition. Both the working memory and LTM are involved in schemas construction which is combination of lower-level schemas, and the further higherlevel schemas, to build up a more complex schema. Once information is stored in LTM, working memory can handle complex schemas that exceed its capacity prior to the information being stored (Ericsson and Kintsch 1995) since the capacity and duration limits of the working memory are far below the requirements of most areas of human intellectual activities (Baddeley 1986; Cowan 2001; Miller 1956). Such cooperation between the two memory systems reduces the load on the working memory. Another process which reduces the load on the working memory and ensures the role of the LTM is schema automation. These automation processes within schema automation enable us to discover large amounts of complex knowledge unconsciously and by intrinsic motivations away from the educational context involving the working memory (Pass et al. 2012).

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Thus, we can sum this up and assume that both the working memory and the LTM, through schema construction and automation, acquire complex knowledge, stored in the different systems of the LTM in the form of complex mental schemas. If we consider–throughout the process of schema construction- that lower-level schemas could be representing the individual letters and words of symbolic languages and the further higher-level schemas, could be representing the compound words and sentences of such languages which are the form of thoughts and matter of thinking strategies, hence, mental schemas could then represent the form of such strategies through the mechanisms of their construction and automation, to reach the final stage in concept formation and produce a new concept (Fig.8).

Fig.8 Symbolic languages are converted into image schemas through reversible interaction between working memory and LTM systems

In sum; thinking -as representing the form of Aristotle's mind- has a matter and a form. Its matter is thoughts and its form is the thinking strategies applied on such thoughts to give them a meaning. Again thoughts which are the matter of thinking have matter and form. Their matter is differentiated into semantics and non-semantics while the form is the corresponding languages of thoughts. Finally thinking strategies which representthe form of thinking have a matter and a form represented by the symbolic languages ( form of thoughts) and the corresponding image schemas, respectively. Both

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the working memory and the LTM systems are in continuous reversible interaction for the process of conceptualization throughout schema construction and automation (Fig. 9).

Fig.9 Thinking or Active mind under the concept of hylomorphism

Perception and thinking are machineries for concepts and the hierarchal distribution of mind highlights the stepwise procedure At the time of Aristotle, very little was known about anatomy and physiology of mind, so by means of introspection and syllogism Aristotle made his speculations and differentiated mind-after its function- into active and passive minds. Nowadays, we have to re-launch the ideas discussed far ago and match them with the most recent findings and the latest empirical knowledge that we have reached. In the present work we target the function of mind and introduce hypotheses that describe concepts and how they are formed. Besides, we try to ensure the intimate relationship between learning and memory in formation of concepts and their basic role in mastering individual differences in cognition and behavior through different processes of percep-

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tion and thinking. Such hypotheses also provide anew speculation for information representation and describe how thoughts circulating in our minds have their distinct nature and interact in a well established integrated system of processing. Thoughts are assumed to be translated into three different languages which all humans know but each individual master one on the expense of the other. Intellectual style preferences in perception and thinking (Saleh, Monir, Saad-Hussein and Mustafa 2014) determine the preferentially styles used by everybody in concept formation. Despite the four perception styles and the four thinking styles introduced by the Intellectual Style Inventory (ISI) are working together in conceptualization yet by nature individuals differ in the predominant style activated in the process. Each style of perception or thinking is rooted in one of the four cortical lobes of the human cortex and has its own distinct features as described by the ISI. According to the hierarchal distribution of mind (fig.10), thoughts start as concrete sensory stimuli and end as abstract mental concepts or image schemas. Such concepts are very unique for each individual and their formation depends on the two psychological functions; perception and thinking. Perception is responsible for capturing information from the surroundings, and converting them into thoughts. Thinking as a following step, is responsible for converting thoughts into meaningful constructs. A mental construct -as an output- represents a new piece of knowledge or concept. This new concept could be reused by perception-as one source of bottom up information- such that concepts keep on growing through both perception and thinking to produce more complex constructs. Old and new constructs or concepts for each individual build up his gestalt (multi-modal image schema) which is the reservoir for all concepts as described by the Integrated Model of Mind (IMM) (Saleh,2014). The different memory systems play different roles in both of perception and thinking. Building a concept depends mainly on the dynamic in-

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teraction between the working memory and the LTM systems to fulfill the various tasks as emphasized earlier and illustrated in more details by the IMM; a multisystem memory model describing learning (Saleh 2014). The IMM introduces more than one type of image schemas; visual semantic, verbal semantic and descriptive image schemas. Each type of image schemas depends in its construction on one of the proposed symbolic languages of thoughts proposed by the present work (verbal language for the verbal semantic image schema, visual language for the visual semantic image schema and language of emotions for the descriptive image schema). Different groups of memory systems are responsible for the different types of schemas. The multi-component image schema (made up of the integrated unity of the other types of schemas with proportionalities equivalent to the degree of predominance of perception styles and thinking styles distinct for each individual) is the final form of complex structure that resides at the core of consciousness at the perceptual representation system and is assumed to influence the focus of attention in the process of conceptualization. Back again to bridging between empiricism and rationalism. Prinze (2005) states in his critical analysis that for the empiricist, concepts are more like mental images or inner models that guide actions, and for the rationalist, concepts are arbitrary symbols, labels or words in a language of thought that are primarily in the business of representing. In light of the presented hypotheses, both views are justified and could be integrated as illustrated by the hierarchal distribution of mind (fig.10). Where Aristotle mind and every human mind could be described in terms of the perception processes manifested by the passive mind and thinking strategies applied by the active mind. Such processes are able to convert the external world of materialistic nature into an internal word of abstract features. External sensory stimuli perceived by the five senses are transferred into different kinds of thoughts eligible to undergo further processes and to be arranged side by side to produce a variety of kinds of constructs. Each kind of construct is characterized by a specific language and by cer-

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tain thinking mechanisms for its formation. New generated constructs carry new conceptual meanings in a continuous process of conceptual learning.

Fig.10 The pyramid of the hierarchal distribution of mind References Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory. Trends in cognitive sciences, 4, 417–423. Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working memory. New York: Oxford University Press. Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1974).Working memory. In G. A. Bower (Ed.) The psychology of learning and motivation (pp. 47–89). New York: Academic. Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual Symbol Systems. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 22, 577-660. Basar, E. (2011). Dynamic memory. In E. Basar (Ed.), Brain-Body-Mind in the nebulous Cartesian system: A holistic approach by oscillation (pp.147-177). Springer Science + Business Media.

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Belova, M. A., Morrison, S. E., Paton, J. J., & Salzman, C. D. (2006). The primate amygdala represents the positive and negative value of visual stimuli during learning. Nature, 439(7078), 865-870. Brand, M., & Markowitsch, H. J. (2010). Thinking and Memory. In B. M. Glatzeder et al (Eds.), Towards a theory of thinking, On thinking (pp. 147-160). Springer Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. Retrieved from: http://www.answers.com/topic/hylomorphism Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. Retrieved from: http://www.answers.com/topic/concept-formation Coltheart, M. (1980).Iconic memory and visible persistence. Perception & Psychophysics, 27 (3), 183–228. Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental storage capacity. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87–114. David, I., & Yeomans, J. (1868).Sensory registration and informational persistence. Journalof Experimental Psychology: Human perception and performance, 12(3), 343-360. Demb, JB., Desmond, JE., Gabriel, JD., Glover, GH., Vaidya, CJ. & Wagner, AD. (1995). Semantic encoding and retrieval in the left inferior prefrontal cortex: A functional MRI study of task difficulty and process specificity. The Journal of neuroscience, 15, 5870-5878. Ericsson, K. A., & Kintsch, W. (1995).Long-term working memory. Psychological Review, 102, 211–245. Eustache, F., & Degranges, B. (2008). MNESIS: Towards the integration of current multisystem models of memory. NeuropsycholRev, 18, 53-69. Fodor, J. A. (2004). Having concepts: A brief refutation of the 20th century. Mind and Language, 19, 29-47. Fodor, Jerry A. and Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1988). “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis” in S. Pinker and J. Mehler, eds., Connections and Symbols, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press (A Cognition Special Issue). Gathercole, S. M. The structure and functioning of phonological short-term memory. http://www.acfos.org/publication/ourarticles/pdf/acfos2/gathercole.pdf Greene, E5. (2007). Information persistence in the integration of partial cues for object recognition. Percept Psychophys6, 69(5), 772-784. Irwin, D. E7. & Yeomans, J.M8. (1986). Sensory registration and informational persistence. JExpPsychol Hum Percept Perform9, 12(3), 343-360. 5.

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Johnson , M . ( 1987 ). The body in the mind: the bodily basis of meaning, imagination, and reason.Chicago : Chicago University Press . Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63, 81–97. Ono, T. (2009).Learning and Memory. In M.D. Binder, N. Hirokawa & V. Windhorst (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Neuroscience. Springer Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Pass, F., & Sweller, J. (2012). An evolutionary upgrade of cognitive load theory: Using the human motor system and collaboration to support the learning of complex cognitive tasks. EducPsychol Rev, 24, 27–45. Prinz, J. (2005). The Return of Concept Empiricism. In H. Cohen and C. Leferbvre (Eds.) Categorization and Cognitive Science, Elsevier. Repovs, G., & Baddeley, A. (2006). The multi-component model of working memory: explorations in experimental cognitive psychology. Neuroscience, 139, 5–21. Ross, W.D. (1961). Aristotle, De Anima, edited, with introduction and commentary, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Saleh, M.S. (2015). The Four Isomorphic Couplets Passive Mind/Active Mind, Definition/Syllogism, Tasawwur/Tasdiq and Perception/Thinking. American Journal of Applied Psychology, 3(2): 43-46. Saleh, M. S., (2014). IMM: A multisystem memory model for conceptual learning. American Journal of Psychology, winter issue, 127( 4). Saleh, M. S., Monir, Z. M., Saad-Hussein, A., & Mustafa, S. S. (2014). Intellectual Style Inventory (ISI): Learning Style Assessment after Cortical Functional Specialization. British Journal of Education, Society & Behavioural Science, 4(7):987-1005. St.Pierre, M., Hofinger, G., & Buerschaper, C. (2011). Human perception: The way we see things. In M. St. Pierre, G. Hofinger & C. Buers chaper (Eds.), Crises management in Acute care settings (pp. 87-99). Springer-verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual review of psychology, 53, 1–25. Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organization of memory (pp. 381–403). New York: Academic. Xu, S. (2005).Development of Dual-Modal Presentations of Textual Information. AMCIS, 9610. 7.

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9. 10.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2943863 http://www.dblp.org/db/conf/amcis/amcis2005.html#Xu05

Opinions on Aristotle Mind Here are few of many submissions that I have made along the last three years or more to most popular scientific journals in the field of psychology and/or philosophy, with the bright hope of finding a convenient platform through which I can share my ideas on concept learning. I can understand and accept, for any one, to disagree with my points of view, but sometimes I asked myself why no one offers me the chance to clarify it more. Honest and professional scientific discussions could have helped me better representing my work. In fact, I aimed from my subsequent submissions to find specialists who share me my thoughts and help me with their knowledge and thoughts. In fact, they were very little who interacted positively with my ideas. But any ways, I am happy now to meet a wider audience whom I am sure would add to me. I am waiting for your comments, opinions, speculations and advices and I am sure that those who are attracted to my topic to the extent that drives them to pay their time and money on my book would be a driving force for me to keep on struggling for making my ideas evidence based facts in the very near future. ******* Aristotle's mind and conceptual learning: Three languages of thought and four types of image schemas Review of General Psychology Dear Dr. Saleh, I apologize for the late response to your submission. One reviewer has provided comments that are not detailed and repeated attempts to find additional reviewers have been unsuccessful - a situation that sometimes reflects the strength of the fit between the submission and RGP. I believe it is not helpful to authors or to the journal to hold on to submissions when reviews are not available in a timely fashion, and so I am sorry to report that I must reject your manuscript. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to consider your submission. Sincerely, ...................., Ph.D. EditorReview of General Psychology http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/gpr/ Reviewers' comments: Reviewer #1: The authors propose a model of conceptual learning and information representation that is tied to Aristotle's writings regarding the nature of the mind. Al-

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though this is a potentially useful undertaking the present manuscript does not make a strong contribution. Also it is poorly written and not formatted appropriately. *******

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Dear Mai Saleh, We’re sorry to inform you that your abstract Aristotle's mind and conceptual learning: Three languages of thought and four types of image schemas was not selected for presentation at the conference "Cognitive Structures: Linguistic, Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives" (CoSt16). With more than ninety submissions, competition was hard and we were forced to reject many deserving submissions of high quality due to space constraints. Thank you very much for your contribution. The reviews we received for your abstract can be found below. With best wishes, ................... On behalf of the CoSt16 program committee ——————————-—REVIEW 1——————————PAPER: 14 TITLE: Aristotle's mind and conceptual learning: Three languages of thought and four types of image schemas AUTHORS: Mai Saleh ————-—Review—————The paper is clearly interdisciplinary in nature which is a huge plus considering the different disciplines participating in CoSt 2016. There are several interesting and relevant aspects, e.g., discussing how the notion of concept is related to long term and short term memory (a lot of theories of concept make reference to LTM, while Barsalou restricts concepts to STM in his earlier papers) and trying to reconcile perceptual based and Language of Thought based theories of concepts. The comparison between different levels of processing in Aristotle (definition, perception - syllogism, thinking) and modern theories of concepts is convincing. There is a lot of potential in this paper. However, I see several problems which need to be addressed or clarified in the final paper. I first state the major issues I have and then will proceed with minor details: (1) The

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author does not elaborate on the dichotomy drawn between perceptual and amodal theories of concepts (especially in Barsalou 1999), which should be done when a model incorporating both is proposed. The paper draws on very different authors and definitions for its assumptions and it is not explained why they should be reconcilable. Neither empirical nor methodological reasons for the proposed mental architecture are provided. (2) It is not clarified which notion of image schema is used. Neither is the equation of image schema and the mental constructs in question explained. There might be other perceptual formats of representation that qualify. (3) There is no explicit reason given why these three languages of thought are assumed. Especially proposing a visual language of thought instead of a general perceptual language of thought including other modalities seems arbitrary. (4) The notions ! of active and passive intellect in Aristotle are quite controversy discussed and the paper presents one interpretation without addressing this debate. Now some minor issues, which might only pertain to the abstract: (1) Barsalou can be said to be a (neo-)empiricist but to say that he is of the same school as Locke and Hume is misleading. (2) Prinz is cited when discussing Barsalou’s theory of concepts instead of citing Barsalou directly, which should be done in the final paper. (3) Definition and syllogism are discussed in Aristotle’s Logic while perception and thinking are the topic of his philosophy of mind (or rather soul). How both disciplines in Aristotle are related to each other is not mentioned. (4) Further methodological clarifications why Aristotle is applied to modern theories and how his position can clarify the issues at hand is required. I recommend accepting the paper in virtue of its potential and interdisciplinary nature but strongly suggest addressing the points mentioned above in the final version. ——————————-—REVIEW 2——————————PAPER: 14 TITLE: Aristotle's mind and conceptual learning: Three languages of thought and four types of image schemas AUTHORS: Mai Saleh

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————-—Review—————The paper discusses concept learning as a combination of thinking and perceiving and the author attempts to draw both to the philosophical and psychological literature. First, the paper is very poorly written to the extent that at points it is hard to follow. Second, the paper reads as if it presents a series of somewhat related views about concept learning without any attempt to build them into a concrete story. At times this is even worse. For instance, the discussion about Aristotle as well as the one about emotions simply, pops up without any motivation which makes following the author’s point really hard. And when the author does try to glue things together this is not doen without problems. For instance, the author moves from Fodor’s claim that concepts allow us to think about something via representing to the claim that learning is the outcome of perceptual and thinking processes. This seems in tension with Fodorian triggering, which precisely excludes the role of thinking (triggering is a purely mechanical, psychologically shallow process) in concept formation. Crucially, Fodor rejects all views of learning as circular (via his Impossibility Argument) and only allows a limited role to perception (just to awaken the dormant concepts). This comment applies also later on in the paper where the author discusses the relation between perception and language of thought (one of the three she suggests that there are). The author needs to clarify the way she uses certain terms, such as Language of Thought, or better still to introduce new concept given the theoretical baggage of the term in question. Also, she needs to clarify what the visual, verbal, and emotional languages of thought are, and why visual information should be characterized as a language. One could go on... ******* Title: Aristotle's Mind and Conceptual Learning: Three Languages of Thought and Four Types of Image Schemas Authors: Mai Saleh Dear Dr . Saleh,

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I regret to inform you that after internal review an editorial decision was made that your manuscript did not suitable for publication in npj Science of Learning. While the ideas within it are interesting, the content of your manuscript is not aligned with npj Science of Learning. We felt that this manuscript would be better at a more specific journal. Thank you for submitting this paper to npj Science of Learning. Yours sincerely, ..................... Editor in Chief npj Science of Learning Dear Dr. Saleh, Unfortunately, I have to inform you that your manuscript "Aristotle's mind and conceptual learning: The three hypothetical languages of thoughts" cannot be accepted for publication in Frontiers in Psychology, section Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. The reason for this decision is: The content of this manuscript does not meet the standards of rigor required by the journal to be considered for publication. The responsible Associate Editor has communicated to me that this submission should be rejected. I follow the AE's suggestion. The AE writes: "I recommend rejecting this manuscript because of several severe issues. First, the language is far below academic standards, even after the first revision. The author appears hesitant to get professional editing help for improving the standard of writing. In several places, the meaning of the text still is unintelligible. Second, the paper treats several disjoined issues without making their connection clear enough (Aristotelian conception of the mind, concept learning, Hylomorphism). Third, there are severe philosophical/theoretical shortcomings in the manuscript. The introduction of contemporary philosophy of psychology (Fodor and Prinz, for example) is very superficial, to the point of factual inaccuracy or misappropriation of technical terms (e.g. using “Language of Thought” to refer to “visual, emotional, and verbal” languages bears no resemblance to Fodor’s conception). Other problems include relying on a general-knowledge encyclopaedia for defining scientific terms (viz. “concept learning”, “hylomorphism”), or failure to apply fundamental psychological concepts to the proper sources (the concept of an “image schema” is not introduced by referring to cognitive linguists such as Lakoff and Johnson, but by appeal to a recent paper by Pass & Sweller). Furthermore, arguably orthogonal theoretical constructs are joined without argument, such as applying the Language of Thought (which is ground-

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ed in the Computational Theory of Mind) to image schemas (which are part of Cognitive Linguistics/embodied conceptions of the mind). Crucial philosophical concepts (such as “form” and “matter” in the context of Aristotle’s metaphysics) are used without a proper introduction or differentiation from their non-technical use. Especially for an interdisciplinary journal such as Frontiers in Psychology and its section Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, such usage of technical terms is inadequate. Just based on these theoretical shortcomings, I would recommend rejection. I am also basing this assessment on the highly critical referee reports. A heavily revised version of the paper, which also incorporates the psychological discussion of the latter part of the manuscript more clearly with the theoretical framework, could be considered for a new submission." With best regards, ................................ Specialty Chief Editor, www.frontiersin.org1 *******

1.

http://www.frontiersin.org

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Dear Dr. Saleh, Thank you for your submission to Psychological Inquiry. I just read through your paper quickly and am returning it based on an evaluation of its acceptability and appropriateness for publication in the journal. As you probably know, only four issues of Psychological Inquiry are published each year, with each focused on a lengthy target article (50-60 pages) followed by peer commentary. Consequently, most submitted papers, even some very strong ones, cannot be accepted for publication. Papers based strongly in research that also advance theory and apply to a broad audience are those with the greatest chance of acceptance. Please understand that many excellent papers are not accepted for publication in Psychological Inquiry due to the minimal number published each year. Thank you for considering the journal. I trust you’ll find another outlet for your contribution. Best of luck with your work. Sincerely, ............................. Editor, Psychological Inquiry Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

*******

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Dear Dr. Sabry Saleh, Thank you for writing with your interesting proposal and for your patience in awaiting a response. Although your proposal contains an interesting thesis, I’m afraid I can’t commission it for TiCS at this time. There are many factors that go into article commissions at TiCS, including the number and nature of articles already in our pipeline and the range of topics we are striving to cover at any given time. I would like to thank you for your interest in writing for TiCS. All the very best, ........................., Ph.D. Editor, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 600 Technology Square Cambridge, MA 02139 Dear Dr. Saleh, Thank you for your submission. Although interesting and potentially important, the reviewer did not believe that its theoretical approach makes it suitable as a contribution to the International Journal of Applied Philosophy, which stresses the application of theory rather than the theory itself. Please accept our best wishes for your finding a satisfactory outlet for your work. Sincerely, ******* Thank you for submitting ‘Aristotle mind and conceptual learning: The three hypothetical languages of thoughts’ to the Philosophical Quarterly. I am sorry to tell you that the editors have decided not to publish your paper in the journal. We are, I’m afraid, unable to send you any comments from referees. We receive over 800 submissions each year, and must reject many very competent papers: considerations can include the length of a paper, the likely level of interest to our readers and the importance we place on covering a wide range of topics in the journal, in addition to the validity or otherwise of the arguments presented. Yours sincerely ******* Dear Dr. Saleh I write to you concerning Cognitive Science manuscript 14-2157, "Aristotle mind and conceptual learning: The three hypothetical languages of thoughts" that you sub-

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mitted for publication. I read over each paper as it comes in to assess its fit to the core mission of the journal. After reading your submission, I think you have developed an interesting framework for thinking about mental processes that is likely to drive your further research over time. However, this framework is too broad to make the kinds of specific predictions that would make the paper a good candidate for Cognitive Science. Thus, I am rejecting this paper for publication. We get a large number of submissions each year to Cognitive Science, so I prefer to identify those papers with a poor fit to the mission of the journal as quickly as possible to avoid reaching that conclusion after a long review process. Good luck with your continued research. Sincerely, ******* Dear Mai Sabry Saleh, We are sorry to inform you that your paper, "Aristotle mind and conceptual learning: The three hypothetical languages of thoughts", has not been accepted for publication in Ergo. Please understand that even high-quality papers can end up being declined, as the bar for acceptance is very high and even a triple-anonymous review process is imperfect. We thank you for submitting your paper to Ergo and hope to publish other work of yours in the future ******* Dear Mai Sabry Saleh, Thank you very much for submitting your article ‘Aristotle mind and conceptual learning’ to Philosophy. I have considered it carefully, but I am afraid that in the end I decided that I could not use it. As you are no doubt aware, a very large number of submissions come to Philosophy. In choosing what to publish, as well as the individual articles submitted I also have to consider the balance and make-up of each issue. In Philosophy we attempt to cover the whole range of philosophy in a way which is not too tightly focused. This means that many worthwhile articles which may well find acceptance in other journals have to be turned down. I do hope that you have better luck with your article elsewhere. Yours sincerely, 27, Aug-2014

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Dear Dr. Saleh: I write you in regards to manuscript # ACP-2014-0025 entitled "Aristotle mind and conceptual learning: The three hypothetical languages of thoughts" which you submitted to Advances in Cognitive Psychology. Unfortunately, after a close reading by myself and the editor-in-chief, we decided to reject your manuscript for publication in Advances in Cognitive Psychology. Detailed comments are given below. Thank you for considering Advances in Cognitive Psychology for the publication of your research. I hope the outcome of this specific submission will not discourage you from the submission of future manuscripts. Sincerely, ........................... Associate Editor, Advances in Cognitive Psychology [email protected] Dear Mai, The editors have judged that your manuscript could not be sent as it is to reviewers. The reason is that it is, at this stage, very difficult to assess the validity and relevance of its claims. These claims, indeed, are too numerous, too general, and not sufficiently organised in a step by step argumentation. Instead of exposing your general theories, I would suggest developing in more details one and only one more specific point, then dedicating more time to exposing one by one the reasons why your claim is original and better than some concurrent claim (more plausible in terms of empirical consequences or consistency with other theories, etc.) You would therefore need to pick out of your numerous ideas one single claim: it could be related to the history of psychology (an analysis of some of Aristotle's ideas about memory, or the architecture of the mind, or perception), or to contemporary theories about one and just one of the numerous theme you deal with in your paper: perception and action, the encapsulation of perceptual cognitive processes, the architecture of the mind, types of consciousness (related to your distinction between thinking and perceiving), learning, etc. The important thing for the Review of Philosophy and Psychology is to have a modest well specified claim with a well developed argument. For more ambitious paper, you might want to try more ambitious journals such as Mind, but I would definitively recommend being more technical at the cost of "grandeur." Yours,

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Comments by the editor-in-chief: "Although Advances in Cognitive Psychology occasionally publishes theoretical papers, the corresponding manuscripts should provide a novel and well-supported view and the manuscript itself should be as clear as possible. The current submission fails on these criteria. First, during reading, I head the impression that the arguments are bordering on the tautological because the concepts were not spelled out in a clear enough manner to complete the arguments. For example, in what respect the central metaphors of “matter” and “form” capture the differences between “perception” and “thinking” is not properly spelled out. Such as comparison requires that the characteristics of both of these conceptual dichotomies are listed and mapped onto one another. This comparison cannot be found in the article. For example, in which respect can one conceive of “information” as “matter”? Also, what is a “thinking strategy” meant to be? Intuitively, I would have chosen the term “thinking process” but the author preferred to talk of “strategy”. Why? All in all, this manuscript has the character of a term paper: The reader follows the author’s considerations during her first explorations in the field of cognitive science. Second, concerning the support for a particular view, there are credible and less credible sources and the author has based many conclusions on the latter type of sources. A lot of the references are to a general encyclopedia and to non-reviewed books. These are not the best references in terms of the scientific rigor applied during reviewing of the corresponding texts. A scientifically working philosopher would probably base her statements on her own reading of the original material, often supported by a fresh (her own) translation of e.g. ancient Greek text. At least the interpretation of a text would be carefully considered in light of existing secondary text book opinions that provide consensus among experts on a particular topic. A psychologist would base her views on citing original empirical research. What is found instead are references to Brand & Markowitsch or to the Encyclopedia Britannica. As credible as these sources might appear to the layman, as worthless is it to borrow authority from such speculative and imprecise references for a proper scientific argument. Third, the manuscript is also not as clear and succinct as it would need to be to be considered for publication. At the outset, it is not made clear what would be gained by reading this manuscript. Is it a guidebook to some interesting psychological theories for beginners in Philosophy? Should it convince the Psychologist of the value of looking more deeply into ancient Greek Philosophy? Is the connection between Aristotle and Baddeley the only way one could ever arrive at the hypothesis of the three languages of the mind? All in all, the manuscript has too many loose ends and lacks a clear purpose

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About the Author Biography Mai Sabry Saleh, PhD in Biochemistry and working as researcher in the National Research Centre of Egypt. She was nominated for the 2017 Grawemeyer Award in Psychology, for her psychological multisystem memory model; The Integrated Model of Mind (IMM). She is the innovator of the learning assessment tool; The Intellectual Style Inventory (ISI). An editorial board member in a number of international peer reviewed journals and interested in mental health, cognition and wellbeing studies. Read more at ohc-ch.org/English.aspx.