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nbr special report #21 | december 2009

counterterrorism cooperation in south asia History and Prospects By Sumit Ganguly

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the national bureau

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nbr special report #21 | december 2009

Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and Prospects Sumit Ganguly

sumit ganguly is Professor of Political Science and holds the Rabindranath Tagore

Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University in Bloomington. A specialist on the contemporary politics of South Asia, he is the author, co-author, editor, or co-editor of twenty books on the region. Dr. Ganguly has previously taught at James Madison College, Michigan State University, Hunter College of the City University of New York, and the University of Texas at Austin. He has also been a fellow and a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., and a visiting fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. He can be reached at . note The author would like to thank the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University for its support and hospitality while writing this essay.

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executive Summary This report examines the prospects and challenges for effective regional counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia.

Main findings • Two discernable patterns emerge from the cases of terrorism in South Asia. First, these cases all involve indigenous uprisings that turned to the use of terrorism. Second, every case saw external intervention frequently exacerbating the original conflicts, prolonging their duration, and dramatically expanding their scope. • There are few examples of effective regional counterterrorism cooperation in the region. South Asian states have been more prone to use terrorist proxies to achieve foreign and security policy goals rather than evince any willingness to engage in viable counterterrorism cooperation. • Weak regional institutional frameworks, the long history of discord, conflict and distrust among the South Asian states, and organizational weaknesses of counterterrorism capabilities present significant barriers to regional counterterrorism cooperation. • The prospects of counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia are distinctly mixed. Though the possibilities for Indo-Pakistani counterterrorism cooperation in the foreseeable future are negligible, there are limited prospects for cooperation between Bangladesh and India, Sri Lanka and India, and Nepal and India.

Policy Implications • No South Asian state, of its own accord, can devise a mechanism to overcome the considerable challenges that thwart regional counterterrorism cooperation. External actors such as the U.S. and the EU may be required to play a substantial and sustained role to initiate such a process. • Sustained pressure on Pakistan is needed to shift Islamabad’s policy position regarding the use of jihadi forces against India to attempt to wrest control of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir and to exploit existing Hindu-Muslim tensions within Indian society. • There is potential for external actors, such as the U.S. and the EU, to play a role in assisting South Asian states with the functional features of policing and counterterrorism cooperation, such as training, border control management, electronic surveillance, and intelligence-sharing.

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outh Asia is no stranger to terrorism. In fact, terrorism as a political strategy long predates the creation of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh as independent states. This report will briefly outline the history of terrorism in the region, discuss past attempts at counterterrorism cooperation, assess the current prospects, and outline the likely challenges that lie ahead in enhancing such cooperation.

A Historical Overview of Terrorism in South Asia India In the early part of the twentieth century, a segment of the Indian nationalist movement veered toward political extremism and the use of terrorism.1 In the post-colonial era in South Asia, terrorism as a political tactic first re-emerged in the state of West Bengal in the form of the Maoist Naxalite movement. The Naxalites received considerable propaganda support, and possibly material assistance, from the Maoist regime in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which, at the time, was flush with revolutionary fervor and reflexively hostile toward India. The Indian state effectively but ruthlessly crushed this neophyte Maoist terrorist movement.2 Subsequently, the most significant indigenous terrorist movement erupted in the Indian border state of the Punjab in the early 1980s. The origins of this movement were deeply rooted in the exigencies of Indian domestic politics.3 Sensing an opportunity to escalate the conflict, however, Pakistan soon become involved in aiding and abetting the Sikh terrorist movement, thereby dramatically expanding the movement’s scope and duration.4 Also, around this time, India witnessed the rise of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which sought to create an independent state in the country’s northeast.5 Subsequently, in 1989 an ethno-religious insurgency erupted in Indian-controlled Kashmir. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), an indigenous organization, was initially at the forefront of this movement.6 Owing to Pakistan’s swift involvement on behalf of the insurgents, however, the movement rapidly adopted terrorism tactics and evolved into a religiously motivated and externally supported extortion racket.7 For a variety of complex reasons India has witnessed a recrudescence of Maoist terrorism. Currently, the country faces a significant resurgent Maoist insurgency that has afflicted as many as fourteen states and 165 districts.8

1

Daniel Argov, Moderates and Extremists in the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1883–1920, with Special Reference to Surendranath Bannerjea and Lajpat Rai (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1967).

2

Ranjit Kumar Gupta, The Crimson Agenda: Maoist Protest and Terror (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2004).

3

Robin Jeffrey, What’s Happening to India: Punjab, Ethnic Conflict and the Test for Indian Federalism (London: Holmes and Meier, 1994).

4

For evidence, see “Patterns of Global Terrorism: Asian Overview,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 1995, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/arms/PGT_report/1994PGT.html.

5

R. Upadhyay, “United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)—A Deviated Movement?” South Asia Analysis Group, March 28, 2005, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers14%5Cpaper1307.html.

6

Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

7

On Pakistan’s involvement, see Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2009).

8

Anuj Chopra, “Maoist Rebels Spread Across Rural India,” Christian Science Monitor, August 22, 2006; and Sudeep Chakravarti, Red Sun: Travels in Naxalite Country (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008).

Counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia u Ganguly

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Sri Lanka In the early 1980s, the Tamil separatist movement, in the wake of an anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo in 1983, took a turn toward terrorism, with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) spearheading the movement.9 In May of 2009, after a brutal and sanguinary civil war that claimed upwards of 90,000 lives, the LTTE suffered a military defeat on the battlefield.10 Despite international public professions of an interest in reconciliation, the Sri Lankan regime adopted a triumphal tone in most domestic pronouncements.11

Pakistan Pakistan-based terrorism has also contributed to two major recent crises in Indo-Pakistani relations. The first crisis ensued after the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian parliament. In this attack, two Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed, were implicated. Following the attack, India embarked on a massive strategy of coercive diplomacy designed to induce Pakistan to end support for such terrorist organizations.12 Though General Perez Musharraf, under substantial private and public pressure from the United States, made a number of public commitments to terminate the Pakistani security establishment’s links with terrorist groups, in practice his government failed to sever these links. Subsequently, LeT-led attacks on a number of sites across Bombay (Mumbai) on November 26, 2008, contributed to a breakdown of the fledgling but ongoing Indo-Pakistani peace process that had been initiated in 2004.13 More recently, Pakistan, which had long been a sponsor of terrorism, has faced considerable blow-back from several of these terrorist groups, most importantly from elements of the Taliban.14 It is at least ironic that the Taliban, which was spawned under the tutelage of General Naseerullah Babar, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s minister of the interior, has in the last two years directed its ire against the Pakistani state.15

Nepal Terrorism was also one of the chosen tactics of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) during its insurrection in the 1990s. The Nepalese Maoists had ties with their Indian counterparts but did not receive support from the Indian state.16 After eschewing violence, the Maoists joined the electoral process and came to power in 2008, ousting the Nepalese monarchy.17

Bangladesh Bangladesh has witnessed it share of domestic terrorism. The majority of terrorist groups involved in Bangladesh have targeted the country’s dwindling Hindu population, harassed fellow

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For a detailed discussion of the origins of Tamil grievances and the resort to terrorism, see Neil DeVotta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

10

Matthew Weaver and Gethin Chamberlain, “Sri Lanka Declares End to War with Tamil Tigers,” Guardian, May 19, 2009.

11

Teresita C. Schaffer and Elizabeth Laferriere, “Triumphalism and Uncertainty in Post-Prabhakaran Sri Lanka,” South Asia Monitor, July 1, 2009 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009).

12

Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, “The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” Security Studies 14, no. 2 (Winter 2004–2005): 290–324.

13

Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti, and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Siege,” New York Times, December 7, 2008; and “Difficult to Resume Peace Process with Pak: Pranab,” Indian Express, December 17, 2008.

14

Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur, “South Asian Security after Mumbai,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 15, 2008.

15

Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

16

Michael Hutt, Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

17

Randeep Ramesh, “Former Maoist Guerillas on the Brink of Historic Nepal Election Victory,” Guardian, April 14, 2008.

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Muslims whom they consider to be inadequately devout, and sought to build ties with transnational terrorist organizations. A coalition government under the aegis of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which held power between 2001 and 2006, did little to contain the rise of Islamist terrorism within the state.18 The new Awami League regime of Sheikh Hasina Wajed may adopt a less lenient posture toward these groups.

Afghanistan After witnessing the eventual victory of the Taliban over other indigenous insurgent groups in the civil war that ensued following the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan finds itself again in the throes of continuing turmoil and violence. The Taliban, who had been effectively ousted from power in late 2001, have managed to successfully regroup in Pakistan’s western borderlands and are now wreaking havoc against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the country.19 In an effort to end depredations by the Taliban against the fledgling elected government, the current U.S. administration appears poised to adopt a new, broader counterinsurgency strategy.20

Regional Trends in Terrorism With a few exceptions,21 two common patterns are discernible in all the cases of terrorism discussed above. First, these cases all involve indigenous uprisings that resorted to the use of terrorism because, correctly or not, members of these dissatisfied groups perceived that normal politics would not enable them to achieve their ends. Also, in every one of these instances, external intervention and support from interested regional states worsened matters. Foreign involvement usually prolonged the duration and dramatically expanded the scope of the original conflicts. For example, India’s initial support for various Tamil terrorist organizations contributed significantly to these group’s capabilities. Similarly, Pakistan’s unrelenting support for a host of Kashmiri insurgent and terrorist groups has fundamentally transformed the indigenous features of the Kashmir insurgency and rendered it almost intractable. Such support has also, for all practical purposes, blighted any prospect of bilateral counterterrorism cooperation between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, it remains far from clear that the regime of President Asif Ali Zardari exercises any effective control over the Pakistani military and the security and intelligence services. On the contrary, it appears that these entities still have distinct organizational imperatives and political goals that may well be at odds with the professed interests of the Pakistani civilian political leadership in ending support for terrorism.22

Limited Counterterrorism Cooperation The history of counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia is quite limited. States in the region have been far more prone to the use of terrorist proxies to achieve foreign and security policy

18

Sumit Ganguly, The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006).

19

Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2009).

20

Peter Baker and Dexter Filkins, “Obama To Weigh Buildup Option in Afghan War,” New York Times, September 1, 2009.

21

The exceptions are Pakistan and the Taliban as well as the Maoists in Nepal and more recently in India that have not witnessed any formal external support.

22

Jane Perlez and Salman Masood, “Terror Ties Run Deep in Pakistan, Mumbai Case Shows,” New York Times, July 27, 2009; and Frederic Grare, Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007).


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goals rather than evince any willingness to engage in viable counterterrorism cooperation. The few examples of cooperation will be discussed below.

Regional Cooperation between India and Sri Lanka India ended its covert support for the LTTE and other Tamil terrorist organizations in the aftermath of the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. Indeed, India deployed the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enforce the accord and help disarm the LTTE. Due to the LTTE’s unwillingness to adhere to the terms of the accord, however, the IPKF’s role quickly metamorphosed from being a neutral peacekeeping entity to being a peace enforcement organization. Over the next two years the IPKF battled the LTTE in an effort to protect the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and to restore some semblance of political order in the country. At the instance of the then president Ranasinghe Premadasa, India withdrew the IPKF in September 1989.23 Subsequent to the withdrawal of the IPKF, India has shown scant interest in supporting any terrorist group within Sri Lanka or elsewhere. Indeed, despite considerable pressure from various political quarters in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government steadfastly refused to be drawn into the final stage of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009 on behalf of the LTTE when the LTTE was faced with imminent military annihilation at the hands of the Sri Lankan armed forces.24

Regional Cooperation between Bhutan and India One of the few other actual instances of meaningful counterterrorism cooperation involved the willingness of the Bhutanese regime to act against ULFA sanctuaries in Bhutan. For several years the ULFA had exploited a porous border between India and Bhutan to establish sanctuaries in Bhutan and obtain food supplies. Under some pressure from the government of India and also concerned about the disruptive potential of the ULFA to Bhutan’s stability, in late 2003 the Royal Bhutanese Army embarked on an operation to oust ULFA terrorists from the country’s soil. Simultaneously, the army arrested a number of Bhutanese for aiding the ULFA under the aegis of the country’s National Security Act.25

Regional Cooperation between Bangladesh and India One or two other examples of counterterrorism cooperation can be cited. During much of the past decade India complained vigorously about the ULFA’s ability to find sanctuaries in neighboring Bangladesh. New Delhi also expressed growing concern about the growth of radical Islamist movements within Bangladesh, some of which had a distinctly anti-Indian tenor in rhetoric and orientation. Indo-Bangladeshi relations were especially strained because of the Indian belief that the coalition regime of (former prime minister Khaleda Zia had little interest in reining in the activities of various extremist Islamist organizations and, worse still, tacitly supported their activities.26 Since the emergence of a new Awami League regime in Bangladesh, following the

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23

For a discussion of the IPKF imbroglio, see Major-General Ashok K. Mehta, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Sri Lanka,” in India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (London: Routledge, 2009).

24

“Turmoil over Lanka, but Govt Sticks to Its Stand,” Times of India, February 19, 2009.

25

Praveen Swami, “The View from New Delhi,” Frontline, http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=20040116005101500. htm&date=fl2101/&prd=fline&; and Subrata Nagchoudhury, “Bhutan Targets ‘Friends’ of ULFA,” Indian Express, December 23, 2003.

26

On Indian views, see Hiranmay Karlekar, Bangladesh: The Next Afghanistan? (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006).


party’s dramatic victory in the December 2008 elections, India and Bangladesh have actually held a joint counterterrorism exercise in February 2009.27

The Prospects and Limits of Counterterrorism Cooperation As the discussion so far suggests, based on past experience the prospects of counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia are distinctly mixed. Pakistan, one of the principal states in the region, and especially the vast Pakistani military and security establishment, has an ambivalent attitude toward counterterrorism. Faced with considerable U.S. diplomatic pressure and substantial economic inducements, the country and its security apparatus made a reluctant and partial commitment to counterterrorism in the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11.28 The Pakistan state has since offered the United States some invaluable intelligence and also turned over a handful of key individuals connected to al Qaeda. That said, Islamabad has pursued an equivocal strategy toward India and the Taliban. Bluntly stated, there is no evidence that Pakistan has abandoned its commitment to use jihadi forces against India in its attempts to wrest control of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir and to exploit existing Hindu-Muslim tensions within Indian society.29 Given this state of affairs, despite the stated interest in jointly combating terrorism, the prospects and possibilities of Indo-Pakistani counterterrorism cooperation remain negligible in the foreseeable future.30 Even though the prospects of Indo-Pakistani counterterrorism cooperation remain dim, it is possible to visualize greater cooperation between and among the other states of South Asia. Specifically, given India’s disastrous experience with the LTTE, it is all but certain that New Delhi will not again countenance support for any violent extremist movement in Sri Lanka. Owing to the country’s substantial Tamil population, the Indian government will keep a watchful eye on political developments within Sri Lanka and will probably use diplomatic leverage to ensure that the rights of the Sri Lankan Tamil community are not completely disregarded in the wake of the Sri Lankan military victory against the LTTE. Similarly, it is reasonable to conclude that under the Awami League regime in Dhaka, India and Bangladesh will make steady if modest progress on counterterrorism cooperation. The dramatic growth of radical and violent Islamist organizations within Bangladesh over the past decade remains a concern across the political spectrum in India.31 Within Bangladesh, elements of civil society and segments of the political elite also have been concerned about the growing influence and strength of these groups. Consequently, the possibilities for meaningful joint action in curbing the activities of indigenous organizations such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Islami Chhatra Shibir, and Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh while simultaneously denying ULFA terrorists, most notably the group’s leadership, safe havens within Bangladesh should be seriously considered.

27

“Bangladesh, India to Conduct Joint Military Training Exercise in Assam,” India Defence, January 14, 2009, http://www.india-defence.com/ reports-4149.

28

C. Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004).

29

Sumit Ganguly, “Delhi’s Three Fatal Flaws,” Newsweek International, December 8, 2008.

30

Rama Lakshmi, “India, Pakistan to Share Intelligence,” Washington Post, July 17, 2009.

31

Sumit Ganguly, The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006).


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There is also the limited possibility of counterterrorism cooperation between Nepal and India to deal with the resurgent Indian Naxalite movement.32 Such cooperation would entail denying the Maoists safe havens in either country, intelligence-sharing, and better management and surveillance of a highly porous border. The prospects of such cooperation are limited, however, because of political uncertainty within Nepal, the likely ambivalence of the Maoist regime in Nepal about actions against Maoist guerillas in a neighboring country, and the structural weaknesses of Nepal’s coercive institutions.

Challenges to Effective Regional Counterterrorism Cooperation The possibilities for bilateral counterterrorism cooperation are obviously limited for the reasons that have been discussed. Might a regional approach to counterterrorism cooperation fare better? What possible institutional mechanisms exist to facilitate such cooperation? What are the principal barriers to such cooperation? At least three possible barriers to regional counterterrorism cooperation can be identified. They can be classified as institutional, normative, and organizational hurdles. First, South Asia is a region with thin institutional frameworks. With the exception of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), there is no other viable region-wide architecture for dealing with common regional problems and issues. Yet SAARC is institutionally hamstrung from undertaking the task of multilateral counterterrorism cooperation. The association’s charter formally prohibits the discussion of “bilateral and contentious” issues, and so tackling the vexed question of regional counterterrorism cooperation is not entirely within its purview. At best, under the terms of an existing agreement, the regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1987), the member states are formally committed to deal with hijacking as a criminal offense. Given existing political conditions in the region and the fraught state of Indo-Pakistani relations, though, it is unlikely that this convention could be meaningfully expanded to encompass genuine counterterrorism cooperation. Such cooperation would involve intelligence-sharing on various terrorist organizations, efforts to actively suppress terrorist activities on national soil, and above all eschewing the use of terrorism groups and tactics as a instrument of state policy. Second, the normative climate of regional cooperation, whether under the aegis of SAARC or otherwise, does not inspire confidence in the ability and willingness of the region’s leaders to forge a multilateral mechanism for dealing with counterterrorism. Some states within the region, most notably Pakistan, have yet to entirely eschew their ties with various terrorist organizations. Others, such as Bangladesh, have a long history of granting considerable leeway to terrorist organizations operating from their soil. Consequently, until all states in the region demonstrate a firm and unequivocal willingness to distance themselves from all terrorist organizations, the prospects for counterterrorism cooperation will continue to be hobbled. In this context it should be underscored that reaching a free-trade agreement, a relatively benign and mostly functional subject, within the SAARC framework proved to be a substantial endeavor, and the full implementation of the agreement’s terms and conditions may still be in abeyance.33

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32

Jennifer Oetken, “Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India,” in India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (London: Routledge, 2009).

33

Dilip K. Das, South Asian Free Trade Agreement: Prospects for Shallow Regional Integration, Working Paper, no.143 (Perth: Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 2007).


The long history of discord and conflict, and the concomitant distrust, among the states of South Asia has inhibited the development of certain routine habits of cooperation despite the material benefits that such cooperation could contribute.34 Third, the organizational weaknesses that exist are considerable. Even if all states in the region were to commit themselves to counterterrorism cooperation, it is not self-evident that they possess the requisite forensic, intelligence, and coercive capabilities and requisite legal frameworks to implement such a strategy. For example, in the aftermath of the Bombay/Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008, the organizational and physical limitations of India’s counterterrorism capabilities were laid bare. Consequently, India has now decided to locate units of the elite National Security Guards in all four major metropolitan centers (Bombay/Mumbai, New Delhi, Calcutta, and Madras/Chennai), to pass new and more stringent legislation to prosecute terrorists, and to create a nationwide national investigative agency.35 Given that India had possessed such anemic capabilities prior to the extraordinary series of terrorist attacks in Bombay/Mumbai, it is not unreasonable to conclude that none of the other, smaller states in the region have the requisite organizational and physical infrastructure to tackle terrorist groups on a war footing.

The Future of Regional Counterterrorism Cooperation What then might be done to address the problems of terrorism that have wracked the region? The task ahead will not be either easy or swift. The barriers to counterterrorism cooperation that exist at regional, national, and local levels are substantial and cannot be quickly surmounted. That said, some preliminary strategies and possible policies to promote regional counterterrorism can be outlined. At the outset, it must be stated that no nation in South Asia can of its own accord devise a mechanism to overcome the problems of collective action that need to be solved to move toward a viable regional counterterrorism strategy. Consequently, it may be more conducive if external actors, such as the United States or the European Union, were to initiate key elements or serve as the catalysts of a viable regional counterterrorism strategy, and for states in the region to respond to such efforts.

Domestic and Foreign Policy Shift in Pakistan In pursuit of such a strategy, a significant policy shift within Pakistan is required. The first and most difficult task is to induce Pakistan to end its support for terrorism, whether in Afghanistan or Kashmir. For far too long, Pakistani elites, both civilian and military, have equivocated about their involvement with and support for terrorism. Unless Pakistan abandons the support of various terrorist organizations, no progress will be made on regional counterterrorism cooperation, and terrorist groups will continue to thrive and wreak havoc in the region and beyond. The principal state in the region, India, which has been the main target and victim of Pakistan-based terrorism, will prove unwilling to participate in any regional arrangement until the question of Pakistan’s culpability is forthrightly addressed.36 Unfortunately, due to its strategic location athwart 34

For a discussion of the conundrum of cooperation in international politics and possible solutions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

35

For the detailed critique of India’s counterterrorism capabilities, see Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009).

36

Ashley J. Tellis, “Lessons from the Mumbai Terrorist Attacks, Part II,” testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C., January 28, 2009.


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Afghanistan, Pakistan has been able to avoid significant censure or sustained pressure to end its support for terrorism. The only possible means to accomplish this end involves sustained dialogue with Pakistan and unrelenting pressure from the United States and EU. The United States, in particular, because of its deep engagement with Pakistan and current donor status, is especially well-positioned to influence the country. In the absence of U.S. leadership in this arena, any effort on the part of the EU is unlikely to succeed. Concerted action on the part of both the United States and the EU, however, may well make the Pakistani leadership realize that it cannot indefinitely support terrorism and continue its dalliance with various jihadi organizations. To bring about this policy shift Pakistani civilian and particularly military elites must be persuaded to see reason on two critical issues. First, Pakistan’s resort to the use of jihadi terrorism has not induced India to make any concessions on the long-standing Kashmir dispute. On the contrary, this approach has actually had the effect of solidifying the Indian position against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. More to the point, with India’s growing economic prowess and increasing military might, the domestic salience of the Kashmir question will inevitably decline.37 Second, Pakistani elites will also need to be convinced that the country faces a genuine problem of destabilization from within if the government persists in the flawed belief that the risks of using jihadi forces are both controllable and calculable. The siege at the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad in July 2007, the Pakistani Taliban’s likely assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December of the same year, and Pakistan’s eventual attempts to clear the Swat Valley of the Taliban infestation in July 2009 should all give the leadership, both civilian and military, pause about the wisdom of the country’s continuing involvement with terrorism.38

Enhance Security Infrastructure Capabilities Apart from attempting to bring about this difficult policy shift, a host of other steps can be taken to encourage and promote counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia. As the tragedy of the Bombay/Mumbai attacks showed, police forces in India were hopelessly outgunned, lacked adequate physical protection, and possessed limited electronic surveillance capabilities. These problems exist across India but vary considerably across states because of the structure of Indian federalism.39 Police forces in the poorer and badly governed Indian states are in considerably worse shape than those of Bombay/Mumbai in the relatively prosperous state of Maharashtra. Matters, of course, are considerably worse in most other South Asian states. Lawlessness is pervasive in Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh. In all three of these states, judicial procedures to varying degrees are partisan, slothful, and inept. Ironically, Sri Lanka, which had limited counterterrorism capabilities but a modicum of judicial independence, is now witnessing a steady erosion of judicial probity. Worse still, the passage of draconian anti-terrorism legislation may actually produce perverse consequences and lead to a squelching of press freedoms and personal liberties.40

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37

Sumit Ganguly, “Will Kashmir Stop India’s Rise?” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (July–August 2006): 45–57.

38

On the Lal Masjid episode, see Manjeet Pardesi, “The Battle for the Soul of Pakistan at Islamabad’s Red Mosque,” in Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Places, ed. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). On Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, see Salman Masood and Carlotta Gall, “Bhutto Assassination Ignites Disarray,” New York Times, December 28, 2009. On the attempts to rout the Taliban from the Swat Valley, see Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “Landowners Still in Exile from Unstable Pakistan Area,” New York Times, July 28, 2009.

39

Under India’s constitutional dispensation, law and order issues are state subjects. The national government can only intervene either at the explicit request of state authorities or if it believes that law and order has collapsed in a particular state. See Arvind Verma, The Evolving Nature of Policing in India (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2010).

40

Lydia Polgreen, “Sri Lankan Editor Lauded by Obama Is Sentenced to 20 Years for Articles on Army,” New York Times, September 1, 2009.


Consequently, one of the most important tasks facing national and state governments across South Asia is to improve the physical capabilities of their police forces. In the absence of such improvements, police simply will not be able to cope with the sophisticated weaponry that many terrorist organizations have acquired. Improving the capabilities of police forces across the region constitutes a vital component in enhancing counterterrorism. That alone will not suffice, however. Due to rampant political interference, inadequate training, and limited pay and perquisites, police forces to varying degrees across South Asia lack professionalism and competence. The citizens of most South Asian countries view the police with a mixture of suspicion and disdain, and repose little faith in the ability of the police to even address matters of everyday crime. Consequently, all governments in the region must be encouraged and even helped to improve the training of their police.

Create Joint South Asian Counterterrorism and Policy Centers There is little question that some governments will view any proposal for joint training of police personnel with suspicion. Such hesitation should not, however, lead potential donor nations to necessarily abandon the prospect of creating such an appropriate institutional training apparatus. In this context, SAARC may be able to play a useful role. Policing in and of itself is not a political subject. Indeed, the proposal could emphasize the functional features of policing and counterterrorism cooperation to help allay the misgivings that no doubt will be expressed from various capitals. Emphasizing the growing dangers of terrorism that confront every state in the region, albeit to varying degrees, should convince national leaders to set aside their innate prejudices toward such multilateral cooperation. Consequently, under the aegis of SAARC, a training academy could be set up with foreign assistance, to train a cadre of police officers in counterterrorism. The creation of such a joint counterterrorism and policing center could also initiate certain habits of cooperation amongst the member states. Officers trained at the same center would develop formal and, more importantly, informal ties with each other. These links could be put to use when any member country faces a particular crisis. Such a proposition is far from chimerical. Even in the deeply troubled and fraught Indo-Pakistani relationship, there is evidence of tacit cooperation between military leaders in the midst of a war to limit the scope of conflict. Such cooperation was possible because of ties between senior military commanders harking back to their common military training during the British colonial era.41

Limit Cross-border Small Arms Transfers Another functional step that states in the region might consider is to work in concert to limit the clandestine transfer of small arms across national borders. Terrorist organizations have been able to thrive because they have managed to smuggle large quantities of small arms across porous national borders.42 These borders are porous because of terrain, poor management, and, on occasion, the cupidity of inadequately paid border personnel. Once again, this constitutes another arena where functional cooperation might be encouraged and supported.

41

Sumit Ganguly, “Discord and Collaboration in Indo-Pakistani Relations,” in Interpreting World Politics: Essays for A.P. Rana, ed. Kanti P. Bajpai and H.C. Shukul, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995).

42

“Arms Trafficking in South Asia: Poor Border Management Turns Bangladesh Transit Route,” Daily Star, December 11, 2007.


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Both the United States and the EU have considerable experience in border control and management. They also have extensive experience in methods of detecting illegal transshipments of small arms. Accordingly, customs and border protection officials from these states can offer invaluable advice, training, and even equipment to improve the border management skills and capabilities of regional personnel.

Improve Intelligence Cooperation Finally, as relevant individuals and organizations in the region develop a degree of trust with each other through a series of iterative contacts, they can tackle the acutely sensitive issue of intelligence cooperation. Thus far, routine and meaningful intelligence-sharing among the states of the region has been extremely limited. The timely sharing of information about potential terrorist plans and actions is critical to the success of region-wide counterterrorism efforts.

Conclusion This analysis shows that terrorism—whether based on Marxist and Maoist notions of class struggle or on the basis of religious dogma—stalks much of South Asia. Despite recent successes against the LTTE, and to a considerably lesser degree the Taliban, the problem of terrorism will persist in the region. Given the persistence of the problem it is in the common interest of all the South Asian states to visualize possible pathways of cooperation. Obviously, short of drastic changes in the national priorities and goals of some states, most notably Pakistan, counterterrorism cooperation in the region will not make dramatic progress. In this context, it needs to be forthrightly stated that the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir constitutes a critical barrier to promoting meaningful counterterrorism cooperation between these two warring parties. This deeply troubling issue cannot be glossed over. In the interim, however, there is little reason to believe that limited, incremental steps cannot be taken to steadily address the issue, especially among the other states of the region. Such steps, once initiated, can also serve as a foundation for broader cooperation, as individuals and organizations develop greater familiarity and trust among one another. It should also be underscored that the states of the region, because of the limited level of prior cooperative ventures, may not be inclined to undertake these efforts of their own accord. Accordingly, external actors with economic, diplomatic and strategic clout may need to provide the necessary catalytic mechanisms to prompt the movement toward cooperation. Such efforts may initially involve the convening of a major conference to discuss common terrorist threats and possible means and strategies for countering them. Such a meeting could then be held on an annual basis, thereby providing some ongoing momentum toward the institutionalization of cooperation. Having initiated this process, the external actors could then simply assume a lowered profile, standing ready to provide advice, information, and material assistance as needed and desired. The steps that have been sketched out do not constitute a panacea for addressing the conundrum of promoting multilateral counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia. Instead, they constitute a set of initial measures designed to initiate a process that may provide the basis for more robust, organized, and institutionalized mechanisms in the future.

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