Crafting European Security - European International Studies Association

5 downloads 0 Views 159KB Size Report
On the other side of the spectrum, Peter Storr, Director of the. International ..... Korski, D. and Gowan, R. (2009) 'Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of ...
Crafting European Security: The Practice of Diplomacy and EU Integration Dr. Mai’a K. Davis Cross University of Southern California [email protected] Abstract: Under which circumstances can groups of diplomats have an independent impact on the progress of EU integration? Although principal-agent theory and bargaining theory are typically used to address similar questions, this article suggests that a revised epistemic community framework enriches our theoretical perspective on the practice of diplomacy. The main hypothesis is that the more cohesive an epistemic community of diplomats, the more likely it is to influence integration. Two key groups – the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) – are analyzed as an empirical test for this hypothesis. Based on the factors of selection and training, meeting frequency and quality, shared professional norms, and common culture, the article finds that Coreper is likely to be a more persuasive group than PSC. This has implications for the larger question of whether the EU has what it takes to become a significant security actor.

I. Introduction Under which circumstances can groups of diplomats have an independent impact on the progress of EU integration? Although principal-agent theory (Miller, 2005) and bargaining theory (Schelling, 1956) are typically used to address similar questions, this article suggests that a revised epistemic community framework enriches our theoretical perspective on the influence of diplomats in the process of EU integration. The evidence presented in this article shows that two major groups of diplomats have been central to crafting a new European security space on behalf of member-states: The Committee of Permanent Representatives II (henceforth Coreper) and the

Political and Security Committee (PSC). While PSC focuses on external security and crisis situations, Coreper specializes in internal security issues. I selected these cases because the ambassadors in Coreper and PSC are both at the pinnacle of the Council hierarchy, just below the Council of Ministers, and each possess a unique kind of security expertise. Thus, these cases are most likely to yield observable results in a policy area that is generally regarded as a hard test for integration. At the same time, Coreper and PSC are ideal cases for comparison in that the strength of their influence varies, making it possible to generate inferences on the impact of the explanatory variables. Several scholars such as Lewis (2005), Howorth (2007), Christiansen (2007), and Mérand (forthcoming) have looked at the role of committees or structure of networks in influencing policy outcomes. This article is largely complimentary to their work, but through using a new epistemic community framework, I hope to enable a more systematic comparison of the relative strength of various groups and consideration of these networked actors’ agency. The case studies draw upon nearly 80 interviews conducted in 2009, including 20 of Coreper and PSC ambassadors and 11 of those instructing Coreper and PSC from major capitals. This research is designed to serve as an empirical test of the main hypothesis that cohesive epistemic communities can be influential in contributing to EU security integration. I recognize that interviews are sometimes regarded with skepticism because interviewees may inflate the importance of what they do. However, any study of epistemic communities will require speaking to those involved as there is typically no other way to establish motives, interests and preferences without speaking to those involved. i Moreover, as Brian Rathbun argues, “when a consensus appears among those in a best position to know, it should be taken very seriously (2008, p. 692).”

In the next section, I briefly lay out the concept of epistemic community and my framework of analysis. Sections III and IV examine Coreper and PSC in turn, highlighting the key characteristics of their composition, internal processes, and ability to influence outcomes. In the final section, I conclude that Coreper tends to be more externally impactful than PSC and that this has implications for the future trajectories of internal and external security integration.

II. Epistemic Communities Building upon the earlier works of Kuhn (1962), Foucault (1973), and Ruggie (1975), Peter Haas operationalized the idea of epistemic community in 1992. He defined the concept as (p. 3), “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.” In other words, epistemic communities must have an authoritative claim on knowledge to impact policy outcomes. Their goals must derive from their objective, expert knowledge, not some other motivation, and this is what differentiates them from other actors. Naturally, knowledge itself may be socially constructed, but epistemic communities must nonetheless regard it objectively. It is important to note that epistemic communities rarely encompass an entire discipline or profession. While Haas’s contribution to the literature has been very valuable, it should not be assumed that we must always treat his interpretation as the only viable one (Cross 2007). There have been several subsequent additions to the literature, many of which specifically address the question of when and why epistemic communities should matter (Radaelli, 1999; Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Richardson 1996; Verdun, 1999; Antoniades, 2003). A big emphasis has been on the idea that conditions of

uncertainty or a triggering crisis are necessary for epistemic communities to play a role. But despite this growth in the literature, there has not been much exploration of the concept itself and its utility for IR. Instead, there have been either supporters or detractors. Those who dismiss the importance of epistemic communities either argue that their role has been exaggerated, or that too many other factors have been left unexplained. I argue that a number of qualities should be taken into consideration to enable the concept to be more effective as a tool for understanding international outcomes. First, it should be recognized that the process of professionalization and professionalism itself are at the heart of epistemic community cohesion. This is often where common points of reference and behavioral rules arise and are internalized. Second, I argue that epistemic communities do not simply exist or not exist, but can be characterized as strong or weak. Third, it should be acknowledged that non-scientific knowledge can be just as impactful as scientific knowledge. And finally, I contend that epistemic communities are often always at work, and thus it is not necessary to look for a triggering crisis or episodes of uncertainty to observe their influence, as others have argued. Altogether, my reconceptualization makes it possible to open up the universe of possible cases, and to draw out an important dynamic in IR, one that is particularly visible in the context of the EU. In addition to the more obvious groups of scientists and technology experts, networks of high-level diplomats, civilian crisis experts, human rights lawyers, military officers, judges, and so on can be important actors in the international landscape to varying degrees. This does not mean that just any transnational group is potentially an epistemic community. An epistemic community is still fundamentally based on the professional expertise of its members, and the objective use of knowledge to prescribe policy.

Do high-ranking EU diplomats comprise epistemic communities? Yes, because they have both procedural knowledge and an authoritative claim on substantive knowledge. Over the course of their careers, those who become Coreper and PSC ambassadors have gained a considerable amount of knowledge on how the EU apparatus works, as well as the intricacies of member-state preferences. They work with instructions, but they also play a role in writing those instructions in the first place. They typically come to agreement among themselves then seek to persuade their politician counterparts of their internal compromises. This is the dynamic that characterizes epistemic communities. They may be closer to the policy process than traditional notions of epistemic communities (scientists and technicians), but this does not preclude them from exercising independent agency. And they can be characterized as stronger or weaker. To measure the strength of an epistemic community as a persuasive actor, four key independent variables can be considered: selection and training, meeting frequency and quality, shared professional norms, and common culture.

I suggest here that these factors matter

empirically, and the evidence below, seems to support their importance. ii Selection & Training provide insight into the origins of an epistemic community, and largely determine the status of a profession. When selection and promotion are highly competitive, this ensures that those who eventually constitute an epistemic community have a high level of expertise. Similarly, if these individuals undergo rigorous and extensive training their expertise is more likely to be recognized by others. Training can come in a variety of forms, but when standards are consistent across national borders, transnational epistemic community are more likely to be cohesive. Meeting Frequency & Quality point toward the nature of interaction among members of an epistemic community. The more face-to-face time they have, the more likely they are to build strong ties, strengthen shared professional norms, and cultivate a common culture. Shared

professional norms concern the protocol, procedure, and norms of consensus-building within an epistemic community. Even when members of a group must disagree about certain substantive issues, their professional norms give them a common basis of understanding that they can count on, and this makes it easier for them to agree on substance. Common Culture comprises the sense of purpose, identity, symbolism, and heritage within the community. It is more than simply esprit de corps, but a sense of identifying with one another.

Figure 1. Epistemic Communities Framework of Analysis

The strength of these four variables indicates the overall cohesiveness of an epistemic community. Cohesiveness, in turn, has a significant impact on the network’s ability to reach a strong consensus as a group. I hypothesize that these internal qualities and processes are key determinants of the group’s external influence. A cohesive epistemic community, like Coreper, is more likely to reach a strong consensus, and subsequently persuade decision-makers of what its members deem best. However, if one or more of its internal qualities is weak, an epistemic community, like PSC, becomes less cohesive and subsequently less persuasive.

III. The Committee of Permanent Representatives Coreper’s members undergo a rigorous selection and training process as part of their professional development. They meet frequently in informal settings, and share a multitude of key professional norms. Their common culture holds the group together, and results in a similar worldview that enables them to more easily reach consensus and persuade their capitals of further integration. After analyzing the four main qualities that make up this epistemic community,iii I highlight Coreper’s impact in shaping the 2005 Strategy on Radicalization and Recruitment to show how the group’s influence works in practice.

Diplomatic Selection & Training Standards of selection and training within a profession indicate the competitiveness, level of expertise, and status of a group. For EU diplomats, professional selection begins right out of university, and is repeated when diplomats are subsequently promoted to new positions over time. The fact that they come from the same top universities contributes to a similar social and networking background. Training occurs at the foreign ministries, but it is clear that actual time in the field – performing the daily duties of a diplomat, navigating through a difficult multilateral negotiation, and learning the nitty-gritty of foreign policy – is a crucial component of this. As Ambassador Mavroyiannis (interview, January 2009) said, “Expertise comes from experience, long exposure, and whether you know the people, issues, and procedures.” Coreper ambassadors originate from this process, and after decades of service, have shown themselves to be the best at what they do. Among senior diplomatic postings, a Coreper appointment is considered one of the most prestigious and challenging. It is comparable to postings to London, Washington DC, Berlin,

and Paris, and for many member-states it is the most important appointment. After all, decisions in Brussels impact a high percentage of domestic legislation (interview, Greek Coreper DeputyAmbassador Joannis Vrailas, February 2009). The choice of who will serve in this post is taken very seriously. In Denmark, for example, the selection process requires governmental approval twice, with two-weeks separating the votes (interview, Danish Coreper Ambassador Claus Grube, January 2009). .By the time the list of potential Coreper appointees is drawn up there are really only a small handful of qualified candidates. One ambassador said that it is actually possible to predict who the people in the pool will be for the next three or four generations (interview, Ambassador Braun, February 2009). Years of experience in EU matters, strong relationships with those in the capital, and demonstrated skill are necessary (interview, Lithuanian PSC Ambassador Darius Jonas Semaška, February 2009). Together, competitive selection and career-long training provide a foundation for Coreper’s potential influence.

Meetings and Shared Professional Norms Face-to-face meetings give members of an epistemic community the opportunity to cultivate relationships, engage in real deliberation, and develop a common culture. This is where shared norms evolve and are reinforced. Coreper meets formally once per week, following a precirculated agenda as well as certain professional protocol. It is during informal meetings, however, that the real discussion occurs, and these occur daily through working coffees, lunches, or dinners. Whereas during formal meetings, there is not enough time for every delegate to speak on every issue, during informal meetings ambassadors can be frank and efficient. Since the 2004 enlargement, informal meetings typically include smaller groups of 6-8 ambassadors with a shared interest in a particular issue. They discuss a range of polices, and try to prepare

each other for upcoming formal meetings. It is clear that informal meetings consolidate relationships within the group. They are so much a part of Coreper’s activities that one ambassador said, “We are not only ambassadors, but friends on the other side of the table…We are permanently together” (interview, January 2009). Besides the quantity, type, and style of meetings, the quality of the interaction is critical to Coreper’s ability to foster cohesion among its members and to reach compromise on key issues. Strong professional norms enable meetings to be more productive, and ensure that everyone is speaking the same language (so to speak). One major professional norm is that Coreper ambassadors get involved in drafting new policy proposals very early on, even before the Commission has formally initiates them. Thus, by the time the Commission has committed something to paper, Coreper has already left its mark, and the document does not change substantially after that. Second, ambassadors strive to be as efficient and results-oriented as possible, and this is reflected at the very moment that they decide something. Coreper deals with issues that have been designated as either subject to unanimity or qualified majority voting (QMV), but the group never votes. Significantly, ambassadors strive to ensure that everyone is on board with each individual policy, regardless of the voting requirements. As one ambassador explains, “If it is a very vital, super important interest, even though it is QMV, there is a gentleman agreement to search for unanimity” (interview, Coreper Ambassador, January 2009). This gentleman’s agreement is significant because these actors are not bargaining to gain as much as possible for themselves, as certain rationalist approaches might anticipate. Furthermore, the ambassadors always negotiate one issue at a time rather than trying to strike bargains across issues(interview,

Finnish Coreper Ambassador Jan Store, January 2009). Members of the group do not want to see anyone “lose”. A third major professional norm is that ambassadors try to avoid escalating an issue to the ministers if at all possible. If they cannot come to agreement amongst themselves, they feel they have failed. Moreover, if an issue is escalated, ministers may actually fight for something that they will publically lose, making it more of a pronounced failure for the EU (interview, Slovakian Coreper Ambassador Maroš Šefčovič, January 2009). Romanian Antici delegate Alina Padeanu (interview, January 2009) said, “A small political problem can become a big political problem at the ministerial level.” Thus, ambassadors may on occasion use escalation as a threat, a last ditch effort to push colleagues to move on a particularly controversial topic (interview, Klen Jäärats, Estonian Antici, January 2009). This is not the standard modus operandi for ambassadors who typically reach consensus willingly and through positive dialogue. These three professional norms are just a few examples of how Coreper guides itself towards internal cohesiveness. But what actually determines their policy goals?

Common Culture Common culture is defined as the esprit de corps, identity, heritage, symbolism, and sense of purpose shared by a group. Individuals who share a common culture define their own interests with the interests of the group, and thus have similar substantive norms. For epistemic communities it is natural that the policy goals they share reflect their common expertise. Coreper’s esprit de corps is manifested as a feeling of being part of a club and empathizing with each other. One ambassador (interview, March 2009) said, “A very special kind of solidarity

bonds us…we have a duty and natural inclination to respect each other for past achievements and accomplishments…” New member-states are no exception to this feeling of solidarity. Enlargement brought with it a greater number of voices and interests at the table, but not new geographic dividing lines (interview, Ambassador Store, January 2009). In many cases, the ambassadors from the newer member-states have more autonomy to act because their capitals do not yet have the administrative wherewithal to try to cope with EU affairs directly (interview, Luxembourg Coreper Ambassador Christian Braun, February 2009). What actually matters more than the newness of the member-state is the newness of the ambassador to Brussels. iv Slovenian Ambassador Senčar (interview, January 2009). said, “Even if you are from an old member-state, if you are new then you have to take time to be an observer.” Those ambassadors with a greater depth of experience and talent as negotiators have greater pull in meetings. What does this wealth of expertise and common culture lead to in terms of actual policy goals? First, members of Coreper to a great extent believe that integration is inevitable and good for Europe. Ambassador Store expressed the idea concisely, “What is good for Europe is good for Finland, even if we didn’t get all that we wanted.” The ambassadors consistently describe themselves as pro-Europe, and in most cases, more pro-Europe than their capitals. Given that they could just as easily approach negotiations as a game of bargaining and strive to gain as much as possible for their national interests, this norm is significant. Cypriot Ambassador Mavroyiannis (interview, January 2009) said, “We are conscious of the need for us to reconcile pursuit of national and pursuit of general interest. This has to do with the idea that one should never – except in extreme cases – put one above the other.” One manifestation of this is that there are no fixed alliances among certain member-states. They genuinely deal with each issue

on its own terms, based on their expertise and ability to get the capitals on board. They feel that they are serving European citizens in common, as one constituency, and that the Council is in effect a kind of EU government (interview, March 2009). Second, along with this, Coreper ambassadors regard themselves as maneuvering in a gray area between technocratic and political decision-making, oftentimes bridging the two. Portuguese Antici delegate Francicso Duarte Lopes (interview, January 2009) said of Coreper, “It has technical tasks and takes political decisions.” This is particularly true for the memberstates that rely heavily on their high-ranking civil servants in Brussels. While a diplomat is fundamentally a civil servant, at the highest echelons of the profession, he may do a politician’s work (interview, Ambassador Grube, January 2009). This is regarded as a way of life in Coreper. Third, when it comes to security policy Coreper ambassadors would like to see it become internally seamless within the EU. They define security broadly to encompass all aspects of everyday life in Europe, and believe that there is a strong interdependence between the internal and external dimensions (multiple interviews 2009). At the same time, they are unwilling to sacrifice civil liberties for security, and this is a strongly held norm. They believe that European citizens will benefit greatly from security integration, and that the EU will operate more efficiently if it is achieved, but that their expertise is needed to strike the right balance. It is taken for granted within Coreper that the EU must have a strong legal space. Thus, they use these general principles as a backbone to push integration forward, and persuade their capitals. The path towards more integration, however, is by no means an easy one.

Persuading the Capitals

Given that these ambassadors do share substantive causal beliefs, even when it comes to the contentious issues of security, how successful are they at convincing their capitals? They in fact face much resistance from the capitals where the tendency is to try to directly control the direction of internal security policy and to guard national regulations, some of which have been in place for centuries. As Austrian Ambassador Schweisgut (interview, January 2009) explained, it is a “situation where the ministers of home affairs are obsessed with secrecy and obsessed with keeping information as close to their chests as possible. They are reluctant to give things early to Coreper. They pre-cook things to the extent possible.” The nature of the resistance does vary depending on the member-state. In the Netherlands, for example, the general approach is to handle internal security on the national level, but if there is added-value from a broader focus they are willing to put national policy into a European context (interview, Policy Officer Rogier Kok, Dutch Ministry of Justice, May 2009). In Portugal, Rita Faden, Director General of Internal Affairs, said that it is important to have a mix of national and EU preferences, but that it is counter-productive to only consider internal security from a national perspective, considering that the EU is nearly internally borderless (interview, April 2009). On the other side of the spectrum, Peter Storr, Director of the International Directorate in the UK Home Office, described the UK’s involvement in EU common security policy as mainly altruistic (interview, May 2009). “We give more than we get out.” The primary way in which a capital has leverage over its ambassadors is through formal instructions, and the main way in which ambassadors exercise agency is through flexibility with those instructions. While receiving instructions from capitals is a big part of how the epistemic community of diplomats operates and is constrained, in practice, instructions serve as a more

formalized means of coordination and persuasion between the two. Instructions are rarely set in stone for high-ranking ambassadors. They serve as a basis for deliberation. Ambassadors each report that they have a high degree of flexibility with their instructions, but that there are varying degrees and types of flexibility across Coreper. This depends on the circumstances in each member-state. Countries with coalition governments, leadership with a weak majority in parliament, or where ambassadorial selection is more political tend to be less flexible (interview, Francisco Duarte Lopes, Portuguese Antici delegate, January 2009). More generally, however, ambassadors gain flexibility and autonomy through their own initiative. This is facilitated by the fact that those in the capitals recognize, trust, and respect Coreper. They understand that their ambassadors have gained a much deeper perspective by virtue of their time in Brussels, and previous experience working on European issues. Head of EU section Emma Gibbons, of the International Directorate in London’s Home Office, said “It’s about being on the frontline, exposed to the day-to-day dynamic.” Rita Faden of Portugal’s Ministry of the Interior (April, 2009), said, “Trust in the ambassador is really important….In the capitals, we may not have the complete picture…[Coreper ambassadors] have asked to change the instructions, and we have been flexible.” Dutch policy officer Rogier Kok (interview, May 2009) said, “In the end, if [the ambassador] doesn’t want to say something, he doesn’t. In the end, he’s in charge. He’s in control. It’s his interpretation of what’s important or not, and what’s achievable.” Thus, ambassadors usually get their way. Sometimes there are certain red lines, but even then the obstacles are not insurmountable. For the most part, ambassadors find themselves negotiating with their capitals just as much as they deliberate amongst themselves (interview, Latvian Coreper Ambassador Normunds

Popens, January 2009). They often strive to get their capitals to approach EU decision-making as an extension of their own government, and find that this promotes constructive approaches to integration (interview, Jäärats January 2009). The example of the 2005 Strategy on Radicalization & Recruitment (SRR) illustrates how Coreper was able to infuse an issue with its own shared causal beliefs.

The Strategy on Radicalization & Recruitment The SRR was designed to define the terrorist threat to the EU, highlight the challenges the EU faces in overcoming extremist ideologies and threat vulnerabilities, and outline the pro-active measures the EU will take to undermine Al Qaeda’s radicalization and recruitment in Europe (Council document 14781/1/05, 2005). The SRR’s section on response to radicalization and recruitment is a particularly important part of the strategy. It entails the following initiatives: 1. disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism; 2. ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism; 3. promote yet more vigorously security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all. The specific records of Coreper discussions involving SRR are classified, but it is possible to gain a picture of Coreper’s influence through a comparison of the draft Strategy (12 September 2005) submitted to Coreper and the final version (11 November 2005), which reflects Coreper’s revisions. This comparison shows that Coreper sought to advance particular goals that emphasized their twin norms of security integration alongside the strengthening of the EU legal space. First, the ambassadors argued that the EU should enact a comprehensive response. They agreed that there is a dangerous, distorted version of Islam that must be combated with efforts to

integrate Muslims into society and empower moderate voices. To do this, they emphasized the importance of non-state, transnational actors like NGOs, alongside state-driven solutions. Second, the ambassadors wanted to elevate the perception of threat. They believed that more people were at risk, and more citizens could be impacted by terrorist activity than had been previously anticipated. They argued that even if a specific country had not been a target, this did not mean that they were immune. They called upon member-states to approach the problem of radicalization and recruitment as a European problem. Third, Coreper emphasized that any action taken by the EU with respect to radicalization and recruitment must be legitimated. To accomplish this, they added to the final draft specific mention of protecting fundamental rights, putting in place a legal framework, encouraging a political dialogue, and involving experts such as academics in shaping policies. In other words, the solution involved asserting “Europeanness” above particularities. Since the Strategy was made public on 24 November 2005, Coreper has revised its policy goals every six months to take into account actual progress and their ongoing deliberations. The SRR became part of the more general EU Action Plan for Combating Terrorism, a policy for which Coreper also performed the preparatory work. The new initiatives include: public diplomacy to explain and legitimate EU actions to the international community and to put forward a common EU image; information sharing across member-states; setting up funding for individual research that would aim to strengthen the relationship between civil society and European authorities, and multinational funding to generate policy proposals that would require a European approach to combating terrorism; and a new approach to extremism that would treat it as a danger within all religions, instead of emphasizing Islam alone. Biannual progress reports show that major initiatives have been successfully launched along these lines, including: the

implementation of a media communication strategy; the development of a “common lexicon of terms”; a signed agreement among member-states to abide by EU laws criminalizing both direct and indirect incitement of terrorist activities; multinational meetings to promote interfaith and intercultural dialogue, direct involvement of major NGOs, and so on. In the end, Coreper persuaded member-states to envision the EU as a contiguous “homeland” in which policy would be legitimated. One year after the launch of the SRR, a progress report states: Radicalization has moved from a somewhat specialist issue to a central theme with profound implications for the future of our society. [SRR] has brought this issue to centre stage and focused minds on how we tackle the problem collectively (Council document 15386/06, 2006). Despite the fact that the majority of member-states had not even experienced the problem of radicalization, Coreper successfully reframed the issue as European.

IV. The Political and Security Committee Although PSC ambassadors share many of the same professional qualities as those in Coreper, for the same reasons that Coreper is strong, PSC is somewhat weaker. PSC does not come together frequently in informal settings, its professional norms emphasize expediency rather than real deliberation, and its common culture does not run as deeply as Coreper’s. At the same time, PSC still engages more in persuasion than bargaining, and its members share a belief that security integration will ultimately be good for Europe. The outcomes, however, are mixed.

Diplomatic Selection & Training

Initially, there was some disagreement about who should populate PSC. The French government saw the committee as a means to boost the EU’s security image and wanted senior ambassadors in the posts, while British leaders were concerned that it could potentially interfere with NATO’s goals, and preferred second-tier appointees. Ultimately, member-states decided in favor of the French perspective (European Council Helsinki, 1999). Nonetheless, many of the larger member-states did not initially choose their top ambassadors for the post, worrying that senior diplomats would take too much control away (Howorth, 2007, p. 9). Over the past decade, seniority has gradually risen, and a PSC appointment brings with it much prestige. Like their counterparts in Coreper, PSC ambassadors are recognized for their expertise in EU affairs. Most have served as European Correspondents at some point (interview, Dutch PSC Ambassador Robert Milders, January 2009). Some have regional expertise, while others have grappled with EU security issues (interview, Finnish PSC Ambassador Anne Sipiläinen, February 2009). And of course they quickly learn a lot once they take up their posts in Brussels. In comparing her Helsinki and Brussels experiences, the Finnish Ambassador said, “We here in Brussels know much more than the capitals can ever know and it’s a different type of knowledge.” Despite some initial controversy over the nature of PSC, there is not much that differentiates this group from Coreper in terms of selection and training. Both groups boast high levels of professionalism, status, and expertise.

Meetings & Professional Norms The quantity and quality of meetings does differentiate PSC from Coreper. In terms of formal meetings, PSC meets regularly on Tuesdays and Fridays, and schedules emergency meetings to discuss a specific crisis as needed (interview with French Nicolaidis delegate

Quentin Weiler, January 2009). Over the past decade, PSC’s schedule has become increasingly overloaded with formal meetings usually lasting the whole day and often going into the night (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007, p. 137). The ambassadors established the Nicolaïdis Group in 2003 to help with the workload. PSC also attempts to meet informally, but they increasingly do not have enough time to do so. It has become such a problem that they have set aside Tuesday lunches as a formally scheduled informal meeting. The fact that decisions must typically be made in formal meetings is not ideal for a number of reasons. One reason is that there are regularly over 100 people in attendance at formal meetings. Simon Duke (2005, p. 20) writes, “The national ‘representatives’ can often comprise more than the [PSC] members, which means that on issues that are particularly emotive or complex the meetings can easily consist of over one hundred people – so much for collegiality.” It would seem that only around 30 individuals should be present, the ambassadors and a few other institutional delegates. But in reality, many others descend upon the meetings: a representative from the Commission, four representatives from the Council Secretariat, national experts on particular topics, various national officials from the capitals, candidate countries’ representatives, a number of note-takes, and so on. In the end, it is impossible to create an intimate atmosphere (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007, p. 138). The ambassadors admit to being quite overwhelmed with information and meetings, and this detracts from their ability to form relationships (Meyer, 2006, p. 126). Juncos and Reynolds (p. 143-4) write, “the Committee’s workload has reduced opportunities for socializing and has rendered the diplomatic work closer to a government in the shadow…the PSC increasingly appears as being ‘outside the charmed circle of diplomacy’.” The inability to have fruitful informal meetings, and the stifled quality of formal meetings means that PSC resembles less a

diplomatic community than a bureaucratic one. This is particularly apparent when compared to Coreper. Perhaps not surprisingly, the professional norms that govern these formal meetings tend to be based on expediency at the expense of real deliberation (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007, p. 142-3). First, no delegation should speak more than once on the same topic in order to accommodate the large number of delegates in the room. If an ambassador feels the need to speak a second time, he or she must apologize to the chair and offer a compelling explanation for speaking again. Second, since the 2004 enlargement there is also a norm that each ambassador should keep his or her statement to less than two minutes. Third, like with Coreper, they strive to reach consensus at their level, rather than escalating issues. There is a feeling within PSC that they may be undercut. Ministers tend to debate external security issues regardless of whether or not PSC has already arrived at consensus, and member-states have sometimes forbidden PSC from discussing certain contentious issues. While the norm to reach compromise at their level appears similar to Coreper’s, the motivation is a bit different: PSC ambassadors do not want to become irrelevant.

Common culture PSC ambassadors have developed an esprit de corps by virtue of the sheer amount of time they spend together and their common professional backgrounds. During their term in Brussels, this esprit de corps gets stronger, and they increasingly think from a Brussels-oriented perspective. The growing importance of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) also brings them together as they pursue common goals that are increasingly influencing the EU’s external image. To some extent, the ambassadors share a common sense of purpose. Dutch PSC Ambassador

Milders (interview, January 2009) said, “We have a common understanding of what security means. We are familiar with the ins and outs of our discussions. We don’t need to explain to each other the basics. The negotiations are more about the detail, the practical side.” For them, the main controversy is not whether or not something constitutes a threat to security, but how to prioritize various threats and what actions to take (interview with Estonian PSC Ambassador Sander Soone, January 2009). They speak the same language of security. In terms of their substantive approach to security, Jolyon Howorth’s surveys (2007, p. 134) of PSC ambassadors show that they strongly support the development of CSDP and a security identity for the EU. They, as well as decision-makers in the member-states, ultimately want CFSP/CSDP to be successful (Howorth, 2007, p. 25). Unlike in Coreper, however, PSC ambassadors seem to lack a big picture to some extent. They only discuss military interoperability on a case-by-case basis, and do not see the issue of military capability as their main responsibility, even though they potentially have much to contribute in this area. They also share no consensus that internal and external security are related in some way, in contrast to Coreper (PSC interviews, 2009). Altogether, this takes away from the achievement of more forward-looking goals. Nonetheless, the very existence of PSC is predicated on a desire to find consensus, and capitals realize that compromising their positions may be necessary. This is manifested in a socalled consultation reflex (Juncos and Reynolds, p. 142). Member-states tend to look to Brussels before publically stating their national positions on foreign policy issues. Along with this, ambassadors indicate that the best strategy for conveying national preferences in their own discussions is to couch them in terms of what is good for the EU (Howorth, 2007, p. 22). They want to be able to speak with one voice, but sometimes they have to settle for the lowest

common denominator. As PSC Ambassador Anne Sipiläinen (interview, February 2009) said, “We are trying to combine EU and national interests. We have to find a single voice somehow. Sometimes that voice is not always that loud, but it is improving.” There is some bargaining that occurs within PSC, but persuasion is still the dominant method of deliberation. Expertise and the personal qualities of ambassadors factor in to this. Ambassador Sipiläinen (interview, February 2009) said, “There are some who have more experience and have more weight in persuading. In all these kinds of groupings, it’s really the person and his expertise and not as much the formal position of the member-state.” Thus, expertise is still a key part of their internal processes.

Persuading the Capitals Standing at the juncture between EU policy and member-state capitals, PSC ambassadors are more concerned with conveying national interests compared to Coreper. They are not totally bound by their instructions, but they approach their work as a process of finding areas of natural overlap between member-states. Howorth (2007, p. 25) writes that one strategy PSC ambassadors employ is to present their country’s preferences as close as possible to where they believe the consensus lies. They are constantly aware of the “collective mindset”, and this is a process closer to consensus-seeking than bargaining. At the same time, the cohesiveness, shared norms, and trust within the group provide them with a basis to persuade their capitals of something more. PSC ambassadors cite numerous examples of negotiations in which they had different starting positions, and were able to narrow the gap through persuading their capitals to compromise, and even achieve unanimity (Howorth, 2007, p. 21).

Like in Coreper, they must work with instructions, but flexibility varies more sharply. Big member-states may provide 50 pages of detailed instructions, whereas small member-states may provide only a few lines (interview, Slovenian Deputy PSC Ambassador Mirko Cigler, March 2009). PSC ambassadors report that more often than not they are able to get memberstates to change their instructions within reason. In some cases, there might be flexibility, but the ambassador is still very closely controlled from the capital. Whatever he or she says in meetings is closely scrutinized back at home (interview, Ambassador Semaška, February 2009). In other cases, ambassadors must decide how much of a personal risk they are willing to take by stretching the boundaries of their instructions. In the end, if each ambassador’s degree of flexibility is vastly different, collective agency becomes more difficult. From the capitals’ perspective, Adam Sambrook, who instructs PSC ambassadors from London, expressed the idea that these diplomats are essentially negotiating within the spaces between their red lines. He said (interview, May 2009), “There are sharp redlines, but not in so far as they are restrictive.” The Portuguese director for Security and Defense Affairs, João Pedro Antunes, who previously served in Brussels, said that he is particularly sensitive about ensuring that his ambassador has room for maneuver (interview, April 2009). He said, “Unless it’s a key issue and we want to be strict about the output, all 27 have to agree. I let the ambassador manage with a free hand.” Quite often Antunes will be asked to change the instructions because of a compromise reached in Brussels, and he is willing to comply. He said, “Every member-state is persuaded by negotiations in Brussels.” When asked whether decisions are mostly made in Lisbon or in Brussels, Antunes explained that at least two-thirds of decisions are determined in Brussels instead of in Lisbon.

The story is also different in the Hague, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs compiles and synthesizes instructions coming from many different government departments, in a complex, routinized process. The final instructions are uploaded to a secure computer database that is accessible to Dutch ambassadors all over the world. Rochus Pronk, a Dutch Political Affairs representative, (interview, May 2009) said, “Sometimes PSC ambassadors may say that they don’t need instructions, but we say you need clear guidance…” With respect to flexibility, Pronk said, “Usually the answer is no…We try to find a compromise, but on some issues there’s a principled stance.” Any changes to instructions are far more likely to happen at the working group level where capital-Brussels interactions are still relatively informal. But this is only one end of the spectrum. The Lithuanian ambassador, for example, barely receives instructions at all. Ambassadors who have less to contribute in terms of security may have less in the way of instructions, but they may also have less influence among their peers. Ultimately, as Juncos and Reynolds (p. 144-5) argue, “interaction in Brussels-based committees can and frequently does impact upon the definition of preferences”. But as I have described, member-states differ fundamentally in their manner of instruction, and the extent to which they are willing to grant flexibility. Rather than pointing to the capitals as wholly responsible for PSC’s context, I argue that this outcome derives more from the group’s own shortcomings. How does this manifest in actual policy outcomes?

The Institutionalization of External Security Cooperation PSC negotiates three major types of security issues. First, it strives to craft a common EU voice in response to international crises or incidences, like the 2008-9 Georgia-Russia crisis, and the 2007-8 Kosovo bid for independence. Second, it discusses and manages ongoing relationships

with third parties like the African Union, Iran, and Russia. Third, it oversees CSDP operations and missions from inception to withdrawal. The bulk of PSC’s work is in the third category, and it is largely an oversight role. Much of the details of operations planning must be determined in other bodies with specific military expertise. PSC essentially takes a problem-solving approach. As Juncos and Reynolds (p. 144) describe it, they “are there to sound out other national positions, gain information, and find out what is and is not possible.” While it is true that PSC’s role has grown alongside the expansion of CSDP and it has a strong coordination reflex, there is not much to suggest that ambassadors are pushing for higher levels of cooperation or integration beyond the day-to-day management of these operations. For example, PSC has not streamlined the overly complex process of CSDP operational decisionmaking in Brussels. This often makes it very difficult for coherent implementation of operations. A recent European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) report, argues that the PSC is guilty of bureaucratic mismanagement, naïve transference (applying a previous model to a new and different situation), ignoring the advice of officers on the ground, micro-managing missions, and neglecting to build connections between internal and external security bodies in Brussels (Korski and Gowan, 2009). PSC has the potential to become a stronger epistemic community, but its internal processes currently preclude this. Informal, face-to-face meetings are a crucial means of building the norms and culture required to be more collectively persuasive. Coreper provides a solid model for this.

V. Conclusion

I have attempted to expose the internal processes within two key epistemic communities of diplomats, and have suggested that their ability to influence is impacted by their internal dynamic. Ultimately, this has implications for the progress of internal and external security integration. On the internal side, the dynamics of decision-making and deliberation indicate that integration is backed by strong norms and a vibrant process of persuasion between Brussels and the capitals. Coreper is an epistemic community that is able to push for small measures, alongside a vision of where integration is ultimately going. Since 9/11, it has become increasingly difficult to talk about internal and external security separately, and Coreper is well aware of this. On the external side, PSC is not as influential overall although it shares the same drive to promote integration as Coreper does. It can be argued that external security is a more contentious issue-area and this explains its lag, but this would not be enough of an explanation. It is clear that the key actors with the potential to find common ground and to push for progress are not as persuasive as they might be. As a result, the outcomes for PSC remain somewhat disjointed and disorganized. I do not deny the importance of member-states, especially when it comes to issues of EU security. But since member-states tend to pull away from further integration in this realm, it is necessary to examine the actors that are pulling in the opposite direction, toward integration, to determine future possibilities. Epistemic communities in the EU are key contributors in this “tug-of-war”, and it is useful to draw them out of the woodwork, to peel back structures and gain a fuller understanding of how governance really works. i

Future research can attempt to cross-check interview statements using other criteria to establish causality between the activities of the epistemic communities and policy outcomes. One way to do this is by tracing changes in the dependent variable over time, as new data becomes available. ii It is beyond the scope of this paper to “prove” the empirical importance of each factor separately. The two case studies are taken as sufficient to back up the logic that these factors are central to the cohesion of epistemic communities.

iii

Citations from interviews may only mention one interview as an example, but all evidence is based on general agreement among those who were interviewed. iv It goes without saying that ambassadors who are new to Brussels are not inexperienced. They all have high levels of expertise on EU issues, and have worked on EU issues from their capitals or other postings.

References Antoniades, A. (2003) ‘Epistemic Communities, Epistemes and the Construction of (World) Politics’, Global Society 17(1): 21-38. Christiansen, T (ed) (2007) The Role of Committees in the Policy Process of the European Union: Legislation, Implementation and Deliberation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Council of the EU Documents 14781/1/05; 10010/3/04; 12165/1/05; 15266/06; 15386/06; 9666/07; 15912/08; 15912/08 ADD 1 REV 1; 15912/08. Cross, M. (2007) The European Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Drake, W. and Nicolaïdis, K. (1992) ‘Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: ‘trade in services’ and the Uruguay Round’, International Organization 46(3): 37-100. Duke, S. (2005) ‘The Linchpin COPS: Assessing the workings and institutional relations of the Political and Security Committee’, Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration. Dunlop, C. (2000) ‘Epistemic Communities: A Reply to Toke’. Politics 20(3): 137-144. Foucault, M. (1973) The Order of Things, New York: Vintage Books. Haas, P. (1992) ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, International Organization 46(1): 1-35. Heinisch, R. and Mesner, S. (2005) ‘COREPER: Stealthy Power Brokers or Loyal Servants to their Government Masters? The Role of the Committee of Permanent Representatives in a Changing Union’, Paper prepared for the EU Studies Association Conference in Austin.

Howorth, J. (2007) ‘The Political and Security Committee and the Emergence of a European Security Identity’. Siena, Italy: IntUne Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an ‘ever closer Europe’. Juncos, A. and Reynolds, C. (2007) ‘The Political Security Committee: Governing in the Shadow’, European Foreign Affairs Review 12: 127-147. Korski, D. and Gowan, R. (2009) ‘Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities’, London: European Council on Foreign Relations. Kuhn, T. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolution, University of Chicago Press. Lewis, J. (2005) ‘The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the EU’, International Organization 59: 937-971. Mérand, F., Hofmann, S. and Irondelle, B. (forthcoming) ‘Security Governance and Power: A Network Analysis of CSDP’, Journal of Common Market Studies. Meyer, C. (2006) The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Miller, G. (2005) ‘The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models’, Annual Review of Political Science 8: 203-225. Radaelli, C. (1999) ‘The public policy of the European Union: whither politics of expertise?’ Journal of European Public Policy 6(1): 757-74. Rathbun, B. (2008) ‘Interviewing and Qualitative Field Methods: Pragmatism and Practicalities’, in Box-Steffensmeier, J., Brady, H., and Collier, D. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 685-701. Richardson, J. (1996) ‘Actor-based models of national and EU policy making’, in Kassim, H. and Menon, A. (eds), The European Union and National Industrial Policy, London: Routledge, pp. 26-51.

Ruggie, J. G. (1975) ‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends’, International Organization 29(3): 557-583. Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999) ‘The advocacy coalition framework: an assessment’, in Sabatier. P. (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 117-168. Schelling, T. (1956) ‘An Essay on Bargaining’, The American Economic Review 46(3): 281-306. Verdun, A. (1999) ‘The role of the Delors Committee in the creation of EMU: an epistemic community?’ Journal of European Public Policy 6(2): 308-28.

8,000 words