conundrum could be seen as an impetus for William Perry's study of Harvard students in ..... work on epistemological beliefs can be tracedâ to Perry's work (p.
CRITICAL THINKING, METACOGNITION, AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS by Steven Henry Wyre
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Education in Educational Leadership
UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX August 2007
UMI Number: 3285587
Copyright 2007 by Wyre, Steven Henry All rights reserved.
UMI Microform 3285587 Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
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© 2007 by STEVEN H. WYRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
CRITICAL THINKING, METACOGNITION, AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS
by Steven Henry Wyre 2007 Approved: Michael J. Vandermark, PhD, Mentor Philip A Clifford, PhD, Committee Member
Accepted and Signed:
Accepted and Signed: Phili~A. Clifford
Dawn Iwamoto, Ed-D. Dean, School of Advanced Studies University of Phoenix
Date 8/24/2007
Date 8/24/2007
ABSTRACT The purpose of this quantitative, quasi-experimental research was to explore the effect, should any exist, of adding metacognitive enrichment exercises to classes in which critical thinking is an implicit learning objective. Completed Schommer Epistemological Questionnaires (1994) were collected from 681 pre-test and 469 posttest students at a central Tennessee community college during the span of one semester. The problem was to find a way to enhance critical thinking skills and learning in general. This research represents the first attempt to measure short-term gains in epistemological maturity. The findings demonstrated that adding metacognitive enriching exercises increased the epistemological maturity levels of the students in all four factors measured by the instrument. In two of those factors, the increase was statistically significant. The conclusion is that more research is warranted, but the findings indicate that a focus on metacognitive enrichment can significantly increase a student’s personal epistemology and, thereby, the student’s critical thinking skills.
1 DEDICATION This is dedicated first to my wife, Meg, who has endured not one, but two doctoral programs with me. Then, it is dedicated to my children, Katie, Winston, Nick, and Davis, who have endured as well.
2 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I must first acknowledge Dr. Phil Clifford, who assisted, not only with the statistical analysis in this study, but in my understanding of that analysis. I must also acknowledge Dr. Leah Hammond and Dr. Mike Vandermark, who, in the capacity of committee member and mentor, respectively, provided exactly what was needed, at just the right time, for my success. The efforts of all three made the process of this dissertation enjoyable. I just also acknowledge the efforts of Margaret Faye Jones, Director of Learning at Nashville State Community College, without whose assistance this study would not have been possible.
3 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................ 1 LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................. 2 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 3 Background of the Problem .................................................................................. 4 Statement of the Problem...................................................................................... 8 Purpose of the Study ............................................................................................. 9 Significance of the Problem................................................................................ 12 Nature of the Study ............................................................................................. 13 Research Questions............................................................................................. 16 Hypotheses.......................................................................................................... 16 Theoretical Framework....................................................................................... 18 Assumptions........................................................................................................ 21 Scope and Limitations......................................................................................... 24 Delimitations....................................................................................................... 25 Summary ............................................................................................................. 26 CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ............................................. 28 Historical Development ...................................................................................... 30 William Perry and the Beginning ................................................................ 31 Exploring Women’s Thinking ..................................................................... 34 The Epistemological Reflection Model ....................................................... 36 The Reflective Judgment Model.................................................................. 39 Argumentative Reasoning ........................................................................... 42
4 Epistemological Beliefs ............................................................................... 46 Three Current Models ......................................................................................... 53 Educational Implications .................................................................................... 61 Variables ............................................................................................................. 66 Independent Variables ................................................................................. 67 Dependent Variables.................................................................................... 68 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 72 Summary ............................................................................................................. 73 CHAPTER 3: METHOD .................................................................................... 77 Research Method and Design Appropriateness .................................................. 78 Research Questions............................................................................................. 81 Population ........................................................................................................... 83 Informed Consent................................................................................................ 85 Sampling Frame .................................................................................................. 85 Confidentiality .................................................................................................... 86 Instrumentation ................................................................................................... 86 Data Collection ................................................................................................... 89 Data Analysis ...................................................................................................... 90 Validity and Reliability....................................................................................... 91 Internal......................................................................................................... 91 External........................................................................................................ 93 Summary ............................................................................................................. 94 CHAPTER 4: RESULTS.................................................................................... 96
5 Methodology ....................................................................................................... 96 Findings............................................................................................................. 101 First Hypotheses ........................................................................................ 101 Second Hypotheses.................................................................................... 103 Third Hypotheses....................................................................................... 104 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................... 108 Conclusions....................................................................................................... 109 Implications....................................................................................................... 114 Recommendations............................................................................................. 116 REFERENCES ................................................................................................. 121 APPENDIX A: SCHOMMER EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONNAIRE... 134 APPENDIX B: BREAKDOWN OF SEQ ........................................................ 139 APPENDIX C: CRITERA FOR A COURSE IN WHICH CRITICAL THINKING IS A CORE OBJECTIVE............................................................. 146 APPENDIX D: CRITERIA FOR METACOGNITIVE COMPONENT.......... 147 APPENDIX E: INSTRUCTOR’S LOG ........................................................... 151 APPENDIX F: SIGNED INFORMED CONSENT: PERMISSION TO USE PREMISES ....................................................................................................... 152 APPENDIX G: INFORMED CONSENT: PARTICIPANTS 18 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER ............................................................................................. 153 APPENDIX H: SIGNED PERMISSION TO USE AN EXISTING SURVEY155
1 LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Group descriptive statistics for Treatment 1. ...................................... 102 Table 2 t-tests and F-tests, by factor, on Treatment 1. ..................................... 103 Table 3 Factor descriptive for Treatment 2...................................................... 104 Table 4 t-tests and F-tests on factors in Treatment 2. ...................................... 104 Table 5 Descriptive statistics for Pre-tests and Posttests................................. 106 Table 6 t-tests and F-tests, by factors, for Pre-tests and Posttests ................... 106
2 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.Treatment one pre-test.......................................................................... 99 Figure 2 Treatment one posttest.......................................................................... 99 Figure 3 Treatment one posttest........................................................................ 100 Figure 4. Treatment two posttest. ..................................................................... 100
3 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Learning builds and alters the memories of the learner (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002; Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 2004). Those memories serve as foundations for beliefs held implicitly or explicitly by the learner. Beliefs, then, act as filters through which incoming information is sorted and used to either alter or reinforce current beliefs, or are discarded as contradictory or dangerous to current beliefs (Schreiber & Shinn, 2003). Regardless of the subject, a learner’s prior beliefs determine the ability of that learner to acquire new knowledge. Understanding how beliefs are modified is crucial for understanding how learning occurs (Kuhn, 2000, 2001). Understanding ways in which to modify beliefs is critical for developing a thorough theory of learning. Although the word beliefs denotes a wide spectrum of definitions, this research explores the core set of beliefs designated personal epistemologies. This set includes personally held beliefs that pertain to knowledge and knowing. After discussing the background and the relevance of studying personal epistemologies, the problem statement and purpose for this research are proffered. The significance of the study is explored, followed by an explanation of the nature of the study, the hypotheses and research questions, and the conceptual framework surrounding the relation of personal epistemology to learning. The assumptions involved in this study and the scope, limitations, and delimitations involved in this research are discussed. The conclusion recapitulates this information and briefly addresses the literature review and the method of research.
4 Background of the Problem The study of epistemology, the study of what can be known, dates back at least to the days of Plato. Asking what constitutes actual knowledge, though, has only recently advanced beyond Plato’s conjecture that it is simply true justified beliefs (see for example, Goodman & Snyder, 1993). The question of how two or more individuals could encounter the same situation and perceive it differently, both claiming knowledge of the veracity of a conclusion drawn from that perception, has remained a viable inquiry. This conundrum could be seen as an impetus for William Perry’s study of Harvard students in the late 1950s (Hofer, 2002). What Perry discovered, “was a roadmap to the development of epistemology during late adolescence, as influenced by a liberal arts education” (Hofer, p. 5). Since this discovery, the quest has been to understand better the relationship between personal epistemology and education. The extreme of this relationship is seen in Reybold (2002) who proffered that, “A personal epistemology is more than a framework for knowing and understanding reality, epistemic assumptions cultivate corresponding behaviors and actions . . . an individual’s way of knowing predisposes a way of being” (p. 537, italics in original). Perry (as cited in Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, 2002; Schommer-Aikins 2002, 2004) is often credited with opening the door for this critical area of study. The pursuit for understanding how one’s personal epistemology develops and how that development affects learning has burgeoned in the last decade (Pintrich, 2002a). Coupled with developments in cognitive and brain studies, this area is of concern to both educators and psychologists. A better understanding of how one’s personal epistemology matures can help educators develop more effective methods to facilitate
5 learning and lead to a more full understand of epistemologically based states of mind (Schommer-Aikins, 2004). Since Perry’s (as cited in Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, 2002; Schommer-Aikins 2002, 2004) landmark study, it has been demonstrated the analysis of an individual’s personal epistemology predicts the ability of that individual to employ higher-order thinking in both academic and personal situations (Bendixen & Hartley, 2003; Hofer, 1999; Schommer-Aikins & Hutter, 2002). The more mature or complex the beliefs, the more likely it is for higher-order thinking to be employed (Bendixen & Hartley, 2003; Dean & Kuhn, 2003). From a developmental perspective, research has focused on how “beliefs influence learning” (Hofer, 2004b, p. 46). Longitudinal studies have demonstrated that education affects beliefs, assisting in the maturation of those beliefs (Baxter Magolda, 2002; Clinchy, 2002; King & Kitchener, 2002). Cross-sectional studies have revealed these beliefs are multidimensional and may not progress as a single unit in discrete stages (Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 1995; Schommer, 1990; Schommer-Aikins, 2002, 2004; Wood & Kardash, 2002). The field of personal epistemology is undergoing developments in the areas of theory and concept as well as exploring various methodologies for research (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Hofer & Pintrich, 2002; Pintrich, 2002a). Recently, some have proffered that a connection between metacognition and personal epistemology must be considered (Bendixen & Hartley, 2003; Dean & Kuhn, 2003; Hammouri, 2003; Hofer, 2004b; Kuhn et al., 1995). The contention is that when one facilitates a student’s thinking about his or her thinking process, that student will demonstrate improved skills associated with more mature epistemologies.
6 Kuhn (2001) stated, “To fully understand processes of knowing and knowledge acquisition, it is necessary to examine people’s understanding of their own knowledge” (p. 1). Kuhn (2000) also said, Understanding knowledge as the product of human knowing is a critical first step in the development of epistemological thinking, which is metacognitive in the sense of constituting an implicit theory of how things are known and increasingly is becoming recognized as influential in higher-order thinking. (p. 178) Kuhn relied on the long accepted distinction between declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge and developed a model of metacognitive development. The prediction of this model is that when a person understands how to evaluate why he or she believes some information to be true, that person is engaged in the highest order of thinking and is able to match theory to facts and deduce the best alternatives or answers. This approach has been successfully applied in the realms of scientific thinking (Bell & Linn, 2002; Hammer & Elby, 2003; Kalman, 2002; Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000; Qian & Pan, 2002), mathematics (De Corte, Op’t Eynde, & Verschaffel, 2002; Muis, 2004), and in areas concerning improvement in reading and writing skills (Hacker 1998; Sitko, 1998). There is evidence that employing epistemological awareness in the classroom works, but an interpretation of exactly why has not emerged. A student’s beliefs about knowledge do affect his or her ability to master a subject, whatever that subject might be. Kalman (2002) discussed, at length, the need to “break the balloon” of students’ prior beliefs when studying the philosophy of science (p. 87). McCombs (as cited in Schreiber & Shinn, 2003) posited that our personal beliefs are filters for information. Schreiber and Shinn further drew on the work of Middleton and Toluk (as cited in Schreiber & Shinn),
7 postulating that our knowledge becomes “structures that impact our engagement in activities” (p. 207). Thus, Schreiber and Shinn concluded that our approach to and engagement in a given task “are filtered through our epistemological beliefs. Therefore, our epistemological beliefs influence our learning processing, which then impacts the level of engagement, strategies, and subsequent tactics implemented” (p. 702). Buehl and Alexander (2001) commented after a review of extant theories on personal epistemology that to get to the “roots” of epistemology, it is critical to understand “how epistemological beliefs change as a result of maturation and educational experience” (p. 416). They also asserted that although the relationship appears veridical, “we know little about the influence of classroom instruction on students’ beliefs,” or how “the practice of teaching a specific subject [might] influence students’ beliefs about how that domain is constituted” (p. 416). Others (Hofer, 2004b; Pintrich, 2002a; SchommerAikins, 2004) shared this sentiment. Bendixen and Rule (2004), discussing an integrative approach to personal epistemology, opined “Chandler’s (1987) statement that how epistemological development is accomplished ‘is little studied and poorly understood (p. 154)’ still rings true today” (p. 70). Researchers (Clinchy, 2002; Hofer, 2004b; King & Kitchener, 2002) have also indicated there is little change in epistemological maturity levels between entering college freshman and those receiving baccalaureate degrees. Whether seen as a developmental stage or as discrete but connected variables, the evidence demonstrates that tertiary institutions are not teaching students how to engage in critical and higherorder thinking. The evidence demonstrates that much more needs to be done in higher education to equip graduates with the skills necessary for higher-order thinking (Kuhn &
8 Dean, 2004). In the sections that follow, the problem statement and stated purpose for this present research are detailed. In brief, the goal is to understand better the relationship between personal epistemology and learning from the perspective of how learning directly influences particular components of an individual’s personal epistemology. Statement of the Problem An oft-stated goal of higher education is to develop critical thinking skills in students and produce members of society able to engage consistently in higher-order thinking (Higbee, 2003; Kuhn & Dean, 2004). Tertiary education has failed in achieving this goal (Pithers & Soden, 2000). There is a clear link between one’s possession of the ability to consistently engage in higher-order thinking and the exhibition of a more mature or complex personal epistemology (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). Studies also indicate a reciprocal relationship between critical thinking and personal epistemology, though the precise nature is unclear (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Hofer, 2004b). It is critical to the development of higher-order thinkers that this relationship be further explored. Understanding the relationship between personal epistemology and learning is vital if the goal of developing higher-order thinking in students is to be achieved. Not only will such exploration benefit “education as a whole” (Bendixen & Rule, 2004, p. 78), a better understanding of how epistemological thinking develops will benefit society as a whole (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). A failure to explore further this relationship would be to ignore empirical evidence and neglect a proven tool for increasing higherorder thinking. Longitudinal and cross-sectional studies have demonstrated that a reciprocal relationship exists between epistemological maturity and the ability to engage in higher-
9 order thinking. What has not been done is exploration for any possible causal relationships or identifiable impact of one upon the other. There has been no attempt to study how a single course, or short-term educational experience, in which both higherorder thinking (critical thinking) and metacognition are taught, might influence one’s personal epistemology. To gain a greater understanding of the development of personal epistemology, this quantitative quasi-experimental study evaluates to what degree, if any, the teaching of a course in which critical thinking is a component, with and without a specific metacognitive awareness component, to undergraduate college students, influences a range of epistemological beliefs. Purpose of the Study The purpose of this quantitative, quasi-experimental study is to analyze the degree to which teaching a course in which critical thinking is a core objective and teaching a course in which critical thinking is a core objective with an emphasis on metacognitive awareness affects the personal epistemologies of undergraduate students at a Nashville community college campus (n=681). In that this research is designed to observe the effect, or lack of effect on personal epistemologies based upon whether or not the teaching of critical thinking includes a metacognitive component, quasi-experimental testing is an appropriate method for this research. In that a pre-test/posttest design is used, the independent variable of time must be considered and will be included in the statistical analysis. The independent variable of teaching platform (teaching a course in which critical thinking is a core objective with or without a metacognitive component) is hypothesized to affect the dependent variables of critical thinking and personal epistemologies. The two dependent variables are held to be
10 in a reciprocal relationship (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Hofer, 2004b; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002) and any affect was measured by the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire (SEQ) (Schommer, 1990). Schommer designed the SEQ to evaluate five different types of beliefs about knowledge and assessments are made along a continuum from naïve to mature. These designations could also be seen as simple to complex, but naïve to mature are the terms used by Schommer, and even though the concept is considered a continuum, the measurements are discrete, categorical levels. Only four of the types of beliefs are assessed in this research (see Appendix C for complete breakdown). The areas to be assessed are Simple Knowledge (SK), Fixed Ability (FA), Quick Learning (QL), and Certain Knowledge (CK). Simple Knowledge concerns beliefs about the structure of knowledge, whether knowledge is more in bits and pieces or more composed of integrated components. Fixed Ability concerns beliefs about how fixed a person’s ability is to learn, whether one’s ability to acquire knowledge is fixed at birth or more fluid and changeable. Quick Learning concerns beliefs about the speed of learning, whether knowledge acquisition should be seen more as quick, not at all, or as more of a gradual process. Certain Knowledge concerns beliefs about the stability of knowledge, whether knowledge is unchanging or more tentative (Schommer-Aikins, 2004, p. 20). The dependent variable of critical thinking is defined as teaching students to apply skills commonly attributed to critical thinking with the goal that the student be able to apply analytical and problem-solving skills in mastering the material. A measurement of this variable is the passing of the course as demonstrated in the final grades each student received for the course. In that critical thinking and personal epistemology are held to be in a reciprocal relationship, this variable is also measured by the SEQ. Faculty members
11 participating in the research agreed to follow a standard protocol for the course (syllabi, texts, assessment measures). Each faculty member was allowed to employ idiosyncratic heuristics to achieve the mandated learning goals. Faculty were responsible for verifying any given student passed the course with a grade of D- or higher and posttest questionnaires were collected only from students who has passed the course. The dependent variable of personal epistemologies is defined as the set of beliefs a person has about knowledge and the nature of knowledge. The dependent variable of personal epistemology is measured by the SEQ. Metacognitive awareness is defined as students learning to both be aware of and to control thinking processes. This result was manipulated by training faculty who be teaching in Treatment 2 in various facets of metacognition as expressed in Kuhn’s (2000) model of metacognitive maturity and Pintrich’s (2002b) description of how to incorporate metacognition into the classroom situation (see Appendix D). The training consisted of a two-hour presentation and discussion on the Kuhn and Pintrich material as well as some information from Bransford et al. (2006) and LeDoux (2002) on basic brain functions. This training was followed up with general emails to the trained faculty once every three weeks to query if any additional assistance was needed in developing ways to introduce metacognitive enriching exercises in particular classes. Instructors were required to complete and turn in weekly logs indicating some metacognitive enriching activity occurred that week in class (see Appendix E) The trained faculty then employed the methods in actual classes. This independent variable was manipulated by adjustments to the curriculum for the course. The standard curriculum for the course is accepted as teaching critical thinking without a
12 metacognitive component. Adding metacognitive awareness is accepted as teaching critical thinking with a metacognitive component. The use of the SEQ for both pre-test and posttest assessments allowed measurement of any changes in the dependent variable of epistemic beliefs, which are directly related to the other dependent variable, critical thinking. By comparing the pretest and posttest data, the goal is to measure quantitatively the impact of the two classes of the independent variable (teaching with and without a metacognitive component) on the maturation of epistemic beliefs. Seventeen instructors were divided by the administration of the school into one of two sets. In one set, nine of the instructors taught the courses included in this research as they normally would. The other set of eight instructors were given training in applying metacognition-enhancing techniques in the classroom. The outcomes of the two sets are compared in chapter 4. Significance of the Problem This study is important because it takes the next logical step in the examination of the relationship between education and personal epistemology. Pintrich (2002a), in a summary of the state of research on personal epistemology, reasoned, “If personal epistemologies are deeply embedded, implicit theories or stances or positions or beliefs, then they can play an important causal role in the dynamics of classroom instruction” (p. 406). Pintrich also reasoned there should be a reciprocal relationship, with “academic success and learning outcomes” (p. 406) affecting the person’s current personal beliefs. Pintrich encouraged research into this relationship. Identifying how specific instruction enables a person to progress from naïve to mature epistemological beliefs will translate to enhancing overall learning. If it is
13 possible to identify the characteristics of learning that enhance epistemological maturity, thereby facilitating greater academic success, focusing on teaching methodologies that bring about this maturity will facilitate greater academic success for more students. If enhancing metacognitive thinking does enhance personal epistemologies, then including such practices would make student success more probable. Considering the task of leadership in education, better understanding the relationship between types of education and epistemological maturity is crucial to the future of teacher education. This research not only enhances the ability of students to learn many subjects, it also enhances the ability of teachers to provide an enriching academic environment. Understanding how certain types of education enhance epistemological maturity will enable better training of educators to facilitate learning. Concerning the enrichment of the body of leadership knowledge literature, this research enhances the ability to lead education in a more productive direction. Understanding the ability to enhance epistemological maturity will not only bring about greater academic success, it will enhance the whole of society by producing a greater stock of individuals capable of the highest levels of thinking that accompany epistemological maturity (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). This research should be amenable to translation into any similar situation to produce a more reasoned and reasonable outcome. Nature of the Study In that observation of a potential, possible causal relationship is sought, a quasiexperimental design yielding quantifiable data is required (Cooper, 2006; Creswell, 2005). The determination is not as positive as could be made by a pure experimental
14 design. However, using students and faculty selected by the administration of the school, introducing the intervention before the final measurements, and dealing with manipuable causes should make the determination more certain (Cooper, 2006). Additionally, using group comparisons, pre-test and posttest measurements, and adequate controls for internal and external validity this research is amenable to a determination of a probable cause (Cooper, 2006). The landmark work of Perry has established that personal epistemologies are malleable and such malleability is seen as a cornerstone for all research on personal epistemologies (as cited in Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). The goal of this research was to uncover at least one area in which personal epistemologies are affected by the learning process, and to observe what causes an actual change in an individual’s personal epistemology. After describing previously used methods of research on personal epistemologies, a further justification for the methodology for this present research is proffered. According to Hofer and Pintrich (1997), “Nearly all the existing psychological work on epistemological beliefs can be traced” to Perry’s work (p. 90). Hofer and Pintrich revised their overview five years later (2002), but little has changed other than that the principle investigators have refined their respective positions. The methods used are associated with the theoretical conceptions of the nature of personal epistemology held by individual researchers. These researchers and their respective methods are discussed at length in chapter 2. The research methods most utilized are interviews (Baxter Magolda, 2004; Clinchy, 2002), quantitative questionnaires (Schommer, 1990; Schraw, Bendixen, &
15 Dunkle, 2002; Wood & Kardash, 2002), and a mix of both quantitative questionnaires and interviews (King & Kitchener, 2002). The methods were applied either to gain a measurement of a person’s epistemological beliefs at a given point in time for correlative assessment or interpretation, or to take two measurements separated by a large expanse of time to determine if changes can be observed. The present research is different from these previous studies in that it measures epistemological changes over a short period of time. Students entering a course in which critical thinking is a core objective were given the SEQ at the beginning of the class. The students were then given the same SEQ at the end of the same course, sixteen weeks after the pretest was given. Performances of individual students was tracked using the 63question SEQ. Changes in responses to any of the questions were monitored, as was performance in any of the four principle factors of SK, FA, QL, and CK. Instructors were pooled into two sets. One set of instructors taught courses as they normally would. The other set of instructors were coached in employing metacognitive techniques. The groups of students with instructors utilizing the metacognitive component were matched to the scores of students who have taken the same type of course (i.e., English, History, Philosophy), but with instructors who did not utilize the metacognitive techniques. Although there was no specific course-to-course matching, representatives for each type of course were in both groups. For reasons discussed in chapter 3, the scores were pooled rather than matched course to course. Controlling for course variability should give a reasonable measure of group changes occurring within the students’ perception of knowledge during a given course with and without the metacognitive component.
16 Research Questions What is the impact of teaching on the development of a person’s epistemological maturity? This is the most fundamental question guiding this research. The goal was to go beyond the consideration of teaching, qua teaching, and concentrate on identifying how teaching a specific subject affects specific categories of personal epistemology. To that end, thee primary questions must be asked: Is there a statistically significant effect of teaching critical thinking during a 16-week course on a person’s epistemological maturity? Is there a statistically significant effect of teaching critical thinking with an added component of metacognitive enrichment during a 16-week course on a person’s epistemological maturity? Is there any statistically significant difference between the two teaching platforms? In the next section, these research questions are expanded and the hypotheses engendered by those questions are provided. Hypotheses There are three principle foci in this study. One is on the impact of teaching critical thinking on the development of personal epistemologies. The second considers whether adding metacognitive enrichment impacts the development of personal epistemologies. The last examines whether there is a difference between the two teaching platforms. For all hypotheses, the impact was assessed experimentally by introducing the independent variable of teaching format, with and without a metacognitive component, and observing for any changes in personal epistemologies. For each of the research questions observations were made to see if there is an impact on personal epistemology as determined by comparisons of the pre-test and posttest scores on the SEQ.
17 Considerations were given to the results in terms of statistical significance and directionality. The first null hypothesis (HO1) based on the primary research question is there is no significant effect of teaching critical thinking on any of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK, FA, QL, and CK) during the span of a single 16-week course. The alternative hypothesis (HA1) is there are significant effects of teaching critical thinking on at least one of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK, FA, QL, and CK) during the span of a single 16-week course. The second null hypothesis (HO2) based on the primary research question is there is no significant effect of teaching critical thinking with an added component of metacognitive enrichment on any of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK, FA, QL, and CK) during the span of a single 16-week course. The alternative hypothesis (HA2) is there are significant effects of teaching critical thinking with an added component of metacognitive enrichment on at least one of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK, FA, QL, and CK) during the span of a single 16-week course. Lastly, to facilitate quantifying the assumption that adding a metacognitive component to a critical thinking course would increase the level of change in maturity of personal epistemology, it must be asked if there is there a statistically significant difference (α = 0.05) in any possible changes between simple critical thinking and critical thinking with metacognitive enrichment component on personal epistemologies. The goal was to observe if adding the metacognitive component increased any possible positive change in personal epistemologies over the teaching of critical thinking without the
18 metacognitive emphasis. To that end, HO3 is there is no statistically significant difference between the effects of teaching critical thinking on personal epistemologies and the effects of teaching critical thinking with a component of metacognitive enrichment on personal epistemologies during the span of a single 16-week course. The alternative hypothesis (H A3) is there is a statistically significant difference between the effects of teaching critical thinking on personal epistemologies and the effects of teaching critical thinking with a component of metacognitive enrichment on personal epistemologies during the span of a single 16-week course. Theoretical Framework Perry (1968) pondered why students at Harvard could attend the same classes and complete the same courses of study only to emerge with different perspectives and levels of academic competence. Building on the extant paradigms in psychology, Perry designed a method to observe, measure, and report students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing and about how an education influenced those beliefs. This study launched a new field of research into personal epistemologies and the relationship those beliefs had to education. After an overview of the broad theoretical area in which this new field functions is discussed, a brief description of how this research meshes with other research in the field follows. Included in this discussion are descriptions of important issues, perspectives, and controversies in the field. From the moment of birth, if not before, experiences interact with the systems that form working, short-term, and long-term memories (Greenfield, 2000). These memories of events and that they occurred, as well as perceptions as to why they occurred, are the building blocks of beliefs, both conscious and unconscious (Czerner, 2001; LeDoux,
19 2002). As new experiences occur the information passes through our belief systems and are either accepted as confirming those beliefs, rejected as contradicting those beliefs, or seen as problematically in discord with current beliefs and in need of more consideration (Bransford et al., 2006; Murphy & Mason, 2006; Schreiber & Shinn, 2003). The belief system is subsequently maintained or altered and poised again to assess new experiences. This is the broad theoretical framework in which research in personal epistemologies occurs. Beliefs about what can be known and how one is able to know it seem to be the lynchpins in one’s overall belief system. In currently proposed models, there is a need for dissonance before any belief might be changed (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Hofer, 2004b; Louca, Elby, Hammer, & Kagey, 2004). If one did not know or believe something to be known as truth, there would be no cause for the supposed discordance that is so often relied on as the mechanism for belief change (Dole & Sinatra, 1998). It is necessary, though, to know more about what triggers this dissonance (Bendixen & Rule). Beliefs about knowledge and knowing both affect and are affected by learning (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002; Schommer-Aikins, 2004). Personal epistemology research reflects a single, identifiable area of belief construction that has recently been associated with the field of education. To improve learning capacity, academic performance, and the ability to employ higher reasoning, it is important to understand the relationship of actual learning to one’s personal epistemology. In chapter 2 many studies are detailed that demonstrate one’s personal epistemology affects one’s outlook on life (Reybold, 2002); one’s ability to apply meaning to any context (Baxter Magolda, 2002); and one’s level of academic performance (Buehl & Alexander, 2001; Cano, 2005; Chan, 2003; Dahl, Bals,
20 & Turi, 2005; Schommer 1990). It will also be discussed how personal epistemology applies to critical thinking even about such issues as those concerning the environment (Lauber, Knuth, & Deshler, 2002). There is no expressed doubt that a connection exists between reasoning and epistemological beliefs. Previous studies are lengthy longitudinal studies or crosssectional analyses. To understand the connection better, it is necessary to examine a short-term educational experience and the impact it has on one’s personal epistemology. There is also no doubt that epistemological beliefs are developmental, but there are disagreements as to whether they progress as an expression of a trait (King & Kitchener, 2002) or as discrete, more-or-less connected variables (Schommer-Aikins, 2004). An expression of a trait would indicate that epistemological beliefs are to be taken as a whole and mature together (King & Kitchener). When seen as discrete variables it is considered possible to have some epistemological beliefs more mature than others (Schommer-Aikins). Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) demonstrated the beliefs are not only discrete, but the level of maturity can vacillate given the context and situation. In a microgenetic study, Kuhn et al. (1995) demonstrated that it is possible for individuals at any age to demonstrate metacognitively mature thinking (similar to Schommer’s notion of maturity in personal epistemology) in one area and not in another, or to be inconsistent in any given area. Still, they stated the focus of the study was on “understanding the causal effect of one factor on another [as] a core building block of more complex forms of understanding” (p. 98). More recent research on the association of memory and the ability to reason yielded the conclusion that “Whilst the pattern of correlations clearly shows that working
21 memory capacity predicts logical accuracy on the reasoning tasks, successful reasoning with thematic problems is in addition independently predicted by inhibitory control” (Handley et al., 2004, p. 192). Again, to understand better this relationship it is necessary to examine more closely the direct impact of teaching on epistemological beliefs. This research not only meets this need, but by assessing beliefs using four factors it assists in the determination of what these beliefs are and how they develop. Assumptions The assumptions contained in this present research are of two categories. The first category is foundational assumptions that encompass the beliefs inherent in the field of study. The second category contains assumptions specific to this present research. Each category is discussed in turn. Considering the notion of epistemology, it seems difficult to imagine there might have been a point in human history in which there were not some individuals pondering the difference between what is believed and what is known as truth. Muis (2004) pointed out that epistemology is divided into three questions: “What are the limits of human knowledge? What are the sources of human knowledge? And [sic] What is the nature of human knowledge?” (p. 317). Muis traced the roots of personal epistemology to Piaget’s conceptions about the acquisition of knowledge (p. 318-9). Perry (1968) accepted the notion of development and grounded his study on the basis that this development could be categorized, somehow, into discrete levels. A somewhat nebulous category of memory and beliefs was born, and while there are differences as to the attributes of this category assigned by various researchers, the overarching assumption is the category exists. Bendixen and Rule (2004) claimed there is
22 currently, “neither a unified model of epistemological understanding to guide research, nor a single model that clearly articulates the relationship between personal epistemology and how epistemological beliefs change and develop” (p. 69). Pintrich (2002a) asserted that, despite the disagreements among researchers, “there is consensus that a personal epistemology includes some aspects of an individual’s cognition or personal stance toward the nature of knowledge and knowing” (p. 391). The second assumption in the fundamental category is that these beliefs may be observed, measured, and described. This assumption is evidenced by the fact that this has been the goal of most if not all researchers in this area. Included in this assumption is the notion that there are more and less mature beliefs about knowledge (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Here the theories bifurcate into unidimensional (King & Kitchener, 2002) and multidimensional constructs (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002; Schommer-Aikins, 2004), but the assumption is the same. Whether considering a single belief about knowledge, one aspect of such a belief, or coherent stages of reasoning involved in that belief there is agreement that some expressions of that belief are more advanced or complex than others. The last fundamental assumption is that epistemological beliefs play an inherent role in education. Schraw (2001) stated that, Schools shape and change beliefs, both as purveyors of knowledge and as epistemological training grounds for developing students. The existing research invites the conclusion that schools should make the effort to change beliefs in positive ways, although it is less clear how those changes should occur, (p. 406)
23 Bendixen and Rule (2004) pointed to an “important link between personal epistemology and conceptual change” and opined that “as the promotion of epistemological change happens with students, this, in turn, facilitates conceptual change” (p. 77). The ultimate goal for understanding personal epistemologies is to improve the abilities of students to learn and think. As to assumptions particular to this present research, they include all of the foundational assumptions and the additional belief that the multidimensional perspective espoused by Schommer-Aikins (2002, 2004) and Kuhn (2000, 2001; Kuhn, & Weinstock, 2002) is correct. The original unidimensional models proposed by King and Kitchener (1994) and Belenkey, Clinchy, Goodberger, and Tarule (1986/1997), and Baxter Magolda (2002, 2004), have given way as such to an embedded system model that includes “many other aspects of cognition and affect, [and] comes from the assumption that epistemological beliefs do not function in a vacuum” (Schommer-Aikins, 2004, p. 23). An alternative is an integrated approach that includes many facets of personal epistemology including a mechanism for change, metacognition, and advanced beliefs (Bendixen & Rule, 2004). This integrated model purportedly addresses the recursive nature of epistemological beliefs espoused by Schommer-Aikins, but explains it as well. Bendixen and Rule stated that, “although our mechanism of change suggests linearity, we consider overall epistemological movement not as a linear progression but as a more spiral-like one” (p. 77). Chandler, Hallett, and Sokol (2002) addressed the competing claims proffered by extant research and poignantly pointed out that
24 [I]t just can’t possibly be true that the self-same threshold insights about representational diversity, or the identical epistemic doubts that such insights naturally engender, do in fact naturally crop up, for the very first time, at the age of 4, and then (miraculously) again at 7, and at 14, and 21. (p. 146) The multidimensional perspectives proffered by Schommer-Aikins and Kuhn adequately address this problem. The final assumption pertinent to this present study is that it is possible for epistemic changes to occur in a short timeframe and the use of the SEQ will adequately demonstrate whether such changes can and do occur. The five sets of hypotheses set forth earlier are positioned on this assumption and only the results of the research demonstrate if this assumption is justified or not. Scope and Limitations In this section, the scope and limitations of the present research are discussed. Specifically, the parameters must be small to match the narrow focus on a specific possible causal relationship between teaching and individual changes in personal epistemology. Also discussed is the concept that this research will be generalizable despite its narrow parameters. The scope has been constrained to how a specific teaching platform affects specific aspects of personal epistemology as it pertains to maturity. The specific aspects of the teaching platform selected are limited to two: critical thinking with and critical thinking without the addition of a component of metacognitive reflection. The scope is further refined by including only courses in which critical thinking is a normal implicit or explicit learning objective. To maintain the narrow scope, different courses were used,
25 but efforts were made to ensure representative from each specific type of course are included in both treatments and in both pre-test and posttest groups within each treatment. The groups under Treatment 1 are compared to groups under Treatment 2. The differences in teaching style and effectiveness are not a focus on this study. As such, it is only the impact of teaching platform that is examined, not the impact of teacher differences. The limitations are closely tied to the narrow scope. As only courses in which critical thinking is a core objective are examined, the implications and findings are not necessarily transferable to other subjects. As stated above and as will be discussed in chapter 2, the application of metacognitive enrichment has been successful in the natural sciences and mathematics instruction. The study is also limited by the use of pre-test and posttest quantitative questionnaires. While the research reveal changes during a short period of time (16 weeks), because interviews were not conducted, the research is not be microgenetic or indicative of precisely what caused any individual change. Delimitations As to delimitations, while it might be possible to add qualitative interviews of both instructors and students to examine the impact of differences in teaching methods, this study is about discovering if such changes actually occur. It needs to be established that a change occurs before venturing into why such a change could occur. The study is further delimited by using only the SEQ. While other instruments are available, the intention is to find a single, non-complicated instrument that lends itself to the greatest amount of directly applicable analysis. Using the four principle factors of the SEQ satisfies this goal.
26 Ultimately, despite the limitations, the information is of value to the study of the relationship of individual personal epistemologies and education in that it provides insights into short-term, individual changes in personal epistemologies not provided in earlier research. By observing precisely what aspects of personal epistemology change during the time span of a single course, it may be possible to refocus attention for future research to identify how specific instruction alters specific beliefs, thereby facilitating an enriched teaching environment. Summary This chapter discussed how recent research has identified a set of beliefs that pertain to a person’s beliefs about knowledge and knowing and labeled those beliefs an individual’s personal epistemology. The background for this research was discussed, demonstrating that a connection between personal epistemologies and academic achievement had been established and it is known that more complex or mature beliefs about knowledge and knowing are necessary for higher order thinking (Bendixen & Hartley, Dean & Kuhn, 2003; 2003; Hofer, 1999; Schommer-Aikins & Hutter, 2002). As stated in the problem statement, much has been done to demonstrate the connection in long-term longitudinal (Baxter Magolda, 2002; Clinchy, 2002; King & Kitchener, 2002) and cross sectional studies (Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn et al., 1995; Schommer, 1990; SchommerAikins, 2002, 2004; Wood & Kardash, 2002) to show that those who exhibit higher order thinking or do better academically have personal epistemologies that are more complex or mature (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002). It has also been demonstrated that personal epistemologies can and often do mature as one becomes more educated. What remains to be demonstrated is how learning, qua learning, affects epistemological beliefs.
27 The purpose for this proposed research was then discussed, to conduct a quasiexperimental study for the purpose of measuring, if possible, any changes in an individual’s personal epistemology during the span of a single, 16-week course. The significance of the study was discussed, as was the nature of the study in that seeking to test five proposed null hypotheses and their alternatives will open the doors to a better understanding of the connection between education and personal epistemology. The theoretical foundations were discussed in terms of what is known and suspected about beliefs concerning knowledge and knowing. This was followed by a discussion of the assumptions involved, not only in the study but also in the field as a whole. Finally, the scope, limitations, and delimitations were discussed as they related to the conducting and expressing of the proposed research. In the next chapter, the theoretical foundations of this study are elaborated. A historical overview and listing of various significant contributions to the study and understanding of personal epistemology are provided. Then in chapter 3, the details of the actual research are discussed.
28 CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE Even though the study of what constitutes knowledge goes back at least to Plato, the focus on personal epistemology is a recent development (Buehl & Alexander, 2001). Invariably, Perry is credited, due to the landmark, longitudinal study of Harvard students in the 1950s and 1960s, for providing the impetus for later research into how an individual’s perspective about the nature of knowledge affects academic performance or is changed by education (Hofer, 2002; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Subsequent research has served mostly to advance or modify Perry’s developmental model (Baxter Magolda, 2002; Belenkey et al., 1986/1997; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; King & Kitchener, 1994, 2002), or to proffer an alternative construct for epistemological beliefs as less strictly developmental in nature and more readily identified as discrete variables that can “moreor-less” develop independently (Kuhn, 1991; Schommer, 1990; Schommer-Aikins, 2002). Within the last two years there have been attempts to develop a new “integrated” construct (Bendixen & Rule, 2004) or model combining personal epistemology with other factors such as metacognition (Hofer, 2004b; Schommer-Aikins, 2004). Bendixen and Rule (2004) offered the analogy of a rosebush to describe their integrated model of personal epistemology (p. 73). The picture is one of a single trunk with many branches, each branch with its own development. The same analogy is applicable to personal epistemology research as a whole. There is, during the evolution of personal epistemology research, beneficial pruning, and new growth and the development of several smaller offshoots. The results indicate there are many branches related to personal epistemology that are not pertinent to this present study. For example, akin to personal epistemology are the studies of beliefs in general and how any belief
29 (disposition) can affect learning such as those considered by Dole and Sinatra (1998) under the moniker of conceptual change, or student motivation, the focus of researchers such as Pintrich (2003). The field has also branched into various applications with mathematics and sciences leading the way by incorporating belief modification into the classroom (Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000; Muis, 2004), followed by language arts (Hacker, 1998; Sitko, 1998). The notion of investigating how a teacher’s beliefs affect students has also become an area of focus (Brownlee, 2004). The emphasis in this review is on the roots and the trunk and on research related specifically to personal epistemology. Though some ancillary branches are mentioned, doing so will be to support the primary focus. The number of primary contributors to this field of research is few and they are included in the historical development. For many of the primary contributors, personal epistemology was not the only subject for their research and writing. For the minor contributors, the entries are recent and reflect a growing curiosity about this relatively new research area. There is an apparent gap in the literature as research began in the 1950s and 1960s did not attract much attention until the mid to late 1980s. There was a minor surge in research in the mid-1990s, and only in the last six years has the field found increased and widespread interest. The field has developed along various routes depending on the perspective of the researcher, be it education, psychology, or sociology. Again, as this present research is specifically about personal epistemology and the relation of learning to beliefs about knowledge, this literature review will focus primarily on the relative material and not on the various offshoots from the main trunk.
30 First, the historical progression of theories about personal epistemology as a construct related to education and learning is explored. For each theory, the conceptions of the author or authors of that theory pertaining to the nature of epistemological beliefs and the methods utilized to measure and observe these beliefs, are discussed. Also discussed is any relevant current research by those authors or other researchers who have attempted to build on the original theories. Following this historical section is one that highlights relevant significant contributions of others in the field. These other contributions are principally concerned with the development of a workable model in which to place personal epistemology in relation to education. Specifically, three current models are described, followed by the highlighting of several researchers specifically related to education who are not discussed in earlier sections. Finally, how the research related to the variables of critical thinking, metacognition, and epistemological beliefs is presented with special consideration given to the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire (SEQ). Historical Development This section details the historical development of the field known now as personal epistemology. The unfolding is, for the most part, chronological. As there is some overlap, consideration was given to when the research began for each contributor listed below. For each contributor, the primary research is discussed, the tools developed, and the findings as those findings pertain to personal epistemology are explored. Also discussed with each contributor are subsequent findings by other researchers as those findings pertain to the perspectives of each primary contributor.
31 William Perry and the Beginning Hofer and Pintrich (1997) described the core of what is seen as personal epistemology as the study of “how individuals come to know, the theories and beliefs they hold about knowing, and the manner in which such epistemological premises are a part of and an influence on the cognitive processes of thinking and reasoning” (p. 88). They traced the moniker of epistemology to Piaget’s use of genetic epistemology to describe intellectual development (p. 88), but clearly attribute the origins of personal epistemology research to William Perry, claiming, “Nearly all existing psychological work on epistemological beliefs can be traced to two longitudinal studies . . . that began in the early 1950s at Harvard’s Bureau of Study Counsel” (p. 90). Perry (1968) was concerned with understanding how students could encounter the intellectual and social environment of Harvard only to be affected differently (as cited in Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Perry and co-researchers developed a tool, the Checklist of Educational Values (CEV), and applied it in 1954 to 313 students in their first year of college. Thirty-one students were included in annual follow-up interviews. Of the 31, 27 were male and 4 female (p. 90). Perry later launched a second study in which 109 students participated initially, who started school between 1958 and 1959 and were followed for four years. Perry (1968) concluded that, “college students’ ways of construing their world were not so much a matter of personality as evidence of a logically coherent, cognitive development process” (as cited in Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, p. 90). While Perry did not claim the model to be developmental, the description of stages through which individuals progressed lent itself to such an interpretation. The first two stages belonged to the first of
32 Perry’s sequential categories labeled Dualism. In this stage, one accepts the absolute knowledge of those in authority and there are definitely right and wrong answers. The next category, containing the next two stages, is Multiplicity where the truth is knowable, though it might not be known yet. The third category is Relativism, containing stages five and six. The individual in these stages makes initial modifications from the dualistic right and wrong, to a more relative or context-based notion of truth. The final category is Commitment within relativism, holding the last three stages and marks the evolution of the individual into the perspective that, per Hofer and Pintrich, reflected “a focus on responsibility, engagement, and the forging of commitment within relativism” (p. 91). The end is that as one progressed through college, one’s personal epistemology evolved as one encounters new educational experiences. The study was limited in that Perry (as cited in Hofer & Pintrich, 1997) chose to record and discuss only the data collected from male participants. Perry claimed this process was not limited to men, but failed to provide evidence for this perspective. The evident bias served as a partial impetus for the next round of research conducted by Belenkey et al. (1986/1997), discussed in the next section. The tool constructed by Perry also served as a partial foundation for the instrument developed by Schommer (1990), the one to be used in this present research. Moore (2002) opined the relevance of Perry was still viable for “understanding learning in a postmodern world” (p. 17). The continuing importance of Perry is that a developmental model was postulated to explain the “differences in learners’ understandings of and approaches to learning, especially in structured academic environments” (Moore, p. 31). Perry continues to thrive, also, because of the heuristic
33 value of his scheme and the perpetuation of the questions still being asked about the relationships between learning and beliefs. That Perry’s (1968) developmental theory is still seen as veridical is evidenced in Yang’s (2005) study of Taiwanese 10th grade students concerning their personal epistemologies and their assessment of a socio-scientific issue. Yang utilized the Learning Environmental Preference Questionnaire that was developed by Moore in 1989. Yang stated that this instrument was used because it was “a convenient tool to reveal general epistemological positions for large scale samples” (p. 70). This tool was also used because it aligned with Perry’s “five essential elements” illustrating personal epistemology: “view of knowledge, view of the role of the instructor, view of the role of students, view of peers in the learning process and evaluation” (as cited in Yang, p. 67). Yang concluded, “high school students’ views concerning evidence and expert opinion were associated with their personal epistemology” (p. 77). It is important to note the underlying premise of a developmental process carried over to several other principal researchers. Except for Schommer (1990), Kuhn (1991), and their colleagues, the five elements described by Yang (2005) as fundamental to Perry’s (1968) perspective of what related to one’s personal epistemology changed with each researcher. For each researcher, though, the standard paradigm was one of progressive development and that individuals matured into higher levels of thinking and knowing as he or she became more educated. There is evidence that some of the individuals at the forefront of developmental theories have modified their original perspective as their research continued (Clinchy 2002; Hofer, 2004a, 2004b).
34 Exploring Women’s Thinking Hofer and Pintrich (1997) suggested the climate produced by Carol Gilligan’s (1982/1993), In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, a response to the male-centered moral development theory proffered by Kohlberg in 1969, facilitated the research of Belenkey et al. (1986/1997). The group adopted an interviewcase study approach and interviewed 135 women. Of that number, 90 were enrolled in college and 45 were selected as they approached a human services agency to get counseling on parenting. The goal was to look exclusively at the perspectives of women and “while they were explicitly interested in the intellectual and epistemological development of women, they concluded that women’s ways of knowing were intertwined with self-concepts” (Hofer & Pintrich, p. 94). The group chose to focus, not on Perry’s descriptions of the nature of knowledge, but on their perceived source of knowledge and the notion of how the self relates to knowledge and to others (Clinchy, 2002; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). The product was a model from which women would pass from silence, in which no objections were offered to an external authority, to the pinnacle of constructed knowledge where, “Knowledge and truth are contextual. The individual sees herself as a participant in the construction of knowledge, one whose own frame of reference matters” (Hofer & Pintrich, p. 96). The stages between these two extremes are, in this order, received knowledge, subjective knowledge, and procedural knowledge. These stages correspond well with Perry’s categories of dualism, multiplicity, and relativism, respectively. Clinchy (2002), reflecting on the model, pointed out the focus was not only on beliefs about knowledge, but about “the world of truth, knowledge, and authority” (p.
35 64). Clinchy also stated, “We could not assert with confidence that the epistemological positions we defined represented a developmental progression” (p. 84) as the interviews were only of a small sample (135), and some of the accounts were given in retrospect. There was also some question about the relationship between education and the individual’s way of knowing. Clinchy commented that “even highly educated articulate women, some of whom make a profession of speaking and writing” (p. 66) were among those counted as being in the perspective of silence. There is a sense of perspective maturation as one progresses through the levels and it seems that one can have split perspectives, but one could not easily skip levels. Clinchy (2002) stated that recent research has prompted the position that future research should focus on “development within rather than across domains” (p. 85). While someone studying humanities might progress from a subjectivist position to one of procedural knowledge, someone studying in the sciences “may ‘skip’ Subjectivism, going directly from Received to Procedural Knowing” (p. 85). The shift in what constitutes epistemological beliefs, from specific beliefs about knowledge to how those beliefs are incorporated into life, can be seen in this research, and as Clinchy admitted, it might be difficult to insinuate the results into the more commonly accepted definitions of personal epistemology. Nevertheless, Belenkey et al. (1986/1997) opened many doors to future research and provide the impetus to others such as King and Kitchener (1994, 2002) and Schommer (1990) to investigate gender differences in epistemic thinking.
36 The Epistemological Reflection Model Per Hofer and Pintrich (1997), Baxter Magolda began research attempting to develop a method for measuring epistemological beliefs and developed the Measure of Epistemological Reflection (MER). Baxter Magolda (2004) described this tool as a “short-essay production task that posed questions about the role of the instructor, learner, peers, and evaluation in learning, and the nature of knowledge and educational decisionmaking” (p. 32). Finding inconsistencies in the efforts of Perry and Belenkey et al., Baxter Magolda “designed a longitudinal study of epistemological development and how epistemological assumptions affect interpretation of educational experiences” (as cited in Hofer & Pintrich, p. 97). The five-year study of 101 individuals, nearly equal in gender mix, utilized the MER and interviews. The study also evolved as it progressed. Baxter Magolda originally focused on seeking data in the areas of “the roles of the learner, instruction, peers, and evaluation in learning; the nature of knowledge; and decision making” (p. 97). These areas were very similar to Perry’s original notions about the essential elements of epistemic thinking. Baxter Magolda later added, “out-of-class learning, and student changes in response to learning experience” (p. 97). Baxter Magolda published the findings in 1992. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) stated that in the study there were “four qualitatively different ‘ways of knowing,’ each with particular epistemic assumptions: absolute, transitional, independent, and contextual” (p. 98). These four ways of knowing align neatly with the stages and levels proffered by Perry (1968) and Belenkey et al. (1986/1997). The definition of epistemology Baxter Magolda developed honed in more on what was happening in the college classroom than specifically on what assumptions could be made about knowledge itself. Baxter Magolda
37 also found there were very few representatives of contextual knowing, the highest form in this model. Contextual knowing is the kind of knowing that continues to reshape itself in light of new evidence or according to a new context. Baxter Magolda (2002) expressed a personal “view of cognitive development [that] is grounded in the constructive-development tradition” (p. 90). This foundation led to two primary assumptions about the development of personal epistemologies. The first is that “the meaning we make of our experiences depends partially on our initial epistemic assumptions, partially on the nature of dissonance we experience when we encounter others with different assumptions, and partially on the context in which the dissonance occurs” (p. 91). The second is that all the stories of the participants were “context-bound” for the participant (p. 91). Baxter Magolda also felt that what was produced was just “one account of the journey from external to internal meaningmaking” (p. 100). The individuals interviewed were followed from the age of 18 until each was in his or her early 30s. What was found fit neatly into Baxter Magolda’s (2002) expressed constructivist perspective. Baxter Magolda opined that even though some of the terminology was different, the “trajectory” of development the individuals followed matched closely the paths observed by Perry (1968), Belenkey et al. (1986/1997), and King and Kitchener (2004). Baxter Magolda expressed a realization that the research was not only about the “epistemological transformation” of test subjects, but of the researcher as well (2004, p. 31). Baxter Magolda stated “that beliefs about self, learning, classroom instruction, and domain-specific beliefs are part of personal epistemology”, thereby concurring with the assertions of Louca et al. (2004) and Schommer-Aikins (2004)
38 (Baxter Magolda, 2004, p. 31). Baxter Magolda also stated a perspective of personal epistemology as something that “is intertwined with other dimensions of development, namely identity and relationships” (p. 31). Baxter Magolda (2002) primarily worked on only this theory and proffered additional ways to add this perspective to new ways of considering personal epistemology. Baxter Magolda considered the importance of encouraging learning partnerships in students as they face the challenges accompanying three core assumptions: “Knowledge is complex and socially constructed; self is central to knowledge construction; and authority and expertise are shared in mutual knowledge construction among peers” (2004, p. 41). Baxter Magolda’s perception of personal epistemology was the content is not as important as the construction of that content. Reybold (2001, 2002) applied the perspectives of Belenkey et al. (1968) and Baxter Magolda (2002) to 14 Malaysian women. The claim was made that construction is important because the content is so much involved in everyday life. Reybold (2002) asserted that “knowing is emotional – these women feel empathy and anger relative to their perspectives of truth and reality” (p. 548). Educators of adults should consider the emotional involvement of the student: “These women put their epistemology into action through everyday activities and mundane choices. Ways of being presume ways of knowing” (p. 548, italics in original). What Belenkey et al. (1986/1997) and Baxter Magolda (2002) produced was a much larger construct than Perry (1968) had developed. While using the development model and stages proffered by Perry, each developed a construct of beliefs about knowledge and knowing that encompassed all of life in the individual’s perception of his
39 or her place in the world. One could grow from simple to more complex beliefs, but the best way to assess the beliefs and the progression was through observations of the person’s actions and reactions with the world at large. The next set of researchers, King and Kitchener (2004), brought the construct of personal epistemology back to the considerations of just beliefs about knowledge and knowing. The Reflective Judgment Model The team of King and Kitchener (2004) approached the notion of epistemological reasoning from a different angle by focusing on “the ways that people understand the process of knowing and corresponding ways they justify their beliefs about ill-structured problems” (p. 13). They followed individuals ranging from students in high school through middle-aged adults over 15 years and developed a seven-stage model describing the evolution of reasoning skills in a developmental progression. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) stated, “Throughout each of the reflective judgment stages, the focus is on both the individual’s conception of the nature of knowledge and the nature or process of justification for knowledge” (p. 100). The seven stages of the Reflective Judgment Model (RJM) are clumped into three levels described as pre-reflective, containing the first three stages; quasi-reflective, containing stages four and five; and reflective, containing the stages six and seven. King and Kitchener (1994, 2002) also found that locating individuals situated at the pinnacle of the model was a difficult task. Finding relatively few individuals who performed consistently at the highest levels of epistemological thinking was common among all researchers. There are just very few humans who ever progress to what the researchers claim to be the highest levels of reasoning or epistemological development. The stages
40 described by King and Kitchener (1994, 2002) are similar to those proffered by earlier models, but differs in the acceptance of the stages and levels as less discrete and separate. It is a possibility for an individual to reflect being in more than one stage at the same time. King and Kitchener (1994, 2002) also attempted to distinguish between reflective judgment and critical thinking. There may be a relationship between the two, but they are not the same. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) summed up this aspect of the study as that when comparing reflective judgment with character development, the results suggested “a moderate relationship between reflective judgment and psychosocial development, and the possibility that the development of reflective judgment may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral judgment” (p. 102). Hofer and Pintrich (1997) pointed out there are several problems with the King and Kitchener (1994, 2002) model. One is that only trained, certified raters were used and the assessments were made by posing hypothetical situations that may or may not reflect real-life situations. A larger issue is that, if reflective judgment is tied to education, the first studies of King and Kitchener seemed to indicate that very little of it is inculcated in the classroom. The participants progressed, on average, only one-half stage between entering college and obtaining a bachelor’s degree. Reflecting on their efforts, King and Kitchener (2004) expressed that applying the RJM to “hundreds of individuals across a wide range of age and education levels” (p. 5) has prompted them to three major observations: (a) There are striking differences in people’s underlying assumptions about knowledge, or epistemic assumptions; (b) These differences in assumptions are
41 related to the way people make and justify their own judgments about illstructured problems; and (c) There is a developmental sequence in the patters of responses and judgments about such problems. (p. 5) They believed the RJM adequately described and predicted these observations. Among the other observations King and Kitchener (2004) made about the conclusions drawn from their research are that “during the 10 years of this study, the use of higher stage reasoning increased and the use of lower stage reasoning decreased” (p. 14), and the model “can detect predictable changes in thinking across educational levels” (p. 15). The model is touted by King and Kitchener as validated because those taking part of a longitudinal study demonstrated a progression from lower to higher levels of reasoning ability and cross-sectional studies found that individuals at higher levels of education performed better at complex reasoning than those at lower levels. King and Kitchener (2004) made one interesting finding that, to some degree, disagrees with most of the other researchers. About domain specificity, they remarked of their research, “These findings suggest that there is a relatively high rate of consistency in people’s use of epistemic assumptions when reasoning about ill-structured problems” (p. 15). The hedge is offered that this may be because the model “describes development in molar rather than fine-grained terms, and therefore is less sensitive to differences in dilemma content” (p. 15). It may also be as King and Kitchener asserted that “development in reflective judgment is related to but distinct from the development in other aspects of cognitive development (verbal aptitude, formal operations, academic ability, critical thinking) and from moral and identity development, and strongly predictive of tolerance for diversity” (p. 16).
42 King and Kitchener (2004) ended the synoptic overview of their own research proffering ways to utilize their findings in future research. The crux of the suggestions is the RJM should be used to teach teachers about the reasons students at different levels of development think and reason in specific ways. Another goal would be to use this information to study and implement ways to provoke, deliberately, students to higher levels of reasoning. King and Kitchener (2004) exhibited an understanding of personal epistemology that was of a process in which one progressed from simple to complex and that, somehow, life and education played a role in facilitating the growth. The next two primary contributors disagreed and demonstrated that personal epistemology might not be as trait-like as earlier researchers had claimed. Both Kuhn (1991) and Schommer (1990, 1998) espoused a perspective of personal epistemology in which the components are interconnected, but do not necessarily develop through progressive levels. Rather beliefs about knowledge and knowing are discrete and can fluctuate in both directions given specific situations and circumstances. Argumentative Reasoning Kuhn (1991) began with an approach similar to King and Kitchener (2004), but focused more on the attributes of everyday thinking. Only part of this study to understand the nuances of argumentation focused on epistemological perspectives. The model Kuhn developed looked much like that of Perry (1968), proffering three levels of skill in argumentation: absolutist, multiplist, and evaluativist. Like earlier researchers, Kuhn also found that achieving the highest stage was rare. Out of 169 subjects, only 2 met the evaluativist criteria on all topics assessed. Unlike King and Kitchener, Kuhn utilized real
43 world situations on which the participants were to express their abilities to explain their own view, offer an alternative view with a rebuttal of that view, offer a solution to the problem, and explain one’s epistemological reflections on the process. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) claimed that Kuhn’s (1991) significance to the study of personal epistemology is the connection of the construct to the reasoning processes utilized in argumentation. Hofer and Pintrich opined, “The skills of argument appear predicated on a level of epistemological understanding that requires contemplation, evaluation, and judgment of alternative theories and evidence” (p. 105). Kuhn (1991) first introduced the notion of metacognition to the process of epistemological development. Thinking about thinking was critical to making any advances or positive changes in one’s epistemic thinking. Kuhn (1991) utilized this belief as she pressed on to study metacognition as opposed to strictly focusing on personal epistemology or epistemic thinking. Kuhn et al. (1995) produced a significant volume detailing microgenetic research on the “claim that strategies of knowledge acquisition may vary significantly across (as well as within) individuals and can be conceptualized within a developmental framework” (p. v). The study examined only 17 adults for the first phase of the testing and 15 for the second, aged between 22 and 47 (p. 25). Of the 15 who started the second phase, 7 boys and 8 girls, only 14 finished. The testing lasted a total of 10 weeks. What was observed was the way the individuals strategized about solving well-structured problems. Kuhn et al. (1995) found there was comparatively little difference between the age groups in the way the subject went about determining strategy. They stated:
44 Initial differences between the two groups, whatever their exact magnitude, were not striking – indeed they were substantially smaller than within-group differences – and by no means were they large enough to explain the sizable differences between the two groups by the time of the final session. (p. 103) Still, Kuhn et al. (1995) asserted, “Both age groups showed variable strategy usage, both groups improved, but adults outperformed the children overall” (p. 104). This finding contradicted the strictly developmental model with which all earlier researchers were working. Individuals at many different ages and education levels could exhibit both mature and naïve thinking depending on the situation. Kuhn et al. (1995) stated the study was significant more because it described what did not happen during knowledge acquisition. Humans do not simply “accumulate evidence until they feel they have enough to draw a conclusion . . . [rather] theoretical beliefs shape the evidence that is examined, the way in which that evidence is interpreted and the conclusions are drawn” (p. 106). The requirement for maturing epistemological beliefs is learning to reconcile new knowledge with old. Kuhn et al. asserted, “New knowledge does not simply add to or displace existing knowledge; new and old must be coordinated and reconciled” (p. 106). The discrepancy within an individual pertaining to the level of thinking was largely dependent on the level of coordinated and reconciled information that individual had on any given subject or task. King and Kitchener (2002) found similar situations when testing individuals studying for the ministry. Specifically, those with a disposition toward God as the revealer of knowledge scored lower when considering “the creation-
45 evolution problem” (p. 47). King and Kitchener (2004) also found this situation when testing students with different majors. Similar findings were reported by Palmer and Marra (2004) when comparing science and engineering students as they considered both science and humanities oriented matters. Palmer and Marra were focused on the ability of those individuals to apply reasoning to problems and found there was still “a relatively high rate of consistency in people’s use of epistemic assumptions when reasoning about ill-structured problems” (p. 15). People at all levels incorporate existing beliefs into all reasoning. Kuhn continued to work with others and to modify the belief in the multidimensionality of personal epistemology and the role of metacognition in development. Kuhn and Pearsall (2000) argued, as essential to scientific thinking, the “recognition that assertions generated by human minds can be differentiated from an external reality against which they can be compared, and appreciate the differing epistemological status of theory and evidence as sources of knowledge” (p. 127). Kuhn and Pearsall also stated that “an essential epistemological requirement [for] scientific thinking is to be clear regarding the sources of one’s knowledge – knowing how one knows” (p. 127). Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) argued the developmental task underlying epistemological maturation “is the coordination of the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing” (p. 123). Kuhn and Weinstock had also, by this article expanded expressed levels of metacognitive maturity, adding realist, a lower level usually only found in children where one’s perceptions are held to be equal to reality, and subdividing other levels. It is in the realist stage that “the objective dimension dominates to the
46 exclusion of subjectivity” (p. 123). As one progresses toward maturity one shifts toward the subjective and ends when there is a coordination of the two realms. Kuhn and Weinstock claimed six levels: realist, simple absolutist, dual absolutist, multiplist, objective evaluativist, and conceptual evaluativist (p. 129). Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) asserted that simple education and life experiences do not necessarily promote epistemological maturity. They opined: To the extent that increasing age and education are not sufficient to effect the transition to an evaluativist level of epistemological understanding, except among a small proportion of the population who are exceptionally highly educated, then other experiential factors need to be considered as possibly implicated in this transition (or, more precisely, in its failure to occur). (p. 138) Kuhn and colleagues (Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn, Katz, & Dean, 2004; Kuhn & Udell, 2001) hoped the realization of the veracity of this model would spark educators to accept that reasoning skills can be developed and that they would seek better ways to accomplish this task. The best way, per Kuhn and colleagues, is through the teaching of and development of skills in metacognition (Dean & Kuhn, 2003), and recognition that the acquisition of new knowledge is affected by current beliefs and personal epistemology (Kuhn, 2001). Kuhn has been the most outspoken researcher on the need to not just study personal epistemologies, but to find ways to move them toward maturity. Epistemological Beliefs Schommer (1990) was the first to postulate that epistemological beliefs were not necessarily attached to each other in progressive developmental stages, but they could be separated into different types and they could be measured independently as well as
47 develop independently. Schommer became Schommer-Aikins after July 2000. Schommer-Aikins credited the earlier research of Perry, Kitchener and King, Ryan, and Schoenfeld as influential in this endeavor (Schommer-Aikins, 2004, p. 20). The system Schommer-Aikins postulated was to see epistemological beliefs as part of a coherent system that progressed through stages sequentially, but as “a system of more-or-less independent beliefs . . . that may or may not develop at synchronous rates” (p. 20). Schommer-Aikins (2004), stated that this model differed from earlier models in six ways: “(a) the addition of beliefs about learning, (b) the identification of distinct beliefs, (c) the consideration of asynchronous development, (d) the acknowledgement of need for balance, (e) the introduction of belief nomenclature, and (f) the introduction of quantitative assessment” (p. 20). The hypothesized beliefs included (a) the stability of knowledge, ranging from tentative to unchanging, (b) the structure of knowledge, ranging from isolated bits to integrated concepts, (c) the source of knowledge, ranging from handed down by authority to gleaned from observation and reason, (d) the speed of knowledge acquisition, ranging from quick-all-or-none learning to gradual learning, and (e) the control of knowledge acquisition, ranging from fixed at birth to life-long improvements. (SchommerAikins, 2002, p. 104-5) There has been no evidence collected to ascertain any relationship between one’s beliefs about the source of knowledge [(c) above] and epistemological maturity using the SEQ. Those factors verified, (a), (b), (d), and (e) above, are known, respectively, as Certain Knowledge (CK), Simple Knowledge (SK), Quick Learning (QL), and Fixed Ability (FA). Schommer-Aikins (2002) cited personal and others’ research as confirming
48 relationships between quick learning and students’ grade point averages, a belief in simple knowledge and “students’ study strategies and comprehension of complex text” (p. 105). Schommer-Aikins’ research has also confirmed relationships between the ability of students to solve problems with ill-structured content and beliefs in both certain and simple knowledge, and solving problems with well-structured content and beliefs in quick learning (p. 105). Hofer and Pintrich (1997) noted the factors known as SK and CK are “consistent with the other epistemological models and theories” they reviewed (p. 108). They noted the conception of FA seemed to be outside of the realm of what is normally considered epistemological beliefs and they see those beliefs as more about intelligence than knowledge per se. Hofer and Pintrich also noted the lack of associations of FA with other factors. They also saw QL as problematic as, “It seems that quick learning is a perception of the difficulty of the task of learning and a general expectation or goal regarding learning” rather than a belief about knowledge (p. 109). Schommer-Aikins (2004) cited two studies, one in 1997 with Walker and one by Dweck and Leggett in 1988 (predating Schommer’s initial report) that confirmed a correlation between beliefs in fixed ability and student persistence in difficult tasks and in beliefs about the value of education (p. 21). The multidimensionality of personal epistemology was confirmed in a number of studies conducted by Schommer-Aikins with other researchers. Schommer-Aikins, Duell, and Hutter (2005) applied the SEQ along with the Indiana Mathematical Belief Scale and the Fenneman-Sherman Usefulness Scale to 1,269 students from two Midwestern middle schools. They concluded that “both general epistemological beliefs and mathematical
49 beliefs play a role in students’ problem-solving performance” (p. 310), and that, in contrast to similar studies in older students, “beliefs in quick learning and fixed ability are tightly woven” (p. 301). They also confirmed that “belief in strategic studying, or lack thereof, is critical to middle school students’ beliefs about mathematical problem solving” (p. 301). The same multidimensionality of epistemological beliefs was confirmed earlier in middle school children in a more general application (SchommerAikins, Brookhart, Hutter, & Mau, 2000). It has also been confirmed in the way individuals perceive everyday events (Schommer-Aikins & Hutter, 2002). Schommer-Aikins’ description of epistemic beliefs as more-or-less independent variables has been adopted by many researchers and the SEQ has been used frequently to examine epistemic thinking both in the United States and abroad. In all but one case, the tool was validated. The descriptions that follow in this section are of research, all crosssectional, designed to align scores on the SEQ with other factors. In some of the cases, the SEQ is modified, but that modification could be only a translation into another language. All of the researchers are operating from a position that personal epistemologies are multidimensional. Kardash and Howell (2000) utilized a modified SEQ to examine the epistemological beliefs of 40 undergraduate students when confronted by text that contained material concerning the relationship of HIV to AIDS. They also used thinkaloud and free-recall measurements to assess the students procedures when confronted with information that agreed and conflicted to prior beliefs on the subject. Among the findings were that individuals who held more sophisticated beliefs concerning the speed of learning were more likely to engage in more learning strategies and that those who
50 held more sophisticated beliefs concerning the certainly of knowledge were more inclined to memorize facts and hold that knowledge in this matter can be certain. Buehl and Alexander (2001) explored extant theories and agreed that epistemological beliefs are not only multidimensional, but multilayered as well. In the article, Buehl and Alexander discussed their earlier research with Murphy about the domain-specificity of epistemic beliefs. Buehl and Alexander (2001) constructed the Domain-Specific Belief Questionnaire they claim was “based to some degree on the SEQ” (p. 411), and focused on the subject areas of mathematics and history. They pared the original 164 items on a 10-point Likert scale questionnaire to 38 after a trial run on 182 undergraduate students. The refined questionnaire contained the 38 items along with 6 specifically mathematics oriented questions and 6 pertaining to history and was administered to 633 college students. Based on the findings they developed a four-factor model, specifically that for each domain of mathematics and history there were two factors: “(a) Need for Effort in Acquiring Knowledge and (b) Integration of Information and Problem-Solving” (p. 411). The questionnaire was given to another group of 523 college students and their model was upheld. The conclusion was that beliefs about knowledge are “largely domain specific” (p. 412) and that students will have different beliefs and levels of maturity based on the subject. Buehl and Alexander asserted that this is not to say that all epistemological beliefs are domain-specific, but that many are. They also pointed out that instruments such as the SEQ did not find domain-specific beliefs because it was not designed to do so and that part of the reason Buehl and Alexander did was because they were looking for them.
51 Schreiber and Shinn (2003) applied the SEQ and the Inventory of Learning Process-Revised (ILPR) to 115 community college students. The ILPR is a 90-item, paper and pencil test constructed to measure students’ approaches to learning. Those approaches are Agentic, pertaining to fact retention and processing; Elaborative, pertaining to making associations with other information; and Deep, pertaining to actively seeking out information to analyze with the task at hand. What they found was that students who scored high in the belief in Fixed Ability scored low in all three types of processing and that students who believed in Simple Knowledge were more likely to be Agentic Processors. Chan (2003) modified the SEQ to study the relationship between epistemological beliefs and approaches to studying used by 292 teacher education students. Chan found The four dimensions of epistemological beliefs (Innate/Fixed Ability, Learning Effort/Process, Authority/Expert Knowledge and Certainty Knowledge) held by the Hong Kong teacher education students were found significantly related to the three study approach constructs (Deep, Surface and Achieving), including the associated six motive and strategy components. (p. 48) Chan and Elliott (2004), building partly on Chan’s research above and on other studies the two worked on together, affirmed the multidimensional nature or epistemological beliefs. While they asserted that some accommodations needed to be made for cultural influences, such as the Confucian principle of hard work, they found the beliefs expressed by students in Hong Kong modeled a multidimensional system formed from a synthesis of Schommer’s five dimensions and Hofer’s and Pintrich’s four (p. 132). They asserted, “An individual’s belief system comprises clusters of beliefs,
52 interacting with one another, and influencing one’s decision making, attitudes and action. Epistemological beliefs constitute a subsystem within one’s belief system and are considered multidimensional in nature” (p. 132). Cano (2005) utilized a modified SEQ, translated into Spanish and a similarly translated Learning Process Questionnaire, and assessed 1600 Spanish students between the ages of 12 and 20. Cano confirmed results from American studies and that “Throughout secondary education epistemological beliefs undergo change, becoming more realistic and complex” and that “as predicted, epistemological beliefs influenced academic achievement directly and also indirectly via students’ learning approaches” (p. 203). Bråten and Strømsø (2005) applied the SEQ to 178 business administration students and 108 student teachers. Their aim was twofold: to examine the dimensionality of personal epistemology and the relation between those dimensions and implicit theories of intelligence in the cultural context of Norwegian postsecondary education . . . [and] to examine the relative contribution of epistemological beliefs and theories of intelligence to motivational and strategic components of self-regulated learning in academic contest within that culture. (p. 539) They found results consistent with studies conducted on students in the United States, and, “The multidimensionality of epistemological beliefs was confirmed and dimensions were related in predictable and consistent ways to aspects of self-regulated learning” (p. 560).
53 Dahl et al. (2005) also conducted research with Norwegian university students and found that [B]eliefs about how thoroughly knowledge is integrated in networks (simple) and how fixed the ability to learn is from birth (fixed) contributed significantly to reported strategy use: Simple to rehearsal and organizational strategies, fixed to elaboration and critical thinking strategies, and a combination of simple and fixed to strategies relevant to the thoughtful monitoring of learning tasks. (p. 257) In building on Schommer-Aikins’ work, these others demonstrated that it is possible to not only view epistemological beliefs as discrete variables, but to measure them as such. Nearly all the work has been such that these variables were analyzed for relationships with other factors such as preferred learning methods or strategy use. It has also been shown that beliefs do change over time in individuals and that a tool such as the SEQ can measure those changes. Schommer-Aikins successfully demonstrated that beliefs about knowledge and knowing do affect actions, and they can be more accurately assessed with self-reporting than through action observation or interviews. One of the most obvious points of contention between Schommer-Aikins and Kuhn and the others mentioned above is the difference between epistemic beliefs as traits and as beliefs. In the next section, this dichotomy is discussed and models are proposed to alleviate the tension. It is important to note these are theoretical models that have yet to be universally accepted or even validated. Three Current Models In this section, three current models are described. In the first, Hofer (2004b) described a conception of personal epistemology that is considered dynamic in that a high
54 degree of malleability exists and development is neither specifically trait like nor specifically stage like, but something in between. Hofer also saw metacognition as critical to any development. Louca et al. (2004) further refined a model proposed in 2002 by Hammer and Elby in which personal epistemology is something more fine grained and should be seen as the proper use of epistemological resources. Finally, Bendixen (2002) and Bendixen and Rule (2004) presented a truly integrated model in which epistemological belief and metacognition are shown to be part of a larger process. Hofer (2004b) did more than act as a chronicler and commentator on the development of personal epistemology. In their landmark review, Hofer and Pintrich (1997) proffered four dimensions to personal epistemology. Two that concerned the nature of knowledge or what one believes knowledge to be true, were certainty of knowledge and simplicity of knowledge. Two others, source of knowledge and the justification for knowing, fell under the category of the nature or process of knowing (Hofer, 2004b, p. 46). Hofer maintained these four dimensions and embedded them into a model of metacognition offered by Pintrich, Wolters, and Baxter in 2000. Building on the work of Kitchener and Kuhn, Hofer constructed a model referred to as epistemic metacognition. The model of metacognition Hofer (2004b)used has three components. One is metacognitive knowledge, which is “the most static and includes one’s knowledge about cognition and strategies, as well as knowledge of self as a learner or thinker” (Hofer, p. 48). To this component, Hofer embedded the epistemological dimensions of certainty of knowledge and simplicity of knowledge. Another component of the metacognition model is metacognitive judgments and monitoring, which includes thinking that is “more
55 process-oriented and involve such aspects as judging task difficulty, monitoring one’s comprehension and learning, and assessing confidence” (Hofer, p. 48). Embedded in this component would be the epistemic dimensions of the source of knowledge and justification for knowing. The last component is self-regulation and control of cognition and learning. This component concerns “planning, strategy selection, allocation of resources, and volitional control” (Hofer, p. 48). Rather than seeing personal epistemology as developmental and exploring how education affects beliefs, or as more trait-like constructs and exploring how beliefs affect learning, Hofer (2004b) pondered a dynamic model that “permits the possibility of a more interactive conception, and one that is malleable, situated, and influenced by teacher, task, and learning environment” (p. 46). The model, when applied to students as they used think-aloud protocols during online searching, produced the results that “students can and do make epistemic judgments metacognitively monitoring the epistemological nature of their learning” (p. 52) and there was evidence for all four epistemic dimensions; the four dimensions “operate interactively” (p. 52). Hofer also found that “individual expertise appears to develop as disciplinary training is advanced and appears more related to course-taking than to age or year in school” (p. 53); and that “students were less likely to transfer their discipline-specific expertise in epistemic assessments” than expected (p. 53). Hammer and Elby (2002) argued there were problems with the extant ontologies pertaining to epistemological beliefs, including those by Hofer (2004b) and Bendixen and Rule (2004). Whether a personal epistemology is seen as a set of beliefs that can be assessed with pen and paper, or traits that can be assessed through observation, Hammer
56 and Elby saw the ontology as “holding a presumption of unitarity” (p. 187). Indeed, either as beliefs or traits, the assumption is that there is some uniformity in construct of epistemological beliefs. As a counterexample, Hammer and Elby asserted that not everyone who answers the same question the same way or exhibits the same disposition or reaction to a specific event can be said, conclusively, to have the same thought processes or beliefs as the others who do likewise. What Hammer and Elby (2002) offered was a new ontology, referring to epistemological resources, rather than beliefs or traits. They postulate a list of such resources as only possibilities and hold that much more needs to be done. They allude to the formation of accurate knowledge in physics as analogous to building up any kind of knowledge. Hammer and Elby suggested resources such as knowledge as propagated stuff or knowledge passed from person to person, and knowledge as free creation, or knowledge created in the mind of the child who then passes it on. It appears that what they are exploring are not beliefs about knowledge, but how any knowledge is acquired. While it is valuable in education to consider how a child learns specific types of knowledge, such as ontology, is not particularly about beliefs about knowledge qua beliefs about knowledge. Louca et al. (2004) picked up the Hammer and Elby model and applied it to the actual instruction of science to children in the third grade. They also compare the other models, beliefs, and traits, to the research. They opined, “Rather than attribute to children any general epistemological beliefs of theories, we understand them to have a range of cognitive resources for understanding knowledge” (p. 58). They conducted a study, but the research was not so much about a child’s or teacher’s epistemological development or
57 expression, but a speculation about the way each of the three models would explain the events in the class. The teacher posed the question “Why do leaves change color?” to the class and led a discussion. As the discussion proceeded, more questions were posed. Essentially, the teacher kept offering analogies until the class really started to understand the factual account of why leaves change color. Louca et al. (2004) claimed that neither beliefs nor traits models could adequately explain the change and that alluding to epistemological resources provided the best framework for understanding the acquisition of understanding. Their assessment of success, though, was inferred by behavior alone and they concede that critics might find this something other than an exploration of personal epistemologies. However, they contended, “As science teachers and education researchers . . . we are interested not just in the views about knowledge that students profess, but also in the views about knowledge that students actually use while learning science” (p. 67). It can be argued that Louca et al. (2004) were not focused on personal epistemologies, but on learning in general. Their allegations against other models of personal epistemology must be addressed. Specifically, by focusing on the origins or sources of knowledge, Louca et al. (2004) asserted that by better understanding the source, students can learn to discriminate between factual and non-factual knowledge. This, though, is precisely what Hofer (2004b) and the team of Bendixen and Rule (2004) stated. By thinking about the source (and thereby the veracity) of their knowledge, students are applying metacognition to assess their beliefs about what can be known. It stands to reason that doing so would increase the complexity or maturity of each
58 student’s personal epistemology. The next model is, perhaps, the most comprehensive of those examined here. Bendixen (2002) noted that most extant models of personal epistemology relied on, mostly implicitly, Piaget’s cognitive disequilibrium to explain the process of changing form more naïve to more mature epistemologies. Bendixen pondered if models of conceptual change might be applicable to “belief change in epistemological development” (p. 193), and listed four conditions for conceptual change. Specifically: The first condition for conceptual change is that individuals must feel that current beliefs are no longer working satisfactorily . . . . The second condition is that individuals must be able to understand the new beliefs . . . . The third condition is that the individual must be able to adequately apply the new beliefs . . . . The fourth condition states that new beliefs must stand up to challenges and lead to further learning. (p. 193) Bendixen (2002) culled a group of 12 undergraduate students from 129 by assessing them on a “test of logical reasoning, a reading comprehension test, and the essay question ‘Is truth unchanging?’” (p. 195). The essay served to initiate an interview on how the participants’ epistemological views changed. The result was a model that closely aligned to the one use in conceptual change. There was first some notion or moment of epistemic doubt, a time when experience no longer matched existing beliefs. This actually precedes the experience of the doubt itself. There needed to be some trigger mechanism to initiate the experience. After the experience is encountered, there were two ways to approach the doubt. One was to surrender to the control of another such as a higher power. This resolved the doubt by accepting the inconsistency as permissible. The
59 other method was to take control and work to find equitable solutions. The first method resulted in strengthened beliefs, while the second resulted in new and better beliefs. Bendixen and Rule (2004) expanded this model to one considered to be the result of an “integrated approach” (p. 69). This model incorporates eight different elements that work together to produce an individual’s personal epistemological development. The first element is the mechanism for change. As noted in Bendixen’s earlier model (2002) there must be a reason evident for a belief to change. Beyond the onset of epistemic doubt, there must also be epistemic volition, or the action made to address the doubt. Bendixen and Rule that action is important in their model “because it focuses attention on the metacognitive awareness . . . and on individuals taking ‘responsibility’ for their epistemological beliefs” (p. 73). The third component of the mechanism for change is resolution strategies. They asserted, “Resolution strategies can provide a means toward progression of advanced beliefs and could include many other kinds of strategies in addition to reflections and one associated with social interactions discussed here” (p. 73). They stressed that reversion to earlier beliefs is always a real possibility. The second element concerns the dimensions of beliefs. Specifically, they are “certainty of knowledge, simplicity of knowledge, justification for knowing, and source of knowledge” (Bendixen & Rule, 2004, p. 73). The third element is advanced beliefs. There is, simply put, “a systematic reaction to and processing of epistemic doubt, volition, and resolution strategies” and that is that there should be “advances in epistemological beliefs” (p. 74). Again, they see that even here there is the possibility of reversion to earlier beliefs. The fourth element is metacognition. They opined, “Metacognition has important implications for the effectiveness and longevity of personal
60 epistemology development” (p. 74). One must be able to assess his or her own progress and thinking to have a lasting impact. The fifth element concerns elements for change. There must be a feeling of dissonance over the mechanisms for change and there must be some personal relevance. The person needs to realize a change matters and that it matters on a personal level. The sixth element is affect. Essentially, there needs to be some emotional involvement. Bendixen and Rule (2004) saw that “affect plays a crucial role at every point” in their model, but that strong feelings might also prohibit the formation of new beliefs (p. 75). The seventh element concerns environment and cognitive abilities. Both the role of peers and the cognitive abilities of the individual must be considered as factors as both can impede or facilitate the changes. The final element is reciprocal causation. The crux of this element is that those who actively engage in epistemic development will be more inclined to continue doing so, and that he or she will influence those around the individual. Bendixen and Rule (2004) said about this factor and intelligence: “Reciprocal causation produces a multiplier effect that inflates both genetic and environmental advantages by a process in which higher IQ leads one into better environments causing still higher IQ, and so on” (p. 76). Bendixen and Rule saw the same working for epistemic development. This is the most complete model encountered in this present research and presents a full examination of the many factors that are involved in any change a person might make as to his or her beliefs about knowledge, or about any knowledge for that matter. Whether one views personal epistemology as a purely metacognitive construct, as the result of accessing the right epistemological resources, or as part of a much more
61 complex system, there are factors that remain consistent. One of those factors is the individual, unless cognitively impaired, can change his or her beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Another factor is there must be some internal conflict, some sense of a discrepancy between what is believed to be true and any subsequent information. A third factor is that this conflict must be acted upon to effect a change even though doing nothing could be seen as acting by choosing not to think about it. The choice to ignore is still a choice. The last factor is that one must have the ability to and make the effort to think about his or her thinking. This last point is the application of metacognition and runs as an undercurrent in each of the proposed models. Applied to education, all three models indicate the epistemological beliefs of both teachers and students need to be considered in constructing classroom environments where challenges to current beliefs and resolution strategies are offered to reshape what is considered to be knowledge. This leads to the next section where additional educational implications are explored. The goal is not to uncover every application of personal epistemology to education but to look at recent applications of the SEQ and to examine major contributions to the study of personal epistemology qua personal epistemology to education. There is a large cache of information pertaining to domain-specific beliefs. Some of this has been discussed above. The goal is focus on the general applications to education. Educational Implications In a landmark article, Schraw (2001) pondered the limits and uses of personal epistemology in education. Many of his suggestions were taken to heart by researchers already mentioned. The three models in the previous section were all delivered after
62 Shaw’s article was published. Schraw set the tone for the research that follows discussing the consideration of the impact of teachers’ beliefs on students, and on the ability of the general public to reason and promote epistemic development. As many researchers previously discussed focused on the beliefs of students, the points made in those discussions will not be reiterated in this section. Schraw (2001), considering extant research into the educational relevance of epistemological beliefs, identified four “emergent themes” and four areas of application in education (p. 451). Schraw expressed there was no agreement on the number of beliefs included in researchers’ descriptions of epistemological. Schraw stated, “Regardless of the number of beliefs, researchers agree unanimously there are at least two fundamentally different types of epistemological beliefs corresponding to the nature of knowledge and the nature of knowing” (p. 455). The second theme is the relationship between the beliefs and concurs that most studies have used some version of the SEQ and the results point to a multidimensional construct (p. 456). The third theme is the development of epistemological beliefs. The fourth theme concerns the measurement of epistemological beliefs and Schraw concluded that multiple approaches would yield the best information (p. 457). There is consensus among the researchers that beliefs mature over time and that students who are more educated tend to hold more mature beliefs. Schraw (2001) opined, “Unfortunately, it is not known whether education causes this change or simply covaries with it” (p. 456). Chinn and Brewer (as cited in Schraw) conjectured that “one possible explanation is that education actively changes beliefs in two ways: by providing new
63 knowledge and information to students and by requiring students to question and revise their existing beliefs as they encounter conflicting evidence” (p. 456). Schraw (2001) stated that, as of his writing, there was no unified model to understand epistemological belief development or to help on describing the change and stability of beliefs, nor of whether the beliefs are domain specific. In the area of future development, beyond satisfying the areas of lack, Schraw proffered four areas that “expanding knowledge of epistemological beliefs can change education” (p. 461). Simply stated, “These include helping teachers to understand their own beliefs, understanding factors that impact students’ beliefs, promoting a critical thinking pedagogy, and introducing conceptual change into the classroom” (p. 461). In regard to researching epistemological beliefs and teacher education, White (2000) utilized interviews of 20 pre-service teacher students to “describe the epistemology of pre-service teachers with respect to the certainly of knowledge, simplicity of knowledge, source of knowledge and justification for knowing as they are viewed through perspectives on problematic classroom situations” (p. 281). White found the students were definitely different in their beliefs and the resembled more of an interconnected web than distinct levels and there could be some reversion to less mature beliefs before succumbing to more mature ones. Kember (2001) argued that: students have a consistent cluster of beliefs about the nature of knowledge, a conception of learning and a belief about how teaching should take place. It shows that these beliefs are a major factor in the degree to which students are able to cope with study in higher education. (p. 205)
64 Kember, though, held that an interrelationship exists between students’ beliefs about learning, teaching, and epistemological beliefs, and that “a belief in one of these areas influences the other two beliefs, and all act in concert to affect learning approaches and outcomes” (p. 206). Schraw and Olafson (2002) addressed the beliefs about knowledge held by teachers and how those beliefs affect choices concerning what occurs in the classroom. Their details are extensive but the crux is that the worldview of a teacher necessarily affects the way that teacher employs his or her craft, and perhaps to the success in the classroom. Many, Howard, and Hoge (2002) also looked at pre-service teacher students. They found “students who approached knowledge as a constructive process were better able to draw” on the experiences of teaching demonstrations and written reflections (p. 314). Also, the students appeared to draw on “multiple lenses to frame their beliefs rather than using one primary epistemological perspective” (p. 318), that they are, in effect, multidimensional. Ravindran, Greene, and DeBacker (2005) utilized the Bendixen, Schraw, and Dunkle Epistemic Belief Inventory (discussed in Bendixen, 2002) on 101 pre-service teachers. Pertinent to this study, they found that “epistemological beliefs had theoretically consistent relationships with students’ cognitive engagement” (p. 230). Brownlee (2004) conducted a study to “investigate graduate pre-service teachers’ epistemological beliefs during a teaching programme based on relational pedagogy and designed to encourage the development of more sophisticated relational epistemological beliefs” (p. 5). The results were that, “nearly all the students (n = 27) in the teaching program commented
65 positively on how the explicit reflections on epistemological beliefs in the teaching programme helped them become more reflective about their beliefs” (p. 13). Dirkx, Kielbaso, and Smith (2004) explored the effects of epistemic beliefs of teachers in community college technical programs. The authors found little connection between the beliefs of teachers and the effectiveness of those teachers in subject matters relevant to technology programs. Pillay (2002) explored the notions behind beliefs about knowledge and argues that understanding them is essential to building a learner-centered higher education. Lastly, there have been other applications of the SEQ or similar measures of epistemological beliefs and their relationships to other factors. Lauber et al. (2002) considered beliefs about knowledge as a factor in the way a New York community reasoned a solution to the overpopulation of Canadian Geese. In a similar way, Kelsey (2003) applied beliefs about knowledge to environmental education and concluded the lack of public participation in international environmental policy is at least partly to blame on the perceptions of knowledge by both the public and the policy makers. Jarvis (2000) utilized “participant observation, structured and unstructured interviews and . . . students’ learning journals” (p. 535) to study the effects of studying English Literature and culture on beliefs about knowledge. Jarvis concluded that students moved from naïve to more mature beliefs about knowledge by studying literature and encountering the challenge posed by literary criticism’s concern with developing a detailed understanding of the role of language in the production of meaning and of the influence of social and historical context on interpretation; by its conscious deliberations about the
66 relative significance of the author’s intentions and the students’ readings and by its exploration of the referential, contradictory, figurative and shifting qualities of the text. (p. 545) Hynd-Shanahan, Holschuh, and Hubbard, (2004), found the same thing with students reading history texts. Burns and Bond (2004) linked mothers’ beliefs about knowledge and engagement in parenting classes: “Mothers with more complex epistemologies expected more discussion and interaction, demonstrated more active involvement in the classes . . . and were more reported by instructors to be more engaged in class than mothers with less complex epistemologies” (p. 417). Bauer, Festner, Gruber, Harteis, and Heid (2004) applied epistemic beliefs to the workplace but could not coordinate the beliefs with an appraisal of the workplace as supportive of learning. What these researchers have demonstrated is that a person’s beliefs about knowledge and knowing are important whether that person is a student or a teacher. What is demonstrated in the classroom, as student or teacher, directly reflects those beliefs and that, as the Bendixen and Rule (2004) model predicted, the beliefs and behaviors are reciprocal. More advanced beliefs spawn more advanced beliefs. To produce an environment in which these beliefs can grow requires a concerted effort by teacher educators, teachers, students, and all those associated with the process of education, on not only the tertiary level, but primary and secondary as well. Variables The independent variables in this research are time and the teaching platform (teaching critical thinking with or without a metacognitive component). Both will be
67 actively manipulated and are discussed in this section.. The specific dependent variables for this research are personal epistemologies, as measured by the four factors (and twelve sub-sets) identified by Schommer (1990), and critical thinking which is measured by the SEQ and the grades received for the course. Regarding critical thinking and metacognition, the goal was to demonstrate a connection between critical thinking, metacognition, and personal epistemology such that they share, at the least, a reciprocal relationship. Also in this section is discussed a reiteration of earlier material on these four factors as viable measures of epistemological beliefs and the use of the SEQ to measure them. Independent Variables In that this research uses a pre-test/posttest design, time must be considered an independent variable. That variable will impact the dependent variable of critical thinking. In keeping with the goal of investigating possible changes over a short period of time, the span was limited to the normal 16 weeks of a traditional college semester. It was also important to keep any possible changes limited to a single course so the decision was to have the pre-test and posttest at the extremes of the allowable 16 weeks. This allowed maximum exposure within the scope of a traditional semester, while limiting the exposure to a single course. It is feasible to hold that different timeframes could have yielded different results. From the models espoused by Bendixen (2002), Bendixen and Rule (2004), Hammer and Elby (2002), Hofer (2004b), and Louca et al. (2004), it is clear that metacognition, or the practice of thinking about thinking, is critical to the development of
68 more complex personal epistemologies. One needs to engage in metacognition to realize that dissonance exists and in the analysis of what to do to alleviate the dissonance. Kuhn (2000), Kuhn et al. (2000), and Kuhn et al. (2004) concurred that critical thinking is a vital part of epistemological maturity. Metacognition is necessary to realize a change is warranted or available, critical thinking is necessary to properly analyze the options. Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) stated, If the development of epistemological understanding is conceptualized as we have proposed, i.e., as a task in coordinating the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing, it is possible that this coordination is more readily achieved with respect to some kinds of judgments than others. (p. 132) The judgments are those resulting from critically analyzing the facts and being able to distinguish between facts and fallacies, i.e., critical thinking. From these assertions it is logical to assume the reciprocal relationship discussed by Bendixen and Rule (2004) will hold and an environment in which critical thinking and metacognition are emphasized should advance the maturity or complexity of an individual’s personal epistemology. It is the goal of this present research to investigate this assumption. Dependent Variables From the assertions of Schommer-Aikins (2002, 2004; Schommer, 1990, 1998; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2000; Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Hutter, 2005; SchommerAikins & Hutter, 2002) and Kuhn (1991, 2000, 2001; Kuhn, et al. 2000; Kuhn, Katz & Dean, 2004; Kuhn & Udell, 2001; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002) already stated, and the confirming evidence provided by the majority of researchers discussed in this review, it is
69 reasonable to hold that it is possible to measure a construct labeled personal epistemology with a pencil and paper tool. As critical thinking and personal epistemology share a reciprocal relationship (Bendixen & rule, 2004; Hofer, 2004b; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002), increases in the ability to think critically are reflected in the measured personal epistemologies and the grades received for the course. Duell and Schommer-Aikins (2001) constructed an overview of all extant methods of measuring epistemological beliefs including all those principle researchers mentioned in the historical overview. They asserted that each instrument was constructed out of the theory held by the researchers who developed it and that each instrument could, in turn, further influence the theory. This is not only true in situations where researchers asking interview questions could alter queries and the “Participants’ own words help the researcher fine-tune personal epistemology from the participants’ point of view” (p. 445). Duell and Schommer-Aikins also hold this to be equally possible in “forced-choice questionnaires” (p. 445). When choosing and instrument, it is necessary to consider the theory of the designer of that instrument. In apparent agreement with the notion that instruments are constructed out of theory, Clarebout, Elen, Luyten, and Bamps (2001) performed an analysis of extant research on Schommer’s (1990) questionnaire and applied translated versions to two empirical studies. The results of the studies were not good because they could not replicate Schommer’s factor structure and, indeed, found different ones (p. 53). One of the complaints they lodged against the instrument is that there has been some inconsistency in the results (p. 74), but those results were from a modified instrument and not the original SEQ.
70 Wood and Kardash (2002) conducted an in-depth analysis of the SEQ and discovered that it was a valid and useful tool in assessing personal epistemologies, though some flaws were noted. Some of their findings will be discussed in chapter 3. In brief, Wood and Kardash combined the SEQ with a similar tool developed by Jehng, Johnson, and Anderson (1993) into an 80-item questionnaire. After eliminating items with negative correlations or ones measuring less than 0.10, they had 64-question tool that yielded a internal reliability alpha of 0.86 (p. 245). To these 64 questions, “Principal axis factor extraction was performed . . . to estimate the factorability of the correlation matrix and to determine the maximum number of factors” (p. 245). They ended up with five factors. Along with this questionnaire, they asked subjects to self-report ACT scores and researched the students’ GPAs. The conclusions confirmed that “epistemological beliefs are multidimensional” and that “there appears to be support for the notion that epistemological beliefs are related to student success, as measured by undergraduate GPA above and beyond student academic aptitude” (Wood & Kardash, 2002, p. 256). Wood and Kardash also found there was very little advancement in belief maturity between freshman and seniors. This, they opined, could be due to the limited nature of the study. They also suggest the field is still young and there is still much room for improvement in tools and theories. Schraw et al. (2002) took Schommer’s instrument and modified it into a 28 question questionnaire. They then used both instruments and a reading comprehension test to compare epistemological beliefs and reading comprehension. They discovered the shortened version, of which seven questions were adopted directly from Schommer’s instrument, had a higher degree of reliability on five factors that closely resemble
71 Schommer’s original factors. Ultimately, they encourage using both the Schommer instrument and their own creation when assessing epistemological beliefs (p. 272). Schommer-Aikins, in a personal correspondence (October 2005), indicated the goal of the research would, very much, dictate the way the instrument was applied and assessed. There are different factor score tables for the instrument in its different forms (high school and college), and applying the factor scores are discouraged if an analysis of a pre-test and posttest are used. Schommer-Aikins (2004) stated there have been several modified versions of the SEQ and that “Among all of these instruments, internal reliability for the measure of each belief ranges from 0.54 to 0.76 (Cronbach’s alphas)” (p. 22). Schommer-Aikins stated a desire to have higher numbers, but there was a known connection between reliability and narrow scope. Schommer-Aikins’s studies have had a more broad scope and, therefore, a lower reliability. Schommer-Aikins stated, though, that If researchers narrow the focus of assessment on domain-specific epistemological beliefs, or epistemological beliefs within the context of a single classroom, they will likely get higher reliability. On the other, they will be assessing not only epistemological beliefs, but also the idiosyncrasies of the teacher, the textbook, and the classroom ambiance. (p. 23) It is for this reason that Schommer-Aikins (2004) cautioned the researchers using the SEQ to be careful not to influence the subjects, and to consider carefully the nature of the class and the association of the instrument with any other instrument. SchommerAikins noted, “Thus, the assessment of epistemological beliefs is delicate regardless of the type of assessment involved. Any form of assessment, whether quantitative or
72 qualitative, can be rendered invalid if it is not properly carried out or properly analyzed” (p. 23). Conclusion Pintrich (2002a) wrote a concise summary of the research up to that point and proffered eight propositions about the demonstrations and opinions of the researchers. The first is that, “Personal epistemology concerns an individual’s cognitions about the nature of knowledge and knowledge claims” (p. 390, italics in original). All researchers seem to agree on this, but as evidenced above, not all agree on what nature of knowledge and knowledge claims define. The second proposition is that, “There are more than one and less than ten independent dimensions that are necessary to define an individual’s personal epistemology” (p. 394, italics in original). Most, though, agreed the ones proffered by Hofer and Pintrich (1997) and Schommer (1990) are consistently present. The third is that “Epistemological thinking is domain-specific” (p. 399, italics in original). There is a bulk of material on the domain-specificity of epistemological beliefs, but as this present research is about personal epistemology in general, this information was only lightly touched upon. The gist, that it is important to consider the context of the knowledge when assessing what a person believes about that knowledge, is discussed. The models proposed by Bendixen and Rule (2004), Hofer (2004b), and Louca et al. (2004) all take this into account. The fourth proposition is that, “Epistemological thinking becomes more ‘sophisticated’ over the course of development” (p. 400, italics in original). As demonstrated in the historical progression section there is still some tension over whether this progression is of discrete beliefs or sets of beliefs in a trait-like fashion.
73 The fifth proposition is that, “Epistemological development is a function of both internal psychological mechanisms as well as contextual facilitators and constraints” (p. 403, italics in original). The sixth is that, “Personal epistemologies can facilitate and constrain academic cognition, motivation, and learning” (p. 405, italics in original). Pintrich credited Schommer as being the “first to tease out the specific relations between personal epistemologies and academic cognition and learning” (p. 405). The seventh proposition is that, “There are no important gender differences in epistemological thinking and the development of personal epistemologies” (p. 407, italics in original). Finally, the eighth proposition is that, “Personal epistemologies can and should be assessed using a diversity of methodologies” (p. 411, italics in original). The conclusion is that what a person believes about the nature of knowledge and knowing matters to that person’s inclination to use higher order thinking. The beliefs one has about knowledge and knowing are complex in nature even if naïve in expression. It is possible to actively measure and advance those beliefs. Pintrich (2002a) concluded his summary, “As we come to a better understanding how individuals think and reason about knowledge and knowing, we should not only be able to improve learning and instruction, but also come to a better understanding of ourselves” (p. 413). It is vital to this end that a better understanding of how specific types of education affect epistemological beliefs occurs. To that end, this research was conducted. Summary In this chapter, the historical progression of theories about personal epistemology as a construct related to education and learning were examined first. For each theory, the conceptions of the author or authors of that theory pertaining to the nature of
74 epistemological beliefs and the methods utilized to measure and observe these beliefs were discussed. Also discussed was relevant current research by those authors or other researchers who attempted to build on the original theories and the significant contributions of others in the field were presented. These contributions were principally concerned with the development of a workable model in which to place personal epistemology in relation to education. Then, several researchers were highlighted as those pertaining specifically related to education not discussed in earlier sections. Finally, how the research related to the variables of critical thinking, metacognition, and epistemological beliefs was presented with special consideration given to the SEQ. On the historical progression, the initial research of Perry (1968) was discussed and how it led to the perpetuation of a developmental model and the creation of a system of measurement for epistemological beliefs. The trail went from Perry to Belenkey et al. (1986/1997) and their expansion of the paradigm of personal epistemology from beliefs in connection to learning to beliefs about knowledge and knowing that affect life in general. Then, Baxter Magolda’s (2002) research from the late 1980s and 1990s was examined where the focus was on something much broader than Perry had imagined. King and Kitchener (1994) brought the perspective back to one pertaining particularly to education and new tools were created (the RJM) to assess behaviors and responses to interview questions for complexity in the epistemological beliefs of college students. Kuhn (1991) took the conception of personal epistemology from one that developed consistently through prescribed stages to the notion they might be more multidimensional. Kuhn’s later work, alone and with others further supported the idea that epistemological beliefs were discrete and could not only develop independently, but
75 they could both advance and retreat in different circumstances and situations. Schommer (1990), though, was the first to describe one’s personal epistemology as discrete and independent variables. Schommer’s subsequent work, alone and with others, further confirmed that epistemological beliefs were multidimensional. The SEQ was developed to measure the dimensions of epistemological beliefs. Ancillary research was provided to demonstrate its validity, not only when used in the United States, but also when adequately translated into other languages. The review then examined three models for personal epistemology. Hofer (2004b) proffered a metacognitive model in which personal epistemology constructs could be embedded. Hammer and Elby (2002) and Louca et al. (2004) described a model in which epistemological beliefs were more “fine grained” and the maturation of beliefs involved the proper accessing and utilization of epistemological resources. Finally, Bendixen (2002) and Bendixen and Rule (2004) detailed an elaborate and seemingly complete model of epistemological belief development that incorporates most of the notions expressed by others. An examination of the relation of epistemological beliefs and education followed, beginning with the astute observations of Schraw (2001) and moving through a plethora of researchers who nearly all made some connection between epistemological beliefs and enrichment in education. As much of this was discussed earlier, the primary focus was on the impact of teachers’ epistemological beliefs on students. Also examined here were some minor studies on other connections of maturity in epistemological beliefs and advanced reasoning.
76 Then the research pertaining specifically to the variables of critical thinking, metacognition, and personal epistemology was examined. Specifically, the three models noted above and a wealth of research by Kuhn (1991) alone and with others, demonstrated a reciprocal link between the three constructs. Evidence was also provided from Clarebout et al. (2001), Duell and Schommer-Aikins (2001), Wood and Kardash (2002), Schraw et al. (2002), and Schommer-Aikins (2004) that the SEQ, though not perfect, was an acceptable as a tool to measure epistemological beliefs. Finally, a conclusion was drawn from this review pertaining to the nature of personal epistemology. Schommer-Aikins (2004) admonishes the use of care when determining the use of the SEQ and in the analysis of any information drawn from those who complete the form. For that reason, the complete details of how the instrument will be use is given in the next chapter.
77 CHAPTER 3: METHOD Since the inception of the field now known as personal epistemology, research has consisted primarily of three types. Many have used longitudinal studies spanning several years (Baxter Magolda, 2002; Belenkey et al. 1986/1997; King & Kitchener, 1994; Perry, 1968) using paper and pencil tools, or interviews, or a combination of both. Others have used cross sectional studies in which personal epistemology scores on paper and pencil tools were analyzed for relationships with other constructs such as academic performance (Schommer, 1990). Kuhn et al. (1995) incorporated both interviews and pencil and paper tools in a microgenetic study. With few exceptions, every study discussed in chapter 2 incorporated one of these methods. It has been demonstrated that complexity or maturity of epistemological beliefs increases with time and experience, but not necessarily so, and that various relationships exist. Some researchers postulate a relationship between higher-level thinking (critical thinking), metacognition, and personal epistemology (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Dean & Kuhn, 2003; Hofer, 2004b; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). No researcher has yet to explore any possible causal relationships between critical thinking, metacognition, and personal epistemology. To that end, this researcher conducted a quantitative, quasi-experimental study, analyzing the effects of teaching simple critical thinking and critical thinking with a metacognitive emphasis on the personal epistemologies of undergraduate students at a central Tennessee community college campus. In that possible causal relationships were being sought, quasi-experimental testing is an appropriate method for this research. The research method and design appropriateness are addressed in the text that follows. Elaborations are made on statements proffered in chapter 1 concerning why
78 quantitative quasi-experimentation was chosen over other methods, why this is an appropriate method, and why it satisfies the goals for this research. Following this is a discussion of the population, sampling, and data collection procedures. Included in this section, with an elaboration on the population, sampling, and data collection procedures, is a discussion of the prior validation of the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire (SEQ) and the appropriateness of its use for this study. Finally, the aspect of research validity is discussed, followed by an elaboration on the data analysis. Research Method and Design Appropriateness As stated in chapter 1, the methods utilized most frequently in the study of personal epistemology are quantitative questionnaires (Schommer, 1990; Schraw et al., 2002; Wood & Kardash, 2002), qualitative interviews (Baxter Magolda, 2004; Clinchy, 2002), or a mixture of both (King & Kitchener, 2002). None of the research, though, was conducted to explore possible or strongly correlated relationships. As elucidation of such relationships is sought in this present research, quantitative data are preferred over qualitative data. Among quantitative methods, quasi-experimental techniques are the most appropriate. For example, Neuman (2003) stated, “Compared to the other social research techniques, experimental research is the strongest for testing causal relationships because the three conditions for causality (temporal order, association, and no alternative explanations) are clearly met in experimental designs” (p. 241). In that possible causal or strongly correlated relationships were being sought, it was critical to go beyond qualitative research or simple correlational designs and engage in active manipulation of the independent variable of teaching platform and to measure, quantitatively, direct effects on the dependent variables. This measurement cannot be
79 satisfied through other qualitative or quantitative designs. In this present research, because it used faculty and students assigned to groups based on the selections of the administration, equating is not possible. As such, the participants cannot be considered to have been randomly assigned. Therefore, the research is quasi-experimental. The determination will not be as positive as could be made by a pure experimental design. However, using students and faculty selected by the administration of the school, introducing the intervention before the final measurements, and dealing with manipuable causes make the determination more certain (Cooper, 2006). Additionally, by comparing like groups, using a pre-test and posttest design, and controlling for threats to internal and external validity, the research should identify a probable relationship, should one exist (Cooper, 2006). This present quasi-experiment views the individual as the principal experimental unit. For clarity, Individual refers to each individual person; Group refers to a unit made up of more than one individual, although number to vary, with one instructor for the 16week duration of the course. Treatment refers to the broader categories; Treatment 1 being those classes taught with simple critical thinking and Treatment 2 being those classes in which a component of metacognitive enrichment was added. Each treatment consists of the intervention of the teaching platform on the individual’s personal epistemologies. Samples were obtained from two distinct populations of students: those who took critical thinking courses that did not use a metacognitive component, and those who did. Because there was no contact or overlap between these populations (all students identified as being in both groups were removed from the study) there is little to no
80 possibility for inter-population communication. Each population is singular and independent. No faculty member teaching in one population taught in the other. This is discussed in this chapter in the section on internal validity. Each population was tested at two times: during the first week and the last week of any given course. It is reasonable to assume the timeframe affected the outcome. The 16-week timeframe allowed maximum exposure to the treatment, while keeping the exposure limited to a single course. The 16-week timeframe also allowed a reduction in the possibility of familiarity with the instrument, maintaining that aspect of internal validity. Because students randomly skipped questions on the questionnaire, pre- and postclass results were imbalanced. It was not possible to use a paired analysis to evaluate preand post-class differences in responses to the questionnaire. Also, incomplete identification information on the pre-tests and posttests made paring specific pre-tests to specific posttests impossible in most cases. As such, the pre- and post-test results from the two distinct populations were treated as independent samples and two-sample t-tests were used to determine if post-test results for each population differed from pre-test results. This is not the optimal situation for accurate assessment. However, the circumstances noted made it the best choice in this situation. The original goal was to observe any changes between the combined pre-test and posttest responses of the individuals in any given treatment. Those changes were identified using the individual responses on the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire (SEQ). However, as stated and as will be further explained in chapter 4, direct pairing of individual pre-tests to posttests, was unfeasible. It remained possible to
81 identify the pre-tests to posttests from any given instructor in a given class, but it was not possible to match individual to individual. As such, the goal was to pool responses into independent samples of pre and post for each treatment. Additionally, to look for more minute changes, any changes in the responses in the four principle categories of epistemological knowledge were examined: Simple Knowledge; Quick Learning; Fixed Ability; and Certain Knowledge. While it may be possible in the future to expand the research to include various courses of study, the goal was to measure any possible change in individuals during courses in which critical thinking is a core objective and compare those with changes in individuals encountering critical thinking enhanced with a metacognitive component. As such, the proposed research used a group comparison approach holding Treatment 1 as the one with the intervention of critical thinking, defined as meeting specific learning goals (see Appendix C) and Treatment 2 as one with the intervention of critical thinking with an emphasis on metacognition (see Appendix D). Research Questions What is the impact of teaching on the development of a person’s epistemological maturity? This was the most fundamental question guiding this research. The goal was to go beyond the simple association of teaching and learning and concentrate on identifying how teaching metacognitive enrichment affects specific categories of personal epistemology. To that end, three primary questions were asked: Is there a statistically significant effect of teaching critical thinking during a 16-week course on a person’s epistemological maturity? Is there a statistically significant effect of teaching critical thinking with an added component of metacognitive enrichment during a 16-week course
82 on a person’s epistemological maturity? Is there any statistically significant difference between the two teaching platforms? In that it is logically possible there could be a positive or negative change to the maturation of one’s personal epistemology, observations will be made to directionality of any possible change. The first null hypothesis (HO1) based on the primary research question is there is no significant effect of teaching critical thinking on any of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK, FA, QL, and CK) during the span of a single 16-week course. The alternative hypothesis (HA1) is there are significant effects of teaching critical thinking on at least one of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK, FA, QL, and CK) during the span of a single 16-week course. The second null hypothesis (HO2) based on the primary research question is there is no significant effect of teaching critical thinking with an added component of metacognitive enrichment on any of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK, FA, QL, and CK) during the span of a single 16-week course. The alternative hypothesis (HA2) is there are significant effects of teaching critical thinking with an added component of metacognitive enrichment on at least one of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK, FA, QL, and CK) during the span of a single 16-week course. Last, to facilitate quantifying the assumption that adding a metacognitive component to a critical thinking course would increase the change in maturity of personal epistemology, it must be asked if there is there a statistically significant difference (α = 0.05) in any possible changes between simple critical thinking and critical thinking with metacognitive enrichment component on personal epistemologies. The goal was to
83 observe if adding the metacognitive component increased any possible positive change in personal epistemologies over teaching critical thinking without the metacognitive emphasis. To that end, HO3 is there is no statistically significant difference between the effects of teaching critical thinking on personal epistemologies and the effects of teaching critical thinking with a component of metacognitive enrichment on personal epistemologies during the span of a single 16-week course. The alternative hypothesis (HA3) is there is a statistically significant difference between the effects of teaching critical thinking on personal epistemologies and the effects of teaching critical thinking with a component of metacognitive enrichment on personal epistemologies during the span of a single 16-week course. The results are discussed in chapter 4. Population The population is composed of students enrolled at a central Tennessee community college campus (n=681). Thus, the students have a wide range of chronological, intellectual, and academic maturity levels. The students from this population included in this study were those who are enrolled in courses where enhanced critical thinking is an implicit or explicit learning objective. Courses included in study are those that focus on remedial learning strategies (n=13), English (n=15), philosophy (n=4), psychology (n=4), sociology (n=2), and history (n=3). This number and area of courses was determined by college administration and instructor participation before commencing the research. Students are enrolled in any of these courses as part of their associate’s degree program, although some could be enrolled as part of a non-degree program. First-time students are required to have proof or graduation from a state approved high school or
84 home school, or have a GED with a score no lower than 450 (Nashville State, 2006). Students under the age of 21 should submit ACT scores no lower than 27 in English or 19 on the Enhanced ACT. Alternatively, they must submit scores on the SAT of no less than 460 on critical writing and 470 on math. Students over the age of 21 must take placement assessments (Nashville State, 2006, p. 11). It is possible to enter the school with lower grades, but students must pass required remedial courses before being granted access to college level courses. For transfer students or other students, the student must present proof of proficiency in writing or math, as demonstrated by transferable credits with a grade of C or higher, or take the placement assessments (Nashville State, 2006). On this campus, 5,332 degree-seeking students were enrolled during the fall of 2005, representing 73% of the total student population (E. Weed, personal communication, June 19, 2006). Among those students, 58% were female, 42% male; 61% Caucasian and 39% African-American or other; 55% were 25 years old or older, 55% were 24% were 24 years old or younger (E. Weed). Of those enrolled, 36% were full-time and 64% were part-time. Most of those students, 62%, were enrolled in courses classified as Arts & Sciences (E. Weed). These students are distributed among four campuses, the majority, 87%, at the main campus (E. Weed). Concerning this present research, 733 students turned in pre-test SEQs. Of that number, 25 were rejected because of being improperly completed or completed by those indicating an age under 18. An additional 27 were rejected as the students completed questionnaires in both Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 courses. Of the 681 included in the pre-test phase of the study, there were and 312 in Treatment 1 and 369 in Treatment 2. In the posttest phase 523 students completed posttest questionnaires. Of that number, 27
85 were eliminated because of improperly completing the form as well as the 27 who had turned in both pre-test questionnaires for both treatments. Of the 469 remaining, 222 turned in completed questionnaires for Treatment 1 and 247 for Treatment 2. The disparity is a result of high rate of attrition on this campus. Informed Consent Although it is possible a person under the age of 18 could be in one of the examined classes, anyone indicating an age under 18 was eliminated from the study. All participation was voluntary. A consent form (Appendix G) was read to the class before the pre-test SEQs were distributed as well as attached to each copy distributed to students. The students were informed that participation implies consent, but that participation is voluntary and that declining to participate will have no affect on the student’s grade. The signatures of the students were required to ensure consent, but were encoded to assure anonymity to all but the sole researcher. Sampling Frame Students are normally enrolled in any of the courses included in this research as part of their normal degree program. Some could be in any of the courses as part of a non-degree program. For any course used in this research there were at least two occurrences of that course area in the fall semester. Students self-enrolled based on course availability and personal schedule constraints. As such, their participation in any course is voluntary. Students were counseled on preferred sequence and about which courses require pre-requisites. Every faculty member participating in this research is considered a full-time faculty at this institution. The faculty members were assigned to courses based on
86 requests by administration and the available courses for any given semester. For this research, the college administration had determined to seek faculty volunteers and made a determination about in which treatment any faculty was placed (M F. Jones, personal communication, June 19, 2006). This administrative selection of faculty reinforces the classification of this research as quasi-experimental (Cooper, 2006). Confidentiality As the pre-tests and posttests are collected, the sole researcher coded the documents to enable matching of the proper pre-test to the proper posttest. This code ensures that no one other than the researcher would be able to identify the participants. The original documents will be retained in a safe and secure location until six months past the date of the final documentation of that research has been accepted and filed and will then be properly destroyed. With these safeguards in place, no violation of the Family Education Rights Privacy Act (FERPA) has occurred. Instrumentation Duell and Schommer-Aikins (2001) evaluated extant methods and instruments for measuring epistemological beliefs. There were four pencil and paper instruments built on a belief in the multidimensionality of epistemological beliefs: the SEQ; the Beliefs about Knowledge and Learning (BKL) developed by Jehng et al. in 1993 (from Jehng’s doctoral study), the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI), developed by Schraw et al., and the Epistemological Understanding by Judgment Domain (EUJD) developed by Kuhn (Duell & Schommer-Aikins, pp. 425-6). The EUDJ has been validated for use with a small group, but no estimation of reliability is offered. The instrument also focused on Kuhn’s levels of metacognitive
87 development (Kuhn & Udell, 2001) relative to matters such as aesthetics, values, and personal taste. As such, it is not appropriate to this study. The EBI is a shorter instrument, composed of 32 questions compared to the 63 in the SEQ and features a demonstrated high reliability. Duell and Schommer-Aikins (2001) reported “0.63-0.87 Cronbach’s Alphas for items in each factor” (p. 426), as well as affirming the validity of the instrument. The similarities between the BKL and SEQ have been noted by Wood and Kardash (2002) and discussed below. On reliability, Duell and Schommer-Aikins reported 0.74 for test-retest results and “0.63 to 0.85 inter-item correlations for items within each belief factor” for the SEQ and “0.84 overall internal consistency” and 0.420.59 inter-item correlations for items within each belief factor” (p. 425). The SEQ was chosen because it contained 63 questions and 12 subsets that had been validated during Schommer’s and subsequent research. The instrument also has a high ease of use and codification. By looking at the four principal factors, any changes should be more apparent. Below are the comments of others who have analyzed the SEQ. Wood and Kardash (2002) took Schommer’s (1990) original data and applied a rotation analysis. The results were that “principle axis factoring with Varamax rotation yielded four factors that corresponded fairly closely to Schommer’s original hypothesis regarding which subsets should load on which factors” (p. 241). They discovered that some of the subsets failed to load on the factors originally hypothesized. One subset for Quick Learning loaded under Innate Ability instead, while another for Quick Learning had “a substantial loading (0.34) on the Innate Ability factor as well” (p. 241). They also found that Avoid Ambiguity loaded, not on Certain Knowledge as hypothesized, but on Simple Knowledge instead.
88 Wood and Kardash (2002) applied the same analysis to the data collected from other studies conducted by Schommer and colleagues. What they found was “Schommer’s Simple Knowledge factor has been remarkably stable across all these studies. Three of the subsets – Avoid Ambiguity, Seek Single Answers, and Avoid Integration – have loaded on this factor in each of the four studies” (p. 241). Other positives include Knowledge is Certain always loading on the Certain Knowledge factor, Learning is Quick consistently loads to the Quick Learning Factor, and Learn the First Time, Can’t Learn How to Learn, and Success is Unrelated to Hard Work consistently load to the Fixed Ability factor. The conclusion was that “the structure yielded from empirical investigations appears to be generally stable, although the factor structure does not yield a one-to-one correspondence with the pattern of loadings Schommer originally hypothesized” (p. 247). Schraw et al. (2002) applied both Varimax rotation and oblique rotation to the original Schommer data. Their primary factor analysis yielded “19 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 that explained 72% of the total sample variation” (p. 266). They did further analysis without Schommer’s a priori groupings and found it is possible to reach “substantially different interpretations” than did Schommer (p. 267). However, Schraw et al. were interested in validating their own instrument, the Epistemological Beliefs Inventory, which they did demonstrate as better in predicting success in reading comprehension than the SEQ. There are problems with the models, but they concern where the subsets are placed more than to the subsets themselves. Again, in that what is being sought are changes, possibly minute changes over a short period, the SEQ is the most amenable
89 instrument to this present research. By recording and measuring changes on individual questions and the four principal factors, it should be possible to lessen errors caused by possible misplacement of a subset in a principal factor. Data Collection The SEQ is detailed in the next section, but it consists of 63 questions to be answered with a 5-point Likert Scale. Because the goal was to observe any changes in the individual on any of the four primary factors collecting such discrete data is necessary. While it might be possible to utilize interviews or interviews coupled with direct observation, neither method would yield the specific information being sought in this study (Duell & Schommer-Aikins, 2001). To collect data free from any influence by the interviewer or observer on the participants’ behaviors or answers, it was necessary to use the SEQ. What the SEQ provides is a self-reported perspective that may be unrecognized by the participant and should demonstrate what the person believes rather than what he or she thinks is believed, or is led to think he or she believes. Data collection was solely with the SEQ, entered into a database by the researcher, and independently verified. The accuracy of the data entry was confirmed by consistent double-checking for each individual SEQ. For the collection, the SEQ was distributed during the first week of class and again during the final week of the semester. For each distribution, the completed SEQs were placed into an envelope, sealed, and delivered to the Dean of Learning Resources, and then to the researcher. These envelops were verified by the Dean of Learning Resources to ensure proper placement into classes and groups.
90 Data Analysis For both the pre-test and posttest, the SEQ was the sole instrument used (see Appendix B for a breakdown). The instrument is designed so that 36 questions are worded in a way that a person with naïve epistemological beliefs would strongly agree and 27 questions in which a person with naïve epistemological beliefs would strongly disagree. After the data were collected, the numbers for the 27 negative questions were transposed so higher scores indicate a more naïve perspective. The lower the score, the more mature the individual’s personal epistemology. A lower score mean would indicate an increase in maturity levels during the treatment. From the pre-test, a distribution was constructed from the collected responses for the statements included in each of the four factors and subset for that factor. After the posttest, the same action was taken and those distributions were compared to each other and to pre-test distributions to determine if the means were statistically different. This was also done for the four primary factors. The primary analysis was by groups The secondary analysis was limited to inter-group factor comparisons. For all hypotheses, the use of parametric tests was warranted based on the observed heteroscedasticity of the data collected. The data are quantile and discrete in nature because of the Likert scale employed, and analysis discussed in chapter 4 determined the statistics for the groups did not deviate noticeably from a Gaussian distribution. Variance in the means was determined with two-sample t-tests. Those tests and results are discussed in chapter 4.
91 Validity and Reliability Internal Creswell (2005) stated, “Threats to internal validity are problems that threaten our ability to draw correct cause-and-effect inferences that arise because of the experimental procedures or the experiences of participants” (pp. 290-291). Creswell listed 12 areas in which these errors might occur. Nine of these areas are also discussed by Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002, as cited in Cooper, 2006). Attention, here, will be paid to the more extensive list by Creswell. Each area will be addressed below with comments about applicability to this present research. Also addressed are the steps that have been taken to reduce or eliminate the threat. Six areas pertain to the participants in the study (Creswell, 2005). In that every group met for only 16 weeks, the aspect of history is controlled. There may have been some minor discrepancies as some periods of student or faculty absence may have occurred, but this is not a threat to the integrity of the research. The relative time in the classroom, participating in the class, was the same for each group. The area of maturation is also controlled by the short duration of the experimentation. The area of regression has been controlled in that no individuals were selected to participate based on test scores. All students coming in were seen as starting on equal footing. Selection and communication with those selected was controlled in the experiment because there was no involvement by the researcher in the selecting any students for any given group. The researcher, also, did not participate in the faculty assignment process. The sixth area concerning participants, mortality, was addressed primarily by focusing on a group comparison first. Should a student have provided a pre-test or
92 posttest without the other, it will not affect the overall group score as the student would be seen as continuing to participate in the treatment. In addition, using group analysis as the primary focus eliminated the need to cull pre-tests from individual students who did not complete the course. . There are four areas pertaining to the treatments used in the study (Creswell, 2005). There is a small possibility of diffusion of treatments in that both treatments occurred in the same timeframe. However, there was little interaction between treatment groups. There was also the possibility that individual students could be involved, simultaneously, in both treatments, or in multiple courses with the same treatment. For this research, such students who completed pre-tests or posttests for both treatments were dropped from the study. Students who were in more than one group in any specific treatment were left in the study. There was no threat of compensatory equalization or compensatory rivalry because no participants were compensated. It was also a factor in controlling for these two areas that no student’s grade was influenced by participation or lack of participation in the study. There was also little possibility of resentful demoralization in that neither treatment should be seen as less beneficial to the students. The final two areas concern threats that pertain to the procedures used in the study. While it was a possibility that students may become familiar with the instrument, it is not likely to be problematic. The 16 weeks between pre-test and posttest, combined with the complexity of the questionnaire, should reduce the chances of familiarity with the instrument.
93 External Cooper (2006) stated that external validity “refers to the generalizability of a causal claim to students, teachers, classrooms, schools, times, and outcomes: (p. 861). Creswell (2005) stated, “Threats to external validity are problems that threaten our ability to draw correct inferences from the sample data to other persons, settings, and past and future situations” (p. 293). Creswell lists three areas for potential threats. Each is discussed in turn. One area is interaction of selection and treatment. For neither treatment should race, gender, socioeconomic status, age, or personality make a difference as far as the treatments, qua treatments, are applied. Research cited in chapter 2 has verified that none of these factors significantly influences the outcome of the SEQ. As the purpose of this quasi-experiment is to study the impact of critical thinking and critical thinking with a metacognitive component on personal epistemology, these factors were not pertinent to any outcomes. The diversity of age, race, socioeconomic status, and gender are limited to that of the general population of the college. Because the selection for the classes was arbitrary, the generalizability should be high when applying to other classes in which critical thinking is a core objective, regardless the composition of those classes. A second area is interaction of setting and treatment. The environment for classes at this college is considered typical of other community colleges. As such, it will not be difficult to generalize the findings to other college settings. The high degree of similarity among community college campuses should make the generalizability to all other community college campuses high. This is one area, though, that would lend itself to further research.
94 The last area of external threat is interaction of history and treatment. Control for this threat is limited because the course is part of a prescribed degree completion plan and normally falls in the same sequence for nearly all students who take it. As such, it would be difficult to infer what effect earlier or later placement in that sequence would produce and it remains a threat to external validity. Summary The research method and design appropriateness were addressed first. Elaborations were made on statements proffered in chapter 1 concerning why quantitative quasi-experimental was chosen over other methods, why this is an appropriate method and why it satisfies the goals for this research. Assertions were made that because the goal of this research is to look for and identify possible causal or strongly correlated relationships between teaching critical thinking or critical thinking with a metacognitive component and epistemological beliefs, quantitative, quasi-experimental research provided the best tools (Neuman, 2003). The research questions and hypotheses were then reiterated from chapter 1. Following this was a discussion of the population, informed consent, sampling frame, confidentiality, and data collection procedures. Included in these sections, with an elaboration on the population, sampling, and data collection procedures, the prior validation of the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire (SEQ) and its appropriateness of use for this study was discussed. Details were provided about the demographics of the student population for the college. A discussion of how students were selected for inclusion in a course in which critical thinking is a core objective was discussed. Also, a description of how selections would be made of both students and faculty for
95 participation in this study was provided. The composition of the SEQ was provided as well as confirmation of its validity (Schraw et al., 2002; Wood & Kardash, 2002). Also discussed was how the SEQ is more appropriate for this research than other available options. The aspects of data analysis were discussed, followed by an elaboration on both internal and external validity. Concerning the data analysis, it was stated the precise measurements were determined by the preliminary analysis of the data. The conclusion of that data analysis is presented in the chapter 4. An analysis of this present research was compared to Creswell’s (2005) list of threats to internal and external validity. Assertions were made that this research has provided sufficient protection against the threats from 12 internal and 3 external threats, save the external threat of history and placement.
96 CHAPTER 4: RESULTS This quasi-experimental research study was designed to identify possible causal or strongly correlated relationships between applying metacognitive techniques in the classroom and the maturation of students’ personal epistemologies. The research did demonstrate the scores on certain factors of the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire (SEQ) indicated an increased maturity when additional metacognitive enriching factors were introduced into a classroom during a 16-week semester. This finding was not consistent in all four factors examined. A brief reiteration of the research methodology and data collection is followed by a recounting of the hypotheses included in the research. Each pair of null and alternative hypotheses is examined in the order originally stated. In the cases where the null hypothesis was rejected, further elaboration is presented. Then, a summary of the research is provided. Methodology The 63-question Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire (SEQ) was administered to 733 community college students in central Tennessee at the beginning of a fall semester. Of those, 52 samples were rejected for data quality reasons as is discussed in chapter 3. Of the 681 samples included in the pre-test phase of the study, there were 312 in Treatment 1 and 369 in Treatment 2. At the end of the 16-week semester, 523 students completed posttest questionnaires. Of that number, 54 were eliminated for data quality reasons as is discussed in chapter 3. Of the 469 samples remaining, 222 turned in completed questionnaires for Treatment 1 and 247 for Treatment 2. The disparity is a result of the high rate of withdrawals from the courses.
97 Often, students had missed one or more of the 63 questions when completing the questionnaires. This made measuring individual scores on the four factors problematic, as a missed number would artificially lower the score for that student on the factor being measured. To ensure accuracy, the groups were pooled and any score of zero (indicating an unanswered question) was eliminated from the analysis. The number of completed answers is indicated in the number of observations (n) presented for each treatment and factor in Tables 1, 3, and 5. Additionally, discrepancies in the identification information made it impossible, often, to match a specific pre-test to a specific posttest. It was possible to ensure a collection of pre-tests and posttests came from the same course and instructor, but not to ensure every individual who took the pre-test took the posttest or that everyone who took the posttest took a pre-test. Because participants from any pre-test group cannot be positively matched to the participants in any posttest group, the samples are treated as independent. Admittedly, this represents a flaw in the design of the study. However, the flaw was not present in the original design, but was introduced by a necessary reduction in the degree of monitoring permitted in collecting the data. A discussion of how this flaw can be reduced in future study is found in chapter 5. That flaw, though, does not negate the findings. It does open doors to additional study in this area. Conclusions may be drawn about impact, but there are serious limitations on determining exactly what brought about the impact. Reiterating, incomplete questionnaires and incomplete identification data necessitated organizing the students into four independent groups.
98 It was suggested the data analysis would benefit from and examination using a General Linear Model or a MANOVA. Both were performed using Minitab 15 (2007). The most important detail was that in each case, the Adjusted R-squared was less than 1% as calculated by Minitab. This goodness of fit test indicates that, as expected, the model is not a fit for the data. Because the data are from independent samples and the assumption that one variable could influence another is not a possibility, using such an analysis is inappropriate for this study. The results from such ill-fitted model would, in fact, increase the possibility of showing no statistically significant difference when one does exist (Type II) and a statistically significant difference (from a falsely assumed interaction) when one does, in fact, not exist (Type I). As such, the analysis of this data was performed with the reasonable and reliable tools for this data, independent twosample t-tests. Parametric statistics were used for hypothesis testing in this analysis because the basic assumptions required, data are discrete-interval and they did not deviate noticeably from Gaussian distributions, were met (Figures 1-4). Minitab 15 (2007) was used to develop the histograms and determine the normal curve. All other statistical computations use Microsoft® Excel (2002) or Megastats® (Orris, 2003) programs.
99
Figure 1.Treatment one pre-test.
Figure 2 Treatment one posttest.
100
Figure 3 Treatment one posttest.
Figure 4. Treatment two posttest.
101 Findings In this section, all three sets of hypotheses, null and alternative, are recounted in the order discussed in Chapter 1. In each case where the null hypothesis was rejected, the results are provided to confirm the rejection. If a null hypothesis is rejected, then an elaboration is also provided about how far the data might be extended to support the alternative hypothesis. Note that a statistically significantly lower mean score indicates a positive change in the maturity levels of personal epistemology. The t-test does a comparison of the means. An independent two-sample t-test can be run with one of two assumptions: one for equal, and one for unequal variances. An Ftest determines whether the variances are equal or unequal. If the probability of a greater F (ρ value) is < 0.05, then the assumption of unequal variances was used for the t-tests. If the probability of a greater F (ρ value) is > 0.05, then the assumption of equal variances was used for the t-tests. In tables 2 and 4 all t-test and F-test results are presented as probabilities (ρ values). First Hypotheses The first null hypothesis (HO1) was there is no statistically significant effect of teaching critical thinking on any of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK-Simple Knowledge, FA-Fixed Ability, QL-Quick Learning; and CK -Certain Knowledge) during the span of a single 16-week course. The alternative hypothesis (HA1) was there are statistically significant effects of teaching critical thinking on at least one of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK, FA, QL, and CK) during the span of a single 16-week course.
102 Descriptive statistics for Treatment 1 are presented in Table 1 and the calculated t-tests and F-tests are presented in Table 2. Using the a priori hypothesis rejection threshold of α = 0.05, and considering the four factors for Treatment 1, Factor 3, Quick Learning, demonstrated a probability (ρ value) < than 0.05. The first null hypothesis is rejected. The coding of the SEQ defines a decrease in the scores on any factor as indicative of an increase in maturity for an individual’s personal epistemology. The results for Quick Learning in Treatment 1 indicate a statistically significant increase in posttest scores over pre-test scores. A decrease in epistemological maturity has been demonstrated. The ramifications of this are discussed in chapter 5. Table 1 Group descriptive statistics for Treatment 1. Pre-test
Factor 1 (SK) Factor 2 (FA) Factor 3 (QL) Factor 4 (CK)
Posttest
Mean
SD
n
Confidence Interval
Mean
SD
n
Confidence Interval
3.01
1.15
8,667
± 0.024
2.99
1.16
6,182
± 0.0289
2.34
1.17
4,921
± 0.032
2.37
1.16
3,509
± 0.038
2.26
1.08
4,027
± 0.033
2.35
1.13
2,845
± 0.041
2.79
1.24
1,803
± 0.057
2.74
1.23
1,206
± 0.069
Confidence interval at 95%
103 Table 2 t-tests and F-tests, by factor, on Treatment 1. ρ
Treatment 1 Calculated t-test
Calculated F-test
Factor 1
0.221
0.282
Factor 2
0.253
0.573
Factor 3
0.003**
0.016**
Factor 4
0.288
0.7516
** = significant at the α = 0.05 level Second Hypotheses The second null hypothesis (HO2) was there is no statistically significant effect of teaching critical thinking with an added component of metacognitive enrichment on any of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK, FA, QL, and CK) during the span of a single 16-week course. The alternative hypothesis (HA2) was there are statistically significant effects of teaching critical thinking with an added component of metacognitive enrichment on at least one of the four areas of measured personal epistemologies (SK, FA, QL, and CK) during the span of a single 16-week course. Descriptive statistics for Treatment 2 are presented in Table 3 and the calculated t-tests and F-tests are presented in Table 4. Establishing the same hypothesis rejection threshold of α = 0.05, the results for both Factor 2 (Fixed Ability) and Factor 4 (Certain Knowledge) warrant rejection of the null hypothesis. For both Fixed Ability and Certain Knowledge in Treatment 2, the resulting mean scores were significantly lower in post treatment scores, demonstrating positive changes in the maturity levels of respondents in courses where metacognitive techniques were employed.
104 Table 3 Factor descriptive for Treatment 2. Pre-test Mean
SD
n
Factor 1 3.00 1.17 10,278 (SK) Factor 2 2.38 1.22 6,284 (FA) 2.24 1.13 4,781 Factor 3 (QL) Factor 4 2.81 1.32 2,184 (CK) Confidence interval at 95%
Posttest Confidence Interval
Mean
SD
n
Confidence Interval
± 0.022
2.98
1.13 6,878
± 0.026
± 0.030
2.33
1.12 3,922
± 0.035
± 0.030
2.29
1.10 3,186
± 0.038
± 0.055
2.72
1.21 1,453
± 0.062
Table 4 t-tests and F-tests on factors in Treatment 2. ρ
Treatment 2 Calculated T-test
Calculated F-test
Factor 1
0.106
0.006**
Factor 2
0.008**
>0.001**
Factor 3
0.053*
0.065*
Factor 4
0.016**
0.001**
* = significant at the α = 0.10 level ** = significant at the α = 0.05 level Third Hypotheses The third null hypothesis (HO3) was there is no statistically significant difference between the effects of teaching critical thinking on personal epistemologies and the effects of teaching critical thinking with a component of metacognitive enrichment on personal epistemologies during the span of a single 16-week course. The alternative hypothesis (HA3) was there is a statistically significant difference between the effects of
105 teaching critical thinking on personal epistemologies and the effects of teaching critical thinking with a component of metacognitive enrichment on personal epistemologies during the span of a single 16-week course. To better enable comparisons, the descriptive statistics for both pre-tests and both posttests are provided in Table 5. The calculated t-tests and F-tests are presented in Table 6. Based on a comparison of the means, there is no factor for which there was a statistically significant difference at the α = 0.05 level. There was no statistical difference between the means, on any factor, between the pre-test groups or between the posttest groups. The third null hypothesis is not rejected. However, the results may come from the different directions in changes indicated in Tables 1 and 3, and the statistically significant differences between pre-test and posttest scores indicated in Tables 2 and 4. For example, the t-tests for Factor 4 (Certain Knowledge), when comparing either pre-tests or posttests for Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, demonstrate no statistically significant difference between the starting and ending points for either treatment. An examination of the difference between pre-test and posttest mean scores, though, does demonstrate a statistically significant difference in Treatment 2. The fact the Treatment 2 group started higher and finished lower on the factor of Certain Knowledge than the Treatment 1 group is obfuscated. The same holds true for Factor 2 (Fixed Ability) If the hypothesis rejection threshold were elevated to α = 0.10, then the third null hypothesis would be rejected as the means for the posttest scores in both treatments for Factor 3 was statistically different at ρ = 0.07. The ramifications of this finding are discussed in chapter 5.
106 Table 5 Descriptive statistics for Pre-tests and Posttests. Pre-test ρ
Factor 1 (SK)
3.01
Treatment one SD n Confidence Interval 1.15 8,667 ± 0.024
Factor 2 (FA)
2.34
1.17
4,921
Factor 3 (QL)
2.26
1.08
Factor 4 (CK)
2.79
1.24
Mean
3.00
Treatment two SD n Confidence Interval 1.170 10278 ± 0.022
± 0.032
2.38
1.220
6284
± 0.030
4,027
± 0.033
2.24
1.130
4781
± 0.030
1,803
± 0.057
2.81
1.320
2184
± 0.055
Mean
Posttest Treatment one Mean SD n
Confidence Mean Interval
Treatment Two SD n Confidence Interval
Factor 1 (SK)
2.99
1.16
6,182
± 0.0289
2.98
1.130
6878
± 0.026
Factor 2 (FA)
2.37
1.16
3,509
± 0.038
2.33
1.120
3922
± 0.035
Factor 3 (QL)
2.35
1.13
2,845
± 0.041
2.29
1.100
3186
± 0.038
Factor 4 (CK)
2.74
1.23
1,206
± 0.069
2.72
1.210
1453
± 0.062
Confidence interval at 95% Table 6 t-tests and F-tests, by factors, for Pre-tests and Posttests ρ
Pre-tests Posttests T-test F-test T-test F-test Factor 1 0.739 0.032 0.581 0.093 Factor 2 0.062* 0.001 0.101 0.026 Factor 3 0.379 0.006 0.070* 0.104 Factor 4 0.576 0.006 0.644 0.638 * = significant at the α = 0.10 level
107 The SEQ was unable to identify statistically significant changes in mean scores between pre-test and posttest treatment groups at the α = 0.05 level. This finding, though, is suspect as it contradicts the findings of statistically significant difference when comparing pre-test and posttest scores within treatments. The results indicate that adding a metacognitive component to teaching does yield statistically significantly higher mean scores in some factors, indicating a more mature personal epistemology in post treatment groups compared pre-treatment results. These factors are concerned with both the fixed and certain natures of what can be known, and how knowledge is obtained. The results also indicated that when a metacognitive component was not added to the teaching of critical thinking, students’ maturity levels concerning the quickness with which one is able to learn can decrease. These results are discussed with other ramifications of the results in chapter 5.
108 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS One goal for higher education is to produce more individuals capable of higherorder thinking (Higbee, 2003; Kuhn & Dean, 2004). Significant evidence exists linking a more mature personal epistemology and the ability to engage more consistently in higher order thinking (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Hofer, 2004b; Pintrich, 2002a; SchommerAikins, 2004). It was held that this relationship was reciprocal, but no efforts had been made to look for possible causation in the relationship. Knowing a possible causal direction would benefit education by facilitating a more certain way to increase a student’s ability to engage in consistent higher-order thinking. The fundamental question guiding this present research concerned the impact of teaching on the maturation process of a person’s epistemological beliefs. The goal for this present quasi-experimental research study was to analyze any possible impact of the insertion of metacognitive enriching activities in a classroom in which critical thinking was a core objective on students’ measured personal epistemologies. An impact was discovered on three of the four factors measured, but the impact was positive on only two of those factors. There are limitations to this discovery, but only to the applicability beyond courses in which critical thinking is a core component. In this chapter, the conclusions derived directly from the analysis are explored first. The results of the statistical analysis are discussed according to negative outcomes first, followed by positive outcomes. Then, implications from those conclusions are explored. Specifically discussed is how this research may be applied by leaders in higher education to facilitate a certain teaching methodology aimed at producing more higherorder thinking. Lastly, recommendations are made for future research.
109 Conclusions Pintrich (2002a) pondered the nature of epistemological beliefs and proffered that if they are “deeply embedded, implicit theories or stances or positions or beliefs” they could “play an important causal role in the dynamics of classroom instruction” (p. 406). The conclusions from the statistical data confirm the complex nature of epistemological beliefs. Concerning the question of causation, there does appear to be a relationship and that adding metacognitive enrichment into certain classrooms directly influences, if not causes the maturation of personal epistemologies. This relationship is seen not only in positive outcomes, but in negative ones as well. The failure to reject the third null hypothesis if the goal of a rejection threshold of α = 0.05 had been maintained is the most negative outcome. When comparing pre-test groups to each other, or posttest groups to each other, there was no statistically significant difference between the means. As stated in chapter 4, this absence of a statistically significant difference could be an obfuscation by the statistical analysis rather than a clear picture of reality. What is not evidenced in the comparisons of pre-test groups and posttest groups is the fact there were statistically significant differences in some factors when comparing pre-test mean scores to posttest mean scores for the same treatment and factor. For example, for both Factors 2 (Fixed Ability) and 4 (Certain Knowledge), the pre-test group in Treatment 2 started higher and finished lower than the posttest groups in Treatment 1. There was a statistically significant difference when adding a component of metacognitive enrichment to the maturity levels of the students’ personal epistemologies.
110 If the hypothesis rejection threshold were elevated to α = 0.10, then the third hypothesis could be rejected as Factor 3 (Quick Learning) yielded a ρ = 0.07 on the comparisons of the differences in the means of posttest groups in both treatments. This finding is interesting in that Factor 3 demonstrated a statistically significant difference for Treatment 1, but in lowering the maturity level of the students’ personal epistemologies. The statistical analysis would indicate there is a significant difference when adding a metacognitive component, but the descriptive statistics indicate the difference is that failing to add metacognitive enrichment is detrimental to a student’s beliefs about how quickly knowledge is obtained. The conclusion drawn is that when considering the construct of personal epistemology, the position that it is composed of individual and varied components rather than a trait is further supported. The varied nature of the results, specifically the directional differences between Quick Learning and Fixed Ability, further confirm the positions of Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) and Schommer-Aikins (2004) that personal epistemologies are composed of discrete, loosely connected variables and that maturation levels can vary significantly within an individual. There appeared to be a general, positive directional flow, but factors changed by different degrees. It is also possible to infer from the results that an individual could hold contradictory beliefs simultaneously. When looking at negative outcomes in the four factors, the changes in Quick Learning were the only ones indicating a negative direction for both treatments. Quick Learning, as a factor, considers a person’s beliefs about just how quickly one should be able to learn. Individuals who hold that if a person does not learn something quickly he or she will probably not learn it are seen as holding the naïve perspective. It is considered
111 more mature to question authority and to hold that learning can be painstakingly slow, and that concentration and great effort can help an individual learn. The pooled scores went up for both treatments, although not as much for Treatment 2 as Treatment 1. Note again that an increase in scores indicates a decrease in maturity levels. While students demonstrated a decrease in maturity levels on this factor for both treatments, the addition of metacognitive enrichment slowed the process. A positive outcome was found in the factor of Fixed Ability, the consideration of a person’s beliefs about one’s ability to learn . The position that one is born either smart or dumb is considered naïve. The belief that learning is a learned ability and that hard work in learning to learn yields rewards is considered mature. This factor is very similar to Quick Learning but considers more the beliefs about an individual’s ability to learn in general and the learning process rather than the learning of individual subjects. The similarity in the factors makes the changes more poignant between the treatments. In Treatment 1, the maturity level of responses demonstrated a decrease, though not a statistically significant one. In Treatment 2, though, there was a statistically significant increase in the maturity of the responses. A reasonable conclusion is that teaching of simple critical thinking actually retarded the students’ positions on not only the efficacy of effort in learning, but about each individual’s ability to learn as well. Introducing metacognitive enrichment, though, led to a greater belief in an individual’s ability to learn how to learn even if the belief in the ability to learn specific subjects was diminished. The factor of Certain Knowledge demonstrated positive changes in both treatments, but only significantly in Treatment 2. This factor considers the notion of truth
112 and holds that believing in an absolute truth or even the ability to find an absolute truth a naïve belief. Conversely, holding to a more ambiguous notion of truth or that newly discovered facts could change currently held beliefs about truth is held to be more mature. It is reasonable to assert that being in a college environment would, almost of necessity, challenge an individual’s previously held conceptions of truth, and the data collected confirm this. It also confirms that introducing metacognitive enrichment greatly enhances this increase in a more epistemologically mature belief system. The only factor not indicating some statistically significant change was Simple Knowledge. This factor considers the composition and applicability of truth. The position that subjects are discrete entities and little can be transferred from one subject to another is considered a naïve position. Holding that authority is to be questioned and there is much benefit in transferring knowledge from one subject to another is considered mature. The mature epistemological position is that knowledge is complex and composed more of bits that can be intermingled to derive new knowledge. Both treatments indicated a slight increase in maturity levels on beliefs about Simple Knowledge, but neither of any statistical significance. The construct of Simple Knowledge is complex, but it is reasonable to hold that exposure to different subjects at the college level would facilitate some increase in maturity on this factor. A reasonable conclusion that may be drawn is that exposure for one semester was not sufficient to facilitate a statistically significant change in either treatment. One general conclusion from the results is that introducing students to a single semester of courses in which simple critical thinking is a core objective can alter the maturity levels in a student’s personal epistemology. That change is not significant and
113 not always positive. In the factor of Quick Learning, the exposure to learning critical thinking alone proved detrimental to that maturity level. In the three other factors, there was a noticeable, but not statistically significant increase in epistemological maturity levels. A second general conclusion is that adding metacognitive enriching activities in the classroom can further enhance positive changes in epistemological maturity. In the factors of Fixed Ability and Certain Knowledge, the introduction of metacognitive enrichment proved to augment significantly students’ personal epistemologies over the teaching of just critical thinking. In the factors of Quick Learning and Simple Knowledge, adding the metacognitive enrichment led to positive changes over what the teaching of simple critical thinking did, though not a statistically significant change. The research also demonstrated that teaching simple critical thinking without metacognitive enrichment might cause a statistically significant decrease of epistemological maturity on the factor of Quick Learning. Metacognitive enrichment, then, is a valuable tool when seeking to increase the maturity levels of a student’s personal epistemology. The direct conclusion from the findings of this research is there is a strong relationship, if not a causal one, between metacognitive enrichment and the maturing of a student’s personal epistemology. When metacognitive enrichment was added to courses in which critical thinking was a core objective, the maturing of personal epistemologies was greater in all factors than through teaching of critical thinking alone. The implications of this research are discussed next.
114 Implications If the goal of education is to change beliefs and develop individuals capable of more consistent higher-order thinking (Pintrich, 2002a; Schraw, 2001), then employing metacognitive enrichment in the classroom should be encouraged. When compared to changes wrought through attention only to the basics of critical thinking, the differences are compelling. The implications of this present research are discussed, first in terms of adding metacognitive enrichment to the classroom and then in terms of the construct of personal epistemology. No part of this study focused on the specific learning of any particular subject. It was only the maturation process of students’ personal epistemologies that was under investigation. It cannot be directly concluded that adding metacognitive enrichment enabled the students in this study to achieve greater academic success. It can, though, be inferred by combining the results with results from other research. There are a number of studies indicating that adding metacognitive enrichment techniques increased learning in the subjects of scientific thinking (Bell & Linn, 2002; Hammer & Elby, 2003; Kalman, 2002; Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000; Qian & Pan, 2002), mathematics (De Corte, Op’t Eynde, & Verschaffel, 2002; Muis, 2004), and in areas concerning improvement in reading and writing skills (Hacker 1998; Sitko, 1998). These studies were concerned with academic success though, and not specifically the maturing of personal epistemologies. If the nature of beliefs is such that learning involves the changing of beliefs (Bransford et al., 2006; Murphy & Mason, 2006; Scheibner & Shinn, 2003), and that beliefs about the nature of knowledge and what can be known are the lynchpins of a
115 person’s belief system (Bendixen & Rule; 2004, Hofer, 2004b; Schommer-Aikins, 2004), it is logical to assume the addition of metacognitive enrichment to the afore mentioned studies not only increased academic success but the maturation levels of the students’ personal epistemologies. If we add to this previous research the subjects included in this study - Sociology, Philosophy, History, and remedial skills - then it is also reasonable to assume that adding metacognition to most, if not all subjects will enhance learning. Previous research also indicated there was a clear connection between more mature personal epistemologies and the use of higher-order thinking. The more complex or mature a person’s epistemology, the more likely it is for a person to use higher-order thinking (Bendixen & Hartley, 2003; Dean & Kuhn, 2003). This research demonstrates that introducing metacognitive enrichment facilitates, if not causes directly, the maturing of epistemological beliefs. The implication is that adding and focusing on metacognitive enrichment in any classroom will lead not only to greater academic success, but also to a more consistent use of higher-order thinking. If a goal for education is to produce individuals capable of a more consistent use of higher-order thinking, this research indicates that adding metacognitive enrichment to courses in which critical thinking is a core objective will better meet this goal. By simply asking students to think about their own thought processes while they study or about how they prepare for a test or write a paper, it is possible to facilitate a greater learning experience. It is also possible to build the skills and the disposition necessary to become a more consistent higher-order thinker. The goal of a more educated populace can be better obtained by incorporating metacognitive enrichment in all classrooms.
116 These implications are pertinent to the leadership of education in that focusing on increasing the maturity levels of a student’s personal epistemology will increase a student’s academic success. To lead in education, the goal should be to find more efficient and more affective ways to bolster a student’s comprehension of a set of subjects. However, an even more important goal should be to lead students in nurturing a stronger ability to comprehend in general. By encouraging the employment of metacognitive enriching techniques in the classroom, this goal is more realizable. A more mature personal epistemology means not just increasing a student’s possible test scores, but demonstrably increasing a student’s ability to comprehend and apply new knowledge. There are also implications from this research applicable to the conception of personal epistemology. Specifically, the disparity between the four factors contributes to the notion that epistemological beliefs are discrete and separated more than connected in a consistent whole. The similarities between Quick Learning and Fixed Ability and the difference in directions in maturity levels during a single semester precipitate a number of questions. Those questions, though, are more about what could have contributed to groups of students having more mature beliefs about one’s ability to learn to learn, while holding that if some subject were not learned quickly, it was not likely to be learned. These questions will be proffered, of necessity, for additional research, a topic addressed next. Recommendations This present research looked only at a possible causal or strongly correlated relationship between metacognitive enrichment and the maturing of personal epistemologies. The data collected confirmed a probable causal relationship. What would
117 further confirm these results would be to conduct the same study but in a truly experimental situation. By having greater control over the administration of the questionnaires, and using a randomly assigned and more closely monitored faculty, additional research should be able to more positively ascribe causality and better describe what initiated the causation. This recommendation is elaborated next, followed by additional recommendations for future research. Then recommendations are made for the application of the knowledge garnered from this research. Finally, a general conclusion to this chapter is given. There were several problematic factors in this present research; most concerned the participation of the faculty. The participating faculty members were voluntary, but the college administration determined whether any particular member was in either of the treatments. It is not improbable to suspect that instructors were chosen because of a disposition to teach in a certain way that may have contributed to the outcome. Only by randomizing this selection could this suspicion have been abated. Discussions with administration and the faculty involved in the metacognitive training produced a greater comfort level that this possibly skewing of the research did not occur. There is also the possibility of negative dispositions toward the study. One member of the treatment group utilizing metacognitive enrichment indicated skepticism during the training. While all faculty members participating in Treatment 2 surrendered a log indicating they had employed metacognitive enriching techniques in the classroom during any given week, the information provided by some on what techniques were employed was sparse and incomplete. Had more involvement been closely monitored, it could have provided better information about exactly what activities worked to promote
118 the maturation process. Access to the faculty during this research was limited to electronic communication. However, the goal of this present research was to examine metacognitive enrichment, qua metacognitive enrichment, sans a focus on specific techniques. Had the level of participation by faculty members been higher in Treatment 2, that participation could have been construed as active manipulation and the conclusions suspect. As such, for this study, the level of participation was serendipitous to the results. Approaching the study from a microgenetic design may be beneficial in determining which techniques were the most beneficial to maturing personal epistemologies. Another alternative would be to incorporate mixed methods into the same study. By interviewing both faculty and students, a greater understanding of precisely what activities promoted the epistemological maturity could be gained. This study was necessary first to warrant such further exploration. The participation level of both faculty and students, as it was, only increases the probability that it was only the inclusion of metacognitive enrichment into the classrooms that brought about the increased maturity levels. Knowing that this inclusion makes a statistically significant difference in maturity levels in even one factor should warrant additional research. The findings also suggest more research is needed concerning the nature of the construct of personal epistemology. That students in both treatments demonstrated a stronger belief that if something is not learned quickly it will not be learned is interesting. Coupled with the findings in Treatment 2, that the students also developed a stronger belief one’s ability is not fixed at birth, raises some questions. It would be beneficial to
119 further explore this notion that a person could come to believe the ability to learn is malleable, but only to a certain point. Recommendations concerning the application of these findings are necessarily general at this time. Specifically, the education of educators should include training in the use of metacognitively enriching techniques in the classroom. This present research indicates that employing simple techniques in a college classroom produced measurable results. As such, similar methods should be taught to educators and encouraged in every classroom. Additional research should be conducted, not only to more precisely define what techniques worked, but how this practice could affect primary and secondary education. If one semester of exposure to metacognitive enrichment could produce measurable results, it is reasonable to assume that starting such enrichment as soon as a child is capable of metacognitive reasoning would increase the learning experience. If the goal of education is to produce individuals capable of higher-order thinking, and metacognitive enrichments meets this goal, then it should be applied as soon as a child’s cognitive development allows. Again, only additional research would confirm or deny these assertions. In summation, the conclusions that could be drawn from the research findings were discussed as were the implications of those findings. Then several recommendations were proffered for additional research and for current application of the findings in the classroom. The end, though, is that this present research confirms the role of metacognition in the enhancement of personal epistemologies. While causation is not conclusively proven, the notion is strongly supported by this research. Even in the space
120 of a single semester, adding metacognitive enrichment techniques to a class in which critical thinking is a core objective produces statistically significant increased in the maturity levels of two out of four factors measured by the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire. Pintrich (2002a), as stated in chapter 2, concluded his summary of the then state of research on personal epistemology by asserting, “As we come to a better understanding how individuals think and reason about knowledge and knowing, we should not only be able to improve learning and instruction, but also come to a better understanding of ourselves” (p. 413). This research was conducted to further not only the understanding of epistemological beliefs, but to enable a better understanding of how to produce a more effective method of education. To lead in education, then, would be to work to ensure this better understanding is inculcated in teachers, and then the students.
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APPENDIX A: SCHOMMER EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONNAIRE Name _________________________
Date___________ Faculty________________________
Strongly Disagree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strongly Agree 1
1
2
If you are ever going to be able to understand something, it will make sense the first time you hear it.
2 3
The only thing that is certain is uncertainty itself. For success in school, it's best not to ask too many questions.
4 5
A course in study skills would probably be valuable How much a person gets out of school mostly depends on the quality of the teacher.
6
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
You can believe almost everything you read 7
I often wonder how much my teachers really know. 8
The ability to learn is innate.
134
9
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
21
1
2
3
4
5
Scientists can ultimately get to the truth. 22 You never know what a book means unless you know the intent of the author.
1
2
3
4
5
It is annoying to listen to a lecturer who cannot seem to make up his mind as to what he really believes.
10
Successful students understand things quickly. 11 A good teacher's job is to keep his students from wandering from the right track. 12 If scientists try hard enough, they can find the truth to almost anything. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
People who challenge authority are over-confident. I try my best to combine information across chapters or even across classes. The most successful people have discovered how to improve their ability to learn. Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe. The most important aspect of scientific work is precise measurement and careful work. To me studying means getting the big ideas from the text, rather than details. Educators should know by now which is the best method, lectures or small group discussions. Going over and over a difficult textbook chapter usually won't help you understand it.
135
23
The most important part of scientific work is original thinking. 24 If I find the time to re-read a textbook chapter, I get a lot more out of it the second time. 25 Students have a lot of control over how much they can get out of a textbook.
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
26
1
2
3
4
5
Genius is 10% ability and 90% hard work. 27 I find it refreshing to think about issues that authorities can't agree on.
1
2
3
4
5
28
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
31
1
2
3
4
5
Being a good student generally involves memorizing facts. 32 Wisdom is not knowing the answers, but knowing how to find the answers.
1
2
3
4
5
33
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
Everyone needs to learn how to learn. 29 When you first encounter a difficult concept in a textbook, it's best to work it out on your own. 30 A sentence has little meaning unless you know the situation in which it is spoken.
Most words have one clear meaning. 34
Truth is unchanging. 35 If a person forgot details, and yet was able to come up with new ideas from a text, I would think they were bright. 36 Whenever I encounter a difficult problem in life, I consult with my parents. 37 Learning definitions word-for-word is often necessary to do well on tests.
136
38
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
46
1
2
3
4
5
Often, even advice from experts should be questioned. 47 Some people are born good learners, others are just stuck with limited ability.
1
2
3
4
5
48
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
When I study, I look for the specific facts. 39 If a person can't understand something within a short amount of time, they should keep on trying. 40 Sometimes you just have to accept answers from a teacher even though you don't understand them. 41 If professors would stick more to the facts and do less theorizing, one could get more out of college. 42
I don't like movies that don't have an ending. 43
Getting ahead takes a lot of work. It's a waste of time to work on problems which have no possibility of coming out with a clear-cut and unambiguous answer. 45 You should evaluate the accuracy of information in a textbook, if you are familiar with the topic. 44
Nothing is certain, but death and taxes. 49 The really smart students don't have to work hard to do well in school. 50 Working hard on a difficult problem for an extended period of time only pays off for really smart students. 51 If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely just end up being confused.
137
52
Almost all the information you can learn from a textbook you will get during the first reading. 53 Usually you can figure out difficult concepts if you eliminate all outside distractions and really concentrate. A really good way to understand a textbook is to re-organize the information according to your own personal scheme. 55 Students who are "average" in school will remain "average" for the rest of their lives. 54
56
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
A tidy mind is an empty mind. 57
An expert is someone who has a special gift in some area. 58 I really appreciate instructors who organize their lectures meticulously and then stick to their plan. 59 The best thing about science courses is that most problems have only one right answer. 60
Learning is a slow process of building up knowledge. 61
Today's facts may be tomorrow's fiction. 62
Self-help books are not much help. 63
You will just get confused if you try to integrate new ideas in a textbook with knowledge you already have about a topic.
138
139 APPENDIX B: BREAKDOWN OF SEQ Simple Knowledge (Factor 1) Avoid ambiguity +
It’s a waste of time to work on problems which have no possibility of
coming out with a clear-cut and unambiguous answer. -
I find it refreshing to think about issues that authorities cannot agree
on. + If professors would stick more to the facts and do less theorizing, one could get more out of college. + I don’t like movies that don’t have an ending. +
It is annoying to listen to a lecturer who can’t seem to make up his
mind as to what he really believes. Seek single answers -
You never know that a book means unless you know the intent of the
author. +
Most words have one clear meaning.
-
A sentence has little meaning unless you know the situation in which
it is spoken. + The best thing about science courses is that most problems have only one right answer. +
Educators should know by now which is the best method, lectures or
small group discussions. -
A tidy mind is an empty mind.
-
The most important part of scientific work is original thinking.
+
The most important aspect of scientific work is precise measurement
and careful work. +
Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe.
+
A good teachers job is to keep his students from wandering from the
right track. + I really appreciate instructors who organize their lectures meticulously and then stick to their plan.
140 Avoid integration +
You will just get confused if you try to integrate new ideas in a
textbook with knowledge you already have about a topic. -
I try my best to combine information across chapters or even across
classes. -
To me studying means getting the big ideas from the text, rather than
details. -
A really good way to understand a textbook is to re-organize the
information according to your own personal scheme. +
When I study, I look for the specific facts.
+ Being a good student generally involves memorizing facts. -
If a person forgot details, and yet was able to come up with new ideas
from a text, I would think they were very bright. +
Learning definitions word-for-word is often necessary to do well on
tests. Depend on authority +
Whenever I encounter a difficult problem in life, I consult with my
parents. -
When you first encounter a difficult concept in a textbook, it’s best to
work it out on your own. +
How much a person gets out of school mostly depends on the quality
of the teacher. + Sometimes you just have to accept answers from a teacher even though you don’t understand them. Fixed Ability (Factor 2) Can’t learn how to learn -
Everyone needs to learn how to learn.
-
A course in study skills would probably be valuable.
-
Students have a lot of control over how much they can get out of a
textbook.
141 -
The most successful people have discovered how to improve their
ability to learn. + Self-help books are not much help. Success unrelated to hard work + The really smart students don’t have to work hard to do well in school. -
Genius is 10% ability and 90% hard work.
-
Getting ahead takes a lot of work.
-
Wisdom is not knowing the answers, but knowing how to find the
answers. Learn the first time +
Almost all the information you can learn from a textbook you will get
during the first reading. -
If I find the time to re-read a textbook chapter, I get a lot more out of it
the second time. + Going over and over a difficult textbook chapter usually won’t help you understand it. Innate Ability + The ability to learn is innate. +
Some people are born good learners, others are just stuck with limited
ability. +
Students who are average in school remain average for the rest of their
lives. + An expert is someone who has special gift in some area. Quick Learning (Factor 3) Quick Learning -
If a person can’t understand something within a short amount of time,
they should keep on trying. +
Working hard on a difficult problem for an extended period of time
only pays off for really smart students. +
If you are ever going to be able to understand something, it will make
sense to you the first time you hear it.
142 +
Successful students understand things quickly.
-
Learning is a slow process of building up knowledge.
Don’t criticize authority -
Often, even advice from experts should be questioned.
-
You should evaluate the accuracy of information in a textbook, if you
are familiar with the topic. +
You can believe almost everything you read.
+ People who challenge authority are over-confident. -
I often wonder how much my teachers really know.
+
For success in school, it’s best not to ask too many questions.
Concentrated Effort is a Waste of Time -
Usually you can figure out difficult concepts if you eliminate all
outside distractions and really concentrate. + If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely end up being confused. Certain Knowledge (Factor 4) Certain knowledge + If scientists try hard enough, they can find the truth to almost everything. + Scientists can ultimately get to the truth. + Truth is unchanging. -
The only thing that is certain is uncertainty itself.
-
Nothing is certain, but death and taxes.
-
Today’s facts may be tomorrow’s fiction.
(Schommer, personal communication, August 11, 2005)
143 The way the questions are designed, 34 are worded such that a person with naïve epistemological beliefs would strongly agree and 27 are worded such that a person with naïve epistemological beliefs would strongly disagree. This position is indicated by the plus (+) and minus (-) signs before each of the sentences from the SEQ. Schommer (1990) indicated that when looking at difference between pre-test and posttest scores it is best to simply look at raw scores. However, it is more efficient to change the numbers so that high numbers reflect a naïve perspective. To that end all scores for questions preceded by a minus (-) would transpose the number (1 = 5, 2 = 4, 3 = 3, 4 = 2, 5 = 1). Then scores should be added for each of the 12 subsets and a mean derived. The mean derived for each subsection and then factor from the pre-test scores will be subtracted from the mean derived for the posttest scores. On the next two pages are the factor score coefficient matrices for both adults and college student, respectively, and indicates how each subset was applied to each factor.
144 Factor Score Coefficient Matrix--Adults SIMPLE
FIXED
QUICK
CERTAIN
FACTOR 1
FACTOR 2
FACTOR 3
FACTOR 4
Seek Single Answers
.34377
- .00296
- .07378
.06962
Avoid Integration
.27183
.05110
- .04937
.05568
Avoid Ambiguity
.32135
.01902
- .04546
- .02410
Knowledge is Certain
- .03596
.01374
- .02324
.57613
Depend on Authority
.09251
- .01332
- .05805
- .08938
Don’t Criticize
.01155
.00407
.12130
.05668
.13786
.00842
.08888
- .08729
Can’t Learn to Learn
- .10701
.76804
- .15743
- .04684
Success = Hard Work
.04169
.09420
.03973
.06228
Learn First Time
.00060
.11412
.08728
- .01033
Learning is Quick
- .06990
- .02514
.66574
.05064
.06211
.05982
.08290
- .09491
Authority Ability Innate
Effort Waste of Time
(Schommer, personal communication, August 11, 2005))
145 Factor Score Coefficient Matrix--College Students SIMPLE
FIXED
QUICK
CERTAIN
FACTOR 1
FACTOR 1
FACTOR 3
FACTOR 4
Seek Single Answers
.27328
- .01804
- .04847
.07339
Avoid Integration
. 25614
- .06399
.01419
- .01724
Avoid Ambiguity
.43010
- .00786
- .03293
- .10907
Knowledge is Certain
- .00098
- .01914
.00323
.42805
Depend on Authority
.10852
.11276
- .14265
- .05309
Don’t Criticize
.11381
- .03915
.12103
.15915
.05639
.10239
.01574
.00083
Can’t Learn to Learn
- .03165
.27244
- .02399
- .04664
Success = Hard
- .00840
.29357
- .09204
.24623
Learn First Time
- .06994
.35588
- .08132
- .06555
Learning is Quick
- .04629
.07997
.72906
- .02686
.02297
.09552
.03933
- .21143
Authority Ability Innate
Work
Effort Waste of Time
(Schommer, personal communication, August 11, 2005))
146 APPENDIX C: CRITERA FOR A COURSE IN WHICH CRITICAL THINKING IS A CORE OBJECTIVE This research included any course in which students are expected to apply thinking strategies to understand the material and meet the other objectives for the course. The exact number of courses and areas was determined by administrative decision as was the level of volunteers among the instructors. The college recently implemented a campus wide initiative for instructors to include critical thinking components in all classes (M.F. Jones, personal communication, June 19, 2006). However, this research will focus only on specific areas of study: Remedial Learning Strategies, History, English, Philosophy, and Psychology. The rationale is as follows: For Remedial Learning Strategies, the core objective is to build skills in critical thinking. Although this course is considered pre-college, the students are adult learners seeking to enter a college degree program. For History, only courses will be selected that place students into a sense of disequilibrium concerning currently held beliefs and facts. For English, only composition courses demanding research will be included. The research component requires student to critically analyze and develop arguments. In Philosophy, both world religions and ethics courses will be included as they also place the students in a position of disequilibrium and require students to analyze and develop logical arguments. In Psychology, only courses where students are required to critically analyze historical concepts and theory and apply the information to current situations.
147 APPENDIX D: CRITERIA FOR METACOGNITIVE COMPONENT A Pintrich (2002b) article discussing the application of metacognition to learning, teaching, and assessing student learning will be given to the faculty and discussed. The goal of this session is to engage the faculty in metacognitive learning and then help them to do the same in their classrooms. The goal of Treatment 2 is to have each faculty teach classes enhancing critical thinking skills as they normally would, but ask students throughout the classes to think about their own thinking and to share with the class. An outline of the Pintrich article is below: I. Two definitions of metacognitive knowledge a. Knowledge of cognition: “knowledge of cognition” and includes “knowledge of general strategies that might be used for different tasks, knowledge of the conditions under which these strategies might be used, knowledge of the extent to which the strategies are effective and knowledge of self” (Pintrich, 2002b, p. 219). i. Strategic- Strategic metacognitive knowledge is a general knowledge a person might have regarding strategies available to learn, think, or solve problems. A. Learning strategies include “rehearsal, elaboration, and organization” (p. 220) or any other strategy one could use to derive meaning from some text or context. B. Thinking strategies would be any method one could utilize in planning, monitoring, and regulating how one things about any learning situation.
148 C. Problem-solving strategies include, literally, any strategy to apply logic via inductive or deductive reasoning to a problem. ii. Knowledge and cognitive tasks- this develops with other knowledge. A. The more strategic knowledge garnered, the more able the person will be to recognize the difficulty level of different tasks and when something more sophisticated is needed. B. Not just a plethora of strategies, but the most applicable strategies (mathematics for physics) C. Also knowing a teacher’s strategy will allow for better performance. iii. Self-knowledge: Pintrich (2002) opined, “One of the hallmarks of experts is that they know when they don’t know something and have to rely on some general strategies for finding the appropriate information” (p. 221). ** “If students do not realize they do not know some aspect of factual, conceptual or procedural knowledge, it is unlikely they will make any effort to acquire or construct new knowledge. Accordingly. . . teachers need to help students make accurate assessments of their self-knowledge, not inflate their self-esteem.” (p. 222)
149 b. The “processes involving monitoring, control, and regulation of control” (p. 219). This is a cognitive process more than a type of knowledge and regards actions considered self-regulating, or when the individual contemplates the use of a strategy falling under the first definition. II. Implications for teaching metacognition. a. Students cannot use what they are unaware of, but knowledge must be accurate, especially concerning self-knowledge. b. Metacognitive knowledge must be taught explicitly. i. Tell them what it is. ii. Tell them why it is important to get it. iii. Tell them how to acquire it. c. Simply asking students to describe their own thought process is of great help. d. Listening to others describing thought processes, even the teacher, helps greatly. e. Each instructor will be asked to teach as he or she normally does, but allow for content appropriate breaks in which students will be engaged in discussion of their own thought processes concerting that content. Examples are: i. Have students write out their thought processes on a specific activity, sharing is optional. ii. Have the faculty explain, in detail, his or her thought processes as he or she solves a problem or encounters an activity.
150 iii. Have learning teams engage in constructive sharing of thought processes during and activity. iv. General encouragement to find different ways to resolve critical thinking issues.
151 APPENDIX E: INSTRUCTOR’S LOG Study in Metacognition and Personal Epistemology Instructor Log Faculty Course Date
Yes/No
Comments
8/28-9/1 9/5-9/8 9/11-9/15 9/18-9/22 9/25-9/29 10-2-10/6 10/9-10/13 10/18-10/20 10/23-10/27 10/30-11/3 11/6-11/10 11/13-11/17 11/20-11/22 11/27-12/1 12/4-12/8 12/11-12/15
The original document was an Excel spreadsheet to allow additional comments.
152 APPENDIX F: SIGNED INFORMED CONSENT: PERMISSION TO USE PREMISES
153 APPENDIX G: INFORMED CONSENT: PARTICIPANTS 18 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER Purpose and Procedures: This study is intended to assess college students’ metacognitive (thinking about thinking) strategies when learning. You will be asked to complete a pre and post test. The scores on these instruments will be correlated with your final grade in the course. Your participation will not affect your grades in this course. Confidentiality: Only the principal researcher will have access to research results associated with your identity. In the event of publication of this research, no personally identifying information will be disclosed. The use of your CWID will be used to correlate scores only. Who to Contact with Questions: Questions about this research study should be directed to the primary investigator and person in charge, Steven Wyre or Margaret Faye Jones, Dean of Learning Resources. They can be reached at 353-3556.
I certify that I have read this form and volunteer to participate in this research study.
_________________________________ (Print) Name
154 _________________________________ Date: _________________ Signature
155 APPENDIX H: SIGNED PERMISSION TO USE AN EXISTING SURVEY
