Critique and direction

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Theorizing about play: Critique and direction Lynn A. Barnett

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Assistant Professor, Leisure Behavior Research , Department of Leisure Studies , University of Illinois , Urbana‐Champaign Published online: 13 Jul 2009.

To cite this article: Lynn A. Barnett (1978) Theorizing about play: Critique and direction, Leisure Sciences: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 1:2, 113-129 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01490407809512876

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Theorizing About Play: Critique and Direction Downloaded by [University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign] at 11:52 16 May 2014

Lynn A. Barnett

Assistant Professor, Leisure Behavior Research Laboratory Department of Leisure Studies University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

This paper presents a review of the extant theoretical models of play behavior. Play theories can be clustered insofar as they suggest different motivations and presuppose distinct underlying mechanisms for playful behavior. The biological view sees the motivation to play as instinctually determined and suggests a genetically inherited predisposition to emit playful responses. The play theories discussed under this heading stress the importance of homeostatic mechanisms and the transformation of energy states as determining when play will occur. The play theories subsumed under the environmental view focus on the typology of play activities and suggest that play is only a subclass of behavior to which the principles of environmental contingencies and reinforcement in learning also apply. Cognitive explanations impart the causation to play as a function of the information-processing mechanisms of the individual. Within this framework play is defined as a state of mind rather than an activity and it is the player's perception of his environment, in interaction with cognitive processes, which determines the characterization of a playful response. Although the theoretical models of play are discussed within these three perspectives, it is suggested that it is more useful to view these three headings as lying on a continuum, since a review of the theories shows a gradual transition and later cognitive-based models still presume an internal biological drive. The difficulties with each perspective are discussed and a synthesis is provided which extrapolates some of the tenets of each of the models, as well as presenting an alternative and interactive view of play behavior. KEY WORDS : play, theories of play, biological base of play, environmental base of play, cognitive explanation of play, psychology. Leisure Sciences, Volume 1, Number 2 0149-0400/78/0415-0113 $02.00/0 Copyright © 1978 Crane, Russak & Company, Inc. 113

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Human beings spend a large portion of their years engaged in a type of behavior which has been termed "frivolous," "meaningless," "trivial," "random," "purposeless," or "playful." Rather than provide clear definitions from which empirical investigation of this behavior can proceed, such descriptions reflect more on the lack of theoretically or empirically determined knowledge concerning this behavior. It is the purpose of this paper to review the extant body of theoretical knowledge concerning the causes, motivation, and instigation of play behavior, and to reflect subjectively on these issues as they advance our knowledge. The central climate of the paper will be subjective reflection and integration of the play theories as they exist and some speculation concerning future conceptualizations of play. It is not the intent of this paper to expound on each individual formulation; for an introduction to and explanation of each of the theories, the reader is referred to Ellis (1973), Gilmore (1966) or Millar (1968). The term "play" is selected from the above descriptors as representative of the class of behaviors under consideration: those behaviors whose onset is motivated by intrinsically based mechanisms rather than extrinsic reward. Theoretical formulations of play can be viewed as they position differing definitions of playful behavior and differing motivations for the play activity itself. A linear transition can be observed whereby, in early formulations, play is defined in terms of its end state, as spontaneous activity necessarily arising from the emergence of certain biological drive states and energy transformed into action. Within this framework, the motivation for playful interaction lies outside the conscious and deliberate control of the player. Later theoretical explanations of play suggest the same underlying causation; however, the appearance and typology of the playful activity is modified by cultural and environmental influences. In these, instigation of the play episode remains physiologically (unconsciously) determined, but its direction and description are uniquely determined by the player's previous experience and level of interaction with his environment. Current models of playful behavior impart causation to the conscious intent and cognition of the player. Here, the motivation for play lies within the immediate state of mind of the participant; environmental influences are recognized as they modulate a given play activity; however, the emphasis is placed on the uniquely determined character of the activity, as heavily influenced by the perceptions and repertoire of the individual. To encapsulate the transistion, theories of play have progressed, almost chronologically, from the view of play as spontaneously determined by unconscious biological processes, to the recognition of an environmental influence,


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and finally to the motivation to play as uniquely a function of cognitive processing. The continuum presented here ranges from the extreme of an unconscious lack of control to the total control of the player in determining not only the typology of the interaction but also its characterization as playful. It should be noted that the categorizations of the play theories discussed below are not exclusive, but are rather meant to illustrate the major contributing motivational states for the groupings of play theories.

Play as Instinctual: The Biological Bases of Play

Early views of play presupposed the existence of an internal biological state which compelled the individual to play. The postulation of such an internally-based force focused on chemical and physiological systems within the body which fluctuated in disequilibrium. The motivation to play was conceived as a mechanism by which the human system could be internally calibrated such that a homeostatic state could be maintained (Cannon, 1932). Thus, playful behavior was regarded by early theorists as crucial to the efficient and natural order of the human system. McDougall (1923) was among the first to postulate an instinctive need or preexistent tendency to play. He delineated 14 major instincts which gained their impetus from a central energy source. Each of these instincts, thus energized, possessed a distinct channel and distinct outlet or goal for the energy. Play behavior was hypothesized to occur as a surplus from the common energy source spilling into all of the existing channels. Thus, play was viewed as any random activity whose appearance was only incidental to the need to expend this common energy source, thus resulting in "vacuum" or "overflow" activity (Tinbergen, 1951). The behavior itself was not influenced by any external stimuli but rather by an uneconomical energy system that was genetically coded in all individuals. Play activities resulted spontaneously from the accumulation of this excess energy force. Schiller (1875), Spencer (1896), and others' (Alexander, 1958; Thorpe, 1963; Tinklepaugh, 1942; Tolman, 1932) conception of play followed this line of thinking. Play was seen as essentially random activity caused by the accumulation of excess energy not used in survivalrelated activities. Playful activities were critical in the sense that they presented the outlet through which the energy surplus could be expended and hence the individual could return to the work of survival. McDougall's (1923) notion of energy forces and suitable channels


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or outlets for the flow of energy was earlier suggested by Spencer (1896). Spencer's surplus energy explanation rested on his speculations about the physiology of fatigue on nerve centers. He suggested that these nerve centers eventually disintegrated through overuse and needed adequate time for restoration. If a nerve center had been idle for a considerable length of time it became physically unstable and was thus susceptible to respond to any incoming stimulus. As illustrative of his position, Spencer cited Darwin's (1859) observation that intense excitement and pleasure make people dance, laugh, clap their hands and stamp their feet. On the assumption that play is instinctive behavior, but in contrast to surplus energy models, Lazarus (1883) and Patrick (1916) suggested that play was the restitution of lost energy rather than the expression of a surplus of energy. They reasoned that an individual's preoccupation with stressful activities necessary for survival decreased his available energy store, making it thus necessary to replenish the energy supply. Play was seen as the means by which energy was replenished, in that it allowed the individual recuperative time from the work of survival. Central to all of these explanations was the view that play is the by-product or outlet for an instinctual, genetically determined force. The resultant behavior was not of interest; rather the investigation and acceptance of these energy states required consideration. Groos (1898, 1901) regarded play as genetically inherited but suggested that the instincts from which it was derived were not encoded in their final form. The inheritance of certain instinctual urges (all behavior was innately determined) was inexact and play was a behavior necessary to practice these imperfect instincts so that they could be perfected by adulthood. In Groos's thinking, it was skilled adult action that guaranteed survival, both of the individual and its young, and childhood play was critical to the perfection of these emerging instincts. Groos's view that play is preparatory for adulthood is based on Darwin's evolutionary principle of natural selection. This principle states that those animals that survived are those best fitted to cope with prevailing conditions and whose offspring can adapt to changing conditions. In Groos's terms, if playful behavior exists, it is because play serves some function in the struggle for survival; it allows the individual the opportunity to practice and perfect the skills needed for survival in adult life. Recapitulation theories (Gulick, 1898, 1902; Hall, 1916; Wundt, 1913) incorporate the principles of inherited instincts to play with the principles of evolutionary theory. Hall (1916) saw children as a link in the evolutionary chain from animal to man. The critical behaviors which



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occurred during the evolutionary process were encoded in inheritance such that the developmental typology of play activities mirrored the phylogenetic development of the species. The child, in his play, was said to relive the history of the race; the experiences of his ancestors are inherited and the child reenacts these experiences in the sequence in which they historically occurred. In contrast to Groos's preparation theory, play was viewed not as an activity that developed future instinctual skills, but rather as one that rid the individual of primitive and unnecessary instinctual experiences carried over by heredity. The view of play as a behavior whose recognition and study lie external to the characterization of the behavior itself seems inadequate. The critical faults inherent in each of the theories presented above are reviewed elsewhere (Ellis, 1973; Gilmore, 1966; Millar, 1968); however, the limiting central theme focusing on an instinctual biological basis for play, merits discussion. In general, it serves little functional or explanatory purpose to label a behavior that is difficult to define as instinctive (Beach, 1966; Bernard, 1926). The motivational labels for play behavior have abounded, including "exploratory drive" (Montgomery, 1954; Nissen, 1930), "manipulatory drive" (Harlow and McClearn, 1954), "drive for visual exploration" (Butler, 1953), "need for stimulation" (Glanzer, 1953 a, b; Nissen, 1930, 1954), "urge for contact" or "urge for locomotion" (Erikson, 1950), and a "sensory-motor-hunger" drive (Tolman, 1932; see Beach 1945, Britt and Janus; 1941, for reviews). Common to all of these descriptions is the view that there is some central energy force which compels the individual to play. The labels were derived from observations of play, and attempt to explain the motivation to play in terms of the description of the behavior itself. These drive-names do little to advance theoretical study in attempting to explain playful behavior. The formulations which posit play as a compensatory factor to either the under- or over-abundance of energy deny the doctrine of evolutionary theory (Darwin, 1859). By natural selection, the quantity of energy available should approximate the quantity of energy expended as critical for survival. To the extent that there is an imbalance in either direction the animal is at a disadvantage, since time must then be spent away from survival-related activities. The notion that the motivation to play and the exhibition of playful behavior are in some way genetically coded does not account for the appearance of new responses in play, nor does it explain those playful activities that are largely a function of advanced technology. To adhere


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to this line of thinking would imply that the individual inherits information about the future since the typology of play often reflects current innovations and models. Despite the inadequacy of each of the models thus far presented, several of these theoretical formulations have contributed to the empirical study of play. First, they have tended to focus attention on playful behavior as an area of study in its own right; second, they have shown that play activities that were defined as nonutilitarian or aimless have a serious and critical biological function; and third, they recognized play as a behavior in which distinct developmental stages could be both identified and delineated. Play as Drive Reduction: The Environmental Bases of Play

The conceptualization of play as motivated by instinctual forces presupposed a homeostatic explanation of human behavior. The human system—and hence all behavior—was motivated by the need to maintain a state of physiological equilibrium. It was the disruption of this internal state which caused and directed the form of any response, and all responses were goal-directed to return to the naturally harmonious state of equilibrium. Several behavioral theorists continued to recognize implicitly the homeostatic structure of man, yet did not base the explicit motivation to play on environmental influences as these shape the appearance and typology of play. Hull's (1943) conception of drive theory states that what determines attraction and avoidance is drive reduction. Individuals tend to continue contact with, to approach and ultimately to be attracted by, those situations which tend to reduce drive. Alternatively, they withdraw from and come to avoid those situations which increase drive. Thus, all drive is presumed to be aversive. According to the theory, there is a hierarchy of responses which is plastic, that is, is subject to the effects of experience. The response or combination of responses which serves to reduce drive becomes the choice in a given situation. The concept of drive and reward came into Hull's theorizing directly from Freud's psychoanalytic theory. Freudian theory explains play as it does most overt activities, as a striving for pleasure, an escape from pain, the reduction of tension, and a way to master disturbing events. In later formulations of his theory, Freud (1920) referred to a hypothesis by



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Fechner which is closely akin to the concept of pleasure in drive reduction. In 1873 Fechner applied the principle of conservation of energy to human beings: by homeostasis (Cannon, 1932) the individual must strive to maintain a constant and stable state of equilibrium. Fechner assumed that internal changes gave rise to pleasure insofar as they contributed to homeostatic stability. If the individual was excited by external stimuli, and hence his stability interrupted, he must act to restore his previous equilibrium. Freud's view (1908, 1920, 1926) was that individuals try to maintain as low a level of nervous tension as possible, that all increases in excitation are viewed as aversive and all decreases as pleasurable. Exciting events, that is, unpleasant tensions and conflicts, are repeated in play because their repetition reduces the excitement previously aroused. Play enables the individual to neutralize the effect of a disturbing event by actively initiating it, rather than being its passive and helpless recipient. Playing to master disturbing events is still an explanation in terms of striving for pleasure since the repetition of such events reduces their previous unpleasant effect. Freud (1920) termed this process "repetition compulsion" since it explained the frequency with which unpleasant experiences were repeated in play. Others (Alexander, 1958; Erikson, 1937, 1940, 1950, 1951, 1959; Klein, 1929; Peller, 1955; Waelder, 1933) have contributed to Freud's original psychoanalytic theory of play, but central to all of these variations is the view of play as a coping mechanism to dissipate the effects of previous tension-arousing states. Dollard and Miller (1950) substituted the principle of reinforcement for Freud's pleasure principle as the basic operating rule of the human individual. The principle of reinforcement refers to the tendency for certain events, when they follow a given behavior, to increase the likelihood of the behavior on subsequent occasions. Like Hull, Dollar and Miller postulated drive-reduction to be the ultimate basis for motivation. The extension of the concepts of Dollard and Miller's social learning theory to play is not clear. Play can be explained within this framework as a subclass of behavior to which the principles of environmental contingencies and reinforcement apply. The particular mode of play, or the typology of any given play response, is solely a function of the individual's previous responses and the habit strength with which they were reinforced. Thus, according to this view, by examining the individual's activity at any given point in time, reliable inferences can be generated about the types and salience of environmental influences in shaping play responses.


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The conceptualization of play as behavior motivated and directed by the principles of drive-reduction stresses the importance of environmental factors as mediating influences. Within this vein, there is little consideration given to explanations of why particular variables serve as effective "reinforcing" agents; that is, all behavior is presumed to be motivated by forces extrinsic to the cognition of the individual. The drive-reduction view places causation to play on the prevailing traumatic or negative experiences and the need, deliberately or unconsciously to neutralize these feelings. The denial of a positive affective component as a motivating state rather than an end result of play ignores many of the behaviors which have typically been regarded as playful. Perhaps one of the most critical issues which can be raised with this approach is the lack of consideration it gives to individual intelligence or creative ability. One of the most prevalent observations of children at play is the degree of spontaneity and individual variability in expression which characterizes their playful encounters. To deny the existence of these factors would ignore one of the essential features in the definition and description of play.

Play as Mental Activity: The Cognitive Bases of Play

Contemporary theoretical models of play encompass a cognitive processing perspective. The motivation for play is seen to lie in the cognitive and developmental level of the individual. Definitions of play have now shifted away from activity-based explanations to definitions of play as a sole function of the intent of the player and the degree of control which the player has over the setting. Piaget (1951) was among the first to emphasize the link between play and information-processing mechanisms and to suggest the causation for play to be a function, more specifically, of the developing intellect of the individual. According to Piaget, the developmental growth of the individual derives from the interplay between two cognitive processes: assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation refers to the process whereby the individual manipulates the information he receives in an attempt to match the stimuli to a class preexisting in the individual's repertoire. Accommodation is defined as the process whereby the individual adjusts his preexistant cognitive structure to bend with the information he receives about the stimulus; that is, the individual adjusts his frame of reference to the object. Intelligent adaptation to the environment occurs when these two processes are in equilibrium, and it is the



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continual active interplay between assimilation and accommodation that forms the foundation for the continual development of intelligence. Within this framework, play is defined as the preponderance of assimilation over accommodation. Piaget denies the existence of a special instinct or motivational state which predisposes the individual to play; rather, play is viewed as an imbalance between the two cognitive processes. As such, play is an integral part of the development of the intellect and hence, play activities reflect the child's current developmental state. The invariant stages which Piaget postulated to result from the child's current cognitive structure also delineate and restrict the types of playful interaction which can be observed. Piaget's conceptualization assigns to play an underlying biological function as the child actively experiments with his environment in distorting the reality of that environment by manipulating objects and inventing situations in nonfunctional ways. This characteristic distortion of reality implies that the child has previously mastered his setting, since assimilation does not serve a specific adaptive function, but rather in play the child adapts reality to meet his own needs. Piaget, like Freud, relegates one of the functions of a playful experience to reducing the unpleasantness of a conflict for the child. He identifies two categories of play which serve this function: "compensatory combinations" and "liquidating combinations." Compensatory combinations are defined as behaviors that distort reality to fit the child's desires and transcend a negative emotional experience to make it more pleasant. Liquidating combinations are those behaviors designed to neutralize and derive pleasure from strong emotions elicited by conflict situations that instigated play. Although Piaget recognized the therapeutic value of play he considered it only one type of catalyst for a play episode, rather than the central theme or motivating cause, as did Freud. Like Piaget, Ellis (1973), stressed the strong consideration of cognition in attempting to explain play. Ellis postulated the application of arousal-seeking models to define play conceptually. He thus saw a physiological basis for the motive to play; however, the typology and causation for playful acts were cognitively based. Arousal-seeking models postulate a sensoristatic drive state (Schultz, 1965) which compels the individual to seek to maintain an optimal state of arousal (Hebb, 1955; Helson, 1959; Leuba, 1955). This optimum level is considered the natural and most efficient operating state of the individual and deviations in either direction are deemed aversive. Arousal level is a function of either the degree of uncertainty or information flow in the environment as subjectively perceived by the individual.


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Objects or settings possessing a low degree of uncertainty present no new information or stimulation to the individual and hence arousal falls to a suboptimal level. In contrast, a stimulus which is too complex to assimilate presents an informational overload and arousal is elevated to a supraoptimal level. Arousal-seeking models postulate the motivation for behavior to lie within the sensoristatic drive, a secondary drive state complementary to the homeostatic system, and which requires the individual to act in such a way as to move arousal to the optimal range. Ellis (1969, 1973) has applied this model to play behavior by defining play as manipulating the environment in some such way as to elevate a suboptimal arousal level to the optimal range. The operationalization of informational input, or uncertainty, in a play context is derived from Berlyne's (1960) collative variables which include novelty, complexity, dissonance, incongruity, and surprise. In a play setting, then, an overly familiar (novelty) or simple object (complexity) will result in a suboptimal arousal level and in an attempt to introduce stimulation and hence elevate arousal to the optimum, the individual will manipulate the object in nonconventional ways. It is this manipulative process in attempting to modulate arousal level which defines play, not the initial suboptimal level or the optimal goal state. The play process is a dynamic one since the individual is never able to maintain an intermediate level of excitation for any significant duration, but rather, constantly passes through the optimum as he or she encounters stimuli, interacts with and resolves them, and then seeks to introduce variability into his environment. Arousal-seeking models account for the developmental behavior of the individual as he learns more about his environment. Sackett (1965) postulated a "pacer" concept whereby the individual increases in complexity as he assimilates more of the characteristics of his environment. As the individual is confronted with a stimulus possessing an intermediate degree of uncertainty he seeks to reduce that uncertainty by attempting to define the stimulus and assign it to an appropriate class. Once the salient characteristics of the stimulus have been internalized it becomes a part of the individual's response repertoire and is available for future appropriate use. The individual becomes more complex as his repertoire and familiarity with the environmental increase and the interactions that he seeks as optimally arousing become more complex in nature. This interactive process continues throughout the individual's cognitive development. Play thus provides a learning experience, in the broad concept of the word, by establishing this medium of interaction.

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Synthesis and Direction

The above review of the play theories that have been formulated to date might leave the reader in a quandary as to where and how to proceed. Although many of these play theories posit distinctly different motivations to play, each presents a unique contribution to our thinking about play. It is this author's contention that none of the theories satisfactorily explain the causal antecedents to play or encompass all of the different types of play that have been observed, both across the individual child's development and across all children at a given developmental level. Therefore, the solution, at least at this stage of our knowledge, is to attempt to extract the coherent elements from each model and to synthesize and integrate these tenets into a viable explanation of play. It should be noted at this point that there exist few data from which to evaluate the explanatory power of any of the models. Therefore, the ensuing discussion is recognized to be both subjectively biased and somewhat speculative in nature. The initial question that must be posited before any model can be delineated is: Why does play uniquely exist? Play as a distinct class of behavior has been observed since the earliest records of man's history (Huizinga, 1949) and hence must have some survival value to the human organism. Play has been observed to increase in frequency, duration, and variety as species progress in position on the phylogenetic scale (Beach, 1945; Loizos, 1967; Lorenz, 1972). Morris (1962, 1964) coined the term neophilic, characterizing playful species as those living in plastic, rapidly changing environments. The suggestion here is that play functions as the process by which the child learns to deal with the inherent variability of his environment. The flexibility acquired in play is internalized as a general problem-solving set, the ability to deal with change before it becomes crucial to survival. Through the playful manipulation of a wide variety of objects and events, in both interactive and nonconventional ways, the playing child acquires a store of information which can later be called upon when the need arises. This notion has gained credibility from a variety of theorists and research efforts and the reader is referred to Barnett (1976 a) and Ellis (1973) for reviews. This view of the function of play as inextricably linked to cognitive development, termed diversive exploratory behavior by Berlyne (1960), is inherent in Piaget, Ellis, and White's (1959) competence-effectance motivational conceptualizations and is contrary to Reilly's (1974) view of play as specific exploratory learning.


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The next question that must be addressed in attempting to explain play is: What is the motivation to play? Here the literature (Barnett, 1974) seems to support Ellis' position that quiescence is not the natural state of the organism, and that man has an inherent need for stimulation or sensory input to his system. The sensoristatic drive state postulated by Schultz (1965), and from which arousal-seeking models are derived, provides the corollary to the survival value of play as generic learning. With the motivation to seek new and varied sources of stimulation, and the increasingly complexified nature of the interactions that are sought, the playing animal not only accumulates information about his environment but also learns to relate this knowledge interactively in both generating and resolving uncertainty. The pleasure derived in play stems from the individual's perception that he is the cause of an event (Nuttin, 1973) rather than that the environment controls and directs the substance of the behavior (Reilly, 1974). Freud's postulation of a pleasure principle, although not the mechanisms he delineated, stresses the emotional effect of play and it is this central descriptive component that has been universally recognized by all theorists and observers of man at play. Csikszentmihalyi (1975 a, b) labels the emotional component as "flow," and while adding little to our theoretical formula of play (Barnett, 1976 b), presupposes almost a transcendental state as characteristic of play activities. The common recognition of a unique emotional response in play suggests not only the novel character of the behavior itself but also its worthiness as an important area for study. Finally: How do we account for the great variety of play activities, and what determines a playful response? Several of the theories differ in conceiving of play as an activity or outcome, or as a process or state of mind. However, these views can be integrated in such a way that we arrive at a statement that play is a state of mind but that the typology of a playful encounter is strongly influenced by environmental factors. The optimal range of arousal hypothesized in Ellis' model is physiologically based but varies from individual to individual. As such, the interactions which are sought as carrying arousal potential are uniquely determined by the frame of reference of the player. What is defined by one individual as "uncertainty-producing" is a function of the interaction of his cognitive processing and the history of his environmental shaping. We can parsimoniously reconcile arousal-seeking (Ellis), learning (Dollard and Miller), and developmental (Piaget) theories by suggesting that play is a state of mind and that the characterization of an activity as playful is individually determined; that playful interactions can generally be characterized developmentally as the individual grows



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more complex while maturing both intellectually and physically; and that the form the activity takes and the choice of an interaction to pursue as pleasurable lie within the environmentally conditioned behavioral repertoire of the individual. In general, the motivation to play and the pleasurable feeling which accompanies it is uniformly determined as variation-seeking behavior. The behavior itself is restricted by the individual's cognitive level of processing since only intermediate degrees of sensory input are sought as pleasurable. The choice of activity is determined uniquely within each individual as a function of his prior experiences and the contingencies and affective responses that resulted. Conclusion

Perhaps one of the most salient reasons play behavior has almost defied definition and theory is its inherent variability. The wide range of play responses that are most usually observed, not only in one child from day to day but also when comparing children at a given level, suggests that theory must necessarily be general and encompassing. But at the same time, any theoretical explanation of play must present specific implications that make it empirically testable. Due to the lack of any substantive data to date, and hence with little precedent from which to proceed, our attempts at theory must at the same time be hindered by lack of adequate methodological techniques. New procedures are beginning to be advanced which present some alternatives to traditional research paradigms (Barnett, 1976 c; Ellis, 1976; Wade, 1976) but the investigation of play is still in its early infancy and demands more cautious attention than it currently receives. In summary, then, play is of critical importance to the development of both the individual and the species; the state of our present knowledge concerning its motivational determinants, mediating influences, typological description, and methodological approach needs to be advanced. Currently, we do not have an adequate and comprehensive explanation which embodies all of the subclasses of this behavior, so that the crucial question still remains: Why does man play? Acknowledgement This research was supported in part by Grant HD 05951 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. The author wishes to thank Dr. Michael Wade for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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