CRS Report for Congress

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May 10, 1995 - President Clinton termed U.S.-Russian ties a "regular, disciplined, working relationship," and as a "good relationship." President Boris Yeltsin ...
95-676 F June 1 1995

CRS Report for Congress Congressional Research Service' The Library of Congress

Moscow Summit, May 10, 1995: Outcome and Implications Jim Nichol Analyst in Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division SUMMARY

The Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting in Moscow on May 10, 1995, addressed several issues of contention in U.S.-Russian relations. The focus was on security matters rather than economic or political issues central to previous summits. Despite what both leaders termed "differences" on key issues, they pledged to remain committed to a U.S.-Russian "working" cooperative relationship. BACKGROUND The Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting in Moscow, May 10,1995, was the fourth of the Clinton Administration. It took place on the heels of Russia's commemoration of Victory in Europe Day, marking the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe, which President Clinton attended as a sign of U.S. respect for the Soviet Union's war efforts. The one-day summit included an approximately three-hour discussion between the two leaders, a press conference, and a televised speech by President Clinton at Moscow State University (MSU) where he urged students and the general public to support continued reforms. The summit was dominated by three major issues of contention--NATO enlargement, Russia's sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, and the Chechnya conflict. No agreements were signed, but six joint statements were issued on European security, nuclear nonproliferation, and other issues. On the morning of May 11, before he left for a summit in Ukraine, President Clinton continued a policy of cultivating ties with other Russians by meeting with seven party and movement leaders and three regional heads at the U.S. Embassy. (See also CRS Report 95-526F, Moscow Summit: A Preview.) MAJOR OUTCOMES Continuation of "Working" Cooperative Ties. Although the summit came amid rising disagreements on a number of issues, both sides emphasized that the relationship remained basically cooperative. In the concluding press conference, President Clinton termed U.S.-Russian ties a "regular, disciplined, working relationship," and as a "good relationship." President Boris Yeltsin pointed to the summit results as belying speculations about a crisis in relations, noting that the two sides "seek to address problems while maintaining a balance of

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CRS-2 interests [and] in assisting each other." The Administration argued that unlike most Cold War-era summits, the meeting was not "pre-cooked" pomp and circumstance, and that President Clinton made progress on several issues that were at an impasse at lower governmental levels. President Clinton's decision to attend Moscow V-E Day commemorations and hold a summit were viewed by many observers as a sign of U.S. support for President Yeltsin. President Yeltsin noted that the visit would be viewed with approval by many Russians as a U.S. "tribute to the people killed in our common struggle against fascism."

Arms Control and Other Security Concerns. Security issues were the main focus of the summit. Russia's planned nuclear reactor and associated technology transfers to Iran were a major issue of contention. Secretary of State Warren Christopher had announced prior to the summit that the United States was adamantly opposed to the reactor transfer. President Yeltsin refused to cancel the deal outright, and the two leaders referred the matter to a commission headed by Vice President Albert Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin for evaluation. The Commission will report its findings, possibly by the time of the meeting of the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations in Halifax, Canada in June (to which President Yeltsin had been invited). President Clinton handed over some additional classified information to President Yeltsin on Iran's nuclear weapons acquisition aspirations, in order to try to convince the Russians to give up the sale. The two sides announced that one reported element ofthe transfer, nuclear enrichment centrifuge technology, would be canceled. Russia also agreed to take back spent fuel from the reactors, closing another possible avenue for weapons development. Asked in the press conference about U.S. congressional proposals to cut off aid to Russia because of the reactor deal, President Yeltsin asserted that "we're not afraid of threats, we never react to threats." President Clinton stated that "we should be quite careful in using the language of threats in a relationship that in the last two years has made the world a much safer place." (See also CRS Report 95-641F, Russian Nuclear Reactor and Conventional Arms Transfers to Iran.) A joint statement on European security noted that "the evolution of European structures should be directed toward the overall goal of integration." The two sides underscored the importance of both Russian and U.S. participation in worldwide political, economic, and security institutions, including Russia's membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP). President Clinton supported Russia's further cooperation with the European Union, and its participation in "other institutions important to European and global economic and security architecture." Both presidents called for strengthening the peacekeeping capabilities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its potential for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Both presidents also pledged that all European states would be allowed to freely choose their security arrangements. President Yeltsin noted that the discussion of NATO enlargement by the two leaders was protracted and inconclusive, and he suggested that talks be continued between the two leaders when they meet in Halifax and at the UN General Assembly in November. The Administration reported that President Yeltsin urged that NATO enlargement be slowed down. President Clinton stressed that Russia would participate in PFP, "a significant force in increasing

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a sense of trust and understanding and working together in security within Europe." (See also CRS Report 95-594S, NATO Enlargement and Russia.) A joint statement on antiballistic missile/theater missile defense (ABM/TMD)delineation noted that "both sides must have the option to establish and deploy effective theater missile defense systems." The statement called for openness and the exchange of information by the two sides to assure that TMD systems do not pose a "realistic threat" to strategic nuclear missiles, are not tested for such a purpose, and are not deployed against each side, and pledged cooperation in developing and fielding TMD systems. In a joint statement on nonproliferation, the two leaders endorsed the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and pledged to continue negotiations toward nuclear disarmament as called for by the NPT. Both sides reaffirmed their commitments to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines calling for nuclear transfers to take place only under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and "only when a supplier is satisfied that such transfers...would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons." The two leaders directed a newly created bilateral working group on nonproliferation to prepare assessments of regional threats and directed the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to report on ways to ensure the safety of nuclear materials. A joint statement on enhancing the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons reaffirmed that the two sides would quickly negotiate "concrete arrangements," including exchange of detailed and regular information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials, and on their safety and security. The two sides also pledged to arrange reciprocal monitoring of storage facilities of fissile materials removed from warheads. They declared that fissile materials removed from dismantled weapons would not be used in new nuclear weapons; that no newly produced fissile materials will be used in nuclear weapons; and that fissile materials from the civil nuclear program would not be used in new nuclear weapons. The two presidents also urged that existing agreements on the irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons be implemented, including closing down plutonium production reactors, halting the use of newly produced plutonium in nuclear weapons, and developing compliance procedures. In April, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev had argued that the "flank limits" (covering allowable numbers of tanks, combat aircraft, and other designated weapons deployed in treaty-defined areas) in the 1992 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, due to come into full force in November 1995, are unfair to a post-Soviet Russia and that the treaty should be altered or abrogated. President Clinton stressed at the press conference that the United States expects Russia to be in compliance with CFE Treaty by November. Meeting this deadline would require withdrawing several hundred tanks and other weapons from the north Caucasus region of Russia, including many in Chechnya. President Clinton did indicate at the summit that "we believe some modifications are in order" to the CFE Treaty to respond to Russia's "legitimate security interests," and that the United States would support some modifications at the review conference in May 1996, presumably involving increased weapons in flank areas, if the changes preserve the integrity of the treaty.

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Among other security issues, the Administration described an agreement on the accountability of Russian SS-25 strategic missiles converted to space launch vehicles as a major accomplishment of summit that ensured the continued implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). The agreement by the Russians to count these converted missiles against the total numbers of missiles allowed under START I would permit the United States to lift an embargo on granting licenses to U.S. companies seeking to place payloads into orbit on these missiles. The two sides also agreed to expand visits to military biological warfare facilities. Both sides agreed to pursue further cooperation in combatting terrorism and criminal activity. President Clinton stressed that "the great security threat of the 21st century...might be coming from often nongovernmental sources in terms of terrorism and organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction getting into [their] hands." An Administration fact sheet on the summit announced that a Civilian Research and Development Foundation would be established under the aegis of the FREEDOM Support Act (P.L.102-511, Section 511) to support scientific work between U.S. and NIS scientists.

Regional and International Mfairs. According to the Administration, Chechnya was discussed "a significant amount of time." President Clinton reiterated U.S. concerns about human rights abuses there, called for the parties to cease fighting and for Moscow's temporary cease-fire to be made permanent. He urged Russia to work with the OSCE monitoring unit in Chechnya and open up routes for international humanitarian aid shipments. Publicly discounting these U.S. concerns in the press conference, President Yeltsin attempted to link Russia's fighting against "terrorism" in Chechnya to U.S. efforts to resolve the Oklahoma City terrorist bombing. Despite press reports during the summit of ongoing battles in Chechnya involving Russian military troops, President Yeltsin asserted that "there are no military actions underway" because Russian police had supposedly replaced the military in carrying out "minor" mopping-up efforts against "gangs." He added that rebuilding and plans for local elections were underway. In his MSU speech, President Clinton stressed that "continued fighting in that region can only spill more blood and further erode support for Russia among her neighbors around the world." Expert working groups also discussed the Middle East peace process and developments in North Korea. Trade, Aid, and Investment. A joint statement on economic reform, trade, and investment detailed cumulative U.S. aid, trade, and investment efforts in Russia and pledged both sides to early realization of the Partnership for Economic Progress, a "charter" issued at the last summit detailing objectives for the development of mutual trade and economic cooperation and for U.S. business investment in Russia. President Clinton indicated that Russia "has a great deal to be proud of in the economic progress that has been made," although problems remain. He concluded that U.S. aid "has been a good investment for the United States because we have a stronger, more democratic, more open, more free Russia and we will continue to support that direction." President Yeltsin promised that Russia would maintain its strict budget discipline. President Clinton voiced support for Russian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international economic forums, and both sides agreed to expedite Eximbank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation financing and loan guarantees for Russian oil and gas, civil aviation, and other projects. In another joint statement, President Clinton

CRS-5 welcomed Russia's assurances that its conventional arms supply contracts with Iran are limited and will end in a few years, which the Administration indicated allows Russia to be admitted as a founding member of a new international export controls regime covering weapons and sensitive or dual-use technologies. IMPLICATIONS FOR YELTSIN AND RUSSIA Most Russian media across the political spectrum assessed the summit in a basically positive light. They mostly endorsed U.S. participation in V-E Day ceremonies and this spilled over into support for President Yeltsin's summitry. The summit also was viewed as demonstrating that President YeItsin remained in political control and able to make decisions that might contravene lower bureaucratic actions. According to many observers, President Yeltsin's persistent requests that President Clinton attend V-E Day ceremonies and hold a summit marked his efforts to bolster his image among both Russian hardliners and reformists in anticipation of presidential elections in mid-1996. He attempted to emphasize a general swing by his administration toward more nationalistic and less pro-Western policies by visibly "standing up to" the United States at the summit. However, he also tried to appeal to reformists by virtue of his meeting with the head of the leading Western nation and by proclaiming that integration with the West and domestic reforms would continue. Because Western leaders did not boycott most V-E Day ceremonies to protest the Chechnya invasion, President YeItsin was spared further damage to his standing as a world leader in public eyes. After the summit, some Russian military officials reportedly criticized decisions to join PFP and on TMD development. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS Many observers supported the Administration decision to attend a summit, noting that it contributed to reducing tensions between the two states and focused efforts on "managing" policy differences. Although major breakthroughs did not occur on the most contentious issues, notable progress was made on same matters and a worsening of relations was avoided, in this view. The New York Times (May 11), Russian affairs analyst Adrian Karatnycky (MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, May 10), and others also endorsed President Clinton's public statements and meeting with opposition leaders, during which he emphasized U.S. concerns over events in Chechnya and urged that Russians not lose faith in democratization and economic reforms. Others such as William Safire (New York Times, May 11) and the Washington Post (May 12) were critical of what they viewed as President Clinton's continued overemphasis on support for President YeItsin and "kid-glove" treatment on Chechnya and other issues. On security issues, many arms control observers praised agreements on SS-25 launchers and other matters, but there was some contention about whether President Yeltsin's agreement not to sell centrifuge technology to Iran was a substantive concession, since it appeared that Russia had only tentatively agreed to such a sale. Some observers at the Arms Control Association and elsewhere raised concerns about the ABM/TMD joint statement, viewing its language as possibly jeopardizing the ABM Treaty, and hence negatively affecting the whole range of strategic arms reductions. Some criticized President Clinton's statement of willingness to examine modifications to the CFE Treaty at the May 1996 review conference as condoning Russian "imperial" military conduct in Chechnya. The Administration countered that it had called

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CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS Many in Congress supported President Clinton's summitry, but others viewed the timing of the summit as inappropriate given the continued Chechnya conflict and the proposed Russian nuclear reactor transfers to Iran. Representative Toby Roth reflected this latter viewpoint on May 9 in reiterating his regret that President Clinton was attending the V-E Day Commemoration in Moscow and holding a summit, but urging that President Clinton speak out publicly in Moscow in support of human rights, democracy, and the renunciation of empire. Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole on May 11 criticized the lack of progress in halting the nuclear reactor sale to Iran, stating that "This flies in the face of the summit's joint statement on proliferation, which pledged to work together closely to promote nonproliferation goals." He also added that the failure of the summit to resolve the nuclear reactor dispute would force the Senate to reassess U.S. policy toward Russia, including aid. Senator Mitch McConnell, chairman of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, stated on May 10 that "the summit was a failure. Nothing was achieved," particularly in stopping the sale of nuclear technology to Iran and ending the Chechnya conflict. While some have favored eliminating all aid to Russia because of its behavior, others advocate continuing some aid for nuclear weapons reductions and anticrime efforts. Others point out that aid to Russia has been declining in any event, and that the FY1996 Administration request for $260 million for aid to Russia, while unlikely to provide much U.S. influence on the Russian government, can be targeted to bolster democratic and market forces. Senator McConnell on March 10 noted that "if aid to Russia is a drop in the bucket, they won't miss it." Senator Joseph Eiden reflected the views of those supporting President Clinton's summitry, arguing that the meeting did not imply U.S. tacit approval of Russia's "brutal behavior" in Chechnya. He also pointed out the importance of face-to-face talks in convincing Russia to alter its decision to sell nuclear reactor technology to Iran, to cease opposition to NATO enlargement and to join PFP, and to cooperate on other security matters. He argued that, rather than threaten to cut aid to Russia, the United States should continue to "engage the Russians in open, frank, [and] even contentious dialogue." Representative Elizabeth Furse and 24 others sent a letter to President Clinton on May 5 endorsing his decision to attend the summit and urging him to propose beginning talks on concluding a START ill treaty. Some members and others were disappointed that a timeframe for beginning these talks was not announced at the summit.