CRS Report for Congress

96-974 F December 2, 1996

CRS Report for Congress ~onal

Research Service . The Library of Congress

Russia: Chechnya at Peace? Recent Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests Jim Nichol Analyst in Foreign Affairs Foreign Mfairs and National Defense Division

SUMMARY The 20-month conflict in Russia's breakaway Chechnya Republic appeared to enter a new stage after August 30, 1996, with the two sides agreeing on a cease-fire and withdrawal of Russian troops. While the cease-fire has held and most Russian troops have already withdrawn, major concerns remain about the durability of the peace. The United States has welcomed the cease-fire and urged the sides to continue work toward a comprehensive peace settlement.

BACKGROUND After a three-year effort to end separatism in Chechnya by means short of armed force, up to 40,000 Russian military and police troops entered the enclave in December 1994, aiming to overthrow the leadership there and reestablish Russian control. Over the next few months, Russian troops slowly pushed most Chechen rebel forces into the southern highlands, but could not vanquish them. Many Chechens and other ethnic groups, particularly those residing in the northern lowlands, cooperated with Russia, tried to remain neutral, or fled. A cease-fire agreement signed by the two sides in July 1995 soon broke down. A widespread anti-war mood in Russia threatened Yeltsin's prospects in the upcoming June 1996 presidential election. Early in 1996, he intensified an armed offensive in Chechnya in an attempt to win the war before the election. After the offensive fizzled, he changed tactics and announced a unilateral cease-fire to begin on April 1, 1996. Despite the cease-fire, which included an offer to negotiate with Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev through intermediaries, Russian forces assassinated him three weeks later. Zelimkahn Yanderbiyev became the new rebel president and on June 1, 1996, met with Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin in Moscow to sign a cease-fire agreement. A further agreement was signed in Nazran, Ingushetia (bordering Chechnya) on June 10, which called for quickly dismantling Russian military checkpoints in Chechnya, disarming Chechen rebels, withdrawing most Russian forces, and holding Chechen legislative elections. (For background, see CRS Reports 95-207F, Russian Conflict in Chechnya, and 96-193F, Chechnya Conflict.) On July 10, days after Yeltsin's re-election, Russian combined forces commander in Chechnya Lt. Gen. Vyacheslav Tikhomirov suspended peace talks and launched intense aerial and ground attacks on Yanderbiyev's headquarters and elsewhere in Chechnya. On August 6, rebels responded by launching an attack on Grozny -- the

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CRS-2 capital of Chechnya which they had lost after fierce fighting in January 1995 -- and quickly routed most Russian troops, who suffered heavy casualties. They also launched successful attacks to "liberate" other major towns in Chechnya.

THE NEW PEACE INITIATIVES Lt. Gen. Aleksandr Lebed was appointed by President Yeltsin to the Russian Security Council (a presidential consultative body) in late June 1996 to bolster his prospects in the second round of the presidential elections. Lebed's intentions regarding Chechnya were at first unclear. After Yeltsin's re-election, Lebed endorsed the July offensive. Following the rebel offensive in Grozny, Yeltsin on August 10 appointed Lebed his special envoy on Chechnya. Lebed travelled to Chechnya and upon his return, announced that he was reverting to his previous stance that the conflict should be settled peacefully and Chechnya allowed to hold a referendum on remaining part of Russia. On August 14, Yeltsin decreed that Lebed would have special powers to "coordinate the activities" of the Russian government to achieve a peace settlement. Military commanders agreed on August 14 to a pause in fighting in Grozny, and cease-fire talks were held during another Lebed visit to Chechnya on August 15. On August 19, however, Yeltsin ordered Lebed to "restore the legal order in Grozny," appearing to advocate the use of force. Upon this cue, the Russian military announced that it would launch an all-out assault to re-take Grozny on August 22 unless the rebels withdrew, and ordered civilians to evacuate. The ultimatum sparked domestic Russian and international protest (see below). Russian shelling of Grozny intensified on August 21, while Lebed travelled to Chechnya to stop the planned attack. After talks with the Russian high command in Chechnya and with rebel leaders, Lebed ordered the Russian military to stand down. On August 22, Lebed and Chechen commander AsIan Maskhadov signed a preliminary accord calling for a cease-fire to begin on August 23. It called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya's southern highlands (specifying withdrawal routes to preclude accidental skirmishes), rebel disarmament, the • demilitarization of Grozny, the creation of a joint military headquarters and joint patrols in Grozny, and the exchange of prisoners and casualties. On August 27, Yeltsin requested Lebed to submit his plan for a political settlement of the Chechnya conflict for his evaluation, after which he would decide whether to meet with him. The Security Council considered a draft on August 29, and Lebed received instructions by phone from Yeltsin to continue his peace efforts. He flew to the town of Khasavyurt in Russia's Dagestan Republic (bordering Chechnya) later that day for further talks. Tim Guldiman, head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Assistance Group in Chechnya, met with Lebed and rebel leaders Yanderbiyev and Maskhadov and they signed the Khasavyurt Accord early on August 30. The Accord incorporated key provisions of the earlier agreements on troop withdrawals. It postponed a decision on Chechnya's status for five years, until December 2001. Lebed called for an interim Chechen government to include members of the Moscow-installed Chechen government, headed by Doku Zavgayev, but both the rebels and Zavgayev balked at cooperation. The interim Chechen government held its first meeting on October 19 to plan presidential and legislative elections to he held on January 27, 1997. Maskhadov was named interim prime minister and minister of defense.

CRS-3 By the middle of November, about 20,000 Russian troops had been withdrawn from Chechnya, leaving about 20,000 in two brigades at two air bases outside Grozny, as well as several thousand regular police and border troops. The June 1996 Nazran Accord permitted some Russian troops to remain in Chechnya, and the Khasavyurt Accord did not clarify the issue. Yeltsin had decreed that Russian troops would be "permanently deployed" in Chechnya, but on November 23 ordered the brigades to withdraw. Chechen negotiators had warned that if the troops were not completely withdrawn before elections on January 27, "instability" might re-emerge, raising the specter of renewed conflict. The OSCE Assistance Group has monitored the troop withdrawals and assisted in carrying out the Accord's provisions on exchanging POWs and the remains of those killed in the conflict. It is also assisting in the follow-on talks.

Lebed's Ouster. Internecine bickering among Yeltsin's subordinates over status, responsibilities, and policy intensified in Autumn 1996 after the president was forced to relinquish virtually all presidential duties to prepare for surgery. Lebed had called for the ouster of Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov for incompetence in prosecuting operations in Chechnya, and his appointees in the Security Council had accused Chernomyrdin of planning a "creeping coup" against Yeltsin. At a press conference on October 16, Kulikov leveled his own charges that Lebed was plotting to seize power through the alleged creation of a "Russian Legion," with help offered by Chechen rebels. Chernomyrdin commented the following day that he found much truth to the allegations, though most observers discounted the charges. That evening, an ailing Yeltsin appeared on television to condemn Lebed's inability to work with his colleagues and to sign a decree ousting him. (For background, see CRS Report 96-812F, Russia: Yeltsin's Health and the Post-Yeltsin Succession.) Yeltsin made several new appointments of individuals who were well regarded by members of his administration and who would not "rock the boat" as had Lebed. On October 19, he named former State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin as the new Security Council secretary and presidential envoy to Chechnya, and on October 29 appointed businessman Boris Berezovskiy and Col. Gen. Leonid Mayorov as deputy secretaries to work on political and economic issues involving Chechnya. On November 5, he appointed Rybkin ally and business manager Georgiy Kurin as his new presidential representative in Chechnya. Kurin was also named the Russian cochair of the Joint Commission on the Settlement of the Crisis in Chechnya, to monitor the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya and prepare rebuilding proposals. Rybkin has pledged to continue Lebed's work and has met repeatedly with Chechen interim government officials to work out principles of RussiaChechnya relations. On November 19, Chernomyrdin discussed a draft agreement on principles of relations with Yeltsin, to govern economic aid, free movement of people and goods, restoration of transport links, repatriation of displaced persons, and other problems. Chernomyrdin and Maskhadov signed the agreement on November 23, and Yeltsin ordered remaining Russian brigades to leave Chechnya (a few troops will remain).

IMPLICATIONS FOR YELTSIN AND RUSSIA The Chechnya conflict has exacted a heavy toll on the combatants. Lebed reported to the State Duma on October 2 that the Chechnya conflict resulted in 80,000-100,000 deaths, including 3,726 Russian military troops (the Defense Ministry reported 2,941), and that almost 20,000 troops were wounded or missing. Several

CRS-4 thousand Interior Ministry troops and police were also killed or wounded. Lebed estimated on September 17 that the Chechnya conflict had cost $12-$15 billion to prosecute. Other Russians estimate these costs at nearly $40 billion, excluding the billions of dollars of war damage to Chechnya. A March 1996 OSCE report stated that Russian government troops had engaged in "wanton destruction and systemic looting" of Chechen towns, took civilian hostages to exchange for cash, and engaged in undisciplined and indiscriminate attacks on civilians. It noted that both rebels and Russian troops used "inhabited localities and public buildings" as battlefields and "the civil population as a human shield." Although polls show that a majority of Russians support the Khasavyurt Accord, and most support or are resigned to Chechnya's independence, there is much vocal opposition among nationalists and communists. Many complain that a military victory is still achievable -- if only political authorities give the military and police free rein -- and urge renewed fighting. They strongly resist the provision calling for a five-year "cooling off' period prior to a Chechen vote on secession, and to Chechen calls for the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. Critics counter that the campaign in Chechnya was a mistaken use of force wantonly and ineptly carried out. They also stress that the "facts on the ground" -- the withdrawal of a substantial portion of Russia's forces from Chechnya -- makes it difficult for Russia to revert to full-scale conflict. While Defense Minister Igor Rodionov has appeared to back the Accord, at least some in the General Staff apparently oppose it. Kulikov and his Interior Ministry also opposed a complete withdrawal. At the hearing on Chechnya on October 2 in the State Duma, Kulikov argued that the Khasavyurt Accord was "a cover for unilateral, boundless concessions of the most humiliating and destructive sort." State Duma Defense Committee chair Lev Rokhlin concurred with Kulikov that the settlement would lead Chechen criminals to infiltrate neighboring areas of Russia. The State Duma approved a resolution on October 25 downplaying the positive impact of the Khasavyurt Accord, merely acknowledging the "cessation of combat actions" and taking a nationalist stance that Russian authority should be reimposed. The Federation Council, the upper legislative chamber, on October 8 took a more conciliatory position, adopting a statement of support for the Accord, while nonetheless stressing that Russia's territorial integrity must be upheld. Ninetythree State Duma deputies on October 1 appealed for a ruling from the Constitutional Court annulling the Khasavyurt Accord, claiming that Lebed had no authority to sign it. State Duma deputy and Communist Party head Gennadiy Zyuganov has opposed the Accord and backed the pro-Moscow Chechens, while State Duma deputy and Yabloko Party head Grigoriy Yavlinskiy has supported it. During Yeltsin's illness and recovery, his administration's Chechnya policy has been uncoordinated and unclear. It has fallen victim to the struggle for power among his subordinates, and Yeltsin's inability or unwillingness to intervene, as well as to fundamental differences over whether and how to end the conflict, according to many analysts. Yeltsin was silent after the August 19 ultimatum was delivered, with his administration reporting that he was checking out vacation spots, though he returned to Moscow late on August 21 because of the crisis. He reprimanded Lebed on August 22 after Lebed had halted the planned attack on Grozny, oddly stating that he was "not entirely satisfied with Lebed's work in Chechnya ... his work has not produced results." Lebed responded that Yeltsin "is welcome to complain ... [but] the constitutional order cannot be introduced through air bombardments." It

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was only late on August 23 that Yeltsin provided conditional support for Lebed's peace efforts, while warning that Chechnya must remain part of Russia. He met with presidential chief of staffAnatoliy Chubais on September 18 and voiced support "on the whole" with the Chechen peace talks. As his health improves, some observers speculate that much bickering within his administration may subside as he lends authority to a political settlement of a conflict he has admitted may be one of the "mistakes" of his presidency. There are various factions in Chechnya, including rebel and pro-Moscow Chechens, criminal and rogue Chechen groups, and ethnic minorities including Russians and Nogais, that complicate a final peace settlement. In mid-October, Chechen forces loyal to Zavgayev reportedly clashed with those of Yanderbiyev in Urus-Martan, and on November 1, they clashed again with other rebels in Znamenskoye (a town northwest of Grozny), threatening wider conflict. Some rebel killings of pro-Russian Chechen officials have been reported, but Yanderbiyev gave a speech on September 23 stressing that "mutual forgiveness" was necessary to build an independent Chechnya. On September 25, Maskhadov called for disarming clan formations to preclude intra-clan conflict and for liquidating criminals posing as rebels. Russia has continued to protest attacks on its withdrawing troops, allegedly by rogue Chechens not under Chechen government control. Some in Russia warn that if Chechnya is permitted to have a five year "cooling off' period prior to a secession vote, other republics and regions may demand a similar arrangement or otherwise push for substantial self-administration. Greater economic autonomy would have severe consequences on Russia's budgetary revenues, already in arrears, they warn. They urge that during the five year "cooling off' period before Chechnya decides on secession, Russia should continue its economic and political reforms and provide substantial rebuilding aid to Chechnya, so that Chechens will decide to remain in the federation. Others argue that most in Chechnya will not change their minds on secession and that a "cooling off' period merely serves to prepare Russia for the inevitable. They discount fears that Chechnya's secession will lead to the breakup of Russia, because no other federal subunit seeks complete independence and most have signed power-sharing agreements with the center. In any event, they argue, some decentralization is beneficial to democratization.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST Vice President Al Gore was in Moscow in mid-July when Russia renewed fighting in Chechnya, and urged President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to return to the cease-fire. The State Department condemned the August 19 ultimatum as "frightening" in its implications. President Clinton sent a letter to President Yeltsin expressing concern about the fate of civilians in Grozny and urging a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The French and Italian foreign ministries also urged an end to the conflict, the Organization of Islamic Countries offered to mediate, and the German Foreign Ministry sent an emissary to Moscow to urge restraint. International aid organizations appealed for peace but also prepared assistance to the tens of thousands of citizens fleeing Grozny. The State Department on August 22 viewed Lebed's initial cease-fire agreement "a positive step forward" toward a settlement.

CRS-6 In his report to Congress on November 4, 1996, as required by Sec. 573 of H.R.3610 (omnibus appropriations, P.L.104-208), Secretary Christopher stated that the U.S. Government has used its bilateral ties with Russia and its leadership in international organizations, principally the OSCE, "to encourage both sides in the [Chechnya] dispute to respect human rights" and to reach "an enduring political settlement." He noted that U.S. diplomats serve in the OSCE Assistance Group, which facilitated the Khasavyurt Accord, and it has assisted the two sides in carrying out the Accord's provisions on exchanging POWs and remains of those killed. The Assistance Group also has monitored troop withdrawals and is lending support to follow-on negotiations. He reported that the United States has provided $30 million to international relief agencies for victims of the Chechnya conflict. Other U.S. aid has been provided to Chechnya through the Eastern Europe and Central Asia Emergency Appeal fund of the International Red Cross.

Congressional Action. The 104th Congress supported the peaceful settlement of the Chechnya conflict and has been critical of Russian conduct there. Representative Tim Roemer, on April 18, 1996, urged President Clinton to press Yeltsin during the upcoming summit meeting to end the Chechnya conflict, among other issues. Representative Gerald Solomon on May 15, 1996, unsuccessfully urged consideration of an amendment to H.R.3230 (defense authorizations) conditioning Nunn-Lugar denuclearization funding to Russia upon its ending offensive operations in Chechnya, among other conditions. Representative Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, in supporting the amendment, argued that Nunn-Lugar aid freed up funds that Russia shifted to prosecute its ''brutal operation" in Chechnya and other activities at variance with U.S. interests. Representative Frank Wolf in May 1996 in House chamber remarks was critical of human rights abuses in Chechnya and urged the Administration to send a special envoy to Moscow to offer mediation. He also led congressional efforts to protest against cease-fire violations in July, terming Russian actions "genocidal," criticizing the Administration for "sitting on its hands," and urging Vice President Gore to raise the issue in Moscow (see above). In March and May 1996, in chamber remarks, Representative Christopher Smith highlighted human rights abuses in Chechnya, including Russian targeting of hospitals and schools in violation of international human rights accords. On July 25, 1996, Senator Mitch McConnell, for Senator Jesse Helms, introduced an amendment to H.R.3540 (foreign operations appropriations) expressing the sense of the Congress that Russia should halt its "unacceptable" offensive military actions in Chechnya in violation of the April cease-fire, that Yeltsin recommence troop withdrawals, and that the two sides resume negotiations toward a peace settlement. In comments on the amendment, Senator Helms was critical of Administration policy, noting that "if President Clinton will not speak for the Nation's conscience, then we in the Senate must.. .." He warned that the conflict could "negatively affect relations between our countries," and that "in addition to the killing of countless innocent victims," the Chechnya conflict threatens "the development of a democratic government" in Russia. The Conference Report (Conf.Rept.104-863) on H.R.3610 (omnibus appropriations), Sec.573, altered this Senate language to call upon the Secretary of State to submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations within thirty days of the bill's enactment, to explain how the United States was assisting in efforts to end the Chechnya conflict. The conferees called on Russia to "permanently halt" offensive military actions in Chechnya and "fully implement" the Khasavyurt Accord.