deputies were elected by party lists and half in single member districts. On one ... eligible to be seated in the State Duma in this portion of the vote. On the .... majority (300 seats) in the State Duma required to override presidential vetoes of.
96-17 F Updated January 4, 1996
CRS Report for Congress Congressional Research Service . The Library of Congress
Russia's December 1995 Legislative Elections: Outcome and Implications for U.8. Interests Jim Nichol Analyst in Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division SUMMARY
On December 17, 1995, Russia held elections to replace the first post-Soviet legislature, which had been elected in December 1993. Ultranationalist and communist parties achieved significant representation, reflecting in part widespread economic distress among the population and discontent over current government social support. Liberal and centrist parties did less well, but were able to gain enough seats to block drastic constitutional and other legislative changes, according to many observers. Yeltsin pledged to continue his reform policies. U.S. policymakers hailed the holding of "free and fair" elections, though some raised concerns about whether the pace or content of Russia's reforms might be altered and whether adjustments might be needed in U.S. policy.
BACKGROUND On December 17, 1995, Russian voters elected deputies to the 450-member State Duma, the lower legislative chamber of the Federal Assembly. The election replaces a "transitional" legislature that sat only two years with a "permanent" legislature to sit a full four year term. In a dual ballot process similar to Germany's, half the deputies were elected by party lists and half in single member districts. On one ballot, voters chose among 43 parties or party blocs listed. In many or most cases, voters were attracted primarily by prominent personalities heading the various parties. Only parties receiving at least five percent of the total votes 'cast were eligible to be seated in the State Duma in this portion of the vote. On the other ballot, voters chose candidates in single member district races, a process familiar to U.S. voters. There were 2,751 candidates in these races, an average of twelve per electoral district (in some districts as many as 40 candidates ran, and in others only two). Further complicating the balloting, 13 regions held gubernatorial races. The 178-member upper house of the legislature, the Federation Council, did not face election on December 17. It is composed of two members from each of Russia's 89 regions, republics, and other enclaves. Many executive and legislative heads of the regions and republics sit in the chamber, and the majority of the sitting governors (almost 60) were appointed to their posts by Yeltsin. After months of wrangling between Yeltsin and the legislature, a Federation Council electoral law was signed into law in early December 1995. It provides for localities to select two
CRS Reports are prepared for Members and committees of Congress
~.
CRS 1111"11111111111111111111111111111
CRS-2 representatives to sit in the body, and allows the current membership to continue to serve at the discretion of the localities. It also calls for regional gubernatorial and republic presidential elections to be held by December 1996. In practice, it appears that newly elected governors and others will sit in the chamber (the 13 governors elected or reelected on December 17 reportedly assumed seats on the Federation Council). The Yeltsin appointees remaining in the Federation Council over the next few months may provide support for Yeltsin's policies against harsh proposals of an antireformist State Duma and give him local support if he runs for President. (On the December 1993 balloting, see CRS Report for Congress 94-19F, Russian Legislative Elections and Constitutional Referendum, January 7,1994; see also CRS Issue Brief 92089, Russia; and CRS Reports for Congress 94-844F, Russia's New [1994-1995J Parliament, October 31, 1994, and 95-894F, Russia's Upcoming Parliamentary Election, August 11, 1995.)
THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN Election campaigning was briefby U.S. standards--beginningwith the announcement on the registration of candidates on November 15 and ending a month later on December 15. Strict limits on campaign contributions and expenditures limited the amount of television and other advertising by candidates, though some abuses were reported. Each party received one hour of free time on state-owned television and some free radio and print advertising. Parties and candidates could purchase added advertising in state-owned or private media. Candidates relied heavily on television to reach the far-flung Russian electorate. The bulk of legislators ran on platforms calling for a slower pace or halt to Yeltsin's reforms. In some constituency races, the Communist and like-minded Agrarian parties combined forces, agreeing not to compete against each other. The liberal parties proved largely unable to reach similar agreements. Chernomyrdin's "Our Home is Russia" party was identified by most voters as the pro-Yeltsin, establishment "party of power" (even though it tried to distance itself from Yeltsin). Polling showed that many voters were more negative toward Yeltsin's record than during the last legislative elections in 1993. On December 15, the last day of permitted campaign advertising, Yeltsin gave an impassioned television appeal for voters not to allow the "forces of the past"--which were responsible for "hunger, real fear, and mass repressions"--to return to power. He warned that this would be "a tragic mistake" for Russia and result in the loss of freedom. He added that "neither centralised planning nor strict regulation of prices can bring salvation. The economy never worked well on commands. It cannot be improved by a general's order." He called for youth to vote, warning that "your indifference will be a vote for the past." He argued that the economy was gradually improving and that voters should preserve "our common home," an allusion to Viktor Chernomyrdin's Our Home is Russia Party.
RESULTS The turnout of 65 percent (out of about 107.5 million eligible voters) exceeded most expectations, overwhelming some balloting sites. Turn-out in all 225 electoral districts in Russia was reported to be above the threshold of 25 percent needed for the election to be valid. Preliminary results for the party list vote were provided on
CRS-3 December 29 by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). Partly because of the complexity of the ballot, vote tallies were delayed. Only four parties surmounted the five percent "hurdle" on the party list vote (see table). The fact that one-half the party list votes were "wasted" raises the issue of an undemocratic "hurdle." Several parties have appealed this issue to the Constitutional Court. Results from the single member constituency races added several deputies from minor parties and many independent (non-party-affiliated) deputies. In many of these races, candidates eschewed party identification partly because many Russians associate parties with the old Communist Party's rights abuses (though many older citizens continue to support the communist party and vote compulsively). Many experts had expected a low turnout because of the apathy of many Russians toward elections and their antipathy to party politics. Virtually all of around 900 Organization for Security and Cooperation In Europe (OSCE) and other international observers judged the election as "free and fair," though they stayed away from Chechnya because of escalating conflict. Many analysts doubted the validity of the Chechnya vote. One observer team in Komi Republic reported that some soldiers stated they had been encouraged by an officer to vote for Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The CEC and observers reported some voting irregularities, though these were mainly due to confusion caused by complex ballots.
IMPLICATIONS FOR YELTSIN AND RUSSIA From the perspective ofYeltsin and the reformers, the main positive outcome of the election was that the multiparty vote was held on schedule and was conducted in a "free and fair" fashion, advancing this aspect of democratic governance. Also,
CRS-4
Chernomyrdin's and Yavlinskiy's parties gained a modest share of the vote, enough to prevent the communists and ultranationalists from gaining the two-thirds majority (300 seats) in the State Duma required to override presidential vetoes of legislation or to amend the constitution. In any event, State Duma bills are examined by the Federation Council, which might try to block anti-reform legislation advocated by the lower chamber, though it is constitutionally weaker than the lower house. Yeltsin commented on December 20 that "the vote passed satisfactorily" and that he was pleased that the Agrarians and LDP did not do as well as expected. He stated that he expected that the new State Duma would "pursue the policy of democratization and ensurance of human rights and freedoms ...from which Russia will not retreat." The overall electoral results are not substantially different than in 1993, where anti-reformist parties also had an edge on reformist parties, according to some analysts. The large field of reformist parties in 1995, however, dispersed the vote and allowed anti-reformist candidates and parties to prevail in many cases. Altogether, Our Home, Yabloko, and Russia's Choice garnered more than one-fifth of the party list vote, compared to about one-fourth for Gennadiy Zyuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and its smaller splinter parties. Analyst Dmitri Simes, on the December 18 Lehrer NewsHour noted, however, that Chernomyrdin's party is not as liberal as Yegor Gaidar's Democratic Choice, which it partly replaces in the new legislature, yielding overall a less liberal atmosphere. He also argued that the CPRF may prove to be a rational opposition in the legislature, unlike the LDP, which he regards as irrational. Simes and Stephen Sestanovich concurred that the reduction of Zhirinovskiy's influence in the State Duma was a positive outcome. Some analysts have argued that the second largest group elected was a "non-party bloc," consisting of 77 independents elected in single member districts who formally eschew party labels. These independents will probably form one or more factions in the State Duma and may constitute "swing voters" who together or individually may lend support to the government on some issues. Analysts also point out that the election results do not perfectly reflect the factions that will emerge in the legislature when it convenes in mid-January, though they do reflect probable policy tendencies. Some Russian observers predict that the State Duma will focus heavily on social issues as leading members position themselves for the presidential race. Communists in the State Duma are also expected to vociferously criticize the Yeltsin government in the run-up to presidential elections, raising the danger of legislative-executive branch gridlock until the presidential elections. They are likely to block proposed government bills and the State Duma may approve few laws, though it may pass many nonbinding resolutions contesting Yeltsin's domestic and foreign policies. It is unlikely to ratify START II, in this view. It may also set up committees to investigate government corruption. The communist-ultranationalist majority may push constitutional amendments, but these are unlikely to be approved by two-thirds majorities in both chambers (or by other constitutional means). The communistultranationalist majority may vote no confidence in the Chernomyrdin government (under Article 117 of the constitution), forcing Yeltsin to dissolve the government. Yeltsin is constitutionally barred from dissolving the State Duma for the first year of its sitting or during the last six months of his term.
CRS-5 Some analysts have viewed the State Duma elections as a "primary" for the presidential elections, scheduled for June 16, 1996. The strong showing for the communists will likely spur Yeltsin to declare his candidacy for President. Some observers predict a titanic election struggle, with Yeltsin reassuming his historic role as the fighter against communism, and seeking to rally the public. Some warn that Yeltsin had canceled the early presidential elections he proposed in 1994 because of Zhirinovskiy's large win in the 1993 legislative races, and might repeat this action in the face of the 1995 communist win. Others discount this possibility because of its patently unconstitutional nature. Analysts in Russia and elsewhere argue that the Yeltsin government should take the electoral results into consideration by altering policies and personnel, although it is not obligated to do so. On December 18, Zyuganov stated that the results meant that "the government has received a vote of no confidence" from the people...the old radical system has collapsed and become bankrupt." He noted that new communist deputies would "certainly demand" the removal of Kozyrev and a shift in foreign policy, and other personnel changes in the cabinet government. Yavlinskiy argued that the high vote received by the communist party was a popular reaction against the policies of the Yeltsin government. While Chernomyrdin pledged after the vote to continue the course of reforms, some in the Yeltsin administration hinted at possible policy and personnel changes. Possible changes might include a strengthening of anti-reformers within the administration such as presidential security service head Aleksandr Korzhakov and a weakening of reformers such as Chernomyrdin, some of whom may be replaced. Foreign Minister Kozyrev has been widely hinted as the first casualty. The Yeltsin government might also adopt more social support measures, which may weaken economic recovery and anti-inflation efforts. Communist Gains. A major question in Russia and the West is the character
of the CPRF and its leader, Zyuganov. Is the party a moderate "social democratic" party, similar to Central European parties that uphold democratization and mixed market relations, or will it seek to re-form an authoritarian Soviet Union? Vladimir Lukin, former Russian ambassador to the United States and Yabloko member, warned on December 18 that "they are real communists" despite their sometimes soothing rhetoric. Others argue that the CPRF is not a "Stalinist" party desiring or able to stifle all civil and human rights. Some analysts have termed the communist surge in the elections a "flash in the pan" or a "last gasp" that will not be sustained in the presidential elections once Russians become more aware of CPRF plans. Public opinion polls have consistently shown that most Russians are not opposed to many aspects of democracy and market relations, so may object to some CPRF plans, or may become more concerned about extremist rhetoric by factions within the CPRF. They also point out that major support for communists is among an older, tradition-oriented, generation that is dying out.
CRS-6
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES The Clinton Administration has been strongly supportive of Yeltsin and his reform efforts and has endorsed Yeltsin's decisions on holding legislative and presidential elections. In a major Administration statement on October 17, Vice President At Gore stressed that "holding free and fair elections will offer proof that a majority of Russians now accept that political combat should be waged on the hustings, the floor of parliament, or on the pages of Russia's free press." While he noted that some observers were predicting dire results for pro-reformists in the election, he emphasized that he expected that reforms would continue in Russia. Commenting on the preliminary election results on December 18, White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry noted that it had been "a hard-fought election...it appears based on the voting that the consolidation of democracy in Russia is moving forward." State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns concurred that "democracy won" because of the free and fair voting. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher on December 19 discounted a major jolt to Russia's reform efforts, reiterating that they were "largely irreversible...people don't want to go back...they like democracy." In congressional testimony on December 15, Anders Aslund argued that the stabilization of the Russian economy would continue despite the electoral results, because of the power of the Russian presidency vis-a-vis the legislature and the growing power of localities and business interests in Russia. He compared Russia to India, where there are many opponents of democracy but it is nonetheless a "vibrant pluralist society." He and. others have called for continued U.S. aid, particularly in the uncertain period before the presidential elections. Others in the Administration and elsewhere have urged a more cautious U.S. policy in response to the electoral results. They warn that anti-reformist tendencies in Russia might accelerate and worsen U.S.-Russian relations. CIA Director John Deutsch testified to Congress on December 19 that the United States should closely watch developments in Russia that might prove harmful to U.S. security interests. In congressional testimony on December 15, former U.S. officials Brent Scowcroft and Richard Armitage noted that the CPRF and the LDP had both called for reconstituting the Soviet Union, which would increase tensions with the new independent states and the West. Armitage warned of possible added Russian hostility toward U.S. investments in Azerbaijan. Some, pointing to Zyuganov's censure of NATO expansion and opposition to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), warned of cooling East-West relations. Scowcroft and others also have warned that Yeltsin might not win a Russian presidential election, so that the United States should increase efforts to establish communications with possible successors. A few have criticized recent U.S. Embassy statements as contributing to anti-Westernism in Russia. (For details of the U.S. policy debate, see CRS Report for Congress 95-1128F, Russia's Future, November 15, 1995.)
