Cyber Security Attacks

ISE ENABLING CAPABILITY PLATFORM ECURITY ORKSHOP 1STYBER CYBERSECUIRTY WORKSHOP

FIRST C

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Cyber Security in the Aviation Context Professor Roberto Sabatini PhD, DEng, FRIN, SMAIAA, SMIEE, MRAeS, MCGI

Head of Group, Intelligent and Cyber-Physical Transport Systems Program Leader, Aviation Systems and Human Factors Avionics & ATM Lab Leader, Sir L. Wackett Aerospace Research Centre School of Engineering – Aerospace Engineering and Aviation Discipline Bundoora East Campus, PO Box 71 Bundoora VIC 3083, Australia Office: +61 3 9925 8015 Mobile: +61 457 126 495 Email: [email protected]

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Melbourne, 16th November 2016

Presentation Outline • ITS and Aviation • Aviation CNS+A Systems • Cyber Security Framework

• Cyber Security Attacks • Avionics Cyber Threats • CNS/ATM Cyber Threats

• Unmanned Aircraft System Cyber Threats • Cyber-Phyisical Integrity Monitoring and Augmentation Research • Recommendations and Future Research Directions

© RMIT University

School of Engineering – Aerospace Engineering and Aviation Discipline

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Intelligent Transport and Aviation Systems Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) include vehicular, infrastructure and networking technologies for improved safety, productivity and environmental performance of all forms of transport. More specifically, ITS adopt advanced Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to enhance air, ground and water transport. These include a variety of navigation, communication and surveillance systems/sensors for all types of intra-vehicle automated/interactive applications and multi-platform networking (i.e., car-to-car, aircraftto-aircraft, ship-to-ship, aircraft-to-ship, etc.), also encompassing connectivity and collaboration between vehicles and traffic management locations (e.g. car-to-infrastructure, aircraft-to-air traffic controller, ship-to-port). In the civil aviation context, ITS are gaining an increasingly important role. Although the aviation business has relied on ICT for many decades, the continuing growth in passenger numbers, short and long-haul flights, demands for advanced services and the ever-increasing pressure on available radio spectrum are all creating a need for innovative cyber-physical system applications (including avionics, air traffic management and unmanned aircraft systems), whose development must properly address safety, security and interoperability issues. In addition, within Europe and US, the Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and the Next Generation Air Transportation Systems (NextGen) initiatives have added legislative pressure to replace the traditional, highly-fragmented air traffic control structures by means of greater harmonization (including civil-military coordination) and assured levels of safety, security and interoperability through standardization. © RMIT University


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Evolving ITS and Aviation CNS+A Systems

Ground-base telecommunication lines provide point-to-point connectivity

CNS+A technologies employed in SESAR/NextGen/OneSKY

Source: NextGen © RMIT University


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Global Airspace Management Systems - Trends 

Current Global Airspace Management System • Aging communication systems • Disjoint set of networks  Currently not globally network centric • Evolved over time with limited concern for network security  Security by obscurity  Closed systems  Insufficient bandwidth to support security measures • Safe and Secure  Air Traffic Control methods have evolved in reaction to changes in technology, capacity and use  Current methods are reaching limit of scalability

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Bringing Safety to the Skies • Mission to provide a safer and more efficient airspace management system • Issues of funding and addressing global harmonisation

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Moving Towards Network Centric Operations • Cross network security • Authentication, Authorization, Accounting and Encryption • Required changes in Policy!

© RMIT University


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Strategic Context – The Big Picture 2000 >

2005 >

2010 >

2020 >

CNS+A

SESAR/NEXTGEN Departure Clearance Digital-ATIS (Airport Traffic Info Service) Oceanic Clearance Classical Radar

Transfer of Control LINK 2000+ Clearances Microphone Check

Downlink of Heading, Speed, Selected flight Mode level S EHS

CASCADE Initial ADS-B services More CPDLC services More D-FIS (DL Flight Info Service)

Airborne Separation

4D Trajectory Negotiation

SATCOM ACARS

Autonomous Separation P+S RADAR

VDL2 Mode S

ADS-B Receiver

VDL2

FCI

Mode S © RMIT University


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Future Aeronautical Communications 1090 / New Link(s) APC

AOC

New Link(s)

ATS

ATN-VDL-2 ACARS

VHF 25/8.33

RADAR F/R

F/R

F/R

F/R

F/R

IP Ground Infrastructure F/R

F/R

F/R

F/R

F/R

F/R

Regional Networks APC - Aeronautical Passenger Communications; AOC - Airlines Operational Communications; ATS - Air Traffic Services © RMIT University


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Future Dual Use Aero-Comms (Civil and Military) UAS

Aircraft

Satellites

Secure High-Throughput Data Link and SWIM

Airport ATM © RMIT University

Airport Ground Support Vehicles Enroute ATM

RPAS Ground Control Station


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Vulnerability of Aviation Cyber Physical Systems CPS Vulnerabilities

Maintenance

Development

Hardware

Software

Hardware

Modify and Repair Hardware Design

Operational

Software

External Environment

Update

PhysicalSystem Interactions

Hardware Implementation

Software Code Design

SystemSystemInteractions

Human Machine Interface and Interactions

Software Code Implementation

Annunciation and Display © RMIT University

Intra- and InterCommunication Systems

Automation Implementation


Command and Control

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Cyberphysical Attacks (Reported)  2015 – The FAA discovers various forms of malware in personnel e-mail accounts. The agency claims there was no damage from the attack  2015 – Ryanair airline suffers financial damages of nearly 3 million pounds resulting from a cyber attack on its bank accounts  2014 – The Cylance company accuses hackers of a coordinated attack against the computer systems of over 16 countries, including attacks on the systems of the airports and airlines of Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the United States  2008 – 800 cyber incident alerts at ATO/ATC facilities. Over 150 incidents not remediated  2007 – Virus loaded into Thai Airways EFB and the virus disabled EFB and spread to other EFBs  2006 – Virus spread to FAA’s ATC systems and FAA is forced to shut down a portion of its ATC systems in Alaska  1997 – Hacker broke into a Bell Atlantic Computer System FAA tower's main radio transmitter and another transmitter that activates runway lights © RMIT University


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Need for a Cyber Security Framework in Aviation  The cyber world of interconnected and interdependent systems has increased the vulnerability of aircraft and systems and therefore the potential impact that breaches in security can have  A cyber security framework is needed to address the following key issues:  Cyber Security threats have the potential to compromise aviation safety  Cyber Security threats have the potential to cause major efficiency disruptions

© RMIT University


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AIAA Cyber Security Roadmap  Establish common cyber standards for aviation systems

 Establish a cyber security culture  Understand the threat  Understand the risk  Communicate the threats and assure situational awareness  Provide incident response

 Strengthen the defensive system  Define design principles  Define operational principles  Conduct necessary research and development  Ensure that government and industry work together © RMIT University


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Current Avionics Radio Systems HF Antenna Antenna

Low Gain Satellite Antenna

GPS Antennas

Displays

TCAS II

High Gain Satellite Antenna

Mode S Amplifier

Flt Deck Displays/ Alerting

Satellite Data Unit HFTransceiver

MMR ILS GPS

Flight Management System

VOR DME

ACARS Management Unit

Radio Tuning Panel

VOR IRS

DME

VHF Transceiver

Mode S

ILS TCAS II Mode S DME VOR Antennas Antenna Antenna Antennas Antennas

© RMIT University

Flight Management System

Audio Control Panel

Autopilot/ Flight Director Systems TCAS II

Monitoring Alerting System

VHF Antenna


Source: Rockwell Collins

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Aeronautical Radio Spectrum Overview of spectrum allocations to aeronautical services utilized by civil aviation

© RMIT University


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Aircraft Data

Source: Rockwell Collins © RMIT University


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Airborne Data Networks – Evolution (1)  First Generation Avionics (1940s – 1960s)  Primitive instruments  Ad hoc ‘black boxes’  Independent sensor and display systems  Individual displays - operator fuses data  Advances in INS, FCS, displays, radar – avionics became mission essential  Increased aircraft performance required real-time computing

Comms

Nav

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Airborne Data Networks – Evolution (2)  Second Generation Avionics (1960s – 1970s)  Centralised and distributed architectures  Analogue data transmission  Some integrated displays  Operator still fuses most data  Mission and safety-critical avionics appears

MC Comms Radar Nav

© RMIT University


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Airborne Data Networks – Evolution (3)  Second Generation Avionics (cont.)  As digital technology evolved, a central computer was added to integrate the information from the sensors and subsystems

 The central computing complex is connected to other subsystems and sensors through analog, digital, synchro and other interfaces  When interfacing with computer a variety of different transmission methods, some of which required signal conversion (A/D), are used  Signal conditioning and computation take place in one or more computers in a LRU located in an avionics bay, with signals transmitted over a one way databus

 Data is transmitted from the systems to the central computer and data conversion takes place at the central computer  Distributed architecture (adopting multiple computers) is an evolution but analog data transmission is still widely used

© RMIT University


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Airborne Data Networks – Evolution (4)  Second Generation Architecture (Centralised)

Radar Tx/Rx

Air Data Computer

Central Computer

INS

© RMIT University

Display & Control


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Airborne Data Networks – Evolution (5)  Third Generation Avionics (1980s – 1990s)  Federated architecture using digital databuses  Partitioned processing resources (to avoid processor overload)  Increasing number of remote terminals  Low risk design, integration and upgrade  Integrated displays and data fusion  Reduced operator workload  Integrity monitoring and fault-tolerance (reduced impact of single processor failure)  In a Federated Architecture data conversion takes place at the system level and data are sent in digital form – called Digital Avionics Information Systems (DAIS). Data communication is digital

© RMIT University


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Airborne Data Networks – Evolution (6)  Third Generation Architecture

Comp

Comp

Comp

Subs

Comp

Subs

Comp

Comp

Comp

Comp

Subs

Comp

Subs

Comp

Subs

Comp

Subs

Subs

F/A-18 C/D B-757/767

© RMIT University

Memory

C-17A F-16C

A-310


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Airborne Data Networks – Evolution (7)  Third Generation Architecture

WP REAR

WP

MIDS/ LINK16

COCKPIT BUS

MIU

CAMU

V/UHFs

DME-P

MHDDs REAR

MHDDs

RAD ALT

MLS

IFF TRANS

HUD RPTR

LC REAR

LC

LGS REAR

LGS

HUD + CAM

CIUs REAR

CIUs

RGS REAR

RGS

AVIONICS BUS MDLR +PDS

GPS

LINS

NC

AC

FLIR/ IRST

DAC

ESM ECM

MAP

HEAPU

MISSION BUS SSICAs

FCC1

FCC2

SCAC

IMUs

NSCAC

MW

VVR HEAPU REAR RADAR

ADTs

FCC3

FCC4

SUs (9)

DECUs

LW

DU

FLARE DISP

CSGs

CHAFF DISP IFF

EMU

APU /CU

© RMIT University

IPU

MDP + PMDS

CSMU

BSD

GENERAL SYSTEMS BUS GCUs

L SPS COMP

R SPS COMP

L FUEL COMP

R FUEL COMP


LG COMP

FRONT COMP

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Airborne Data Networks – Evolution (8)  Fourth Generation Avionics (1990s – Present)  Extensive use of digital databuses

 Switched networks, parallel and serial buses  High throughput data networks  Multi-sensor systems and data fusion employed in several mission tasks  Modularity, fault-tolerance and platform reconfiguration – First generation IMA (IMA-1G)

© RMIT University


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Airborne Data Networks – Evolution (9)

Source: Aerospace – WorldPress.com

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Airborne Data Networks – Evolution (10)  Fifth Generation Avionics (Near Future)  Dedicated UAV/UAS requirements impact on avionics architectures  High throughput and reconfigurable data networks  Data fusion employed in most mission tasks – operator (air/ground) performs high level duties  Improved modularity, fault-tolerance and platform reconfiguration – Second generation IMA (IMA-2G); unified networks for civil and military applications  Cyber-security requirements in the CNS+A context

© RMIT University


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Types of Attacks  Sensor/System Cyber Attacks  Supply Chain Attack: Gaining access to supplier computers and modifying the firmware (e.g., preinstalling back doors, malicious code, etc.)  False Data Injection: Compromising a computer-controlled sensor by injecting false data in computer-driven data analysis/fusion process.  Jamming: Transmitting high power signals to impede reception of RF/EO signals (i.e., degrading accuracy and continuity).  Spoofing/Meaconing: Synthesizing and transmitting a false signal to deceive a target RF/EO sensor’s positioning and/or tracking data; Meaconing refers to capturing legitimate RF/EO signal and rebroadcasting with alterations (e.g., time delay), affecting the RF/EO sensor estimation accuracy, continuity and/or integrity (e.g., GNSS).  Malware Infection: Inserting software into the system with deliberate harmful intent including viruses, worms, back doors and trojan horses.

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Types of Attacks  Firmware Attacks  Code Injection  False Data Injection

 Firmware Modification  Sleep Deprivation  Malware Infection

 Network Attacks  Command Injection  Communication Jamming  Denial of Service  False Data Injection  Fuzzing  Network Isolation  Packet Sniffing  Password Cracking © RMIT University


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Avionics Case Study: ADS-B

Source: FAA © RMIT University


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Avionics Case Study: ADS-B  Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) is becoming a major cornerstone of aircraft de-confliction  Three types of threats ADS-B message have been identified:  Message Corruption  Message Denial  Message Delay

 ADS-B is inherently vulnerable to hacking, jamming, spoofing and meaconing because of its open architecture and unencrypted signals, and because equipment is easy to obtain

© RMIT University


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Air Traffic Management (ATM) Cyber-Landscape  In the last twenty years, the “cyber-landscape” in ATM has evolved significantly, particularly in conjunction with: •

a continuing migration from dedicated to general-purpose hardware, including personal computers, rack servers, tablets, laptops and even personal mobile devices, to which a growing number of off-the-shelf wireless devices are connected (incl. headsets, input devices, printers etc.)

•

a continuing migration from a dedicated and largely domestic-only Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Networks (AFTN) towards global IP-based connectivity

•

the ongoing implementation of new SESAR and NextGen technologies, most of which are data-link-based or terrestrial IP-based technologies (incl. SWIM, VDL, 4D-TRAD, AeroMACS, A-CDM etc.)

 The future of ATM as depicted by NextGen/SESAR involves substantially greater amounts of data exchanged in real-time across an increasing number of stakeholders

© RMIT University


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ATM Cyber Security  Cyber-security was inherent in traditional ATM systems thanks to the limited or null interconnectivity between dedicated CNS/ATM subsystems  Current ATM requires highly interconnected Decision Support Tools (DST) addressing the requirements of both strategic and tactical operational timeframes  Currently, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP) implement the following CS measures: •

Online submission of flight plans and flight plan amendments can only be performed by authenticated and authorized users and is subject to very detailed scrutiny (checks are performed to avoid any intentional/unintentional duplication in flight crew, aircraft, call-sign).

•

Authentication and user restrictions especially in relation to external entities participating to the CDM process (airlines, weather offices, handling agents, airport management, etc.)

•

Encryption and tunnelling (IP-based interconnectivity): increasingly adopted for ground-based telecommunication network

© RMIT University


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ATM Cyber Security

Source: FAA

© RMIT University


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ATM Case Study: SWIM

© RMIT University


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UAS Vulnerabilities

Source: Javaid et al., 2012 © RMIT University


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UAS Vulnerabilities

© RMIT University


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Cyber Integrity Features Caution Integrity Flag (CIF): A L E R T S

A predictive annunciation that the C/N/S data delivered to the avionics system is going to exceed the Required C/N/S Performance (RCP/RNP/RSP) thresholds specified for the current and planned flight operational tasks (C/N/S alert status)

Warning Integrity Flag (WIF): A reactive annunciation that the CNS data delivered to the avionics system has exceeded the Required C/N/S Performance thresholds specified for the current flight operational task (C/N/S fault status)

Time-to-Caution (TTC): T T A

The minimum time required for the CIMA system to implement remedial actions that avoid unacceptable C/N/S performance degradations leading to unsafe conditions

Time-to-Warning (TTW): The maximum time allowed from the moment a cyber-physical threat leading to a C/N/S fault resulting in an unsafe condition is detected to the moment that the CIMA system provides a warning flag to the user

© RMIT University


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Cyber-Physical Integrity Monitoring and Augmentation

Navigation Systems

Surveillance Systems

Integrity Flag Generator CNS Integrity Models

LOS/BLOS Data Link CTCM Identification ABIA

Caution and Warning Display

CTCM UAV Avionics

LOS/BLOS Data Link Aural Cautions and Warnings

States and Control Data

UAV Effectors

Remote Control Loops Aiding Loops

UAS GCS © RMIT University


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CNS+A Certification Framework INITIAL CERTIFICATION

Airworthiness Certification Manned and Aircraft/RPAS Unmanned Aircraft Avionics Avionic Systems Systems

Regulations (Defined) Standards (Defined)

Airborne Systems

CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS CONTINUING AND PERFORMANCE CERTIFICATION CERTIFICATION Continuing Airworthiness Certification

Regulations (Defined) Standards (Defined)

Airborne Systems

Airborne Systems

Airborne CNS Systems Data-Link Systems

C

N

S

Navigational Aids

Required Total System Performance Certification

Airborne Systems

Surveillance Systems Design Certification

C

N

S

Regulations (Partially Defined) Standards (Partially Defined)

Communication Systems

Continuing Total System Performance Certification

Regulations (Partially (Defined) Defined) Standards (Partially (Defined) Defined)

Airborne Systems


Non-Airborne Systems Information Systems

Non-Airborne CNS Systems

ATM Systems Non-Airborne Systems

INTEGRATED CNS+A SYSTEMS

Commissioning Certification


Non-Airborne Systems

Initial Total System Performance Certification

Regulations (To be Defined) Standards (To be Defined)


© RMIT University


Service Change Certification



Continuing Total System Performance Certification

Regulations (Partially (Defined) Defined) Standards (Partially (Defined) Defined)


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CNS+A Certification Framework Safety

- Design - Laboratory test

Security

- Design - Laboratory test - Ground test - Flight test

Integrity


Interoperability


Signal in Space (SIS)

System

Human Machine Interface (HMI)

CNS+A System

© RMIT University

Assessment Requirements


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Future Research  Evaluate the potential of CIMA to enhance the performance of next generation CNS/ATM systems for Performance/Intent Based Operations (PBO/IBO) and Four-Dimensional Trajectory (4DT) management  Full CNS integrity monitoring and augmentation functionalities for ground-based 4DT DST and avionics Flight Management Systems (FMS)  Next Generation Air-to-ground Data Link (NG-ADL) development including cyber security features

 Cyber-Security of UAS in conventional and Software-Defined Radio (SDR) architectures  CIMA forensic applications © RMIT University


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Questions and Discussion

Thank you!

© RMIT University


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References  R. Sabatini, “Avionics-Based GNSS Integrity Augmentation for Manned and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.” 2nd Gyeongbuk International Aviation Forum (GIAF 2013). Plenary Speech. Seoul (South Korea), November 2013.  R. Sabatini, “Satellite Navigation Systems: The State-of-the-Art and the Future.” Chosun University. Invited Keynote Lecture. Gwangju (South Korea), October 2013.  R. Sabatini, “Avionics Data Networks, Systems Integration and Certification Challenges.” International SMi Digital Cockpit Seminar 2013. Invited Post-Conference Lecture. London (United Kingdom), May 2013.  R. Sabatini, “GNSS, Augmentation Systems and Advanced Aerospace Applications.” University of Greenwich – Invited keynote lecture on Satellite Navigation. Greenwich (UK), May 2012.  ISO/IEC 27000 — Information security management systems  ISO/IEC 27005 — Information security risk management  DO-236 Security Assurance and Assessment Processes for Safety-related Aircraft Systems  ICAO Annex 17 – Security  ICAO Document 9985 – Air Traffic Management Security Manual  NIST SP800-30 — Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems  NIST SP800-53 — Information Security  NIST SP800-82 — Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security  RTCA DO160 – Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment  RTCA DO178 – Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification  RTCA DO-254 – Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware  RTCA DO-233 – Portable Electronic Devices Carried on Board Aircraft  A. Javaid et.al., Cyber security threat analysis and modeling of an unmanned aerial vehicle system. In Homeland Security (HST), 2012 IEEE Conference on Technologies for (pp. 585-590).  ETSI, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute – URL: http://www.etsi.org/technologiesclusters/technologies/intelligent-transport © RMIT University


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References •

T. Kistan, A. Gardi, R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy and E. Batuwangala, “An Evolutionary Outlook of Air Traffic Flow Management Techniques.” Progress in Aerospace Sciences. In press (December 2016).

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F. Cappello, S. Ramasamy and R. Sabatini, “A Low-Cost and High Performance Navigation System for Small RPAS Applications.” Aerospace Science and Technology. In press (October 2016). DOI: 10.1016/j.ast.2016.09.002

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V. Sharma, R. Sabatini and S. Ramasamy, “UAVs Assisted Delay Optimization in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks.” IEEE Communications Letters. In press (October 2016). DOI: 10.1109/LCOMM.2016.2609900

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A. Zanetti, Alessandro Gardi and R. Sabatini, “Introducing Green Life Cycle Management in the Civil Aviation Industry: the State-of-the-Art and the Future.” International Journal of Sustainable Aviation. In press (October 2016).

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J. Liu, Y. Lim, A. Gardi and R. Sabatini, "Cognitive Pilot-Aircraft Interface for Single-Pilot Operations.” Knowledge-Based Systems. Vol. 112, pp. 37–53. November 2016. DOI: 10.1016/j.knosys.2016.08.031

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R. Kapoor, S. Ramasamy 1, A. Gardi, C. Bieber, L. Silverberg and R. Sabatini, “A Novel 3D Multilateration Sensor Using Distributed Ultrasonic Beacons for Indoor Navigation.” Sensors, Vol. 16, No. 10, pp. 1637-1649. October 2016. DOI: 10.3390/s16101637

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S. Ramasamy, R. Sabatini, A. Gardi, J. Liu, “LIDAR Obstacle Warning and Avoidance System for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Sense-andAvoid.” Aerospace Science and Technology, Vol. 55, pp. 344–358, August 2016. DOI: 10.1016/j.ast.2016.05.020

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A. Gardi, R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy, “Multi-Objective Optimisation of Aircraft Flight Trajectories in the ATM and Avionics Context.” Progress in Aerospace Sciences, Vol. 83, pp. 1-36. May 2016. DOI: 10.1016/j.paerosci.2016.11.006

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R. Sabatini, M.A. Richardson, A. Gardi and S. Ramasamy, “Airborne laser sensors and integrated systems.” Progress in Aerospace Sciences, Vol. 79, pp. 15-63, November 2015. DOI: 10.1016/j.paerosci.2015.07.002

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R. Sabatini, F. Cappello, S. Ramasamy, A. Gardi and R. Clothier, “An Innovative Navigation and Guidance System for Small Unmanned Aircraft using Low-Cost Sensors.” Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Vol. 87, Issue 6, pp. 540-545. October 2015. DOI: 10.1108/AEAT-06-2014-0081

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Y. Lim, A. Gardi and R. Sabatini, "Modelling and evaluation of aircraft contrails for 4-dimensional trajectory optimisation." SAE International Journal of Aerospace, Vol. 8, Issue 2. September 2015. DOI: 10.4271/2015-01-2538

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A. Mohamed, S. Watkins, R. Clothier, M. Abdulrahim, K. Massey and R. Sabatini, “Fixed-wing MAV attitude stability in atmospheric turbulence—Part 2: Investigating biologically-inspired sensor.” Progress in Aerospace Sciences, Vol. 71, pp. 1-13, November 2014. DOI: 10.1016/j.paerosci.2014.06.002

© RMIT University


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References •

S. Ramasamy, R. Sabatini, A. Gardi and T. Kistan, “Next Generation Flight Management System for Real-Time Trajectory Based Operations.” Applied Mechanics and Materials, Vol. 629, pp. 344-349, October 2014. DOI: 10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.629.344

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A. Gardi, R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy and T. Kistan, “Real-Time Trajectory Optimization Models for Next Generation Air Traffic Management Systems.” Applied Mechanics and Materials, Vol. 629, pp. 327-332, October 2014. DOI: 10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.629.327

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S. Ramasamy, M. Sangam, R. Sabatini and A. Gardi, “Flight Management System for Unmanned Reusable Space Vehicle Atmospheric and Re-entry Trajectory Optimisation.” Applied Mechanics and Materials, Vol. 629, pp. 304-309, October 2014. DOI: 10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.629.304

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M. J. Marino, S. Watkins, R. Sabatini and A. Gardi, “Sensing Unsteady Pressure on MAV Wings: a New Method for Turbulence Alleviation.” Applied Mechanics and Materials, Vol. 629, pp. 48-54, October 2014. DOI: 10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.629.48

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M. T. Burston, R. Sabatini, R. Clothier, A. Gardi and S. Ramasamy, “Reverse Engineering of a Fixed Wing Unmanned Aircraft 6-DoF Model for Navigation and Guidance Applications.” Applied Mechanics and Materials, Vol. 629, pp. 164-169, October 2014. DOI: 10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.629.164

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A. Gardi, S. Ramasamy, R. Sabatini and T. Kistan, “Terminal Area Operations: Challenges and Opportunities”, Encyclopedia of Aerospace - UAS, eds R. Blockley and W. Shyy, John Wiley: Chichester, 2016. DOI: 10.1002/9780470686652.eae1141

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R. Sabatini, A. Gardi, S. Ramasamy, T. Kistan and M. Marino, “Modern Avionics and ATM Systems for Green Operations”, Encyclopedia of Aerospace Engineering, eds R. Blockley and W. Shyy, John Wiley: Chichester, 2015. DOI: 10.1002/9780470686652.eae1064

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R. Sabatini, A. Subic, G. Dorrington, A. Mouritz, C. Wang, C. Bil, T. Kistan, A. Gardi and S. Ramasamy, “A Roadmap for Aviation Research in Australia”, Encyclopedia of Aerospace Engineering, eds R. Blockley and W. Shyy, John Wiley: Chichester, 2015. DOI: 10.1002/9780470686652.eae1082

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R. Sabatini, A. Gardi, S. Ramasamy, T. Kistan and M. Marino, “Modern Avionics and ATM Systems for Green Operations”, Green Aviation, Chapter 27, eds R. Blockley et al., John Wiley: Chichester, 2016. ISBN: 978-1-118-86635-1

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R. Sabatini, A. Subic, G. Dorrington, A. Mouritz, C. Wang, C. Bil, T. Kistan, A. Gardi and S. Ramasamy, “A Roadmap for Aviation Research in Australia”, Green Aviation, Chapter 32, eds R. Blockley et al., John Wiley: Chichester, 2016. ISBN: 978-1-118-86635-1

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E. Batuwangala, T. Kistan, A. Gardi and R. Sabatini, “Certification Challenges for Next Generation Avionics and Air Traffic Management Systems.” IEEE AESS Systems Magazine (under review). November 2016.

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References • A. Mohamed, R. Clothier, S. Watkins, R. Sabatini and M. Abdulrahim, “Fixed-Wing MAV Attitude Stability in Atmospheric Turbulence PART 1: Suitability of Conventional Sensors.” Progress in Aerospace Sciences. Vol. 70, pp. 69-82. July 2014. DOI: 10.1016/j.paerosci.2014.06.001 •

R. Sabatini, C. Bartel, A. Kaharkar, T. Shaid, S. Ramasamy, “Navigation and Guidance System Architectures for Small Unmanned Aircraft Applications.” International Journal of Mechanical, Industrial Science and Engineering, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 733-752. April 2014.

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R. Sabatini, A. Gardi and M. A. Richardson, “LIDAR Obstacle Warning and Avoidance System for Unmanned Aircraft.” International Journal of Mechanical, Industrial Science and Engineering, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 62-73. International Science Index. April 2014. http://waset.org/publications/9997995

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R. Sabatini, T. Moore, C. Hill, “A Novel GNSS Integrity Augmentation System for Civil and Military Aircraft.” International Journal of Mechanical, Industrial Science and Engineering, Vol. 7, No. 12, pp. 1433-1449. December 2013. http://waset.org/publications/9996882

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R. Sabatini, M. A. Richardson, M. Cantiello, M. Toscano, P. Fiorini, “A Novel Approach to Night Vision Imaging Systems Development, Integration and Verification in Military Aircraft.” Aerospace Science and Technology, Vol. 31, Issue 1, pp. 10–23. December 2013. DOI: 10.1016/j.ast.2013.08.021

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R. Sabatini, L. Rodriguez, A. Kaharkar, C. Bartel, T. Shaid, D. Zammit-Mangion, “Low-Cost Navigation and Guidance Systems for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – Part 2: Attitude Determination and Control.” Annual of Navigation. Vol. 20, pp.97-126. November 2013. DOI: 10.2478/aon-2013-0008

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R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy, A. Gardi and L. Rodriguez Salazar, “Low-cost Sensors Data Fusion for Small Size Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Navigation and Guidance.” International Journal of Unmanned Systems Engineering, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 16-47. August 2013. DOI: 10.14323/ijuseng.2013.11

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M. Sangam, R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy and A. Gardi, “Advanced Flight Management System for an Unmanned Reusable Space Vehicle.” International Journal of Unmanned Systems Engineering, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 48-68. August 2013. DOI: 10.14323/ijuseng.2013.12

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R. Sabatini, A. Kaharkar, C. Bartel and T. Shaid, "Carrier-phase GNSS Attitude Determination and Control for Small UAV Applications.” Journal of Aeronautics and Aerospace Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 4. July 2013. DOI: 10.4172/2168-9792.1000115

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R. Sabatini, T. Moore, C. Hill, “A New Avionics Based GNSS Integrity Augmentation System: Part 2 – Integrity Flags.” Journal of Navigation, Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 511-522. June 2013. DOI: 10.1017/S0373463313000143

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A. Y. Javaid, W. Sun, V. K. Devabhaktuni, M. Alam, “Cyber Security Threat Analysis and Modeling of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System”, 2012 IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 2012.

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Contact for More Information

Professor Roberto Sabatini Head of Group, Intelligent & Cyber-Physical Transport Systems Program Leader, Aviation Systems and Human Factors Avionics & ATM Labs Leader, Sir L. Wackett Aerospace Research Centre School of Engineering – Aerospace Engineering and Aviation Discipline RMIT University, Bundoora East Campus, Bldg 251.03.24 PO Box 71 Bundoora VIC 3083, Australia Telephone: +61 3 992 58015; Mobile: +61 457 126 495 Email: [email protected] http://www1.rmit.edu.au/staff/roberto-sabatini

© RMIT University


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FIRST CYBER SECURITY WORKSHOP Panel B – Cyber Security Industry Collaboration Panel Moderator: Prof. Rob Sabatini Panelists: Prof. Sarah Pink, Dr. Mahdi Jalili, Dr. Stan Karanasios, Dr. Jenny Zhang, Dr. Paul Perry

 What are the main opportunities for Industry-University collaboration? • High-risk and medium/long term research

• Blue sky research vs. application specific  What industry sectors would benefit the most from collaborating with Academia? • ICT, Transport, Energy • Defence R&D and Military Forces • Police, Homeland Security and Border Protection  What potential industry partners can we identify today? • Local, regional and multinational corporations • Large companies vs. SMEs © RMIT University


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