Dealing with Wicked Problems in Networks ... - Oxford Journals

Dealing with Wicked Problems in Networks: Analyzing an Environmental Debate from a Network Perspective Ellen M. van Bueren Delft University of Technology

Erik-Hans Klijn Erasmus University of Rotterdam

Joop F. M. Koppenjan Delft University of Technology ABSTRACT Policy makers in today’s network society are increasingly confronted with complex and wicked policy problems that require collective action. This article analyzes such a collective action problem from a policy network perspective. By explaining impasses and breakthroughs in decision-making processes from a cognitive, a social, and an institutional point of view, the network perspective offers explanations for the presence and absence of collective action. INTRODUCTION: MANAGING WICKED PROBLEMS

Many of today’s policy problems are complex and contested, and they are called wicked for good reasons (Rittel and Webber 1973; Radford 1977; Mason and Mitroff 1981). They are persistent despite considerable efforts to solve them. This is especially true of highly technical problems in the fields of environment, health, and safety. Such problems have to be dealt with in a context of great uncertainty with regard to the nature and extent of the risks involved for individuals and society as a whole. It is commonly assumed that uncertainty springs from a lack of technical knowledge about the nature of the issues involved and their solutions. We often do not know enough about the causes and effects of problems. Causal relations are numerous, interrelated, and difficult to identify. For example, we assume that increased levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere cause environmental risks, but we do not know what concentrations of carbon dioxide are threatening, and we can only guess the consequences. This cognitive uncertainty, however, is only part of the story. Wicked policy problems are often found at the boundaries of natural and social systems (Dryzek 1997, 8). Uncertainties result not only from a lack of scientific knowledge but also from strategic and institutional factors. Strategic uncertainty exists because many actors are involved. Their strategies to address the problem are based on their perceptions of the problem and its solutions, which may differ from the views of others. The carbon dioxide debate illustrates the wide variety of actors and strategies involved in attempts to deal with this policy issue. Diverging and conflicting strategies are the result, and these may cause stagnation and deadlocks in policy debates—they may also lead to surprising and unexpected outcomes. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 193–212 © 2003 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc.

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Institutional uncertainty results from the fact that decisions are made in different places, in different policy arenas in which actors from various policy networks participate. In the case of the carbon dioxide debate, decisions are made in arenas ranging from the international to the regional or local level. The institutional setting in which complex problems are dealt with is thus highly fragmented. Often, decisions are only loosely coupled and sometimes not at all. In this article we argue that, due to the three types of uncertainty involved, decisions can only adequately be handled by enhancing and intensifying interactions between stakeholders. We base our approach to wicked policy problems on policy network theory. This network perspective to policy making has received substantial attention in the last ten to fifteen years (Rhodes 1997; O’Toole 1997; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997; Agranov and McGuire 2001). It provides a framework for analyzing the strategic and institutional complexity of problem solving and decision making. Wicked problems are dealt with in policy games: processes in which actors try to get a grip on the uncertainties that characterize these issues. In doing so, the actors involved are dependent upon each other. The resources necessary to tackle the problem are scattered across different parties. As long as there is no shared perception of the content of the problem, it is difficult to be sure about the strategies other parties will develop, and it will also be difficult to decide upon one’s own course of action. From this perspective, dealing with wicked problems is—to a large extent—a problem of interaction. On this point, the traditional approaches to wicked problems fall short. More research cannot solve differences in perceptions of the problem and its possible solutions, and it cannot prevent research and its results from being ambiguous and contested. Decisions based on limited and contested information will provoke strong reactions from stakeholders and will polarize decision making. The strategy of risk avoidance and learning by doing is often unacceptable in the face of the nature of the risks that urge governments to take more than small steps. We use a network framework to analyze the interaction processes in the Dutch zinc debate, a dispute between policy makers, water managers, architects, industrialists, and many researchers and consultants about the environmental impact of diffuse emissions from zinc and galvanized building products and the possible ways to address this problem (Klijn, van Bueren, and Koppenjan 2000). This debate has been going on for more than a decade. Participants in this debate consider it characteristic of the wicked policy debates that they increasingly encounter in their daily work. This type of debate is relatively new to them, and they were interested in what kinds of analysis and recommendations would result from a policy network approach. The zinc case gives an example of the analytical possibilities of the network perspective. But the case also provides us with insights into how wicked problems in networks and the difficulties that accompany them can be dealt with. In this article, we present our conceptual framework, introduce the policy networks and arenas involved in the zinc debate, and describe the course and outcomes of the policy debate with special emphasis on the impasses and breakthroughs that emerged during these processes. We present the explanations for these impasses and breakthroughs in relation to the influence on the strategic reactions of the key players of the cognitive, strategic, and institutional uncertainties present in the debate. Note that our analysis focuses on the nature and quality of the decisionmaking process that evolves around a wicked problem, not on whether the arguments about the content of the problems are right or wrong. Our conclusions are presented at the end of the article.

van Bueren, Klijn, and Koppenjan

Environmental Debate from a Network Perspective

THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS: UNCERTAINTIES IN NETWORKS Concepts of the Policy Network Approach: Games, Arenas, and Networks

Games, arenas, and networks are central concepts in the policy network approach. Policy games are a series of interactions between actors that focus on influencing problem formulations, solutions, and procedures regarding an approach to a specific policy issue (Allison 1971; Crozier and Friedberg 1980; Axelrod 1984; Scharpf 1997). Arenas are places where specific groups of actors interact on an issue and make choices on specific aspects of the issue (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972; Koppenjan 1993). Thus, an arena consists of a set of actors, the decision-making situation in which they can be found, and the organizational arrangements involved. Examples of arenas are the project groups or settings in which a specific policy or action is prepared. Policy games can occur within one arena, but more complicated policy debates take place in various arenas simultaneously. Furthermore, different games may be played simultaneously within one arena, and this may have consequences for the assessments made in that arena and for the couplings and de-couplings between policy games (Klijn, van Bueren, and Koppenjan 2000). A policy network is a collection of stable relations among mutually dependent actors (Rhodes 1997; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997). Networks develop during the course of time through frequent interactions in one or more arenas, and they are more encompassing and generally more durable than arenas. Networks, however, are not separate from arenas: arenas are activated parts of networks around a concrete issue or policy. Networks make interaction, cooperation, and learning between parties in policy games and arenas easier because they provide the institutional arrangements that support these activities (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). Not all policy games fit neatly into a network. The discussion about Amsterdam airport, for instance, cuts through policy networks in such areas as air transport, environment, safety, zoning, and planning. When a policy game concerning a concrete issue cuts through different policy networks, the members of different networks will meet in an arena. Lacking a common frame of reference, work methods and shared values will then inhibit a common approach. Distinguishing policy games, arenas, and networks enables us to capture the fragmented nature of policy games and the institutional aspects of the context in which these games unfold. The Dependent Variable: Process and Outcome of the Policy Game

The process that develops during a policy game can be analyzed by distinguishing a number of rounds, which can be characterized by impasses and breakthroughs (Radford 1977; Teisman 1992). In each round actors explore problems and solutions and look for opportunities to reach a joint decision. This, however, is far from simple: conflicts of interests and attempts to avoid the risks involved in collective action may result in impasses (Olsen 1965; Ostrom 1986), and these impasses can lead to the termination of the game. Then again, breakthroughs may occur, which give the game new impulses and result in a crucial decision. A crucial decision offers an answer to the problem that caused the impasse and, to a large extent, determines the conditions for the next round in the policy game. A round may be played in a specific arena, but it can also play out simultaneously in different arenas.

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The outcome of a policy game can consist of substantive decisions, changed strategies, and institutional effects. These outcomes are achieved during the process through a series of interactions and decisions in different rounds. Substantive outcomes can vary from nondecisions (Bachrach and Baratz 1970), one-sided and “blunt” decisions (adverse selection; Jensen and Meckling 1976), and compromises (Allison 1971) to innovative decisions on the basis of goal intertwinement and enrichment (Teisman 1992). An outcome can also be found at the strategic level: the nature of strategies used by actors may change. Furthermore, policy games can have an institutional impact: through trial and error, parties become acquainted with each other, learn to speak each other’s language, and build a common frame of reference (Termeer 1993). When this influences the rules of the network, we speak of network formation or network change (Klijn 2001). In our analysis, we are interested in the extent to which substantive, strategic, and institutional outcomes contribute to the reduction of uncertainty. If this is the case, we speak of cognitive, strategic, or institutional learning (cf. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Schön and Rein 1994), respectively. Explanations for Impasses and Breakthroughs in Policy Games

In the network perspective, the explanation of policy games regarding wicked problems is focused on the degree to which parties succeed in reducing uncertainty through interaction and cooperation and on what factors contribute to or detract from this. The network approach emphasizes the policy process and the interactions and strategies of actors and often pays less attention to the content of the process. In the zinc case, which is characterized by, among other things, conflicting perceptions about the nature of the problem, it is necessary to include the substantive dimension in the analysis of the policy process. This is done by mapping the cognitive perceptions of actors.1 We distinguish between four clusters of factors that can explain impasses and breakthroughs in policy processes: social, cognitive, institutional, and network management factors. Social causes of an impasse result from a lack of interaction between actors whose resources and cooperation are indispensable for tackling the problem or strategies are insufficiently coordinated. A breakthrough emerges when new linkages are made between parties or arenas or when actors change their strategies. Cognitive causes of an impasse are different perceptions about the nature, causes, and effects of problems, about solutions, and about the quality of available knowledge and research. Diverging perceptions and knowledge conflicts may result in “dialogues of the deaf ” (Termeer 1993; Van Eeten 1999) where parties talk at each other but do not listen to what is said. It is possible to cause a breakthrough by using new proposals, a redefinition of the problem, or new knowledge, providing that the new strategy results in a common frame of reference. Institutional factors often lie behind these social and cognitive causes. Institutional causes of an impasse include a lack of supportive and facilitating institutions that actors can share, such as durable relations, rules, shared convictions, norms and values, and a shared language. This situation occurs, for instance, when a new problem cuts through different policy networks. A breakthrough is established when proposals, strategies, management efforts, and arrangements compensate for the lack of supporting institutional arrangements. The last explanation for the occurrence of an impasse or breakthrough concerns the existence or absence of network management and its quality. In our conceptual framework, Due to space constraints we cannot include this mapping or the backing of our reconstruction of the networks, which is presented in the next section and was based on a survey of involved actors in the case. 1



Figure 1 The Analytical Framework

Institutional Variables: shared or not shared values, rules, language, institutions Explanatory Variables

Social Variables: • lack of interaction/clashing strategies • changes in participation and strategies

Cognitive Variables: • diverging/conflicting perceptions • new/redefining perceptions

Network management presence/absence and quality

Interaction Process: Policy rounds with impasses and breakthroughs (culminating in crucial decisions)

Content Dependent Variables

Crucial decision 3

Crucial decision 1

in round 1

round 4 round 3 round 2 Crucial decision 5 Crucial decision 2

i1 Time t1

Assessment criteria

Is there learning with respect to uncertainty? • Substantive: refining and redefining problems and solutions • Strategic: from go-alone to cooperative strategies • Institutional: forming and adapting shared values, rules and institutions

tn

Outcomes: content process institutions

Input next rounds

network management is an important strategy for preventing impasses and stimulating breakthroughs in the decision-making process resulting from social, cognitive, and institutional factors. Policy games are complex and unstructured because actors have different perceptions and interests and because smooth interaction and agreed upon outcomes do not come about by themselves. Network management—strategies focused on improvement of the cooperation of the actors—has to achieve collaboration. Network management includes the fulfillment of roles of facilitator, broker, and mediator and efforts to reach agreements between parties involved in the goals, structure, and rules of the policy game (see Friend, Power, and Yewlett 1974; Mandell 1990; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Klijn, Koppenjan, and Termeer 1995). The analytical framework is summarized in figure 1. The analytical framework given in figure 1 will now be applied to the zinc case. This case involves a debate that has dragged on since 1990 about diffuse zinc emissions in surface water and aquatic sediments. The Dutch zinc debate is an example of a policy game dominated by cognitive, strategic, and institutional uncertainty. Similar policy debates in the Netherlands have been evolving around the emissions of comparable substances (lead and copper) and around issues concerning health and safety. Although zinc is not (yet) considered to be a wicked issue in other countries, it turned into a wicked debate in the Netherlands from the moment that the actors from other arenas got involved and the zinc problem could no longer be addressed from one point of view.

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Many of the zinc emissions are attributed to the building sector, which uses zinc products and galvanized steel. Zinc is used frequently because it is easy to apply, it protects steel from corrosion, it is completely recyclable, and architects like its aesthetic quality. It can be used for gutters, rain pipes, roof sidings, roofing, and so on. Zinc is a natural and essential component in an environment, but too much of it can be harmful. As a result, the Dutch Parliament has, based on the scientific insights of the day, set objectives for maximum permitted levels of zinc in the environment. The policy game that emerged around these objectives—that is, the environmental risks of zinc and the emissions of zinc from galvanized building materials—is presented later in this article. We will first discuss the context of the zinc policy game: the policy context, arenas, and networks in which the game is being played. NETWORKS AND ARENAS IN THE ZINC DEBATE

Just as for many other wicked environmental problems, the zinc debate in the Netherlands is scattered over policy networks and arenas. We have reconstructed three policy networks and five policy arenas that have dominated the zinc debate. The reconstruction is based on qualitative data derived from interviews with key players, on document analysis, and on quantitative data derived from a questionnaire sent to key players. The networks, the participants, and the main issues in the policy debate in these five arenas follow. Three Networks in the Zinc Debate

Environmental policies in the Netherlands are formulated by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment (in Dutch: Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer) and are also effectuated by other ministries, provincial and local governments, and governmental authorities such as the water boards. The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment consists of various departments. In the zinc debate, the Environmental Department (in Dutch: het Directoraat-Generaal Milieubeheer) is a key player in the environment and product network, and the Housing Department (in Dutch: het Directoraat-Generaal Volkshuisvesting) is a key player in the housing network. A third network, the water network, is dominated by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management (in Dutch: Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, het DirectoraatGeneraal Rijkswaterstaat), in this article referred to as the Water Department. These three networks have their own agendas and consist of both public and private organizations, including public and private research institutes. The environmental network is focused on environmental quality, standards, and objectives, and on the necessary product and process innovations that must be made by the industry to achieve these goals. In the housing network, the Housing Department, housing organizations, and the building industry concentrate on housing and living. The water network primarily consists of (semi)public authorities and is focused on water management. Five Arenas in the Zinc Debate

We distinguish between five arenas in the zinc discussion. We will discuss each of these briefly; table 1 presents a summary of this information.

Objective-Setting Arena

Environmental Department, Water Department, RIVM and RIZA, zinc industry

1985 (zinc on list of prioritized substances)

Ecotoxicity of zinc: environmental risk, objective assessment method, values

National

Arena

Key players

Existing since

Issues

Level

Emission Arena

National

Volume of zinc emissions from building materials, solutions and alternatives to zinc building products

1985 (zinc on list of prioritized substances)

Environmental Department, Water Department, RIZA, zinc industry, research bureaus

Table 1 Overview of the Arenas in the Zinc Discussion

Diffuse Sources Arena

European Arena

National and subnational

Research methods to determine environmental risk, solutions and alternatives to zinc building products

1993 (publication of SEV guidelines for sustainable building)

National and subnational

Steering and instruments for emission reduction, solutions and alternatives to zinc building products

1973 (establishment of committee to coordinate the implementation of water policies)

European Union

Ecotoxicity of zinc: environmental risk, objective assessment methods, values

Mid-1990s (first overview of zinc problem by RIVM)

Housing Department, Water Department, Environmental Department, Sustainable Building RIZA and RIVM, RIVM, European zinc Agency, Committee for Environmental Department, industry, relevant member Experiments in Public water boards, provincial state ministries, relevant Housing (SEV), branch and municipal governments, member states’ research organizations building corporate sector, Ministry institutes industry, research of Economic Affairs bureaus, zinc industry

Sustainable Building Arena

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The Objective-Setting Arena

Water quality objectives, including the objective for zinc, represent desirable norms for water quality. They are prepared by the public research institutes of the Environmental Department and the Water Department, RIVM (the environmental research institute), and RIZA (the water research institute) and decreed by the national government. The water boards are ultimately responsible for achieving the zinc objectives. A reduction of zinc emissions gained political priority in 1985 when the national research institutes’ (RIVM and RIZA) measurements showed that zinc levels in the inland surface waters and aquatic sediments significantly exceeded the objectives. The debate in the objective-setting arena is dominated by scientific disputes about zinc. Questions have been raised about whether zinc poses a risk to the environment and about the assessment methods used to determine zinc objectives. The zinc industry points to the facts that zinc is an essential element in the environment and there is a natural variation in the zinc concentrations present in the environment. The Emission Arena

Central to the debate in the emission arena is the volume of zinc emitted by zinc and galvanized building products. That zinc is a natural element in the environment and that there are many other diffuse sources of zinc emissions, for example in agriculture and transport, are arguments for the zinc industry to question the emission volumes ascribed to building products. The issues in this arena are to determine how much zinc is emitted by building products, the relative contribution of these emissions to the total amount of zinc in the environment, and the actions required to reduce such emissions, such as product innovations and prohibitions. The Sustainable Building Arena

In the sustainable building arena, players are especially concerned with developing checklists in which products are ranked according to their environmental effects. These checklists serve as recommendations to parties involved in building projects, such as local governments, project developers, architects, and contractors. The most important issue in this arena is to determine the potential for environmental damage of products. The life cycle analysis (LCA) method is commonly used for this purpose. This method determines the relative environmental damage of products during their entire life cycles. The outcomes, however, are highly influenced by the assumptions used in the calculations. The Diffuse Sources Arena

In the diffuse sources arena, national, provincial, and local governments and water boards exchange information and viewpoints on issues of water management, such as the water quality objective for zinc and the ways to achieve this objective. This exchange takes place on various central and decentralized platforms where actors are especially concerned with steering issues: How can they achieve the lowest possible emission of zinc? What instruments should be used? What is the target group? Regional and local water authorities set their own priorities, and in some regions the reduction of the use of zinc building materials is one of their top priorities. The European Arena

Zinc emitted by diffuse sources is a policy issue that is barely addressed in other countries. When countries such as Australia pay attention to zinc, their attention is directed primarily



toward negative environmental effects caused by the production of zinc. The persistent exceeding of the zinc objectives in the Netherlands, however, in combination with the attention given to sustainable building and water quality in that nation contributed to the decision to establish the reduction of diffuse zinc emissions as a political priority. The Dutch Environmental Department put zinc on the agenda of the European Union and was assigned to draft a risk assessment report (RAR) containing an analysis of the risks of zinc concentrations. An RAR is a first step toward a European directive that can be duplicated by other member states. The zinc risk assessment was performed by RIVM in the same way they had made the risk assessment for the Dutch situation. Not surprisingly, the questions raised in the European arena are similar to the ones in the objective-setting arena: they are about the ecotoxicity of zinc and the methods used to assess this. This overview of networks and arenas reveals two striking things. The first is an absence of politicians and environment interest groups. Explanations for this are found in the complexity of the zinc debate and the scientific nature of many of the issues it raises. Although the zinc issue gives rise to intense conflicts between parties involved, politicians and environmental interest groups prefer to dedicate their time to issues that are easier to communicate. Second, the zinc industry is present in all arenas. As a result of the checklists for sustainable building, the zinc industry was confronted with lower sales and decided to take action. It then quickly became clear that there was no central place from which to operate, and the zinc industry was forced to enter the various arenas in which its interests were at stake. • In the objective-setting arena, the zinc industry presented alternative methods for deriving policy objectives from scientific norms. • In the emission arena, the zinc industry conducted research into corrosion rates of zinc. • In the sustainable building arena, the zinc industry initially participated through court cases, but when this failed it sought entry into overarching organizations for the building industry and thus gained access to certain forums, providing information to municipalities and water boards. • The zinc industry is only indirectly represented in the diffuse sources arena through interest organizations in industry and by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. • In the European arena, the Dutch zinc industry has been involved from the start, and it has activated zinc industries in other member states. Figure 2 provides an overview of the networks, arenas, and participants in the zinc debate. Zinc has become a prominent subject of debate within a few years. From a relatively simple problem that was being dealt with from a one-dimensional point of view, the issue has evolved into a debate that takes place in multiple arenas and in which many actors from different networks participate. The discussion in these arenas involves the definition of the problem, the validity of methods and data, and the legitimacy of the actors’ strategies and competencies. The issue that appears to be concrete and bounded at first glance turns out to be complex in terms of interactions and strategies, knowledge, and institutional setting.

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Figure 2 An Overview of the Prominent Networks, Arenas, and Actors in the Zinc Debate

Housing Network (Housing Department, Sustainable Building Agency, the Committee for Experiments in Public Housing (SEV), provinces, municipalities, builders, architects, etc.)

Sustainable Building arena

Diffuse sources arena

Water Network (Water Department, research institute RIZA, water boards, provinces, municipalities, etc.)

International arena

Emmission arena

Environment and Product Network (Environmental Department, research institute RIVM, zinc industry, etc.)

Objective setting arena

THE ZINC DEBATE: TEN YEARS OF POLICY BATTLE

The foundation of the zinc debate was laid in 1985 when zinc received political priority at the national government level. In the early 1990s, the zinc industry was suddenly confronted with the consequences of this policy change. Its turnover dropped drastically, and it was forced to undertake action to combat policies aimed at abolishing the use of zinc in building products. This was the start of a long-standing game between actors of the three networks, played in the five policy arenas. In each of these arenas decisions have been made that are important to zinc emission policy processes. The most important events and interactions during the policy process from 1990 to 2000 are described in the following sections. Interactions: A Drawn-Out Process

In the mid-1980s, diffuse zinc emissions became a problem in the Netherlands. Zinc was put on the list of prioritized substances that required special attention because the water quality objectives for zinc and other substances had been considerably exceeded. For each of the



prioritized substances, it was necessary to develop a basic document, a report about the extent of the problem, its causes, and possible solutions. The Basic Document on Zinc was developed by RIVM and published in 1992. The report contained little that was new, and the zinc industry did not initially see a problem. During the same time, another initiative developed: sustainable building. The building sector was designated as a target group in the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan for policy on sustainable building. This provided provinces, and municipalities in particular, with the opportunity to solidify environmental objectives. National government supported these initiatives with economic and communicative instruments. The water network also favored such initiatives. The water boards are ultimately responsible for compliance with the zinc objectives. The water boards also had to deal with extra costs for purification. However, the regional and local governments and the water boards lacked the legal instruments needed to address the causes of diffuse emissions. The Guide for Sustainable Building, published in 1993 by the Dutch Committee for Experiments in Public Housing (in Dutch, Stichting voor Experimenten Volkshuisvesting; SEV), advised against the use of zinc as a building material, and this became a useful instrument for decentralized government authorities in their sustainable building policies. Despite the fact that authorities could only use this checklist on a voluntary basis, the zinc industry was confronted with decreasing demand. A protest by the Dutch zinc industry to the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment, of which the Environmental Department and the Housing Department were subdivisions, led nowhere because the ministry attributed this policy area to provinces and municipalities. Instead, this ministry and the minister of the Water Department indicated that the prevention of emissions was an important cornerstone to water quality policy and thus had consequences for production processes and material choice. In a court case initiated by the zinc industry against the SEV, the judge ruled for the latter, primarily because the reports submitted by the zinc industry on the environmental impact of its products were judged to be not objective. The Dutch zinc industry then changed its strategy and began discussions with the Environmental Department on the issue over which the department did have authority: objective setting. In 1995, the zinc industry published an Addendum to the Basic Document on Zinc in which it contested the methods used for establishing the objectives. Current methods failed to consider the zinc concentrations that were natural to an environment, which vary from area to area, and did not consider the possibility of species being able to adapt to changing zinc concentrations. In their Addendum, the zinc industry proposed a different method for establishing zinc objectives that considered both of these aspects. In response, the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment requested advice from the National Health Council in December 1995. The compiling of the advice from the health council took some time. In the meantime, new reports appeared on the nature, size, and seriousness of the zinc problem: its ecotoxicity, background concentrations, methods, measures, size of diffuse emissions, the building industry’s share in these emissions, LCA scores of zinc and alternative products, and so on. The reports were produced by the zinc industry, which by now had organized itself into the Association for Zinc and the Environment (in Dutch: de Vereniging voor Zink en Milieu), the research institutes of RIVM and RIZA, and other well-respected private research firms. In these reports, the parties repeated their own viewpoints and offered little new information. Nevertheless, assessments of the size of diffuse zinc emissions were corrected downward: they were lower than assumed in the Basic Document. The atmosphere

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was tense and characterized by mutual distrust. At the local level, developments continued: zinc was considered taboo in many municipalities, but other municipalities did not take much action as long as the confusion endured. The sequel to the SEV, the National Package for Sustainable Building, again advised against the use of zinc. In early 1998, the long awaited advice of the health council was published. It reached a Solomonic judgment: although no correct method existed to determine environmental quality objectives, the health council suggested that the government establish precautionary measures and develop policies to reduce emissions. Parliament agreed to take measures to reduce diffuse emissions. In consultation with the Association of Sustainable Building Metal, the successor to the Association of Zinc and the Environment, a two-pronged track was designed: an objective-setting track and a product innovation track. Little progress was made in the objective-setting track. The zinc industry believed that its opportunities for influencing the objective-setting debate were insufficient and that influence was only possible after the fact and in the margins. Added to this was the fact that an objective-setting track was initiated at the European level with the development of an RAR. The Netherlands chaired this effort, and the Environmental Department delegated the task to its research institute, RIVM. The objective-setting discussion was repeated, but this time at the European level. Some progress was made with respect to estimating emissions. An attempt to formulate research with the support of all key players failed because they could not agree on the starting points and constraints. Another attempt, by RIZA and the industry, was more successful. Together, they had researched the size of diffuse zinc emissions. These findings were published in late 1999, and the estimates were substantially lower than originally assumed in the Basic Document of 1992: 105 tons per annum instead of 4,125 tons per annum. The zinc industry wanted a covenant in the context of the product innovation track, but the Environmental Department felt that there were too few hard commitments to justify the efforts toward a covenant. The Ministry of Economic Affairs also became involved but could not bring parties much closer on this point. Instead, the Environmental Department proposed an exchange of letters of intent. The zinc industry hoped that in response to this agreement, the Environmental Department would ask regional and local governments to discontinue their policy of discouraging the use of zinc, a policy that had met with success. This correspondence about product innovations started in 1999 with a letter from the zinc industry, and, although it took the Environmental Department more than six months to answer it, by the end of the year 2000 both parties were optimistic about the prospects of this correspondence. Despite this, the success of the product innovation track remains uncertain and depends on developments in the other arenas as well. Table 2 summarizes the perceptions of the main stakeholders in the zinc debate. Outcomes: An Evaluation

Ten years of discussion on the zinc issue has seen a process with slow progress, numerous impasses, and some hesitant breakthroughs. Real winners are missing. The departments, research institutes, and industry are still working on their objective-setting method. The advice of the health council to develop a new method has begun—somewhat late. Some sustainable building checklists still advise against the use of zinc, and the water quality objectives continue to be exceeded. Table 3 summarizes the most important outcomes of ten years of debate and interaction in the five arenas.



Table 2 Perceptions of Key Stakeholders in the Zinc Debate

Participant in the Zinc Debate

Perceptions of the Issue

Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment (including the Housing Department, the Environmental Department, and the Sustainable Building Agency)

Prevention of diffuse zinc emissions is an important cornerstone of water quality policy and thus has consequences for production processes and material choice. Policies of decentral governments to discourage the use of zinc do not fall under the jurisdiction of the ministry

Water Department of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management

The prevention of diffuse zinc emissions is based on the precautionary principle and should get high priority in the formulation and implementation of environmental policies

Water boards

Zinc levels do not come near the water quality objectives for zinc and some of the water boards advise local governments and actors in the housing sector against the use of zinc

RIVM

Too much zinc in water and aquatic sediments is an environmental risk. The objective-setting method of the RIVM derives objectives from scientific data that show what levels of zinc consitute acceptable risks

RIZA

Out of precaution, zinc emissions should be reduced as much as possible. Zinc and galvanized building products are important diffuse sources of zinc emissions, and their use should be banned

SEV/branch organizations building industry and urban planning sector

LCA is the method to determine the environmental impacts of products. LCA-based checklists for sustainable building advised against the use of zinc, but in 1998 LCA could no longer support this. In 1999 the branch organizations for urban planning produced their own checklist, which advised against the use of zinc

The Dutch zinc industry (and, since the late 1990s, the European zinc industry)

Zinc is an essential element in our natural environment. The methods on which the zinc objectives and LCAs are based fail to recognize this. Zinc and galvanized building products are a modest source of diffuse zinc emissions

Provincial and municipal governments (other noncentral governments are confused by the contradictory reports and wait for the outcome of the debate)

Sustainable building is a top priority, and zinc should not be used in building projects

Ministry of Economic Affairs

The interests of both the zinc industry and the industry that produces alternatives to zinc building products should be protected, and this limits the efforts to mediate between the Environmental Department and the zinc industry

The Dutch National Health Council

As long as there is no correct method to determine environmental quality objectives, it is legitimate for the government to establish precautionary measures and develop policies to reduce diffuse zinc emissions

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Table 3 The Outcomes of Ten Years of the Zinc Debate

Arena

Issue

Outcomes

Objective-setting arena

Ecotoxicity of zinc

The health council argues that methods to assess the environmental risks of zinc are insufficient; methodological innovations are starting slowly

Emission arena

Volume of zinc emissions from building materials

A breakthrough in the different estimates by research institutes is made in 1999, when a research authorized by RIZA and the zinc industry shows an estimate of 105 tons, whereas the original estimate was 4,125 tons; some convergence in opinions emerges as a consequence of common starting points of research

Sustainable building arena

LCAs to determine environmental impact of building products

LCA is still very sensitive to assumptions. The building sector, including the zinc industry, works on a more reliable and more transparent method; meanwhile, decentralized governments continue to discourage the use of zinc as a building material

Diffuse sources arena

Steering and instruments to reduce emissions

Legal instruments to reduce the zinc emissions from diffuse sources are still lacking, and authorities continue to discourage the use of zinc with voluntary and communicative instruments

European arena setting

Ecotoxicity of zinc

Repetition of the zinc debate in the objective-arena, this time in a European context

Arenas for emissions, sustainable building, and diffuse sources

Solutions and alternatives to zinc building products

The demand for zinc building products in the Netherlands is still declining as a consequence of its negative image; pressure from local authorities not to use zinc continues; the proposals of the zinc industry for product innovation encourage more interaction between players in this arena



Table 4 Main Causes of Impasses and Their Consequences (1994 to 1998)

Causes

Main Factors

Consequences

Social

Strategies of main actors (departments and zinc industry) were aimed at the vital interests of other actors

Strong conflicts because interests of actors are being threatened— distrust on both sides (i.e., industry and public actors)

Cognitive

Asymmetrical argumentation structure (i.e., scientific rationality versus political-administrative rationality)

Dialogue of the deaf

Institutional

Few connections between various networks, domain demarcations, and separation of policy formation and research

Very little interaction and learning between various policy arenas, promoting conflict and cognitive fixation

Network management

Decision making not very transparent—absence of active network management

Possibilities for innovations are being missed

THE ZINC GAME EXPLAINED

In this section we try to provide an explanation for the impasses and breakthroughs in the interactions of the policy game. We use the factors that have been elaborated in the analytical framework (figure 1): social, cognitive, and institutional causes and network management. Explanations for Impasses in the Zinc Debate

In the period from 1994 to 1998, the interaction process between the main actors stagnated. Table 4 summarizes the main causes of this stagnation. To determine social cause, one can point to the actors’ choice of strategies to protect their own positions, which harmed the vital interests of other parties, causing conflicts and distrust between actors. The developments on setting objectives for zinc, in combination with the activities of decentralized governments, threatened the market share of the zinc industry. The frontal attack of the zinc industry on the objective-setting method of the RIVM threatened the latter. As a result, all parties got the impression that the opposing side operated from cynical self-interest and provided only information that strengthened its own position. Research by the zinc industry was considered partisan and unscientific. The RIVM’s defense of the objective-setting method was regarded by the industry to be a result of science politics by a monopolistic research institute. Research became a weapon in the battle between parties. Parties initiated research and engaged renowned research institutes in an attempt to convince the others of their vision. A report war ensued: research results evoked new research projects aimed at proving the earlier results wrong. The reports piled up, resulting in a growing distrust on both sides, minimized interaction, and increased cognitive uncertainty. From a cognitive perspective, we can observe that the choice of the zinc industry to fight the objective-setting method led to an asymmetrical argumentation structure. To the Water Department and its research institute, RIZA, the water quality objectives for zinc were only steps in the direction of the final objective: the lowest possible emissions to achieve

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clean water. The Environmental Department also supported emission reduction. The suggestion that the method for determining the environmental quality objectives developed by the research of RIVM could not pass a scientific test was not the core issue for the Environmental Department. The department was, after all, convinced that the crucial issue was that the emissions were too high. This asymmetry in arguments explains the stagnation between parties from a cognitive point of view: the parties talked at each other and did not listen. The report of the health council shows that the zinc industry would never achieve its goals through its substantive strategy. The government’s pursuit of emission reductions was considered legitimate, even when the scientific method for objective setting was not foolproof. Even when criticism of the objective-setting method was acknowledged, it did not bring the zinc industry any closer to its goal of preventing the limitation on the use of zinc. Looking at institutional causes, one can observe that the interactions of the policy game on zinc emissions occurred in different arenas and in different networks. Interactions between representatives of different networks develop with great difficulty. Although actors meet face to face, they lack a common understanding. What is more, there are mechanisms that reduce or discourage interaction (see Klijn, van Bueren, and Koppenjan 2000). The rules within networks increased the distance between the networks and strengthened their cohesion, making interaction between actors from different networks even more difficult. Traditionally, water management is a separate policy area under the purview of the water boards and the Water Department. For a long time, these entities have fulfilled this task almost autonomously, with or without local government involvement. Despite gradual changes in this structure, the interactions between actors were still highly influenced by rules developed in the past. Some of the striking characteristics of these are • domain demarcations inhibiting interaction and linkages. Actors from other networks have difficulty accessing the water network. It would be unusual, for instance, for departments to approach lower levels in the water network, such as water boards, without prior consultation with the central level, that is, the Water Department. These divisions between networks also continue down to the lower levels. Thus developers of real estate had no contact with the water boards. • responsibilities for policy initiatives with respect to water quality mainly resting with public actors. The self-evidence of these responsibilities and the dominance of public actors were barriers for more-intensive interaction between public and private actors. • separation of policy and implementation from research. Generally, the research institutes enjoy a high degree of autonomy and hold, more or less, a monopolistic position. This contributes to the separation of research and policy. Policy makers regard research data as authoritative, much to the consternation of representatives from the zinc industry. • information rules and hierarchy. Within the water network, specific rules exist for the nature of information and for what is regarded as authoritative information. Information in general has a rather technical, statistical, and objective nature. Furthermore, lower parts of the network, that is, water boards, municipalities, and provinces, trust the information from the ministries. Information from the zinc industry is regarded as partisan.



Network management was not very prominent in the zinc debate. None of responsible governmental agencies tried to further the interaction between parties involved using network management strategies. All of the actors strongly focused on the content of their strategies and on their own beliefs and interests in these strategies. Most of the interactions were guided using the formal procedure for setting objectives and individual actions of one of the actors in this kind of policy process. National government failed to recognize the need to link local and regional arenas to the national discussion. The zinc industry received a late invitation to the objective-setting debate and was thus left with little room for a substantive contribution. The European trajectory received little direction from the Environmental Department, and the preparation of the risk analysis was delegated to RIVM. All in all, national government and other parties made little attempt to direct the interaction between parties, some positive exceptions notwithstanding. This is perhaps one of the most striking questions to emerge from these findings: why did public organizations pay so little attention to the management of a process in a situation that so obviously was characterized by stagnations, strong conflicts, and very little progress, in terms of both content and effects generated? The explanation must be found in the complexity of the process that made it hard to manage and in the institutional factors. The separation between the networks made it very difficult for public actors to pick up the role of network manager. Therefore, if actors did assume that role, they played it only for a very small part of the process, when it fell into their perceived domains. During the process, these institutional factors were then strengthened by the conflicting strategies and the resulting distrust between actors. So in this sense, institutional context and process interacted with each other to create an unfavorable situation. Nevertheless, some improvement occurred at the end of the process, as we will discuss in the following section. Explanations for Breakthroughs in the Zinc Debate

Despite the somber tone of the previous section, some preliminary breakthroughs emerged on themes such as emissions research, product innovations, and objective setting. The main factors for breakthroughs can be found in table 4. The social causes of these preliminary breakthroughs were triggered by the statement of the health council. It made actors more aware of their interdependencies. Neither the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment nor the zinc industry achieved its goals in the objective-setting arena, and the parties were thus bound to one another. A warming of relations occurred, especially between the zinc industry and the water research institute, RIZA. The zinc industry, stimulated by the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, decided to change its strategy and no longer limited itself to fighting the substance of national policy. It carefully began to seek a way to approach the national government by opening up product innovations to debate. Although not all public parties warmed to the more constructive attitude of the industry, an opening did develop. Contacts with RIZA resulted in joint research that provided a substantive breakthrough in the discussion on corrosion rates and the size of emissions. The willingness on the part of the zinc industry to discuss product innovations provides an important cognitive explanation for the creation of a breakthrough in the relationship between the government and the zinc industry toward the end of the 1990s. This enabled a new formulation of the substantive agenda. With a promise to invest in product

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Table 4 Factors That Explain Breakthroughs

Causes

Main Factors

Consequences

Social

Growing awareness of interdependency

Growing interaction between (some) public and private actors

Cognitive

New agenda (focus on product innovation)

Space for solution enlarged

Institutional

Only minor changes

Minor

Process management

Small but explicit attempts to increase interaction and create joint research activities

Minimal progress in interactions and better relations between some of the actors

innovations, the Dutch zinc industry created barter value for consulting with other parties in the environmental and product arena and in the objective-setting arena. Whereas institutional factors provide a powerful explanation for stagnation, it is evident that the explanation for breakthroughs, not counting exceptional circumstance of external pressure, must be found at the levels of strategies and network management. However, during interactions, certain (informal) rules can lose their strength. This happened in the zinc case to some extent with the rules that prevented access to the scientific segment of the arena for outsiders. Another important development was that the zinc companies developed their relationships during the process and thus organized themselves more effectively. During the process, initiatives were undertaken to get parties to work in accord, although these initiatives were small in scope. An example of these network management strategies is the request for advice from the health council. The council’s report acted as a mediating function, placing the initiative back with the conflicting parties. In response to this situation, outsiders, such as the Confederation of Netherlands Industry (peak organization of Employers in the Netherlands), also attempted to bring the parties back into accord. The Ministry of Economic Affairs also tried to mediate. The ministry asked for some understanding of the zinc industry’s position on the part of other departments, and it guided the zinc industry toward the track of innovation. The efforts of the health council and the Ministry of Economic Affairs to mediate were inspired by the perceived seriousness of the impasse in 1998 but were temporary actions rather than permanent assumptions of network management roles. In addition to the above-mentioned attempts, there were also efforts to initiate joint research. Joint contractor roles, such as those taken by RIZA and the zinc industry in the study of corrosion rates, appeared to be more successful than participation in supervisory committees. Both parties in this case accepted conclusions that deviated from earlier conclusions because they had worked together to formulate the assignment and starting points for research. This success resulted in a reduction of cognitive uncertainty in at least one area, a first indication of consensus formation and the development of mutual trust. In general, although the attempted network management strategies did contribute to the hesitant breakthrough in the game, this aspect still needs more attention. To date, the breakthroughs in the zinc debate are limited, and we must wait and see whether their effects are sufficient to realize continued interaction and cooperation. Many of the factors that caused impasses are still present. In other arenas, conflicting strategies are still dominant. However, there are further indications for improved relationships. For instance, at



first it seemed that the substantive stalemate in the national discussion between RIVM and the zinc industry would be reproduced in the European arena. Recently it seems that the interactions in this arena have developed in a more communicative and cooperative way. CONCLUSIONS

Using a network perspective to analyze the wicked environmental problem, as we have done in this article, not only provides knowledge about the nature of the character of wicked problems but also shows very visibly that interdependent actors have a collective action problem. Actors are dependent in the sense that their actions influence other actors’ interests, and solving the problem usually requires the joint action of various actors. But these interdependencies are often very complex and not easily visible, as the case analysis shows. Even if the actors do acknowledge their interdependency, they find it difficult to engage in joint action. Institutional barriers, cognitive differences, and the dynamics of the interactions themselves can block joint action and the undertaking of necessary network management strategies. In this sense, using a network perspective not only highlights the characteristics of the decision situation in which actors perform but also makes the blockage and problems of joint action visible for them. It shows that doing more research will not solve the perception differences about the starting points and value of that research. In addition, it shows that in most cases, unilateral action will not result in satisfactory outcomes. The case demonstrates that breakthroughs in the joint action problem are possible but require much effort and a clear understanding of actor positions and institutional constraints. REFERENCES Agranov, Robert, and Michael McGuire. 2001. Big questions in public network management research. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 11, no. 3:295–326. Allison, Graham T. 1971. The essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Boston: Little Brown. Axelrod, Robert M. 1984.The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1970. Power and poverty, theory and practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen. 1972. A garbage can model of organizational choice. Administrative Science Quarterly 17:1–25. Crozier, Michel, and Erhard Friedberg. 1980. Actors and systems: The politics of collective action. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dryzek, John S. 1997. The politics of the earth: Environmental discourses. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Friend, John K., John M. Power, and Chris J. L. Yewlett. 1974. Public planning: The inter-corporate dimension. London: Travistock Publications. Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. The theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 1976:305–60. Reprinted in Firms, organizations and contracts: A reader in industrial organization, edited by Peter J. Buckley and Jonathan Michie, 103–67. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kickert, Walter J. M., Erik-Hans Klijn, and Joop F. M. Koppenjan, eds. 1997. Managing complex policy networks. London: Sage. Klijn, Erik-Hans. 2001. Rules as institutional context for decision making in networks: The approach to postwar housing districts in two cities. Administration and Society 33, no. 2:133–64. Klijn, Erik-Hans, and Joop F. M. Koppenjan. Public management and policy networks: Foundations of a network approach to governance. Public Management 2, no. 2:135–58.

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