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This essay examines Peru's regional and local governance con- flicts on the ... matic political and economic liberalization at the turn of the twenty-first century.
Democratization Through Contention? Regional and Local Governance Conflict in Peru Gary Bland Luis A. Chirinos ABSTRACT Social conflict in Peru has increased dramatically since 2004. The economic origins of these disputes, which result mostly from the growth of mining operations, have received considerable scholarly attention. The emergence of collective action directed at the performance of regional and local government, however, has received little notice. This essay examines Peru’s regional and local governance conflicts on the basis of hundreds of reported cases. It investigates the nature of these episodes and the strategies adopted by community organizations to get their complaints addressed. It finds that the political opportunity of the posttransition period, dissatisfaction with government performance, and new participatory rights have helped to give rise to such collective action. Community protagonists choose between institutional and noninstitutional strategies but often combine them to help ensure success. Maintaining legitimacy proves essential to both sides. This article argues that these events represent both constraints and favorable developments for subnational democracy in Peru.

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t times a model of peaceful dispute resolution, on other occasions an eruption of violence, conflict in regional and local governance has been a regular occurrence in Peru since the democratic transition of 2001. In March 2005, for example, in the small, rural district of Conayca, located in the Andean province of Huancavelica, a municipal councilor and local oversight committee sought unsuccessfully to remove the mayor from office. The mayor was accused of a series of administrative irregularities, including a lack of transparency. Months later, after attempts at dialogue failed and the mayor allegedly refused to give an official account of his administration, the opposition took over and shut down the municipality for five months. Peru’s Ombudsman (the Defensoría del Pueblo), which prepares monthly reports on social conflict, implored the community to reject the use of force and respect existing procedures for citizen participation. The municipality later reopened, and peace apparently held through the next election (Peru Ombudsman 2005–6). In November 2008, the Front for the Defense of the People of Carmen Alto, a district municipality in Peru’s Ayacucho Department, demanded improved transGary Bland is a fellow in democratic governance at RTI International. [email protected]. Luis A. Chirinos is a professor in the School of Government at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru. [email protected] © 2014 University of Miami DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-2456.2014.00223.x

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portation and a reduction in fares, which had recently risen by 40 percent. Following negotiations among the service companies, municipal officials, and the Front, fares were lowered. A year later, the mayor reported that while fare levels were no longer an issue, the problem of poor service remained to be addressed (Peru Ombudsman 2008–10). At the regional level, in November 2011, eight hundred farmers, led by the Front of Agrarian Organizations of Santa Province, blocked the Pan American Highway for several hours in a protest against the regional government of Ancash. The various social organizations involved objected to an Ancash government– financed study that, they believed, underestimated the risk of a new irrigation project to their water supply and agricultural development. The protesters then appealed to the national government (Peru Ombudsman 2011). Providing further indication of political tension, in September 2012 Peru held another round of revocatorias, or recall elections—the formal process by which voters can remove their regional and local elected officials before the end of their terms—in 270 municipalities. Regional and local politics in Peru clearly can be contentious. In each of these cases, subnational government is not simply involved in some respect; it is also the explicit target of collective political action, including the formal attempt to remove the authorities through a recall (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 5).1 Community or nongovernmental organizations are taking action in response to any number of complaints— reputed corruption, mismanagement, or a lack of participation—against regional and local authorities. We call these disputes “regional and local governance conflicts” (RLGCs).2 Usually the disputes remain local or regional affairs, and there is no inherent reason to believe that they present a problem for Peruvian democracy. Conflict is a normal, healthy aspect of social relationships, as Dahl reminds us, “often a part of a larger process in which the actors in conflict all end up better off.” The “search for mutually beneficial solutions”—or compromise, to the extent that it occurs—“is essentially a good thing” (Dahl 1971, 155). The conflicts are nonetheless in many ways a reflection of the state of regional and local governance in Peru following dramatic political and economic liberalization at the turn of the twenty-first century.

RISING REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE CONFLICT IN A DEMOCRATIZING PERU Examining social conflict of any type—meaning RLGCs as well as several other reported varieties—in the post-Fujimori period hardly means that conflict did not exist previously. Since the start of the Toledo government, however, Peruvians have increasingly resorted to collective action to address their rising complaints against mining companies, private sector development programs, ministries, and elected officials, among many others; politics under the newly democratic system has become much more contentious. Acting largely through community organizations, citizens have complained, protested, and demanded that the targets of their complaints change their behavior, or in the case of governmental authorities, change their policies or the way they govern or even depart from office.

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Figure 1. Level of Conflict in Peru, Annual Totals by Type, 2004–2011

Source: Peru Ombudsman, 2004–11

This study is based on the 93 monthly reports on social conflict produced by the Peruvian Ombudsman between 2004 and 2011. The total number of social conflicts detailed in the reports, considering all types of disputes, has increased dramatically since early 2004, which serves as our baseline because it was the year the Ombudsman began its reporting. In early 2004, the total number of conflicts reported was 63, all of which were local governance conflicts (LGC); regional governance conflicts (RGC) were not yet included. By the end of that year, a total of 92 conflicts had been identified (see figure 1). By 2010, following a steep annual increase, the cumulative, end-of-year total peaked at 350 cases. At the end of 2011, the total remained high, at 311. The conflicts are varied; they extend well beyond a single episode; and they frequently go unresolved for months or years. The spike in their number is largely a result of the public reaction to the activities of mining companies and other extractive industries in environmentally sensitive areas. In fact, in 2011, these “socioenvironmental” disputes represented well over half of all conflicts, and they continue to roil national politics. RLGC is the second-largest source of social conflict in Peru. Figure 1 demonstrates that the level of LGC has been fairly steady across the nine-year span, though it was higher in 2004–5 and in 2009. First elected in 2002, regional governments have faced about 12 cases per year since such cases were first recorded in 2008. Though not included in figure 1, the typically contentious process of recalling elected officials at the regional and municipal levels is part of our analysis of RLGC. Under the 1994 law on citizen participation and oversight, elected officials can be subject to recall in the second and third years of their four-year terms if 25 percent

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of the electorate petitions for recall. Since 1997, when the first recalls were held, the number of jurisdictions involved in the process has jumped from 61 to as many as 317 in 2009; there were 270 in 2012 (JNE 2009; Noticias Elecciones Perú 2012). Scholars of Latin America investigating the effects of economic liberalization on subnational contention provide valuable insight into collective political activity at the intermediate and local levels.3 These studies typically seek to explain the changed nature of social protest as Latin America has democratized and decentralized over the past three decades (Kohl 2002; Murillo and Ronconi 2004; Roberts and Portes 2006; Garay 2007; and Arce 2008). As Arce points out, this scholarship is optimistic about collective political action despite the pressures of neoliberal reform (2008, 38–39). The political opening, and particularly the geographic segmentation of collective action that has followed decentralization, has helped to create new opportunities to push for change. Contestation has emerged at all levels of government to oppose the pressures—increased poverty, unemployment, and inequality—created by free market economics. The growth of the mining sector in particular has generated conflict, including RLGC in mining areas, as a consequence of revenue abundance (Arellano-Yanguas 2011; Echave et al. 2009, 185). In this body of work, then, contentious subnational politics are addressed in the context of national policy reform. Regional and local governance, which is our interest in this article, is not the focus. Another growing body of scholarly work examines the trajectories of subnational governments in newly democratic countries undergoing decentralization. These studies demonstrate that the democratization of politics, especially in subnational jurisdictions with increased authority and resources as a result of decentralization, is often contentious. Collective action aimed at removing authoritarian leaders, building citizenship, and ensuring fair elections has characterized subnational politics in democratizing and decentralizing Mexico (Cornelius et al. 1999). The struggle for democracy in six rural municipalities in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador has involved the collective efforts of indigenous and peasant federations (Cameron 2010). Party factionalism, charges of electoral fraud, silent marches, and large urban protests led to an unsuccessful challenge to authoritarian rule by the governor of Oaxaca, Mexico, and a successful effort in Santiago del Estero, Argentina (Gibson 2004). This body of work, then, focuses broadly on issues of democracy and is typically based on a few cases. Drawing from the hundreds of cases of conflict recorded in the monthly Ombudsman reports, we use RLGCs as a window on subnational politics in the posttransition period. In the next section we describe the frequency of RLGCs, examine where they are occurring, and highlight some demographic features of the regions and municipalities in which they occur. In the third section we consider the context for conflict—the democratic transition, decentralization reform, and the introduction of participatory rights. Following the work of Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1998), who emphasize the importance of political opportunity to the emergence of collective action, we argue that the Peruvian context is ripe for RLGC.4 Section 4 presents the causes and elaborates on the nature of RLGC. The fifth section exam-

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Table 1. Demographics in District Municipalities with Local Governance Conflicts by Human Development Index (HDI) Quintiles, 2005–2011 Quintile

Average HDI

Number of Conflicts

Average Population

Average % Urban Population

1 2 3 4 5

0.4290 0.5426 0.5693 0.5975 0.6513

14 12 14 15 12

13,492 6,931 9,064 37,539 122,540

17.10 34.28 36.89 71.61 94.25

N = 67 conflicts (district data incomplete; provincial municipalities excluded) Source: Peru Ombudsman (December reports for 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011); PNUD 2009; INEI 2007

ines the role of civil society actors, and section 6 considers complexities that tend to make RLGC difficult to resolve. Because this is a large-N study in which each conflict is characterized by its own dynamics, the concluding section considers the broad implications for democratic governance. The conflicts, we find, are both negative, because they illustrate the institutional weaknesses that drive much of the contention, and positive, because they reflect new citizen demands for accountability and other rights from their elected officials. A subnational government’s degree of legitimacy, often weighed against the perceived legitimacy of the opposition’s claims, proves to be a main determinant in the emergence of conflict and its resolution.

EXAMINING REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE CONFLICT, 2004–2011 On average, the Ombudsman’s reports on social conflict indicate, Peru experiences some 54 RLGCs per year. As illustrated in figure 1, provincial and district municipal government is the target in the large majority of cases—about 42 per year since 2008—while regional government has faced nearly 12 conflicts annually.5 Though not a large number at the municipal level, the trend appears to be sustained over time: 2004–5 and 2009 witnessed relatively high levels, but the number has recently leveled at more 30 per year. At the regional level, the total covered about 15 regions and, with the exception of a dropoff in 2010, has been fairly constant over time as well. Examination of the demographic, geographic, and political characteristics of the conflicts provides additional insight into the nature of these cases. Drawing on a sample of district municipal conflicts over a six-year period, table 1 illustrates that LGCs tend to occur most commonly in the municipalities that are least developed.6 It also shows that LGCs have the weakest state presence; the three lowest quintiles include 40 municipalities.7 They tend to occur in small, rural districts, like the large majority of districts in the country. A significant number are also found, however,

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Figure 2. Sample LGCs (Municipal Districts) by Population

Source: Peru Ombudsman (December reports); INEI 2007

in relatively large, developed urban areas: there are 27 in this sample with an average urban population of more than 70 percent. The same sample of LGCs is grouped by population in figure 2, illustrating that more than 40—about 60 percent—are found in districts with a population of less than 20,000. As seen in table 2, though the sample is smaller by about half, almost two-thirds of the RGCs emerge in smaller departments in which state presence, as measured by the state density index (SDI), is clearly weaker. These regions are also, on average, less urban. It is noteworthy that police presence for RGCs is the lowest in small, rural jurisdictions. The same holds for LGCs, as indicated in figure 3. The figure shows that police presence is low in the provinces with the largest number of LGCs (municipal-level data were unavailable); in provinces with fewer LDCs, that presence is considerably higher. RLGCs raise questions about the rule of law, particularly citizen respect for it and the states’ ability to prevent or adequately manage conflict. Though police presence cannot be equated with actual upholding of the rule of law—indeed, it may serve best as another indicator of state presence—police levels do reflect what one would expect: where conflict is higher, levels are lower. Examination of the location of RLGCs allows us to determine if geographyrelated features have some explanatory significance. Table 3 provides a summary by department of the location of each of the RLGCs in our sample. Most (a total of 80) of the conflicts involve local governments, partly for historical reasons. The popular election of municipal authorities has been occurring since 1980, and the public

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Table 2. Demographics in Regions with RGCs by SDI Quintile, 2008–2011

Quintile

Average SDI

Number of Conflicts

Average Population

Average % Urban Population

Average Police Presence

1 2 3 4 5

0.5460 0.5816 0.6055 0.6581 0.7670

7 13 5 5 3

903,900 759,233 897,665 1,283,971 474,463

57.8 58.8 59.4 64.9 82.9

Medium low Medium Medium Medium high High

N = 33 conflicts. SDI = PNUD State Density Index Source: Peru Ombudsman, 2008–11; PNUD 2009; INEI 2007

has much more experience interacting with them. Peruvians have more direct, relatively frequent contact with municipal management and relatively clear understanding of municipal roles and responsibilities. In addition, municipal officials deal with concrete aspects of daily life, and the issues involved are more sensitive and pressing for the average Peruvian. Though they are much larger jurisdictions, regional governments report fewer conflicts (a total of 33). Established only in 2003, regional governments were beginning just their third term of office in 2011. Citizens do not have as clear a sense of regional administration; regional issues are not as frequently or directly related to their daily lives as are municipal concerns. Given the limitations on the progress of decentralization, moreover, regional governments have yet to assume the full set of functions established by law. In fact, further reform remains on the policy agenda. In many instances, therefore, community organizations concerned with regional development issues prefer to approach the federal government directly. Generally, regions with high levels of conflict—five or more cases—tend to have common features (see table 3). Many are communities in the Andean sierra, are rural, have high rates of poverty, are socially and economically underdeveloped, and often exhibit high rates of general unrest. Loreto and Puno departments stand out as the most conflictive. State density and police presence in the huge Amazonian department of Loreto are among the lowest in the country. In highland Puno, state density is at the lower end and police presence is in the middle range. Puno has a high degree of diversity and a unique combination of modernity and underdevelopment. Ancash and Cajamarca have strong ties to the mining industry—as table 3 notes, they were among the leading regions in per capita transfers of mining royalties—and high levels of environmental conflict, which probably serve to increase RLGC. Turning to the incidence of recall of regional and local authorities, Peru has seen rapidly growing interest in the use of this institutional oversight mechanism for protesting the performance of elected officials and perhaps removing them from office. Since they began in 1997, recall efforts have occurred mostly in municipal

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Figure 3. Police Presence in Provinces with Local Governance Conflict, 2005–2011

Source: Peru Ombudsman; PNUD 2009

districts. These events can be quite contentious, and they are used to influence the behavior of, mostly, district mayors and local councilors. The process begins with the recall advocates’ acquisition from the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) of an “electoral kit,” the form used for obtaining the requisite number of signatures in favor of the recall. If sufficient signatures are gathered (and other criteria are met), the vote is convened. If more than 50 percent of the voters vote in favor, the elected official is removed and “complementary” elections are later held nationwide to replace him or her. The Peruvian subnational electoral system is especially conducive to recalls, and may be the major incentive behind escalating interest in them. Municipal and regional officials, mayors in particular, win office with a simple plurality of the vote. When several candidates are vying for the post—in the absence of virtually nonexistent national parties, there are often 8 or more—the winning candidates often claim a mere 30 percent or even much less of the vote. In small municipalities, the winning margin can be quite small, and it becomes clear that well over half of the electorate voted for someone else. In such cases, it does not take much for an activist opposition to rally enough signatures to force a recall, especially in small municipalities with no more than 2,000 or 3,000 total voters. Considering that in anticipation of the September 2012 recall 1,674 recall kits were requested from ONPE—70 mayors and 397 councilors were ultimately voted out—one gets a sense of the countrywide politicking and contention that surrounds these events (Noticias Elecciones Perú 2011b, 2012).

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Table 3. Geographic Location of Regions with High Levels of Conflict, RLGC Sample, 2005–2011 Department a

Ancash Ayacucho Cajamarcaa Cuscoa Huánuco La Libertad Loreto Piura Puno San Martín Total All regions

LGCs

RGCs

Total

5 6 4 5 5 5 12 4 12 5 63 80

2 2 2 2 0 1 4 1 8 3 25 33

7 8 6 7 5 6 16 5 20 8 88 113

aRegions

with highest levels of mining royalties in 2009 (Arellano-Yanguas 2011, 624) Source: Peru Ombudsman, December reports, 2005–11

In 2009, as illustrated in figure 4, successful recalls followed the historical pattern. They occurred largely in small, rural district municipalities. Of the 22 mayors removed from office, 87 percent served in districts with a population of less than 10,000, while only one occurred in a highly urban district with a population greater than 20,000. Likewise, in the 7 preceding recall processes during the period 1997– 2008, with the exception of 2004, the proportion of rural localities exceeded 60 percent; and in most of the localities, the voters numbered between 1,000 and 5,000. In addition, most of the districts experiencing recalls were located in the Andean sierra region of Peru. This region accounted for more than 65 percent—and a couple of times, more than 80 percent—of the recalls every year through 2008 (Noticias Elecciones Perú 2011a).

THE POST-FUJIMORI TRANSITION: A CONTEXT FOR CONFLICT? Democratization, decentralization, and the broad adoption of participatory rights were all formally instituted within three years of Alberto Fujimori’s exile in 2000, shifting dramatically the political opportunity structure for collective action. Peruvians dismantled more than a decade of authoritarianism and quickly began restoring the legitimacy of their country’s representative institutions. As has often been the case following the demise of Latin American authoritarian regimes, the reconstruction of democracy in Peru included a strong reaction against centralism—the pervasive corruption, abuses, and arbitrariness of the Fujimori regime (Conaghan 2005)—and widespread support for more participatory, decentralized government (Bland 2011). Peruvians were seeking autonomy and access to the state, not simply

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Figure 4. Characteristics of the 22 Municipal Districts in which Mayors were Recalled, 2009

Source: JNE 2009

inclusion in decisionmaking affecting their lives and livelihoods but also engagement in ensuring that those policies were actually being put into effect. Democracy provided the broad political space and autonomy for increased collective action. With Alejandro Toledo’s assumption of the presidency in 2001, Peru witnessed its second democratic transition in 21 years. The first, in 1980, under the 1979 Constitution, reestablished democratic institutions after 12 years of social and economic reform under an authoritarian military regime. A critical component of that first transition was municipal reform and the restoration of elections for mayors and councilors. Representative municipalities were only beginning to develop, however, and their real power remained limited in regard to the national government. At the regional level, President Alan García (1985–90) convened indirect elections in 1990, but regionalization did not advance further before he left office. The subsequent Fujimori regime then worked to control and weaken the municipalities while converting the regions into centralized administrative councils. Under the Toledo government, the tide turned again; political and societal actors galvanized around state reform and the establishment of democratic rights that promised to strengthen citizen participation and the fight against corruption. Rights such as access to public information, mandates for the establishment of consultative councils, citizen oversight mechanisms, and collaborative management were core elements of the reform strategy. Decentralization in the post-Fujimori period began with reform of the Constitution of 1993. The constitution establishes five levels of authority, from the regional government down to the submunicipal centro poblado, or village, and a

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four-phase process for parallel implementation.8 Each level is accorded additional responsibilities and access to new resources; direct elections are mandated for all of them. In addition, the constitution calls on all levels of government to establish mechanisms for public participation and citizen oversight, including public budget review, referendum, legislative initiative, recall, and removal of functionaries. Implementation of the new constitutional mandate led, over the brief 2002–3 period, to the adoption of a general decentralization law, a regional government law, regional and municipal elections, and, as we will see, a series of laws strengthening participatory rights (McNulty 2011, 32–42; PNUD 2006). Decentralization, especially on the scale seen in the Peruvian transition, tends to increase public expectations of improvements in the quality of life in local communities. Political competition (elections in particular) is likely to intensify because the prize for winning—decisionmaking authority—has grown. In Peru, the breakdown in the political party system and lowered barriers to ballot access have facilitated the proliferation of local electoral groups and have helped generate heated competition, sometimes violent, with each electoral cycle. The public generally expects its elected authorities to be accountable to the locality; to the extent that they are perceived to be unresponsive to community interests, tensions flare. On the fiscal side, Peru has seen the transfer of new functions and financial resources to the regional and local levels. Fiscal transfers from the central government—a 29 percent increase for regional governments and a 54 percent increase for municipalities between 2007 and 2010—and revenue generated from taxes on mining and extractive industry profits have produced significantly increased revenue in the regions and localities in which the extraction occurs. Because extractive industries have produced so much income—notably in mountainous mining areas—horizontal fiscal inequalities have deepened among subnational jurisdictions (Proyecto USAID/Perú ProDescentralización 2011, 98–100; Arellano-Yanguas 2011). As is the case anywhere, disagreement over the distribution of resources often fuels the fires of conflict. Furthermore, decentralization implies a larger presence of the state in the periphery, outside of Lima, and therefore can facilitate citizen access, scrutiny, and more regular oversight of the activities of government authorities. The establishment of participatory rights in post-Fujimori Peru was extraordinarily strong. In addition to the constitutional provisions, the 2003 decentralization reform mandates that regional and local government promote citizen participation in development plans and budgets. It also calls on all citizens to join in participatory and oversight processes. Modification of the regional government law established the organization and means of participation by new Regional (RCC) and Local Coordination Councils (LCC), ostensibly giving citizens an explicit role in overseeing regional and local affairs. The 2003 participatory budgeting (PB) law provides the legal framework for PB; mandates its use at the regional, provincial, and district levels; and requires the creation of committees to oversee the execution of PB-developed budgets. The 2002 access to information law provides the parameters for releasing government information at all levels and for monitoring progress toward transparency (McNulty 2011, 35–45).

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The establishment of these new rights has also provided fertile soil for the growth of RLGC. As community organizations, political opponents, coordinating councils, and others attempt to take advantage of opportunities—which even now are less than familiar procedures—they run into real and perceived obstacles to the exercise of these rights. Indeed, experience shows a multitude of problems with the legal reforms, specifically in terms of their practical implementation and fulfillment of commitments. Problems have included institutional and cultural barriers to participation and information access, complex technical conditions for introducing PB proposals, ambiguity in the identity and role of RCCs and LCCs, elimination of projects approved by PB, preferential treatment in project selection, instability in PB oversight committees, and weak or no incentives to obey the law (no sanctions for violators) (Grompone 2005; Chirinos 2009).

MOTIVATIONS FOR AND NATURE OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE CONFLICTS Both the factors motivating community groups to take action against the authorities and the general nature of these conflicts are important to understanding RLGCs. Peruvian community and indigenous organizations at the municipal and regional levels are regularly squaring off with their democratically elected officials for a variety of reasons. On some occasions, citizens take over the municipal government to demand that certain projects be carried out; on others, they denounce managerial irregularities in a daylong street march. Be it through a sit-in or a recall effort, they demand attention to concerns about financial accountability, broken campaign promises, and neglect of investments decided through participatory budgeting. Our analysis of RLGC cases demonstrates that, in terms of both frequency and content, the most important motivations for LGC are protests against ordinances; unanswered requests for information, including reports on budget accountability; authorities’ failure to follow through on commitments or decisions; allegations of irregularities and corruption; the authoritarian exercise of power; and problems related to participation, including participatory budgeting. Keeping in mind that regional governments are relatively new, we found that the principal motivations for RGC are claims for breach of agreements that arise from participatory budgeting, petition for or renewal of public works, requests for support for development projects, opposition to the opening of a mine for environmental reasons, changing the status of a public agency, and application to remove an official. We found that these episodes of RLGC are closely tied to core values of civic management: honest and ethical behavior, transparency and communication, democratic practice and participation, social and political representation, and effective government.9 Motivations frequently relate to public sector management as it directly affects governability and the proper functioning of democracy. They reflect the political and social nature of RLGC, not just its legal or formal side. RLGC involves, therefore, citizen interaction with and perception of public administration, and is closely tied to the exercise of authority by elected officials;

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that is, to their political legitimacy. Struggles for power or leadership reflect the degree to which the state—in this case, the subnational government—is viewed as legitimate. Where most citizens believe that the state has the authority to enforce its decisions, even when they do not agree with those decisions, neither the authorities nor the citizens need to turn to force to obtain or preserve political power (Goldsmith 2012, 121; Linz and Stepan 1978, 16–18). The state’s ability to identify and address solutions to societal problems, Linz adds, is especially important to the establishment of a healthy level of democratic legitimacy (Linz and Stepan 1978, 18–19). Conversely, as legitimacy erodes, the prospects for state-citizen contention increase. As Weber has explained, with such erosion, contention is more likely to move outside the realm of “legality,” to prove resistant to resolution through state laws and institutions, and ultimately to reach the “decisive means for politics”: violence (quoted in Gerth and Mills 1946, 79, 121). Though pure politicking is likely to be involved in some cases, generally RLGC arises when the administration is neither predictable nor transparent and when basic government functions are ineffectively performed. In a typical case, a segment of the public perceives the municipal or regional government as being mismanaged and having lost some measure of power, resources, or status. Citizens identify the situation as a problem: an unmet need, an unresolved issue, breach of trust, or a violation of rights, or perhaps unfulfilled aspirations or expectations. Sooner or later a collective realization of the unjustness of the situation, the different interests involved, and those responsible motivates community groups to act, mobilize resources to resolve the problem, and assume the risks and associated costs, having balanced them against the expected benefits. The enforcement capabilities of the legal system and the state’s ability to keep public order also become part of the equation. Such collective action can involve diverse modalities or expressions of conflict. The preferred modality will most probably be chosen on the basis of past experience and the perceived likely response of the authorities. On some occasions, collective action occurs through institutional procedures previously established in the legal framework; on other occasions, it takes place through ad hoc or noninstitutional channels. The legal system clearly provides a variety of options for processing conflicts in regional and local governance, and citizens have multiple means of participation and recourse. Where dissatisfaction with management has produced RLGC, for example, formal means of collective action have included access to information requests, recall of officials, and referenda. In cases in which the community is protesting the government’s failure to comply with PB or public budget hearings, Peruvians can request information, file complaints with the mayor, or work through civil society– based local or regional coordination councils. Likewise, in boundary disputes or misuse of natural resources, they can appeal to the regional government. The reality, however, is that community organizations encounter serious difficulties in exercising their rights and making these procedures work. Often the procedures or actions required are inadequate for addressing the dispute. Institutional channels entail the application of excessively formulaic rules or criteria, which makes the process slow.

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In addition, legal and economic barriers to accessing institutional channels are very high: they are expensive and time-consuming, and require skills that are generally uncommon among community groups and civil society organizations. Moreover, there are alternative ways to achieve the same or even greater results at lower cost, which may already be part of the organizations’ existing repertoire. Facing weak incentives, poorly functioning bureaucracies, and other barriers to success, community organizations often opt for noninstitutional strategies. These have long proven better suited to their aims, given the nature of the conflicts. Indeed, experience indicates that noninstitutional forms (violent ones included) have been the most effective when it comes to achieving collective action objectives. Over decades of experience, civil society groups have acquired the know-how to utilize these strategies effectively. They know the bar for access is low, costs are minimal, and those costs can even be reduced should they become excessive. An additional advantage is that in the process of addressing a conflict the parties involved have the flexibility to operate on equal footing in regard to the authorities, to reinvent the process as they proceed, and to get closer to the actual issues at stake, particularly the social, ethical, or cultural problems that typically define these conflicts. Noninstitutional strategies serve to force a certain result or a favorable change in the situation. They are always an option for collective action, and the decision to use them is a tactical consideration that depends on developments in the ongoing conflict. Such is the case with staging a sit-in, for example. In 18 recorded sit-in cases, 8 were used to establish a dialogue and 5 were done in protest of a mayor’s failure to fulfill a promise (usually public budget accountability). Civic groups have successfully used noninstitutional strategies to get their demands placed on the regional or local public agenda. Some approaches blur the distinction between legal and illegal action. The most common and longest used noninstitutional strategy is the demand for dialogue, which indicates a willingness to move beyond exclusively legal channels and focuses on negotiation. In many cases the purpose of direct action—sit-ins, strikes, rallies, public pronouncements, marches, street blockades, and so on—is to bring about the initiation of dialogue. The demand for dialogue, which is the focus of the Ombudsman’s work as well, is especially important for three reasons. First, it opens a space in which the parties may decide to establish a mutually agreed-on agenda, the course of discussions, and procedures based on the progress of the process. Our examination of RLGCs indicates that the failure to achieve dialogue early on leads to an attempt to increase pressure through direct action, greater polarization, and increased risk that the issue will be left unresolved. In 2010, for example, in at least four cases, the dispute had continued for a year without dialogue.10 In two instances in Puno Department—San Juan del Oro and Arapa, where elected officials could not take office for many months—the conflict was ongoing for two years and three years, respectively. The second reason dialogue is important is that the parties to the conflict understand that they are often, in fact, simultaneously playing on both institutional and noninstitutional stages. The objective is to accumulate as much bargaining power as possible to achieve a favorable outcome for one’s side. As such, dialogue

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functions as a hinge that ensures the continuity of the relationship. The breakdown of dialogue is a constant threat, for it implies that everyone will now play by their own rules. Even in cases of increased polarization, however, the parties to the conflict know that they can always return to dialogue. Furthermore, dialogue is important because of its symbolic role, demonstrating to the parties that they are on equal footing. This is especially important for the community organizations, as it legitimates them both to their base and to the society at large. Combining institutional and noninstitutional approaches, community organizations will appeal to outside government entities. In cases involving allegations of corruption (especially when no other information is available), protesting community groups may also request action by the office of the Contraloría General (Peru’s comptroller). The crucial question in these instances is whether or not the public entity is able to meet expectations. In Acoria (Huancavelica) and Arapa (Puno), for example, one factor worsening the conflict was the Comptroller’s refusal to participate, citing a lack of necessary conditions. Discouraged, the community turned to noninstitutional actions. The district attorney is another option, but the response has been ambivalent. At times, the judiciary has responded swiftly and cases were resolved; in other instances, the response was weak and resolution languished for some time. In the cases left unresolved, the effect was often to intensify the conflict and sharpen the use of noninstitutional tactics, even targeting the judiciary. Noninstitutional action also occasionally involves instances of violence. Often, riots are the result of an accumulation of tension caused by an incident such as police brutality, involvement of criminal elements, or mobilization generated by violent extremists. The use of violence is always a risk to community organizations because it threatens their legitimacy, can discredit the cause they are attempting to defend, prompts legal action for the recovery of damages, and precipitates the breakdown of dialogue. Initiation of negotiations or return to the negotiating table is, again, always an option. Ultimately, as we have seen, community organizations involved in RLGCs must often balance institutional and noninstitutional strategies, using one or the other or both in a complex cost-benefit calculation aimed at achieving success for their cause.

CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS IN REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE CONFLICTS A full understanding of RLGCs calls for a close examination of the activities, strategies, implications, and in some cases, conspicuous absence of civil society actors—from civic organizations and political fronts to national NGOs and political parties. A common perception of groups making claims against regional and local governments is that they are acting to defend existing rights or fighting for new rights. For the most part, however, RLGC is best viewed as a process of reaching a resolution of a dispute, usually a process carrying some measure of legal or judicial ramification. Indeed, community organizations tend to view conflict as a bargaining process—a meeting with the authorities to negotiate and agree on a

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resolution. As we have seen, establishing a basis for negotiation is a primary objective in itself, typically pursued from the start, and central in developing a strategy for collective action. In addition, local community protagonists in RLGCs often search for allies to support and increase their bargaining power. Their natural allies are other community groups in the jurisdiction, and they invest significant time and effort in constructing a solid, representative coalition. They also seek support from other influential allies able to give added legitimacy to their claims and secure logistical and professional support. A good example is the Catholic Church, which in many ways has played the role of mediator between communities and the authorities, and has in many cases been an advocate for claimants. In a conflict raised by businesses in Piura’s central market, for example, the archdiocese played a critical role early on as a promoter of dialogue. Local civil society organizations, for their part, can lend support through high-level technical and professional resources that can otherwise be expensive and difficult to find. In the 1970s and 1980s, social mobilization developed within an organizational fabric that allowed civil society groups to represent their interests across broad sectors of Peruvian society at all levels. The process generated leadership involving a high degree of experience and skill. All major sectors of civil society—small farmers, the private sector, students, indigenous groups, women, and youth—relied on longestablished primary levels of organization. Private entrepreneurs had chambers of commerce, for example; women founded community kitchens and “Glass of Milk” committees; and workers had private and public employee unions. These were organized nationally into the respective federations that were so influential three or four decades ago. Today, for multiple reasons—including neoliberal market reform, globalization of the economy, authoritarian government, the destructive impact of Shining Path terrorism on peasant organizations, and the democratizing, decentralizing, and participatory reforms highlighted in this essay—this organizational structure is fragmented and, in some respects, dissolved (Chirinos 2009, 106–8). Civil society organizations today are relatively weak, although remnants of the old organizations still remain in some sectors. With respect to RLGC, as the Ombudsman’s reports make clear, the critical players are neighborhood organizations and peasant and indigenous communities organized into local and, to a lesser extent so far, regional “fronts.” Another phenomenon is the rise of radio and television personalities who have gained some prominence in political life and social conflicts. In several instances, they have emerged as local or regional leaders with large enough appeal to run, with some success, for political office. National parties that in the past were important civil society allies can no longer fulfill this role, given the collapse of the party system (Dietz and Myers 2007). Through 2010, there had been only one registered case in which all parties on a department’s parliamentary bench participated in the resolution of a conflict. It was the case of Juliaca, Puno, in which the party members served as mediators in a protest against the rising rates set by the Juliaca water service company. Regional or local par-

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ties, which, in most cases, are simply electoral vehicles for local leaders, have gained some importance, and may have some influence on the modality of a conflict. Social media have also taken on a leading role in RLGCs as allies of both community groups and the authorities. In some RLGCs, community organizations and the local government have formed a collaborative alliance in relation to both public and private entities. Case examples include joint municipal-community action to demand improved quality of transport service and lower ticket prices, to protest against the national government for revoking a company’s building permit, and to object to the local water authority’s problematic water distribution and rates. Through its regional offices, the national Ombudsman has played a central role in identifying conflicts, mediating, and creating conditions for the establishment of dialogue. The Ombudsman’s effectiveness is based on the general public’s high degree of confidence in the institution. Community groups seeking support are often directed to the Ombudsman early in the conflict, as witnessed in Lajas (Cajamarca), when a group of citizens were requesting information from the municipality’s Office of Internal Affairs. Being in good legal standing is critical for those making claims or planning a protest. During the course of the conflict, community organizations deliberately seek to place themselves on the side of the law, as this allows them to present and maintain a positive image to the authorities, protect themselves from unfair accusations, and legitimate their cause in the public realm. Therefore they insist on soliciting official information from the authorities and attempting to substantiate claims based on existing rights. A recurring example is the request for the Comptroller to intervene in cases of alleged corruption. In Codo del Pozuzo (Huánuco), local claimants secured the intervention of the district attorney, the Ombudsman’s Office, and the Comptroller. Likewise, in Moquegua, on an issue of litigation brought by the central market, the Comptroller intervened and mediated, essentially administering the process. In both cases, however, the intervention was unsuccessful. The Codo del Pozuzo conflict lasted more than a year and was never resolved. In Moquegua, the Comptroller’s report was never made public, and a year later the conflict was still unresolved. The strategies and accompanying tactics chosen by community organizations are, again, directly related to their desire to settle the dispute in a favorable way. Throughout the process, local groups assess the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy before deciding on a particular course of collective action. Our review indicates that the most important criteria in making that assessment and developing the approach are, first, whether conditions of access to authorities are appropriate for establishing a dialogue. Second, community groups will consider the prospects for fast and efficient resolution of the conflict, which is generally preferred. Third, they will consider historical experience with strategies that have proven effective or less so. To the extent that the assessment turns negative as to the prospects for success with formal, institutional channels, mobilizations, sit-ins, or takeovers become the preferred option.

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COMPLEXITIES IN RESOLVING REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE CONFLICT In a better, if not perfect, world, RLGC would be rare, because Peru’s institutions would be responsive and effective enough to address issues before they became conflictive and to quickly resolve complaints that did manage to devolve into conflict. It bears considering what the obstacles are to more effective handling of conflict resolution, while noting that limitations often involve institutions and practices external to local and regional authorities and beyond the reach of pressures exerted by local civic groups. The Peruvian legal system is a profusion of law and regulations at all levels of government that establish a diversity of rights for diverse segments of civil society. The distinctions among them are not always clear and precise; ambiguities, loopholes, and differing interpretations emerge that limit the exercise of equal rights. Conditions on the exercise of rights are also complex, expensive, and time consuming—and the benefits do not necessarily exceed the costs—which, as we have seen, Peruvians have long recognized through their use of noninstitutional strategies. This is notably the case with the rarely utilized direct democracy provisions of the law on participation rights. Moreover, as noted, legal requirements for many rights do not establish penalties for their infringement. Obvious examples are the lack of penalties for authorities who do not comply with PB or with the mandate for public budget accountability meetings. Underlying many cases of RLGC is the problem of access to public information. A civil society organization’s first action is usually a request for information regarding the problem motivating the complaint. The typical response from the authorities is to deny the request or provide no response at all. Legal remedies in such situations are generally ineffective. The only way to pressure the authorities is often, therefore, through the use of noninstitutional approaches. Often the legal system simply does not have established procedures or the capacity to deal with some of the situations that cause social conflicts. The problem is compounded when the conflict is not specifically defined under the law, meaning that no authority is responsible for processing it, let alone resolving it. Even in cases for which legal procedures are in place, these are not necessarily relevant enough to ensure the proper handling of the conflict. The experience of many local organizations is that legal formalism renders procedural rules and regulations ineffective. For this reason, and because it gives them the ability to manage the process, organizations soon become proponents of ad hoc dialogue and negotiation. Overlapping responsibilities among government agencies and levels are often manifested through inaction when it comes to dispute resolution. In recent years, moreover, decentralization has further clouded the assignment of responsibilities and thereby aggravated the problem. The RLGCs examined here include, for example, problems between municipalities and public agencies, such as the Agency for the Formalization of Informal Property (COFOPRI), on boundary issues and between public service companies and regional governments.

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The extension of conflicts over long periods—months and even years—with no prospects for dialogue or resolution is another difficult issue. Of the 44 local governance conflicts in 2006, for example, only 7 were reported to be resolved; in 2010, the Ombudsman reported that 12 of 34 local governance conflicts were resolved; and in 2011, solutions were reached for only 2 of 32 municipal conflicts. Though legal formalism does lengthen these disputes, the delay is also a result of strategic decisions made by the parties involved. The authorities look to extend the conflict, hoping that the protesters’ power to mobilize supporters will wane. Groups in civil society seek to keep conflicts alive to keep the authorities permanently in check. Here one witnesses the constant struggle for greater bargaining power as each party looks for new opportunities to address the conflict with better prospects for success. The strategies employed by civil society groups occasionally make already difficult conflicts more complicated. Groups may elevate their demands, an action that may be political gaming designed to harass the authorities and do little, if anything, to solve the conflict itself. There is also the prospect of “hidden” demands that initially do not appear explicitly and yet arise later, after a dialogue has been opened. The diversity of civil society groups involved, along with shifting alliances within citizen coalitions, helps explain their sudden shifts in strategy. In a conflict in Imaza (Amazonas), for example, eight new demands were presented in the first round of discussions. State agencies have no way to identify, monitor, prevent, or manage social conflicts. In 2006, a Multisectoral Commission for Prevention of Social Conflicts was established, but proved ineffective. Four years later, the Office for Management of Social Conflicts was created within the prime minister’s office, and has made limited progress. Meanwhile, just two ministries have established their own management units to deal with social conflicts. Offices for the management of conflict do not yet exist at the regional and local levels, though international donor agencies are looking to support their development. Consequently, there is no conflict management policy and few opportunities to develop preventive policies or participatory mechanisms designed to reduce the risk of conflict. The one exception is, of course, the Ombudsman. Another factor, as seen in other types of conflicts, is that government leaders and the bureaucracy often do not have a proper understanding of local culture, especially with respect to peasant and indigenous communities (Echave et al. 2009, 225). Traditional language, cultures, and practices are largely ignored. The gap in understanding is a direct consequence of legal universalism and the lack of an intercultural view of both society and state. It leads to authoritarianism, preferential treatment for some citizens, and a culture of secrecy around public management.

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CONCLUSIONS One cannot separate the RLGCs analyzed here from Peru’s extraordinary democratic transition and consolidation. The transition began a chain of events that continues to support consistent interaction between the state and society and gives rise to contention. These episodes are ultimately the consequence of a setting in which Peruvian communities, encouraged by new local elites and organizational leaders, are responding to opportunities that lower the costs of collective action, reveal potential allies, show where government authorities are vulnerable, and trigger collective identities for action around a common issue or group of issues (Tarrow 1998, 20). Just over a decade ago, the return of democracy provided the political space for more accountable government and a series of reforms affecting subnational politics and administration. The opportunity for collective action emerged quickly, even if taking advantage of it has not always been possible. In almost half of the regions and a consistent number of municipalities each year, Peruvians have been willing to take to the streets if necessary, on the one hand to express their disgust with the performance of elected authorities, and on the other, to demand accountability in the exercise of their newfound democratic rights. Peruvians in municipalities all over the country continue to demonstrate a strong propensity seriously to consider removing their elected authorities after their first year in office. If democratization helped prompt collective action, decentralization and the establishment of a broad set of participatory rights has fueled the organizational efforts of civic groups determined to get their demands addressed. Decentralization has given regional and local government an increased level of authority that can be considered significant (and is certainly perceived by many Peruvians as such). Regional and municipal governments, especially those with increased revenue provided by taxation of extractive industry profits, are operating public services, deciding community development priorities, and managing resources, among other responsibilities. Meanwhile, the provision of a range of rights of participation and access to information legally obligates the elected official and citizen to interact for the betterment of the community. In practice, enforcement of these rights and requirements is often at best a formality. We have seen nonetheless that many regional and local authorities are subject to increased political pressure, usually from activities of civic “fronts” demanding responses, accountability, or participation. It is no surprise that recourse to these rights, as well as the failure to respect them, has helped generate contention. RLGCs thus reflect the impact of new or continued civic organization and government decentralization, despite the limitations of the process of implementing the reforms. This conclusion, in particular, is supported by studies of social protest, as noted above: decentralization relocates collective action to subnational arenas, and the nature of protest is often determined by the relative openness of the state (Kohl 2002; Murillo and Ronconi 2004; Robert and Portes 2006; Arce 2008). In Peru, disputes over decisionmaking, as well as complaints about management—corruption, authoritarian practices, poor workmanship, and so on—are the basis for much

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of the collective action. LGCs are about municipal-level issues: failure to comply with public commitments, objections to an ordinance, use of the budget, and the increased price of bus service. Community or neighborhood organizations in largely rural and indigenous communities rise up in protest. As for RGCs, the experience so far is that they involve regional or intermunicipal issues over which the regional officials ostensibly hold authority. That authority is questioned in some instances, however, because the regions remain relatively centralized, and collective action that should ordinarily be regional will be directed instead at the national level. What does all of this contention signify for the development of regional and local democracy, if not the national democratic system? On the one hand, RLGCs point to real constraints on the development of subnational democratic institutions and particularly on the effectiveness of decentralization and participatory governance. There is a simmering discontent or mistrust of regional and local authorities that is the result, first, of weak institutions. Surely, in many instances, elected officials are attempting to respond to communities long frustrated about being ignored. The authorities, however, often do not have the experience, personnel, administrative systems, or resources to respond adequately. Weak institutional capacity also gives rise to a waste of resources, poor services, and corruption, especially in revenueflush mining regions. Second, contention arises because the populations that are neglected and in need—poor farmers, the indigenous, and isolated rural villages in particular—do not have a voice. Elected officials tend to favor urban localities because they contain more votes, and direct resources, investments, and municipal employment accordingly (Echave et al. 2009, 185). Like the proverbial squeaky wheel getting the grease, sometimes being contentious is the only way to get the authorities to be responsive. RLGCs also reflect a lack of institutions with the ability to articulate or channel complaints between state and society. The failure of the party system and the crisis of representation and geographic segmentation of national civil society organizations, coupled with a weak state, has eliminated mechanisms for mediation that, in the past, helped resolve issues before conflict erupted. On the other hand, RLGCs are also a reflection of nascent democracy at work. Regional and local authorities are facing pressures to be more responsive and open in addressing regional and local needs, so community organizations form and build local alliances, usually to raise a problem that the authorities have failed to address. Their actions reflect problems of governance. Yet like the case of the mayor of Carmen del Alto noted at the start of this article, these episodes do provide evidence of authorities generally doing what they can, with varying levels of success, to represent community interests and work with citizen groups under difficult financial, human resource, and other constraints. Local elites operate a political setting in which national political parties and federated organizations and their regional affiliates no longer hold sway. The community groups they lead in many cases are acting with considerable strategic sophistication, mixing institutional and noninstitutional tactics to reach a dialogue with authorities, preserve the legitimacy of their cause, and eventually make progress in resolving the problem.

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One can see the emergence of a new culture of political action based on the idea that citizens have the right to question the authorities and hold them accountable. The presence of governance conflict where financial resources have increased reflects justifiable concerns about corruption, but it also demonstrates that citizens and groups will get involved when participation or contention around the nature of community investment, for example, has tangible meaning. In mining areas, neglected rural communities demand to know where and how the flood of revenue is being utilized and why they are not benefiting. Legal or formal mechanisms and procedures for processing complaints do exist, but are discarded either partially—because in some measure they can serve as cover for the larger strategy for sustaining legitimacy—or entirely— because they have long been considered ineffective. Community protagonists choose noninstitutional mechanisms because, given historical experience, these are seen as more effective substitutes. Ultimately, the two types are often combined, because local actors see a measure of value to both in attempting to achieve their aims. Our examination of RLGCs highlights the significance of legitimacy. Its maintenance is a critical objective of all parties to a conflict. For regional and local administrations, legitimacy is built on public ethics; transparency and communication; democratic practice, especially participation; and effective government. Failure in any of these areas can lead to widespread complaints, forceful objection, or an immediate takeover of a municipality by the opposition. It is important to note that in Peru, where mayors are often not only elected with a small plurality of the vote (i.e., 70 to 80 percent of the electorate voted for another candidate) but also accorded majority control of the council, the legitimacy of the newly elected official can be undermined almost immediately. For those engaged in collective action, legitimacy is the lifeblood of the cause; without it, achieving anything is unlikely. The absence of a system of political parties that can mediate between the state, society, and competing local elites probably makes it more difficult to sustain the political relationships on which legitimacy is built. Peru continues to implement and rework its legal framework for decentralization, participation, and social inclusion. Regional governments are barely a decade old, and they have yet to successfully take on major functions they have been assigned, including health care and education. As these reforms evolve, they will continue to affect the development of regional and local governance. One can expect the demands, collective action, and level of contention to increase as well. Decentralization and participatory governance are extended processes of institutional development, the progress of which is best measured in decades. They do not provide for immediate developmental progress, yet they are often sold on the promise of improvements in the quality of life. The failure to meet expectations of change, which often exceed the capacity of regional and local institutions in any case, creates discontent, generates organized opposition groups, and provides openings for political opponents (Weiner and Huntington 1994). Peru’s regional and local governments are not all strong, complex, and autonomous—or legitimate— enough to accommodate pressure for increased participation and accountability. For good and ill, conflict is the result.

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NOTES We would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for LAPS and our copanelists at the 2012 meetings of the Latin American Studies Association and Midwest Political Science Association, where we presented an earlier version of the manuscript. The time and suggestions they gave to our work helped improve this final product. 1. Tilly and Tarrow’s definition of contentious politics (2007) broadly refers to any interaction involving government, either direct or indirect engagement. 2. “Local” governance refers to both types of Peru’s municipalities: district and provincial. 3. In Latin America, depending on the country, the intermediate level refers to states, provinces, departments, or—as in Peru—regions. 4. Tarrow (1998, 19) applies the notion of political opportunity structures to the subnational as well as national level. 5. The Ombudsman’s reports on conflict directed at regional governments, which were newly established in 2003, began only in 2008. 6. The sample is drawn from the Ombudsman’s December reports from 2004 to 2011. As such, it captures almost all conflicts for the year and avoids duplication. 7. PNUD (2011) developed a “state density index” (SDI) that is closely related to its human development index (HDI). Since SDI data are provided only at the provincial and regional levels, we use HDI as a proxy for SDI for our sample of district municipalities. 8. The reform provided for the creation of five macroregions through amalgamation of the 25 regions, but the plan was voted down in a 2005 national referendum. 9. The discussion in this section is based on our review of the March, June, and October Ombudsman reports each year from 2006 to 2010. 10. Moquegua, Vilcashuamán (Ayacucho), Tabaconas (Cajamarca), and El Tigre (Loreto).

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