Determinants of Forest Landowner Participation in the Endangered ...

Human Dimensions of Wildlife, 10:249–257 Copyright © 2005 Taylor & Francis Inc. ISSN: 1087-1209 print / 1533-158X online DOI: 10.1080/10871200500292827

Determinants of Forest Landowner Participation in the Endangered Species Act Safe Harbor Program

1533-158X 1087-1209 UHDW Human Dimensions of Wildlife Wildlife, Vol. 10, No. 04, September 2005: pp. 0–0

Forest S. R. Mehmood Landowners andand D. Endangered Zhang Species

SAYEED R. MEHMOOD1 AND DAOWEI ZHANG2 1

Arkansas Forest Resource Center, School of Forest Resources, University of Arkansas—Monticello, Monticello, Arkansas, USA 2 School of Forestry and Wildlife Sciences, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, USA This article presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of landowner participation in the Safe Harbor program. Safe Harbor has been introduced as an alternative to the traditional “command and control” approach to implementing the Endangered Species Act. Results from the empirical model suggest that size of land ownership, certain land characteristics, some silvicultural management practices, and landowner perceptions and opinions are the significant determinants of participation in the program. The results will aid public agencies and policy-makers as they refine the program contents and strategies, thereby increasing the rate of participation. Keywords Endangered Species Act, Safe Harbor, logistic regression

Introduction The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 was enacted with the explicit goal of protecting plants and animals that face serious threats of extinction (Tobin, 1990). The legislation, and supporting documents produced by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service—the agency responsible for enforcing ESA, provided land use guidelines to prevent “taking” of a species. Over the years, however, opposition to the ESA has grown significantly as society’s moral interests collided with its economic interests. Although the ESA has seen limited success on public lands, implementation of its provisions on the nation’s private forests has been particularly difficult (Kennedy, Costa, & Smathers, 1996). Society’s interest of protecting biodiversity were at times in conflict with constitutionally guaranteed private property rights and gave rise to a set of complex and controversial policy dilemmas. The rights to one’s private property are protected by the Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. The takings clause ensures protection against taking of private property by a guarantee of just compensation. However, it is possible that government action may restrict the use of private property without physically “taking” it. This is often referred to in legal literature as “regulatory taking” (Lipford & Budreaux, 1995). The ESA’s mandate to protect endangered species sometimes created controversies regarding government regulation of private properties. Furthermore, ESA’s use of subjective terms such as “harm” in defining “taking” of an endangered The authors are indebted to two anonymous referees and the editor of this journal for their comments and suggestions to an earlier version of this article. Address correspondence to Sayeed R. Mehmood, P.O. Box 3468, School of Forest Resources, Monticello, AR, 71656, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

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species has given rise to conflicts resulting in court cases such as the Sweet Home case. In Sweet Home the Supreme Court held that habitat modification, such as timber harvesting, is tantamount to harming an endangered species, further deepening the controversy (Flick, Tufts, & Zhang, 1996). Gradually it became evident that new “market based” strategies, rather than the traditional “command and control” approach, were needed for the ESA to succeed on private land. One product of this new approach is the Safe Harbor program. The program is currently offered in the southern United States and is promoted to help protect the Red-cockaded Woodpecker (RCW) and other endangered species (Zhang & Mehmood, 2002). Under the Safe Harbor Program, participant landowners are required to manage for the baseline population of endangered species (i.e., the population of endangered species at the time of enrollment) in exchange for avoiding the responsibility for any additional species that may appear in the future. The landowners also agree to enhance the habitat for endangered species, which in case of RCW can be accomplished by prescribed fire, mid-story hardwood removal, drilling of artificial cavities, and other means (Bonnie, 1997). This voluntary, fully transferable program is designed to provide flexibility in land management and remove at least some regulatory uncertainty from forestland investments. The Safe Harbor program is relatively recent and has not been the focus of much research. This is the first empirical attempt to investigate the factors affecting participation in the program. This study identifies significant factors affecting landowner participation in Safe Harbor and suggests an effective strategy for the agencies to ensure optimum use of their resources and maximize gains. The results are useful for public agencies, service and consulting foresters, policy makers, and landowners.

RCW and the Safe Harbor Program Red-cockaded Woodpecker (RCW) (picoides borealis) is found on both public and private lands throughout the Southeast (Meyers, 1996). The RCW is designated as endangered and protected by the ESA. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service have published a Red-cockaded Woodpecker Procedures Manual for private lands. This manual explains what a landowner may not do within an RCW habitat with active RCW presence. The term “cluster” is defined as the collection of cavity trees used by a group of RCW for nesting and roosting and may consist of 1 to 15 trees within 5 to 10 acres. Within an active cluster (1) damaging or removing an active cavity tree, (2) removing any pine greater than 10 inches diameter at breast height (DBH) unless the stocking is greater than 50 BA (if the stocking is greater than 50 BA then it can be thinned down to 50 without removing any trees with more than 12 inches DBH), (3) using pesticides, (4) construction of roads and facilities, (5) planting of shrubs or ornamentals, and (6) other activities that might cause harassment or stress for the bird is prohibited (Costa, 1992). The term “foraging habitat” is defined as the pine and pine-hardwood stands contiguous to the cluster containing 10 inches DBH or larger pines of at least 25 years of age. The habitat must contain at least 60 acres (can be up to 300 acres) and a minimum BA of 3000 ft2 of pines with 10 inches DBH or more. The number of stems required for the foraging habitat may vary from 2,000 (for trees more than 16 inches DBH) to 5,000 (for trees 10 inches to 10.9 inches DBH) depending on the average DBH of the stands (Costa, 1992). A failure to comply with these requirements would constitute a “taking” and may subject the landowner to civil and criminal prosecution. Taking of an endangered species is defined in

Forest Landowners and Endangered Species

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the ESA as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”2 Red-cockaded Woodpeckers are non-migratory and territorial birds, that inhabit the mature southern pine forests across the Southeast. They are cooperative breeders and are segregated into mutually exclusive clans (Hooper, Robinson, & Jackson, 1980). Timber harvesting, land conversion, and urbanization have led to a decline in RCW population over time (Meyers, 1996). A steady move toward short-rotation even-aged pine plantations in the South coupled with the continual decline in the use of fire as a management tool has caused further reduction in RCW habitat (Jackson, 1971; Wood, 1994). RCWs excavate cavities in mature southern pine trees, preferring those that are infested by red-heart fungus (Phellinus pini). RCWs are the only excavators that create cavities exclusively in living trees (Lennartz, 1985). The red-heart fungus softens the otherwise dense heartwood, which makes it easier for the birds to excavate (Conner and Locke, 1982). In general, longleaf pine (Pinus palustris) is seen as the preferred species by RCWs. However, loblolly pine (Pinus taeda), shortleaf pine (Pinus echinata), slash pine (Pinus elliottii), pond pine (Pinus serotina), and virginia pine (Pinus virginiana) all have records of being used by RCWs (Hooper et al., 1980). The Safe Harbor Program is promoted in the South to maintain RCW habitat and eventually increase the number of RCWs on private lands (Bonnie, 1997). Participation in the Program involves a voluntary contract between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and private landowners. In South Carolina, however, the State Department of Natural Resources is responsible for administering the program. Landowners enrolled in the Program agree to protect a pre-established baseline population of RCWs (which may be zero) and enhance RCW habitat for the baseline population using prescribed fire, mid-story hardwood removal, drilling of artificial cavities, and other means (Bonnie, 1997). In case there is a future increase in endangered species population (additional to the pre-determined baseline population), the landowner is only required to notify the contracting agency, which will then move those additional individuals. The contract is completely voluntary, fully transferable, and can be terminated by the participating landowners with a 60-day written notice (Zhang & Mehmood, 2002).

Hypotheses, Model, and Data This study was based on a 2000 survey of private landowners in North and South Carolina. The data used to estimate the empirical model were collected through this survey. Each observation in the data set represented a landowner. A total of 162 landowners were included in the data set; 46 were enrolled in the Safe Harbor program. A detailed description of the survey is documented in Zhang and Mehmood (2002). The empirical model used a landowner’s status of participation in the Safe Harbor Program (yes or no) as the dependent variable. Because Safe Harbor was in its infancy at the time of the survey, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service may have engaged in some effort to recruit landowners. The Program, however, remains open to all landowners and private consultants, and industrial resource managers have started to show interest in the program. Landowners are also likely to hear about the program from their peers that have decided to participate. The authors submit that such efforts on the part of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service have likely minimized over time. A variety of factors may influence enrollment in the Safe Harbor Program. These include characteristics of the land, “risky” management activities, landowner perceptions, and the impacts of agencies and other individuals on a landowners’ choice. The present

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model included variables to capture the impacts of each of these factors. The specific model was:

SIGN = f (ACRE, NEAR, MATURE, BURN, RISK, MORAL, OUTSIDER, AGENCY, FORESTER) The dependent variable represented whether or not a landowner had signed a Safe Harbor agreement; a binary variable that took the value of one if an agreement had been signed, and zero otherwise. The first explanatory variable, ACRE, represented the total acreage (expressed in hundreds of acres) of forestland owned by each landowner. A relatively large ownership involved a substantial investment on the part of the landowner. These landowners were also more likely to actively manage their land for forest products (Zhang & Mehmood, 2001), and had more to lose from regulatory uncertainty. Assuming risk aversion behavior in landowners, it was hypothesized that these landowners will have a higher probability of signing a Safe Harbor agreement. It was expected that this variable would have a positive sign. The remaining independent variables were qualitative and binary. The second explanatory variable, NEAR, represented whether or not there were active RCW clusters within a one-mile radius of the land. The presence of RCW in such a close proximity may increase the risk of future RCW relocation into the land. Knowledge of the presence of RCW in such proximity to the land can affect the landowner’s perception of the risk of RCW relocation to his or her land. This in turn may increase the likelihood of the landowner’s willingness to sign an agreement. NEAR was expected to have a positive sign. The amount of mature pines was represented by the variable MATURE. Red-cockaded Woodpeckers prefer using mature pines (30 years or older) as their host trees. Old growth pine or pine-hardwood stands are essential for their survival. From a landowner’s perspective, however, presence of mature pine increases the risk of the land becoming RCW habitat. Such landowners are more likely to sign an agreement in an attempt to remove future uncertainties. This argument implied a positive sign for MATURE. Apart from land characteristics, certain management activities may also have favored RCW relocation. These included management practices such as prescribed burning, and the use of chemical or mechanical methods to control understory hardwoods. The variable BURN represented the use of these practices. Landowners that use prescribed burning and/or chemical and mechanical control of hardwoods are at a higher risk of their land becoming suitable RCW habitat, and are more likely to sign a Safe Harbor agreement. For this reason, the variable BURN was expected to be positive. Perceptions held by a landowner can be important in his or her decision to enroll in the program. A landowner’s perception regarding the future risk from RCW, general opinions about the ESA, and opinions about the Safe Harbor program itself could have an influence on shaping a landowners’ decision. The next three variables were designed to capture the impacts of such opinions and perceptions. The variable RISK denoted the degree of risk from future RCW relocation on land as perceived by the landowner. The variable had a value of one if the landowner perceived the risk to be high or moderate, zero otherwise. Because the likelihood of enrollment was hypothesized to increase with risk, this variable was expected to be positive. The variable MORAL represented landowners having an opinion that the society has a moral obligation to protect the Redcockaded Woodpeckers and other endangered species. These landowners were expected


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to be relatively more sympathetic to the RCW and were likely to view the ESA in a favorable light. They would also have a higher probability of willingness to help the RCW, and were therefore likely to be willing to sign an agreement. This variable was expected to be positive. The variable OUTSIDER represented landowners who were concerned that the Safe Harbor program would weaken their property and privacy rights. Due to private property rights concerns, endangered species management on private land has been a delicate, often controversial issue. Additionally, there has been a certain degree of skepticism about the role of the government and its agencies in private land management, especially in the South. Landowners that have concerns about outsiders on their land are likely to be skeptical of the Safe Harbor program, and are therefore less likely to enroll. This variable was expected to be negative. Due to the privacy and property rights issues and the presence of skepticism among landowners, the manner in which they are approached about Safe Harbor can be important. If a landowner feels negatively about the program at first impression, it is likely to reduce the probability of participation. The two remaining variables, AGENCY and FORESTER, attempted to capture these impacts. These variables represented the sources that initially informed a landowner about Safe Harbor. Federal and state agencies were represented by the variable AGENCY, whereas FORESTER represented consulting foresters. However, it was difficult to predict a sign for these variables; they must be determined empirically. Logistic regression procedures were used to estimate the model. In logistical regression, probabilities are assigned for each possible outcome in a discreet dependent variable. In this case, these probabilities were,

P(Yi = 1) = Pi =

e Xi b 1 + e Xi b

P(Yi = 0) = 1 − Pi =

1 1 + e Xi b

where Pi represents the probability that an individual landowner will sign a Safe Harbor agreement, and Xiβ is a standard regression notation representing the right hand side of a regression model in matrix terms. Unlike ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the logistic procedure involves estimating the regression parameters by maximizing a likelihood function. The likelihood function for this model was

n y (1− yi ) L = ∏ Pi i (1 − Pi ) i =1 The coefficient estimates in logistic regression do not carry the implication of per unit impact of individual independent variables as in the OLS case. To draw such implications, marginal effects for each independent variable were calculated as follows:

dPi d Xi

= Pi (1 − Pi )b

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Results and Discussion Standard tests did not indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity or any other specification errors. There were no large correlations among explanatory variables that may adversely affect the estimates. The log likelihood test was significant at p < .01. All of the explanatory variables had expected signs. Coefficients and marginal effects are presented in Table 1. The acreage variable was positive and significant at p < .01, implying landowners who owned large parcels had a higher probability of signing an agreement. This was consistent with the hypothesis that landowners with large amounts of forestland were more Table 1 Logit Estimates of the Empirical Model Variablesa

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Constant

−6.47*** (−5.04)

ACRE

0.05*** (2.92) 2.86*** (3.76) 2.06*** (3.03) 1.87** (2.39) 0.88* (1.72) 1.77** (2.15) −2.07** (−2.24) 0.18 (0.29) 2.52*** (3.81)

NEAR MATURE BURN RISK MORAL OUTSIDER AGENCY FORESTER Log-likelihood Restrict. log-likelihood Chi-squared No. of Observations

Marginal effect (std. error)

Mean of variable

0.01 (0.01) 0.64 (0.20) 0.46 (0.17) 0.41 (0.18) 0.21 (0.12) 0.39 (0.19) −0.46 (0.21) 0.04 (0.14) 0.56 (0.17) −40.91 −96.66 111.50*** 162

39.98 (0.20) 0.20 0.63 0.30 0.68 0.25 0.27 0.24

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .001. a ACRE represents the size of ownership for each landowner, whereas NEAR represents the presence of active RCW clusters within one mile of his or her land. MATURE is the amount of mature pine. Use of burning and chemical or mechanical methods of controlling understory hardwoods is represented by the variable BURN. RISK is a landowners’ perception of the probability of RCW relocation on to his land. MORAL represents whether or not a landowner believes that the society has a moral obligation to protect RCWs and other endangered species. OUTSIDER is whether or not the landowner believes that Safe Harbor would weaken his property rights. AGENCY and FORESTER represent the organization or individual that first approached the landowner regarding Safe Harbor.


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likely to actively manage and derive income from their land. It was expected that these landowners would be interested in protecting their investment by removing some future uncertainties. The variables representing the presence of RCW nearby and the amount of mature pine on land were both positive and significant at p < .01. These two variables represented land characteristics that tend to favor the RCW. The results were consistent with our hypothesis that “risky” land characteristics served as an incentive to signing a Safe Harbor agreement. The variable representing management practices that favor the Red-cockaded Woodpeckers, BURN, was positive and significant (p < .05). This suggested that landowners who had employed prescribed burning and chemical or mechanical methods of controlling understory hardwood had a higher probability of signing an agreement. The variable RISK was also positive and marginally significant (p < .10). This implied that the landowners’ perception of the degree of risk of possible RCW relocation on land had a positive relationship with the probability of signing an agreement. The higher the risk of land becoming an RCW habitat as perceived by the landowner, the higher the probability of signing an agreement. The variable representing landowner attitude on saving endangered species was also positive and significant (p < .05). This meant that landowners who believed that the society had a moral obligation to protect RCW and other endangered species had a higher probability of enrolling into the program. On the other hand, landowners that were concerned about the privacy and property rights issues were less likely to sign an agreement. This variable (OUTSIDER) was negative and significant (p < .05). The variable representing public agencies was positive but not significant. The consulting forester variable, on the other hand, was positive and significant (p < .01). Comparing the results for the two variables, it appeared landowners that learned about Safe Harbor from their consulting foresters had a higher likelihood of enrolling into the program. This may be due to the general skepticism about government agencies among private landowners. This result may be important in determining an appropriate strategy on how to approach landowners about Safe Harbor. Marginal effects for the explanatory variables are listed in Table 1. From these effects, a comparison of the impacts of each of the explanatory variables is possible. It was evident that the presence of RCW within close proximity had the largest impact on enrollment in Safe Harbor. Consulting foresters, by informing their clients about Safe Harbor, had the second largest impact. The issue of privacy, presence of mature pine on land, and the use of “risky” management practices also had significant impacts. Results for the empirical model shed light on the determinants of private landowner participation in the Safe Harbor program. Consistent with the hypotheses, land size, “risky” land characteristics and management practices, landowner perception of risk, landowner opinions about the ESA, and the source of information on Safe Harbor had significant impacts on participation. These results may have important policy implications. Because these estimates were based on actual landowner participation, public agencies responsible for implementing Safe Harbor can adjust their strategies based on the results and increase their probability of success. Landowners that own larger parcels appeared to have a higher probability of enrollment in the program. Economies of scale are the likely reason for this result. Larger parcels have the potential to yield significant amounts of income. Another important component of participation in Safe Harbor appeared to be the number of “risk factors” associated with the silvicultural management activities. These factors tend to attract RCW, hence the probability of land becoming RCW habitat increased significantly. Presence of active RCW clusters in close proximity to the land made it logical to assume that the land

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may become RCW habitat in the future. Presence of mature pine dramatically increased that possibility because the RCW prefers nesting on old-growth pines. The use of prescribed burning and chemical or mechanical hardwood control also contributed to the risk because the resulting ecosystem tended to favor the RCW. Therefore, if a landowner had one or more of these factors present on land, he or she had a higher probability of being willing to participate in the Safe Harbor program. Another significant factor was the landowner’s own perception of risk associated with his or her land. Importance of this factor, however, was totally dependent on the level of landowner awareness of RCW and management implications of the ESA. If the landowner was not aware of the RCW and its status as an endangered species, the perception of risk from RCW will be zero. The survey showed that a substantial proportion of non-participants in Safe Harbor were not familiar with the provisions of the ESA (43%), its impacts on forest management (47%), and legal consequences of not complying with the ESA (51%) (Zhang & Mehmood, 2001). Programs to improve landowner awareness on these issues are in order. Landowner opinions about the ESA in general and Safe Harbor in particular influenced their participation in the program. This was not surprising, however, because opinions often dictate actions and can be considered an important determinant. Following this logic, landowners who concurred with the notion that the society had a moral obligation to protect the RCW were expected to have a higher probability of participation in the Safe Harbor program. On the other hand, landowners concerned about private property rights may fear that Safe Harbor will invite outsiders on their land, and were less likely to sign a Safe Harbor agreement. The final category of variables captured the role of public agencies and private foresters in a landowner’s decision to enroll. Landowners were asked to list their sources of information on Safe Harbor. The results imply that landowners who identified their consulting foresters as their primary source of information had a high probability of participating in the program. The public agency variable, on the other hand, was not significant. This may be indicative of a landowner’s level of comfort with different sources of information. The results imply that the landowners felt more comfortable when approached by their foresters. It is also possible that landowners may perceive information from their foresters to be more reliable. However, because knowledge about Safe Harbor was generally low among non-participants, this result should be viewed with caution.

Conclusions Results from the empirical model suggested some strategies that could be undertaken to boost participation in the Safe Harbor program. Public agencies responsible for implementing the program and policy makers should find this information useful. The results suggested that efforts should be undertaken to increase general awareness of landowners about the program. Public agencies should focus their limited resources on owners of large parcels with substantial mature pines, who have active RCW clusters in close proximity to their land, and those who practice silvicultural management that favors the RCW. These landowners have the highest probability of having RCW on their land either now or in the future and thus have a high likelihood of signing an agreement. Landowner opinions should also be studied in the process of finding future participants. Individuals that are “friendly” to the concept of saving endangered species are more likely to participate. Also, landowners that are concerned about privacy and property rights are less likely to enroll. Steps should be taken to minimize these concerns. Interaction with the landowners, seminars, and meetings with landowners who are already participants in the program should


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help in this endeavor. The results also suggested that the landowners may be more comfortable being approached by consulting foresters than public employees. The public agencies could work closely with the consulting foresters and increase the probability of enrolling new participants.

Note 1. The Endangered Species Act as amended by P.L. 108–136, November 24, 2003. Available on the Web at http://endangered.fws.gov/esa.html.

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