Direct Delivery of Power Subsidy to Manage Energy ... - ScienceDirect

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ScienceDirect Aquatic Procedia 5 (2015) 22 – 30

World Water Week, 31 August to 5 September 2014, Stockholm, Sweden

Direct delivery of power subsidy to manage energy–ground water–agriculture nexus M. Gulatia* and S. Pahujab a

United Nations Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) Initiative, P.O. Box 500 F-162, A- 1400, Vienna, Austria b The World Bank, 1818 H Street, Washington, DC 20433, NW, USA

Abstract India’s energy policy of subsidized power supply to the agricultural sector has significantly contributed to a high level of dependence on ground water supply for irrigation in rural areas. Stakeholders – energy companies, farmers and other power users – are trapped in a continuous downward spiral of deteriorating power service delivery, near-bankrupt electricity companies, declining ground water levels, and stagnant or declining agricultural productivity. Yet, the dynamics of electoral politics has made it almost impossible to normalize the level of electricity tariffs. This article proposes a scheme for direct delivery of the power subsidy to farmers in a cost-effective, transparent and targeted manner. The scheme makes use of segregated electricity feeders, minimum energy support for farmers, smart metering and subsidy delivery via ICT-based instruments in order to maximize benefits for all stakeholders by offering a better power supply and transparent subsidy delivery mechanism to reduce inefficiencies in the current system and breakout of the downward spiral. © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-reviewunder under responsibility of Stockholm International Water Institute. Peer-review responsibility of Stockholm International Water Institute. Keywords: energy-ground water-agriculture nexus; India; power subsidy; rural electricity supply

1.

Introduction

Electrically powered ground water irrigation is widely prevalent throughout the world, especially in South Asia, North China, the Middle East, North Africa, Mexico and the USA. India is considered to be the largest user of ground water, accounting for at least 60 per cent of the world’s irrigation water supply and 85 per cent of rural drinking water

* Corresponding Author. Tel.: +43 (1) 260 60 834 12 E-mail address: [email protected]

2214-241X © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of Stockholm International Water Institute. doi:10.1016/j.aqpro.2015.10.005

M. Gulati and S. Pahuja / Aquatic Procedia 5 (2015) 22 – 30

supply (World Bank, 2010; Margat & van der Gun, 2013). India’s unique policy of an ‘unmetered’ and often ‘free’ power supply for those working in the agricultural sector has significantly contributed to a high dependence on the supply of ground water in rural areas. All the relevant stakeholders – the state, power companies and farmers – are therefore trapped in a vicious spiral of declining ground water levels, stagnant or declining agricultural productivity, deteriorating power service delivery and near-bankrupt electricity companies. Until the early 1970s, as in other countries, India levied charges on electric tubewell owners based on metered electricity consumption. However, as the number of tubewells began to increase rapidly in the next decade, state electricity companies removed the meters, stopped recording consumption and introduced flat tariffs for agricultural electricity supply. The aim was to reduce transaction costs, with the expectation that the flat tariffs would be gradually increased in line with increases in generation and supply costs. However, the dynamics of electoral politics made it almost impossible to normalize the tariff levels. Populist policies were competitively adopted by political parties and this led to many states providing a free and unmetered supply of electricity. Farmers today take this for granted, which can result in ground water being exploited and electricity being used inefficiently. While this substantial inefficiency and technical/commercial losses are hidden behind the ‘generous’ policy, state-level policymakers hesitate to reduce or withdraw these power subsidies due to the fear of political unpopularity. If there are further delays in addressing the energy–ground water nexus issue, it will be difficult to avoid irreversible damage to government budgets, utilities, farmers, ground water resources and the overall environment. To minimize the impact of an unmetered and subsidized power supply, a systematic, viable, realistic and politically feasible approach to change the status quo is urgently required. This article proposes a transparent, efficient and politically feasible solution in the form of a scheme that delivers the power subsidy directly to farmers. It involves segregated electricity feeders for agriculture, minimum energy support (MES) for farmers, smart metering and subsidy delivery via information and communications technology (ICT)-based instruments, and performance-based incentives for employees of the utility companies. The scheme could provide farmers with an improved service delivery, as well as giving them incentives to use electricity and ground water efficiently. It is also expected to improve the operational and financial performances of power companies while creating the right conditions for improving the rural power supply without aggravating the states’ fiscal burden. Finally, the article explores how different stakeholders’ interests can be aligned, and proposes an implementation framework 2.

Impact of unmetered and subsidized power

The total subsidy reflected as receivable in the books of the power utilities increased to INR 369 billion in 2012– 2013 from INR 300 billion the previous year. This subsidy, as a percentage of revenue from the sale of power, increased from 12.44 per cent in 2011–2012 to 12.81 per cent in 2012–13. While state governments release almost the entire subsidy, the power companies ignore the substantial technical and commercial losses. The aggregate technical and commercial losses for utilities were 25.38 per cent in 2012–2013, and the aggregate book losses on accrual basis for all utilities reached INR 680 billion (more than USD 11 billion). During the same period, the share of agricultural consumption accounted for 23 per cent of total energy sold (in GWh). However, the share of revenue from agricultural consumers was only 8 per cent of the total revenue (Power Finance Corporation, “The Performance of State Power Utilities” for the years 2010-11 to 2012-13). Furthermore, large and persistent financial losses in the power sector are exacerbated by the inadequate and late payment of the subsidy by the state governments and have hindered infrastructure maintenance, undermined the utility companies’ ability to finance the investments required to meet the increasing demands for electricity, and impeded the development of the companies’ organizational capacity and staff skills. Financial institutions are also no longer willing to extend short-term loans to power companies that suffer financial losses. Without systematically changing how power is delivered to the agricultural industry, the power sector would continue to be a fiscal burden and an impediment to India’s plans to accelerate economic growth.

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While farmers are presumably the beneficiaries of subsidized electricity, they suffer from a de facto ‘deelectrification’ due to the lack of accountability of the power companies. The power that is supplied to the agriculture sector is rationed and is of poor quality, suffering from voltage fluctuations, changing frequency, low voltage, frequent interruptions and phase imbalances. This imposes significant coping costs on not only the farmers but also the entire rural population. Thus, the growth of local industries and businesses in rural areas has been hampered. Moreover, ground water overexploitation has reached near-crisis level in some Indian states. Nine states – Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Haryana, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu (Figure 1) – together account for 85 per cent of the ground water blocks that are in a critical condition in India (Planning Commission, 2007). If the current trend of falling ground water tables continues, 60 per cent of all aquifers in India will be in a critical condition by 2025.

Figure 1. Stressed ground water blocks in India. Source: Mukherji, et al., 2012

It is clear that the current system of electricity provision to the agricultural industry is unsustainable. While numerous suggestions have been made to address the problem of inter-linked energy–ground water–irrigation sectors, most have focused on the withdrawal of power subsidies and the reintroduction of pricing for agricultural power. These solutions have not gained much traction, which is understandable because they ignore the political realities on the ground. Farmers who are used to the notion of free or highly subsidized power are reluctant to relinquish that access, so political decision-makers hesitate to implement a rational pricing for the agricultural power supply as it could result in popularity being lost. Rural prosperity is largely driven by the irrigation economy in which ground water plays an important role and under the present circumstances, a withdrawal of subsidies from farmers cannot be considered a realistic proposition. However, as this article will describe, it is quite possible to redesign the subsidy without reducing the benefits to the farmers, and to deliver it in a cost-effective and transparent manner. Furthermore, there is evidence that electricity unit pricing has a positive influence on ground water use efficiency and productivity (Kumar, 2005). Therefore electricity pricing could be implemented in a politically feasible manner, it would form an effective approach for ground water management.

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3.

Proposed alternative: direct delivery of power subsidies

The scheme proposed here offers farmers an improved electricity service as well as incentives to use electricity and ground water more efficiently within the existing framework of free or subsidized power. It will also motivate power company employees to improve their operational and financial performances, and create the right conditions for improving the rural power supply without increasing the fiscal burden on the government. Under the scheme, farmers would have two options. They can choose either to continue with the current system of limited hours of (low-quality) power supply, or to adopt the new system of a more reliable power supply with the subsidy distributed as a quantity of electricity. Adoption of the new scheme would be decided by farmers collectively, through a majority decision, as a community of consumers connected to a feeder supplying electricity for irrigation (‘opt-in’ feeders). In this scheme, the national government and state governments do not have to promote a policy that might be perceived to be unfavorable by the farmers, but instead offers an option they might be willing to try. There are four key elements to the scheme: segregated feeders to supply power to farmlands and villages; MES for farmers; smart metering and subsidy delivery through use of ICT-based instruments; and transparent and measurable performance-linked incentives for employees of the power companies. First, the current system of supplying electricity to the village habitat and agricultural consumers through the same feeder, which holds the residential and commercial consumers in the village hostage to the supply schedule of the agricultural consumers, needs to be changed. Having separate electricity feeders for supplying the agricultural load and the village habitat would make it possible to provide better-quality power to rural non-agricultural (residential and commercial) consumers for longer. This would generate opportunities for micro-enterprises to invest in off-farm and non-farm income-generating activities. Moreover, it would help realize the potential of ‘smart’ rationing and the synchronization of farm power supply with the needs of agricultural operations. The positive results of feeder segregation can be seen in several Indian states. For example, in Gujarat, where feeder segregation was pioneered through its Jyotigram Scheme, the power supply to villages has been significantly improved while still maintaining subsidies, resulting in prospering village economies and an enhanced quality of life (Shah & Verma, 2008; Shah, et al., 2008; World Bank, 2012). Karnataka also achieved good results in some pilot projects; for example, feeder segregation of power supply in Malur Taluk resulted in a significant reduction in the frequency and duration of interruptions, an improved voltage and fewer transformer failures (Table 1). The High Voltage Distribution System included in feeder segregation in Punjab also successfully improved the quality of supply to agriculture. However, some states that focused only on segregation and not on simultaneously improving feeder metering and management controls did not achieve similar advantages. The Indian Government has recognized the benefits of rural feeder segregation and has launched a flagship programme that will hopefully benefit from the lessons learned from previous successes as well failures (Shah & Verma, 2008; World Bank, 2012). Table 1: Results of feeder segregation in Malur Taluk, Karnataka (World Bank, 2012) Serial number. 1

Details

Before segregation

After segregation

Improvement in voltage (single phase)

150 V

218 V

2

Reduction in distribution transformer failure rate

1.37%

0.8%

3

Reduction in technical losses

20.7%

17.3%

4

Increase in demand and billed energy (kWh)

91,180

100,342

5

Reduction in the number of interruptions

85

22

6

Reduction in the duration of interruptions (hours/year)

213.7

6.45

Secondly, MES would provide an annual electricity allocation to each farmer, encouraging them to use electricity more efficiently. The MES could be defined either in number of hours of supply or in quantity of electricity (kWh), and the amount of subsidy can be estimated either on the basis of connected load or the size of landholding. The authors favour distribution of the subsidy in kWh linked to the size of landholding. With this approach, the electricity requirement estimates for existing agricultural operations would be prepared and finalized through farmer consultations and the participation of agricultural experts. Any electricity saved by the farmer through efficient use or

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conservation could be either added to the MES for the following year or encashed. It would therefore completely shift the farmers’ incentives towards more efficient energy and ground water use. Countries such as Spain, Mexico, Oman and Bangladesh have already implemented MES (Mukherji & Shah, 2012). Thirdly, smart metering and subsidy delivery via ICT-based instruments would be an integral part of the scheme. Smart metering that can be read online in real time is a well-established and cost-effective technology that could easily be adopted in India, as mobile connectivity is widely available. A mobile phone could be used to control a farmer’s pump sets and power use from hundreds of kilometers away, and also to receive information on power supply, consumption and billing. A farmer from Punjab driving a truck to Bangalore to supplement his income, could operate the pump on his farm in Punjab while on the road. Automated metering infrastructure (AMI) has been successfully deployed in North America, Europe, South America and East Asia, and is being promoted in India through the India Smart Grid Task Force. The subsidy would be delivered via smart card or bar-coded vouchers sent by the state government directly to the beneficiaries. Fourthly, performance-based incentives would be provided to power company employees. Creating performancebased incentives is critical to gain utility workers’ support for implementing and sustaining the scheme. Over the past decade, specific, quantifiable, equitable and transparent incentives to improve productivity have been introduced in some Indian companies in the form of employee stock options (ESOPs). As of 2008, more than 100 companies listed on the Mumbai Stock Exchange had issued ESOP schemes (Dhiman, 2009). Some state utility companies, for example, in Maharashtra, West Bengal and Haryana, have also initiated a form of performance-linked incentives. The proposed scheme will provide longer hours of supply to the farmers, with flexibility of use, and deliver the subsidy direct to the beneficiaries through an ICT-based instrument, unlike the current system. This approach would help provide better estimates of agricultural power consumption and losses, thereby making theft by other customers more difficult. Furthermore, the subsidy burden on the state government can potentially be reduced while maintaining the subsidy benefits to the farmers. 4.

Aligning the stakeholders’ interests

Direct delivery of the power subsidy is expected to bring substantial benefits to each stakeholder as against the current conditions of mistrust and distorted incentives (Table 2). For example, farmers could reduce production costs and risks by synchronizing energy use with irrigation needs. They would also enjoy more flexibility and convenience, as the power supply would be provided for longer and can be controlled remotely. An improvement in the power supply to a village would improve the inhabitants’ quality of life and promote local non-farm and off-farm economic activities. Similarly, power companies would be able to take advantage of prompt subsidy payment and cost-covering tariffs at an efficient performance level. Customer demand could be met and quality services provided, with less political interference operationally. As the utility companies’ financial dependence on government would decline, company employees would be able to get better salaries, better career opportunities and professional development. Both the national government and state governments could expect economic growth driven by the improved power sector under the scheme for direct delivery of the power subsidy. Also, the amount of fiscal burden could be predicted and subsidy costs reduced. Electricity theft would be reduced and the efficient use of electricity and ground water would be widespread. Decision-makers would obtain political benefits from a better supply to the agricultural industry and a 24/7 power supply to the rural population. Notwithstanding these foreseeable benefits, implementing the proposed approach would still be a big challenge because farmers are initially not likely to trust the commitment of the state government or the utility companies. Equally, the state governments and the power companies consider that farmers do not use free power in an efficient manner. In addition, the state governments and regulators do not trust the power companies when it comes to reporting losses and agricultural consumption. Therefore, building trust among stakeholders through meaningful consultations and by implementing successful pilot schemes should be the first step of the approach. In Punjab and Karnataka, a survey and focus group discussions with farmers revealed that some of them were willing to pilot a metered supply scheme, despite a widespread mistrust of utility companies and government, which remains a recurring theme and major barrier to implementing any scheme (IWMI, 2011). Most paddy growers who supplemented irrigation through diesel-fired power generation expressed a willingness to pay for additional power.


Typically, the farmers defined supply quality as: ‘better voltage, fewer fluctuations, longer hours of supply and daytime supply’, since supply during the night makes it difficult to monitor water distribution. Farmers were willing to pay for additional supply and metered consumption if the costs were reflected in the support price of their crop. About 74 per cent of farmers were willing to accept metered connections and to pay for a good-quality supply but opinions differed across the regions: farmers in Sangrur were more receptive to trying the new scheme compared with those in Patiala who were opposed to metering. However, most farmers expressed a lack of confidence in the ability of the power company to implement the scheme (IWMI, 2011). Table 2: Stakeholder incentives: from distortions and mistrust to desired outcomes. Source: Authors 2015 Stakeholders

Existing conditions

Desired outcomes

Farmers

Inadequate (five to six hours) and inconveniently timed supply Poor-quality supply, unaffordable tariff requiring subsidy, high costs for power connection, difficulty in getting connected High coping costs

Power supply synchronized with irrigation and harvesting needs Adequate, good-quality power supply for agriculture Tariff subsidy necessary to sustain agriculture

Non-agricultural rural consumers

Limited hours of supply Poor quality of life (health, education, burden on women) Small and medium enterprise investments unattractive due to power shortage, rural economy almost completely dependent on lowproductivity agriculture

Improved power supply and service quality for non-agricultural rural consumers Tariff concession for vulnerable households Easy connection and continuous supply to SMEs

Power-sector employees

Poor compensation and unsatisfactory career opportunities Operation and maintenance responds only to dire emergencies Political interference in tariff, staffing and revenue collection, power theft is overlooked or politically protected Poor reputation among consumers, media and politicians

Improved compensation career opportunities and professional development Reduced financial dependence on government, thus reducing political interference Employees take pride in their work and are committed to the company and consumer satisfaction

Elected representatives

High political cost for power company’s poor performance Dissatisfied rural constituents Inefficient power sector Instrument of political patronage

Political benefits from subsidy and efficient power sector Development dividend

Government

Impedes economic growth Unsustainable fiscal burden Significant losses and theft Inefficient electricity/ground water use

Power sector drives economic growth Predictable fiscal burden and lower subsidy costs Eliminate electricity theft Efficient electricity and ground water use

Power distribution companies

Politically mandated tariffs, insufficient subsidy Unable to borrow and invest for system expansion to meet demand Unable to upgrade staff skills

Cost-covering tariffs at efficient performance level Prompt subsidy payment Meet customer demand and provide a quality service Operates within government policies but without political interference High-quality staff, competitive and well-run company

Urban consumers

High tariffs for poor supply and service

Good supply, professional service, fair tariffs

Suppliers, lenders, investors

Financially unviable High political and regulatory risks

Credit-worthy borrower

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5.

Implementation framework

The implementation framework consists of four phases that could be brought into effect over three to four years, depending on the progress in rural feeder segregation. Phase 1 would be a conceptualization process lasting for about six months, involving consultations with stakeholders and building political and administrative support for the implementation team. Phase 2 would focus on planning and design, including engineering design, collection and validation of land-records and consumer data, and estimation of the MES subsidy allocation. Phase 3 would include pilot-testing, monitoring and assessing scalability and last for one to two years. Engagement with farmers, proactive communication and coordination of the implementation team with the appropriate agriculture and ground water departments of the state would be integrated into one package and delivered simultaneously. The last phase would focus on rolling out the scheme through the entire state, with a strong and scaled-up implementation team, a spatially segmented and sequenced implementation programme, and committed political and financial resources for two to three years. The institutional arrangements for implementation would consist of the state government, the power distribution company and the feeder-level user community for the ‘opt-in’ feeders. The state government would launch various entities, including a project steering committee comprising representatives from the departments of power, finance, revenue, agriculture and water resources, the power company, farmers and the feeder-level user community coordinators, and headed by the Chief Secretary. The finance department would be responsible for implementing the mechanism for smart cards or bar-coded vouchers, making advance and replenishment subsidy payments, maintaining financial accounts and auditing the subsidy payments. The revenue department would establish systems to maintain updated land-records and provide online access to the power company in order to ensure the alignment of electricity connection for farm power and subsidy allocation with existing landrecords. The agriculture and ground water departments would help design the subsidy allocation by providing adequately disaggregated information on agricultural productivity, costs and prices, ground water resources, etc. The ground water department could also be responsible for implementing an incentive scheme to improve the efficiency of ground water use through supporting measures such as laser levellers, micro-irrigation and soil moisture measuring devices to optimize the application of water. The power company would be responsible for power-related components, i.e. feeder segregation, AMI, communication infrastructure, metering and billing systems, geographic information system, a consumer database and linkage with land-records. It would also communicate with farmers and other stakeholders, and supervise the community organizations. The feeder-level user community of the ‘opt-in’ feeders is the most important element of the direct subsidy delivery scheme. Farmers need to understand the scheme and receive strong assurances that the power subsidy allocation is secure. It is essential to build consensus among farmers supplied by the selected feeder to opt for the new scheme, and to provide a mechanism for redressing any grievances during implementation. Engagement with the farmers for these activities would be carried out by community organizations or individual feeder-level coordinators (feeder community coordinators) hired by the power company. These coordinators would be an integral part of the implementation mechanism, work closely with the utility company and report to the project steering committee. 6.

State of electricity governance and implementation pathway

Not all states need to adopt this approach. Indian states differ vastly from each other in terms of demand for power from the agricultural sector, grid access, load density and water table. They also differ in terms of institutional capacity, resources, political economy and prior experience with feeder segregation. Therefore, a five-stage pathway of implementation is proposed and states can choose their point of entry depending on their political economy, institutional capacity and availability of resources (Figure 2). This involves four steps: 1) establishing a detailed communication and consultation programme before implementation; 2) designing the specifics of the programme based on the feedback from farmer consultations; 3) conducting pilot programmes and using the results and feedback to improve the scheme design before replication and scaling-up; and 4) providing a choice of ‘opt in’ or ‘opt out’ at a feeder collective level to ensure voluntary participation and thereby establish farmers’ trust in the power companies and government.


Any attempts to address the energy–ground water nexus will inevitably assume continuation of free or subsidized power to the agricultural sector. In this context, the direct delivery of subsidized electricity to farmers is regarded as a pragmatic and politically feasible solution that can enhance rural power supply without increasing states’ fiscal burden. It is also expected to create incentives for the efficient use of electricity and improve utility performance. It is generally accepted that pro rata electricity tariffs could result in the efficient use of ground water, but many have argued that the level of tariff increases at which the demand becomes responsive will be too high to be socioeconomically viable. The proposed scheme obviates the need for tariff increases, and could therefore serve as a pragmatic instrument for influencing ground water abstraction and use by farmers.

Figure 1. Five stages of electricity governance and conditions precedent for moving to the next stage. Source: Authors 2015

7.

Conclusions and the way forward

Ground water-based farming is the engine of rural India’s economic prosperity. State governments, utility companies and farmers should address the ground water–energy nexus through a set of politically and financially feasible and socially acceptable alternatives. This work provides a clear rationale and evidence for the way forward with the direct delivery of power subsidies, and has been reviewed in the light of international best practices and broadly vetted through stakeholder consultation. Because there are vast differences between Indian states in terms of demand for power from the agricultural sector, grid access, load density, state of the water table, institutional capacity, resources, political economy and previous experience with feeder separation, a modular implementation programme is proposed to suit the individual circumstances of the states. Depending on the political economy, institutional capacity and availability of resources, states can choose an implementation pathway that is most appropriate for them. As the proposed scheme combines mature and proven technologies and management tools, each individual state can choose its entry point into the five-stage modular subsidy delivery model, depending on its starting conditions and opportunities afforded by political economy. Since history has locked the farmers, power companies and state governments in a state of distrust, it is critical that implementation of the scheme is supported by not only adequate financial and managerial resources but also a credible process of trust-building between stakeholders.

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Acknowledgements The financial and technical support by the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) is gratefully acknowledged. References Dhiman, R.K., (2009). The elusive employee stock option plan-productivity link: evidence from India, International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management 58 (6), 542-563. IWMI, (2011). Groundwater and electricity linkages: evidence from farmers’ surveys in Punjab (September 2011) and Karnataka (October 2011). Report submitted to ESMAP, World Bank by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) Colombo. December, 2011. Kumar, M.D., (2005). Impact of electricity prices and volumetric water allocation on energy and groundwater demand management: Analysis from Western India. Energy Policy 33, 39–51. Margat, J.J., van der Gun, J., (2013). Groundwater around the World: A Geographic Synopsis. CRC Press/Balkema, Leiden. 376 pages. Mukherji, A., Shah, T., (2012). A Review of International Experience in Managing Energy Irrigation Nexus. Water Policy Research Highlight, Article No. 34/2012. IWMI-TATA Water Policy Program, International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Colombo. Retrieved online April, 2014 from: http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/iwmi-tata/PDFs/2012_Highlight-34.pdf. Mukherji, A., Shah, T., Giordano, M., (2012). Managing Energy-irrigation Nexus in India - A Typology of State Interventions. Water Policy Research Highlight, Article No. 36/2012. IWMI-TATA Water Policy Program, International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Colombo. Retrieved online April, 2014 from: http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/iwmi-tata/PDFs/2012_Highlight-36.pdf Planning Commission (2007). Report of the Expert Group on Groundwater Management and Ownership, Government of India. Planning Commission, Yojana Bhawan, New Delhi. Power Finance Corporation (PFC). (2013). PFC Report: Performance of State Power Utilities from the years 2010-11 to 2012-13. PFC, New Delhi. Shah,T., Bhatt, S., Shah, R.K., Talati, J., (2008). Groundwater governance through electricity supply management: Assessing an innovative intervention in Gujarat, western India. Agricultural Water Management 95, 1233-1242. Shah, T., Verma, S., (2008). Co-management of electricity and groundwater: an assessment of Gujarat’s Jyotigram Scheme. Indian Economic & Political Weekly 43 (7), 59-66. World Bank, (2010). Deep wells and prudence: Towards pragmatic action for addressing groundwater overexploitation in India. World Bank, Washington D.C. Retrieved online August, 2014 from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INDIAEXTN/Resources/2955831268190137195/DeepWellsGroundWaterMarch2010.pdf. World Bank, 2012. Lighting Rural India: Experience of Rural Load Segregation Schemes in States. World Bank, Washington, DC. Retrieved online from: September, 2014 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16690/814850WP0Final000PUBLIC00Box%20379832B.pdf?sequence=1.