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Argumentation studies and discourse analysis: the French situation and global perspectives .... Alice, who was always ready for a little argument = une bonne discussion ..... always been well known in the specialist circle of philosophers of law.
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Argumentation studies and discourse analysis: the French situation and global perspectives M Plantin Discourse Studies 2002; 4; 343 DOI: 10.1177/1461445602004003676 The online version of this article can be found at: http://dis.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/4/3/343

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A RT I C L E

343

Argumentation studies and discourse analysis: the French situation and global perspectives

CHRISTIAN PLANTIN C E N T R E N AT I O N A L D E L A R E C H E RC H E S C I E N T I F I Q U E U N I V E R S I T Y O F LYO N

(GRIC),

2

Discourse Studies Copyright © 2002 SAGE Publications. (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) Vol 4(3): 343–368. [1461-4456 (200208) 4:3; 343–368; 023676]

A B S T R A C T This article focuses on the development of argumentation studies in France and their complex relations with discourse analysis. First, the meanings of the basic word ‘argument’ in French and in American English are discussed and contrasted. Second, a brief historical section summarizes the complex history of rhetorical argumentation in France up until the late 1980s and the Perelmanian revival. Third, Grize ‘natural logic’ and Anscombre and Ducrot ‘argumentation within language’ are briefly discussed from the discourse analysis point of view. These programmes have restored argumentation study to favour in France, where it is currently the research paradigm most referred to in recent work. The fourth section examines the present situation in France which is characterized by a strong new interest in argumentation in all disciplines; this is fuelling a tendency towards the use of argumentation theories – classical or modern – for practical, short-term analysis purposes. Fifth, a proposal is made for a better integration of argumentation studies in discourse analysis, based on the conception of argumentation as opposite points of view, either in face-to-face disputes or in written arguments, sometimes lasting for several centuries. This article is based on the premise that research into the history of rhetoric and argumentation, as well as in specific discourse analytic trends that emerged in France during the 1970s, has some permanent value in that a better understanding of an academic discipline’s historical development can be a good introduction to its current problems. KEY WORDS:

dialogue, French studies, informal logic, pragmatics, rhetoric

Formulated in the 1960s and 1970s, the earliest French discourse analytic programmes initiated by Foucault or Pêcheux were seldom argumentation oriented; nonetheless, argumentation studies now appears to be a popular branch of discourse analysis, at least in France. The reasons for this evolution are rather complex; some are closely linked to the specificity of the French situation, others are more general.

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344 Discourse Studies 4(3)

This article analyses the development of the complex relations between argumentation studies and discourse analysis as follows: (1) In order to clarify the definition of the word ‘argument’ in French and American English, some divergent meanings are examined. (2) This section argues that the discourse-analytic programme has specific ‘conditions of production’ of its own, that is, historically situated. The historical decline of rhetoric, expelled from the curriculum at the turn of the century, is part of the context. Until the late 1980s and the Perelman revival, the prevailing intellectual and academic background had been characterized by ignorance and a distrust of rhetorical argumentation. (3) Grize’s ‘natural logic’ (1982, 1990, 1996) and Anscombre and Ducrot’s ‘argumentation within language’ (AwL) theory (Anscombre, 1995; Ducrot, 1972, 1973, 1984, 1988; Ducrot and Anscombre, 1986; Ducrot et al., 1980) are briefly discussed from the discourse analysis point of view. These programmes have restored the study of argumentation to favour in France, where it is currently the research paradigm most referred to in recent work. (4) This section examines the present situation in France which is characterized by a strong new interest in argumentation in all disciplines. This is fuelling a tendency towards the use of argumentation theories – classical or modern – for practical, short-term (some might say, short-sighted) analytic purposes, focusing on the corpora under analysis. Complex models integrating insights from interaction theory and enunciation theory are needed. (5) A proposal is made for a better integration of argumentation studies in the discipline of discourse analysis, based on the conception of argumentation as opposite points of view, either in face-to-face confrontation or in written arguments sometimes lasting for several centuries. This article is based on the premise that research into the history of rhetoric and argumentation, as well as in specific discourse analytic trends that emerged in France during the 1970s, has some permanent value in that a better understanding of a discpline’s historical development can be a good introduction to its current problems.

1. Pre-theoretical lexical research There is a significant difference in meaning between the lexico-semantic fields associated with the word argumentation in French (F) and in American English (AE). Whereas argumentation (F) is indeed a good counterpart of argumentation (AE), the words argument, argumenter (F)/argument, to argue (AE) are faux amis, false friends; in most of their occurrences, an argument (AE) is not un argument (F), and to argue (AE) doesn’t translate as argumenter (F). In other words, the obvious morphological parallel between the following two series of words can be semantically and theoretically misleading in some major aspects:

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Plantin: Argumentation studies and discourse analysis 345

American English (AE): French (F):

an argument, to argue, argumentation, argumentative, argumentativity un argument, argumenter, arguer, argumentation, argumentatif, argumentativité.

TO ARGUE , ( AN ) ARGUMENT

In a basic study, O’Keefe (1977) suggests ‘two meanings of argument and arguing’, along the following lines: ●



to argue (1) = ‘to give reasons’ (Webster); following this definition, to argue can be constructed with a singular or plural subject, and is followed by a ‘that’ clause. To argue that P is a monological activity. to argue (2) = ‘to have a disagreement; quarrel; dispute’ (Webster); following this definition, to argue is constructed with the preposition about, and refers to a vast domain of interactions ranging from normal discussion to verbal and paraverbal fights. Arguing with X about P is a dialogical activity.

These definitions demonstrate how these two distinct lexico-semantic fields can be distinguished in American English. In French, the verb argumenter is an excellent equivalent of to argue (1) = ‘to give reasons’, but a very poor translation of to argue (2) which corresponds to ‘discuter (de manière agressive)’ (F); argumenter (F) never means ‘to quarrel’. All the words belonging to its lexico-semantic field have this monosemic meaning: un argument (F) is always a logical argument, never ‘a quarrel’, etc. Therefore, the use of the French set of words is more restricted than the use of the seemingly parallel American English set of words; the French set of words denotes a logicolinguistic activity, without any interactional, potentially aggressive, connotation. In the following examples, neither argument (F) nor argumentation (F) can be used to translate argument (AE): Alice, who was always ready for a little argument = une bonne discussion Alice didn’t want to begin another argument = recommencer à se disputer If you lose an argument... = si vous n’avez pas le dessus dans une discussion

Two further points: ●



un argument (F) can designate through synecdoche (in which a part represents the whole), the complete discourse ‘good reasons + point of view’, just like ‘an argument’ (1) (AE). the meaning of the (not very usual) French verb arguer (de) differs from argumenter (F) in a curious way. In the sentence ‘Pierre argue de P’, the speaker mentions Pierre’s position or argument, without identifying himself with this position. Therefore, arguer de P (F) is typically used to report the opponent’s argument or to distance oneself from an argument. By saying ‘M. Le Pen argue de . . .’ the speaker mentions Le Pen’s argument and distances himself or herself from the discourse of the extreme right-wing leader.

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346 Discourse Studies 4(3) ARGUMENTATIVE , ARGUMENTATIVITY ( AE )

The problem becomes acute with argumentative (F) vs argumentative (AE); argumentatif (F) is derived from argument, and only carries a meaning related to ‘building up a good logical argument’. However, argumentative (AE) is more likely to mean argue with X: thus, an argumentative character (AE) = une personne querelleuse (F). All this demonstrates that there is a risk of misunderstanding French expressions like l’orientation argumentative d’un énoncé, which are basic to Anscombre and Ducrot’s theory of argumentation, whose semantic thesis implies that ‘any sentence conveys as (part of) its meaning an orientation towards a conclusion.’ The (practically unavoidable) word-for-word translation ‘the argumentative orientation of an utterance’ should not be taken to refer to or evoke any form of verbal aggression; the production of argumentatively oriented utterances does not denote an aggressive personality. The conclusion therefore is that the lexical field of argumenter (F) is semantically homogeneous and always denotes a verbal–intellectual activity consisting of ‘giving good reasons’, i.e. ‘constructing an argument’. Therefore, a practical rule could be to think solely of argumentation (F/AE) when dealing with French words like argument, argumenter, argumentative and argumentativité. Table 1 sums up these analogies and differences. 1. Analogies and differences in American English (AE) and French (F) for basic forms of the word ‘argument’

TA B L E

American English (AE)

French (F)

argumentation to argue (1) (to argue that –) to argue (2) (to argue with –/ about –)

argumentation argumenter discuter, se disputer

an argument (1) an argument (2)

un argument une discussion, une dispute

argumentative (1) argumentative (2)

argumentatif, -ive ergoteur, raisonneur (Collins), querelleur

argumentativity (1) argumentativity (2)

argumentativité l'agressivité verbale

Note: argumentative (1) (AE) and argumentativity (1) (AE) have been introduced as a development of the argumentation, argue (1) line.

Thus, from a theoretical point of view, we can conclude that the field of argumentation studies corresponds very well to the field of the études de l’argumentation; however, the study of argument covers a broader field, of a more fiery nature, i.e. the field of ‘conflict studies’. I come back to this point later in this article.

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Plantin: Argumentation studies and discourse analysis 347

2. The legacy It could be argued that discourse analysis has a past: rhetoric. According to its classical definition, rhetoric is the theoretical and practical science of public speaking with a heterogeneous audience, including resolute opponents, enthusiastic supporters and sceptical, scrupulous or stubborn ‘don’t knows’. Through (more or less carefully planned) discourse, speakers choose specific words to represent their views and opinions and convert their audience towards their preferred line of action. This rhetorical procedure can be applied to all public discourse – judicial, political, religious and ceremonial. In the US, contemporary rhetoric is a traditional component of speech studies. This situation contrasts strongly with the prevailing situation in France, where the brilliant development of the history of rhetoric can be contrasted with the scarcity of practical rhetorical analysis of contemporary (non-literary) material. This may parallel the development of discourse analysis; for example, it could be unwise to oppose rhetoric without practice and examine discourse analysis without studying its history. Maybe this only adds to the controversial relationship between discourse analysis and rhetorical analysis: are they separated by an ‘epistemological abyss’ or simply by a series of historical accidents and academic routines? The indisputable fact is that the analysis of contemporary discourse is carried out quite independently of the conceptual framework of rhetorical analysis; a major part of this very conceptual framework has come under the apparently more acceptable term of ‘argumentation studies’. The discourse of discourse analysis has been built up on the implicit rejection (or neglect, or absence) of rhetoric, in keeping with a century-long historical trend, that needs to be at least outlined here. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, rhetoric was excluded from the universities and logic became a formal discipline. Some aspects of the present situation of argumentation studies in France can be considered to be a consequence of this historical trend. At that time, argumentation studies was certainly not a specific field. In order to get an initial idea of what happened then, this article now examines argumentation’s closest relatives: logic and rhetoric. ARGUMENTATION STUDIES IN RELATION TO RHETORIC

As a basic part of rhetorical creativity, argumentation studies were affected by the disappearance of rhetoric from the new-born Republican university’s syllabus at the end of the 19th century. Rhetoric was criticized and eliminated as a non-scientific, therefore illegitimate, study. In France, practical rhetoric has never recovered from this type casting; only the history of rhetoric is considered a suitable subject for the academic field. In order to understand what happened to rhetoric at that time, one has to keep in mind the historical and political background, that is, the 1870 defeat of France by Germany and the necessity for a new start in politics as well as in intellectual life. Politically, this new start was the Third Republic.

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348 Discourse Studies 4(3)

In intellectual life, this was a period of intense political and ideological activity, of the re-conception of knowledge and, consequently, re-definition of the basic tasks of the university and reformation of the curriculum. This general remodelling was promoted by the Third Republic, on the basis of both a secular and a positivist view of science, culture and society. The impulse for these transformations was a new conception of knowledge: ‘positive knowledge’. History was the rising star, the prototypical positive method able to deliver scientific knowledge in the field of the humanities. Positive knowledge was seen as contradictory to ‘formal knowledge’, the best example of which was rhetorical ‘know how’. No considerations of consensus, opinion, topoi, doxa, amplification or eloquence could be defended when confronted with the positive findings of historical research. Thus, rhetorical knowledge is no knowledge at all. Moreover, two aggravating circumstances reinforced the case against rhetoric: (i) the predominance of Jesuit education in a period of intense contest between the church and the state (which ended with the 1905 separation of church and state); and (ii) owing to its use in Jesuit colleges, the fact that rhetoric was linked to Latin, with all rhetorical exercises being practised in that language. This period marked a peak in the neverending quarrel over the place of Latin in literary studies, similar to the modern movement for an emancipation of French from Latin. A secular state would thus strive to eliminate rhetoric from the educational curriculum as it was synonymous with one-sided religious education. Consequently, the new curriculum in French studies was re-shaped as an historical approach to literature, as opposed to a rhetorical one; new forms of academic expression (French composition, literary history, commentary on literary texts) appeared in high schools (lycées). All these new forms explicitly excluded rhetoric, even if the classical rhetorical forms and devices remained in practice throughout this period, as well as in our own – how could it be otherwise? Therefore, it was not surprising that, owing to its link to an earlier conception of education, rhetoric became the obvious symbol of an out-dated religious education compared to the positive knowledge promoted by the modern Republican university. This is the basis for rhetoric’s continuing status of illegitimacy in France. A symbolic measure was taken in 1885, when the 12th grade in high school was renamed: formerly the ‘rhetoric class’ (classe de rhétorique), it now became anonymously known as ‘the last year’ (la classe de terminale); see Collinot and Mazière, 1987; Compagnon, 1983; Douay-Soublin, 1992; Fumaroli, 1980, 1999. Since the discipline of argumentation studies was closely associated with rhetorical studies, it was clearly on the wrong side. But how far? To my knowledge, this question has never received an appropriate answer. However, it should be emphasized that the rhetoric that was excluded from the syllabus – Jesuit rhetoric – was not focused on argumentation but on praelectio, that is to say, text explanation and amplification: a form of oratory not intended to convince by proof and debate, but to subjugate by verbal power.

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Plantin: Argumentation studies and discourse analysis 349 ARGUMENTATION STUDIES AS LOGICAL STUDIES : NEO - THOMISM

Thus, it would be an over-simplification to conclude that the exclusion of rhetoric would inevitably bring about a decline in argumentation studies. Other considerations concerning logic must come into play. These are well known. They correspond to the new status of logic as a branch of mathematics. The publication of the Begriffschrift by Gottlob Frege in 1879 marked the turning point from which logic was no longer seen as the ‘art of thinking’. In France, two major works testify to this long drawn-out evolution: (i) Arnauld and Nicole’s Logique in 1662 (the full title is La Logique ou l’art de penser contenant outre les règles communes, plusieurs observations nouvelles propres à former le jugement (Logic or the art of thinking, containing as well as the common rules, some new observations on forming judgements); and (ii) works such as Condillac’s Traité de l’art de raisonner (Treatise on the art of reasoning) in 1796. In the latter the ‘art of reasoning’ is the art of studying mathematics. Logic became that ‘formal’ discipline against which ‘natural logic’, ‘informal logic’ and ‘substantial logic’ were to rebel one century later. In 1888, Anthelme Chaignet published La rhétorique et son histoire (Rhetoric and its history), the last introductory book to Aristotle’s argumentation theory – and a very good one. Is it possible to conclude that, along with rhetoric and traditional logic, argumentation studies were finally abandoned at the turn of the century? This conclusion would require further investigation. A conceivable hypothesis is that the interest in argumentation lived on but in the restricted domain of religious education, as a part of neo-thomist philosophy. In 1879, Pope Leo XIII published the encyclical Aeterni Patris, which established Thomas Aquinas as a quasi official philosopher for the catholic church. There is certainly a connection between this publication and the fact that important developments relating to traditional logic, as well as valuable examinations of different kinds of arguments can be found in philosophical handbooks such as Abbé Henri Colin’s, Manuel de philosophie thomiste (Manual of thomist philosophy) (1926) dedicated to higher religious education. Important treatises like Maritain’s (1966) Eléments de philosophie II –L’ordre des concepts – Petite logique (logique formelle) (Elements of philosophy II: Order of concepts – Minor logic [formal logic) could also be considered proof of a permanent interest in logic as a philosophy of natural cognition in a neo-thomist framework. A second point needing more investigation concerns argumentation as a practice. As mentioned earlier, this period was highly polemical in religious, political and scientific matters. It might be suspected that, in some way, wellintentioned passionate religious polemists resorted to the age-old argumentation techniques to contest the best-established scientific results – particularly in the field of history, anthropology and geology – on topics such as the age of the earth or the date of the first appearance of human beings.1 There was clearly a clash between argumentative discourse and the reality of scientific proof. Stepping outside their field of validity, argumentative practices were prey to devastating

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350 Discourse Studies 4(3)

refutations of the conclusions they delivered and, further, at risk of being invalidated as a potentially interesting method of investigation in any field. To sum up: at the turn of the century, rhetoric was associated with a group characterized by its religious fervour and anti-Republicanism and was thus excluded from the state education curriculum; logic had turned into a branch of mathematics, whereas argumentation studies were restricted to neo-thomist philosophy and religious education. Finally, argumentation practices were discredited by irrelevant interventions in the most advanced scientific fields. This situation was to remain unchanged until at least the 1970s. THE

1960 S

AND

1970 S :

THE NEW RHETORIC WITHOUT INFLUENCE

The1950s saw the revival of well-known and much celebrated argumentation studies such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1976[1958]) and Toulmin (1993[1958]) as well as Curtius (1948), Lausberg (1960) and Ong (1958). A small book published by Jean-Marie Domenach, La propagande politique (Political Propaganda) (1950) should be added to this brilliant set. Domenach’s definition of the aims of propaganda is quite similar to Perelman’s definition of argument, except in one respect: Domenach emphasizes the fact that beliefs are created and reinforced not only by discursive means but also – and maybe above all – by voice and gesture accompanying discourse, as well as a whole set of semiotic signs such as music and pictures, in addition to forms of organized public action (for example, demonstrations). The classical topos of the ‘renaissance’, or revival, of rhetorical argumentation should be considered in the light of the background sketched in the preceding section; rhetoric and argumentation studies had to win a new legitimacy. In this connection, two works are generally mentioned. Roland Barthes’ (1970) essay, L’ancienne rhétorique – aide mémoire (The Ancient Art of Rhetoric – A Memo) was a short reminder of the classical structure of rhetorical theory. The same year, Groupe Mu (Dubois et al., 1970) published Rhétorique générale (General rhetoric). This fascinating book analyses figures of speech from a linguistic point of view, following the general approach of structuralism applied to semantics. Although conducted in Liège, Belgium, this research mentions Perelman only in a footnote. It looks like proof of the divergence between the two areas of research.2 To a certain extent, the structuralist programme of rhetoric could be designated a ‘Rhetoric within language’ approach, to borrow the title of Ducrot’s AwL programme. However, none of these works stimulated any research that would bring about a practical revival of rhetorical argumentation, neither in education, nor as a social, discourse-theoretic discipline. We now need to consider the reception of Perelman’s book in France. It seems that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise was not practised in the 1960s and 1970s, if it was read at all; his book was therefore not very influential at that time. This claim must be qualified on two counts. First, Perelman’s work has always been well known in the specialist circle of philosophers of law. Second,

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Plantin: Argumentation studies and discourse analysis 351

the new rhetoric appears to be a central theme of reflection for the Neuchâtel school, formed by Jean-Blaise Grize (1982, 1990, 1996), as shown by the topics of the very first issues of the journal Travaux du centre de recherches sémiologiques (CdRS) during the early 1970s: for example, Vignaux (1969–70), Borel (1969–70; Borel et al., 1983) and Grize (1971: see Appendix). Nonetheless, the general trend seems clear. In Belgium, rhetorical argumentation was flourishing around Perelman’s circle, natural logic was developing in Switzerland; however, in France at that time, it seems that nothing significant was happening in the field of rhetorical analysis applied to discourse – no development of a new rhetoric. Perelman was not a ‘cultural leader’ (especially since his work had absolutely no influence on education). To account for this fact, we must consider the prevailing intellectual atmosphere of the period. Roughly speaking, the leaders of intellectual life were such brilliant personalities as Louis Althusser, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan and Michel Pêcheux. The general intellectual atmosphere and the prevailing ideological orientation favoured views of discourse and speech in radical opposition to the general programme of argumentation studies. The main areas of conflict were as follows: ●





The new rhetoric could be criticized for its insufficient theorizing. From a structuralist point of view, the arguments proposed by the new rhetoric were incohesive. Nonetheless, the restriction of argumentation to discursive means was quite in tune with the then predominant structuralist methods or ideology, advocating a strictly literal approach to the text, ignoring any pragmatic considerations. According to rhetorical argumentation, speakers plan and structure their discourse around certain ‘conscious’ goals. During the 1960s and 1970s, criticism was levelled against the concept of ‘author’ or ‘intentionality’ in favour of socio-psychological determinations of discourse. This can be seen in the discourse analysis programme advocated by Pêcheux whereby discourse analysis aims to bring discourse back to its ‘conditions of production’. This would seem to imply that discourse cannot be ‘accounted for’ by its internal structure and avowed meaning and function, but only by the external, material conditions in which it was produced – that is, the social conditions of its occurrence and the social standing of its source (the speaker) from a Marxist point of view, as well as the psychoanalytic constraints on his or her speech. For such an investigative programme, rhetorical argumentation could only be denounced as a form of illusion, an illusory attempt made by the subject to control his or her discourse. Finally, opposition was evident on socio-political grounds. These fields of study base their research on contestation and the radicalization of conflict, which is in marked contrast to the policy of negotiation and rational mediation generally associated with argumentation studies.

This is the situation that prevailed more or less until the end of the 1980s. Subsequently, a new period began with the return of Perelman’s New Rhetoric

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352 Discourse Studies 4(3)

(1976[1958]), which is now quite widely read, along with Ducrot and Grize. But traces of this century-long distrust of argumentation can be easily found – for example, the fact that major works in English, such as Hamblin’s (1970) Fallacies are still generally unknown.

3. The turning point of the 1970s: argumentation reinstated In the 1970s, the works of Ducrot and Grize were influential in the re-introduction of the concept of argumentation into the field of human sciences and discourse analysis. Both have contributed to the re-definition of the usual meaning of the term. NATURAL LOGIC

Since the 1970s, Jean-Blaise Grize, Denis Apothéloz, Marie-Jeanne Borel and Denis Miéville have developed the concept of ‘natural logic’ at the Centre de Recherches Sémiologiques at Neuchâtel University; particular attention was always paid to the linguistic, psychological and sociological implications. As mentioned earlier, the works of Perelman and Ducrot were well-known and regularly discussed at Neuchâtel; in contrast, the Neuchâtel Centre’s work was not acknowledged by Perelman and Ducrot. The Neuchâtel Centre’s research is regularly written up in books and in the Centre’s journal, Travaux du centre de Recherches Sémiologiques de Neuchâtel, which is probably the only journal in French to be published over the last 30 years, focusing on argumentation from a logico-epistemic perspective. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the natural logic programme in detail (see Van Eemeren et al., 1996) but attention is now drawn to some significant points. The ‘natural logic’ programme can be seen as part of the general trend developed in the 1970s in which formal logic was criticized as unsubstantial. The term ‘natural’ applies to a logic of dialogue and a logic of objects. It is a logic of dialogue only in a restricted sense of the word: the dialogue usually consists of a speaker or writer addressing an utterance (or text) to a listener (or reader). This is very similar to the classical rhetorical situation, where orators try to modify or change their audience’s opinions without the benefit of any positive feedback. This contrasts sharply with the ‘formal dialectic’ programme. The concept of ‘logic of objects’ is at the very core of the natural logic programme. The theory deals with ‘objects of thought’, ‘images’ or ‘representations’. The aim of natural logic is to investigate the thought processes at work in the production or reception of a text. The text is considered important only in that it provides clues to the reconstruction of the underlying thought process; this theory is not a linguistic, but rather a cognitive, theory of argumentation. Thought processes mirror linguistic processes (a full understanding of these processes would require a good knowledge of Culioli’s theory of language). At first sight, these processes can be grouped together as: (i) ‘mental operations’: forming a concept of an object and of a predicate – these concepts are taken from

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Plantin: Argumentation studies and discourse analysis 353

the domain of ‘pre-notions’; and (ii) judging, that is predicating and asserting. The result of these processes is a representation or schematization, expressed by an utterance. Grize’s basic position is that all these processes have an argumentative value. If we consider only the linguistic counterparts of these processes, this theory might be called an AwL theory that differs from that of Ducrot. The argumentative value of an utterance comes from its global structure, resulting from a coherent series of operations (or choices). This representation is dialogical in that it contains not only a representation of a state of affairs but also an image of the listener/audience and the situation, combined with the self-representation of the speaker. Schematization (the representation of subject, predicate, speech act and pragmatic elements) shows the content under a certain light (éclairage), or point of view; in other words, it adds to the semantic content by providing listeners with an orientation towards a certain conclusion, or insight. Following this approach, arguing involves ‘schematizing’, building up a schematization and presenting it to the audience or listeners, who have the option of accepting or rejecting it. The argumentative strength of a schematization comes from the fact that it reflects reality. The general task of argumentation studies is to study the hidden mechanisms (or mental operations) behind the superficially acceptable appearance of a schematization. Arguing is a hidden process. The best argument is fact. As Grize states: if you can’t provide the facts, build the most acceptable schematization you can. The resulting conception leads to a better consideration of the selfdenying, non-Popperian, character of everyday argument. It should be pointed out that no mention has been made so far of the classical argumentative relationship between argument and conclusion. An image of ‘scaffolding’ (étayage) most aptly represents this relationship: the argument ‘props up’ or ‘backs up’ the conclusion. A specific argumentative text expresses what Grize calls a ‘reasoned organization’. Its argumentative value is the combined result of the schematization and propping-up procedures. The way an object is introduced into a discourse, its subsequent transformations, the way it is connected with other objects or beings, etc., plays a central role in the dynamics of schematization. This is a very important technical point, very easily transferred to the study of argumentation in dialogue or interactions. The centrality of categorizing or classifying procedures in the arguing process is certainly one of the many stimulating ideas one can find in Grize’s natural logic. THE ‘ARGUMENTATION WITHIN LANGUAGE ’ [ ARGUMENTATION DANS LA LANGUE ] THEORY

Oswald Ducrot introduced the concept of argumentation in a 1973 paper entitled ‘Les échelles argumentatives’. His programme is generally known as ‘the theory of argumentation within language’, following the title of a 1983 book coauthored with Jean-Claude Anscombre, L’argumentation dans la langue (see Van Eemeren et al., 1996). The focus in this section is on one theoretical point: Ducrot’s theory of argumentation is a theory of meaning. Argumentation is introduced as a very specific technical concept functioning

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354 Discourse Studies 4(3)

in the field of linguistic semantics. The specificity of this use of the concept of argument is frequently acknowledged by Jean-Claude Anscombre, who speaks of l’argumentation dans notre sens (our concept of argument). Of course, this remark does not imply any criticism of the concept, but it does imply that its relation with the classical concept of argument is problematic, and that its application to the classical field of argumentation studies cannot be taken for granted. The best-known results of the theory (the analysis of connectives, operators, of polyphony – not to mention a new concept of topos) which are now taken as basic instruments of general discourse analysis, are only manifestations of a deeper insight into the nature of linguistic meaning. Let us consider Ducrot’s favourite example, the utterance ‘the weather is fine’ (P1). What is the meaning of P1? According to Ducrot, it should not be conceived as a description of a certain state of affairs. To understand the meaning of P1 is to understand what the speaker is aiming at when he or she utters it; for example, an invitation to go to the beach. Uttering a sentence is pointing to something else, a possible continuation ‘beyond the sentence’, a second utterance ‘let’s go to the beach’ (P2). However, this concept of meaning is certainly not free from paradox. It is certainly a significant insight, and an excellent tool for analysing argumentation in speech and discourse (parole). A metaphor can help. A proverb – Chinese of course – says that when the wise man points to the stars, the fool looks at the finger. Here the finger is P1; the star – out of reach – is P2, and the fool is the one who tries to find ‘in’ P1 the meaning of P1; P1 has no other meaning than pointing to P2. The same thesis on meaning can be found in other fields, in history for example. An historian would say that the meaning of an historical fact cannot be understood either when or where it occurs. An event has no meaning as such; its historical significance can only be understood in relation to subsequent events – to its consequences rather than its causes. An analogy can also be found in ethics, where it is acknowledged that to confer value on an act, one must consider its consequences. In other words, the value of the means is the value of the end; or, the meaning of an utterance is linked to its set of consequences. To a certain extent, the AwL theory of meaning can be seen as a kind of systematic ad consequentiam theory of meaning. Interpreted in an Aristotelian framework, this theory states that the meaning of a sentence is the final outcome of the sentence, i.e. its desired conclusion. Last, but not least, this coheres with the well-known fact that conclusions often come first and arguments are sought afterwards. By definition, for a lawyer, his or her client must be proved not guilty (P2, conclusion). How can he or she prove it? By finding something to say, i.e. an argument P1. Later the lawyer utters P1 with the meaning P2; that is, it (the sentence, spoken by the lawyer) will aim at the conclusion P2 ‘My client is innocent’. In other words, when the lawyer says ‘P1!’, if his or her opponent reacts by saying: ‘What does that mean? That she is innocent?’, this opponent is using a concept of meaning that perfectly demonstrates Ducrot’s theory. This is because, according to Ducrot’s theory, there is an equivalence between ‘P1 is an argument for P2’ and ‘P2 is the meaning of P1’. This equivalence can be suggested as follows:

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Plantin: Argumentation studies and discourse analysis 355 P1 is an argument for P2 P1 is a good reason to do, believe, admire, etc. P2 P1, therefore P2 P2 is a consequence of P1 in or by saying P1, the speaker wants to prove P2 the speaker says P1, because his or her goal is to prove, suggest, etc. P2 when the speaker says P1, he or she means P2 P2 is the meaning of P1

Ducrot’s concept of meaning is a theory of meaning ‘in language’ [en langue], not a theory of meaning in context. P2 is seen as a conclusion aimed at by P1 (i.e. the meaning of P1) according to strictly linguistic criteria; in other words, the grammatical acceptability of the discourse P1 + P2.3 Some consequences of this theory must be considered. First, in the expression argumentation dans la langue, the word langue must be taken in its strict Saussurian sense, as opposed to parole, ‘speech or discourse’. An explicit translation would be something like ‘argumentation depends on linguistic competence’. This statement should sound surprising. However, the fact that this concept of argument was accepted without discussion can be considered as a symptom of the total absence of any classical or Perelmanian concept of argument in the intellectual field at that time. All classical theories see argumentation as a discursive phenomenon, and the capacity to argue as definitely not a characteristic of linguistic competence, but a specific discursive (interactional) competence, that can be improved by teaching and practice. Language as such cannot be argumentative any more than it is always clear; it is the discourse and speakers who make it so. Other disturbing – or exciting – consequences must be faced as well. The verb corresponding to argumentation in the AwL theory is certainly arguing that . . . To argue that P is combining a set of utterances and deriving a conclusion from a set of premises. If arguing that P is the equivalent of practising linguistic competence, that means that as soon as you speak, you argue. If we accept this conclusion, how can we explain the numerous speech acts we are used to studying? All speech act theory would have to be revised. Another consequence must be emphasized: if argumentation is ‘within language’, it cannot be good or bad; argumentative discourse can only be grammatically correct or incorrect. Again, I’m not suggesting that these consequences cannot be defended, only that they cannot be accepted without discussion. The AwL theory is only concerned with the linguistic aspects of sentence connection. It approaches and explains our discourse on the basis of linguistic competence, as demonstrated by the practice of integrating pragmatics within language [pragmatique intégrée]. There is no autonomy of discourse in Ducrot’s approach, discursive phenomena are explained in terms of an underlying

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linguistic competence. Consequently, the most puzzling aspect of the AwL theory might be that it has been immediately considered a major contribution to discourse analysis, along with theories of narration or description (whereas they are not compatible). It seems that the old discursive magic of the word ‘argumentation’ remains alive and well in the new linguistic re-definition of the word. Grize and Ducrot’s approaches to argumentation are central to the understanding of what is going on in today’s research in France. Although very different at first sight, they share a number of theses. Both are generalized theories of argument: there is no sentence without a certain ‘éclairage’ (Grize) and no sentence without an orientation (Ducrot). As a consequence, neither theory includes a ‘critical component’. There is not much that you can do to oppose a schematization or an orientation. That’s why the idea of a ‘criticism of argument’, of a fallacy theory, sounds very strange in this context; and the recent Perelmanian vogue will certainly not change the situation very much.

4. An overview of argumentation research and applications Arguing is a rhetorical activity. However, in France at present, the concept of rhetoric is undergoing a post-modern drift of its own. In contrast, under the leadership of Marc Fumaroli, the development of the history of rhetoric (particularly in the fields of education and literature) is quite remarkable (Fumaroli, 1999). In my opinion, the possibility of a revival of a practical rhetoric – a rhetoric that embraces its historical evolution as well as the new machinery of modern communication – is quite limited (Reboul, 1991). The main reason for this is that the new disciplines of communication, interaction studies and discourse analysis have definitely taken over the analytical and practical functions of rhetoric in these fields. At the moment, broadly speaking, the most diverse academic fields are taking a strong (and relatively sudden) interest in argumentation, so that it is now more or less considered as a discourse analytic discipline. Therefore, one could argue that argumentation studies in France are in a desperate state of fragmentation; or that they are omnipresent, acting as a powerful ‘fertilizer’ for human and social sciences, even extending to hard sciences. From a philosophical point of view, the popularity of the concept could be commented on in several ways – for example, as the result of a fresh appraisal of the necessity for arbitration between people with incompatible values in specific cases (this should not sound new to Perelmanian ears). Political theorists have now become more conscious of the basically uncertain and controversial character of socio-political decisions, and tend to judge the legitimacy of a decision not by its conformity to a pre-existing law or rule, but according to the unique criteria that it must be the outcome of debate. In general, social cohesion is not grounded in a social contract or in mutual sympathy, but in the quality of debate promoted by the group. Of course, this does not preclude but, on the contrary, stimulates the socio-political manipulations of debate, particularly in the media.

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Plantin: Argumentation studies and discourse analysis 357

There are no journals or book series exclusively dedicated to argumentation studies. Articles on argument are only to be found scattered randomly in academic journals or confined to special issues.4 Argumentation studies do not constitute a unified discipline; yet, considering the fact that arguing is basically a form of contextualized speech behaviour, they could find a basic and comfortable home in the field of discourse analysis. Robust research is developing throughout the human and social sciences: law (McEvoy, 1995); sociology (Boudon, 1991; Bouvier, 1994, 1999; Passeron, 1991); political science; psychology; linguistics (see section 3: in the field of discourse analysis: Doury, 1996; Eggs, 1994; Plantin, 1990, 1996, 1998; Plantin et al., 2000); philosophy (Cossutta, 1996; Meyer, 1986; Meyer and Lempereur, 1990); literature (Amossy, 1991; Declerq, 1992); communication (Breton, 1996); cognition and linguistics (see section 3: Baker, 1996, 1999; Vignaux, 1976, 1981, 1988), first and second language acquisition, etc. The most common theoretical frameworks are interactionism, cognitivism and linguistics, or discourse analysis. Research extends via cognition studies and didactic disciplines to hard sciences (physics, mathematics, etc.), where arguing merges with explaining, demonstrating and reasoning. Each discipline maintains a line of research in relation to argumentation studies, deeply influenced by the problematic and research style of the field. For instance, philosophical problems concerning the ethics of communication are developed in communication studies. The question of fallacy, which is not considered a legitimate component of a linguistic approach, could play a role in the analysis of the reasoning process; in fact, the most exciting perspectives are developing in more holistic directions. In education, pioneering work on argumentation was carried out in professional education, in practical courses devoted to ‘Expression and communication techniques’ [Techniques d’expression et de communication]. In general education, a kind of ‘argumentative turn’ was taken in 1996, when a practical exercise on argumentation was introduced as part of the baccalauréat.5 Typically enough, this exercise is part of the test in French language and literature. Recent proposals (2000) have been made to introduce an explicit argumentative line into the baccalauréat’s philosophy syllabus. Given the symbolic and practical importance of the baccalauréat in the French education system, this could be considered as a kind of consecration for argumentation studies as a discourse-analytic discipline; however, all these academic exercises are based mainly on very classical literary materials, leaving no room for actual debates in interaction. All these innovations are hotly discussed. Publications in this field are flourishing (see the Pratiques articles listed in the Appendix).6 Weaknesses must also be acknowledged. Argumentation studies (historical approaches included) in France are ‘ethnocentric’, that is, entirely centred on Greco–Latin approaches. There is no living theoretical dialogue with our neighbouring Mediterranean traditions, i.e. Arabic and Jewish practices and thought on debate, rhetoric and argument. The link to research in English is erratic; the general trend is completely at

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odds with one of its most influential paradigms – logic-oriented research on fallacy. There are exceptions, however, such as pragma-dialectic and, generally speaking, argumentation as a special kind of formal dialog.7 The question of different types of arguments, often considered as basic, is never discussed as such in French research. There are not many contributions on, for example, ad hominem or ad misericordiam or ad populum. When these categories are mentioned (mainly in PhD dissertations), they are loosely used as labels, as convenient tools in the task at hand. On the other hand, the concepts of topos, doxa and stereotypes are often considered as basic. These two observations are of course related. Research on connectives, originating in Ducrot’s work as a consequence of his basic views on the semantics of discourse, is well developed. At one time, it was unduly popularized as the very core of argumentation processes or techniques, particularly in education. However, a well-documented and illustrated lexicon of connectives in French is still lacking. Some essays, papers and dissertations in argumentation are developing in separate and specific paradigms, for example as ‘theory-driven’ contributions to the ‘argumentation in language’ theory. But, on the whole, research is ‘data driven’, i.e. based on large corpora in a variety of settings, the objective being to give the most accurate description of the data. This kind of research is generally eclectic in its resources. Depending on the level of description, it utilizes methods and concepts originating in different theoretical frameworks, argumentation in language, natural logic, neo-classical rhetoric, pragma-dialectic – and, occasionally, a faint hint of rhetoric. Though highly polysemic, the concept of argumentation is thus frequently considered as a global convenient ‘resource concept’ to be used liberally as a one-off application when analysing a discourse. But Ducrot’s argumentation is not that of Grize, which is not that of Perelman, which is not – to mention just one – that of Woods and Walton (1992). The present situation could be characterized by a flight from theory, which is certainly not the best way to react to alleged theoretical excesses of other ages. Constructive argument between the main trends in argumentation research are still needed. The central weakness comes from the fact that the new interest taken in argumentation and the unquestionable development of research has not brought about a parallel development of education in argumentation theories and practices at the higher education level. Here lies certainly the most serious lacuna. At high-school level, teachers are supposed to teach argumentation competence; however, it appears that they have to rely mainly on self-training with some basic books and one-day crash courses. At university level, the situation is the same. The theory of argumentation, analysing argumentative discourse and interactions needs expertise. The contradiction is that nowadays, in France, there is no systematic academic teaching on these points. What is at stake here is certainly the future of argumentation studies. If nothing is done, if only to give a basic foundation to one concept of argument, or at least to articulate the current concepts, the word ‘argumentation’ could become just an inter-

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Plantin: Argumentation studies and discourse analysis 359

disciplinary password, a kind of joker one can allude to at will in any scientific discipline or situation, for an opportunistic remark.

5. Outline of a discourse analytic framework for argumentation studies This section outlines a programme encompassing argumentation studies within the field of discourse analysis. Ethnical considerations as to what could be typically French or un-French in this approach are not discussed. DEFINITION : ARGUMENTATION AS DISCURSIVE CONFRONTATION

The following discourse-analytic programme in argumentation diverges from the semantic or cognitive programmes inasmuch as it does not consider argumentation as a simple logico-semantic or cognitive capacity. Arguing is considered as a discursive activity, anthropologically grounded in a specific discursive situation. The typical object of argumentation studies is as a specific form of discourses in interaction, characterized by conflicting points of views. This is compatible with the classical view that argumentation studies should emerge as a confrontation of assertions in classical judicial settings (rhetoric) or in a philosophic–scientific perspective (dialectic), as well as in contemporary views of argument in pragma-dialectics (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1996). As Schiffrin (1987) states: ‘argumentation seems to be a mode of discourse which is neither purely monologic nor dialogic . . . [a] discourse through which speakers support disputable positions’ (pp. 17–18). Discourse analysis is generally characterized by the nature of its data (naturally occurring sets of utterances) and its method (a functional approach based on a set of speech acts) (Schiffrin, 1994) in contrast to a structural paradigm, characteristic of classical grammar and operating with constructed data, drawn from the analyst’s competence, considered as typical of the general (or ‘ideal’) speaker–hearer. It could be argued that, as far as theory is concerned – even functional theory – structural aspects come into play. In other words, one undisputable view is that there are linguistic constraints on the link between argument and conclusion. A second view is that no connector in French can be considered as having only an argumentative function, even parce que (because) or donc (so, therefore). The functional concept ‘being an argument for such-and-such conclusion’ can be ascertained only on a contextual basis; that is, the fact that the truth of a sentence or the approval of a line of action is uncertain or disputed. According to the classical approaches of argumentation, argumentation consists of a recognizable pattern of (oral or written) utterances, each of which is functionally linked to the whole set. Consider, for example, the famous Toulmin example about Harry being a British subject since he was born in Bermuda. The utterance: ‘Harry is a British subject, he was born in Bermuda’ could either be an informative discourse about who Harry is, or a statement settling an argument:

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‘Harry was born in Bermuda, he’s a British subject’. The reading of this discourse as an argument is contextually bound, the crucial contextual feature being that the current discourse is about the possible nationality of Harry. The introduction of the connective, ‘so’ excludes the informative reading; the introduction of the modal ‘probably’ does not necessarily imply an argumentative interpretation. The intonation pattern could also play a role in this choice. Thus, strictly linguistic–structural phenomena as well as contextual clues play a role in determining the argumentative interpretation of a string of utterances. Argumentation cannot be defined as a genre of discourse: disputes can be staged in a play as well as in a novel or in a poem; they occur in highly institutionalized situations (in court, in houses of parliament), as well as in spontaneous everyday situations (family arguments), as vile propaganda as well as in the most noble educational or scientific activities. From this point of view, argumentative discourse is very similar to narrative or descriptive discourse and the temptation here is to define a set of basic devices (argumentation, narration, description, etc.) which could be considered as the basic components of discourse which, when combined, could account for any form of discourse. But it is well established that narration and description can be argumentatively oriented (this could be built into a reason for considering argumentativity as a basic feature of discourse). It could be maintained that the ‘fairiest’ of fairy tales ‘argues’ for some conclusion about the world. Here the ‘counterdiscourse’ pragmatic criteria come into play: the fact that this story does not confront an adverse story is considered a good reason to speak of ‘pure’ narration or description. DATA : TEXTS AND INTERACTIONS

Classical approaches to argumentation examined restricted types of discourses: syllogistic (or quasi-syllogistic) discourse for the logically oriented theories of fallacy, short paragraphs for the new rhetoric and two-sentence discourses in the AwL theory. Only monological discourses are considered, and used mainly as examples. Natural texts are considered expansions (sometimes by increased length) of such core arguments. As a discourse-analytic discipline, argumentation analysis must confront the problem of corpora at the outset. Although the basic data of argumentation studies are defined on the basis of discursive confrontation, they are not limited to data emanating from face-to-face interactions. Argumentative activity is best characterized by a perpetual to-and-fro between expression (énonciation) and interaction, a ‘self ’-centred moment, an ‘other’-centred moment. Positions can be confronted through both written and oral discourse, occurring in a large variety of (institutional or private) settings. This heterogeneity must be taken into account in the constitution of corpora for argumentation analysis. From this point of view, theory must deal not only with constructed examples used for the sake of theory-building or illustration but also face complex data, coming from a variety of social or intellectual fields for interdisciplinary case analysis.

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Plantin: Argumentation studies and discourse analysis 361

Two different kinds of corpora can be considered as eligible for the study of argumentation. First, the analysis of specific, face-to-face argumentative encounters, in dialogue or polylogues, as in negotiation sessions, for example. At this point, argumentation studies has to add a socio-psychological dimension in group studies, and to take conflict studies into consideration. As noted at the beginning of this article, the American English lexical data point to an interesting theoretical question on the relationship between the study of the arguing that and arguing with process, that is, the relationship between argumentation studies and interpersonal conflict studies. To check how far these two fields are interconnected, we might take a look at Conflict Talk, a collection of essays edited by Allen D. Grimshaw (1990a), subtitled Sociolinguistic Investigations on Arguments in Conversation. In his substantial presentation and conclusion, Grimshaw never refers to ‘argumentation studies’, and never uses the word argumentation (1990b, 1990c). Two papers use the word argument to refer to their object, Goodwin and Goodwin (1990) ‘Interstitial Argument’ and Schiffrin (1990) ‘The Management of a Cooperative Self during Argument: The Role of Opinions and Stories’. If I have checked correctly, they never use the word argumentation. The conclusion seems to be that the study of arguing with develops independently from the study of arguing that; no explicit relations are posited between these fields. Second, argumentation analysis has, as a specific task, to build up disciplinespecific corpora. Such corpora are constituted by the large set of interventions around a (more or less specific) argumentative question, not obligatorily of the loftiest order. Such an everyday problem could be, for example ‘Should we build a new school or just repair the existing one?’. This kind of corpus is characterized by its heterogeneity. It will gather oral (prepared or spontaneous) interventions and written interventions; oral interventions will allude to written ones and written interventions will be grounded in oral ones. A variety of settings will come into play: private discussions at home, more formal ones in semi-institutional settings (parents’ associations), leaflets, official public encounters at the town hall, not to mention the inevitable meetings of professionals. If things go wrong, articles will appear in local newspapers, followed by letters to the editor, television reports, the courts might get involved, etc. TOOLS AND CONCEPTS

Argumentation studies should not be too concerned about achieving autonomy or being a ‘fundamental’ discipline, either from a linguistic or a logical point of view. When analysing face-to-face argumentative interactions, argumentation analysis normally uses the basic tools of grammar and linguistics, interaction theory, discourse analysis, plus a set of specific concepts. From this perspective, analysing argumentation needs more than a simple set of elementary notions, not just the logical theory of the syllogism, nor the usual rules for adjusting discourse to one’s partner, or for building up a coherent discourse. In argumentative situations, concepts of interaction theory undergo a transformation. For example, preference for agreement turns into a preference for

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disagreement (that is, the answer of one’s opponent is not expected to be in agreement with the first turn); politeness rules are modified. The tenant is not impolite when he or she appeals to his or her landlord: ‘You have no right to raise my rent to such an extent!’; it’s quite normal for the landlord to praise his or her apartment in order to justify the increase in the rent, although in friendly encounters, politeness principles prohibit trespassing on the other’s territory or praising one’s own property. Subject and meaning: two controversial notions Classical discourse analysis8 was characterized by the systematic and coherent denial of a set of notions (traditionally considered as simple and self-evident, which is certainly far from true), among which are the following propositions from Maldidier (1990): Le sujet individuel et collectif, la communication intersubjective (p. 50) The individual and collective subject, intersubjective communication Les mots communiquent un sens, il y a des personnes et il y a des choses, du subjectif et de l’objectif, de l’émotionnel (rhétorique) et du cognitif (logique). (p. 37) Words communicate a meaning, there are people and things, subjective and objective, emotions (rhetoric) and cognition (logic).

Meaning, subject, interdiscourse (interdiscours): three conceptual puzzles play a major role in classical discourse analysis, the positive emphasis put on the role of interdiscourse, a strong criticism of a set of notions around the concept of subject, and the will to build up a new concept of discursive meaning. As far as argumentation studies are concerned, the most sophisticated concept of meaning developed in relation to argumentation theories is certainly Ducrot’s concept of discursive meaning mentioned earlier. On the burning question of the subject, a certain vision of the rhetorical subject (maybe a classroom vision) seems to be the target of Foucault’s (1969) criticism in the following passage: Discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined . . . it is neither by recourse to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to a psychological subjectivity that the regulation of its enunciation should be defined. (p. 74, quoted in Williams, 1999: 84)

This dispersion and discontinuity can be interpreted (some would say distorted and defaced) in terms of the interplay of several sets of roles. First, linguistic roles (Austin’s phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts); second, the pragmatic–interactional roles, including the dispersion and discontinuities on the part of the audience,9 as well as generic roles; third, social roles come into play, as well as institutional roles defining a specific encounter in a specific setting. Argumentative interaction, seen as a three-way interaction – a particular kind of trilogue, adds three specific roles to the interactional set: proponent, opponent and third party. In a specific

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interaction, these three roles can be enacted by specific persons or groups; they can also be enacted by the same person, at different stages of a monologue. Three discursive positions are correlated with these three roles: the proponent engages in a discourse of proposition; the opponent, in a counterdiscourse, or discourse of opposition; the third party takes responsibility for the topic of the argument. The argumentative roles relate to the narrateur/narrataire (narrator/listener) roles in narration, or the expert/non-expert roles in explanation. All work towards defining the foundation of the argument.10 The concept of interdiscourse which relates to a rather structuralist view of discourse meaning, could also be seen as a major discourse-analytic contribution. Incorporating a specific discourse into interdiscourse has a special significance for argumentation studies in large corpora, gathered around a specific argument. It can show how a certain class of argumentative forms have been used for many centuries. For example, during the 1997 debate on immigration and French nationality, the following argument was expounded: On n’est pas Français parce qu’on est né à Roissy [Paris airport] Just because you are born in Roissy does not mean to say you are French

This argument echoes an earlier argument set out in the drafts of the Napoleonian Civil Code during the 1800s: Un enfant naît en France de parents étrangers: ceux-ci venaient d’arriver. Peu de jours après, ils retournent dans leur pays: leur enfant les suit. Lui-même n’y reparaïtra peut-être de sa vie. On demande à quel titre un tel individu peut être Français. (Weil, 1997: 15) A child was born in France to foreign parents who had just arrived. A few days later, they went back to their country. Their child followed them, maybe he will never reappear in France for the rest of his or her life. How can he or she claim to be French?

Establishing such long-term argumentative stabilities can be argumentation analysis’s contribution to the non-linear decoding advocated by general discourse analysis in opposition to the ‘obviousness of a series of sentences’ [l’évidence des enchaînements] (Maldidier, 1990: 16). But the value of linear analysis must not be underrated: the task of coherently attaching a system of labels characteristic of the different argumentative operations is in no way an easy and trivial one, when dealing with long interactions involving several active participants.

Conclusion Seen a generation later, the 1960s and 1970s criticism of the concepts of communication, subject and referential meaning curiously echoes the century-old criticism of the rhetorical approach to intersubjective communication with its all-too human array of moral, logical and emotional proof; only the paradigms backing the criticism have changed. This programme has tried to establish a field of research on the epistemic, political and psychoanalytic components of discourse. These components were considered to be mainly unconscious and out of

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the speakers’ control (individuals do not always fully comprehend what they are saying), but considered accessible to the analyst under certain theoretical conditions (analysis makes the meaning of the discourse clear). This position creates an abyss between ordinary and expert practices. Argumentation analysis shares neither this desperate view of the speakers, nor this esoteric view of the theory. After all, discourse analysis is a discourse that has proved as docile to its general conditions of production as any lay discourse can be, and the changes in these conditions have so far produced some changes in theoretical styles. Maybe all the concepts formerly criticized (and sometimes demonized) can be discovered, reshaped, in contemporary discourse analysis and in argumentation studies. This might be considered to be treason with regard to the original foundations of discourse analysis or, alternatively, the price theory has to pay to be true to its basic programme – the study of speech in context. NOTES

1. Copious examples of this fallacy of ‘irrelevant and untimely argumentation’ can be found, for example, in Jaugey (1960) or Moigno (1881). A prototypical example can be found in an argument of Chateaubriand (1877): Nous touchons à la dernière objection sur l’origine moderne du globe. On dit: “La terre est une vieille dont tout annonce la caducité. Examinez ses fossiles, ses marbres, ses granits, ses laves, et vous y lisez ces années innombrables. . . . Cette difficulté a été cent fois résolue par cette réponse: Dieu a dûcréer et a sans doute créé le monde avec toutes les marques de vétusté et de complément que nous lui voyons. We reach the last objection on the contemporary origin of the earth. One says: ‘The Earth is old, everything denotes its obsolescence. Examine its fossils, its marbles, its granite, its lava, and you will read in them these innumerable years . . . This difficulty has been solved a hundred times with this answer: God must have, and certainly has, created the world with all the marks of decay and additions that we see today. 2. See Wenzel’s bitter comments in Van Eemeren et al. (1987: 103). 3. In French this opposition is expressed in terms of ‘sens’ vs ‘signification’; however, some authors use ‘sens’ for the linguistic meaning and ‘signification’ for the meaning in context, and other authors vice versa. 4. The following – non-exhaustive – list gives an idea of the variety of these journals, set out as follows: title of special issue, journal references and journal’s academic field: La rhétorique aujourd’hui, Mesure 3 (1990). Paris: José Corti (literature, philosophy, education). Rhétorique et sciences du langage, Verbum (1993) 1–2–3. Nancy (linguistics). Argumentation et rhétorique, Hermès (1995) 15, 16. Paris: CNRS editions (cognition, communication, politics). Argumentation et sciences sociales, L’année sociologique (1994) 44, 45. Paris: PUF (sociology). L’argumentation en dialogues, Langue française, Garcia-Deban (ed.) (1996) (linguistics).

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Plantin: Argumentation studies and discourse analysis 365 Enseigner l’argumentation, Pratiques (1997), Pratiques 97. Metz (French studies, pedagogy). 5. Twelfth grade exam, taken on leaving high school. 6. As a second important point concerning research in education, it must be mentioned that a new program of the INRP (Institut National de la Recherche Pédagogique/ National Institute for Pedagogical Research) focuses on argumentation in all highschool disciplines. 7. The ISSA Amsterdam Conference is playing a major role in improving this situation. 8. A distinction should be drawn between the second discourse analysis of the 1980s and the original, or ‘classical’ perspective, developed by and around Foucault and Pêcheux in the 1970 or discourse analysis stricto sensu. 9. In Forms of Talk, Goffman (1981) identifies two complex structures: the reception format, ratified participants (addressed or unaddressed) as opposed to bystanders (overhearers or eavesdroppers); and the production format, animator, author, figure and principal (pp. 154ff., 173ff.). ‘In short, the animator produces talk, the author creates talk, the figure is portrayed through talk, and the principal is responsible for talk’ (Schiffrin, 1990: 241). Ducrot et al. (1980) distinguishes between the complex set ‘sujet parlant/locuteur/énonciateur’ on the production side and the ‘auditeur/allocutaire/destinataire’ set on the reception side (pp. 35–8). 10. It might be interesting to confront this notion in Goffman, and the parallel notion of ‘position’ as defined in Foucault (1969), his chapters on ‘La formation des modalités énonciatives’ and ‘La fonction énonciative’. REFERENCES

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Plantin: Argumentation studies and discourse analysis 367 Grize, J.-B. (1990) Logique et langage. Gap: Ophrys. Grize, J.-B. (1996) Logique et communication. Paris: PUF. Hamblin, C.L. (1970) Fallacies. London: Methuen. Jaugey, J.-B. (1960[1889]) Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique. Paris/Lyon: Delhomme et Briguet. Lausberg, H. (1960) Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik. Munich: Max Hueber. Maldidier, D. (ed.) (1990) L’inquiétude du discours: Textes de Michel Pêcheux. Paris: Editions des Cendres. Maritain, J. (1966) Eléments de philosophie: II L’ordre des concepts, 1 – Petite logique (Logique formelle), 21st edn. Paris: Téqui. McEvoy, S. (1995) L’invention défensive – Poétique, linguistique, droit. Paris: Métailié. Meyer, M. (ed.) (1986) De la métaphysique à la rhétorique. Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. Meyer, M. and Lempereur, A. (1990) Figures et conflits rhétoriques. Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. Moigno, F. (Abbé) (1881) Les splendeurs de la foi – Accord parfait de la révélation et de la science/de la foi et de la religion. Paris: Blériot Frères. O’Keefe, B.J. (1977) ‘Two Concepts of Argument and Arguing’, Journal of the American Forensic Association 13: 121–28. Ong, W. (1958) Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Passeron, J.-Cl. (1991) Le raisonnement sociologique: l’espace non-poppérien du raisonnement naturel. Paris: Nathan. Perelman, Ch. and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1976[1958]) Traité de l’argumentation – La Nouvelle rhétorique, 3rd edn. Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. Plantin, Ch. (1990) Essais sur l’argumentation. Paris: Kimé. Plantin, Ch. (1996) L’argumentation. Paris: Le Seuil. Plantin, Ch. (1998) ‘Les raisons des émotions’, in M. Bondi (ed.) Forms of Argumentative Discourse/Per un’analisi linguistica dell’argomentare. Bologna: CLUEB. Plantin, Ch., Doury, M. and Traverso, V. (eds) (2000) Les émotions dans les interactions. Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon. Reboul, O. (1991) Introduction à la rhétorique. Paris: PUF. Rhétorique et discours critiques (1989) Paris: Presses de l’Ecole Normale Supérieure. Schiffrin, D. (1987) Discourse Markers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schiffrin, D. (1990) ‘The Management of a Cooperative Self during Argument: The Role of Opinions and Stories’, in A.D. Grimshaw (ed.) Conflict Talk: Sociolinguistic Investigations on Arguments in Conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schiffrin, D. (1994) Approaches to Discourse. Oxford: Blackwell. Toulmin, S.E. (1993) The Uses of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vignaux, G. (1981) ‘Enoncer, argumenter: opérations du discours, logiques du discours’, Langue française 50: 91–116. Vignaux, G. (1976) L’argumentation: Essai d’une logique discursive. Geneva: Droz. Vignaux, G. (1988) Le Discours, acteur du monde – Enonciation, argumentation et cognition. Gap: Ophrys. Vignaux, G. (1999) L’argumentation: du discours à la pensée. Paris: Hatier. Williams, G. (1999) French Discourse Analysis: The Method of Post-Structuralism. London: Routledge. Weil, P. (1997) Mission d’étude des legislations de la nationalité et de l’immigration. Rapports au Premier Ministre, p. 15. Paris: La Documentation française. Woods, J. and Walton, D. (1992) Critique de l’argumentation. Paris: Kimé.

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368 Discourse Studies 4(3) A P P E N D I X : S P E C I A L I S S U E S O F J O U R NA L S

Travaux du centre de recherches sémiologiques ( CdRS), Université de Neuchâtel Vignaux, G. (1969–70) ‘La nouvelle rhétorique: Revue critique et perspectives d’application’. CdRS 1. Borel, M.-J. (1969–70) ‘Pour définir l’argumentation’, CdRS 3. Grize, J.-B. (ed.) (1971) ‘Logique de l’argumentation et discours argumentatifs’, CdRS 7. Wülser, C. (ed.) (1982) ‘Actes de langage explicatifs’, CdRS 40. Wülser, C. (ed.) (1992) ‘Les organisations raisonnées – Analyse de l’articulation de séquences discursives’, CdRS 60. Miéville, D. (ed.) (1993) ‘Relations formelles et non formelles’, CdRS 61. Miéville, D. (ed.) (1995) ‘Raisonnement et calcul’, CdRS 63. Langue française (1976) ‘Argumentation et discours scientifique’, Langue française 42. (1981) ‘Argumentation et énonciation’, Langue française 50. (1996) ‘L’argumentation en dialogues’, Langue française 112. Pratiques (1992) ‘L’argumentation écrite’, Pratiques 73. (1994) ‘Argumentation et langue’, Pratiques 84. (1997) ‘Enseigner l’argumentation’, Pratiques 96.

is a senior researcher at the French National Science Council (CNRS). His field of research is argumentation in texts and interactions from a linguistic perspective. He has published L’argumentation (Seuil, 1996) and co-edited, with M. Doury and V. Traverso, Les émotions dans les interactions (book + CD-ROM, Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2000), and papers on polemics, interactions in conflicts, argumentation and emotions, and the concept of topos. Since 1999, he has been Director of the Research Group on Interactive Communication at the University of Lyon 2. A D D R E S S : Groupe de Recherches sur les Interactions Conversationnelles (GRIC), Université Lyon 2, 5 avenue Pierre Mendès-France, 69676 Bron, France. [email: [email protected]]

CHRISTIAN PLANTIN

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