Does Public Service Motivation Matter?

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International Public Management Journal

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Motivating Employees of the Public Sector: Does Public Service Motivation Matter? Simon Anderfuhren-Bigeta; Frédéric Varonea; David Giauqueb; Adrian Ritzc a UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA, b UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE, c UNIVERSITY OF BERN, Online publication date: 08 September 2010

To cite this Article Anderfuhren-Biget, Simon , Varone, Frédéric , Giauque, David and Ritz, Adrian(2010) 'Motivating

Employees of the Public Sector: Does Public Service Motivation Matter?', International Public Management Journal, 13: 3, 213 — 246 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/10967494.2010.503783 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2010.503783

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International Public Management Journal MOTIVATING EMPLOYEES OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR: DOES PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION MATTER? SIMON ANDERFUHREN-BIGET AND FRE´DE´RIC VARONE

Downloaded By: [David, Giauque] At: 06:32 9 September 2010

UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA

DAVID GIAUQUE UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE

ADRIAN RITZ UNIVERSITY OF BERN

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes if, and to what extent, the public service motivation (PSM) construct has an added value to explain work motivation in the public sector. In order to address the specificity of PSM when studying work motivation, the theoretical model underlying this empirical study compares PSM with two other explanatory factors: material incentives, such as performance-related pay, and team relations and support, such as recognition by superiors. This theoretical model is then tested with data collected in a national survey of 3,754 civil servants at the Swiss municipal level. Results of a structural equations model clearly show the relevance of PSM. They also provide evidence for the importance of socio-relational motivating factors, whereas material incentives play an anecdotal role.

INTRODUCTION Motivated employees are the cornerstones of all organizations, as work motivation is one crucial determinant of individual and organizational performance. This holds true in the private, the public, and the non-profit sectors. Work motivation is thus a great concern for both scholars and managers. Many paradigms and theories have sought to answer the longstanding question: ‘‘What motivates employees?’’ This article focuses on the work motivation construct, applied to the public sector. International Public Management Journal, 13(3), pages 213–246 DOI: 10.1080/10967494.2010.503783

Copyright # 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1096-7494 print /1559-3169 online


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It tries to identify the combination of extrinsic and intrinsic factors explaining why public employees show varying levels of work motivation. Its originality relies on the construction of an integrative model of three interrelated factors of work motivation in the public sector. This model combines competing but not mutually exclusive motivational factors: public service motivation (PSM), team relations and support, and material incentives. Competing hypotheses on the impact of various factors on work motivation are of course rooted in more profound considerations of what drives the actions of human beings, resulting in differentiated visions of human rationalities. In a nutshell, human beings are either selfish or altruistic. According to this ideal–typical dichotomy, public employees are either ‘‘knights’’ or ‘‘knaves’’ (Le Grand 2006). In the literature on public administration and management, motivation of public employees has consequently been studied from (at least) two opposing approaches. The first one, inspired by public choice theories, maintains that public employees behave according to ‘‘a canny maximization of self-interest’’ (Sen 1995, 2). This conception of public employees’ motives has penetrated the public sphere, in Europe at least, in connection with the new public management (NPM) academic debate and subsequent practical reforms (Giauque 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). This vision of work motivation was concretely translated into the introduction of human resource management (HRM) tools originally coming from private business management such as performance-related pay (Forest 2008; Perry, Engbers, and Jun 2009). This HRM strategy largely aims at motivating public employees by the fulfillment of their extrinsic needs. The second approach we consider here is the PSM construct (Perry and Wise 1990; Perry and Hondeghem 2008a). This construct is part of the broad category of ‘‘needs theories’’ of motivation (Perry and Wise 1990). It brings questions of values and identity back into work motivation theories (Shamir 1991) and argues that public employees are stirred by higher-order drives. It clearly puts the emphasis on the disinterested, altruistic, and pro-socially oriented work behavior in the public sector, even if a rational dimension (attraction to policymaking) is part of the construct (Perry and Wise 1990). The PSM construct can be seen as a counterweight to the rational choice theories then dominating the field (Perry 2000; Perry and Vandenabeele 2008), which stressed that human behaviors may exclusively be explained by individual psychological mechanisms related to self-interest (Dardot and Laval 2009). In a word, the PSM construct was developed to broaden the theory of work motivation in public organizations, and it postulates that public employees are special in that they behave differently from their private sector counterparts and are not driven by extrinsic motives alone (Barrows and Wesson 2000; Blais, Blake, and Dion 1990; Boyne 2002; Rainey 1983; Rainey 1982; Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Bright 2009). Many empirical studies have so far measured the level of PSM in various public organizations (Perry and Hondeghem 2008c) and have then tested the antecedents of PSM (e.g., socio-demographic factors), its outcomes (e.g., individual performance), or its correlates (e.g., organizational commitment). For an overview, see Pandey and Stazyk (2008). If the relationship between PSM and job satisfaction has been studied in depth (Naff and Crum 1999; Park and Rainey 2007; Park and Rainey 2008; Taylor 2007; Taylor 2008; Bright 2008; Steijn 2008), the impact of


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PSM on work motivation remains clearly understudied. This article proposes to fill this gap by analyzing the explanatory power of PSM for work motivation in the public sector. Furthermore, in order to address the relevance and specificity of the PSM construct when studying work motivation in the public sector, the theoretical model and the empirical study need to compare and put into relation PSM with other explanatory factors of work motivation also drawn from ‘‘need theories’’ (i.e., material incentives and team relations and support). So our research question is as follows: ‘‘What is the added value of PSM compared with competing factors in explaining work motivation in the public sector?’’ To answer this question, first, we have developed an integrative model that combines PSM, material incentives and team relations and support from the organization as interrelated independent variables, with work motivation as the dependent variable. Then, we have tested this model, using a structural equation modeling (SEM) approach, with data collected in a national survey of 3,754 civil servants at the Swiss municipal level. The main results of our empirical study show that PSM has a real added value in explaining work motivation in the public sector. Team relations and support also appear to be an important motivator for public employees, while material incentives are a poor predictor of work motivation. The negative correlation between PSM and our scale measuring extrinsic motivators shows that public employees motivated to serve the public interest are inclined to disregard monetary rewards. These preliminary results suggest the relevance of the PSM construct for motivation theories within the public sector and open promising new avenues of research.

THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES Work Motivation Work motivation is a longstanding topic in organizational studies (Le´vy-Leboyer 2006). It is the primary determinant of performance for both private and public sectors. In organizational studies, several concepts are often confused (Maugeri 2004). On the one hand, satisfaction (in this case work=job satisfaction) is a psychological state characterizing the interaction between an individual and his or her organization, between his or her expectations and the perception of the obtained results (Locke 1976; Michel 1994). On the other hand, different concepts focus on the attachment to the organization. Organizational commitment (e.g., Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1982; Meyer and Allen 1991) is a psychological state characterizing the link between an individual and his or her organization, and it is closely related to the decision to stay within the organization or leave it (Vandenberghe 2005). Organizational identification (e.g., Foote 1951; Hall, Schneider, and Nygren 1970; Ashforth and Mael 1989; Van Dick 2004) characterizes ‘‘the process by which the goals of the organization and those of the individual become increasingly integrated or congruent’’ (Hall, Schneider, and Nygren 1970, 176), whereas work involvement aims at a comprehensive understanding of the way an individual projects him=herself into work and identifies with the job. This concept is related to the nature of the individual’s investment in his=her professional role (Michel 1994) besides other potential


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roles. Work motivation, however, is a process by which the employee decides to work hard and sustain his=her efforts. Because patterns can be identified in the actions of employees at work, this concept is of particular interest. Many theories and definitions of this construct compete to explain what motivates people (Kanfer 1990). Apart from the diversity of conceptualizations and measurements, most authors nowadays agree with the basic premise that ‘‘the concept of motivation represents a hypothetical construct used to describe the internal and= or external forces producing the induction, the direction, the intensity and the persistence of behavior’’ (Vallerand and Thill 1993, 13). According to this definition, motivation is a meta-concept that comprehensively focuses on the effort and energy deployed by an individual when acting in a given setting. This construct relates to the individual’s project(s), the general meaning that he=she attributes to his=her actions and behaviors (Michel 1994). For a work organization, this energy should be deployed toward organizational goals and objectives. ‘‘Orientation of the motivation concerns the underlying attitudes and goals that give rise to action—that is, it concerns the why of action’’ (Ryan and Deci 2000, 54). Needs, motives, and values theories (Maslow 1954; Herzberg 1971; Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman 1959; Alderfer 1969; Deci and Ryan 1985) focus on the individual (internal) or situational (external) determinants of behavior. They share the fact that motivation arises when individuals seek optimal satisfaction of certain needs (Roussel 2000). ‘‘Need theories’’ were developed in the wake of Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs (Maslow 1954). More associated with work motivation questions, Herzberg’s two-factor theory (hygiene and motivation) posits that these two categories function differently. The motivation factors increase satisfaction, while hygienic factors only serve to reduce dissatisfaction (Herzberg 1971). Later, self-determination theory introduced the intrinsic–extrinsic dichotomy into motivation theories (Deci and Ryan 1985; Ryan and Deci 2000). Against the background of these work motivation theories, several needs or motives can be identified in the literature. Here we focus on three main categories of motivators: PSM, team relations, and support and material incentives. The expected impact of each category of variables on work motivation is presented in the following paragraphs, before being integrated in a global model. Public Service Motivation In public management, empirical research about PSM has increased over the last twenty years (Perry and Hondeghem 2008b). In fact, it is one of the fundamental concepts of HRM in the public sector (Coursey and Pandey 2007a). PSM was initially defined as the ‘‘individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions or organizations’’ (Perry and Wise 1990, 368). Emphasizing altruistic values as major components of PSM, Vandenabeele defines PSM as ‘‘the beliefs, values and attitudes that go beyond self-interest and organizational interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity and that motivate individuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate’’ (Vandenabeele 2007, 547). Because of this altruistic component PSM should be understood as a particular kind



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of motivation (Perry and Hondeghem 2008b). Furthermore, it involves underlying normative concerns, such as political ideologies (Lewis 2010; Gailmard 2010). In addition, PSM is not a public sector-specific measure of work motivation, but is rather a particular type of motivation, particularly prevalent in the public sector but also relevant for studying volunteers’ motivations (Clerkin, Paynter, and Taylor 2009; Perry et al. 2008; Steen 2006). Its empirical operationalization is varied and subject to controversy (Wright 2008). Initially it was developed for the North American context and was composed of four dimensions, namely ‘‘attraction to politics and policymaking,’’ ‘‘commitment to the public interest,’’ ‘‘compassion,’’ and ‘‘self-sacrifice.’’ As for a ‘‘needs theory’’ framework, PSM consists of fulfillment of higher-order needs. One can thus argue that the will to act in congruence or consistency (Festinger 1957; Bandura 1986) with public values is a specific need or motive of public employees. In doing so, individuals with a high level of PSM are likely to seek jobs in the public sphere (Perry and Wise 1990; Vandenabeele 2008b; Steijn 2008). They will also be more satisfied with their jobs (Naff and Crum 1999; Bright 2008; Taylor 2007; Taylor 2008). From a PSM perspective, the motivation of public employees is oriented toward the realization of the values and goals of public service because they are part of the identity of certain public employees and therefore determine and justify their behavior (Perry and Vandenabeele 2008). In the literature, PSM seems to be substituted for usual (non-domain characterized) work motivation measures, even if its conceptual characteristics are closer to an identification or a value-fit construct. That said, PSM, as an independent variable, is of particular interest because of its hypothesized desirable outcomes. It has consistently been reported that PSM is a factor of job satisfaction, as stated before, organizational citizenship behaviors (Kim 2006; Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan 2008), organizational commitment (e.g., Taylor 2007; Taylor 2008; Crewson 1997), as well as whistle-blowing (Brewer and Selden 1998). On the other hand, some authors relate PSM to organizational (Kim 2005; Ritz 2009) and individual (Leisink and Steijn 2009; Alonso and Lewis 2001) performance, even though the empirical evidence for a positive relationship is very small (Brewer 2008). Conversely, the PSM-performance relationship seems to be mediated by job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Vandenabeele 2009). Surprisingly, few studies have directly tested the hypothesis that PSM has an effect on work motivation. In a study looking at the motivational patterns underlying the choices made by civil servants and students in Belgium, Vandenabeele and his colleagues tested non-sector specific motivation theories. Their results show that PSM is an important and particular element of the motivational characteristics of public employees (Vandenabeele et al. 2004). The exploratory research conducted by Cerase and Farinella (2006) on the motivation of Italian officials shows that three out of four dimensions of PSM1 are positively correlated to work motivation, when ‘‘attraction to politics and policymaking’’ is positively correlated to a measure of poor motivation. Those results are, however, preliminary and need further analysis. Taylor’s study (2007) is also a dimensional analysis of PSM in relation to work outcomes. According to the results of this study, the more compassionate public civil servants are, the less motivated to work they are. On the other hand, the more they are committed to the public interest, the higher is their level of work motivation.

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On the basis of these divergent empirical results, it is reasonable to take all four dimensions of the PSM construct into account. We thus formulate the following hypothesis: PSM has a positive impact on work motivation in the public sector (Hypothesis 1). Of course, PSM is just one specific factor explaining work motivation, and several other motivational factors also have an effect on work behaviors (Vandenabeele and Ban 2009). Both material incentives and team relations may play an important role in the motivational process of civil servants. Comparative studies of the motivational patterns of public and private sector employees (Solomon 1986; Jurkiewicz, Massey, and Brown 1998) clearly suggest the appropriateness of an approach integrating additional explanatory variables to which we turn now.

Material Incentives Since the seminal work of Deci and Ryan (1985), the distinction between intrinsic drives and extrinsic factors has become a classic among motivation theories. While the former refer to the inherent satisfaction linked with undertaking an activity, the latter concern the outcomes of the activity (Ryan and Deci 2000). Comparative studies have consistently demonstrated that public employees have different motives from private ones. In particular, they are more inclined to disregard extrinsic elements such as pay and other material rewards and to value intrinsic job characteristics. These empirical results are validated both in North America (Jurkiewicz, Massey, and Brown 1998; Lyons, Duxbury, and Higgins 2006; Rainey 1982; Crewson 1997) and Europe (Buelens and Van den Broeck 2007). Nevertheless, two-thirds of the countries that belong to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, at different degrees, use or intend to implement performance-related pay scheme (OECD 2005). Switzerland is one of the leading countries on the topic and has implemented such a reward system at its three levels of governance (federal, cantonal, and municipal; Steiner 2000; Emery 2004). At least for the public sector, the preference for intrinsic motivators might explain the (partial) failure of performance-related pay reward schemes to enhance the motivational level of public servants and the performance of public organizations (Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh 2010; OECD 2005; Perry, Engbers, and Jun 2009). For instance, the studies of English civil servants by Marsden and colleagues (Marsden and Richardson 1992; 1994; Marsden, French, and Kubo 2001) show that public employees, at least in the U.K., are skeptical about the usefulness of performance-related pay: they doubt both its incentive and its rewarding effects. Those results are largely confirmed in other countries (Pilichowski 2009). Relying on these previous findings, we formulate a second research hypothesis: Material incentives have a negative impact on work motivation in the public sector (Hypothesis 2).

Team Relations and Support Intrinsic motivation may be attained when need-based components, opportunities, or incentives that fulfill the higher-level needs of individuals are satisfied (Bright



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2009). And PSM has the capacity to fulfill higher order needs (Perry and Wise 1990). But PSM is not the only intrinsic motivator in the public sector, and several strands of theories of motivation state that relatedness or group affiliation is one of the basic needs of individuals (Maslow 1954; Fairbairn and Jones 1954; Epstein 1994; Baumeister and Leary 1995). To complement PSM and material incentives as motivators, this study addresses the need for public employees to have good relationships and to be supported or recognized at work. Results from comparative studies give an idea about how the quality of team relations and support by the superior or the organization is important for public employees. For instance, they value more than their private counterparts the possibility of having good interpersonal relationships with colleagues and co-workers (Posner and Schmidt 1996; Khojasteh 1993; Buelens and Van den Broeck 2007). Vandenabeele et al. (2004) show that insertion in a team or affiliation with colleagues is important for the motivation of public employees. Furthermore, the recognition from superiors might also have a strong motivational potential in the public sector (Khojasteh 1993; Rainey 1982; Vandenabeele et al. 2004). Therefore, it makes sense to put the emphasis on socio-relational components of the working team. In this respect, we take it as a given that good relationships and recognition are two complementary elements of the need for relatedness. On the one hand, to be part of a team is valued by employees because it creates physical and emotional security, facilitates the construction of a common social reality, is useful, and provides means of social regulation (Stroebe and Stroebe 1996). On the other hand, the need to be recognized by colleagues and superiors highlights subjective and affective elements of work motivation. The French tradition of research on the sociology of work reminds us that socialization and good interpersonal relationships at work are important in terms of identity construction (Dubar 2005; Garner, Me´da, and Senik 2006; Sainsaulieu 1988; Dubar 1992) and are also a strong factor for well-being in the work setting. Recognition is founded in a humanist perspective on work relations and has been defined as follows: recognition is a reaction expressed in the short term after a specific or general action or behavior that the individual perceives to merit a positive and personal response (Bourcier and Palobart 1997). Such positive feedback is a determinative element of motivation and performance for the members of the working team (Stajkovic 2003; Lamontagne 2006; Herzberg, Mausner, and Bloch-Snyderman 1959). In a survey of employees of credit institutions, Whitener (2001) found a significant relationship between the degree of organizational commitment and employees’ perception of organizational support. Many scholars argue that it is important, or even vital, to have positive experiences at work to enhance the development of organizational commitment and work motivation. This feeling is the core of the concept of perceived organizational support, which measures employees’ ‘‘global beliefs concerning the extent to which the organization values their contributions and cares about their well-being.’’ (Eisenberger et al. 1986, 501) Employees are grateful for the support they receive, feel indebted to their enterprise, and respond to the favorable treatment they receive by showing a stronger commitment to their employer (Eisenberger, Fasolo, and Davis-LaMastro 1990).


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This psychological mechanism contributes to the consolidation of social exchange and is linked to commitment in several studies (Hutchison 1997; Eisenberger, Fasolo, and Davis-LaMastro 1990; Eisenberger et al. 2001; Guzzo, Noonan, and Elron 1994; Shore and Tetrick 1991; Shore and Wayne 1993). Finally, HRM practices emphasizing team support, and recognition as a reward, build an organizational culture that stimulates creativity and innovation (Andriopoulos 2001; Jimenez-Jimenez and Sanz-Valle 2005; Martins and Terblanche 2003). They lead to better production and financial results (Delaney and Huselid 1996; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997) and induce employees to adopt discretionary behavior in line with the interests of the organization (MacDuffie 1995).These empirical results generally confirm that socio-relational elements, such as inclusion in a team and good relationships within this working team, are crucial factors impacting work motivation. Hence recognition from superiors or colleagues represents a non-pecuniary reward for employees, fulfilling their need for affiliation and relatedness. So our third research hypothesis reads as follows: Good team relations and support have a positive impact on work motivation in the public sector (Hypothesis 3). Theoretical Model Within a broad need theory of work motivation, this literature review leads us to develop the hypothesized model of the present study. However, one additional point should be mentioned here. On the one hand, this study is precisely designed to assess the respective contribution of PSM, team relations and support, and material incentives, on the explication of work motivation. On the other hand, because motivation arises when a combination of interrelated factors are met (Le´vy-Leboyer 2006), we should postulate relations between them. First, according to the PSM theory, individuals decide to enter the public service for reasons other than material or financial ones. For them, salary is not their priority, and the maximization of this kind of reward does not correspond to their ideals. For instance, individuals imbued with self-sacrifice values do not expect much of the material incentives. Conversely, empirical studies indicate that an increase in extrinsic motivators may even reduce the positive impacts of intrinsic factors (i.e., PSM) on work motivation. Such a ‘‘crowding-out effect’’ (Frey and Jegen 2001) was empirically attested for volunteers (Frey and Goette 1999) and blood donors (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997) as well as for PSM-oriented civil servants (Georgellis, Iossa, and Tabvuma 2008; Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh 2010). Thus, we expect a negative correlation among PSM and material incentives. An empirical result of this kind would suggest the potentiality of such an undesirable effect. Second, primary socialization is one of the most important antecedents of PSM (Perry 1997). Therefore, individuals having a high level of PSM enter the public sector with a similar set of values. Those common ‘‘belief systems’’ facilitate their identification with other members of the team (Van Dick et al. 2004). Conversely, it has been demonstrated that the level of PSM is influenced by the organizational environment of public employees (Moynihan and Pandey 2007; Perry 2000; Taylor 2007; cited by Taylor



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Figure 1. Theoretical Model.

2008) and that the quality of the relationship with colleagues and superiors is one of the most critical factors of this environment (Perry and Porter 1982). Finally, the disinterested motivation of public service motivated employees is both targeted to the whole society and to their organization and colleagues (Kim 2006; Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan 2008). Thus, it is likely that such a motive will exert a positive influence on how they value working in a pleasant and supporting team. In a nutshell, we expect a positive relationship among PSM and team relations and support. Third and last, individual and collective performances rewarded by material incentives depend generally on good team work. Likely, performance appraisals often assess the individual’s capacity to be a team player. Additionally, recognition and appreciation of superiors are preconditions to receive material rewards such as pay bonuses or career advancement. For all those reasons, we also expect a positive relation between material incentives and team relations and support. Therefore, the resulting model integrates simultaneously the relationships among the independent variables and their effects on the dependent one (see Figure 1). In this respect, SEM is particularly appropriate for such research design.

DATA AND METHODS Data Collection and Sample Characteristics The primary data for this study were collected in a national survey of civil servants at the Swiss municipal level. Apart from the municipalities in the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland, virtually all the 2,636 Swiss municipalities were contacted by mail and invited to take part in a national survey on the motivations of Swiss public



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servants. In order to raise participation, the municipal authorities were promised a benchmark report containing the survey’s key results. In the end, 279 municipalities participated in the survey, which was either paper-based or administered online. The municipalities themselves were responsible for its distribution amongst their employees and also provided us with some basic statistics (number of employees, percentage of males and females, supervisory and non-supervisory employees, etc.) to assess the response rate and the representativeness of the sample accurately. At the end of this process, the survey was given to 9,852 civil servants, from whom 3,754 questionnaires were returned, yielding a response rate of 38.1%. Table 1 displays the demographic description of the sample. The sample includes municipal civil servants of various hierarchical levels, mostly (51.4%) frontline employees. They perform a variety of job tasks (7.4% participate in the formulation or planning of public policies, 50.9% are in charge of the implementation of public policies, and 41.7% supply internal services). Seventy-nine percent were German-speaking and 21% French. This corresponds roughly to the language distribution of the resident population of Switzerland (Lu¨di and Werlen 2005).

TABLE 1 Demographic Description of the Sample (N ¼ 3,754) Variable Gender Male Female Educational level Secondary school Professional apprenticeship High school diploma Upper professional apprenticeship University degree Other Age 15–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 Mean (Years)

Classified in years.

Percentage 54.40 45.60 4.20 44.70 7.70 22.30 17.60 3.50 4.70 12.90 21.30 29.70 25.70 5.80 42.26

Variable Linguistic region Swiss-German Swiss-French Hierarchical position Apprentice, trainee Auxiliary Employee Manager Senior manager Other Time with organization 36 Mean (Years)

Percentage 79.00 21.00 4.20 0.80 51.40 27.20 15.30 1.10 12.20 27.90 23.60 9.90 11.80 6.30 4.20 2.60 1.00 10.34


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Measures of the Variables All measures consisted of items with response options on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree; see Appendix A for list of items and details). This type of measurement is, by nature, ordinal, even if researchers assume for practical reasons that they are continuous (Blaikie 2003, 24). However, we know that ‘‘continuous methods can be used with little worry when a variable has four or more categories, as long as normally distributed categorical variables are given’’ (Bentler and Chou 1987, 88). In this study, we meet both prerequisites: our Likert-type measures have five categories, and multivariate normality should not cause trouble as the usual coefficients of distribution (skewness and kurtosis) do not reach established cut-off criteria (Kline 2005), as shown in Appendix A.2 The constructs of PSM and work motivation were measured with previously tested items. On the other hand, team relations and support (TRSS) and material incentives (MIS) relied on items we developed ourselves in the wake of attested scales. However, for questionnaire-size concerns we could not insert all the questions. Therefore, we have chosen and adapted items from previous work3 to reflect how our independent constructs (TRSS and MIS) are valued, from a motivational perspective, by the respondents. Given this fact, we were very cautious when testing our measurement instruments. In this respect, we relied on model generating confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) procedure (Byrne 2001). Prior to analysis of the full structural model, a two-step procedure was carried out for the construction of the measures of the independent variables. First, the reliability of the independent scales was tested separately following a model generating CFA approach and modified according to fit indices and size of factor loadings. This process led to the construction of three scales to measure how public service motivation (PSM), material incentives (MIS), and team relations and support (TRSS) motivate civil servants. Second, a simultaneous factor analysis of all the independent variables was done to verify cross-loading items and to assess the discriminant validity of the scales. Such an approach, in opposition to the creation of summative scales assessed with Cronbach’s alpha, has several advantages. It does not postulate ‘‘a priori’’ equal weighting of items and takes into account all their variations (or characteristics; variances and error terms) when put in relation with their construct. On the other hand, coefficient of reliability is often misleading (Sijtsma 2009) and is highly influenced by the number of items (Cortina 1993). Nonetheless, for comparative purposes, Cronbach’s coefficient of reliability is provided as an indication (see Appendix A).

Work Motivation Many different operationalizations of work motivation compete in the literature. But the core of the concept consists of a sense of commitment to the job and a willingness to put effort into work (Maugeri 2004). Two items measuring the generic concept of work motivation were adapted from Wright’s study because of a previous test in a civil-servant work setting (Wright 2004). The first was I am always totally committed to my work no matter how many difficulties there are; this captures the

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commitment facet. The second item was I’m always ready to start early in the morning and finish late at night to get the job done; this captures employee eagerness. Because fit indices and factor loadings cannot be estimated correctly in CFA with fewer than four items, the reliability of the scale was inferred from the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability displayed in Appendix A (.55). Cronbach’s alphas under the 0.60 threshold are often considered to be poor (Kline 2000). But, as the work motivation scale has only two items, we consider this level as not problematic. Moreover, these two items are not only quite strongly correlated (.42), but they are clearly more associated compared with all other variables in the study (see Table 2). Finally, when inserted in the final SEM model, both items have a factor loading superior to the 0.40 accepted threshold (Motiv 1 ¼ .57 and Motiv 2 ¼ .74), which suggests they are part of the scale of Work Motivation.

Public Service Motivation The various conceptualizations of PSM have resulted in different operational definitions. In this study, Perry’s multidimensional measure is taken as the baseline (Perry 1996). We reduced the set of items to a 14-item scale including items for all four PSM dimensions. The items were chosen based on previous research in the psychometric testing of a PSM scale (Coursey and Pandey 2007b; Coursey et al. 2008; Kim 2009; Vandenabeele 2007, 2008a). We intended to keep the PSM scale in this study as close as possible to Perry’s instrument (1996). Some adjustments were however necessary. For instance, the wording of some items was slightly adapted to fit the national context of this study, while preserving the meaning of the items. All items were translated into German and French. The question whether PSM is second-order formative or reflective4 still remains open (Wright and Christensen 2009). Though a case can be made for understanding PSM as a second-order formative construct, we stuck to a reflective measurement, as suggested by Coursey et al. (2008). Our measure of PSM resulted in a four-dimensional figure with two items per dimension. This scale is very good in terms of its psychometric characteristics (v2 ¼ 101.492, df ¼ 16, p-value ¼ .000, TLI ¼ .98, CFI ¼ .99, NFI ¼ .99, p-value of close fit ¼ .99, RMSEA ¼ 0.04). For the first order, all standardized factor loadings were above usual threshold (0.58–0.93) and were acceptable for the second order (0.35–0.84). Even though ‘‘attraction to policymaking’’ had a factor loading below the general threshold of 0.40, we decided to keep it in the final model to adhere to the most widely used four-factor operationalization of PSM. Finally, the inter-item correlations (see Table 2) provide further insights on the discriminant validity of the PSM dimensions, as all pairs of retained items are not only highly and significantly correlated, but their association is always the greatest, compared with other items related to other constructs.

Material Incentives From a behavioral point of view, material incentives such as pay, performancerelated pay, or career advancement are extrinsic factors of motivation (Ryan and

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11. Pol 2

9. Bonus exceptional perf 10. Pol 1

7. Pay per performance 8. Career

3. Superior recognition 4. Colleagues Recognition 5. Relationships w=colleagues 6. High wage

1. Motiv 2 2. Motiv 1

Pearsons Correlations (Shared Variance)

.053 (.0028) .095 (.0090) .069 (.0047) .014 (.0001) .086 (.0073) .044 (.0019) .052 (.0027)

.030 (.0009) .060 (.0036)

.070 (.0049) .083 (.0068)

1

2

1 .423 (.1789) .161 (.0259) .143 (.0204) .131 (.0171) .014 (.0001) .051 (.0026) .028 (.0007) .048 (.0023)

1

.047 (.0022) .047 (.0022)

.489 (.2391) .373 (.1391) .248 (.0615) .240 (.0576) .261 (.0681) .174 (.0302)

1

3

.038 (.0014) .042 (.0017)

.403 (.1624) .213 (.0453) .178 (.0316) .201 (.0404) .125 (.0156)

1

4

.012 (.0001) .018 (.0003)

.226 (.0510) .204 (.0416) .258 (.0665) .136 (.0184)

1

5

.027 (.0007) .016 (.0002)

.518 (.2683) .483 (.2332) .259 (.0670)

1

6

.076 (.0057) .057 (.0032)

.594 (.3528) .437 (.1909)

1

7

.001 (.0000) .025 (.0006)

.340 (.1156)

1

8

1

9

.010 (.0001) .004 (.0000)

TABLE 2 Intercorrelations

.844 (.7123)

1

10

1

11


12

13

14

15

17

(Continued )

16

226

2

.175 (.0306) .149 (.0222) .020 (.0004) .088 (.0077) .162 (.0262) .137 (.0187)

1

.177 (.0313) .236 (.0556) .102 (.0104) .122 (.0148) .132 (.0174) .095 (.0090)

.056 (.0031) .063 (.0039) .067 (.0044) .088 (.0077) .030 (.0009) .044 (.0019)

3 .086 (.0073) .095 (.0090) .072 (.0051) .109 (.0118) .056 (.0031) .065 (.0042)

4 .038 (.0014) .039 (.0015) .082 (.0067) .107 (.0114) .057 (.0032) .065 (.0042)

5 .025 (.0006) .028 (.0007) .010 (.0001) .028 (.0007) .080 (.0064) .010 (.0001)

6 .047 (.0022) .083 (.0068) .061 (.0037) .001 (.0000) .044 (.0019) .002 (.0000)

7 .018 (.0003) .049 (.0024) .021 (.0004) .035 (.0012) .021 (.0004) .024 (.0004)

8 .031 (.0009) .046 (.0021) .041 (.0068) .010 (.0001) .038 (.0014) .011 (.0001)

9 .231 (.0533) .204 (.0416) .109 (.0118) .125 (.0156) .070 (.0049) .139 (.0193)

10 .232 (.0538) .179 (.0320) .104 (.0108) .142 (.0201) .073 (.0053) .127 (.0161)

11

.446 (.1989) .184 (.0338) .205 (.0420) .323 (.1043) .266 (.0707)

1

12

.150 (.0225) .171 (.0292) .221 (.0488) .213 (.0453)

1

13

Note. In grey, correlations among items measuring the same construct. Mean correlations ¼ 0.1227. Mean shared variance ¼ 0.0369. Sig. 0.01 (bilateral); Sig. 0.05 (bilateral).

17. Self-Sacr. 1

16. Self-Sacr. 2

15. Comp 1

14. Comp 2

13. Civ Int 1

12. Civ Int 2

Pearsons Correlations (Shared Variance)

Continued

TABLE 2


.376 (.1413) .204 (.0416) .155 (.0240)

1

14

.202 (.0408) .189 (.0357)

1

15

.405 (.1640)

1

16

1

17


227

Deci 2000). Four items were used for the Material Incentive Scale (MIS). It is important for me to have a high wage is rather similar to the one used by Jurkiewitcz, Massey and Brown (1998). Two items focus on the desire for pay per performance: It is important for me to have a high pay per performance, and It is crucial for me that there are bonuses to reward exceptional work. The fourth item of this scale captures the importance, for public employees, to have good career perspective. This scale had acceptable reliability (v2 ¼ 46.026, df ¼ 2, p-value ¼ .000, TLI ¼ .94, CFI ¼ .99, NFI ¼ .99, p-value of close fit ¼ .009, RMSEA ¼ 0.08). The standardized factor loadings ranged from 0.49 to 0.83. Moreover, the four items are well interrelated, and this compared with items related to other constructs (see Table 2).


Team Relations and Support The quality of team relations and support from supervisors are underestimated intrinsic factors. This scale contains three items that measure the importance of receiving positive feedbacks from superiors and colleagues as well as the valuation of good working relations with colleagues. As the number of items is not sufficient to proceed to a CFA, Cronbach alpha was computed as an indication of reliability (.69). In the final model, their factor loadings range from .57 for relationship with colleagues to .70 for supervisor recognition, providing further evidence of their association with the Team Relations and Support Scale (TRSS). Here again, the discriminant validity of the construct is supported by the level of inter-items correlations. The three items are strongly related also in terms of their relations with all the other items (see Table 2). Results of the Simultaneous Factor Analysis The intermediary model (correlation of independent variables) fitted the data well (v2 ¼ 410.694, df ¼ 83, p-value ¼ .000, TLI ¼ .97, CFI ¼ .98, NFI ¼ .97, p-value of close fit ¼ 1.000, RMSEA ¼ 0.03). All factor loadings are above the usual threshold, signifying that all items are well related to their respective latent construct. The relatively low levels of correlations among the constructs provide further evidences of their discriminant validity. Common Method Bias Prevention and Diagnostic Research on organizational behavior using self-reported surveys is often confronted by common method bias (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). This issue is seen either as a critical methodological point threatening the validity of conclusions about observed relationships among variables (Podsakoff et al. 2003) or as an overstated issue for survey-based research (Spector 2006, cited by Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan 2008). Questionnaire design and data collection strategies, and post-hoc analyses of the data, are two ways either to attenuate potential measurement biases or to verify whether or not they are present and potentially influential (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). Anonymity in questionnaire administration, in data collection


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and analyses, as well as clarification of the purpose of the study are important for attenuating common method biases (Podsakoff et al. 2003, 888, cited by Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan 2008). For that reason, our data collection was strictly anonymous. We also accompanied our invitation to fill the questionnaire with a cover letter explaining the goals of the study and the general ethic of scientific research. Respondents were explicitly asked to answer freely the questions and reminded that no data will be transmitted to their employers. In addition, most items used in this study were taken from previous research, and all self-developed items were carefully designed. One of the major problems with self-reported survey data concerns the independence of the constructs as they may correlate with each other (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Therefore, two complementary empirical analyses of common method bias were carried. First, at the suggestion of Podsakoff et al. (2003), Harman’s single factor test (with unrotated principal components) was performed with all the items of the study. It revealed the presence of six distinct factors among the seventeen items of the study.5 Second, we made use of an analysis of the correlations and shared variances among the items. Table 2 shows that the average correlation among all the items is low (.12) as well as the average shared variance (.04). Furthermore, the items used to create each scale are highly correlated, and always more than with any other items of the study. According to these statistical results, we consider that common method bias, if it exists in the current study, is not very important and should not interfere with interpreting the results. Statistical Methods This study relied on the SEM approach, which is particularly relevant when assessing a causal model with complex constructs (Hayduk 1987). SEM combines the two familiar multivariate techniques of factor analysis and multiple regression analysis. The main difference between SEM and traditional multivariate techniques is the simultaneous estimation of a series of separate, but interdependent, multiple regression equations. SEM is recommended to represent theoretical concepts better by using multiple measures to reduce measurement error. Furthermore, it improves the measurement of relationships between constructs by taking into account the measurement error in the constructs (Hair et al. 2009). In comparison to conventional regression analysis, SEM has several advantages. First, as the items are not computed as summative scales, all their respective variances are taken into account when testing the model of regression. Second, it is particularly relevant for complex scales such as PSM, which is a second order construct. Finally, the purpose of the present study is to assess if an integrative model containing PSM, compared and in relation to competitive sources of motivation, can provide a comprehensive understanding of work motivation in the public sector. In this respect, SEM estimation is particularly appropriate for this aim. It provides simultaneously the impacts (regression weights) of the independent variables on the dependent one and their relations (correlations), as well as a number of fit index providing information on whether or not the theorized model is in adequacy with the configuration of the empirical data.



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The empirical analysis applied reflective CFA for construction of the independent scales and SEM with Amos 17.0 full information maximum likelihood (FIML; Arbuckle 2008a) estimation to test the causal or structural model. Even though it would be more appropriate to apply diagonally weighted least squares estimation or weighted least squares mean and variance adjusted estimation, because the usual maximum likelihood estimator using covariance or correlation matrix does not fully take into account the ordinal nature of the used measures, and, as a consequence, factor correlations and factor loadings may be underestimated and v2 values inflated (Byrne 2001; West, Finch, and Curran 1995; Finch, West, and MacKinnon 1997), we choose FIML because it is suitable to estimate models using ordinal measures (Jo¨reskog and Moustaki 2006). In addition, FIML is a good method to handle missing data. It avoids a reduction of the sample caused by the covariance matrix creation and the exclusion of cases, either with likewise or pairwise deletion (Wothke and Arbuckle 1996), and is superior to data imputation methods (Olinsky, Chen, and Harlow 2003). Hence, FIML provides estimators that have less bias and are less sensitive to sample variability (Enders 2001). That is why ‘‘FIML appears to be the best method for handling missing data for most SEM applications’’ (Allison 2003, quoting Duncan, Duncan, and Li 1998). Model fit is assessed by inferential v2 and several descriptive goodness-of-fit indices. Since the v2-statistic is known to be inflated for samples with N > 200 (Kelloway 1998), v2 is referred to here as descriptive information rather than a strong inferential test upon which a model is accepted or rejected. In addition to v2, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), normed fit index (NFI), and the Tucker-Lewis fit index (TLI) were consulted as fit indices in line with their respective usual thresholds: TLI > .95, CFI > .95, NFI > .95, RMSEA < .06, according to Hu and Bentler (1999).

RESULTS Descriptive Statistics Table 2 provides bivariate, and Appendix A the univariate, statistics of the items and scales used in this study. (For practical reasons, we provide statistics using summative scales, but the final model was estimated with their respective items.) Means (in Appendix A) for Work Motivation and TRSS are high. At first sight, public employees of Swiss municipalities appear highly motivated, and they highly value relationships with colleagues as well as a confident and supportive work environment. Structural Equation Modeling Results As it is common practice in SEM, several models were specified and tested. For instance, we have tested a model using two other motivational factors particularly relevant within the public sector. These were job security, which contributes a priori to its attractiveness (Vandenabeele 2008b; Lewis and Frank 2002), and work-life


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balance (Buelens and Van den Broeck 2007; Lindorff 2009; Worrall, Cooper, and Campbell-Jamison 2000; Worrall and Cooper 2007), which are both elements particularly valued by public employees. Demographic variables such as gender, level of education, and organizational tenure were also considered in preliminary models. Those control variables were omitted from the final model for two reasons. First, the model had a very bad fit. Second, those variables had no influence (non-significant factor loadings; no increase in the R2 of Work Motivation) on the dependent variable. Consequently, the final model estimated was fairly simple, with three constructs rooted in three non-exclusive theoretical perspectives competing to explain the work motivation of municipal civil servants. The results of the structural model provide evidence supporting the relevance of this approach. Appendix B shows all the parametric characteristics of the structural model. This model reached generally accepted thresholds and was well fitted (v2 ¼ 580.936, df ¼ 109, p-value ¼ .000, TLI ¼ .96, CFI ¼ .97, NFI ¼ .96, p-value of close fit ¼ 1.000, RMSEA ¼ 0.03). Such an adequacy between the hypothesized model containing three interconnected motivational factors impacting on a general measure of work motivation suggests the coherence of such an approach. Figure 2 presents the standardized estimates for the final model. Finally, in the context of the study, this three-factor model explained 22% of the variance in work motivation. A few comments should also be made on the association among the explanatory variables. All the independent variables were significantly related (PSM MIS [.08], PSM TRSS [.20], MIS TRSS [.45]). The observed association between PSM and material incentives is negative as expected. This empirical finding supports the general findings of a potential crowding-out effect by extrinsic motivators and provides mild support for the view that if public managers implement such incentive schemes when PSM plays a strong role among their employees, a detrimental effect on motivation can be expected. Hypotheses Testing Hypothesis 1 postulates that PSM has a positive impact on work motivation. In the context of this study, we demonstrated that PSM accounted for the largest share of the explained variance of work motivation (standardized factor loading ¼ .40). The fact that PSM is a strong factor in work motivation in the public sector was also confirmed by a supplementary test: When we added PSM to the two other independent variables (TRSS and MIS), the percentage of explained variance in work motivation rose from 0.6% to 22%.6 A test of the same two models, with and without PSM, executed with ordinary least squares linear regressions, led to similar results. This result strongly supports inclusion of PSM as an important motivational factor in the public sector. Hypothesis 2 asserts that material incentives have a negative impact on work motivation in the public sector. Results from the structural model do not strongly support this, as MIS is positively related to motivation. One must be cautious in the interpretation of such an effect as the regression weight falls barely short of statistical significance using conventional tests (p-value ¼ .106).

231 Figure 2. Full Structural Model.


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Furthermore, the standardized coefficient is rather low (.045) and thus supports the suggestion that material incentives only weakly support work motivation in the public sector. Hypothesis 3 suggests that the perceived quality of team support, measured in terms of recognition from superiors and colleagues, and the quality of relationship with teammates, has a positive impact on work motivation. The findings of this empirical study clearly support this hypothesis. Team relation and support accounted for the second largest part of the explained variance of work motivation (standardized factor loading ¼ .17).


LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS This study has two main limitations. The first one is how generalizable empirical results stemming from the Swiss municipal context are. The second one concerns the use of self-developed measures. First, as the findings presented in this study concern Swiss public employees at the municipal level, we should be cautious about not interpreting the results as a general judgment of the motivational patterns of all public employees, or even of all Swiss public employees. Switzerland is a federal state characterized by the principle of subsidiarity between the local authorities, the cantons, and the federal level of government. Local authorities thus have a great deal of autonomy under the federal constitution, but are under certain restrictions at the cantonal level. The municipal level of government is primarily characterized by a strong logic of service provision and by the closeness of elected politicians and public servants to citizens. Furthermore, in our sample the biggest cities in Switzerland (e.g., Zurich, Geneva, Basel, and Bern) were underrepresented, which also leads to a supplementary caution when extrapolating the results obtained to the behavior of Swiss public servants in general. The second cautionary note concerns our measures. If the use of self-developed items calls into question the reliability of the results and their comparisons with previous findings, we nevertheless maintain that those items were carefully designed to capture, as well as possible, the particular factors of motivation. The purpose of this article was to assess empirically the relative impact of PSM as a work motivation factor. Drawing on a literature review of the ‘‘need perspective’’ on motivation, we have identified two other potential sources of public employee motivation: material incentives as extrinsic factors, and team relations and support as intrinsic factors. These three variables were then integrated in a structural model in order to test their respective influence. The main findings support PSM as a strong predictor of work motivation in the public sector. Furthermore, PSM has an explanatory added value in comparison with competing factors. In addition, alongside PSM, socio-relational factors such as recognition from colleagues and superiors and good relationships with colleagues are good predictors of work motivation. This need to interact in a supportive work environment might not be a specific feature of public work, but it has its roots in the deepest human need for social relationships and recognition. This last point hints at a social identity theory of work motivation. Identification, in the context of the workplace,



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can have multiple targets, and co-workers is one of them (Van Dick et al. 2004). Finally, this study also supports the view that material incentives are poor predictors of work motivation in the public sector. This study opens new research avenues. A replication of this study with better and validated measures of satisfaction with co-workers and superiors as well as material incentives would probably bring further insights. In particular, it would be of great interest to perform the same analysis with other HRM practices in order to assess their impact on work motivation in the public sphere. Given the lack of research in this area, it would be interesting to assess different kinds of HRM practices in order to better identify their influence. This kind of research would also be of great interest for HRM practitioners. Furthermore, like other studies analyzing the effects of PSM as an overall construct with several dimensions, it is conceivable to think of different effects for each of its four dimensions (Vandenabeele 2009; Taylor 2007). One may also consider supplementing this quantitative cross-sectional study with in-depth qualitative interviews with public agents. Our results also raise normative questions regarding the NPM reform trend, at least as it has developed in Europe. They provide further evidence for the view that, if work motivation in the public sector depends on intrinsic factors such as PSM or the desire to interact in a supportive and cooperative environment, reforms that raise the role of extrinsic incentives (such as pay for performance) could miss their intended goals. At least one major human resource management measure inspired by NPM, pay-for-performance, could be counter-productive from this perspective (Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh 2010; Perry, Engbers, and Jun 2009). Detrimental effects on motivation in the public sector are the result. Further comparative research with administrative services that have implemented such approaches and, as control cases, traditional administrative services might provide further evidence on this debate.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This article is part of a broader research project (n 100012–116083) financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation. The authors would like to thank the reviewers and the editor of IPMJ for their astute comments and suggestions, which contributed to the improvement of the present article. A previous version was presented to the 14th International Research Society on Public Management Conference in Bern 2010. The authors are grateful for the discussion they had with the participants.

NOTES 1. In this study, the measured dimensions of PSM were: ‘‘attraction to policymaking,’’ ‘‘commitment to the public interest,’’ ‘‘self-sacrifice,’’ and ‘‘bureaucratic governance.’’ The latter dimension was developed by Vandenabeele (2008a) to suit the European context. It reflects traditional principles of European public services such as equality, equity, or continuity. 2. 3 for Skewness and 10 for Kurtosis. 3. Delery and Doty (1996) on strategic human resource management, the work of Jurkievicz and Massey (1997) on motivational factors. We were also inspired by the items


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designed by Spector (1985) for job satisfaction subdimensions and by the battery developed by Bourcier and Palobart (1997) on work recognition. 4. The reflective-formative issue concerns the specification of a model of measurement (for an extensive discussion, see Jarvis, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff 2003). It refers to critical issues faced when constructing scales: direction of causality between items and scales, correlations between the items, possibility to delete items of the same scale, and location of the measurement error term. Of course, when turning to a second order construct, as PSM is, the issues are the same and refer both to the relations between items and subscales (or dimensions), and to the relations between the dimensions and the construct. For PSM, the pending question refers to whether or not PSM is a second-order formative construct. The underlying issues are whether or not the four subdimensions should be part of the PSM construct, and how those subdimensions are related. 5. Results of the rotated (varimax) factor analysis show that at the exception of the ‘‘self-sacrifice’’ and the ‘‘commitment to the public interest’’ dimensions of PSM that load on the same factor (an overlap that is well known in PSM research; Wright 2008), all the items are related to their respective constructs. 6. Fit coefficients for the model without PSM: v2 ¼ 191.750, df ¼ 24, p-value ¼ .000, TLI ¼ .954, CFI ¼ .976, NFI ¼ .972, p-value of close fit ¼ .975, RMSEA ¼ 0.043.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS Simon Anderfuhren-Biget ([email protected]) is a research assistant and PhD candidate at the University of Geneva. He is finishing his doctoral thesis on PSM in Switzerland. His research interests include organizational sociology, HRM practices, well-being at work, and value-laden motivations. Fre´de´ric Varone ([email protected]) is Professor of Political Science at the University of Geneva. His current research interests include comparative public policy (e.g., sustainable management of natural resources, regulation of biotechnologies), program evaluation, and public sector reforms (e.g., New Public Management, liberalization and privatization of public services). David Giauque ([email protected]) is Assistant Professor at the University of Lausanne, a member of the Institute of Political and International Studies, and a member of the Swiss Public Administration Network (SPAN). His current research interests include comparative public administrations (e.g., public management reforms), human resources management in the public sector, sociology of organizations and public administrations (e.g., sociology of public employees, relationships between political actors and bureaucrats). Adrian Ritz ([email protected]) is Assistant Professor of Public Administration. He is a member of the executive board of the Center of Competence for Public Management at the University of Bern and member of the Swiss Public Administration Network (SPAN). His current research interests include motivation and performance in public organizations, public management reforms, and human resources management in the public sector.

243

Mean ¼ 3.46 Cronbach ¼ .700

Material incentives

Cronbach ¼ .68

Pay per performance Career Bonus exceptional perf

Superior recognition Colleagues recognition Relationships w= colleagues High wage

Motiv 2

Mean ¼ 4.11

Cronbach ¼ .55 Team relations and support Mean ¼ 4.44

Motiv 1

Item Name

Work motivation

Variable Name

3.38 3.66

3.19

3.57

1.205 1.225

1.284

0.977

0.732

0.863

4.24 4.56

0.774

0.675

1.073

St. Dev.

4.50

4.44

3.79

Mean

0.949

0.278 0.639 0.376

0.156

0.544

0.433 0.727

5.454

1.558

1.209 2.081

4.623

1.950

2.197

0.109

0.724 1.230

Kurtosis

Skewness

(Continued )

It is important for me to have high pay per performance. It is important for me to have good career perspectives. It is crucial for me that there are bonuses to reward exceptional work.

I’m always ready to begin early in the morning and to stop late at night to do the job. I am always totally committed to my work no matter how many difficulties there are. . Positive feedback from my hierarchical superior is very important for me. Positive feedback from my colleagues is very important for me. It is important for me to have good working relationships with my colleagues. It is important for me to have a high wage.

Items Wording (English)

All items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 ¼ strong disagreement, 5 ¼ strong agreement)

TABLE A.1 List and Details of the Variables and Items

APPENDIX A: LIST AND DETAILS OF THE VARIABLES AND ITEMS


244

3.35 3.19 4.01 3.64 3.76 3.76 3.14 3.24

Comp 1

Comp 2 Self-Sacr. 1

Self-Sacr. 2

Mean

Pol 1 Pol 2 Civ Int 1 Civ Int 2

Item Name

Based on summative indexes.

PSM Mean ¼ 3.51 Cronbach ¼ .69

Variable Name

1.037

1.065 1.022

0.981

1.216 1.229 1.040 1.049

St. Dev. Kurtosis 0.820 0.911 0.652 0.218 0.119 0.554 0.259 0.385

Skewness 0.312 0.182 1.074 0.530 0.554 0.652 0.143 0.215

I’m very interested in politics. I like to discuss political subjects with others. I consider public service my civic duty. It is important for me to contribute to the common good. I’m often reminded by daily events how dependent we are on one another. Most social programs are too vital to do without. I think people should give back to society more than they get from it. I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else.

Items Wording (English)

All items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 ¼ strong disagreement, 5 ¼ strong agreement)

Continued

TABLE A.1



245

APPENDIX B: STRUCTURAL ESTIMATES FOR THE FULL MODEL TABLE B.1 Structural Estimates


Variables and Items

Regression Weights (Unstandardized)

Work motivation Motiv 1 Motiv 2 TRSS Colleagues recognition Relationship w= colleagues Superior recognition MIS High wage Pay per performance Career Bonus for exceptional job PSM PSM_Policymaking Pol 1 Pol 2 PSM_Civic Interest Civ Int 1 Civ Int 2 PSM_Compassion Comp 1 Comp 2 PSM_Self-Sacrifice Self-Sacr. 1 Self-Sacr. 2 a

p-value (.001)

Standardized Factor Loadings

Variance

R2 .224

(1)a .824

.568 .744

.354 ( ) (1) .707

.690 .574

.908

.697 .392 ( )

(1) 1.661 1.415 .956

.640 .811 .735 .490

.150 ( ) (1) (1) 1.002 1.441 (1) 1.193 .920 (1) .969 1.095 (1) 1.144

.345 .923 .915 .876 .614 .726 .561 .648 .579 .694 .599 .675

.119

.767

.314

.481

Set to (1) for identification purpose. Statistically significant at p < .001.

TABLE B.2 Bilateral Associations Variables

Correlations

Covariances

p-value (.001)

TRSS PSM MIS PSM MIS TRSS

.196 .082 .446

.045 .020 .166

Statistically significant at p < .001.


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TABLE B.3 Regression Path on Dependent Variable Motivation TRSS MIS PSM


Regression Weights

p-value (.001)

Standardized Factor Loadings

.176 .044 .632

.172 .045 .402

Statistically significant at p < .001.

.106