University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, Jamaica ...... J. E. Greene, 'Cooperativism, Militarism, Party Politics and Democracy in Guyana', in P. Henry.
Electora~Studies(1985). 4:1, 57-68
Electoral Politics and Political Development in Post-independence Guyana KEMPE
RONALDHOPE*
University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, Jamaica
Guyana, formerly British Guiana (a British colony), became an independent sovereign nation on 26 May 1966 and subsequently declared itself a ‘Cooperative Republic’ in 1970. Independence was achieved under a coalition government of the People’s National Congress (PNC) and the United Force (UF). The PNC was, and still is, led by Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham. The UF was led by Peter D’aguiar. The PNC draws its principal support from among the Black (Afro-Guyanese) and mixed groups, who are heavily concentrated in the urban areas. The UF draws its support mainly from among the Portuguese, Chinese, Amerindians, and some of the East Indian middle-class. The opposition party, from the time of independence to the present, is the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) which is led by the Marxist Dr Cheddi Jagan. The PPP draws the bulk of its support from the East Indian (IndoGuyanese) population who reside primarily in the rural areas. From 1950 to 1955 Burnham and Jagan were co-leaders of the PPP before Burnham left to form the PNC. This article discusses and analyzes electoral politics and political developments in postindependence Guyana. However, before embarking on that task it is necessary that some brief background information be provided on the pre-independence elections and political experience that influenced events in the post-independence period.
Pre-independence
Elections
and Political
Experience
The pre-independence era in Guyana was one of political struggle, ethnic violence, foreign interference, and leadership crises. Few developing countries have embarked on the movement toward independence under circumstances more difficult than those in Guyana. In the end, Guyana achieved its independence in an atmosphere of crisis though there was expression of much hope for the future by the leadership and followers of the dominant People’s National Congress (PNC). The two major political leaders in Guyana are Forbes Burnham and Cheddi Jagan. In the early 195Os, Burnham (a lawyer) and Jagan (a dentist) headed an independence movement which sought to eliminate colonialism from Guyana and institute a socialist society in which everyone would be accorded maximum opportunity for self-realization. They succeeded in setting in motion the struggle for political independence through their political party the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) which they had launched in 1950 as the single racially united party in Guyana. Jagan was the leader of the party while Bumham was the chairman. Under this dual leadership, the original PPP projected itself as a social equalitarian liberating force of all the Guyanese people.’ Appreciation is expressed to an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier draft of the paper. 0261-379418510110057-121503.00 0
1985 Butterworth
& Co(Publishers)Ltd
iS
.Elc~~~~~rt~l Politics d:n~iPolrt~c-d Der~elopnxnt in Posl-independence
Grt_van~
In the elections of 1953 the PPP won. Committed to socialism and espousing national independence, the PPP received the majority of the total vote and Rarnered IS of the 24 seats in the legislature. This was the summit of the PPP’s popular support which. however, ~‘as preceded and followed by events and complications that hindered the part]; from ever again ITinning a distinct majority of the popular vote in a national election. But the 1953 election victory was an historic event. The elections Fvere the first ever held under universal adult suffrage in Guyana and gave the PPP the majority of seats in the colonial parliament. The Jaganite thesis at the time was that the capture of state pouer by a socialist political power-indeed. one rooted in the ideology of hlarsism-Leninism-is imperative for the propelling of radical changes to alleviate the conditions of the poor who have all suffered exploitation under colonialism and neo-colonialism.2 Such was the nature of the rhetoric of the PPP. They adopted an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist attitude in their approach to and examination of. the state of the society and its problems. That was totally unacceptable to the British government and, after only 133 days in office the colonial plantocracy and commercial interests persuaded the British Governor that private property was in danger of espropriation. This resulted in the constitution being suspended and British troops were installed in the country to supervise the eviction of the new national PPP government from power. In the intervening period. specifically in 1955. there was a split in the ranks of the PPP. and Forbes Burnham left to organize his own political party. the PNC. Jagan leading the PPP and Burnham firmly in control of the PNC were perceived as racial antagonists, and their individual popularity among members of their respective ethnic group brought to the fore their support on purely racial grounds. In 1957. a form of representative government was restored as the British authorities permitted elections. Those elections revealed a marked polarization of the electorate along racial lines. The PPP won the election by capturing 9 of the 14 elected seats in the newly established Legislative Council while the PNC won three seats and two other minor parties. the United Democratic Party and the National Labour Front, won one seat each. However, Burnham refused to accept the new system of election. To the PNC. the 1957 general election revealed how difficult it was for them to win power at subsequent elections under the existing first-past-the-post system given the increasing polarization along racial lines in the country. The PPP had a tremendous advantage o\‘er the PNC since its supporters were resident mainly in the rural areas where the majority of constituencies were demarcated. The PNC therefore argued for a change to proportional representation Lvhich was seen as being both more equitable and fair. In 1961, elections were again held. That election was held under a new constitution intended to usher in self-government. The constitution also made provision for the first time for registration by enumeration and the number of constituencies was increased to 35. The PPP won 20 Parliamentary seats and the election. the PNC and the UF won 11 and 4 seats. respectively. The trend of racial voting became entrenched in this election to the extent that both the PPP and the PNC were using the PPP-originated slogan ‘apanjhat’ (vote for your own race).! Of the 20 seats won by the PPP. 15 were in predominantly East Indian dominated areas and 5 from marginally populated constituencies. The PNC. on the other hand won its 11 seats from among the predominantly urban-Black constituencies. The support of the UF came partly from two Amerindian constituencies and partly from two urban middle-class constituencies. In October 1962, a Constitutional conference was held but the parties failed to reach an agreement. The PNC. now supported by the UF, continued its demand for a change in the electoral system to proportional representation while the PPP supported the existing first-
KEMPE RONALD HOPE
59
past-the-post system of simple plurality. In October 1963, another Constitutional conference was held in London. This time the leaders of the three parties signed a letter to Duncan Sandys, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, requesting that the British government settle all outstanding constitutional issues and they will undertake to accept those decisions. A few days later Duncan Sandys rendered his judgment, and sided with the PNC and UF, that the electoral process be changed to proportional representation as of the 1964 elections. In the elections held in 1964, under the new system of proportional representation, none of the parties gained an absolute majority. The PPP received 46 per cent of the vote and won 24 seats, the PNC gained 41 per cent of the vote and 22 seats, while the UF received 12 per cent of the vote and 7 seats in the new 53-seat House of Assembly. The combined strength of the PNC and UF provided a majority of seats (29) and the PNC was asked to form a coalition government with the UF in a blatant attempt to keep the Marxist PPP from ruling the nation.
The
1962-4
Civil Disturbances
Undoubtedly. the 1955 split between Burnham and Jagan had as its great significance the organization of political activity along racial lines. It is this organization which was later to become institutionalized and instrumental in precipitating the disturbances of 1962-4. Consequent on the racial aspects of the split, the civil disturbances were also a conflict of ideology. The first of the crises leading to the disturbances occurred in February 1962 when the Jagan government proposed a budget that included new and increased taxes. The budget itself was economically sound and feasible. However, its major impact would have been on the property-owners and businessmen whose interests were represented primarily by the UF. The PNC joined ranks with the UF and organized protest demonstrations and mass rallies in opposition to the budget. This was followed by strikes in the civil service and other sectors which finally culminated, on 16 February 1962 (Black Friday), in an outbreak of rioting, arson, looting and general violence. A state of emergency had to be declared and British troops had to be brought in to keep the peace and save the Jagan government from further disruption. The following year, 1963, in April, there was a general strike which lasted for 80 days and was accompanied by more riots and demonstrations which paralyzed the country’s import-export trade creating a serious scarcity of foodstuffs. These disturbances were precipitated by the PPP government’s attempt to enact a Labor Relations Bill which sought to give the government the power to decide the recognition of trade unions for purposes of representation of workers. The response of the opposition, supported by the various union leaders, was that the bill was totalitarian and politically motivated. Eventually. the bill lapsed and the strike was called to a halt in early July. In 1964, the most serious of the crises in the 1962-4 civil disturbances occurred. Violence again erupted after the Guyana Agricultural Workers’ Union (GAWU), a PPPbacked union of sugar workers, called a strike in support of its demand for recognition as the bargaining agent for sugar workers. This strike was opposed by the Trades Union Council (TUC) which was PNC-dominated. The disturbances were widespread and the racial pattern of the violence became entrenched. There were bombings, arson, mass murders. Thousands of people had to flee their home districts and seek refuge among their own ethnic group in those communities where such a group predominated. At the termination of the disturbances more than 175 persons were killed, 920 were injured, about 1.400 homes were
(10
Pc,;:r:c-j ::nd Poi~t~cd Deueiopnrrnt in Post-inii~pt’n,i,~nrr GIL_~.:~J
Ez‘~lilr,::
destroyed by fire. approximately property nas estimated at about The disturbances to their louest impossible Central
of 1962-4
crippled
ebb in the country’s Xgency
some of these disturbances place as Leader
However.
acted with the full knowledge
After
and
independence
Guyana specifically
which
Other
in 1966.
nas
196s.
there
the CIA’s
Political
of the British
and the UF crossed
the Boor of the National
realigned itself to project the image various ethnic groups and religious virtuallv
without
anv Afro-Guvanese
support
some
a
election nere
in sovereign
held,
however.
the PXC and UF disinte-
in the registration of voters. At the same Several prominent members of the PPP and joined the PNC. The PNC had
mass-based and sought the mass support of At the same time. however. the PPP nas primarily
hlarxist-Leninist pdsitions. In the 1968 elections the PNC won an independent results.
the elections
Assembly
of being factions.
becoming
Independence
the unity that was forged between
grated over mounting alleeations of PNC partiality time. the PPP began to lose its racial cohesiveness.
The CIA
Both the British
to Guyana
Post
that gives
in a vacuum.
government.
opposed
Before
the
and UF in promoting
began for the first general 1968.
blamed
to tvhat seems a permanent
role was not effected
Developments
preparations
and almost
Jagan has consistently the PSC
to
race relations
it ivas difficult
is now a bode of literature
Lvere vehemently to accomplish.
held in December
in October
Cheddi
and damage
and brought
led to his banishment
’ Indeed
and cooperation
and United States governments communist nation as Jagan sought
Elections
of Guyana
(CIA) for aiding and abetting that eventually
to relocate.
As a consequence.
to function.
of the Opposition.
to that belief.’
kvere forced
the economy
history.
for the PPP government
Intelligence
credence
15.000 persons US32 million.
because majority.
of its continued According
extremist
to the published
the PIKC Ken 30 seats. the PPP 19 seats. and the UF 4 seats. These elections, like arose primarily previousI>: held. n-ere conducted in controversy. h The controversy
over such issues
as overseas
voting
and the introduction
of prosy
voting.
were counted. the PSC was declared the majority winner with 55.Sl while the PPP and UF received 36.49 and 7.41 per cent. respectively. The leaders of the PSC argued that the swing in its favour merely to the period electorate majority.
of peace
and prosperity
that
followed
its accession
‘After the votes
per cent of the vote. represented
a response
to office in 1964.
The
was convinced. they contended, that if the PNC was returned to oftice with a large the party would do much more than as part of a coalition. However, there \vas
considerable evidence were padded enabling
to suggest that the elections were fraudulent. Electoral lists in Guyana the PNC to win seats in areas that were traditionally the strongholds
of the opposition. Independent data compiled by the Institute of Race Relations in London suggested that the registration list for Britain contained 20.000 more names than there uere Guyanese of voting age.’ In the United States there was the same corrupt practice as the great majority of the people listed did not exist. Immediately following the establishment of his majority government. Bumham moved swiftly to consolidate his power. His primary concern was to proceed on a rapid path of decolonization while at the same time bringing economic prosperity to the nation. In February 1970. Guyana nas transformed into a Cooperative Republic. The government argued, at the time. that cooperatives were seen as the most appropriate means, in the nation’s circumstances. of bringing together the limited financial resources and the human resources of the small man into a unit that is large enough to constitute a viable enterprise.” In July 1973. general elections were held. The PNC government again claimed a
KEMPE RONALD HOPE
61
majority. This time they claimed a two-thirds margin of 37 seats out of the total 53 seats. Such a margin was enough to effect constitutionai changes. The PPP were awarded only 14 seats and the UF 2 seats. Again. widespread fraud was reported and the PPP protested by refusing to take their seats in Parliament as the official opposition. This boycott made the UF the government’s opposition by default. As in the 1968 election. the abuse of the overseas and proxy votes was criticized. But the major outrage was centered on the tampering and hijacking of the ballot boxes by the Guyana Army.9 Some ballot boxes were taken to Army headquarters and many of them disappeared for days before being rediscovered. Many people discovered that their ballots had already been cast by unauthorized proxies while others. overwhelmingly opposition supporters, were simply turned away at the polling stations: and samples suggested that nearly half the 33,000 people listed as overseas voters did not exist. Many other irregularities were discovered during the eventual counting of the votes. For example. many youths whose names did not appear on the registration list as voters and who did not have any identification cards were permitted to vote despite objections from opposition party polling agents.” The election results demonstrated, much more clearly than in 196s. that a change in government could no longer be secured through the ballot box. What occurred in 1973 was not a general election, but intervention by the army and police to enable the PNC to usurp and maintain power by fraud. In 1973, following the amendment to the constitution which abolished legal appeals to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom and redu,c:d the voting age to 18 from 21, the government introduced a program of National Service. r2 National Service was initiated to provide Guyanese citizens with both the skills and attitudes needed to contribute positively to the economic, social, and cultural revolution that had already been embarked upon. It was, therefore, intended to be the government’s principal instrument to ensure the emergence and the development of the type of Guyanese essential to the prosperity, furtherance, and survival of the country. Guyana, however, is not the only country which has initiated a National Service program. Several other countries do have such a system, though it may exist under a different name. Tanzania, for example. has what is called a ‘Policy of Self-Reliance’. This policy. as reflected in the Arusha Declaration, is similar to Guyana’s National Service to the extent that it calls for the training and working together of individuals in the interest of each other and the nation as a whole, to bring about selfreliance. The policy stresses the importance of agriculture which is, as in Guyana. the base of the economy; the need for the people to be educated; and the urgency of good leadership. The ultimate aim of the self-reliance policy is to feed, clothe and house the nation. In Guyana, National Service was also expected to contribute to the drive to feed, clothe and house the nation.‘3 Also occurring in 1973 was the formation of the Working People’s Alliance (WPA) which later became a political party in 1979. The WPA brought together politicians and intellectuals from both major ethnic groups pledged to racial harmony, free elections. and democratic socialism. They saw themselves as the viable alternative to Bumham’s fraud and corruption and Jagan’s ideological foolishness. They felt that the task of transformation ‘can best be achieved in the context of a united front of revolutionary democratic parties or groups both Marxist and otherwise’.14 Since the split between Burnham and Jagan. the WPA held out the first potential of an alliance cutting across the main ethnic cleavages that have been the basis of the poiitical alignment in Guyana.“> In 1974, through the Declaration of Sophia, Bumham announced the doctrine of the ‘paramountcy of the party’. By such paramountcy, it was deemed that henceforth all organs of the state, in&ding the government, would be considered as agencies of the ruling PNC
to
62
Electorul Politkx 2nd Poiiticul Detdopment
in Post-independence
GIL_VJ~
and subject to its control. Thus, politics and government administration became. at one and the same time, the domain of the PNC. Theoretically, and to some degree it happened in practice. all major decisions affecting the state apparatus had to be taken at the party level. This not only ensured party loyalty but it produced a further centralization oi power by the elite and reinforced the gap between the PSC party leadership and all others. An important development occurred in August I97 5 when a considerable change in the position of Jagan and his PPP was publicized. Jagan decided to return with his party to Parliament and pledged his ‘critical support’ for the Burnham regime. He proclaimed, ‘Our political line should be changed from non-cooperation and civil resistance to critical support. ’ I(7He further stated that ‘if we are to arrive at our goal of socialism, imperialism must first be destroyed and who ever helps must be praised.“’ To this end he appeared with, then Prime ~I~nister. Burnham on the same platform on the tenth anniversary celebrations of Guyana’s independence on 26 May I976. Perhaps a fitting manner to celebrate a decade of post-independence by the tw;o men lvho have been, and continue to be. the dominant figures in Guyana’s politics. As it turned out, in 1977. Jagan and Burnham found themselves on a collision course again. Jagan began to advocate participation in the government and called for new elections. The PNC refused both overtures and Jagan retaliated by calling a strike of the sugar workers. The government. however, was able to prevail and the GAWU had to surrender. Bitterness swept the sugar belt and production declined conside~bly.18 Production of sugar in 1977 was 242.000 long tons compared to 333.000 long tons in 1976. a reduction of 27 per cent. Of this total. X8,000 tons were exported which, when compared with the previous year’s exports of 296,800 tons. represented a steep decline of as much as 30 per cent. As a result of these lower export quantities. receipts from export sales declined by USS29.3 million (29 per cent) from the’1976 level of USSlOI.5 million.19 In 1978, general elections were constitutionally required. However, the PSC decided on a national referendum. held in July 1978, that prolonged the life of the existing Parliament and transformed it into a constituent assembly which began operations in November 1978 aided by an advisory panel consisting of representatives of various interest groups. The referendum vote was controversial, to say the least. The PPP, WPA, and other opposition groups, including unions and church leaders called for a boycott. They were concerned with the registration procedures and the use of proxy and overseas votes. But. as might have been expected, the PNC government announced a 7 1.4 per cent turnout and a 97.4 per cent vote in its favour for the bill. However, other independent committees reported a turnout of no more than lo-14 per cent.:” In November 1978. belief in the government’s capacity to enforce law and order was severely shaken by the highly publicized and gruesome Jonestown itlassacre.” International attention was drawn to Jonestown (so named after Jim Jones the leader of the People’s Temple religious cult) when United States congressman Leo Ryan and some members of his party were murdered while investigating Jonestown based on allegations that American citizens were being brain-washed and held against their will by Jim Jones and his lieutenants. The murder of Congressman Ryan was effected to silence the Congressman on what he had found. The Congressman had encouraged dissent and repudiation from among Jones’s followers and this jeopardized his (Jones’s) leadership and very existence. After having Congressman Ryan murdered. Jim Jones ordered the mass suicide of his followers. hIore than 700 people. including Jim Jones, committed suicide. In a curious manner, the Jonestown atiair was more than a grisly story of a fanatical cult in Guyana’s jungle. It brought to the fore the Guyana government’s role in making the cult a special. privileged group of American immigrants. The government saw the cult as a
KEMPE ROMLD HOPE
63
model agricultural community in line with its policies to settle the hinterland and its notion of cooperative socialism. The Jonestown cult was. however, well armed with weapons, drugs, and a powerful radio transmitter, all of which they received with the full knowledge of Guyanese officials, forming what the PPP called a ‘state within a state,‘21 and leaving open to speculation the exact nature of their relationship with the government of Guyana. Between 1979 and the holding of elections in December 1980. several violent and bizarre incidents occurred. In 1979, three of the leaders of the WPA were arrested on arson charges. Two of them, Omowale and Rupert Roopnarain were eventually freed for lack of evidence. The other, Dr Walter Rodney, who by now had emerged as the chief spokesperson for the WPA, was granted bail. Two government buildings were destroyed by fire in July 1979. Father Bernard Drake, a Jesuit priest, was senselessly stabbed to death while taking picttqes for the Catholic Standard (a Roman Catholic Church anti-government newspaper) during a demonstration to protest the arrests of WPA members. In October 1979, Education Minister Vincent Teekah was mysteriously shot to death in Georgetown and no satisfactory explanation has been provided by the police. The only witness, an American, was hurriedly flown out of the country. 23 Teekah had defected from the PPP to the PNC in 1976 and was promptly rewarded with a Cabinet post. In June 1980, Dr Walter Rodney was killed in a mysterious car explosion which many regard as an assassination plot orchestrated by the PNC regime.‘” The government instead accused Walter Rodney of being a terrorist and charged his brother Donald, who was with him at the time of the explosion, with possession of an explosive device which was to be used to blow up the Georgetown jail. In early 1982 Donald Rodney was found guilty and sent to prison for 18 months. In October 1980, after the new constitution of Guyana was completed, Burnham became the country’s first Executive President. On 15 December 1980, general elections were held under the new constitution. The PNC, naturally, the PPP, and a new version of the UF contested the election. The WPA decided against participation and observed a day of remembrance for their fallen comrade, Walter Rodney. instead. The announced results of the election gave 77 per cent of the vote and 41 seats to the PNC; 19 per cent of the votes and 10 seats to the PPP; and 3 per cent of the votes and 2 seats to the UF. The opposition parties alleged fraud and they were supported in their claim by a team of international observers headed by the British peer Lord Avebury.Z5 Lord Avebury and his team found that voters in many instances were intimidated and physically prevented from voting for opposition parties. Many of the staff for the whole polling process appeared to be supporters of the PNC. A large number of eligible voters were denied their right to vote as a result of deletion of their names from the electoral list, abuse of proxy voting, abuse of postal voting, being recorded as dead, being given wrong identification numbers, or of fraudulent votes being cast in their names. Some ballot boxes arrived late at polling stations and in some areas the hours of polling were arbitrarily extended. Evidence was also found of tampering with the ballot boxes by the military. Based on the above and other evidence, Lord Avebury and his team concluded ‘. . that the election was rigged massively and flagrantly. Fortunately, however, the scale of the fraud made it impossible to conceal either from the Guyanese public or the outside world. Far from legitimizing President Bumham’s assumption of his office, the events we witnessed confirm all the fears of Guyanese and foreign observers about the state of democracy in that country.“” Since 1980, Bumham has been attempting to consolidate his position and give legitimacy to his Presidency. However, he has had to contend with strikes and demonstrations spearheaded by bauxite and sugar workers which have dramatized the widespread popular discontent and anger in Guyana about some of the government’s economic policies. Many
64
E/eclorrrl Politics and Political Development
in Post-independence
Guyana
oi these demonstrations have taken place in areas considered to be strongholds of the PNC. Linden, for example. formerly Mackenzie but renamed after Bumham’s first forename. is a good example of that. Perhaps the most significant feature of such action by the workers is that it has involved both Blacks and Indians as well as unions that are considered to be pro-PNC.” The regime has attempted to stem such embarrassing unrest with arrests. brutality. and misinformation. Amid the growing food shortages and hardship, increasing layoffs and dismal economic prospects. the Burnham government has never been more unpopular nor more solidly in power.‘* It is the manner in which that power is maintained that is the essence of the discussion below.
Domination
and Control
Domination and control by the PNC regime has been and continues to be achieved primarily through the manipulation of the military, para-military, and police forces. These three units are used as part of the machinery that helps to sustain a government in power when all rational indicators suggest a decline in popular support and widespread disaffection with its rule. In other words, the increasing militarization of Guyanese society is one of the devices used to sustain a regime whose legitimacy has declined.?9 President Burnham, who is the commander-in-chief of the uniformed services of Guyana, has been able to secure their loyalty by providing for them goods and services that are not available to ordinary civilians; by extending to his command, privileges not even available to some of his Ministers; and by maintaining a distinctly predominant Afro-Guyanese configuration among the services. The ranks as well as the officer corps share Burnham’s communal affiliation as is also the case with the other ruling party elite. Under such circumstances, common notions of security threats may and have provided the groundwork for party-military cooperation. The uniformed services will act not only to portray their own loyalty, however, but also to safeguard their own privileged positions and, act they will, even against members of their own ethnic group. When people generally regard government officials and elected representatives as, by and large, doing a reasonably good job, and that they and the nation-state as a whole are benefiting in a manner that is tolerably satisfactory to them, they are willing to obey the laws and regulations made and enforced by their government. In contrast, in a nation, such as Guyana, where the political culture is negative in character (that is, where people feel that their government is a fraud, that the government officials and elected representatives are corrupt. and that they themselves really can do little or nothing about the situation). the ability to elicit favorable feelings and attitudes toward government is very low. Such a situation results in confrontation between the government and the people and inevitably the use of force to restore order, dominate, and control. A climate of repression then inevitably. takes over. President Burnham has been able to keep the party and his uniformed services so tightly interwoven that any East Indian opposition is demoralized and any Black opposition is confined to a handful of intellectuals,jO such as the WPA. The military has developed, in effect, as the pivot of regime survival3’ and, it is partly in that context that the process of militarization has taken place in Guyana.32 Domination and control in Guyana is also effected through non-force tactics that are equally as repressive. It is not unusual, for example, for individuals to be either not hired, dismissed, demoted, or transferred out to remote areas if they are regarded as a threat to the PNC. The late Dr Walter Rodney was refused an academic position at the University of Guyana exactly because of his outspokenness against the Burnham regime. Other university lecturers have been fired without notice for their anti-government activities and
KEMPE RONALDHOPE
65
some civil servants who had participated in strikes were demoted. Other forms of non-force repression in Guyana include control of the media, preventive detention, and the instilling of fear. Guyana’s three radio stations and daily newspaper (Guyana Chronicle) are owned by the government and used in a crude manner to transmit government propaganda. News of the political opposition is almost non-existent. They are denied access to the national media and they are frequently denied permission to hold public meetings. The opposition papers, (The Mirror of the PPP; Dayclean of the WPA; and the Catholic Standard of the Catholic Center) have frequently been denied permission to import or accept gifts of newsprint to facilitate their publication. Moreover, they have been subjected to several libel suits by Burnham, his Cabinet members, and even PNC supporters. The financial effect on the opposition has been serious and from time to time they have had to suspend publication while the New Nation, the official publication of the PNC, thrives. Preventive detention can and has been employed in Guyana under the National Security Act. Such detention was used against the striking sugar workers in 1977 and would probably have been used again had there been any major disturbances during the 1980 elections. Fear is instilled in Guyana by the probability of what is likely to happen to anyone who engages in anti-government activity. The PNC has a massive network of informers who have been known to misrepresent and misinterpret what is actually being said and done. On the streets, people speak fearfully of the House of Israel, a religious sect of several thousand Guyanese headed by a man who calls himself Rabbi Washington but is really a fugitive from the United States named David Hill. There is widespread belief that the sect operates as a paramilitary squad for the Burnham regime-a belief that Burnham himself has denied several times. However, Rabbi Washington was quoted in 1982 by the govemmentcontrolled newspaper as having said that his was ‘not a religious group, we are also considered a somewhat military organization’.33 Clearly then, the Burnham regime has clear and painful ways of dealing with dissension and political opposition. This, undoubtedly, has sharply discouraged public displays of such opposition. No one can deny, therefore, that while dissipating human rights and making a mockery of democracy, Burnham’s domination and control has guaranteed short-term political stability. This system of domination is a product of the personalized styling of the paramount leader-President Burnham. s4 He has been able to establish, exercise. and maintain control over the entire political system with a chief characteristic being the possession of the ultimate means of sanction against defiance of such domination and control. As such, Bumham’s domination and control imputes a regulative aspect. The regulative aspect refers to the ability to control the behavior of individuals and groups of individuals as well as to regulate their relationships and interactions. This capability is most directly related to the government’s task of maintaining power by creating and maintaining order and stability through repression. Consequently, human rights are suppressed.
Conclusions The PNC has been able to consolidate its power in Guyana and all indications are that the party plans to remain at the helm of the nation, ad infinitum. It is widely believed that ‘the government will not change through elections’.35 It has been able to stay in power by electoral fraudj6 giving rise to questions about its legitimacy while at the same time creating a political crisis. Guyana therefore remains the only Commonwealth Caribbean nation where the outward forms of free elections are respected while the elections themselves are
66
Electoral Politics and Political Development
in Post-independence
Guyand
fraudulent. Such electoral fraud will continue to be tolerated by the British and American governments until such time that a non-left-wing or a moderate political party emerges. The current Marxist-oriented opposition parties are not regarded as viable alternatives. Ethnicity remains a dominant factor in political activity in the country. The two major political parties have exploited the existence of ethnic cleavage as a means toward political mobilization and they continue to draw the majority of their electoral support from their particular ethnic group.‘7 Ethnic groups are not irrational, but they grow out of sentiment. custom, and familiarity rather than out of deliberate calculation. As such, the basic function of ethnicity is that of binding individuals to a well-defined racial group as has occurred in Guyana with the Blacks and East Indians. Charisma has also played an important role in Guyana’s political development. The existence of a charismatic leader generally suggests underlying instability and cleavages. This does not mean. however. that every unstable society has a charismatic leader. The emergence of charisma is essentially a voluntary act of will. In Guyana. political relationships are basically personalistic and visual. Political actors are related to each other according to a personalized and visible frame of reference. This is the main reason for the primacy of personal loyalty, in the politics of Guyana. as the basis of political relationship. Within that context, political decisions also have concrete and personal meanings and impact upon the normal life of individuals within the country. There is. therefore, that sense of close intimacy in terms of both the relakionship among political actors and the relevance of political decision-making and decisions made. Charisma, in Guyana. has invariably been associated with the person who possesses it rather than with the institution or office he represents. The strength and virtue that emanate from charisma inhere in the person himself, and not in the office he holds. The personal charisma of Burnham is highly flexible and allows him to play several roles. He still remains the symbol of independent Guyana and a hero to many Blacks. He continues to be worshipped fanatically bv many urban black residents who affectionately refer to him as the ‘Comrade Leader’. Successful charismats. such as President Burnham. however, have seldom manifested a willingness to step down and make room for new blood. With the passage of time. Burnham has expanded the security measures designed to insure his safety. He has also manifested increasing messianic tendencies, i.e., behavior reflecting his belief that he is the sole possessor of higher truth and wisdom. Under such situations, communication within the political system tends to deteriorate. As these structural rigidities block outlets for change and mobility within the electoral system. the only alternatives for such change and mobility then become those of violence. Such violence, which has been occurring sporadically in Guyana since 1978, has even moved the opposition leader to recently predict the imminent downfall of the Burnham regime. Dr Jagan said ‘We have a very volatile situation. INOWthe people are uniting in struggle against the government. Mass action will flow from these conditions and we are going to be leading it. We are calling for a broad national front to throw out the government and build the country up again.‘“” When violence is perpetrated. however, it tends to result in swift and severe retaliation by the government and further results in a much more concentrated effort at domination and control.
References
and Notes
1. Ralph Premdas, Party Politics and Racial Division in Guyana, (Denver: Center of International Race Relations, University of Denver, 1973). p. 4. 2. Paul Singh, Political Thought in Guyana: An HistoricalSketch, (Georgetown, Guyana: Department of Political Science, University of Guyana, i\iIarch 1972). p. 52.
KEMPE RONALD HOPE
67
3. Kernpe Ronald Hope and hIaurice St. Pierre, ‘Ethnic Political Participation and Cooperative Socialism in Guyana: A Critical Assessment’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 6, October 1983, p. 507. 4. See, for example, Cheddi Jagan. ‘The Role of the Opposition in Guyana’, Caribbean RevietLs. 7. October-December 1978, pp. 37-9. 5. Perhaps the best account of the role of the CIA and other foreign influences can be found in Cohn V. F. Henfrey, ‘Foreign Influence in Guyana: The Struggle for Independence’. in Emanuel de Kadt (editor), Patterns of&reign Influence in the Caribbean, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972). pp. 49-81. 6. A good empirical analysis of the 1968 General Elections can be found in J. E. Greene, Ruce Versus Politics in Guyana: Political Cleavages und Political Mobilization in the 1968 Generals &ction.(Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the Wrest Indies, 1974). 7. Robert H. Manley, Guyana Emergent: The Post-independence Struggle for l\!ondependent Development, (Boston: Schenkman, 1979), p. 12. 8. See the Budget Speech by Dr Ptolemy Reid, Parliament of Guyana. Sessional Paper No. 4. 1969, p. 14. 9. See Janet Jagan, Army Intervention in the 1973 Elections in Guyana, (Georgetown: PPP Education Committee, October 1973); and Ralph R. Premdas, ‘Guyana: Socialist Reconstruction or Political Opportunism’, Journal oflnteramericun Studies and World AfIairs, 20. hlay 1978. p. 145. 10. ‘Guyana: Guided Democracy’, Latin America, 7, 27 July 1973, pp. 236-8. 11. Janet Jagan, Army Intervention in the 1973 Elections, p. 77. 12. A complete discussion of the various aspects of the program can be found in Kempe Ronald Hope, ‘Guyana’s National Service Programme’, Journal of Administration Overseas, 15. January 1976, pp. 34-S. 13. Ibid., p. 37. 14. Statement by the WPA, Georgetown, December 1973. 15. J. E. Greene, ‘Cooperativism, Militarism, Party Politics and Democracy in Guyana’, in P. Henry and C. Stone (editors), The !Veu’er Caribbean: Decolonization, Democracy and DeLeiopment. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues. 1983). p. 275. 16. See ‘Dr. Jagan’s Address’, Sunday Mirror, 7 August 1975, p. 9. 17. Ibid. 18. Thomas J. Spinner, Jr., ‘Guyana Update: Political, Economic, Moral Bankruptcy’. Caribbean Review, 11, Fall 1982, p. 10. 19. Bank of Guyana, Ann& Report 1977, pp. 11-12. 20. Anthony Payne, Change in the Commonwealth Caribbean, (London: Chatham House Papers. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1981). p. 12. 2 1. See Donald J. Waters, ‘Jungle Politics: Guyana. the People’s Temple, and the Affairs of State’. Caribbean Review, 9, Spring 1980, pp. S-13. 22. William E. Ratliff, ‘Guyana’, in Robert Wesson (editor), Communism in Central America and the Caribbean, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 1982), p. 146. 23. Ibid. 24. See, for example, Percy C. Hintzen and Ralph R. Premdas. ‘Guyana: Coercion and Control in Political Change’, Journaloflnteramerican Studiesand World Aflairs. 24, August 1982. p. 347; and Thomas J. Spinner, Jr.. ‘Guyana Update: Political. Economic. Moral Bankruptcy’. p. 11. 25. A condensed version of the Team’s report can be found in. Lord Avebury and the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, ‘Guyana’s 1980 Elections: The Politics of Fraud’. Caribbean Review, 10, Spring 1981, pp. 8-11; 44. 26. Ibid., p. 44. 27. Guyana Update, No. 4, London, July-August 1983, p. 1. 28. Richard J. ILleislin, ‘Guyana’s Leader Thrives as His Nation Founders’, The iVeu, York Times, 12 October 1982, p. 2. 29. J. E. Greene, ‘Cooperativism, Militarism, Partv Politics, and Democracy in Guyana’. p. 266. 30. Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Securhy in Divided Societies, (Athens. Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1980), p. 184. 3 1. Percy C. Hintzen and Ralph R. Premdas, ‘Guyana: Coercion and Control in Political Change’, p. 348. 32. See George K. Danns, ‘Militarization and Development: An Experiment in Nation-Building’.
6s
Electonlf Poiitlis und Poiitlcai Der,elopment Trunrition. No. 1. 1978,
33.
in Post-independence
Guyana
PP. 13-34.
Quoted in Richard J. hleislin. ‘Guyana’s Leader Thrives as His INation Founders’, p. 2. 34. George K. Danns. Dominution jncf Pou,er uz Gu_vuna. A Study of the Pohce in n Third World Contest, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books. 1982). p. 183. 35. Statement bv Clive Thomas. a Guyanese academic and one of the leaders of the WPA. as quoted in a Lew W’heaton article for Associated Press that was published in the United States on 4 November 1979. 36. John Bartlow illartin, L/S. Policy in the Caribbean. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978). p. 68. 37. See Kempe Ronald Hope and hlaurice St. Pierre. ‘Ethnic Political Participation and Cooperative Socialism in Guyana: A Critical Assessment’. pp. 505-16. 38. See ’ Jagan Forecasts Fall of Guyana’s Regime’, The Neu, York Times. 21 October 1982.
