Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States

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Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States Author(s): Robert G. Moser Reviewed work(s): Source: World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Apr., 1999), pp. 359-384 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054083 . Accessed: 08/01/2013 08:59 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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SYSTEMS AND THE

ELECTORAL

NUMBER OF PARTIES IN POSTCOMMUNIST

STATES

By ROBERT G.MOSER*

REND Lijphart concluded his book on electoral systems in con solidated

A

democracies

with

note on new democracies:

the following

a first electoral system has to be chosen which will When hopefully guide the new democracy s elections for a long time (or, in the case of a redemocratizing country, a new system thatwill hopefully work better than the old one), it is im portant to examine all of the options aswell as their advantages and disadvan to the extent

tages-Therefore,

democracies twenty-seven to electoral offer engineers old democracies.1

will

that

have

this

some

in the new

study

practical democracies

of

seventy

electoral

it may utility, than in these

have

systems more

in to

twenty-seven

in this statement is an assumption that the effects of elec Implicit toral systems are more or less universal and will therefore hold in new as well as old. Based on a rational choice democracies of understanding the behavior

essence

of voters

the influence of electoral systems in for the shape of party systems powerful explanation democracies. of decades the After testing, empirical of the major hypotheses made famous by Maurice Duverger?

has provided consolidated

and candidates,

a

that single-member elections tend to constrain the plurality a to a much greater ex of significant in parties operating polity tent than multimember (PR) systems?has proportional representation as remained intact.2 democratization has swept Thus, remarkably

namely, number

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Sci ence Association, D. C, August 28-31,1997.1 would like to thank Joel Ostrow, Frank Washington, and four anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Iwould Thames, also like to acknowledge research support provided by the University of Texas at Austin and an IREX Short-term Travel Grant used for fieldwork in Russia. 1 Arend Democracies, Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven 1945-1990 2 Maurice

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 151-52. in theModern State (New York and Activity Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization 1963); Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 2d ed., (New Haven: Yale Wiley, H. Riker, "Duverger's Law Revisited," in Bernard Grofman and Press, 1971); William University Arend Lijphart, eds., Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon, 1986); in Bernard Giovanni Sartori, "The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?"

WorldPolitics 51 (April 1999), 359-84


360

WORLD POLITICS

southern Europe, Latin America, and now the former com through states of east central munist it has been quite nat and Eurasia, Europe

ural for politicians

and political

to new democracies knowledge tablish a new electoral law.3 to be seen, however, of electoral systems, based

It remains effect Western

will

democracies,

to apply this body of

scientists

the momentous

making

to es

decision

whether

the hypotheses the regarding on for the most part the experience of new democracies, in hold actually particu

larly in the very different social and political context of postcommunist states. The

of Russia, Ukraine, and Poland (Senate elec experiences can shown that and elections tions) plurality majoritarian produce s of that the reach very fragmented party systems, suggesting Duverger laws may be limited.4 Such findings have important practical implica have

new

as

to survive. also struggle They new institutionalism, for which important implications a seeks to grant institutions effect that is to some extent inde political of their social and political environments. pendent tions

for these

have

democracies

This

article

examines

the effect

in five (SMD) elections postcommunist in the electoral systems postcommunist some

of those

the standard

states

district single-member to ascertain the effects of

context.

states, most notably Poland pattern of party consolidation

It will

be shown

that

and Hungary, have followed over time in reaction to in

of electoral

have Ukraine, cases can be attributed

Cox,

of PR and

and others, most systems, while notably Russia not. The different in effects of electoral these systems

centives

found

they

theoretical

to different

levels

states. in postcommunist Building I argue that the constraining effects

of party institutionalization on the work of Sartori and of electoral

systems

on

the

number of parties will be mitigated by the institutionalization of the party

system.5

Institutionalization

is defined as

a process bywhich a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known,

if not

universally

accepted.

Actors

develop

expectations,

orientation,

and

and Arend Lijphart, eds., Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon, Grofman and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants 1986); Rein Taagepera ofElec toral Systems (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Lijphart (fn. 1). 3 for New Democracies," Choices See, in particular, Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Journal ofDe mocracy 2 (Wmtex 1991). 4 to "From Solidarity 3 (April 1992); Journal ofDemocracy Jasiewicz, Krzysztof Fragmentation," Robert G. Moser, The Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 3 (1997); Marko inMarch-April Elections 1994," Europe Parliamentary Bojcun, "The Ukrainian Asia Studies 47, no. 2 (1995). 5 Votes Count (Cambridge: Cambridge See Sartori (fn. 2); and Gary W. Cox, Making University Press, 1997).


ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES

361

behavior based on the premise that this practice or organization will prevail into the foreseeable future. In politics, institutionalization means that political actors have

Weak

clear

and

stable

about

expectations

institutionalization

of party electoral

and majoritarian plurality ductive effects in postcommunist of strategic voting cases studied here

the behavior

of other

actors.6

can

the failure of explain re to have their systems expected states. Moreover, in the level variance over time among the postcommunist

and learning can be attributed

systems

to a

level of party institu country's states increased postcommunist strategic showing over time are those with most the institutionalized party systems voting no to elec in the those that exhibited region, while signs of adaptation tionalization.

Those

constraints have weaker party systems. toral-system low party institutionalization of some postcommunist that PR systems with may suggests legal thresholds constraint tions.

Finally, states,

given the this study

a greater provide of parties than single-member district elec the status of political them with parties by providing

on the number

PR elevates

a

over nomination monopoly district elections.

procedures

not

found

in single-member

the failure of electoral effects systems to have their predicted Perhaps not in new, unconsolidated democracies should be surprising. Sartori has argued that strong electoral (for systems example, plurality systems) do not have their expected reductive effects on the number of national parties

in countries

with

unstructured

that strategic voting in all approximated political

argued

party certain

requires contexts.8

This

systems.7 Similarly, Cox has conditions that may not be article builds on these hy

support from postcommunist potheses by providing empirical in Latin America, The least institutionalized party systems

states.9 such

as

6

Scott Mainwaring, in the Third Wave of Democratization: "Rethinking Party Systems Theory of the Importance of Party System Institutionalization" (Paper presented at the annual meeting D. C., August 28-31,1997), American Political Science Association, Washington, p. 7.Mainwaring is the key variable distinguishing argues that party institutionalization party systems in established The

Western democracies and party systems in democratizing states, and he explains much of the variance states. to his measures of in democratic performance within the broad class of democratizing According institutionalization?which control over candidate nomi emphasize continuity of party organizations, nations, and the volatility of electoral support of parties?party systems in Eastern Europe and the are among the least institutionalized former Soviet Union of the late democratizers. See also Samuel Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12. Huntington, 7 Sartori, (fn. 2), 62. 8 Cox (fn. 5). 9 is important because scholars have not identified many empirical cases that do not fulfill This Cox's necessary conditions for strategic behavior. Cox's primary example of a country with a weakly institutionalized party system defying the expected effects of a plurality electoral system is Papua New on the Indian a Guinea. See Cox (fn. 5), 85. Sartori concentrated multiparty example which produced and a dominant party system in the electoral realm, but the expected high levels of disproportionality were translated into seats. See Sartori (fn. 2), 55-56. system after votes


WORLD POLITICS

362 have

tended

tionalization,

thus

Brazil,

to

PR electoral

systems that foster party frac to the debate over the con challenge The majoritarian weakly systems.10

adopt

no

providing effects of PR and straining institutionalized party systems of postcommunist cases in which and majoritarian electoral plurality

states present a set of are used (in systems a system), providing unique and the re strategic voting

or as

a electoral part of mixed to test opportunity hypotheses regarding ductive effects of these systems.

dependently

Duverger's

Law and Its Limits

originally formulated three laws of the effects of electoral

Duverger systems:

representation tends to lead to the formation of many inde (2) the two-ballot majority system tends to lead to the for pendent parties,... mation of many parties that are allied with each other,... and (3) the plurality (1) Proportional

rule

final

The

to

tends

a

produce

two-party

law, Duverger

system.11

claimed,

was

to a

"the closest

sociological

law."12

Subsequent

studies

have

better

specified

the causal

nature

of these

correlations both empirically and theoretically. District magnitude number

of representatives

elected

from

was

each district)

found

(the to be

the decisive influence on disproportionality andmultipartism. Low dis trict magnitudes,

particularly

single-member

districts,

have

a

powerful

constraining effect on the number of parties and produce high levels of to seats. district High cause a not of do (but greater proliferation parties of parties) and produce lower levels of disproportional multiplication of effect electoral The systems was found to reside constraining ity.13 disproportionality allow magnitudes

in the translation

from votes

a

at the district level.14 Fi level rather than at the national directly was to not interact the the electoral found with, override, system nally, to structure in society.15 The major modifications Duverger's cleavage

most

laws arise from

these findings.

10 in Comparative Scott Mainwaring, "Brazilian Party Underdevelopment no. 134 (Notre Dame: stitute Working of Notre Dame, Paper, University 11 Maurice Duverger, "Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later," inGrofman 12 Ibid., 69. 13 and Shugart (fn. 2); Lijphart (fn. 1). 14Taagepera Sartori (fn. 2), 54-55. 15 District and Olga Shvetsova, "Ethnic Heterogeneity, Peter Ordeshook ber of Parties," American Journal ofPolitical Science, 38 (1994); Cox (fn. 5),


Perspective, 1990). and Lijphart

Magnitude, 203-21.

" Kellogg

In

(fn. 2), 70.

and the Num


363

at the district that electoral-system effects are manifested to the correlation level has been used to accommodate be exceptions tween at the For and national level. systems systems two-party plurality fact

The

retained three or four significant par example, Rae argued that Canada a ties electoral because of the existence of geo system plurality despite in Canada concentrated minority graphically parties. Minority parties one of the some dis major parties in supplanted a re tricts while third parties nationally.16 revision Such remaining on the number tained the plurality of parties system's causal influence at the elections still produced because plurality two-party competition district level. With concentrated minority parties, how geographically survived

ever,

because

the same

district,

they

two

resulting

were

parties

in

not

multipartism

in every

always the major players at the national level.

Cox has contributed greatly to this debate by explicating the condi tions under which

strategic

takes place. Using

voting

a rational

choice

model, he argues that strategic voting (and by implication strategic that involve entry and departure by elites) requires certain conditions time horizons, and the availability actors' motivations, of preferences, accurate information. Cox has that Thus, argued single-member plu to reduce the vote for minor if one or rality elections may fail parties more

of the following

conditions

arise:

(1) The presence of voters who are not short-term instrumentally rational; (2) lack of public information about voter preferences and vote intentions (hence about which candidates are likely to be "out of the running"); (3) public belief that a particular candidate will win with certainty; or (4) the presence of many voters who care intensely about their first choice and are nearly indifferent be tween

Even date

their

and

second

if conditions

lower

choices.17

are favorable

races at the district

for the establishment

level, the projection

of two-candi

of this bipartism

to the na

tional level is not assured. Rather it depends on the ability of parties to unite

in single nationwide If this party organizations. two candidates in the elections accomplished produced plurality across at the district to a multitude level may belong of different parties prominent

elites

is not

the country. Cox cites institutional the direct elec forces, most notably as tion of a powerful for the na national executive, primary pushing to tionalization of parties that is essential of Duverger's the realization third

law at the national

tionalization, 16 Rae 17 Cox

however,

level. In the absence the existence

of a general

of nationwide

(fn. 2), 95. (fn. 5), 79.


theory of remains parties

na a

364

WORLD

necessary

POLITICS

condition

only for the constraining to be felt at the national level.18

effect

of plurality

electoral

systems of these preconditions The presence for to the national of local projection bipartism tionable communist

initial during states with electoral

previous may

voters

deny

and the strategic behavior level are particularly ques elections in new democracies, in post especially little or no democratic tradition. The absence of

experience and elites

and accurate

information alone polling to information behave necessary

the

strategically.

Most

importantly, the lack of well-established

the ability of voters serve as the primary mechanism

dermines

ion, while

electoral

and elites

to channel

are a

systems

to behave

secondary

political parties un Parties

strategically.

and aggregate public opin mechanism the influencing

number of viable political parties.19 If significant political parties do not or political nor In weak of public opinion. represent ganizations large segments no voters the absence of identification leaves with party systems, party of characteristics candidates and patron cues, other than the personal exist

cannot

they

age, as to how

aggregate

elites

political

to cast their votes. Due in the most

unstable

organizations enter and leave the scene ally

into nationwide

to the nature of party transitory democracies, parties continu in tandem with the political clout

new

(usually no and provide between electoral continuity periods. voters to cultivate Such little for lasting opportunity provide most For for one party or another, uncommitted. leaving preferences in Russia survey research has put the number of independent example, a party identification at 78 percent, voters without 13 compared with of their

leader) conditions

percent for theUnited States and 8 percent forGreat Britain.20 It is dif to the ficult, then, for us to attribute voting preferences ers in unconsolidated in the same way we democracies to voters in consolidated with democracies preferences concrete party systems. Without strategic preferences, cess based If one essary

of vot

majority attribute

voting institutionalized

voting

as a pro

seems very on a rank unlikely. ordering of preferences the conditions consolidated democracies, only

nec

examines

for strategic

voting

are

usually

approximated.

Exceptions

are few

and easily accommodated through special conditions for geographically parties. This in the larly postcommunist

concentrated

18 Ibid., 182-93. 19 See Sartori (fn. 2), 55-56. 20 Richard Rose, Steven White,

is not world

the case for new democracies, particu where parties are not well-developed

and IanMcAllister,

How

Russia

Votes (New York: Chatham

1997), 135.


House,

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES and voters

It would

systems.

cannot

and elites

easily respond a mistake to assume

be

to incentives that

365

from

electoral

institutional

effects

found in established democracies will be replicated in the very differ ent social

of new democracies

context

in eastern

Europe

Mdced Electoral

Reconceptualizing

and Eurasia.

Systems

states reflect the influence of postcommunist of some sort states the German of mixed electoral system. Many employ PR contests in both in elected system with representatives party-list or two-round districts and multimember large plurality majoritarian

The

electoral

systems

in districts. No exclusively systems single-member plurality in single-round, all representatives district races, single-member certain obstacles in testing theo and this for those interested produces states. ries of electoral in postcommunist systems Mixed electoral of electoral the systems complicate categorization elections elect

and the analysis of effects. Most scholars have thought of a systems as a PR to mixed electoral modified form of curb the system designed a accurate for is Such party proliferation.21 potential quite conception seats for those mixed that utilize that interlock systems compensatory the two halves

of the electoral

system

does. Another

into one, as the German used in Russia and Croatia,

system, type of mixed seats. Rather, it calculates ever, does not use compensatory the two portions of the system and allows parties separately seats won

other

tier.

in each Shugart

half

of the

of the

system how

the vote to

results

of

keep all of the

system regardless has argued that such a system is actually a modified to Since there is no mechanism the PR tier prioritize assumes that the effects of the plurality por tier, he

system. plurality over the plurality tion of the system will

override

the more

feeble

PR tier.22

levels of mul systems also tend to produce moderate as have intended. In practice, tipartism and disproportionality designers reason such results are laudatory and are a major the system has why Mixed

electoral

been

replicated electoral systems, tween

most

so

widely however,

in east add

and Eurasia. Mixed Europe to the dichotomous debate be

central little

PR and has shown that the systems. Western plurality scholarship on is effect of electoral the number of parties systems powerful

the constraining 21 22Lijphart Matthew

effect

of single-member

plurality

systems.

Taken

at

(fn. 1), 39-46.

Shugart, "Building the Institutional Framework: Electoral Systems, Party Systems, and no. 2.26 and European Presidents," Working Studies, 1994), Paper, (Berkeley: Center for German 10-15.


366

WORLD POLITICS

face value,

the electoral

of east central

systems

Europe

and Eurasia

do

not offer any persuasive cases to test this hypothesis. The high levels of states can be attributed to party fractionalization usually found in these structure and an in the combination of a fractionalized social cleavage state that no postcommunist system. Given strong electoral sufficiently the strongest exclusively system?single-member employs plurality can not test whether a elections?one electoral system would plurality have

been

able

to curb

the party

fractionalization

in many

found

such

states.

Mixed electoral also offer certain opportunities for systems, however, a one can treat the comparison of electoral I that mixed argue systems. electoral system that employs separate votes for each tier of the system as its name a mixture of two separate electoral exactly implies?as a side side. Such arrangements by operating conceptualization provides or PR tiers a to the of effects separate study plurality unique opportunity of a mixed variables nomic

system while holding such as culture, social

constant

other and

cleavages,

intervening possible the level of socioeco

development.

This

conceptualization

of mixed

electoral

systems

follows

the

method of controlled comparison, which studies "cases that differ with regard

to the variables

one wants

to

investigate,

but

similar with

regard

to all other important variables thatmay affect the dependent variables; can then be treated as control vari variables these other important a ables."23 Although tool, cases that are simi powerful methodological are in certain variables lar except very hard to find. This independent studied the interre has been used effectively method by Putnam, who in Italy, institutions and social environment political lationship between over time in electoral examined and by Lijphart, who systems changes a that when countries.24 within individual country argued Lijphart its electoral system "many potentially explanatory important changes can be controlled in the sense that they can be assumed not to variables the same country, the same political differ or to differ only marginally: elec combination the same voters, and so on."25 The by mixed parties, and electoral toral systems of dichotomous (PR systems plurality/ma joritarian)

in a single

social

environment

contributes

a

significant

dimension of comparability not found in Lijphart's study.Despite theoretical

malleability,

electoral

systems

are resilient

23 (fn. 1), 78. 24Lijphart Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work' Civic Traditions Press, 1993); Lijphart (fn. 1). University 25 Lijphart (fn. 1), 78.

inModern


institutions.

Italy

(Princeton:

their All

Princeton


the same broad categories changes within the class of PR systems. Mixed elec systems, mostly within to the the diametri compare systems provide unique opportunity

of Lijphart's of electoral toral

cases

367

involved

cally opposed categories of PR and plurality elections upon which the debate

over electoral

systems has been based. to mixed electoral systems

is not without approach precedent. some scholars have test for the PR and strategic voting, compared to one another. mixed tiers of Germany's electoral system plurality and Cox have all used the mixed electoral Fisher, Jesse, Bawn, system of to show the greater level of in West the plu strategic voting Germany This

To

rality tier than in the PR tier. Such analyses have consistently found that inWest received more votes large parties Germany than in the PR tier and vice versa for smaller parties,

in the tier plurality as the vot strategic

ing hypothesis would predict.26 By showing that voters behave differ tiers of a mixed such studies bolster the system, ently in the separate case for tiers of the mixed electoral different systems separately treating as as a vote is cast in each tier. long of different tiers of mixed controlled electoral The sys comparison is not without tems, however, problems. The greatest problem potential cross is cross-contamination the two cases compared. Unlike between across time, the electoral systems analysis Lijphart's test are not in of one another. They this being compared independent form two halves of one electoral system for the same legislative body in same matter the two halves of the the election. No how independently into two sys of mixed electoral the separation system operate, systems two tiers of tems for the purpose remains artificial. The of comparison one another some extent. a mixed to will electoral affect system surely For example, that run in the PR tier of the election have small parties national

analysis

or

costs

of electoral and could be competition as well with districts in the single-member expected in terms of seats. Or, one or two large parties little regard to payoffs the dominate races, having coattail effects may single-member plurality the ef that produce greater vote shares in the PR contest. Consequendy, a PR fective number of parties half of mixed in the system may tend to already

assumed

the entry to run candidates

be lower than if the system had a strictly PR electoral system. 26

Vote Thesis," Comparative Politics 5, no. 2 (1974); Eckhard Jesse, Steven Fisher, "The Wasted of the Federal Elections from 1953 to in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Analysis "Split-voting 1987," Electoral Studies 7, no. 2 (1988); Kathleen Bawn, "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: Ger no. 4 (1993); Cox man Electoral as a Social Choice Outcome," American Journal of Political Science 37, (fh. 5), 82-83; Samuel H. Barnes, Frank Grace, James K. Pollack, and Peter W. Sperlich, "The German 1962). Party System and the 1961 Federal Election," American Political Science Review 56 (December


368

WORLD

POLITICS

to in important keep the danger of cross-contamination it does not ruin this experiment. Incentives for strategic mind, entry in the single-member tier may be and withdrawal district by elites While

weakened

it is

the costs

because

voting, Strategic West Germany.

and payoffs should remain

however, Rational

voters

will

are of competition changed. intact as shown in studies of

still have

incentives

to abandon

small parties in the plurality tier in favor of large parties with a better chance

of winning.

district

elections in favor

ality time

the mechanical effects of single-member Moreover, should remain intact producing greater disproportion PR tier. Over than in the corresponding of large parties should produce strategic behavior in the translation of votes into seats.

such mechanical

ties who

are

effects

punished

The Effects

of pr Systems

Do

electoral systems states and consolidated

affect

in Postcommunist

by par

States

in of parties postcommunist answer this To similarly? question,

the number

democracies

states will be examined. Three in five postcommunist electoral systems a mixed electoral and Lithuania, of these, Russia, Hungary, sys employ tem of various combinations elected of PR and plurality or majoritarian as two tiers of these systems will be seats. The individually analyzed separate scribed Poland These and

de method controlled-comparison with electoral systems, single-tier also be studied.

the systems following countries above.27 Two and Ukraine, cases were

single-member of varying

will

selected district levels

examples

to of PR roughly equal coverage provide cases The also electoral systems. provide of party

institutionalization.

Poland

and

Hungary have the highest level of party institutionalization. Parties mo nopolize

the nomination

ginal phenomena. While

process

making

independents

rare and mar

there is significant volatility in popular support

or to election, tenden ideological major parties and Ukraine the time.28 Russia oppo represent site end of the spectrum. Parties do not control the nomination process in single-member the field of candidates dominate and independents

for parties from election cies have survived over

27

data was not available for the single In the case of the 1992 Lithuanian elections, district-level PR tier of the 1992 Lithuanian election was included in the district tier. Therefore, only the

member

study. 28 inHungarian Six major parties have remained dominant politics since the end of communist rule. has argued that the political system the party system in Poland has been more fluid, Tworzecki While is actually more consolidated around a small number of political tendencies. Hubert Tworzecki, Parties of Poland (Boulder, Colo.: Westview and Politics in Post-1989 Press, 1996). The recent consolidation reformist forces into the AWS would tend to support this assessment.


ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES district

elections.

and long-lasting resents a middle cases. Like

369

are fluid, and voters tend not to have a strong a with identification Lithuania rep particular party.29 the east European and former Soviet ground between Parties

to monopo and Hungary, Lithuanian parties tend in lize nominations but are not as stable or firmly grounded society.30 on the electoral 1 Table basic information systems of the provides

five

Poland

countries

cases

Each

individual

election

for which

data were

as an individual

case. sys By separating mixed PR and tiers, fifteen component plurality/majoritarian result: nine PR elections and six elections conducted under a plu

available will tems

analyzed. be treated

into

their

measures common to the electoral system.31 Two majoritarian to examine will be these the effective literature used systems: systems number of parties and the index of The least-squares disproportionality. a measure of parties provides effective number of party system frac rality

or

tionalization seats

The

by counting by their parties weighted so that very small not count as much do parties

shares as

of votes

or

large parties.32

level of disproportionality produced by an electoral system is the

deviation

between

tion

the proportion of seats

and the proportion to cross-national cording

studies

in an elec party receives in the gets legislature. Ac to be tends highest disproportionality of votes

a

it actually

in plurality more parties

small parties and reward large systems, which penalize than multimember district PR systems. Like the effective index of the least-squares measure, number-of-parties disproportional 29 is perhaps best captured by the unusually high level of split-ticket voting in This characteristic Russia. In 1993, 70 percent of voters planned to split their votes in the PR and plurality tiers, voting for different parties or for a party and an independent candidate in the two halves of the election. Only 19 (fn. 20), 139-40. Rose, and McAllister percent planned to vote a straight party ticket. White, 30 Kitschelt provides an index of the chances of program-based party formation for postcommunist to the classification of the cases in of the level of party institutionalization states, which corresponds s scale this study. Using Kitschelt and Poland have the highest scores at 5.5 and 5.0 respec Hungary are lower at 3.5 to 5.0. Russia, Ukraine, and other Soviet republics tively. The Baltic states marginally in Postcommunist have a much lower score of 0.5. Herbert Kitschelt, "Formation of Party Cleavages no. 4 (1995), 457. Moreover, Evans andWhitefield Democracies," argue for a similar Party Politics 1, classification of postcommunist states' potential for the development of stable party systems, with east central Europe (Poland, Hungary, the greatest potential for stable and the Czech Republic) possessing and other Soviet successor states followed by the Baltic states with Russia, Ukraine, party development of stable party systems. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen having much lower chances for the establishment in Eastern Europe," British Journal of Politi the Bases of Party Competition Whitefield, "Identifying cal Science 23, no. 4 (1993). 31 a vote is cast are seats in compensatory Only tiers in which analyzed here. Therefore, Hungary and Poland calculated on the basis of previous votes are not included. 32 The effective number of parties index is calculated by squaring the proportion of the vote or seat shares of each party, adding

these together,

See Lijphart

andTaagepera

1 by this total:

then dividing

Nv=l/X(Vl2)orN=l/Z(Si2) (fn. 1), 67-72;

and Shugart

(fn. 2), 77-81,104-5.


WORLD POLITICS

370

TABLE1

Country Russia

Hungary

in Five Post-Communist

Systems

Electoral Electoral

PRTier

System

Plurality/Majoritarian Tier 225 seats elected by

225 seats elected in one nationwide district with 5% legal threshold

mixed

same

Lithuania

70

mixed

seats

rules

second

single-member top three go round

plus

to

any

in one

71

of first-round

seats

elected

vote

under

nationwide district with

two-round

4%(1992)and5%(1996)

in single-member two go districts; top round second

391 seats elected in 37 multimember districts;

PR

under

candidate with 15% or more

legal threshold

Poland

elected

majoritarian

in

districts;

thresholds

elected

seats

176

two-round

in one nationwide district with

single-member

districts

seats elected

compensatory

in

plurality

152 seats elected in 20 multimember districts with 4% (1990) and 5% (1994) legal threshold; 58

mixed

States

majoritarian

rules

to

none

seats 69 compensatory elected in one nationwide

district; no legal threshold

(1991),5%(1993)

Ukraine

450 seats elected under

none

majoritarian

two-round

majoritarian in single-member districts; top two go to rules

second SOURCE: Cox v 1993 godu

round

(fh. 5), 50-54; Bojcun (fn. 4); "Polozhenie o vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoy dumy in 1993), Rossiiskie vesti, October for elections of deputies of the State Duma

(Provisions

12,1993.

ity weights tions have

the deviations less effect

than

between

seats and votes

so that small devia

large ones.33

33 share differ is calculated by squaring the vote-seat index of disproportionality The least-squared ences and adding them together; this total is divided by 2; and then the square root of this value is taken: LSq For discussion

of these two measures

see

= SqRtofl/2*I(vrs.)2 Lijphart

(fn. 1), 67-72;

and Taagepera

77-81,104-5.


and Shugart

(fn. 2),

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES 2

Table for Proportional

Effects

Representation

Effective # of Electoral

Legal Case

371

Tier/Election

Effective # of

Least-Squares

Index of Disproportionality

Parliamentary

Threshold

Parties (N )

Parties (N)

5% 5%

7.58 10.68 12.50

6.40

4.94

20.56

Russia 1993 Russia 1995 Poland 1991 Poland 1993 Poland 1997 Lithuania 1992 Lithuania 1996 Hungary 1990 Hungary 1994

5%

4.59

3.32 10.87 3.86 2.95

4%

4.10

2.86

5%

7.94

3.16

17.81 10.63 7.55 16.34

4%

6.71

4.31

9.34

5%

5.49

3.73

8.53

none 5%

9.80

6.11

Cox (fn. 5), 159. Poland: Frances Millard, ed., "Poland," in Bogdan Szajkowski, ofEastern Europe, Russia and the Successor States (Essex, U.K.: Longman Group, 1994), 313-42. Hungary: Benoit Lars Johannsen, and Anette Pedersen, (fn. 40). Lithuania: Ole Norgaard, of Multi-Party "The Baltic Republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: The Development Systems," in SOURCE: Russia:

Political Parties

ed., Political Parties 60; Lithuanian

Szajkowski,

Bogdan

1994),

Longman Group, online at http://rc.lrs.lt/rinkimai/seim96.

Table nist

2 shows

states. The

tern and the Successor States (Essex, U.K.: ofEos Europe, Russia Seimo rinkimo '96," dataset, Seim, "Lietuvos Respublikos

of PR systems striking characteristic

the effects

most

the number

which

postcommu of all the states is the level

party proliferation is expected in PR

of party fractionalization. While elections, states outstrips fective number

in the selected

of significant found in anything

parties

developed for the cases parties

of elective

in

postcommunist The average ef studied here is 7.71,

operating countries.

is higher than all electoral systems in consolidated democracies

except Belgium

and nearly

twice

the average

for consolidated

democra

cies using PR (D'hondt method).34 It is also higher than inmost new democracies with the exception of Ecuador and Brazil, both of which have

ten effective

around

the high

Clearly, in part to fragmented

parties.35 states is due in postcommunist of parties structures. However, the high and fluid cleavage

number

level of disproportionality used

in every

electoral

case but one)

produced by legal thresholds (which were suggests

an absence

of strategic

behavior

in

those cases with the highest level of disproportionality. The average level of disproportionality produced by PR systemswas 11.31 (11.96 ex more than cluding Poland 1991, which had no legal barrier). That is 34 Lijphart (fn. 1), 96,160-61. 35 Cox (fn. 5), 309-11.


372 twice dated

WORLD the average democracies

POLITICS

level of disproportionality than and is also higher

in consoli for PR systems the average of majoritarian

systems.36 to

According proportionality,

and Shugart's Law of Conservation of Dis Taagepera the number of parties and hence the level of dispropor

tionality produced by a systemwill be underestimated by the actual vote shares make

to real voter because voters and elites (as opposed preferences) decisions the vote even strategic favoring larger parties before

takes place.37 Thus,

parties

postcommunist

ticipated the disproportionality

and voters

should

have

an

that would be produced by the legal

threshold

toward larger parties capable of imposed and have gravitated the threshold. Then there would have been fewer electoral overcoming on sure losers, and votes would have been wasted parties, fewer dispro would have been lower. This process should increase over portionality time as voters and elites learn the rules and adapt to the incentives of the system. Among varied ways.

our cases Poland

this phenomenon seemed to occur in significantly to the the strongest evidence of adaptation provides

incentives of a legal threshold and learning over time. Poland had the party proliferation was legal threshold. There

highest

there was no among our cases in 1991 when limited consolidation and very high dis very

proportionality in 1993 when a 5 percent legal threshold was first in an absence of troduced, strategic behavior. But in 1997 elites suggesting to learn from the effect of the 5 percent seemed devastating legal on small in broad electoral and consolidated threshold parties, they blocs

the effective

cutting

number

of electoral

parties

in half. As

a con

sequence, the level of disproportionality dropped significantly because there were

A smaller small parties left without representation. over in the effective number of parties and disproportionality decrease time in Hungary also shows support for the learning of strategic be havior both

fewer

over countries

time.

Russia

the number

and Lithuania of parties

show an opposite in the PR tier increased

trend.

In

substan

tially from the first to the second election raising disproportionality exponentially. accounts What

in the learning of strategic behav for this difference our ior among cases? Party fragmentation does not seem to be the cul on the one hand, had the most fractionalized party system prit. Poland,

in its first election, yet it displayed the greatest amount of adaptation to 36 (fn. 1), 96. 37Lijphart and Shugart Taagepera

(fn. 2), 123; Lijphart

(fn. 1), 97; Cox

(fn. 5), 173-78.


ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES over

constraints

electoral-system

time. Hungary

373 a

also has

relatively

high degree of party fractionalization but a low degree of dispropor tionality. On the other hand, Lithuania had the lowest degree of party fragmentation in 1992 but almost doubled the number of significant electoral

parties

at the next

election

threshold from 4 to 5 percent.

an increase

despite

in the

legal

I argue that the difference in learning over time is caused by the de most of institutionalization. has the stable gree party party Hungary same six in this It is dominated system sample. by the major parties

that have consistently crossed the legal threshold and left little room for

tumul party system has been much more marginal parties. Poland's but Tworzecki that underneath has its fluid tuous; surface, Pol argued ish society is divided and is evolving along several dominant cleavages a

toward

is different

structure similar toWestern cleavage in countries of the former Soviet

tion of the Baltic

these

countries

or even statehood governance independent is Politics and century. polarized, parties with political social constituencies have been slow to emerge. In Russia

with

experience in the twentieth identifiable the most

republics, democratic

situation Europe.38 The Union. With the excep recent have no significant

the extreme ends of the political occupy parties a small of dedicated followers. This leaves spectrum minority a broad and center that encompasses voters the of amorphous majority a multitude a lesser ex and is represented of minor fluid, by parties. To saw the former communist which tent, the same is true for Lithuania, a return to in 1992 with of seats, only to be re power party majority developed and have

of the right at the next elec over time. Under of the center increasing such voters to defect from the conditions incentives ignore marginal parties no clear because for a major party representing ei they have preference placed by the Lithuanian tion, with minor parties

Conservatives

ther end of the political spectrum. Moreover, which

parties

in most This

are viable

or "out of the running" are the "undecideds."39

opinion polls is not to say that voters

and elites

it is difficult to decide since

in Soviet

the largest group

successor

never respond to the incentives of legal thresholds. The

con by social we of political parties. Thus, to in response strategic behavior

in these states, however, strategic behavior that retard the institutionalization ditions may

expect

Lithuania

to

experience

states will

likelihood of

is undermined

38Tworzecki(fn.28),194. 39 This is particularly true in Russia where surveys regularly report that 40 percent of respondents an swer "don't know" to questions about whom they will vote for in the next election, more than twice the and McAllister (fn. 20), 141. percentage supporting the most popular political party. Rose, White,


374

WORLD POLITICS sooner systems there is a better

electoral because tion

than Russia

or other

environment

for future party

former

Soviet

republics institutionaliza

there.

of Plurality and Majoritarian Postcommunist States

Effects

Systems

in

even more

ex conundrum perplexing by postcommunist presented has been in and elec party proliferation perience plurality majoritarian have been deemed the most reductive electoral tions, which powerfully

An

in the

systems

In two

literature.

not

and Ukraine,

cases, Russia

only

have single-member district elections failed to produce local bipartism at the district chanical due

to

level, but

they also have the number

effect?reducing

failed

is seen

disproportionality?that

to

produce

a dramatic

me

of parties entering the legislature in comparative experience. The

failure of strategic behavior in single-member district elections typically leads to an overwhelming

advantage

for the largest party

in the system

and thus to a dominant party system as found in India until the 1990s. Russia

and Ukraine, therefore, in the legislature arising

ation

are from

cases of party prolifer district elections. single-member

truly unusual

Table 3 shows the effects of single-member district plurality andma joritarian elections. In three cases (Lithuania 1996, Hungary 1990 and 1994) there was a significant mechanical effect in the SMD tier. In all cases

these half

the effective

the effective

number

of parliamentary parties of elective parties. Moreover,

number

was the

less than level

of

disproportionality in SMD elections in Lithuania and Hungary was extremely high with values equal to or higher than themost dispropor tional

PR election

isons

further

district

in the study, Russia 1995. Within-country compar the increased reductive force of single-member support

elections

number

in these

of parliamentary

cases. parties

In Lithuania

and Hungary the effective in the single-member district elections

was lower and the level of disproportionality higher than in the corre PR tier, just

sponding

Hungarian number tiers

expect

from

the

experience is particularly striking. Although

of electoral

in the 1990

mentary

as one would

parties

parties and 1994

produced

literature.

The

the effective

was

PR and majoritarian quite similar in the the effective number of parlia elections, in the single-member districts was less than

half of that in the PR tier. Indeed, the impressive victories of theHungar ianDemocratic Forum (MDG) in 1990 and theHungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)in 1994 were driven in large part by seatswon in single-member districts. The MDF won 67 percent of the 176 single-member district



375

TABLE3 for Plurality

Effects

and Majoritarian Effective

Effective #of

*of Electoral Case

Electoral

Russia 1993 Russia 1995 Lithuania 1996 Hungary 1990 Hungary 1994 Ukraine 1994

Parties (N ) 6.13 5.00

maj.

3.23 6.10 7.75

maj.

7.14

2.03

maj.

6.17

1.35

maj.

2.46

4.15

plurality plurality

Least-Squares

Parliamentary

Parties (N )

System

Tier/Election

Index of Disproportionality

Effective # of Candidates

4.27 11.09 20.37 31.88 40.89

7.06 7.36 5.59

3.06

n/a

5.97 5.64 5.44

Information 8, 1993; Service, Report on Eurasia, December Foreign Broadcasting na v Commission of the Russian Federation, "RezuTtaty golosovaniya vyborakh on elections Dumu po odnomandatnym of (Results Gosudarstvennuyu voting izbiratel'nym okrugam" to the State Duma in single-member Election report, Central voting districts) (Unpublished o 1 okruzhnykh komissii Commission, Moscow, 1994); "Dannye protokolov No. izbiratel'nykh SOURCE: Russia:

Central

Electoral

rezultatakh vyborov deputatov Gosudarstvennoy Federatsii Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoy no. 1 of distict electoral of (Data vtorogo sozyva po odnomandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam protocol on the results of elections of commissions deputies of the second State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian "Dannye protocol Hungary:

Federation electoral district), Rossiiskaya gazeia, January 17,1996; by single-mandate no. 2 ob izbiratel'nomu po federal'nomu protokolov itogakh golosovaniya okrugu (Data of no. 2 on results of vote for federal electoral okrug)," Rossiiskaya gazetay January 24, 1996. Benoit and Anette Pedersen, "The Baltic (fn. 40). Lithuania: Ole Norgard, Lars Johannsen, Latvia

Estonia,

Republics

ed., Political

Szajkowski, Longman

1994),

Group,

and Lithuania:

of Multi-party in Bogdan The Development Systems," of Eastern Europe, Russia and the Successor States. (Essex, U.K.: Seimo rinkimo '96," at 60; Lithuanian Seim, "Lietuvos Respublikos Ukraine parliamentary dataset this online (fn. 4), 239; Bojcun parties:

Parties

http://rc.lrs.lt/rinkimai/seim96. is an estimate of partisan affiliations in April Project, districts

for 338 deputies who were elected after the first run-off election for Election parties: International Foundation Systems Ukrainian at this is a dataset of first-round election results for all 450 http://ifes.kiev.ipra.ua;

1994. Ukrainian

elective

1996, in Ukraine.

least-squares

to the incongruence Due of the data for electoral index of disproportionality for Ukraine was not computed.

and parliamentary

a

parties

seats on 24 percent of the first-round vote in 1990 while the MSZPwon 86 percent of those seats on 31 percent of the first-round vote.40 a different situation Russia and Ukraine present altogether. The

ef

fective number of parties reaching parliament (4.15 for Ukraine 1994 and over 5.00 for Russia 1993 and 1995) show none of the dramatic mechanical probably

effect

found

underestimates

in the other the amount

cases. Moreover, this measure of party fractionalization pro

40 from data in Kenneth Benoit, "Votes and Seats: The Hungarian Electoral Computed in G?bor T?ka, ed., The 1990 Election to theHungarian the 1994 Parliamentary Elections," and Data. Dataset, (Berlin: Edition Sigma, forthcoming). Assembly: Analyses, Documents fas. harvard.edu/stafi7ken_benoit. http://data.


Law

and

National online

at

376

WORLD POLITICS

duced

by Ukraine's

system

majoritarian

in which

independents

made

up the largest "bloc"of representatives entering parliament (40.2 percent) a cohesive and can hardly be considered group. They were, however, a measure treated as in the of the effective num single entity computing

ber of parliamentary parties.41The high effective number of candidates per district in Russia shows that Russia's plurality system failed to have its most

basic

an effect What

effect?local

Sartori

claimed

two-candidate even held the cases

distinguishes

contests

at the district

level?

in unstructured

party systems.42 and Russia from the others

in Ukraine

in single-member is the of district candidates proliferation independent a small In Ukraine, of the candidates elections. (11 per only minority were vot nominated rather than cent) by parties by groups of officially ers or worker collectives.43 This percentage, overestimates the however, a number of independents because many candidates with partisan affil iation

chose

to be nominated rather

membership sure of partisanship vote went Russian

than party

methods. by nonpartisan as the more nomination

Using accurate

party mea

61 percent of the first-round candidates, among to the This candidates.44 independent corresponds roughly in which 48 candidates percent experience nonpartisan gained to

of the vote in 1993 and 36 percent in 1995. In Lithuania independents won

only

3 percent

of the vote.

In Hungary

the vote

for

independent

candidates dropped from 7 percent in 1990 to only 2 percent in 1994. in Ukraine and Russia not only made up a large propor Independents tion of candidates for office, for the they also accounted competing in the winners. winners of the of percent Fifty-two largest proportion

Russian elections in 1993 were independents and 34 percent in 1995, while 40 percent of Ukraine's winning candidates did not belong to a party. In Lithuania's 1996 andHungary's 1990 elections, independents made

up only

6 percent

and 3 percent

of the winners,

respectively.

41 on estimates of The effective number of parliamentary parties is based partisan affiliation in the were of Ukrainian for 338 450 who deputies successfully elected after the first run-off elec parliament tion inApril 1994. Bojcun (fn. 5), 239. Only 338 of the 450 district elections were declared valid after the first run-off because the other districts failed to fulfill the required criteria of both 50 percent par candidate. The rest of the seats were filled in special ticipation and 50 percent support for the winning the fluid and unstable nature of partisan affiliation in elections held until 1996. Given make-up In the Russian this figure should be considered only an estimate of party fractionalization. Ukraine on in parliamentary case, the effective number of parliamentary factions, parties is based membership in the legislature. which renders a more accurate reflection of party fractionalization 42 Sartori (fn. 2), 62. 43 Bojcun (fn. 4), 233. 44 for Election Systems (iFES), which This figure is based on data from the International Foundation voter group, workers and the for a candidate listed both the mode of nomination collective) (party, party affiliation of the candidate. The latter was used to estimate the percent of vote going to inde ipri. kiev. ua. pendents. See IFES, online, http://ifes.


ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES There

were

There

no

is some

tion procedures

dates without

377

1994 election.45 winners in Hungary's nonpartisan over nomina are control that evidence gaining parties at least in Russia where the number of winning candi

a partisan affiliation declined in 1995. Both Russia and

to have a continue of independent however, Ukraine, large contingent a weakness in candidates winning elections, which signals continuing countries in their party systems not found in the other postcommunist this study.46 is just another candidates The proliferation of independent sign of as in Russia and Ukraine the lack of party institutionalization opposed not to the other cases in the and Russian parties have study.47 Ukrainian in in districts these the nomination controlled process single-member countries

and have

not

enjoyed

a consistent

level of significant

support

nationwide (with the possible exception of the Communist Party of the one or in 1995). Consequently, without beginning or to benefit from two strategic voting disproportionality, large parties the number of candi elections fail to constrain district single-member their own districts dates per district. Rather, produce single-member candidates and allow individ of partisan and nonpartisan proliferation name resources to find financial ual candidates and with recognition

Russian

Federation

success

in parliament, of party affiliation. Once regardless as a not act does unified group but candidates independent ther. Some join parties they eschewed during the campaign;

this mass

of

splinters fur others form

new

to electoral associations factions unrelated fielding parliamentary in the members of still others become atomized candidates campaign; a affiliation with any consistent larger group. parliament without 45 on the vote for and their success in gaining seats are based on the following independents Figures sources: IFES (fn. 44); Bojcun Information Service, Report on (fn. 4). Russia: Foreign Broadcasting of the Russian Federation, Eurasia, December 8, 1993; Central Electoral Commission "Rezul'taty na v Dumu po odnomandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam," Gosudarstvennuyu golosovaniya vyborakh re in single-member (Results of voting on elections to the State Duma voting districts) (Unpublished 1 No. izbi Central Election 1994); Commission, Moscow, port, okruzhnykh "Dannye protokolov o rezultatakh Sobraniya Dumy Federal'nogo vyborov deputatov Gosudarstvennoy ratel'nykh komissii Federatsii vtorogo sozyva po odnomandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam" (Data of protocol Rossiiskoy on the results of elections of no. 1 of district electoral commissions deputies of the second State Duma of the Federal Assembly electoral district), Rossiiskaya of the Russian Federation by single-mandate izbi po federal'nomu gazeta, January 17, 1996; "Dannye protokolov No. 2 ob itogakh golosovaniya ratel'nomu okrugu" (Data of protocol no. 2 on results of vote for federal electoral okrug), Rossiiskaya Benoit Seim, "Lietuvos Respub (fn. 40). Lithuania: Lithuanian gazeta, January 24, 1996. Hungary: 1rs. It/rinkimai/seim96. likos Seimo rinkimo '96," dataset, online at http://rc. 46 elections under a new mixed electoral system similar InMarch 1998 Ukraine held parliamentary to Russia's, which was not included in this study for lack of data. The results show a continued preva district elections in Ukraine. Of the 225 deputies candidates in single-member lence of independent elected in plurality elections, 114 (51 percent) were independents. 47 uses the candidates as one characteristic of his of strong independent Mainwaring proliferation index of party institutionalization. 6). (fn. Mainwaring


378

WORLD POLITICS

The fact that proliferation of nonpartisan candidates did not occur cases in all the that party institutional postcommunist again suggests are ization varies in the region. While and fluid relatively weak parties a in all the emerging clear distinction democracies, postcommunist needs to be made between those states with parties that dominate the and control the choices voters face and those that process electoral role in the system plays an important develop on center attention of parties in this context. PR systems party-list

nomination

do not. The ment

as the for nomination, while dis parties only vehicles single-member to enter the contest. At the trict elections candidates allow nonpartisan same time, the effects of electoral on the number of are systems parties

mitigated by the institutionalization of the party system itself. Finally, itmust be reiterated that while plurality and majoritarian effect in some postcom systems had a significant mechanical to have no munist districts states, single-member appeared surprisingly in any of the cases under ex effect on the number of electoral parties electoral

In no case does

amination.

the effective

number

of elective

parties

in

SMD elections approach the number expected in the literature (M + 1 where M signifies the number of candidates winning election). Of are more

elections

course, majoritarian

in this sense for they

ambiguous

provide more incentives for party proliferation in the first round. For majoritarian

mains M vance

cases,

to the

second

the expectation

however,

+ 1with M

of reductive

influence

re

signifying the number of candidates that can ad For Lithuania

M

+ 1 would

equal three is between effective candidates the two top per district since the run-off an vote getters, not come close to Lithuania does expectation approxi allows the top three finishers mating. Hungary plus any candidate with round.48

15 percent of the vote into the second round. Thus, only in Hungary can the to a of attributed number effective candidates be high permis sive electoral of compensatory

since Hungary tier has a third national system, especially seats that uses votes not used to win seats from both

the single-member district tier and the territorial PR tier.This situation provides candidate

chief

incentive

no chance

with

can be used The

for party proliferation because a vote for a to the next round is not wasted; it of getting seats in the national tier. for compensatory

even more

consequence

of the failure

of voters

and parties

to act

strategically is a high level of disproportionality in those countries with relatively developed dent candidates. Up 48 Cox

of the proliferation parties that constrain indepen to now, most elites (with the party postcommunist

(fn. 5), 123.



379

exception of Poland) have failed to anticipate being punished by the mechanical effect of effective thresholds of single-member districts. to fail to achieve representa thus have entered competition They only voters have tended not to tion. Likewise, postcommunist anticipate or do not care. on that their vote will be wasted marginal parties cases

all the postcommunist

Thus,

employing

dis

single-member

tricts examined here provide some surprising and intriguing findings. In Ukraine

and Russia,

single-member

districts

produce

party prolifer

ation defying both the expectation of strategic voting and mechanical effects due to disproportionality. In Lithuania andHungary, large par ties benefit

from

greatly

the mechanical

effect

of single-member

dis

tricts due to high disproportionality, but voters and elites did not seem or able to react to these

willing

incentives

and behave

strategically.

The big question for both PR and single-member district electoral systems iswhether the lack of strategic voting found in this study is a or elections. Will there permanent transitory feature of postcommunist over time as be greater party consolidation hold and takes democracy to elites and voters learn the rules and better adapt the incentives pro

vided by the electoral system? Perhaps time and repeated electoral cy cles are all that found

for electoral

so to the types of outcomes regularly produce democracies. Cox has argued that time is required to take effect in new democracies:

is needed

in established systems

The typical scenario in emerging democracies, whereby a great number of par ties spring up in the first elections, and there is a relatively slowwinnowing out pro cess, makes sense. A large number spring up in the first election because it is not clearwho will be viable andwho not. As information is revealed about voter pref erences,

the more

serious

groups

will

continue

to enter,

even

against

poor

short

term odds, in the hopes of convincing less committed competitors to drop out.49 While

there have

not yet been

enough

elections

to make

any defini

tive judgments about learning, these initial findings suggest some in cases and between In differences electoral among systems. teresting both PR and single-member with district the countries the elections, more showed institutionalized the strongest party systems signs of over time. In PR elections, saw their ef Poland and learning Hungary over fective number of electoral and disproportionality parties drop rose the number of parties and disproportionality time, while sharply in to the second. In and Lithuania Russia from the first election single member district elections, showed signs of party consol only Hungary

idation over time, and Russia (the only other country with full data for 49

Ibid., 159.


WORLD POLITICS

380 more

saw fractionalization increase over time. In election) PR and the district elections, under single-member comparing learning in PR elections was, contrary evidence of learning of strategic behavior to evidence greater than in SMD elections. This suggests expectations, one

than

states PR elections in postcommunist in controlling effective the number

that more

the dramatic

Given

with legal thresholds may be of parties than SMD elections. and effects produced by effective

mechanical

legal thresholds in both PR and single-member

in

district elections

states, one could expect the winnowing-out process de postcommunist as as are some to scribed by Cox give long developed enough parties in of party preferences. semblance Voters, then, can behave strategically are weakest can not even of and those Where parties light preferences. the nomination

control

process,

however,

such as in Russia

and Ukraine, district elec

in single-member less likely, particularly learning becomes are allowed to candidates tions where proliferate. independent

System Effects

Electoral The

and elites.

New Democracies

systems in postcom suggest that electoral a to of level led strategic behavior by significant cases the number of effective In most electoral parties

findings presented states have not munist voters

in Other

here

to ex the carrying of the electoral system leading capacity a trend to post Is this of levels tremely high peculiar disproportionality. in all new in initial elections communist states, or can it be found

exceeded

democracies?

of electoral

the proliferation

Perhaps

parties

in postcom

munist states is a normal condition of initial elections thatwill subside as increased out

information

should tion

similar

show

in the number most

and experience If so, comparisons

ones.

nonviable

party proliferation of electoral parties

reward viable other

with

in initial over

parties and weed new democracies

elections

and contrac

time.

the electoral sys comparison use tems of the states and new democracies, which plu postcommunist show whether the most powerful would rality systems. The comparison The

would

effective

be between

electoral system has faced party proliferation in initial elections in other new democracies elites

learn

mocratizers

to

only

to

consolidation produce the system. Unfortunately,

navigate have adopted

plurality

over

time as voters few

systems.50 Therefore,

50 Eleven

third-wave the most

and de in

elections in the 1980s adopted plurality systems initial democratic countries experiencing islands. Such cases do not provide the most suitable very small states, mostiy Caribbean states. Nevertheless, these new democracies did not experience comparison with large postcommunist states in the study. The exhibited by the postcommunist the same high level of party proliferation

but all were


ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES structive

is a historical

comparison democracies

new

older, Two postwar

that have

one with now

of

elections

initial

consolidated.

become

relatively Federal Republic,

the German

democracies,

the

381

its

with

mixed electoral system employing both plurality elections and PR, and India, with its pure plurality system, will be examined to shed some light on the degree of party proliferation in initial elections under a plu on the system rality system and sult of learning.

s reductive

over

properties

time as a re

support for the history provides a common in new idea that party proliferation may be phenomenon do but that reductive effects of the electoral take democracies system Postwar

Germany's

over

hold

time.

electoral

early

Scholars

found

have

of strategic voting totals for parties between

under

evidence

in vote

the PR rules in the difference plurality two tier. The district tier and the single-member par largest German more votes in the the CDU/CSU and the have SPD, ties, single gained

member districts than in the PR racewhile lost votes. This

situation

suggests

smaller parties like the FDP

that voters

from

defected

small par

ties less likely to win in single-member districts and gravitated toward in the discrepancy for representation. While a tiers is not that significant, averaging gain for the three parties most 2 percent affected

parties with better chances the vote between the two or

loss

of

less

than

evidence of strate (CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP), it does provide persuasive the vote does not really in rules even when gic voting under plurality of seats among parties.51 the final distribution fluence This

did not occur

phenomenon

in the first election

under

the mixed

system in 1953. In that election the SMD tier produced over three effec tive electoral

parties

a

(3.38),

higher

effective

of electoral

number

par

ties than in the corresponding PR tier (3.31). By the next election the in the single-member parties produced to 2.75, tier pro district and the single-member duced fewer effective electoral parties than the PR tier (2.78), as the lit erature would This trend has grown over the years reducing expect.52 in the single-member dis the chances for victory by marginal parties effective

number

districts

had

of electoral

fallen

tricts to virtually

nothing

and solidifying

a

two-party

system

in the SMD

tier. Since the third election held under the mixed system in 1961, no party

other

than

the CDU/CSU

average effective number of electoral parties in Russia's lower than the average produced Cox (fn. 5), 309-11. 51Jesse(fn.26),112. 52 of effective Calculations

number

or SPD has won

a

single-member

district

is 2.26, which ismuch for this group of new democracies cases see two plurality elections. For data regarding these

of parties were

based on data in Barnes


et al. (fn. 26), 906.

382

WORLD POLITICS

seat. Thus,

Germany

a case of

provides

increased

consolidation,

pre

sumably due to learning, which began to take place in the second elec tion. German

voters

and elites did not need much

time

to

adjust

to the

incentives

of the electoral system. an India provides of the opposite example phenomenon?a ent absence of a system. Party strategic voting under plurality

persist prolifer

ation at the district level has remained high in India despite the fact that the plurality system consistently produced very high dispropor tionality,

severely

penalizing

marginal

parties.

As

a consequence,

until

the late 1980s, India experienced a dominant party system inwhich the Congress Party maintained votes while the opposition no evidence of consolidation first

two

elections,

a of seats based on a minority of majority was is there Unlike Germany fragmented. over time as a result of In India's learning.

the effective

number

of electoral

parties

stood

at

4.21 despite the fact that the high disproportionality of the plurality system

narrowed

that number

down

to less than

two effective

parlia expect voters and elites to against small parties, the high level of adjust not subside over several decades of did fractionalization party repeated In six elections from 1962 to 1984, India actually democratic elections. had more effective electoral parties, an average of 4.31, even though the

mentary

one would

(1.79). Although parties to the severe disincentives

electoral

system's mechanical

effect

repeatedly

reduced

the number

of

effective parties entering parliament to 221P By the end of the 1980s the mechanical effect of India's plurality electoral system even failed as the Congress majorities Congress party lost power and the manufactured In 1996 thirty decades for gave way to coalition governments. enjoyed were in parliament with 5.88 effective parliamentary parties represented a similar outcome 1998 parliamentary elections The produced parties. similar to the frac strikingly district elections.54 tionalization single-member two in initial elections These show that party proliferation examples a a common occurrence. while be However, may Germany provides with

5.29

effective

parliamentary produced by Russia's

parties,

case of learning that produced strategic voting beginning in the second 53 (fn. 1), 161. 54Lijphart elections were based on seat distribu Calculations for the 1996 and 1998 Indian parliamentary indiavotes. com. One crucial difference be tions provided by the India Votes '98website, http://www. tween the Indian and Russian cases is that the Indian case tended to produce two- or three-candidate races at the district level. The multiparty system at the national level was produced by the fact that the two in each district did not belong to the same two major parties from district to dis major candidates saw an average of seven significant candidates compete in trict. This was not the case in Russia, which in Indian elections see districts. For district-level analysis of the number of candidates single-member and the Number of Parties in India and and Ken W. Kollman, "Party Aggregation Pradeep Chhibber the United States," American Political Science Review 92 (1998), 332.


383


peated

that the passage of time and re to promote sufficient strategic behavior.

the Indian

election,

elections

shows

experience alone are not

As in the postcommunist cases, Iwould argue that the key determining factor

is the

institutionalization

tivelywell-established strategic

voting

while

India failed to do so.

of the party

system,

in which

a rela

party system inGermany provided the basis for a more

weakly

institutionalized

party

in

system

Conclusions The findings presented here suggest that electoral systems affect the states and in more established of parties in postcommunist de in very different ways. These findings provide greater empir ical support for Cox s theoretical work on the conditions for necessary a to take Without institutionalized strategic voting place. relatively party system, voters and elites may not have the ordered party prefer ences to behave or may not have to information strategically enough differentiate viable from nonviable contenders. Under such conditions one would not expect the reductive of elec impact powerful plurality tions to take effect. Cox anecdotal evidence from only provided Papua number

mocracies

to illustrate how such conditions in the realworld may produce party proliferation under plurality rules.55The findings pre

New Guinea

states may suggest that many postcommunist under such circumstances. transition ing democratic

sented

here

be undergo

This study has reemphasized the importance of party institutional ization

as an

variable intervening systems and the number

electoral

the relationship influencing of parties. The constraining

between effects

of

thresholds seemed to vary with the institutionaliza legal and effective states. Countries tion of the party system in postcommunist like Poland and Hungary with more developed showed party systems greater ten to electoral system incentives dencies for strategic adaptation and learn

ing over time while

countries like Russia and Ukraine with weakly

no or systems showed signs of strategic behavior an eventual not guarantee learning. The passage of time will necessarily to electoral in found consolidated systems along patterns adaptation institutionalized

party

never a institution relatively produces as case alized party system the of India powerfully demonstrates. Under conditions of extreme party underdevelopment, the electoral use that the of system party labels?proportional promotes representa

democracies

55 Cox

if the social context

(fn. 5), 85.


WORLD POLITICS

384 be more

tion?may

effective

in constraining

the number

of parties

than

the plurality system, provided a legal threshold is used. Indeed, inRus sia a PR system with effect than

a 5-percent its plurality time PR elections with legal

legal

chanical over

in a

threshold

had

Poland

counterpart. can reduce thresholds

state as elites

and voters

a has

stronger shown

me that

the number

of

learn the incentives

parties postcommunist of the system. Our cases have shown no such dramatic reduction over time in of electoral number district single-member parties

in the elec

to curb party fractionaliza systems may find better results with

tions. Therefore, electoral engineers tion in states with developing party

hoping

PR and a legal threshold than with single-member district elections. states

Postcommunist

provide that defies

a

to electoral studies with challenge even the electoral systems. strongest such as those found in Russia systems,

party fractionalization The most party underdeveloped such fragmentation and Ukraine, produce fect of single-member district elections nomena

suggest

that

in integrating

that even does

not

the mechanical

take hold.

postcommunist

states

ef

Such phe into the field

of electoral studies greater attention will need to be paid to the impli cations puzzle which

of party systems. The main under is the process and conditions this analysis states. in democratizing become institutionalized

of low levels of institutionalization arising party

from systems
