electoral volatility in postcommunist belarus

PARTY POLITICS

VOL 6. No.3 pp.343-358

Copyright ©2000 SAGE Publications

London. Thousand Oaks. New Delhi

RESEARCH NOTE

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ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN POSTCOMMUNIST BELARUS Explaining the Paradox

Elena A. Korasteleva ABSTRACT

Since the fall of communism nearly a decade ago, a series of important changes have occurred within the party system of Belarus. On the one hand, there is a potential for party system stabilization, given relatively stable party competition, the acceptance of parties as legitimate political actors in the electoral game, and the existence of predictable group loyalties to them. On the other hand, one may still witness intensive vote changing, the tendency for the presidency to strengthen, and a lingering sign of reversion in Belarus's democratization. This necessitates a discussion of the extent to which these two perspectives are contradictory, and how the paradox can be explained. The study examines the nature of instability and its causes, and discusses whether vote changing may be interpreted as 'quasi-volatility', which does not primarily imply a radical dealignment in voting.

KEY WORDS _ Belarus _ democratization _ electoral volatility _ immature party system _ party consolidation _ presidential factor

A Thorny Path to Democracy Despite its early extrication from communist rule, the Republic of Belarus has experienced a protracted course of polity transformation. Its democratization seems highly controversial and even inverse in nature. After 9 years 1354-0688(200007)6:3;343-358;013298 Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Templeman Lib/The Librarian on May 4, 2015

from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.

PARTY POLITICS 6(3)

of autonomy, Belarus, rather than leading the way in the democratization process, is now lagging behind most other Central and East European democracies. Moreover, national sovereignty, earnestly sought in 1991, has turned into a superfluous burden for 77 percent of the population, l and the ruling elite selfishly exploits the public desire for a restoration of the Russia-Belarus Union. The original 1994 parliamentary constitution was altered in 1996 by referendum, to the President's preferred design, and parliament has displayed no disloyalty to the incumbent since. Economic reforms have likewise stagnated. A policy of inaction has been pursued as the best option in a collapsing order. On the other hand, political parties no longer proliferate. They have settled down and become legitimate actors, though with limited powers. The democratic wing has begun to develop transnational cooperation, thus slowly approximating to a West European ideological profile. Illegally dismissed by President Lukashenko in 1996, the 13th Supreme Soviet declared a counterpresidential election on 16 May 1999 in accordance with the 1994 constitution. Governmental authorities gave no official reaction to election campaigning by the underground opposition, but did engage in clandestine intimidation of the candidates. However, public opinion is highly divided. Societal conflict largely accumulates along a 'Lukashenko-anti-Lukashenko' divide, which may be due to the elite's inability to govern effectively and the continuing incapacity of the population to be heard. 2 The puzzle here seems to be a continuing combination of political immaturity with prima facie signs of party consolidation, associated with legitimate political actors/organizations, predictable group loyalties to them and relatively patterned competition. This may suggest that there is no linear correlation between party crystallization and system stabilization. The system may well contain a potential for institutionalization, which, evidently, does not of itself provide the motivation for irreversible democratic change. Therefore, one may still witness intensive vote changing; legal, but voiceless parties; the tendency for the presidency to strengthen, and a lingering flavour of backwardness. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to explain the logic of instability and the mechanics of its persistence in Belarus. Why, after nearly a decade of independence, do parties not unravel into a stable patterned system, which could foster a balance in political power in society? What makes voters change their preferences at the expense of party loyalty? The paper proceeds in three sections. The first outlines the potential leeway for party system settlement in Belarus. The second section examines structural levels of electoral volatility and offers some contradictory evidence about party system development. Finally, we assess the factors that contribute to the existence of instability and estimate the national perspective for democracy in the light of such factors.

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KORASTELEVA: ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN BELARUS

The Bias Towards Stability in the Belarus Party System The analysis of existing parties, their programmatic offers and electoral performance indicates that there is a potential for party system institutionalization. This can be seen from (1) relatively stable inter-party competition, (2) the acceptance of parties and party leaders as legitimate political actors in the electoral game, and (3) the existence of predictable group loyalties. 3 Like other new democracies, Belarus witnessed extraordinary party proliferation between 1991 and 1994, reaching 35 parties in total. However, by 1998 it had settled down to 28 officially registered parties, amongst which only a dozen are nationally recognizable, and after the 1999 political audit, only 17 formally remained registered. The consolidation process has been fostered by Presidential Decree No.2 1999, which requires compulsory registration of political parties and public organizations with a threshold of 1000 registered members. Among those who would undoubtedly pass the imposed political 'audit' are the Communists (PCB) on the left and the nationalists on the right (the Belorussian Popular Front 'Adradgenne' - the BPF), the two largest formally structured political parties, with memberships of 9300 (PCB) and 5100 (BPF) respectively.4 Among the rest are the right-wing United Civic Party (UCP), headed by the economist and former National Bank manager Bogdankevich; the rightof-centre Social Democratic Party 'Narodnaia Hramada' (SDP); the leftwing Labour Party (LP) which is allied to the Independent Trade Unions (Bukchvostov); the centre-right Liberal Democratic Party (Gaidukevich); and both pro-presidential parties - the splinter Communist Party of Belarus (Chikin) and the Social Democratic Party of Public Consent (Sechko). During the 1996 parliamentary crisis, the third largest left-orientated party, the Agrarian Party (AP), split and ceased to exist on the national level. After breaking away from its party family, the Belorussian Social Democratic 'Hramada' (BSDH), under the leadership of Stanislav Shushkevich (former spokesman 1990-91), has aligned with the right-wing BPF. Due to this its future as a credible political player remains uncertain. A dynamic analysis of party ideological positions suggests they have a fixed and relatively linear distribution along the left-right political spectrum. The issues of reform moderation, state social protection and reunion with Russia are eagerly advocated by the communist bloc on the left. LiberaVnationalist parties, articulating pro-European and nation-building issues, form the oppositional right end of the spectrum, with a blend of smaller parties advertising vague ideological stances in the centre. 5 Voters seem to recognize the programmatic offers of the leading parties by giving them distinct ideological labels within the political spectrum. Since 1996 a new divide - 'Lukashenko-anti-Lukashenko' - has emerged, introducing a second principal line of party competition and thereby creating a multi-dimensional space. This was subsequently reflected by voters. According to them, the party spectrum separates now into three ideological camps 345 Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Templeman Lib/The Librarian on May 4, 2015

PARTY POLITICS 6(3)

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Figure 1. Ideological party spectrum in Belarus according to voters' perceptions, October-November 1996 Note: The configuration of political parties is based on the question 'Whom would you vote for, if the election were tomorrow?' A Euclidean distance model was used to measure statistical similarity/difference between parties as independent variables in two-dimensional space. Kruskal's stress test is less than 0.001 (significance). This chart represents a two-dimensional model of the Belarus political spectrum according to voters' perception. The horizontal dimension is labelled from 'populist, moderate' on the left to 'radical, liberal' on the right pole of the spectrum. The inclined vertical axis represents the distribution of party positions along 'Lukashenko-anti-Lukashenko' ideological divide. Three ideological camps can be distinguished: the moderate left-orientated (bottom left); the pro-presidential blocs of small and hardly discernible parties (top left); and the radical anti-system opposition consisting of PCB, BPF, UCP, SDP, AP, and the liberal women's party 'Hope'. For list of parties see Appendix. Source: Korasteleva (1998). See text for survey details.

(Figure I): the moderate left-orientated; the pro-presidential blocs of small and hardly discernible parties; and the radical anti-system opposition consisting of PCB, BPF, UCP, SDP, AP, and the liberal women's party 'Hope'.6 The mean gross volatility of the leading parties (Figure 2), based on estimates from sample public surveys between 1991 and 1998, seems to have become more similar in recent years, which is consistent with the tendency towards party polarization in voters' perceptions. In other words, individual-level change in voters' expectations of national parties becomes relatively patterned, in the sense that voters do not 'switch' as much as they did before, having crystallised their loyalties. Multiple classification analysis (MCA), along with cross-tabulation and cluster analysis, helps to approximate group loyalties regarding people's party choice. One can trace distinct geographical, educational and occupational divisions in voter identifications. For example, most urban residents tend to cast their votes for the right-wing democratic parties. Moreover, younger and professionally trained cohorts residing in smaller cities are inclined to support nationalist programmatic appeals, whereas the middle-aged intellectuals of Minsk and regional centres normally vote for 346 Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Templeman Lib/The Librarian on May 4, 2015


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Figure 2. Mean gross volatility of individual parties, Belarus, 1991-8 Note: The measure of mean gross volatility refers to individual-level changes in voting and was calculated as an average change in percentage of votes for individual parties from one point in time to another during the annual observation. See Appendix for the list of parties. Source: Opinion polls 1991-8 (three to six times a year), Centre of Sociological and Political Research, BSU, Minsk, in which present author participated. Stratified nationwide sample included 1500 respondents with 95% confidence probability in average, representing adults over 18.

the Social Democrats and the UCP liberals. The Communists find their principal constituencies among the rural and less educated elderly population. In occupational terms, the democratic cluster of voters is largely composed of the self-employed, the unemployed (students, housekeepers, etc.) and those who survive on state benefits. Among those who would rather look backward towards reunion with Russia, one can mainly designate pensioners, both unemployed and employed, and fulVpart-time workers, who are reliant on scarce benefits and earnings. 7 The above analysis shows that there is potential for the party system to institutionalize, given the effectiveness of existing parties and their acceptance by the majority of the public. In addition, the manifestation of some regularity in voter attitudes and partisanship contributes to the prospects for system democratization. However, as was stated earlier, the consolidation of party alternatives does not inevitably result in the consolidation of the party system as such. In other words, parties may well perform their mission, but of themselves do not provide enough political will for system stabilization. The citizenry and interest groups must perceive them as the means of determining governance, its accountability and effectiveness. They must function in reciprocity and congruence with other institutions of power. Failure to follow these expectations may lead parties to lose their voting potential. Recent developments in electoral politics (1998-9) demonstrate an apparent decline in public estimation of parties as a stepping-stone to power, although party group loyalties remain their principal characteristic. This seems contradictory to the established patterns of some regularity in individual-level voting. 347 Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Templeman Lib/The Librarian on May 4, 2015

PARTY POLITICS 6(3)

Measuring Electoral Volatility To estimate the degree of change or stability, both in party performance and voters' choice amongst the existing party alternatives, we should examine structural levels of electoral volatility. The measure of electoral volatility can be seen as incorporating individual vote shifts and it displays the distribution of party strength during the course of observation. Given that the party ideological positions are fairly fixed on the political spectrum and have recognizable programmatic images for Belorussian voters (see above), the index of volatility may reflect the level of voters' mobilization and the degree of their adherence to party choices. This will also help to resolve the argument over how well the contemporary party universe is structured and whether there is some bias towards party system stabilization in the new democracy. Electoral volatility can be measured on the basis of election results or opinion poll evidence, depending on data availability and their informative value. In the case of the newly emerging democracies, with a limited number of election runs and not yet settled patterns of voter participation and party competition, sample surveys can be more revealing for estimating perspectives of party system development, because they permit a greater number of observations over a given period. In addition, if opinion polls are conducted on a regular basis three to five times a year, and allow approximation of results to a nationwide sample, with 95 percent confidence probability, this may provide a parsimonious and reliable measure of volatility over time. By that is implied a full-term observation of voting behaviour covering various levels of political activity in the annual cycle, including election campaigns, which more effectively reflects a microcosm of change that may have taken place among voters (see Farrell et aI., 1995: 110-27). The levels of survey volatility are expected to be higher and more receptive to change with increasing frequency of observations, as this is the period when voters form their opinions and are more prone to change their minds. Therefore, if there should be a patterned choice or short-lived allegiance, the character of volatility will immediately identify it. The final advantage of the poll-calculated index of volatility in this context is its capacity to indicate political change in action rather than in stasis. It reflects more immediately the outcomes of the political game, pre-empting the negative effect of power misbalance after the elections. At the same time, one should be mindful of the projective character of any measure of electoral volatility based on intended voting, which may approximate but not necessarily coincide with the reality. To examine the dynamics of electoral choice and the level of party structuration in Belarus, the results of the 1991-8 opinion polls were analysed. 8 The annual volatility indexes were calculated as mean net (using the formula of Pedersen, 1979) and mean gross change in voting preferences. In the first case, the absolute differences in party support between opinion polls that were attached to the most salient political events of each year were summed 348 Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Templeman Lib/The Librarian on May 4, 2015


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0.00 - - ' - - - - - + - - - - + - - - - - + - - - - + - - - - - + - - - - + - - - - - - - - 1 1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1994 Figure 3. Mean net volatility, Belarus, 1991-8 Note: The measure of mean net volatility indicates the absolute differences in party support between opinion polls that were attached to the most salient political events of each year, which were summed and divided by two. The annual index of volatility is calculated as the average of observations at a given year. See text for further explanation. Source: Author's data. See Figure 2 for survey details.

and divided by two. Counted as an average thereafter, the mean annual volatility index represents an alternative to Pedersen's measure of net volatility, as it is year specific. It examines the degree of aggregate voter instability over the course of separate political events and campaigns during a given year. In turn, mean gross volatility refers to individual-level changes in voting and was calculated as the percentage of 'voters' who change their preference from one point in time to another during the annual observation (see Farrell et ai., 1995: 110-27). Both measures were utilized in order to conceive change as multi-layered and multi-dimensional: net volatility (Figure 3) reflects instantaneous change in voting, i.e. from one observation to another, and gross volatility (Figure 4) shows accumulation of vote shifts in total throughout the year. Volatility measures help to approximate the general patterns of voting behaviour and assess the degree of stability in voters' party preferences. The mean net and gross volatility indexes appear to coincide in shape, displaying a steady growth tendency. This contradicts the mode of gross volatility reflecting moderate vote shifts amid individual parties (see Figure 2). The implication can be that electoral interchange in individual cases may have acquired a 'homing' pattern, which is similar to an inertia effect in changing settled preferences in voting behaviour. This, as it is seen, may disguise considerable volatility, the overall analysis of which, including a range of smaller parties (total volatility) and their separation into ideological camps (block volatility), should be more illustrative. Total volatility itself reflects electoral mobility of broader party fronts and gives a general impression of the extent of their settlement within the electorate (see Figures 3 and 4). The

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PARTY POLITICS 6(3)

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Figure 4. Mean gross volatility, Belarus, 1991-8 Note: See text for details of estimation. Source: Author's data. See Figure 2 for survey details.

measure of block volatility provided below is more informative for identifying the profundity of the ideological divide between the acting parties as well as of voters' dispositions and cohesion of choice. Bartolini and Mair's approach (1990), although based on estimates from sample surveys rather than election results, was used to assess the levels of

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