Engineered Safety Features Control System

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May 21, 2013 - Power Control System. • Process Control System. • Alarms. • Indications. • IPS. • Monitoring Systems. Non-Safety. Software (NS). Important to ...
TECHNICAL MEETING ON INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL IN

ADVANCED SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED REACTORS (SMRS) 21-24 May 2013

TECHNICAL FEATURES OF MMIS DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGIES OF SMART In Soo KOO [email protected]

Introduction

SMART MMIS

Classification Protection

Control

SCOPS RPS DPS ASTS

ESFCS Safety Control

Power Control RRS CRDMCS RPCS

Process Control PZR Control CVCS BOP

2nd Control FWCS SBCS TB Control Condensate Control

Alarm and Indications IPS(SCOMS, CFM, NSSS+BOP Monitoring, Alarm, SOE, HDSR)

Monitoring

ICCMS PAMS Primary Integrity Monitoring/Seismic Monitoring/RMS

Classification IC-1 • SCOPS • RPS • ESFCS • Safety Controls • Interlocks • ICCMS • PAMS • Indications

Safety-critical Software (SC)

IC-2

• DPS • ASTS

Important to Safety Software (ITS)

IC-3

• Power Control System • Process Control System • Alarms • Indications • IPS • Monitoring Systems

Non-Safety Software (NS)

Redundancy 

Single Failure Criteria ■ SCOPS - 4 channels

■ RPS - 4 channel - 2/4 coincidence logic - Manual trip switches

■ ESFCS - 4 channel - 2/4 coincidence logic - Manual actuation devices

■ Safety Controls ■ Electric Power ■ PAMS



Control systems – 2 channels, X-Y

Defense in Depth ■1st level - To prevent deviations from normal operation and to prevent system failures - Control echelon; Power Control System, Process Control System, 2nd Control System

■2nd level - Protection echelon ; SMART Core Protection System, Reactor Protection System, Diverse Protection System, Automatic Seismic Trip System

■3rd level - Mitigation echelon; Engineered Safety Features Control System, Safety Control System

■ 4th level: - Monitoring echelon; Post Accident Monitoring System, Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System

Defense in Depth

Monitoring ESF actuation Protection Control

Diversity ■ Diversity Protection System - Anticipated transient without scram - Common cause failure

■ Diverse functions - Main control panel – Safe shutdown panel - Alarm and Indication System – Information Processing System - Reactor Protection System – Reactor Regulating System - SMART Core Protection System – SMART Core Monitoring System (IPS) - Post Accident Monitoring System – Critical Functions Monitoring (IPS)

Data Communication – Cyber Security SMART MMIS Cyber Security Lifecycle Process

Defense-in-depth protective structure

Qualification of Digital Technology Safety Anal. EQ QA

CGID

Digitalized System - Hardware Issues

System Concept

System Design

Validation

System Req’ts

Hardware Planning

Hardware Req’ts

User Planning

User Req’ts

Hardware Design

Hardware Fabrication

Hardware Assembly & Test

Hardware

Hardware

Hardware

User Layouts

User Documents

User Procedures

User

User

User

Software

Software

Software

Human Factors Concern Software Planning

Software Req’ts

Software Design

Software Implementation

Software Integration

Validation

Installation

System Integration

CMF Methodology Defense-in-Depth Evaluation

Diversity Anal. & Req’ts

Diversity Methods

Reliability Methodology Reliability Goal Evaluation

Reliabilty Anal. & Req’ts

Reliability Methods

Management Development QA Safety Anal. V&V

Digitalized System - System Issues

CM

Operation & Maintenance

COTS Requirements

Design

Code

Integration

Validation

Req’ts Anal.RP Design Anal. RP Imple. Anal.&Test RP Integ. Anal.& Test RP Valid.Anal&Test RP

Req’ts RP

Design RP

Implementation RP

Integration RP

Digitalized System - Software Issues

Validation RP

Installation

Change

Instal.Anal&Test RP

Change RP

Installation RP

Change RP

Human Factors Design Concept New Function

MMI Concept

Operating Experience Function Allocation Criteria

Design Guideline

FRA & Preliminary FA

System Analysis

Dynamic Model

I&C System Structure

Conceptual MMI Design

Conceptual Design Phase

Basic Design Phase

Task Analysis Function Allocation

MMI Design MMI Prototype

Operating Procedure Development

I&C System Design I&C sys. Prototype Development Detailed Design

Detailed Design Phase

Overview of SMART MMIS

Control Room • ADVANCED Control Room • Seated-type Compact Workstation • Elastic Tiled Alarm Display Method • Alarm Reduction Method • EID-based Information Display

• Human Factors Engineered Features • Enhanced Communications between Operators

• Enhanced Motor Tasks • Improved Detection Possibility of an Unanticipated Event in Early Phase of the Event Propagation

• Improved Situation Awareness even under Massive Alarm Status

• Enhanced Accessibility of Plant Information

Alarm and Indication System •

PARM(Proactive Alarm Reduction Method) is based on the contents of the past operating affects during the next time of the alarm reduction.

I&C Characteristics  DIGITAL Instrumentation and Control Systems       

Fully Digitalized Instrumentation & Control System design Platform Based on DSP for Safety System(Hard-real Time Characteristics) Dual Scheme per Channel of Protection System Embedded O/S : Scheduler Segmentation Technology for ESF-CCS CMF Reduction Hot stand-by and Duplex Structures of Control System Safety and Non-safety Soft Controller

 Hard Real-time Characteristics Scheduler based on the DSP Timer  Satisfy the SCOPS Mission Time  On-line Periodic Test for Idle Time 

Exec. Time

0 ms 2 ms

Periodic Test Idle Time

Mission Time

50 ms

SMART Core Protection System Software functions

MCP Speed COOLANT Input From CHECK

CEA Position

Output to POWER & THERM TC, TH PR, D Penalty Factor

CHECK

TRIP

CRPOS

THERM

Input from COOLANT & CHECK

POWER Input From COOLANT

Output to COOLANT & POWER

IPS

PR TC TH D(I), I=1 to 3 CEA(I), I=1 to 12

D

C

IS

Trip Buffer Variables CHFR Margin LPD Margin CEA Deviation, ETC.

B A

SCOPS (DSP NIC)

PPS Cabinet Status Data on SCOPS CHFR Margin LPD Margin CEA Deviation, ETC.

AIS

PPS

CHFR Trip Signal LPD Trip Signal CWP

CR

Neutron Flux PWR CHFR Margin LPD Margin Coolant Mass Flow Rat

Reactor Protection System

Engineered Safety Features Control System From From From From

EIM EIM EIM EIM

A1 B1 C1 D1

From From From From

EIM EIM EIM EIM

A2 B2 C2 D2

From RMS A

From RMS B

From PIS A

NASGM A

BASGM A

SASGM A

NCCM A

BCCM A

SCCM A 안전등급제어계통 캐비닛 A

Component Control Card 안전등급기기제어 캐비닛 A BASGM : BOP ESF Actuation Signal Generation Module BCCM : BOP ESF Component Control Module EIM : ESF initiation module MCC : Motor Control Center To MCC NASGM : NSSS ESF Actuation Signal Generation Module NCCM : NSSS ESF Component Control Module PIS : Process Instrumentation System RMS : Radiation Monitoring System SASGM : Safety-related System Actuation Signal Generation Module SCCM : Safety-related Component Control Module

Power Control Systems * Including RSP & Soft Controller

MCR Non-Safety Com. Network

SCOPS

IS

Isolation Power Control System AIS

Component Initiation Signal

IPS

Component(CEDM, MCP)

* Power Control System * Non-Safety Com. Network

CEDMCS

RRS

Component Initiation Signal CEDM Power Control Equipment

MCP Power Control Equipment

RPCS

Process Control System

 Charging and purification system  Feedwater control system  Non-safety BOP control system  Diverse protection system

2nd Control System * Secondary Control System * Non-Safety Com. Network

CONDENSER VACUUM SYSTEM

SBCS

TCS (*Turbine Supplier)

Condensate Water CS

Circulation Water CS

Component Initiation Components(Valves, Pumps and etc…)

* Including RSP & Soft Controller

MCR Non-Safety Com. Network IS

Power Control System Secondary Control System

AIS

Component Initiation Components(Valves, Pumps)

IPS

Ex-core Neutron Flux Monitoring System

Ex-core Neutron Flux Monitoring System  Safety ENFMS Ch A Ch B Ch X

 4 channels at operation • Channel A, B, C, D  High, Med, Low/channel • Wide range: 10-8%-200%(Log) • Narrow range: 0%200%(Linear)

 Non-safety ENFMS  Operation periods • 2 channels with A, B, C, and

Ch Y Ch C Ch D

D detectors  Refueling periods • 2 channels with X, Y source range detectors • Source range: 10-10%-10-4%

In-core Instrumentation System R: Rhodium Self Powered Neutron Detector B: Background Detector T: Core Exit Thermocouple

PAMS/ICCMS/PIS PAMI Display A

PAMI Display B

I

IPS

AIS

I AIS net IPS net Safety B Safety A

I

I

I I

ICCMS UNIT B ICCMS UNIT A I/O Module

CET

RPV Level

SM

Other Firmware

Communication Module

Integrity Alarm Unit

Integrity Analysis Computer

PSV Alarm Unit

I/O Module

ALM Alarm Unit

Analysis Module

LPM Alarm Unit

Diagnosis Module

MCPVM Alarm Unit

Scheduling Module

I/O Module

Output Generation

Other.

Utility

Firmware / OS

Firmware / OS

Communication Module

Communication Module

Sensors/transmitters/---

Others  Information processing system  Critical Functions Monitoring  SMART Core Monitoring System  NSSS and BOP  HDSR  Passive Autocatalytic Hydrogen Recombiner  Automatic Seismic Trip System  Radiation Monitoring System

Post Fukushima Action Items

Further development for Multiple Reactors ■Autonomous control ■ Control rooms for multiple reactor operation ■ Qualification ■ Reduction of price or costs

Thank you very much for Your attention