Nov 11, 2015 - Muslim community under-âsiege. ⢠Overwhelming, 75% of the survey sample reported a high sense of their community being under siege.
Enhancing community coopera1on in counter-‐ terrorism AIC Seminar 11 Nov 2015 Dr Adrian Cherney Acknowledgement: CI A/Prof Kris1na Murphy (Griffith University) Australian Research Council Discovery project DP130100392 -‐ Avoiding community backlash in the fight against terrorism
Community coopera/on & CT (1) • The most single important component in the domes2c defeat of terror in the next decade is the ability of the police to work with communi2es to do just that” (Sir Ian Blair, former Commissioner of the UK Metropolitan Police Service). • We know we can't arrest our way of this problem (Assistant Commissioner of QLD police – 2015). • “Because the Muslim community…have felt very targeted for probably the last 12 years...I think you have to start with grass roots engagement of let's just talk”. (AFP Community Liaison Team Member – 2015).
Community coopera/on & CT (2) • Community outreach and engagement with Muslim communi/es central component of police CT efforts. • Engagement challenging (Cherney & Hartley 2015). • How do police win trust and coopera/on?
Study • Qualita1ve focus groups (14; 104 par/cipants; youth, middle age, new arrivals; 67 males/37 females across Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne; occurred 2013/2014). • Quan1ta1ve survey – 800 Muslims – Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne (occurred June-‐August 2014).
• More recent research – police engagement efforts.
Muslim community under-‐siege / under a^ack
“It’s upseHng because they tangle us in something that we have nothing to do with, you know being born and brought up here and that’s something that happens overseas [in reference to terrorist a^acks such as 9/11, 7/7] that we have nothing to do with, just because we have the same faith although they did this. So it really has nothing to do... it’s upseHng that you have to be judged and being judged based on something that really you don’t even prac2se or believe in”
Muslim community under-‐siege
• Overwhelming, 75% of the survey sample reported a high sense of their community being under siege. • E.g. ‘I feel at risk of being accused of terrorist ac2vi2es because of my faith’. • Belief that society a^ributes nega/ve inten/ons towards Muslims & Islam. • Is this the inevitable outcome of CT discourse and policy – basis should not be ignored.
When a community feels under siege…… • Perpetuates a sense of vic/mhood. • Provides fer/le ground for conspiracy theories to flourish. • Can create defensiveness and suspicion towards authori/es. • Can even perpetuate conflict between groups. • Does it reduce willingness to cooperate with police?
Table 1: Under siege, trust in police & willingness to cooperate with police in counter-‐terrorism efforts: bi-‐variate correla1ons !
Mean!(SD)!
Cronbach!
1!
2!
3!
4!
5!
1.#Siege#mentality# 2.#Trust#in#police#
3.52#(0.91)# 3.83#(0.78)#
0.92# al! 0.90#
1# >.35*#
# 1#
# #
# #
# #
3.#Procedural#justice#
3.93#(0.74)#
0.95#
>.34*#
.82*#
1#
#
#
4.#Work#with#police# Procedurajustice# 5.#Report#
4.15#(0.80)#
0.92#
>.27*#
.67*#
.66*#
1#
#
3.96#(0.84)#
0.96#
>.35*#
.74*#
.73*# .66*#
#Procedural#justice#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
6.#Age#
34.89#(15.51)#
#
#
#
#
#
#
7.#Income#
9.99#(3.57)#
#
#
#
#
#
#
8.#Police#Contact#
0.40#(0.92)#
#
#
#
#
#
#
9.#Mosque#attendance#
5.31#(2.04)#
#
#
#
#
#
#
10.#Education#
5.32#(2.03)#
#
#
#
#
#
#
11.#Muslim#faith#
69.4%#
#
#
#
#
#
#
12.#Country#of#birth#
57.9%#
#
#
#
#
#
#
13.#Marital#Status#
46.3%#
#
#
#
#
#
#
14.#Gender#
50.5%#
#
#
#
#
#
#
1#
# Note: * p ≤ 0.001; higher scores on scales indicate more favourable assessments; Gender (0=female; 1=male); Country of Birth (0=overseas; 1=Australia); Muslim Faith (0=Shia; 1=Sunni); Marital Status (0=not married; 1=married); Income (1=$11,000 to 20= $110,000+); Mosque a^endance (0=never to 8=daily). Percentages shown for dichotomous variables, with percentage referring to the ‘1’ category
Under siege, trust in police & willingness to cooperate • Table 1 shows: 1. Feeling “under siege” has a nega/ve impact on people’s trust in police and their willingness to cooperate with police. 2. Respondents who felt more under siege were less trus/ng of police when it came to combatng terrorism. 3. Also less likely to want to work with police to combat terrorism. 4. Less likely to want to report suspicious terrorist related ac/vity to police. Recognise this does not demonstrate causa/on. BUT -‐ demonstrates that feeling under siege is related to Muslims’ scep/cism toward the police. What can police do about this?
Winning trust and coopera/on • Quality of police engagement and interac/ons become important. • Sends an important message to Muslims they are valued and respected. • Procedural jus/ce is about the quality of treatment and police decision-‐making. • Can it overcome barriers to collabora/on (sense of siege) and enhance coopera/on?
Procedural jus/ce research • Wealth of research shows that PJ increases coopera/on with police & police legi/macy (Jackson et al 2013; Mazerolle et al 2014). • Four elements: 1. Neutrality. 2. Fairness. 3. Respect. 4. Voice. Help to win trust – key to community-‐based CT efforts.
Will test whether: • a) PJ mediates the rela/onship between feeling under siege and trust in police • b) PJ mediates the rela/onship between feeling under siege and Muslims’ willingness to cooperate with police. • If PJ does buffer the effect of a siege mentality on trust and coopera/on then this will be an important finding.
Analysis and measures • Series of regression analyses • Trust in police to combat terrorism e.g. You trust police to make decisions that are good for everyone when they are inves2ga2ng and prosecu2ng terrorism. Two coopera/on measures: • Work with police – e.g. A^end a community forum held at your local Mosque to discuss with police how terrorism can be prevented • Report to police – e.g. A person talking about traveling overseas to fight for Muslims • PJ in CT -‐ e.g. When dealing with people in your community concerning issues of terrorism, the police: – apply the law consistently to everyone, regardless of who they are – give people a chance to express their views before a decision is made • Range of controls -‐ demographic and background differences
Table 2 OLS Regression of independent variables on ‘trust’ in police to combat terrorism !
Step!1!
!
!
Step!2!
B!(SE)!
β!
Intercept(
4.50((.18)(
(
(
.88((.15)(
(
(
Age(
.00((.00)(
.08(
(
.00((.00)(
.01(
(
Gender((0=female)(
:.14((.06)( :.09*( (
:.04((.04)(
:.02(
(
Muslim(faith((0=Shia)(
.01((.05)(
.00(
(
:.01((.03)(
:.01(
(
Country(of(birth((0=overseas)(
.11((.07)(
.07(
(
.06((.04)(
.04(
(
Marital(status((0=not(married)( .20((.07)(
.12**( (
.09((.04)(
.06*(
(
Income(
:.01((.01)(
:.02(
(
:.01((.01)(
:.05(
(
Education(
.00((.02)(
.01(
(
.01((.01)(
.02(
(
Mosque(attendance(
.03((.01)(
.07*(
(
.01((.01)(
.02(
(
Police(contact(
:.19((.03)( :.22***( (
:.07((.02)( :.08***( (
Siege(mentality(
:.28((.03)( :.32***( (
:.07((.02)( :.08***( (
Procedural(justice(
:(
:(
(
.81((.02)(
(
(
(
(
(
( (
Adjusted!R2!
!
B(SE)!
! Β!
!
.76***( (
.21(
( (
.69(
( (
R2!change!
(.21(
( (
.48(
( (
F!change!
21.29***(
( (
1209.6***(
( (
df!
10,(789(
( (
1,(788(
( (
( Note: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.
* The size of the coefficient for the siege mentality variable dropped substan/ally on entry of procedural jus/ce
Table 3 OLS Regression of independent variables on inten1ons to ‘work’ with police !
!
WORK!
!
!
!
Step!1!
!
Step!2!
!
!
B(SE)!
β!
Intercept(
4.92((.19)(
(
(
1.92((.21)(
(
(
Age(
2.00((.00)(
2.03(
(
2.00((.00)(
2.08(
(
Gender(
2.14((.06)(
2.09*( (
2.06((.05)(
2.04(
(
Muslim(faith((0=Shia)(
.02((.06)(
.01(
(
.01((.05)(
.00(
(
Country(of(birth((0=overseas)(
.07((.07)(
.04(
(
(.03((.06)(
.02(
(
Marital(status((0=not(married)(
.21((.07)(
.12**( (
.12((.06)(
.07*(
(
Income(
.01((.01)(
.03(
(
.00((.01)(
.01(
(
Education(
2.03((.02)(
2.07(
(
2.02((.01)(
2.06(
(
Mosque(attendance(
.01((.02)(
.03(
(
2.00((.01)(
2.01(
(
Police(contact(
2.21((.03)(
2.24***( (
2.11((.02)(
2.13***(
(
Siege(mentality(
2.20((.03)(
2.23***( (
2.04((.03)(
2.04(
(
Procedural(justice(
2(
2(
(
.67((.03)(
.61***(
(
(
(
(
(
(
( (
((
.45(
( (
Adjusted!R2!
.14(
!
B(SE)!
Β!
!
R2!change!
.15(
((
.31(
( (
F!change!
13.81***(
((
452.32***(
( (
df!
10,(789(
((
1,(788(
( (
(
Note: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.00
At Step 2 the size of the coefficient for the siege mentality variable dropped significantly
Table 4 OLS Regression of independent variables on inten1ons to report to police !
!
REPORT!
!
!
Step!1!
!
Step!2!
!
B(SE)!
Β!
Intercept(
4.89((.19)(
(
(
Age(
.00((.00)(
.04(
(
4.00((.00)(
4.02(
Gender(
4.20((.06)( 4.12***( (
4.11((.05)(
4.07*(
Muslim(faith((0=Shia)(
.04((.06)(
.02(
(
.03((.04)(
.02(
Country(of(birth((0=overseas)(
4.02((.07)(
4.01(
(
4.07((.06)(
4.04(
Marital(status((0=not(married)( .16((.08)(
.09*(
(
.06((.06)(
.03(
Income(
4.00((.01)(
4.02(
(
4.01((.01)(
4.04(
Education(
4.00((.02)(
4.00(
(
.00((.01)(
.01(
Mosque(attendance(
.02((.02)(
.05(
(
.01((.01)(
.01(
Police(contact(
4.19((.03)( .21***( (
4.08((.02)( 4.09***(
Siege(mentality(
4.29((.03)( 4.31***( (
4.10((.02)( 4.11***(
Procedural(justice(
4(
4(
(
.75((.03)(
(
(
(
(
(
(
Adjusted!R2!
.19(
( (
.56((
(
R2!change!
.20(
( (
.36(
F!change!
19.82***(
( (
654.96***( (
df!
10,(789(
( (
1,(788(
( Note: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.00
!
B(SE)!
β!
1.50(.19)(
(
.66***(
( (
At Step 2 the size of the coefficient for the siege mentality variable dropped significantly
In summary • Results indicate that PJ has the poten/al to mediate the effect of feeling under siege on Muslim’s trust in police and their willingness to cooperate with police in CT. Implica/ons – • There are prac/ces police can adopt to build trust with Muslim communi/es. • Police can poten/ally help to mi/gate reac/ons among Muslims to CT discourse and policy.
Conclusion • Data limita1ons – cross sec1onal. • Important to understand how police can win the trust of Muslim communi1es, who an important line of defense against radicaliza1on. • PJ is part of good engagement – however need to recognise though PJ may not always be possible in CT context. • Quality of community engagement within the control of police to influence.
