Epistemological Beliefs Across Domains Using ...

Research in Higher Education, Vol. 44, No. 3, June 2003 ( 2002)

EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS ACROSS DOMAINS USING BIGLAN’S CLASSIFICATION OF ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES Marlene Schommer-Aikins,*,** Orpha K. Duell,* and Sue Barker*

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: The purpose of this study was to examine students’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge and learning, epistemological beliefs, across domains that vary according to Biglan’s classification of academic disciplines (hard vs. soft disciplines and pure vs. applied disciplines). One hundred and fifty-two university students completed three questionnaires that assessed their epistemological beliefs about mathematics (hardpure), the social sciences (also pure), and business (neither hard nor pure). Correlations indicated that students’ epistemological beliefs were similar for mathematics and social sciences, as well as for mathematics and business. When the amount of academic experience was taken into account, some evidence of domain specificity was found. These results support Sternberg’s caveat that the dichotomy of domain generality/specificity is an assumption that should be questioned. We propose that future researchers should investigate the breadth of applicability of epistemological beliefs.

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: KEY WORDS: epistemology; beliefs about knowledge and learning; domain specificity; domain generality.

INTRODUCTION The study of students’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge and learning, or epistemological beliefs, has come to the forefront of educational researchers’ interest. The importance of the topic in general is that these beliefs have been linked to students’ academic performance. For example, students who have a strong belief that knowledge never changes have difficulty accepting tentative answers (Schommer, 1990). Students who have a strong belief that knowledge is organized as bits and pieces are more likely to have difficulty comprehending complex text, less likely to engage in self-regulated learning, and less likely to be intrinsically motivated (Hofer, 1999; Paulsen and Feldman, 1999). Students *Wichita State University, Wichita, Kansas. **Address correspondence to: Marlene Schommer-Aikins, College of Education #123, Wichita State University, Wichita, KS 67260-0123. E-mail: [email protected] 347 0361-0365/03/0600-0347/0  2003 Human Sciences Press, Inc.

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who have a strong belief that the ability to learn is fixed at birth display helpless behaviors when faced with a difficult academic task (Dweck and Leggett, 1988), are less likely to value education (Schommer and Walker, 1997), and are less likely to engage in self-regulated learning strategies (Paulsen and Feldman, 1999). Students who have a strong belief that learning is quick or not-at-all are less likely to assume computation tasks that will take longer than a few minutes (Schoenfeld, 1983), less likely to engage in elaborate study strategies (Paulsen and Feldman, 1999), and more likely to earn low grade point averages (Schommer, 1993; Schommer, Calvert, Gariglietti, and Bajaj, 1997). Hence, although personal epistemology is typically held at the unconscious level for many students, these beliefs have subtle, penetrating influences on their study strategies and comprehension. The focus of the present study is to delve into the very nature of students’ epistemological beliefs. Specifically, the purpose of this study was to examine students’ epistemological beliefs across different academic disciplines. William Perry Jr. (1968) initiated the inquiry of the psychology of students’ epistemological beliefs. Perry interviewed and surveyed Harvard undergraduates throughout their undergraduate years. He found that many first-year students believed that knowledge is simple, certain, and handed down by omniscient authority. Perry theorized that students went through nine epistemic positions. This evolution of cognitive development ultimately led to a substantial number of fourth-year students believing that knowledge is complex, tentative, and derived through reason and empirical evidence. Perry’s work served as the groundwork for other researchers’ study of students’ personal epistemology. Although epistemological belief researchers followed Perry’s work, they in turn studied different aspects of personal epistemology. For example, Kitchener and King (King and Baxter Magolda, 1996; Kitchener and King, 1989) studied students’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge and reality and the consequences these beliefs have on students’ justification of knowledge. Their theory, referred to as Reflective Judgment, describes seven stages of development. In the early stages, students believe that knowledge is absolute and reflects a concrete reality. Knowledge assertions can be justified with direct observation. In the middle stages of development, students recognize an element of uncertainty of knowledge. While there is an element of reality, knowledge cannot be justified. Hence, knowledge assertions are simple idiosyncratic opinions, all of which are given equal value. In the final stages of development, reality is no longer assumed. And, although knowledge assertions can be elusive, some claims can be determined as better than others based on an array of evidence and reasoning. Some researchers have focused their work on women’s epistemological beliefs (Baxter Magolda, 1998; Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule, 1986). For example, Belenky et al. were concerned that Perry’s work was based predominately on the male perspective. To ascertain women’s epistemological beliefs, they interviewed 135 women. Their work generated five epistemological

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perspectives, which they labeled Women’s Ways of Knowing. In early periods of epistemological belief development, women were described as having little or no voice. Women accepted knowledge from authority without question. Interim epistemological belief development was characterized as subjective knowledge. Knowledge was considered personal, private, and intuitive. Advanced epistemological belief development was characterized as knowledge is justified through both objective and subjective processes. Hence, women acknowledged the need for objective verification; at the same time, they sensed that some degree of subjective thought innervates people’s interpretation of objective evidence. Baxter Magolda (Baxter Magolda, 1989, 1998; Baxter Magolda and Porterfield, 1985) extended Perry’s work by specifically comparing men and women’s epistemological beliefs. Based predominately on interviews, Baxter Magolda found gender-related patterns of knowledge justification as individuals developed. In the early stages, women were more likely to see their task as accepting knowledge, whereas men were attempting to master knowledge with questioning as part of the process. In a transitional period of development, women focused more on personal justification, whereas men focused on impersonal justification. In the final stages of development, women were more likely to seek justification with the interaction of others; men sought justification without the need of interplay with others. Other researchers have studied epistemological beliefs independent of the Perry lineage. For example, Dweck and her colleagues (Dweck, 1999; Dweck and Bempechat, 1983; Dweck and Leggett, 1988) have studied children’s beliefs about the nature of intelligence. Some children have a strong belief that the ability to learn is innate only, or belief in fixed ability. Other children have a strong belief that the ability to learn can improve over time and experience, or belief in incremental ability. She found that children who have a strong belief in fixed ability will display helpless behavior when given a challenging academic task. They typically perseverate on the same study strategies and ultimately cease to try. Children with a strong belief in incremental ability will display mastery behavior. They will typically vary their approach to the task and persist until a solution is reached. In addition to belief in fixed ability uncovered by Dweck and belief in omniscient authority as uncovered by Perry and his followers, Schoenfeld (1983, 1985) highlighted yet another aspect of personal epistemology by observing high school students solve geometry problems. As students worked on their problems, they were asked to think aloud and sketch out their process of solutions. Schoenfeld’s analyses of the students’ protocols revealed belief in fixed ability (one is born with the ability to understand proofs), omniscient authority (proofs and hard answers are handed down by mathematicians), and quick learning (mathematic problems should be solved in 12 min or less, if not they will never be solved). Over 30 years after Perry’s initial work, researchers were studying varying

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aspects of epistemological beliefs. Each researcher (or team of researchers) tended to work in isolation and focus on different aspects of personal epistemology. In 1990 Schommer proposed that epistemological beliefs be conceived as multidimensional. She suggested that to capture the complexity of epistemological beliefs, personal epistemology should be perceived as a system of more-orless independent beliefs. By system she meant that personal epistemology should be considered as a set of different beliefs. A questionnaire that she developed assesses four beliefs: (a) stability of knowledge, ranging from never changing to always evolving; (b) structure of knowledge, ranging from isolated bits to highly interrelated concepts; (c) speed of learning, ranging from quick or notat-all to gradual; and (d) ability to learn, ranging from fixed at birth to life-long improvement. By more or less independent Schommer meant that the individual beliefs do not necessarily develop at the same pace. For example, an individual could believe knowledge is highly complex. At the same time, the person could hold the belief that either knowledge is certain or knowledge is uncertain. The multidimensional conceptualization of epistemological beliefs has been upheld by other researchers (e.g., Dunkle, Schraw, and Bendixen, 1993; Jehng, Johnson, and Anderson, 1993). One characteristic of personal epistemology that remains elusive is the degree to which an individual will hold similar beliefs across academic domains. In the past, epistemological beliefs where studied as if they were domain general (Baxter Magolda, 1988; Jehng et al., 1993; Perry, 1968). For example, students believe knowledge is simple and certain; they would believe this to be true for history, sociology, mathematics, and biology. This assumption of domain generality was likely made to serve as a convenient starting point in a line of research. As this area of research has matured, this assumption has been questioned. Schommer and Walker (1995) tested the domain generality of epistemological beliefs across two academic domains, social sciences and mathematics. Social science is considered an ill-structured domain because relationships between social science issues are highly complex and intertwined. Answers to problems are often multiplistic and incomplete (Alexander, 1992). Comparatively speaking, mathematics is considered a well-structured domain. Mathematical concepts can be organized sequentially, as well as in more complex ways, and agreed-on answers can often be found. Schommer and Walker asked students to complete the Schommer (1990) epistemological questionnaire twice, once with the social sciences in mind and once with mathematics in mind. In addition to explicit instructions to consider a specific academic domain, items within the questionnaire referred to the specific domain. In between the completion of these questionnaires, students read and were subsequently tested on one of two passages. One passage topic was about the social sciences and the other passage topic


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was about mathematics. Data analyses revealed significant positive correlations between epistemological beliefs across the two academic domains. Furthermore, epistemological beliefs in both domains predicted passage comprehension similarly. The less students believed in simple knowledge and certain knowledge, the more accurately they comprehended passage information. Schommer and Walker interpreted these results to mean that epistemological beliefs are moderately domain general. In other words, to a moderate degree students have similar epistemological beliefs across domains that vary in ill or well structuredness. When one says that beliefs are domain general, in practical terms “general” means that if individuals tend to believe that knowledge is highly interrelated and that there are multiple answers to problems, then they will believe this to be true in most domains. What “moderate” means in practical terms is that the degree of interrelationship and multiplicity will vary across disciplines. For example, social sciences may consist of highly complex concepts and have multiple solutions to problems. And although mathematics tends to have parsimonious structure and single answers, there is also the possibility for some solutions to be elusive, and there are times when mathematics has multiple solutions to the same problem. In 1998, an alternative interpretation of Schommer and Walker’s work was suggested by Paulsen and Wells based on their study of the epistemological beliefs of students majoring in different academic domains. They speculated that the moderately strong positive correlations found by Schommer and Walker may not be indicative of domain generality. Rather, these correlations may reflect a real similarity between the domains of mathematics and social sciences. According to Biglan’s classification system (Biglan, 1973a) of academic domains, both disciplines are considered “pure.” A stronger test of domain specificity would compare domains that do not share this characteristic. This alternative interpretation motivated the present study. First, we summarize Paulsen and Wells’ 1998 study. Second, we present the rationale behind their alternative interpretation. Inspired by Paulsen and Wells’ idea, we then outline a new test of Schommer and Walker’s moderate domain-general hypothesis. Using Schommer’s (1990) questionnaire, Paulsen and Wells (1998) compared epistemological beliefs of students who were majoring in different academic disciplines. They asked students to complete the epistemological belief questionnaire and then compared students from different disciplines. Hence, Paulsen and Wells assessed students’ epistemological beliefs once for academics in general. There were two critical differences in their research approach compared with the Schommer and Walker’s study. First, Paulsen and Wells’ research question was “Do students from different disciplines have different epistemological beliefs?” In other words, Paulsen and Wells had a between-subject design. In con-

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trast, Schommer and Walker’s research question was “Do students have different beliefs across academic disciplines?” Schommer and Walker used a within-subject design. Second, Paulsen and Wells used Biglan’s (Biglan, 1973a, 1973b) classification system of academic disciplines when making their comparisons among students from different academic fields. Specifically, they compared disciplines that varied on two of Biglan’s dimensions, hard-soft and pure-applied. In contrast, Schommer and Walker compared disciplines that varied on one dimension, ill structured vs. well structured. Biglan (1973a) developed a classification system of academic domains by consulting with university faculty. Biglan writes, How can we get at the “important” characteristics or dimensions of academic subject matter? In this study it was assumed that scholars in the various areas are the best source of information about the characteristics of different disciplines; whatever dimensions they use in thinking about academic areas are considered to be important. (p. 195)

Biglan asked more than 200 faculty members from two universities, one a large research university and the other a small denominational liberal arts college, to sort 36 academic disciplines based on similarities between areas. No limit was placed on the number of categories the faculty could generate. Using multidimensional scaling, a three-dimensional solution was chosen as the best solution for these data. Starting with the strongest dimension (accounting for the most variance) these dimensions included: (a) hard-soft, (b) pure-applied, and (c) nonlife-life. Hard academic disciplines (e.g., engineering, chemistry) were characterized as having a single paradigm that allowed scholars within the discipline to agree on research methodology, basic concepts, and research questions. Soft academic disciplines (e.g., education, sociology) lacked a common paradigm, and often scholars within these disciplines argue over methodology and key concepts. Pure academic disciplines (e.g., mathematics, sociology) focus on theory building. Concepts are typically a work in progress. Applied academic disciplines (e.g., finance and special education) focus on theory application. Tentativeness is overshadowed by the practical need to make decisions in the field. Life academic disciplines (e.g., agriculture and biology) are concerned with living or organic objects. Nonlife academic disciplines (e.g., geology and computer science) have the absence of biological objects of study. In a follow-up study, Biglan (1973b) found that two of these dimensions, hard-soft and pure-applied, served as the strongest predictors of the structure and output of university departments. Table 1 shows a sample of academic disciplines categorized along Biglan’s two strongest dimensions. The intuitions of the professors in Biglan’s study do seem to reflect academic


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TABLE 1. Sample of Academic Domains Classified According the Biglan’s Two Main Dimensions Dimension I Dimension II Pure

Applied

Hard

Soft

Mathematics Botany Geology Mechanical Engineering Agricultural Economics Civil Engineering

Sociology History Psychology Finance Special Education Economics

characteristics as described by others (Alexander, 1992; Beers, 1988; Burbules and Linn, 1991; Cleminson, 1990; Donald, 1983, 1990; Lattuca and Stark, 1995; Stark and Lattuca, 1997; Wineburg, 1991). For example, pure fields are about the business of discovering and developing new theories. The very nature of theory building implies change and the constant pursuit of finding new relationships among ideas. “It seems reasonable to speculate that the ongoing pursuit of new knowledge about relationships among abstract concepts through basic research may encourage students majoring in such fields to view knowledge as an evolving set of interrelated ideas, and learning as something that takes place gradually” (Paulsen and Wells, 1998, p. 377). Applied fields are about the business of using knowledge. For example, when faced with a classroom of students, a teacher cannot vacillate when decisions need to be made immediately, minuteby-minute. To hesitate in the classroom is to instill doubt in waiting students. Paulsen and Wells speculate that this could encourage students to believe in certain knowledge that is learned quickly. Hard fields are about the business of teaching major paradigms that have developed over a long history of research. Consensus of methodology and content are strong. Paulsen and Wells speculate that this could encourage students to believe in certain, unambiguous knowledge. Soft fields, however, embrace diversity of opinion and encourage students to play with ideas and stand toe-totoe with ambiguity. To ignore ambiguity is to have an incomplete picture of the field. Paulsen and Wells speculate that this could encourage belief in complex, ambiguous knowledge. The impetus behind the study being reported is Paulsen and Wells’ (1998) insightful link between Schommer and Walker’s (1995) study and Biglan’s classification system, “when these two domains (mathematics and social sciences) are recognized as similar along the pure-applied dimension, the significant correlations may not indicate a ‘general’ domain-independent component of episte-

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mological beliefs” (p. 378), the researchers’ point being that both domains are pure based on Biglan’s classification system. The present study is a new test of Schommer and Walker’s work. It is important for two reasons. First, if research found dissimilarity between fields varying on the pure-applied dimensions, but similarity between fields varying on the hard-soft dimension, researchers might need to reconsider the past theories and findings of ill-structured vs. well-structured domains. That is, the distinction of ill-structured vs. well-structured may not be as clear as has been thought for the last decade. Second, to advise educators how to anticipate students’ epistemological beliefs, the issue of domain specificity/generality must be better understood. To test Biglan’s classification system on domain issues of epistemological beliefs, students completed three domain-specific epistemological questionnaires. Comparisons of epistemological beliefs were made between disciplines that share one of Biglan’s major dimensions (mathematics, which is pure-hard, vs. social sciences, which is pure-soft) and disciplines that do not share Biglan’s major dimensions (mathematics, which is pure-hard, vs. business, which is softapplied).

METHOD Participants This research was conducted at a midwestern state-supported university located in an urban setting. With an enrollment of approximately 15,000 students, the university offers programs in business, education, engineering, fine arts, health professions, liberal arts, and sciences. One hundred and fifty-two college students (91 female and 61 male) ranging in age from 17–51 participated in this study. Students were from a variety of majors, such as business (46), education (36), mathematics/hard sciences (20), engineering (19), and social sciences/ health/fine arts (19), and a small group of undecided majors (12). Students also varied by year in school. There were 38 freshmen, 27 sophomores, 45 juniors, 20 seniors, and 12 graduate students. The majority were European American (109); 12 were Asian American; 10 were African American; 5 were Hispanic; 2 were Asian/Pacific Islander; 2 were Native American; 5 were Multi/Ethnic Racial; and the remaining 7 identified themselves as Other. To decrease the potential effects of self-selection, students were offered incentives to participate. Classroom instructors gave extra credit for participation. In addition, participants’ names were included in a lottery; at the end of the semester, one name was selected to win $100.00.


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Materials Students’ domain-specific epistemological beliefs were assessed with an instrument that was derived from Schommer’s original domain-general epistemological belief questionnaire (Schommer and Walker, 1995). The original domain-general questionnaire assesses four epistemological beliefs including beliefs about (a) the structure of knowledge, ranging from isolated pieces to interrelated concepts; (b) the stability of knowledge, ranging from certain/ unchanging to tentative/evolving; (c) the speed of learning, ranging from quick or not-at-all to gradual; and (d) the ability to learn, ranging from fixed at birth to improvable. Subsets of items were constructed to assess each epistemological belief. For example, the structure of knowledge is assessed with subsets of items that focus on (a) single answers, one can focus on a single piece of information or one can focus on multiple pieces of information; (b) integration, one can isolate information or integrate information, and (c) ambiguity, one can avoid ambiguity or accept ambiguity in answers. Within each subset, items were written from both a positive and negative valence for the following 12 subsets: knowledge is certain, success is unrelated to hard work, individuals can learn how to learn, the ability to learn is innate, the process of learning is quick, learning occurs with the first effort, concentrated effort is a waste of time, integrating material should be avoided, seek single answers, avoid ambiguity, depend on authority, and avoid criticizing authority. The questionnaire contains 63 items. Participants respond to statements, such as “The only thing certain is uncertainly itself,” and “You can believe almost everything you read,” on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Using exploratory factor analysis (Schommer, 1990) and mean scores from the subsets of items, four epistemological beliefs were generated: structure of knowledge, stability of knowledge, speed of learning, and ability to learn. This factor structure has been replicated with other college students (Schommer, Crouse, and Rhodes, 1992) and with high school students (Schommer, 1993; Schommer et al., 1997). Test–retest reliability is .74, and inter-item reliabilities for items composing each factor range from .63 to .85 (Schommer, 1993; Schommer et al., 1992). Epistemological beliefs, as assessed by this questionnaire, have predicted comprehension, metacomprehension, grade point average, and the valuing of education (Schommer, 1990, 1993; Schommer et al., 1992; Schommer and Walker, 1995, 1997). For this study, the domain-specific version of Schommer’s (Schommer and Walker, 1995) epistemological belief questionnaire was used to assess students’ epistemological beliefs in the fields of mathematics, social sciences, and business. The domain-specific version instructs students to keep an academic domain in mind: “Please think about business, such as finance and accounting,

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while you are completing this questionnaire.” The discipline is also referenced within individual items of the questionnaire, for example, “The best thing about accounting courses is that most problems have only one right answer.” Students respond on a Likert scale ranging from 1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree. Two items were added to the instrument to check on student attentiveness while completing the questionnaire, for example, “Leave this item blank.” Evidence to suggest that students are able to focus on a specific domain while completing the questionnaires is provided by Schommer and Walker’s work. Reminders of the specific domains were placed on the top and the middle of every page. In addition, the reference to the specific domain was made in about every third item. (A pilot study of this questionnaire revealed that when reference to the specific domain was made in every item, participants were irritated, insulted, and distracted by the repetition.) As a check for students actually taking different domain perspectives, Schommer and Walker had a control group of students complete the social science domain-specific questionnaire twice: We expected that correlations would be smaller than test-retest correlations if the students were truly keeping the domain in mind. These results show that the correlations between corresponding domain-specific epistemological beliefs in the experimental group were all smaller that the correlations between pairs of epistemological factors scores in the control group, rs = .66 vs. .74 for Belief in Fixed Ability, .48 vs. .76 for Belief in Simple Knowledge, .52 vs .54 for Belief in Quick Learning, and .41 vs .93 for Belief in Certain Knowledge, respectively. (1995, p. 429)

This suggests that students were able to keep a specific domain in mind while completing the questionnaire. As can be noted in the result section of the current study, the fact that some correlations between academic domains were as low as .11 and .38 does suggest that participants were able to keep different domains in mind while completing the questionnaires. For this study, questionnaire booklets were prepared to counterbalance the order in which students completed the domain-specific questionnaires. Filler tasks, such a request for demographic information and simple puzzles, were inserted between each version of the epistemological belief questionnaire to serve as a memory distractor between each epistemological belief assessment.

Procedure Booklets were distributed in 13 different classes. Students were asked to complete this booklet at home, independent of any outside help. Furthermore, they were instructed not to go back to an item once they had answered it. To avoid sheer volunteer participation we added two types of incentives, class credit and a chance to win $100.00. Three hundred and sixty packets were distributed; a total of 165 booklets were returned. After checking student attentiveness items,


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152 books were considered properly completed packets and were used in analyses. RESULTS Overview of Initial Analysis To test the question “Are epistemological beliefs domain general?” two main analyses were conducted. First, the correlations of epistemological beliefs between mathematics and social sciences and between mathematics and business were examined after controlling for background variables. Second, the differences between these pairs of correlations were tested for statistical significance. If Biglan’s classification system is reflected in students’ epistemological beliefs, then correlations between mathematics and business should be significantly smaller than correlations between business and mathematics. If results are consistent with Schommer and Walker’s work, moderate, positive correlations should be found among all pairs of epistemological scores and no significant differences between pairs of correlations should be present. Correlations After Controlling for Background Variables Inter-item reliability was calculated for the items composing each domainspecific epistemological belief. Examination of Cronbach alphas indicated that eliminating four items from the scale would improve inter-item reliability. Interitem correlations after the four items were eliminated ranged from .58 to .73. All the inter-item reliabilities are shown in Table 2. Using hierarchical regression, each mathematical epistemological belief was regressed on the corresponding social science or business epistemological belief, after the background variables of academic major (classified according to Biglan’s system), age, gender, educational level, and grade point average were en-

TABLE 2. Cronbach Alphas for Each Epistemological Factor (N = 152) Academic Domain

Epistemological Belief

Mathematics

Social Science

Business

Stability of knowledge Structure of knowledge Control of learning Speed of learning

.67 .66 .70 .58

.63 .60 .67 .64

.67 .64 .73 .62

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tered into the equation. Since 18 students did not provide an academic major, two dummy variables representing Biglan’s categories were created: (a) pure major (+1), applied major (–1), no major (0); and (b) hard major (+1), soft major (–1), no major (0). Background variables were entered as a block, followed by the corresponding epistemological belief variable (in either business or social sciences). Since nine students did not report their age, missing values were substituted with the mean age (x¯ = 24.94) of the sample. Separate regressions for the social science domain and business domain were conducted to derive their correlations with the mathematics domain. All social science and business epistemological beliefs were significantly related to the corresponding mathematical epistemological beliefs. In general, regressions results indicated that both social science epistemological beliefs and business epistemological beliefs predict mathematical epistemological beliefs. These correlations ranged from .47 to .73. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for epistemological beliefs across the three measured domains. Table 4 shows a summary of regression results. Table 5 reports the correlations between domains and the comparisons. Comparisons between pairs of correlations indicated no significant differences. These findings are consistent with Schommer and Walker’s work (1995). Ancillary Analyses: Correlations Across Academic Experiences In response to encouragement in reviews of this manuscript, we decided to take another look at the data from the perspective of the students’ academic experience. Schommer (1994) suggested that the issue of domain specificity/ generality could be complicated by the notion of the amount of academic experience one has. Indeed in 1994 Schommer wrote, I propose that the issue of domain specificity is far more complex than simply saying epistemological beliefs are, or are not, domain independent. Essentially, I suggest that the issue of domain specificity may be intimately related with individuals’

TABLE 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Epistemological Beliefs Across Domains (N = 152) Mathematics

Social Science

Business


M

SD

M

SD

M

SD


2.86 2.83 3.60 3.77

1.16 0.36 0.45 0.47

3.03 3.07 3.70 3.79

1.16 0.33 0.43 0.50

3.07 3.00 3.66 3.75

1.16 0.35 0.46 0.49


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TABLE 4. Regressions of Mathematical Epistemological Beliefs on Either Social Science or Business Epistemological Beliefs After Controlling for Background Variables (N = 152) Domain of Beliefs Being Predicted

R2 Change

F

Background variables Stability of knowledge Background variables Stability of knowledge

.02 .53 .02 .50

0.38 167.52*** 0.38 150.08***

Background variables Structure of knowledge Background variables Structure of knowledge

.04 .21 .04 .31

0.95 40.39*** 0.95 67.25***

Background variables Control of learning Background variables Control of learning

.06 .33 .06 .45

1.45 78.45*** 1.45 131.81***

Background variables Speed of learning Background variables Speed of learning

.09 .35 .09 .39

2.28* 89.96*** 2.28* 105.31***

Predictor

Stability of mathematical knowledge Social Science Business Structure of mathematical knowledge Social Science Business Control of mathematical learning Social Science Business Speed of mathematical learning Social Science Business

Note. Separate regressions were carried out to determine R2 change (increment) for the social science epistemological beliefs and the business epistemological beliefs. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

TABLE 5. A Comparison of Partial Correlation Coefficients After Controlling for Background Variables (N = 152)


Math and Social Science Correlation

Math and Business Correlation

Observed t


.73 .47 .59 .62

.71 .56 .69 .65

0.51 1.40 1.94 0.59

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experience.... When an individual acquires a substantial amount of experience, they will develop a sophisticated epistemological point of view in the domain of their expertise. The real mystery is whether their epistemological bent for their area of expertise will generalize to other domains. It is such a tentative point, that I prefer to wait for empirical evidence before I draw any conclusions. (p. 36)

One piece of information available to us was the number of classes students had taken in academic areas reflecting Biglan’s classification system. Students were asked to report how many courses they had taken in mathematics, social sciences, and business (including the course in which they were presently enrolled) using a categorical system of: (a) 0–2, (b) 3–4, (c) 5–6, (d) 7 or more. Students were fairly evenly distributed when grouped as (a) having fewer than three courses (low exposure) or (b) having three or more courses (high exposure). Hence, students were grouped as low vs. high academic exposure for mathematics (low, n = 81; high, n = 71), social sciences (low, n = 78; high, n = 74), and business (low, n = 117; high, n = 35). We asked two questions based on the amount of academic exposure to the two domains targeted in each zero order correlation. If students have a similar amount of academic experience for the two domains being compared, will their epistemological beliefs tend to be domain general? If students have high academic experience in one domain and low academic experience in the other domain, will their epistemological beliefs tend to be domain specific? The zero order correlations for each combination of academic experiences are shown in Table 6. Since these are preliminary analyses, we simply examined the pattern of correlations. In general, individuals with either high academic exposure to both domains or low academic exposure to both domains showed moderate to moderately strong domain generality. These correlations ranged from .43 to .88. Individuals with a mixture of academic exposure (high in one domain and low in the other domain) showed a wider range of correlations, suggesting some degree of domain specificity. These correlations ranged from .11 to .80. DISCUSSION Academic experience notwithstanding, the results of this study support the idea that epistemological beliefs of college undergraduates are moderately domain general. After controlling for background variables, correlations of epistemological beliefs between domains were positive and of moderate strength, which is consistent with Schommer and Walker’s (1995) work. Contrary to predictions based on Biglan’s classification of academic domains, there tended to be stronger correlations between mathematics and business when compared with correlations between mathematics and the social sciences. These findings are consistent with researchers (Schraw, Dunkle, and Bendixen, 1995; Spiro, Coulson, Feltovich, and Anderson, 1988) who have suggested that students cop-


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TABLE 6. Correlations Between Epistemological Beliefs Among Students Categorized According to Level of Academic Experience Within Domains

Epistemological Belief Stability of knowledge Structure of knowledge Control of learning Speed of learning Stability of knowledge Structure of knowledge Control of learning Speed of learning

Level of Math Academic Experience High

Low

Level of Social Science Academic Experience

Level of Business Academic Experience

High

Low

High

Low

.88 .64 .59 .77 .63 .46 .59 .59

.54 .11 .45 .48 .78 .47 .79 .66

.83 .43 .63 .50 .62 .38 .74 .80

.66 .55 .75 .65 .74 .72 .68 .68

Note. High math experience and high social science experience had 40 participants. High math experience and low social science experience had 31 participants. Low math experience and high social science experience had 34 participants. Low math experience and low social science experience had 47 participants. High math experience and high business experience had 15 participants. High math experience and low business experience had 56 participants. Low math experience and high business experience had 20 participants. Low math experience and low business experience had 61 participants.

ing with ill-structured domains (e.g., social sciences) will struggle in learning when using study strategies and epistemological beliefs that apply only to wellstructured domains (e.g., mathematics). Examining the correlations for students who had high exposure to both domains of interest supported a moderate to moderately strong domain-general hypothesis. One possible interpretation of this finding is that as individuals are exposed to more college course work in each domain, they may begin to see the similarity between fields at an abstract level. For example, even in mathematics, ambiguity and change can be found as mathematicians develop advanced mathematical concepts (Alexander, 1992). Students with low academic experience in both domains of interests showed a similar pattern of moderate to moderately strong domain generality. We can only speculate that one possible explanation is that with little domain-specific knowledge, students may have a developed epistemological beliefs from upbringing, peers, media, and general academic experiences (Schommer, 1993, 1994), which they now generalize across domains.

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Correlations for students with a mixture of academic experience offer an intriguing pattern. There was a large range of correlations suggesting that epistemological beliefs for some students are domain specific. Since these analyses are preliminary, we can only suggest a developmental path to be tested in future research. One such path is as follows. Consider the possibility that as children, individuals’ epistemological beliefs tend to be domain general, based on experiences from family, friends, culture, and general education. As college students gain more academic experience in domains of interest, they may begin to develop differences between their emerging epistemological beliefs in their domain of interest and their general epistemological beliefs developed from childhood. As students gain deeper knowledge in additional domains, they may begin to see similarities at some more abstract level across domains. Hence, their epistemological beliefs may once again merge, resulting in a tendency toward domain generality. We hope that these speculations inspire others to pursue this line of inquiry. This speculative path of development notwithstanding, the fact that disaggregating the data revealed variation in domain specificity/generality of epistemological beliefs calls into question the dichotomy itself. Schommer and Walker (1995) alluded to the weakness of the dichotomy issue by using the phrase “moderate domain generality.” For some educational researchers the notion of “moderate” domain generality may be troubling. For example, in response to a submission of epistemological belief research to a national conference (Schommer-Aikins, Duell, and Barker, 2001) one reviewer reacted to the phrase “moderate domain generality” and a corresponding statement, “It’s a matter of degree,” by writing the following: “That sort of vagueness may not fly in the academic community.” The reviewer did not appreciate the preciseness that was actually being expressed. By moderate domain generality, we mean that an individual who tends to believe in simple, certain knowledge in one domain will tend to have similar beliefs in other domains. Yet, the epistemological beliefs will not be exactly the same. The individual may still have a stronger belief in simple, certain knowledge in mathematics than in the social sciences. This is a reasonable notion, considering that there is more parsimony in the mathematical sciences compared with the social sciences (Alexander, 1992). Conversely, other educational researchers may applaud the notion of “moderate” domain generality. Sternberg (1989) reasons that the debate of domain generality vs. domain specificity as an either/or argument creates a false dichotomy. Sternberg has reflected on similar dogmatic stances in the areas of information processing (domain-specific vs. domain-general) and intelligence (general intelligence vs. multiple intelligences). He considers extreme dichotomous hypotheses as suspect because he has observed the phenomenon of researchers’ agendas vacillating between extreme hypotheses for years, only to eventually come to


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the realization that evidence supports a more balanced or synthesized hypothesis. Further, Sternberg suggests that when researchers are given a research question, they often accept the presupposition without question. The findings of this study suggest that the presupposition of a dichotomy (domain-generality vs. domain-specificity) should be questioned. In short, we are questioning the question that led to this study. We suggest that the field is asking the wrong question. It is not an issue of either/or. As Schommer (1994) has suggested, domain specificity/generality may vary over time and expertise. More importantly, we propose that the question should be, “What is the breadth of applicability of epistemological beliefs?” In other words, rather than investigating domain generalizability or domain specificity, we may want to be investigating the breadth of applicability of epistemological beliefs. As with any study, this work has its limitations. Ideally, the sample size would be larger, Biglan’s academic domains would be better represented among the participants by using a random stratified sampling technique, administration of questionnaires would be under more controlled conditions, and follow-up interviews would be conducted. Nevertheless, this study serves as a springboard for future research. There are many complex issues yet to be addressed. Is it the case that domain generality/specificity may vary depending on the age or education of the student? Is it possible that extreme domain generality could be costly to students in that they may fail to see the unique nuances of individual disciplines? Is it possible that extreme domain specificity could be costly to students in that they may fail to see overarching similarities between disciplines that could facilitate transfer of knowledge from one domain to another? The results of this study have important practical implications. Students do vary in their epistemological beliefs. Hence, faculty cannot assume that all students think alike. Nor can faculty members assume that students have the same epistemological beliefs as theirs. If there is a large epistemological belief discrepancy between the faculty member and the students, academic performance can be affected. For example, if a faculty member asks students to prepare for an exam, some students may assume that preparation means memorizing definitions, whereas others may believe preparation means understanding the interrelationships among ideas. Another example would be when a faculty member gives students a difficult and time-consuming task. Some students may cease to try, either because they think learning is quick or not-at-all or they think that only the gifted can overcome challenging academic tasks. Other students may persist in the face of difficulty because they believe learning requires effort and/ or they believe learners can improve their ability to learn through experience. Since epistemological beliefs are related to comprehension, metacompre-

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hension, persistence, interpretation of information, and the valuing of education (Dweck, 1999; Schoenfeld, 1985; Schommer, 1990; Schommer and Walker, 1997; Schraw et al., 1995), school administrators, as well as faculty, should not ignore them. Colleges may want to assess epistemological beliefs during the orientation process. This would allow colleges to identify students who may need guidance in developing epistemological beliefs that are congruent with academic success. The research being reported suggests that a single assessment of epistemological beliefs may not be enough. It may be that epistemological beliefs need to be assessed across several domains. At the minimum, epistemological beliefs in the well-defined and ill-defined domains (or in Biglan’s terms, the soft and hard domains) should be assessed. In this way, faculty can determine if students have any extreme epistemological beliefs and whether the extremeness is applicable across many domains. Since students’ epistemological beliefs can change over time and academic experience (Perry, 1968, 1970; Schommer, 1998), college faculty may want to assess students’ epistemological beliefs. This could be followed up with philosophical discussions that are incorporated with the class content. Or if the faculty member did not want to invest class time on underlying epistemological issues, the individual may want to be very explicit when giving class assignments. Assume that no assumptions can be made. Make it clear that understanding is critical or that memorizing is not the same as understanding. Let students realize that it is normal to experience difficulty when facing challenging assignments, that today’s facts may really be the stepping stones to new facts in the future, that to know is to be aware of the interrelationships among the concepts as well as knowing the concepts themselves, and that the ability to learn can potentially improve throughout a lifetime. It is possible that if faculty members take the time to deal with these epistemological issues at an explicit level, they may also modify their own instructional techniques to be more in line with their personal epistemology. For example, faculty members who believe “to know” is to integrate and apply knowledge might prepare class assignments and assessments that require students to synthesize content between classes and with real world experiences. In sum, these findings suggest that the issue of domain specificity/generality goes beyond a simple dichotomy. It is more aptly considered as an issue of the breadth of domain applicability. Furthermore, for any particular student, this breadth of applicability may vary depending on academic experience and other yet to be discovered factors of the student. Although much remains to be discovered about epistemological beliefs, it is clear that they are playing a critical role in the educational process. As tacit and messy as epistemological beliefs may seem, they should not be ignored. When students and faculty members are in epistemological synchrony, there is an opportunity for maximizing the educational experience.


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