Ethnic Fractionalization: The World, China and Malaysia in ...

China-ASEAN Perspective Forum 杨国庆

民族多元性 161 中国—东盟论坛

Vol. 2, Nos. 1&2, April/October 2012, pp. 161-206 第 2 期, 第 1&2 册, 2012年4月/10月, 第 161-206 页

民族多元性: 世界﹑中国与马来西亚 / 杨国庆

Ethnic Fractionalization: The World, China and Malaysia in Perspective Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh* University of Malaya Abstract Existing studies on public policy and ethnicity either included only one of the three main non-class cleavages in society – racial (phenotypical), linguistic, religious – or considered them as separate variables. This paper, using world data as well with special focus on China and Malaysia, suggests that they should be regarded as different manifestations of one single characteristic of ethnic differentiation, for to treat these different “ethnic markers” as separate variables or to employ one to the exclusion of the others regardless of the peculiarities of individual countries, forged especially by their specific historical geography and degree of ethnic intensity, inevitably leads to mismeasurement of the degree of fragmentation. Nevertheless, the inadequacy of such a measure of ethnic fragmentation needs to be recognized not only due to the crosscutting or mutually reinforcing nature of cleavages, but also to the existence of other non-ethnic social variables that either contribute to the institutional complexity of the social environment in which the ethnic fragmentation functions or by themselves directly affect the degree of ethnic fractionalization. Keywords: ethnic differentiation, ethnic fractionalization, non-class cleavages, historical geography of ethnicity, ethnic intensity, China, Malaysia JEL classification: H12, J15, Z10, Z13

CAPF vol2 nos1&2 combined text 0161 161

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162 Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh

Ethnic Fractionalization

1. Introduction1 The socioeconomic implications of ethnic diversity has in recent years acquired an increasing global significance, due especially to the impact of reethnicization and the widening of inequalities in Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism, or more appropriately, what Raiklin (1988) called “totalitarian state capitalism”, in the summer and autumn of 1989. There social tensions are increasingly “expressed and enacted […] as interethnic conflicts: conflicts among majority and minorities; or as conflicts among competing minorities” (Gheorghe, 1991: 842). Although ethnic diversity is not an exclusive feature of today’s developing societies, it is nevertheless particularly relevant to them, since economic deprivation or desperate poverty “unduly heightens sensitivities and breeds a general atmosphere of unreasonableness and distrust, making it immensely more difficult to attain solutions to outstanding problems on the basis of a reasonable give and take” (Vasil, 1984: 1 2). Indeed, the perceived gravity of impending ethnic conflicts led Aron (1969: 46) to predict that such conflicts “over social, racial, or political dominance – in turn or simultaneously – appear more likely than the continuation of the class struggle in the Marxist sense”. With ethnicity becoming “a perplexing political issue overlapping with and sometimes displacing the issue of class” (Rex, 1983: xxi), particularly in multiethnic developing countries, a study of the relationship between the demographically/politically dominant ethnic group and the State2, and the role of ethnic diversity in the political economy of the states concerned, should be more than a theoretical exercise. 2. The Concept of Ethnic Diversity The importance of ethnic diversity as has been outlined above means that a precise definition of the concept is much needed. Nevertheless, its measurement has always been problematic. This is complicated by the confusion between the related concepts of race and ethnicity. There is a tendency in academic circles to distinguish between socially defined and biologically defined races – “ethnie” and “race”. An ethnie or ethnic group is said to exist when three conditions are present – “a segment of a larger society is seen by others to be different in some combination of the following characteristics – language, religion, race and ancestral homeland with its related culture; the members also perceive themselves in that way; and they participate in shared activities built around their (real or mythical) common origin and culture [and] a nation [is] an ethnic group that claims the right to, or at least a history of, statehood” (Yinger,


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1986: 22). In contrast with “racial groups” which are biological categories based on immutable, physical attributes fixed at birth, “ethnic groups” are defined by a much wider range of cultural, linguistic, religious and national characteristics, with a more flexible form of group differentiation. However, racial and ethnic characteristics thus defined often overlap in any one group while extremely deep divisions are often found between groups whose racial as well as ethnic differences are actually imperceptible, e.g. the Burakumin, the so-called “invisible race” of Japan. Moreover, as Yinger remarked, in practice ethnicity has come to refer to anything from a sub-societal group that clearly shares a common descent and cultural background (e.g. the Kosovar Albanians), to persons who share a former citizenship although diverse culturally (Indonesians in the Netherlands), to pan-cultural groups of persons of widely different cultural and societal backgrounds who, however, can be identified as “similar” on the basis of language, race or religion mixed with broadly similar statuses (Hispanics in the United States). Barth (1969) noted that the “traditional proposition” that race=culture =language(=nation) is far removed from empirical reality. Hoetink (1975: 18) abstained from the use of the term “ethnic” – and preferred “socioracial” instead – because “ethnic group” suggested an absence of overlapping ascriptive loyalties. He noted that from the important ascriptive criteria of territoriality (ancestral homeland), notions of common descent (“race”), language and religion, the presence of only one of the four is necessary to create an “ethnic group” (Hoetink, 1975: 24). Since ethnicity may ambiguously subsume a variety of exclusive or overlapping loyalties, Hoetink preferred to analyse these in terms of their ascriptive content and their greater or lesser correlation. The term “ethnic” as used in this paper should therefore be considered equivalent to Hoetink’s term “socioracial”. The problem of defining ethnicity is reflected in the conflict in Northern Ireland. As Brewer (1992: 352) remarked, this conflict is “perhaps more difficult to understand, both for the analyst and the lay person, than that caused by racism”. The case of sectarianism is more nebulous in nature as the social marker (religion/sect) involved is less visible and deterministic, but more context-bound to the beliefs of those involved (in the sense that individuals are able to change their religion or deliberately conceal it by confounding the stereotypes that surround it, but unable to do so with their physical “racial” features). Furthermore, unlike “race”, the saliency of religion/sect was long thought to have declined in the Western world. Like Australia or the United States of America, Northern Ireland is basically a settler society. Nevertheless, unlike them, its indigenous


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population has not been exterminated or socially demoralized. As a result, two separate communities survive and perpetuate mainly through endogamy, residential exclusivity, distinct cultural associations and a segregated school system. The two communities differ in ethnic descent – the indigenous Gaelic community vs. descendants of the Scottish settlers – as well as in their feeling towards Irish nationalism. Both, however, share the same English language, since Irish Gaelic as a living language (in the sense of an ordinary everyday vernacular) has in general failed to survive into the twentieth century, other than a diminishing minority of speakers scattered along the Gaeltacht – on the west and south coasts of Ireland; and the result of the Irish Republic’s effort at “restoration” – not “revival” since it has never completely ceased to be spoken – of the language as a vernacular has not been particularly impressive. Nevertheless, what is most obvious as a boundary marker in Northern Ireland is religious denomination – Catholics vs. Protestants. From a doctrinal point of view, these two groups tend to view each other as heathen but, as Schmit (1977: 229) noted, such views have not been unusual among Catholics and Protestants in other countries where they coexist peacefully. The confessional labels in Northern Ireland thus denote more than conflicting doctrines or minor cultural distrust. They refer to profound ethnic distinctions. With intermittent violence between the two groups, the labels “Catholic” and “Protestant” have stood as important symbols of ethnic solidarity in Ireland since the seventeenth century. They were subsequently reinforced by continuing economic grievances, cultural hostilities, political conflict and violence. The gravity of the conflict is reflected in de Paor’s statement that “in Northern Ireland Catholics are blacks who happen to have white skin” (de Paor, 1970: 13, cited in Smooha, 1980: 266). While religion is the most visible source of conflict in Northern Ireland, the clash can hardly be called a “religious conflict” since it is not one of rival theologies or doctrines. According to the “situational theories” of ethnicity, a boundary marker is mobilized when actors develop identity investments due to their economic or political interests (Barth, 1969; Wallman, 1979). In the case of Northern Ireland, religion happens to be the most available, meaningful boundary marker which can be socially appropriated to define groups who conflict over other socioeconomic and political interests. As Curran (1979: 148) noted: The real division stems from religion as a cultural force and a badge of ethnic identity […] For a Catholic, religion is an integral part of Irish nationalism, something inextricably joined with the history of a persecuted and oppressed people struggling for liberation. For a


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Protestant, religion is even more important because of a confusion over national identity that leaves him unsure whether he is British, Irish, or Ulsterman […] In the “black North” of Ireland, as in the Middle East, religion is what distinguishes “us” from “them”, especially for Protestants.

Thus sectarianism can be conceptualized as a sub-type of ethnic diversity, and religion as a source of ethnic differentiation. This reorientation in perspective is not only applicable to Northern Ireland, but also possesses important theoretical implications for other cases where religion is perceived to be a principal source of conflict, e.g. Lebanon, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sri Lanka and Cyprus. Therefore, the term “racial” should more appropriately be used to describe group distinction on the basis of phenotypical (i.e. physical) characteristics, while “ethnic” refers to those based solely or partly on cultural characteristics. The term “ethnic” can also be generalized to be a blanket concept (Hoetink’s attribute “socioracial”) to cover both the above distinctions. The term “cultural” here mainly covers the ascriptive attributes “ethnolinguistic” and “ethnoreligious”. The emphasis on language and religion in empirical research is due mainly to the fact that they are the relatively less vague factors in the fourfold categorization of ascriptive loyalty (Hoetink, 1975: 23-24). Despite examples such as the Jews and Judaism or the tendency to identify Arabs with Islam, the use of religion to define ethnicity is unsatisfactory. Turks, Kurds and Arabs have the Islamic faith in common but it is absurd to classify them as one “ethnic group”. Similarly, the Muslim Bengalis in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) had failed to identify with the Muslims in West Pakistan, neither have the ethnolinguistically diverse coreligionists in (West) Pakistan itself ever identified with one another. While the sharing of a common language has been the most frequently attested attribute of “ethnicity”, there are flaws with this definition too. The cases of Hindustani (Hindi Urdu) and Serbo Croatian are examples where religion overcomes language in defining ethnic identity. Thus there is reason to regard these two ascriptive criteria as largely complementary. Karpat (1985: 96) gave the following example: … today the Bulgarian government regards the Pomaks (Bulgarianspeaking Muslims) as ethnic Bulgarians but the Pomaks do not accept that view. They intermarry not with Christian Bulgarians but with Muslims. Turkey accepts as “Turks” the Bosnian Muslims and the Pomaks although these do not speak a word of Turkish and belong to the Slavic race. In other words, today, language and religion are assumed to go together, although they do not always do so in fact: Muslims attach more importance to religion while Balkan Christians emphasize language as the primary ethnic bond.


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Therefore, a measure of ethnic diversity must be based on phenotypical characteristics (race) or both cultural and racial ones (ethnicity). Since ethnicity is defined in terms of both ethnolinguistic as well as ethnoreligious attributes (the other being racial), a distinction between ethnic and linguistic/religious diversity is ambiguous in nature. For instance, in constructing measures of ethnic and religious “variance”, McCarty (1993) commented that “the distinction between Catholic and Protestant may be very important in Ireland but meaningless in Egypt” (p. 231). Nevertheless, as a religious distinction it is as real in the latter as in the former. The difference can only be said to be “meaningless” with respect to its role as an ethnic boundary, in Egypt vis-à-vis the case of Ireland. Finally, even while attention is paid to all such dimensions of ethnicity, the definition problem would still not go away. While such a difficulty exists regarding language (the distinction between dialect, patois and language – it is often said that a language is but a dialect with an army), it is even more elusive in the case of religion. The distinction between Christianity, Islam and Buddhism is clear, but how comparable is it with that between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism? Are Lutheranism, Methodism, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormonism and the Unification Church different religions, sects or cults? The respective identities of Sunni Islam, Shi’a, Ahmadism, Druzism and Baha’ism pose a similar question. By defining some as religion and others as sect/cult, one may fall prey to the prejudice of established orthodoxy. Shi’a Islam is as much a deviationist sect in the majority Sunni world as Baha’ism is in the dominant Shi’a society of Iran. Ahmadism is as much a Messianic cult as early Christianity or Nichiren Buddhism. The beliefs of the Druzes in the eyes of mainstream Islam are as heretical as those of the early Copts or Maronites in the medieval Christian world. Similar problems do not arise when religion is treated as an ethnic marker. Such definition of ethnicity is more context oriented. Roman Catholicism and Protestantism are ethnic markers in Northern Ireland but not in Malaysia, although the two exist there as separate religious communities. Karpat’s observation (cited above) that Muslims attach more importance to religion as the primary ethnic bond than Christians is in general applicable even beyond its original Balkan context. Such attachment has been reinforced in the twentieth century by the persistent deprivation and economic backwardness of the masses, partly resulting from Western (or in ethnoreligious terms, Christian) colonialism. Religion thus serves as a boundary marker mobilized by the exploited, who developed identity investments due to their common politico-economic disadvantage, as suggested by the “situation theories” of ethnicity (Barth, 1969; Wallman, 1979).


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The Bosnian Muslims’ ethnic ties with Christian Slavs were supplanted by religious solidarity with the Muslim world only after the collapse of Yugoslavia brought about their agonizing defeat in the ensuing ethnic war. Similarly, the Pomaks’ ethnic identification with Muslim Turks rather than Slavic Christian Bulgarians results mainly from the socioeconomic discrimination they suffer. A similar situation can be observed in Northern Ireland where, “as in the Middle East, religion is what distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘them’” and “inextricably joined with the history of a persecuted and oppressed people struggling for liberation” (Curran, 1979: 148). On the other hand, different Islamic sects also play a more important role as ethnic markers than contemporary Christian denominations, with the exception of Northern Ireland. As the youngest of the three major Semitic monotheistic religions, Islam is entering a stage where tolerance for heresy and secularism is minimal, reminiscent of the age of Inquisition when sects like the Huguenot or Albigensian bore the hallmarks of ethnic divisions. To see the majority Muslim society of Lebanon or Iraq as a medley of ethnoreligious segments rather than a monolithic entity, for instance, is important for an accurate assessment of the degree of its ethnic diversity. The effect of religious sectarianism on the “ethnic boundary process” (à la Barth, 1969) varies in strength from country to country, but this is largely a matter of ethnic intensity which should be treated as a separate issue, closely related to the historical geography and numerical structure of ethnicity, as well as the degree of regional concentration. An equally important point to note is that there are other socioeconomic reasons behind ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious divides. This is especially the case in Brazil and Spanish speaking America where social definition is relatively fluid, reflected in the Brazilian proverb: “A rich black man is a white and a poor white man is a black” (Mason, 1970: 122). It is probably in this light that Hoetink had chosen the attribute “socioracial”, which reflects the concept of “social race” (visà-vis “biological race”) expounded by Wagley (1959). Similar concerns are covered by Gordon’s concept of “ethclass” as “the portion of social space created by the intersection of the ethnic group with the social class [which] is fast becoming the essential form of the subsociety in America” (Gordon, 1978: 134), and by Bonacich’s “split labour market theory” as a “class” approach to race and ethnicity (Bonacich, 1972, 1979). These are summarized in Rex’s comment that “the large communal quasi-groups which are called ethnic and racial are the collective entities which are brought together in systems of class, estate, status group domination, caste and individual status striving [… and] what we call ‘race and ethnic relations situations’ is very often not the racial and ethnic factor as such but the injustice of elements in the class and status system” (Rex, 1986: xiii).


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Although social classes may not be as precisely bounded as ethnic groups, both represent forms of demographic diversity which serve as a means of group identification, an arena for the confinement of group relations and a carrier of cultural patterns of behaviour (Gordon, 1978). 3. An Index of Ethnic Fractionalization To measure the degree of ethnic diversity, this paper proposes the computation of an index of ethnic (or socioracial) fractionalization that takes into consideration three major types of non-class cleavages in society - racial (phenotypical), linguistic and religious. It is constructed through the computational procedure of Rae and Taylor’s index of fragmentation (F), defined as the probability that a randomly selected pair of individuals in a society will belong to different groups (Rae and Taylor, 1970: 2223). The index varies from 0 to 1. The value is zero for a completely homogeneous country (the probability of belonging to different groups is nil). The value 1 occurs in the hypothetical society where each individual belongs to a different group. n

F =1− ∑( i =1

ni ni − 1 )( ) N N −1

where ni = the number of members of the ith group and N = the total number of people in the population. The fragmentation index is identical to Rae’s measure of party system fractionalization (Rae, 1967: 55-58) and Greenberg’s measure of linguistic diversity (A)3 (Greenberg, 1956). It is the complement of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Hall and Tideman, 1967).4 Data for computing the ethnic fractionalization index (EFI) are drawn from various sources, including the individual studies of Katzner (1995), MRG (1990), Kurian (1990), Gunnemark and Kenrick (1985), Malherbe (1983), annuals such as the EWYB5, RSW 6, WABF 7, various issues of CIA’s World Factbook 8, as well as many other references on individual countries/regions. The first two categories are mainly concerned with the numerical dimension. The last category is particularly important since it concerns the socio-political and historical background which directly affects the definitions of ethnicity. The source of data for the computation of the EFI (see Table 2 below) is broader than that of previous studies on public policy and ethnicity, e.g. Mueller and Murrell (1986) and McCarty (1993). Mueller and Murrell relied on Taylor and Hudson (1972)9 which computed three different sets of indices based on data from Roberts (1962), Muller (1964) and the Atlas


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Narodov Mira10 respectively, none of which are employed here since they are relatively dated. McCarty’s source of data for his ethnic and religious “variance” is the World Factbook. However, a close scrutiny of this source reveals its major weaknesses, viz. the tendency to employ broad categories such as “Caucasian”, “African”, “white”, “black”, “Nilotic”, “Mongoloid”, “Indo-Aryan”, “Dravidian”, “Hamitic” and the like, as well as the focus on “official” languages and commercial linguae francae rather than “home” languages. Computation based on such broad categories would result in the gross underestimation of heterogeneity. Therefore it is necessary to broaden the source of data to achieve more detailed breakdowns of racial, ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious categories. The EFIs for 240 countries/regions are computed and presented in Table 1. Some countries are included more than once to take into consideration major changes in political boundaries since 1990 or for some other reasons (e.g. Cyprus is included as a country but the Greek and Turkish sectors are also given separate entries). Tables 3 and 4 shows further the characteristics of EFI in four country sets, classified in accordance to the current categorization made in World Bank’s World Development Report (WDR). 11 As noted above, the EFI takes into consideration three major types of non-class cleavages in society – racial (phenotypical), linguistic and religious. Some examples will show the importance of covering all these three aspects. Linguistically Rwanda and Burundi are homogeneous societies. Kinyarwanda and Kirundi – two closely related Bantu languages – are spoken by virtually the entire populations of these two countries. A fragmentation index calculated from linguistic data alone would have a value approaching zero. However, the minor phenotypical differences among the Hutus, Tutsis and Twas (especially between the first two), reinforced by historical intergroup inequalities, have become an important ethnic boundary marker in these societies. By taking into consideration this racial element, the EFIs for these two countries rise to 0.18 and 0.26 respectively. From both the racial and linguistic perspectives, the fragmentation index for Bosnia-Hercegovina also approaches 0 since its entire population consists essentially of Serbo-Croatian-speaking Slavs (albeit the language is written in two different scripts, Latin and Cyrillic). However, incorporating the religious element gives a value of 0.68. Similarly in Northern Ireland, the religious perspective raises its EFI from 0 to 0.40. Lebanon’s index is almost zero from the linguistic angle, but rises towards the other extreme (0.82) after the ethnoreligious element is considered. By contrast, the EFI for Iran is low from the religious point of view – more than 95 per cent of its population share the same faith. However, the racial and linguistic elements increase it to 0.66.


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Table 1 Ethnic Fractionalization of 240 Countries/Regions Rank

Country/Region

Congo, Democratic Rep. of the (formerly Zaire) Uganda, Republic of Kenya, Republic of India, Republic of South Africa, Republic of Cameroon, Republic of Mali, Republic of Philippines, Republic of the Nigeria, Federal Republic of Tanzania, United Republic of Cote d’Ivoire/IvoryCoast, Republic of Lebanon, Republic of Mauritius Zambia, Republic of Chad, Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Papua New Guinea, Independent State of Yugoslavia, Socialist Fed. Rep. of (pre-Jan 1992) Suriname, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Sierra Leone, Republic of Angola, People’s Republic of Gabonese Republic Gambia, Republic of The Central African Republic Ethiopia (pre-May 1993) Indonesia, Republic of Qatar, State of Liberia, Republic of Guinea, Republic of Ghana, Republic of Afganistan, Republic of Bolivia, Republic of Burkina Faso Mozambique, Republic of Cayman Islands (UK) Ethiopia (post-May 1993) Sudan, Republic of the Canada Belize Guam (US) Eritrea Malawi, Republic of Togo, Republic of Virgin Islands (US) Congo, Republic of the

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9.5 9.5 11 12 13 14 15 16.5 16.5 18 19 20 21 22.5 22.5 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47


EFI 0.885 0.883 0.877 0.876 0.873 0.852 0.844 0.838 0.827 0.827 0.826 0.821 0.814 0.813 0.810 0.806 0.806 0.795 0.789 0.788 0.776 0.771 0.771 0.765 0.764 0.757 0.756 0.754 0.746 0.745 0.742 0.741 0.739 0.735 0.734 0.727 0.720 0.717 0.715 0.714 0.711 0.705 0.699 0.691 0.689 0.688 0.685

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Table 1 (continued) Rank

Country/Region

Monaco, Principality of Malaysia Kazakhstan, Republic of Kuwait, State of Bosnia and Herzegovina New Caledonia (Fr.) Niger, Republic of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (former) East Timor Laos/Lao People’s Democratic Republic Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Namibia, Republic of Iran, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Islamic Republic of Benin, Republic of French Polynesia (Fr.) Micronesia, Federated States of United Arab Emirates Andorra, Principality of Pakistan, Islamic Republic of Guatemala, Republic of Morocco, Kingdom of Peru, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Republic of Nepal, Kingdom of Guyana, Co-operative Republic of Ecuador, Republic of Latvia, Republic of Colombia, Republic of Cuba, Republic of Djibouti, Republic of Tajikistan, Republic of Nauru, Republic of Fiji, Republic of Belgium, Kingdom of Macedonia, Republic of Bahrain, State of Yugoslavia, Federal Rep. of (post-Jan 1992) Hawai’i (US) Bhutan, Kingdom of Christmas Island (Australia) Cape Verde, Republic of Liechtenstein, Principality of Brazil, Federative Republic of Moldova, Republic of Georgia, Republic of Mexico/United Mexican States Thailand, Kingdom of

48.5 48.5 50 51.5 51.5 53.5 53.5 55 56 57 58 59 60 61.5 61.5 63 64.5 64.5 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79.5 79.5 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95


EFI 0.684 0.684 0.679 0.675 0.675 0.671 0.671 0.670 0.667 0.665 0.664 0.663 0.661 0.660 0.660 0.656 0.655 0.655 0.651 0.648 0.645 0.643 0.637 0.635 0.634 0.628 0.615 0.612 0.601 0.591 0.585 0.583 0.583 0.580 0.574 0.573 0.566 0.561 0.560 0.555 0.552 0.551 0.550 0.549 0.546 0.545 0.542 0.535

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Country/Region

96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106.5 106.5 108 109 110 111 112.5 112.5 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124.5 124.5 126 127.5 127.5 129 130 131.5 131.5 133 134 135 137 137 137 139 140 141 142 143

Switzerland/Swiss Confederation Estonia, Republic of French Guiana (Fr.) Brunei Darussalam, State of Zimbabwe, Republic of Burma, Union of Gibraltar (UK) Yemen, Republic of (post-May 1990) Iraq, Republic of Tonga, Kingdom of Man, Isle of (UK) Chile, Republic of Venezuela, Republic of Yemen Arab Republic (pre-May 1990) Turks and Caicos Islands (UK) Cocos Islands (Australia) Nicaragua, Republic of Uzbekistan, Republic of Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of Palau Islands (US) Singapore, Republic of Panama, Republic of Bermuda (UK) Svalbard (Norway) Czechoslovakia (former) Albania, Republic of Turkmenistan Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of Northern Mariana Islands (US) Norfolk Island (Australia) Spain Dominican Republic Sri Lanka, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, Democratic Republic of Botswana, Republic of Ukraine Syrian Arab Republic Oman, Sultanate of Puerto Rico (US) Northern Ireland (UK) United States of America Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Jamaica Algeria, Democratic and Popular Republic of Belarus, Republic of Croatia Cyprus Lithuania, Republic of


EFI 0.531 0.528 0.526 0.525 0.522 0.520 0.517 0.507 0.502 0.500 0.498 0.498 0.497 0.495 0.493 0.487 0.484 0.484 0.481 0.480 0.479 0.477 0.476 0.468 0.464 0.460 0.455 0.452 0.444 0.444 0.436 0.429 0.429 0.420 0.418 0.417 0.417 0.406 0.405 0.403 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.375 0.373 0.371 0.358 0.345

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Country/Region

144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152.5 152.5 154 155 156 157 158 159.5 159.5 161 162 163 164 165 168 168 168 168 168 171 172 173.5 173.5 175 176 177 178 179 180.5 180.5 182.5 182.5 184 185 187.5 187.5 187.5 187.5 190 191

Western Sahara West Bank (of the Jordan River) Barbados Turkey, Republic of Cook Islands (NZ) United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland Aruba (Neth.) Russian Federation Grenada Azerbaijan, Republic of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Israel, State of Bangladesh, People’s Republic of Rwanda, Republic of San Marino, Most Serene Republic of Quebec (Canada) Egypt, Arab Republic of American Samoa (US) Bulgaria, Republic of Viet Nam, Socialist Republic of Burundi, Republic of Somalia Bahamas, The Commonwealth of the Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Argentina/Argentine Republic Netherlands Antilles (Neth.) Saint Helena (UK) Slovakia Lesotho, Kingdom of Greenland/Kalaallit Nunaat Comoros, Federal Islamic Republic of the Cambodia, State of Costa Rica, Republic of France/French Republic Uruguay, Oriental Republic of New Zealand Romania El Salvador, Republic of Italy/Italian Republic Niue (NZ) Mongolia Swaziland, Kingdom of Saint Lucia Guadeloupe (Fr.) Martinique (Fr.) Honduras, Republic of British Virgin Islands (UK) Slovenia


EFI 0.343 0.339 0.333 0.330 0.327 0.325 0.320 0.311 0.308 0.308 0.306 0.303 0.285 0.275 0.272 0.270 0.270 0.269 0.264 0.262 0.258 0.256 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.254 0.253 0.241 0.241 0.238 0.237 0.235 0.218 0.217 0.202 0.202 0.196 0.196 0.187 0.186 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.180 0.170

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Country/Region

192 193 194 195 196.5 196.5 199 199 199 201 202 203 204 205.5 205.5 207.5 207.5 209 210 212.5 212.5 212.5 212.5 215 216 218.5 218.5 218.5 218.5 221 222.5 222.5 224.5 224.5 226 227 230 230 230 230 230 234.5 234.5 234.5 234.5 237 238 239 240

Hungary, Republic of Sweden, Kingdom of Antigua and Barbuda Western Samoa, Independent State of Germany, Federal Republic of (pre-Oct 1990) Germany, Federal Republic of (post-Oct 1990) Yemen, People’s Democratic Republic of (former) Solomon Islands Reunion (Fr.) Armenia, Republic of China, People’s Republic of Finland, Republic of Libya/Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahi. Seychelles Saint Kitts and Nevis, Federation of Czech Republic Vanuatu, Republic of Ireland, Republic of Cyprus (Greek sector) Macao (China) Malta Paraguay, Republic of Australia, Commonwealth of Haiti, Republic of Japan Montserrat (UK) Iceland, Republic of Netherlands, Kingdom of the Tuvalu Greece/Hellenic Republic Denmark, Kingdom of Dominica Marshall Islands, Republic of the Norway, Kingdom of Poland, Republic of Cyprus (Turkish sector) Tunisia, Republic of Kiribati Taiwan (Republic of China) Hong Kong (China) Falkland Islands (UK) Gaza Strip Saint Pierre and Miquelon (Fr.) Mayotte (Fr.) German Democratic Republic (former) Portugal, Republic of Austria, Republic of Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of


EFI 0.168 0.164 0.150 0.138 0.134 0.134 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.128 0.125 0.122 0.117 0.115 0.115 0.114 0.114 0.113 0.097 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.095 0.079 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.068 0.059 0.059 0.058 0.058 0.047 0.045 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.012 0.004 0.002

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Table 2 Ethnic Fractionalization (Sources of Data)

Country/Region

Source

Afganistan Albania Algeria American Samoa Andorra Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Aruba (Neth.) Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bermuda (UK) Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil British Virgin Islands Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Cayman Islands (UK) Central African Republic Chad Chile China, People’s Republic of Christmas Isl. (Australia) Cocos Islands (Australia) Colombia Comoros Congo, Republic of the

WF, Katzner WF CF, Katzner, WABF WiF, WF CF, WF Katzner CF WF WF WF WF WF, Katzner WF, Katzner WF WF WF WF WF, Katzner WF, Katzner WF Katzner, Gunnemark WF WF, Gunnemark WF RSW CF, Gunnemark WF WF WF WF Katzner, Gunnemark WF Katzner Gunnemark, WF WF CF, WF WF WF CF, Katzner, Gunnemark WABF WF, Katzner WF WiF WF, MRG WF WF

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46


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Table 2 (continued)

Country/Region

Source

Cook Islands (NZ) Costa Rica Côte d’Ivoire/Ivory Coast Croatia Cuba Cyprus Cyprus (Greek sector) Cyprus (Turkish sector) Czech Republic Czechoslovakia (former) Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Timor Leste/East Timor Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia (pre-May 1993) Ethiopia (post-May 1993) Falkland Islands (UK) Fiji Finland France French Guiana (Fr.) French Polynesia (Fr.) Gabon Gambia Gaza Strip Georgia Germany, East (former) Germany, West (pre-Oct 1990) Germany (post-Oct 1990) Ghana Gibraltar (UK) Greece Greenland/Kalaallit Nunaat Grenada Guadeloupe (Fr.) Guam (US) Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau

WF CF, WF Gunnemark, WF WF EWYB, RSW WF WF WF CF, RSW Gunnemark CF, EWYB, RSW CF, WF CF WF Gunnemark WF MRG CF, WF Katzner Katzner WF Gunnemark Katzner WiF WF, Katzner WF, Katzner EWYB, Katzner WF, MRG Gunnemark, MRG CF, Gunnemark Katzner, WF WF WF, Katzner WiF, MRG, Gunnemark WiF CF, WABF Katzner, Gunnemark WiF Katzner WF, Katzner EWYB, RSW, Katzner WF CF, WF Gunnemark, WF CF, WF, Gunnemark WF, Gunnemark

47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92


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杨国庆

民族多元性

177

Table 2 (continued)

Country/Region

Source

93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 \ 133 134 135 136 137 138

Guyana Haïti Hawai’i (US) Honduras Hong Kong (China) Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq Irish Republic Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Korea, North Korea, South Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao (China) Macedonia, Republic of Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Malta Man, Isle of (UK) Marshall Islands Martinique (Fr.) Mauritania Mauritius Mayotte (Fr.)

WF, WABF WF WABF WF EWYB, RSW, Katzner WF CF Katzner, Gunnemark Katzner, Gunnemark WF, Katzner, MRG WF CF, MRG, WABF MRG, WF, Katzner CF, Williams, Katzner WF, MRG MRG MRG WF, Katzner Katzner, Gunnemark WiF CF CF, WF WF Katzner WF, Gunnemark WF, Katzner MRG Gunnemark Gunnemark Gunnemark CF, WF Katzner, WF CF, EWYB, RSW WF WF, MRG EWYB, RSW Katzner, Gunnemark Katzner, Gunnemark Katzner, Gunnemark CF WiF WABF WF WF Katzner WF


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Table 2 (continued)

Country/Region

Source

139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184

Mexico Micronesia Moldova Monaco Mongolia Montserrat (UK) Morocco Mozambique Burma Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands Netherlands Antilles New Caledonia (Fr.) New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Niue (NZ) Norfolk Island (Australia) Northern Ireland (UK) Northern Mariana Islands (US) Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Islands (US) Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Puerto Rico (US) Qatar Québec (Canada) Réunion, La (Fr.) România Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Helena (UK) Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint-Pierre et Miquelon (Fr.) Saint Vincent & the Grenadines

WF, MRG WABF, Gunnemark WF WF WF WiF Katzner, MRG Gunnemark Katzner Katzner, WF, WABF WF Gunnemark, Katzner WF, Katzner WF WF, MRG WF WF Katzner, Gunnemark Katzner WiF WiF MRG Gunnemark, WF CF, Katzner, Gunnemark WABF, WF Katzner, Gunnemark Gunnemark WF Katzner, MRG WF, MRG WF Katzner, Gunnemark WF WF WiF WF Williams, Gunnemark WiF CF, WF, Katzner CF, Katzner, WABF CF, WF WiF CF, WABF CF, WF WiF CF


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杨国庆

民族多元性

179

Table 2 (continued)

Country/Region

Source

185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230

San Marino São Tomé e Príncipe Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Svalbard (Norway) Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan (Republic of China) Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Turks & Caicos Islands (UK) Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine USSR (former) United Arab Emirates United Kingdom of GB & NI United States of America Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela Viêt Nam Virgin Islands (US) West Bank (of Jordan Riv.)

WABF WBE CF, WF WF, Katzner CF Gunnemark, WF Katzner, WF RSW, Katzner WF, Katzner WF WF Katzner, Gunnemark Katzner, WABF, WF EWYB, WF Katzner, MRG WF, Gunnemark WF, Gunnemark WABF CF, WF, MRG WF WF CF, Katzner Katzner, WF, WABF Katzner, Gunnemark Katzner, Gunnemark, WF WABF, Gunnemark Gunnemark WF WF WF, Katzner WF WiF WF Katzner, Gunnemark WF Gunnemark WF WF, MRG, Kurian Katzner, EWYB WF, WABF Katzner, WF WF WF WF, Katzner WF WF


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Table 2 (continued)

Country/Region

Source

231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240

Western Sahara Western Samoa Yemen, North (pre-May 1990) Yemen, South (former) Yemen (post-May 1990) Yugoslavia (pre-Jan 1992) Yugoslavia (post-Jan 1992) Congo, Democratic Republic of the (formerly Zaïre) Zambia Zimbabwe

WiF WF WF WiF WABF, WF CF WF Gunnemark, Katzner

CF EWYB Gunnemark Katzner Kurian MRG RSW WABF WBE WF WiF Williams

Gunnemark, Katzner Gunnemark, WF

The Cambridge Factfinder, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, various editions. The Europa World Year Book, London: Europa, various issues. Gunnemark, Erik and Donald Kenrick (1985), A Geolinguistic Handbook, 2e, Kungalv: Goterna (Printer). Katzner, Kenneth (1995), The Languages of the World, new ed., London: Routledge. Kurian, George Thomas (1990), Encyclopedia of the First World, Vol. I & II, New York: Facts on File. Minority Rights Group (ed.), World Directory of Minorities, Harlow, Essex: Longman, various editions. The Europa Regional Surveys of the World, London: Europa, various issues. The World Almanac and Book of Facts, Mahwah, New Jersey: World Almanac/Funk & Wagnalls, various issues. The World Book Encyclopedia (International), Chicago: World Book/ Scott Fetzer, various issues. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, New York: Maxwell Macmillan/Brassey’s, various editions. The World in Figures, compiled by The Economist, London: Hodder & Stoughton, various years. Williams, Colin H. (ed.) (1991), Linguistic Minorities, Society and Territory, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Table 3 Ethnic Fractionalization (EF Index)

Mean

Max

Min

CV

All countries (N=119)

0.469

0.885

0.002

0.59

Advanced industrialized countries (N=23)

0.224

0.714

0.012

0.89

Upper-middle- and high-income developing countries (N=20)

0.372

0.873

0.002

0.67

Lower-middle-income countries (N=38)

0.496

0.852

0.039

0.48

Low-income countries (N=38)

0.640

0.885

0.020

0.37


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181

民族多元性

Table 4 Ethnic fractionalization of four categories of countries (EF index) Advanced industrialized countries

Upper-middle- & high-income developing countries

Canada Belgium Switzerland Luxembourg Spain USA UK France New Zealand Italy Sweden Federal Rep. of Germany Finland Ireland Australia Japan Iceland Netherlands Greece Denmark Norway Portugal Austria

0.714 South Africa 0.574 Gabon 0.531 Malaysia 0.452 Trinidad and Tobago 0.436 Nauru 0.395 Mexico 0.325 Venezuela 0.235 Singapore 0.217 Barbados 0.196 Turkey 0.164 Grenada 0.134 Israel 0.122 Taiwan, Republic of China 0.113 Bahamas 0.096 Antigua and Barbuda 0.079 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.077 Seychelles 0.077 Cyprus (Greek sector) 0.068 Malta 0.059 Republic of Korea 0.058 0.019 Mean 0.012

Mean

0.224

Lower-middle-income countries

Low-income countries

Cameroon The Philippines Cote d’Ivoire/Ivory Coast Lebanon Papua New Guinea Angola Indonesia Bolivia Belize Congo

Congo, D.R. (formerly Zaire) Uganda Kenya India Mali Nigeria Tanzania Zambia Chad Guinea-Bissau


0.852 0.838 0.826 0.821 0.806 0.771 0.754 0.735 0.711 0.685

0.873 0.765 0.694 0.635 0.583 0.542 0.497 0.479 0.333 0.330 0.308 0.303 0.274 0.255 0.150 0.115 0.115 0.097 0.096 0.002 0.372

0.885 0.883 0.877 0.876 0.844 0.827 0.827 0.813 0.810 0.806

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Table 4 (continued) Lower-middle-income countries

Low-income countries

Iran Guatemala Peru Ecuador Colombia Djibouti Fiji Cape Verde Zimbabwe Iraq Tonga Chile Jordan Panama Syria Thailand Jamaica St Vincent & the Grenadines Morocco Egypt Costa Rica Swaziland Honduras Algeria Western Samoa Vanuatu Dominica Tunisia

0.661 0.645 0.637 0.615 0.601 0.585 0.580 0.551 0.522 0.502 0.500 0.498 0.481 0.477 0.417 0.406 0.395 0.306 0.293 0.270 0.237 0.186 0.185 0.163 0.138 0.114 0.059 0.039

Senegal Madagascar Sierra Leone Gambia Central African Republic Liberia Guinea Ghana Burkina Faso Mozambique Sudan Malawi Togo Niger Benin Pakistan Nepal Bhutan Burma Yemen Arab Republic Nicaragua Sri Lanka Equatorial Guinea Mauritania Comoros Tuvalu Kiribati Lesotho

0.788 0.776 0.771 0.764 0.757 0.745 0.742 0.741 0.734 0.727 0.715 0.691 0.689 0.671 0.660 0.648 0.634 0.555 0.520 0.495 0.484 0.429 0.395 0.348 0.241 0.077 0.039 0.020

Mean

0.496

Mean

0.640

It is interesting to note that the characteristics of EF in the four country sets12 shown in Table 3 indicate a steady increase in the average degree of ethnic fractionalization from the advanced industrialized countries to the low-income countries. However, an exactly reverse pattern can be observed in the case of within-group variation, with CV declining from the advanced industrialized countries to the low-income countries. Details of individual country variations are given in Table 4.


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Han 汉 Zhuang 壮 Manchu (Man) 满 Hui 回 Miao 苗 Uyghur (Uygur) 维吾尔 Tujia 土家 Yi 彝 Mongol 蒙古 Zang (Tibetan) 藏 Bouyei (Buyi) 布依 Dong 侗 Yao 瑶 Chosŏn (Korean) 朝鲜 Bai 白 Hani 哈尼 Kazakh (Kazak) 哈萨克 Li 黎 Dai 傣 She 畲 Lisu 傈僳 Gelao (Gelo) 仡佬 Dongxiang 东乡 Lahu 拉祜 Sui (Shui) 水 Wa (Va) 佤 Naxi 纳西 Qiang 羌

Year 92% 1% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.63% 0.51% 0.58% 0.43% 0.41% 0.226% 0.22% 0.19% 0.17% 0.14% 0.11% 0.0983% 0.0985% 0.091% 0.056% 0.0509% 0.039% 0.033% 0.036% 0.0307% 0.0312% 0.025% 0.018%

1990 92% 1% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.68% 0.65% 0.63% 0.47% 0.44% 0.239% 0.238% 0.21% 0.151% 0.15% 0.12% 0.1007% 0.1005% 0.093% 0.057% 0.0511% 0.047% 0.041% 0.037% 0.033% 0.03% 0.0249% 0.0246%

2000 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

Tu 土 Mulam (Mulao) 仫佬 Xibe (Xibo) 锡伯 Kirghiz (Kirgiz) 柯尔克孜 Daur (Tahur) 达斡尔 Jingpho (Jingpo) 景颇 Maonan 毛南 Salar (Sala) 撒拉 Blang (Bulang) 布朗 Tajik 塔吉克 Achang 阿昌 Pumi 普米 Evenki (Ewenki) 鄂温克 Nu 怒 Kinh (Vietnamese) 京 Jinuo (Jino) 基诺 De’ang 德昂 Bonan (Bao’an) 保安 Russki (Russian) 俄罗斯 Yugur (Yugu) 裕固 Uzbek (Ozbek) 乌孜别克 Moinba (Menba) 门巴 Oroqen (Olunchun) 鄂伦春 Drung (Dulong) 独龙 Tatar (Tartar) 塔塔尔 Hezhen (Hezhe) 赫哲 Gaoshan 高山 Luoba (Lhoba) 珞巴

Year 0.017% 0.014% 0.015% 0.013% 0.0108% 0.0106% 0.006% 0.0077% 0.0073% 0.0029% 0.0025% 0.0026% 0.0023% 0.0024% 0.0017% 0.0016% 0.0014% 0.00103% 0.0012% 0.00109% 0.0013% 0.00066% 0.00062% 0.00052% 0.00045% 0.00038% 0.00025% 0.00021%

1990

0.019% 0.017% 0.015% 0.013% 0.0107% 0.0106% 0.0086% 0.0084% 0.0074% 0.0033% 0.00273% 0.00271% 0.0025% 0.0023% 0.0018% 0.0017% 0.0014% 0.0013% 0.00126% 0.0011% 0.001% 0.00072% 0.00066% 0.0006% 0.00039% 0.00037% 0.00036% 0.00024%

2000

民族多元性

Source: Computed with data from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Table 5 China: Ethnic Composition – The National Picture 杨国庆 183

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4. Ethnic Diversity in China and Malaysia A comparison of China’s and Malaysia’s positions in Table 1 brings out readily the high homogeneity of the former’s ethnic composition (0.125) vis-à-vis the latter’s heterogeneity (0.684). Nevertheless, there are various important aspects of the ethnic equation that are not revealed by an index of this nature (being based on the numerical structure of ethnic composition), including the historical geography of ethnicity, as well as the territorial, political and economic dimensions. Due to the abnormal size of China’s population and in particular the size of China’s citizens of the Han ethnicity, a distortion or misrepresentation emerges in the application of this index to China as the country’s large populations of minorities13 – about 110 million in total, including the 16 million Zhuang, 10 million Manchu, 9 million Hui, 8 million Uygurs, 5 million Mongols and 5 million Tibetans – are practically dwarfed almost to invisibility by the sheer size of the Han population, as is evident in Table 5. In fact, based on the “critical mass” theory (advanced, among others, by Semyonov and Tyree, 1981), societies are considered multiethnic only if minorities constitute more than ten per cent of their population. It is thus obvious that the issue of “numerical significance” cannot be the sole criterion involved in the anomaly of China. To see this peculiarity in the demographic composition of the “multiethnic” China, compare this with the case of Malaysia, as illustrated in Figure 1, and note the contrasting proportion of the majority ethnic groups in the respective countries.

Figure 11 Ethnic EthnicDistribution DistributionofofMalaysia Malaysia Figure Other Bumiputera: Peninsula aboriginals 1.1% & Borneo natives 11.8% Others 1.3% Indians

7.5% 52.4%

Chinese

Malays

25.8%

Source: Yeoh (2006: 224), Figure 1, computed with data from Malaysian Source: Malaysian Department of Statistics, Banci Penduduk dan Perumahan Department of Statistics, Banci Penduduk dan Perumahan 2000/2000 2000 (2000 Population and Housing Census). Population and Housing Census.


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Rank


+

0.085 0.085 0.084 0.053 0.034 0.029 0.025 0.017 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.006

0.078 0.077 0.075 0.045 0.031 0.011 0.023 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.005

Zhejiang 浙江 Shandong 山东 Anhui 安徽 Shanghai 上海 (Zhixiashi) Shaanxi 陕西 Jiangsu 江苏

0.006 30 Shanxi 山西 28 0.125 0.005 31 Jiangxi 江西 29 0.097 0.095

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

16 18 17 19 20 24 21 25 22 23 26 27 30

0.633 0.629 0.620 0.581 0.543 0.456 0.344 0.317 0.295 0.191 0.175 0.165 0.133

0.602 Qinghai 青海 0.632 Xinjiang 新疆 (Uygur Zizhiqu) 0.631 Guangxi 广西 (Zhuang Zizhiqu) 0.540 Guizhou 贵州 0.541 Yunnan 云南 0.447 Ningxia 宁夏 (Hui Zizhiqu) 0.326 Inner Mongolia / Nei Monggol 内蒙古 (Mongol Zizhiqu) 0.311 Hainan 海南 0.288 Liaoning 辽宁 0.152 Hunan 湖南 0.194 Jilin 吉林 0.156 Gansu 甘肃 Tibet/Xizang 西藏 Tibetan zizhiqu 0.085 (Tibetan Zizhiqu) – Chongqing* 重庆 (Zhixiashi) 0.089 Sichuan# 四川 0.110 Heilongjiang 黑龙江

1990 2000 Hubei 湖北 Hebei 河北 Beijing 北京 (Zhixiashi) Tianjin 天津 (Zhixiashi) Fujian 福建 Guangdong 广东 Henan 河南

++

Year

EFI 2000

Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi 1990

Rank

2000

Year

EFI 1990

Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi

“autonomous region” “direct-ruled/independent municipality”, i.e. municipality under the central government. # Sichuan includes Chongqing for 1990, but excludes Chongqing for 2000. * Chongqing under Sichuan for 1990. Source: Computed with data from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses.

Notes:

1 3 2 1 3 2 4 5 5 4 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 12 11 10 12 11 13 15 14 – 15 14 16 13

1990 2000

Table 6 China: Ethnic Diversity by Province (sheng), Zizhiqu+ and Zhixiashi++ (Ethnic Fractionalization Index) 杨国庆民族多元性 185

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Figure 2 China: Ethnic Diversity by Province (sheng), Zizhiqu and Zhixiashi

Notes: Officially designated Western Regions in bold italics. East-West Boundary. Source: Computed with data from the 2000 population census.

Nevertheless, to get the real picture of China’s ethnic mosaic, such national-level statistics is obviously inadequate. To do so, one needs to go below the broad national image to examine the country’s sub-national units whose degrees of ethnic diversity are shown in Table 6 and Figure 2. It can be noted in Table 6 and Figure 2 that the top seven regions in the ethnic diversity rankings are regions now classified as western under the “Develop the West” (xibu dakaifa 西部大开发) strategy. They include four of the five ethnic zizhiqu of China. Xinjiang – one of the two politically most volatile regions of the country (the other being Tibet) – tops the list. This picture of China’s ethnic diversity at the level of her sub-national units is the direct opposite of the Malaysian case, as shown in Figure 3, where the ethnically more diverse states are those at a higher level of economic development.


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(a)

(b)

Source: Yeoh (2008: 80), Figure 3.12, computed with data from Malaysian Department of Statistics, Banci Penduduk dan Perumahan 2000/2000 Population and Housing Census. Data for Singapore and Brunei are from the CIA World Factbook 2005.

Figure 3

杨国庆民族多元性 187

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To further understand the ethnic mosaic of China, see Table 7 and Figure 4 that indicates the proportion of each ethnic group in the country’s sub-national units. Only those groups that are not lower than one per cent are shown.14 Again, for comparison, the proportions of the various ethnic groups in the Malaysian states are illustrated later in Figure 5. Table 7 China: Ethnic Distribution by Province (sheng), Zizhiqu+ and Zhixiashi++ (%)@ Province, zizhiqu and zhixiashi

Year Ethnic distribution

1 Qinghai* 1990 2000

Han 58%; Tibetan 20%; Hui 14%; Tu 4%; Sala 2%; Mongol 2% Han 54%; Tibetan 23%; Hui 16%; Tu 4%; Sala 2%; Mongol 2%

2 Xinjiang* 1990 Uyghur 47%; Han 38%; Kazakh 7%; Hui 5%; (Uygur Zizhiqu) Khalkh 1%; Mongol 1% 2000 Uyghur 45%; Han 41%; Kazakh 7%; Hui 5%; Khalkh 1%; Mongol 1% 3 Guangxi* 1990 (Zhuang Zizhiqu) 2000

Han 61%; Zhuang 37%; Yao 3%; Miao 1%; Dong 1% Han 62%; Zhuang 32%; Yao 3%; Miao 1%; Dong 1%

4 Guizhou* 1990 2000

Han 67%; Miao 12%; Buyi 8%; Dong 4%; Tujia 3%; Yi 2%; Gelao 1%; Shui 1% Han 63%; Miao 12%; Buyi 8%; Dong 5%; Tujia 4%; Yi 2%; Gelao 2%; Shui 1%; Bai 1%

5 Yunnan* 1990 2000

Han 67%; Yi 11%; Bai 4%; Hani 3%; Dai 3%; Zhuang 3%; Miao 2%; Lisu 2%; Hui 1%, Lahu 1%; Wa 1%; Naxi 1% Han 67%; Yi 11%; Bai 4%; Hani 3%; Dai 3%; Zhuang 3%; Miao 2%; Hui 2%; Lisu 1%; Lahu 1%; Wa 1%; Naxi 1%

6 Ningxia* (Hui Zizhiqu)

1990 Han 67%; Hui 33% 2000 Han 65%; Hui 34%

7 Inner Mongolia* (Mongol Zizhiqu)

1990 Han 81%; Mongol 16%; Manchu 2%; Hui 1% 2000 Han 79%; Mongol 17%; Manchu 2%; Hui 1%

8 Hainan

1990 Han 83%; Li 16%; Miao 1% 2000 Han 83%; Li 16%; Miao 1%; Zhuang 1%

9 Liaoning 1990 2000 10 Hunan


Han 84%; Manchu 13%; Mongol 1%; Hui 1%; Korean 1% Han 84%; Manchu 13%; Mongol 2%; Hui 1%; Korean 1%

1990 Han 92%; Tujia 3%; Miao 3%; Dong 1%; Yao 1% 2000 Han 90%; Tujia 4%; Miao 3%; Dong 1%; Yao 1%

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民族多元性

189

Table 7 (continued) Province, zizhiqu and zhixiashi


11 Jilin

1990 Han 90%; Korean 5%; Manchu 4%; Mongol 1% 2000 Han 91%; Korean 4%; Manchu 4%; Mongol 1%

1 2 Gansu*

1990 Han 92%; Hui 5%; Tibetan 2%; Dongxiang 1% 2000 Han 91%; Hui 5%; Tibetan 2%; Dongxiang 1%

1 3 Xizang/Tibet* (Tibetan Zizhiqu)

1990 Tibetan 96%; Han 4% 2000 Tibetan 93%; Han 6%

1 4 Chongqing* ## (Zhixiashi)

1990 – 2000 Han 94%; Tujia 5%; Miao 2%

1 5 Sichuan* #

1990 Han 95%; Yi 2%; Tibetan 1%; Tujia 1% 2000 Han 95%; Yi 3%; Tibetan 2%

1 6 Heilongjiang

1990 Han 94%; Manchu 3%; Korean 1% 2000 Han 95%; Manchu 3%; Korean 1%

1 7 Hubei

1990 Han 96%; Tujia 3% 2000 Han 96%; Tujia 4%

1 8 Hebei

1990 Han 96%; Manchu 3%; Hui 1% 2000 Han 96%; Manchu 3%; Hui 1%

1 9 Beijing (Zhixiashi) 1990 Han 96%; Hui 2%; Manchu 2% 2000 Han 96%; Hui 2%; Manchu 2% 2 0 Tianjin (Zhixiashi) 1990 Han 98%; Hui 2% 2000 Han 97%; Hui 2%; Manchu 1% 2 1 Fujian

1990 Han 98%; She 1% 2000 Han 98%; She 1%

2 2 Guangdong

1990 Han 99% 2000 Han 99%; Zhuang 1%

2 3 Henan

1990 Han 99%; Hui 1% 2000 Han 99%; Hui 1%

2 4 Zhejiang

1990 Han 99% 2000 Han 99%

2 5 Shandong

1990 Han 99%; Hui 1% 2000 Han 99%; Hui 1%

2 6 Anhui

1990 Han 99%; Hui 1% 2000 Han 99%; Hui 1%

2 7 Shanghai (Zhixiashi)

1990 Han 100% 2000 Han 99%

28 Shaanxi*

1990 Han 100% 2000 Han 100%

29 Jiangsu

1990 Han 100% 2000 Han 100%


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Table 7 (continued) Province, zizhiqu and zhixiashi


3 0 Shanxi

1990 Han 100% 2000 Han 100%

3 1 Jiangxi

1990 Han 100% 2000 Han 100%

Notes: + “autonomous region” ++ “direct-ruled/independent municipality”, i.e. municipality under the central government. @ Decimals are rounded to the nearest. Ethnic groups below 1 per cent are not shown. * provinces, zizhiqu, and zhixiashi now classified as the “western regions”. # Sichuan includes Chongqing for 1990, but excludes Chongqing for 2000. ## Chongqing under Sichuan for 1990. Source: Computed with data from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses.

Figure 4 China: Major Ethnic Groups by Province (sheng), Zizhiqu and Zhixiashi

Notes: Mg = Mongol; T = Tibetan; U = Uyghur; Z = Zhuang Only ethnic group > 10% are shown (see the “critical mass” theory referred to above). Officially designated Western Regions in bold italics. East-West Boundary. Source: Computed with data from the 2000 population census.


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(a)

(b)

Source: Yeoh (2008: 79), Figure 3.11, computed with data from Malaysian Department of Statistics, Banci Penduduk dan Perumahan 2000/2000 Population and Housing Census. Data for Singapore and Brunei are from the CIA World Factbook 2005.

Figure 5

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5. Beyond a Simple Measure of Ethnic Fragmentation The measurement of ethnic fragmentation would, however, tend to be partial in term of applicability in the wider context of social fragmentation without taking into consideration the other non-ethnic social variables which either contributes to the institutional complexity of the social environment in which the ethnic fragmentation functions or by themselves directly affects the degree of ethnic fractionalization. One of such variables is related to the effect of the economic environment on the relationship between public policy and ethnic conflict. That economic situations play an important role in interethnic conflict seems obvious. Collins (1975: 389-390) believed that the more severe a (political/economic) crisis, the greater the tendency for groups to coalesce along the lines of collective interests and the society to polarize into two-sided conflicts. Van Evera (1994: 9) claimed that public become receptive to scapegoat myths (which are more widely believed) when economic conditions deteriorate. Rex (1970) noted that scapegoating is a means to restore social equilibrium, a mechanism whereby resentment may be expressed and the existing power structure maintained. It is “the social process par excellence that literally fulfils Parsons’ description of one of his functional subsystems as pattern maintenance and tension management” (ibid.: 45). Baimbridge, Burkitt and Macey (1994: 432) observed that the deflationary impact of the Maastricht Treaty may intensify nationalism, racism and anti-Semitism “as the economically insecure seek weaker scapegoats to blame for the economic problems confronting them”. Hauser and Hauser (1972) stated that scapegoats occur when there is an imbalance between power and citizens’ rights and are “often an élite’s safeguard in its dealings with a dissatisfied and potentially dangerous majority” (p. 330). In other words, the repressed, negative and hostile feelings of the majority vis-à-vis its own ruling élite are transferred on to the scapegoat. The anti-minority outbursts in the history of many Southeast Asian countries were in the main rooted in the lower-class masses’ resentment directed at their own ruling élite who was perceived to cooperate with and protecting rich minority interests. Similar phenomenon can be observed amidst the anti-Suharto campaigns in Indonesia in the late 90s in which minority commercial institutions were attacked. In the extreme case, the scapegoat may seem to be totally unrelated to the initial cause of the feelings of hostility. The term “freefloating aggression” has been used in this case while the more general concept of “scapegoating” is reserved for the transfer of hostility towards any object (Turner and Killian, 1957: 19). The pattern of ethnic conflict caused by scapegoating may not be solely a racial problem, but may partly result from social class differential and the economic environment.


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Mauzy (1993) noted that rapid economic growth15 could be the most important variable in explaining the absence of ethnic violence in Malaysia (as occurred in Lebanon and Sri Lanka) in response to preferential policies which led to growing ethnic polarization. Every subject she interviewed between October and December 1990 “cited the continued possibilities of making money as the chief reason why there has been no ethnic violence in Malaysia, despite more polarisation, less accommodation and more repression” (ibid.: 127).16 An important element that is often overlooked in studies on ethnic diversity has been the numerical structure of the multiethnic countries.17 Out of a sample of 132 states, Said and Simmons (1976: 10) noted that only 9.1 per cent can be considered “ethnic-free”. A total of 18.9 per cent contain an ethnic group which represents more than 90 per cent of the population, and another 18.9 per cent with the largest ethnic group constituting 75-89 per cent of the population. However, in 23.5 per cent of the countries the largest ethnic group accounts for only 50-74 per cent of the population, and in 29.5 per cent of the states it does not constitute half the population. Moreover, in 40.2 per cent of the countries the population consists of five or more significant ethnic groups. According to what he calls “nation-group attributes”, Nielsson (1985) classified the world’s population into “single nation-group states”, “one nation-group dominant states”, “one nation-group dominant states with fragmented minorities”, “bi-national states”, and “multinational states”, none of which, however, represents a total congruence of “nation-group” and “state”. With the exception of rare cases like Iceland and the two Koreas, as well as some tiny island states (see Table 1), there is no country in the world which can claim to be ethnically homogeneous; even Nielsson’s “single nation-group states” are defined as those in which the nation-group accounts for between 95 and 99.9 per cent of the population. More significantly, Nielsson’s taxonomy points out the importance of the numerical structure of multiethnic states. A distinction can be made between bi-ethnic states (with two major ethnic groups of significant proportions) and states with more than two major ethnic groups.18 Lijphart (1977: 56) remarked, “The notion of a multiple balance of power contains two separate elements: (1) a balance, or an approximate equilibrium, among the segments, and (2) the presence of at least three different segments.” However, cooperation among groups becomes more difficult, as the number participating in negotiations increases beyond three or four. On the other hand, a moderately multiple configuration is preferable to a dual segmentation as the latter entails a constant tension between “a [majority] hegemony or a precarious balance [… and it leads] easily to an interpretation of politics as a zero-sum game” (ibid.). Bi-ethnic states are


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thus a special, problematic type of multiethnic state. In a bi-ethnic state, a gain for one ethnic group is easily perceived as a loss for the other. By contrast, in societies with more than two major ethnic groups it may not be apparent who loses when one ethnic group improves its position. This can lead to a logrolling situation, in which each group cares primarily about its own gains and nobody is conscious of the possible costs of a policy decision. The scenario is outlined in Steiner’s study on consociationalism in Switzerland (Steiner, 1974). It also implies that ethnic tension could be more easily aroused by preferential policies in bi-ethnic states than in those with more than two ethnic groups. In addition, a related aspect of the numerical structure of ethnicity refers to the role played by the relative size of ethnic groups in the societal power structure (see, e.g., Stone, 1985; van Amersfoort, 1978; Schermerhorn, 1970), which exerts a crucial bearing on the degree of ethnic conflict and pluralism. Besides the numerical structure of ethnicity, other factors also act to influence ethnic intensity. Among them are whether the ethnic divisions are territorially based, the historical geography (homeland vs. immigrant) of the ethnic groups, and whether the ethnic cleavages are crosscutting or mutually reinforcing. The variables of territoriality and historical geography of ethnicity, though basically also related to ethnic intensity, can be seen from a different angle. Territorial division along ethnic lines may put an upward pressure on public spending as central governments respond to ethnic demands via regional spending, which is not applicable in a country where ethnic groups are dispersed and intermingling in residence. A country where the population consists of both homeland and immigrant ethnic groups, due to the imbalance in ethnic intensity and legitimacy (claims to the land), is more conducive to the use of public spending to implement ethnic preferential policies, resulting in the expansion of the public sector. Examples of such countries are Malaysia, Fiji, Sri Lanka (where part of the Tamil population are immigrants from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu), various states of India, Indonesia, Uganda, Guyana, Trinidad, etc. The last issue to be highlighted here, but probably the most important in the context of this paper, is the crosscutting or mutually reinforcing nature of cleavages that can actually be seen in the same light as the historical geography of ethnicity. In his analysis of Dutch politics, Lijphart (1968) proposed that if a society is too heterogeneous or too homogeneous over racial, linguistic and religious cleavages, democratic political organization is not likely to be stable. A stable democracy must have both a minimum of ethnic homogeneity and a minimum of heterogeneity. Furthermore, the intensity of ethnic conflict depends on both the intensity of group membership (“ethnic intensity”) and the degree of crosscutting


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(XC).19 The more the cleavages reinforce one another, the more intense the conflict will be (Rae and Taylor, 1970: 112). Conversely, the intensity of conflict declines with increasing degree of crosscutting. As Lijphart (1977: 75) noted, perfectly crosscutting and perfectly coinciding cleavages rarely occur in practice, but differences in the degree of crosscutting (or the reverse, that of coinciding or reinforcing) can be critically important. The way in which different cleavages cut across each other can have crucial consequences for the intensity of feelings generated. It affects the sharpness of the ethnic boundary and consequently the overall degree of fragmentation of the society. According to the theory of crosscutting or overlapping memberships, crosscutting produces crosspressures that result in moderate attitudes and actions (ibid.; Almond, 1956; Almond and Powell, 1966). The effect of crosscutting or mutually reinforcing cleavages can be seen in Table 8 that shows the separate linguistic and religious fractionalization indices for Southeast Asian countries. Fiji, which bears a close similarity to Malaysia in its historical geography of ethnicity and the political and economic impact of its deep interethnic problems, is also included in the list for comparison. The other aspect of ethnic fractionalization, the racial (phenotypical), is not shown in the table because for these countries it is mostly identical to or negligibly different from the linguistic fragmentation. Table 8 Linguistic and Religious Fragmentation in Southeast Asia and Fiji Fractionalization Index Country Linguistic Religious Brunei 0.515 0.555 Burma 0.520 0.205 Cambodia 0.238 0.095 Indonesia 0.754 0.238 Laos 0.562 0.255 Malaysia, Peninsular 0.694 0.541 The Philippines 0.838 0.300 Singapore 0.479 0.709 Thailand 0.535 0.096 Viet Nam 0.177 0.201 Fiji 0.580 0.579


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Rae and Taylor had shown that the XC equation (see note 19) could be rewritten as XC = 2FC – F1 – F2 where F1 is the fragmentation of cleavage X1, F2 is that of cleavage X2, and FC is the probability that any two individuals are in different groups in at least one of the cleavages (ibid.: 96). The derivation of F1 or F2 (following the computational procedure of Rae and Taylor’s index of fragmentation described earlier) is relatively straightforward. However, to calculate FC, more detailed data will be required, for instance the proportion of members in each linguistic segment who belong to each religious category and vice versa. This equation is important in showing how crosscutting is in fact closely related to the fragmentation of the relevant cleavages. Since FC can take on several values for given fixed values of F1 and F2, the latter do not completely determine XC. However, F1 and F2 do constrain the possible values of XC. Rae and Taylor showed that if F1 and F2 are both very low (i.e. the cleavages are not very fragmented), FC must also be low. Conversely, FC is high if both F1 and F2 are very high. Hence, from the relation XC = 2FC – F1 – F2, the measure XC must be low in both of these cases. This means that there cannot be much crosscutting whenever F1 and F2 are both very low (near 0) or both very high (near 1). High values of XC can only occur when one of the cleavages has low fragmentation and the other has high fragmentation (ibid.: 99-103). It can be seen in Table 8 that ethnolinguistic-ethnoreligious crosscutting is prevalent in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and probably Burma while such ethnic cleavages are obviously mutually reinforcing in countries like Malaysia, Brunei, Fiji and probably Singapore. The predominant Roman Catholic/animist East Timor, which is not included in the list, is another country exhibiting crosscutting characteristics, with its high degree of linguistic fragmentation (0.667) assuaged by the lack of sharp religious differentiations. The above shows that, Malaysia, which is characterized by its reinforcing racial, linguistic and religious cleavages, should be considered more fragmented in terms of overall ethnic structure, than another country that happens to have similar degrees of racial, linguistic and religious differentiations but where such cleavages are crosscutting. The same can be said of Fiji. Therefore, to reveal the true picture of ethnic fragmentation, the levels of EFIs should ideally take into consideration the effects of crosscutting.


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6. Concluding Remarks This paper proposes an index of ethnic fractionalization that comprises all three major types of non-class cleavages in society – racial (phenotypical), linguistic and religious. Whereas the existing studies on public policy and ethnicity either included only one of these components (Mueller and Murrell’s work which employed linguistic groups as the units of measurement) or considered them as separate variables (McCarty’s “ethnic variance” and “religious variance”)20, this paper regards these components as different manifestations of one single characteristic. In other words, racial (phenotypical), linguistic and religious characteristics represent different markers of ethnic (or socioracial) distinction (often more loosely termed “ethnic markers”). To treat them as separate variables or to employ one to the exclusion of the others inevitably leads to the mismeasurement of the degree of fragmentation. There are two ways to encompass all these three ethnic markers. The first option is to construct a composite index based on three separate indices measuring racial, linguistic and religious diversities respectively. Although technically simple, this option is not adopted in this paper due to the high risk of mismeasurement, as there is no way to accurately gauge the relative weight of the three separate types of fragmentation, especially in the light of the possible crosscutting or reinforcing link between them. On the contrary, the approach followed here is to employ solely the most significant ethnic marker of a country as the unit of measurement, for instance, race (phenotype) in Rwanda, language in India and religion in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Such an approach can of course be said to be as arbitrary as the first option as it disregards the other “less significant” ethnic cleavages. However, on close scrutiny it emerges as the most accurate way to measure ethnic diversity since in reality it is the most prominent cleavage that counts in the polarization of society, though it is in itself often a symbol for social mobilization finding its root in some politico-economic differentiation. It also has the advantage of not having to rely on arbitrary weighting of different indices as required by the first option and avoiding excessive assumptions (Occam’s razor). Therefore, while the index of ethnic fractionalization (EFI) proposed in this paper represents the degree of fragmentation in terms of one of the following cleavages: racial, linguistic and religious (with the possibility of some conceptual overlapping among them), exactly which type of cleavage is selected depends on the particular context of the country concerned. For instance, ethnoreligious cleavages provide a more accurate picture of the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina – so do racial differences in Rwanda and Burundi – than linguistic ones, since linguistic homogeneity


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of these countries is far from reflecting the true degree of their ethnic fragmentation. Ideally, the effect of crosscutting and reinforcing influences between the different markers should also be taken into consideration but again it is practically impossible to accurately measure such complex links (quantitative measurements of the degree of crosscutting or reinforcing such as Rae and Taylor’s XC index would require detailed field survey in each country, which is beyond the scope of this paper, to determine the proportion of the members of a type of ethnic group who also belong to some other types of ethnic groups). Instead of arbitrarily assigning values for such influences, it serves to provide a more accurate measurement of the overall ethnic diversity and demographic heterogeneity, for practical purposes, by not taking them into consideration. While the existence of such influences cannot be denied, a comparison of individual countries’ social histories easily reveals that such influences are not as significant as to alter the relative degree of fragmentation between countries. Notes * Dr Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh 楊國慶 is Director and Associate Professor of the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Malaysia. Graduated with a PhD from the University of Bradford, West Yorkshire, England (1998), his research interests include institutional economics, China studies, decentralization and fiscal federalism, and socioracial diversity and the role of the State in economic development. His works have been published in journals and occasional paper series such as The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, GeoJournal: An International Journal on Human Geography and Environmental Sciences, Journal of Asian Public Policy, International Journal of China Studies, Malaysian Journal of Economic Studies and the Copenhagen Discussion Paper series, and his recent books, as both editor and contributor, include Ethnic Interaction and Segregation on Campus and at the Workplace (2004), Economic Kaleidoscope (2005), China and Malaysia in a Globalizing World (2006), Emerging Trading Nation in an Integrating World (2007), Facets of a Transforming China (2008), China in the World (2008), CJAS Special Issue (26(2)): Transforming China (2008), Regional Political Economy of China Ascendant (2009), China-ASEAN Relations (2009), Towards Pax Sinica? (2009), IJCS Special Issue (1(1)): Changing China (2010), East Asian Regional Integration (2010), IJCS Special Issue (1(2)): Social Change in the Age of Reform (2010), IJCS Special Issue (2(2)): Reform, Governance and Equity (2011) and IJCS Focus (2(3)): South China Sea and China’s Foreign Relations (2011). 1. This paper, focusing on the conference and special issue’s theme of ethnic and cultural diversity, represents an updated and expanded version of an article first published as “Phenotypical, Linguistic or Religious? On the Concept


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and Measurement of Ethnic Fragmentation” in the Malaysian Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. XXXX, Numbers 1 and 2, June/December 2003, pp. 23-47. 2. The word “State” (with a capital “S”) is used here (except in quotations) to refer to the central body politic of a civil government – in contrast with the private citizenry or a rival authority such as the Church, whereas “state” (with a lower-case “s”) refers in general to other senses of the term, including a “country” or a political territory forming part of a country. The word “nation” in this sense is avoided here since it has the alternative connotation of a community of common ethnic identity, but not necessarily constituting a state. n

3. A = 1 − ∑ (Pi) 2 i =1

where P = the proportion of total population in the ith language group. 4. Discussions of F and similar indices are also found in Wildgen (1971), Taylor and Hudson (1972), Vayrynen (1972), Wilcox (1973), Milder (1974) and Lijphart (1977). 5. The Europa World Year Book, London: Europa Publications, various issues. 6. The Europa Regional Surveys of the World, London: Europa Publications, various issues. 7. The World Almanac and Book of Fact, New York: Pharos Books/Scripps Howard, and Mahwah, New Jersey: World Almanac/Funk & Wagnalls, various issues. 8. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, New York: Maxwell Macmillan/Brassey’s, various issues. 9. These indices are no more included in the subsequent edition of this work (Taylor and Jodice, 1983). 10. Atlas Narodov Mira, Moscow: The N.N. Miklukho-Maklaya Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences, Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the USSR, 1964. 11. Different sources and nature of data utilized, nevertheless, mean that the exact boundaries of income brackets used here may not always coincide with those in the WDR. CV in Table 3 refers to the coefficient of variation derived by dividing the standard deviation by the mean. CV is generally taken to indicate substantial variation if it has a score of more than roughly 0.25 (see Lane and Ersson, 1990: 58). 12. The four country sets, comprising a total of 119 countries, are established according to the level of affluence reflected in their gross domestic products (GDP) per capita. The definition of income groups follows closely the country categorization in World Bank’s World Development Report. 13. As noted by Gladney (1991: 6-7), due to the interchangeability of the terms “ethnicity” and “nationality” in the literature, there is much confusion over minority nationality identity in China. The term minzu 民族 is used for both concepts of nationality and ethnicity (or zhongzu 种族) in China, the former being what the Chinese State has designated “56 nationalities”. While “ethnicity” should more rightly refer to an individual’s self-perceived


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identity, it is also often influenced by State policy. Gladney (ibid.) pointed out that in contrast to the limited term minzu (nationality/ethnicity”) used in China, Soviet ethnological vocabulary distinguished in Russian between ethnos, nationalnost, and narodnost (“ethnicity”, “nationality”, “peoplehood”) (Chapter 1, note 19). In other words, “nationality” (minzu) is what the Chinese State has conferred upon the 56 ethnic groups identified mainly in the 1950s (ibid.: 6). This historical background explains a lot about China’s “national” policy till today. Leaving aside the Han-non-Han dichotomy, even the socalled “Han Chinese“ as a homogeneous ethnic group, whether phenotypically or culturally, may not be what it has always been taken for granted. The great diversity of the mutually unintelligible regionalects is well known. (The speakers of many of the Chinese regional languages are simply too numerous for the word “dialects” to be used as an appropriate term to designate their languages. For instance, the number of speakers of either Cantonese (Yue 粵) or Hokkien/Fujianese (Min 閩) is larger than the number of speakers of either Polish or Ukrainian, the two East European/Slavonic languages with most numerous speakers except Russian, or the speakers of Dutch, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish combined.) Regional differences – including the distinction between the wheat-eating northerners and rice-eating southerners – have always been observed, or as one observer noted, there are the […] “Han” Chinese of south-coastal China who speak dialects other than Mandarin and who, in fact, sometimes refer to themselves as T’angjen (men of T’ang, after the T’ang dynasty, seventh to tenth centuries) rather than as Han-jen (after the Han dynasty, third century B.C. to third century A.D.) and […] the “national minorities” in south China who have been to varying extents acculturated to Chinese ways – to the point, in some cases, that they had no awareness of being different, of being a “minority,” until they were informed of the fact by workers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences who came to their areas after 1949. (Moseley, 1966: 9) 14. An interesting fact that stands out in Table 7 and Figure 4 is that the ethnic group whose name marks a particular zizhiqu may not be the demographically dominant group there. In Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi, the Han Chinese constitute the dominant group (67, 83 and 61 per cent respectively), while the Hui, Mongol and Zhuang are in fact minorities in the respective zizhiqu (33, 16 and 37 per cent respectively). In Xinjiang, while the Uygur outnumber the Han, the former are hardly a majority, constituting less than 50 per cent of the zizhiqu’s total population. Tibet is the oddity in the whole of China, with Tibetans constituting 96 per cent of the population, demographically dwarfing the Han to a mere 4 per cent. The official figures have been disputed by the Tibetan government-in-exile who claims that “accelerating Han population transfer into Tibet […] has reduced the Tibetan people to a minority in their own land [… and today] there are over 7.5 million non-Tibetan settlers in Tibet including Chinese and Hui Muslims, compared to six million Tibetans” (Cook and Murray, 2001: 141). However,


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15.

16.

17. 18.

19.

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such allegations of population transfer is rebutted by the Beijing government, who argues that “the only Han Chinese living in Tibet are specialists who have gone there voluntarily to help in the region’s development [… and they] make up less than five per cent of the population and many of the people are there for only a few years before returning home” (ibid.). Measured by the rate of expansion in gross domestic product per capita, “economic growth” used to be synonymous with “economic development” and “economic progress” in general (Sen, 1988). However, it bypasses the problem of how national income is distributed. To grasp the true meaning of “economic development”, Lane and Ersson (1990: 49) noted the importance of separating (i) the level or rate of growth in GDP total or per capita; (ii) the level or rate of change in a set of social indicators measuring average individual well-being; and (iii) the distribution of income and wealth. However, it is interesting to note an opposite view posited by Harris in his study of ethnicity in Latin America (1964: 98) that “the price which the underdeveloped countries or regions […] have paid for relative racial tranquillity is economic stagnation”. Economic stagnation, he believed, may lead to less ethnic conflict than economic expansion “by virtue of the fact that there has not been too much to fight for” (ibid.: 97). While not denying the possibility that ethnic conflict may increase with economic expansion, Hoetink (1973: 111-112) argued that it is not the expanding economy per se that disturbs racial tranquillity but rather the presence of poorer members of the dominant ethnic group, “who are not objectively different from the other poor racial groups and hence tend to exploit their ascriptive distinctions à outrance”. In other words, economic expansion leads to a decline in economic differentiation and therefore results in an emphasis on other dimensions of social distinction, especially racial characteristics. Based on the “critical mass” theory – advanced, among others, by Semyonov and Tyree (1981) – societies are considered multiethnic only if minorities constitute more than ten per cent of their population. The term “multiethnic” (or “polyethnic”) has been generally used in the literature to mean “consisting of more than one ethnic group”, i.e. including the bi-ethnic case, although occasionally it is also used in contradistinction to (and thus excluding) the bi-ethnic case. In this paper the term “multiethnic” is often used in the latter sense (i.e. in contradistinction to and excluding the bi-ethnic case). The context will serve to avoid any confusion between this narrower definition of the attribute “multiethnic” from the broader one. An option may be to reserve arbitrarily the term “polyethnic” for this narrower sense. This, however, risks creating more confusion as this word has always been used interchangeably in the literature with the term “multiethnic”. Rae and Taylor (1970) defined “crosscutting” (XC) as the proportion of all pairs of individuals whose two members are in the same group of one cleavage but in different groups of the other cleavage: XC =

A+B N ( N ' − 1) / 2 '


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where A is the number of pairs whose members are in the same group of the cleavage X1 but in different groups of X2 (i.e. matched on X1 but mixed on X2), B is the number of pairs whose members are in different groups of X1 but in the same group of X2 (i.e. mixed on X1 but matched on X2), and N' (N' – 1) / 2 is the total number of pairs (N' = the number of individuals in the overlap) (Rae and Taylor, 1970: 92). Examples of X1 and X2 most relevant to the present study are language and religion, race and religion, or language and race. Like the fragmentation index employed here, the measure XC also varies between limits of 0 and 1. XC is zero when cleavages are “completely reinforcing” – all the matched pairs on X1 are matched on X2 and all the mixed pairs on X1 are mixed on X2. XC is equal to one in the hypothetical case of complete crosscutting if all matched pairs on X1 were mixed on X2 and all mixed pairs on X1 were matched on X2. 20. Language is the marker used in constructing the ELF (ethno-linguistic fractionalization) in Kuijs (2000), and race (phenotype) that employed in another by Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1998), both following similar computation procedure as in this paper. The former covers a population of 54 to 79 countries while the latter focuses on U.S. cities, metropolitan areas and counties.

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