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Vol: 3 No : 2 Winter 2010

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES

Vol: 3

No: 2

Winter 2010

Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim Forecasting Turkey's Natural Gas Consumption by Using Time Series Methods Kadir Can Yalç›n Market Rationality: Efficient Market Hypothesis versus Market Anomalies Sad›k Ünay Hegemony, Aid and Power: A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the World Bank Mette Nordahl Grosen, Bezen Balamir Coflkun A Decade of SAPs, Market Liberalization and Environment in Tanzania (1987-1998) Onder Cetin 1941 Resolutions of El-Hidaje in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Case of Traditional Conflict Transformation Eren Tatari, Renat Shaykhutdinov State Response to Religious Revivalism in Post-Soviet Central Asia Ümit Kurt The Doctrine of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” as Official Ideology of the September 12 and the “Intellectuals' Hearth - Ayd›nlar Oca¤›” as the Ideological Apparatus of the State Hakan Yeflilova Justice, Human Rights, and the Quasi-Civil Society in a Muslim Context

ISSN 1307-6000

Ömer Çaha Attitudes Towards the Status of Women in Turkish Society: The Case of Istanbul Gokhan Bacik, Sammas Salur Coup-proofing in Turkey

9 771307 600002

FAT‹H UNIVERSITY

34500 Büyükçekmece / ‹stanbul Tel: + 90 212 886 33 00 www.fatih.edu.tr

Kemal Ozden, Ihsan Yilmaz An Attempt at Pseudo-Democracy and Tactical Liberalization in Turkey: An Analysis of Ismet Inönü's Decision to Transition to a Multi-Party Political System Bekir Ç›nar The Relationship Between Terrorism and Liberal Democratic States Özlem Demirtafl Bagdonas Reconsidering the Incompatibility Between European Orientation and Cyprus Policy: Westphalian and Post-Westphalian Approaches to Turkey's Cyprus Policy and the EC/EU

FAT‹H UNIVERSITY

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES European Journal of Economic and Political Studies (EJEPS) is an international peer-reviewed journal. Editors: Nizamettin Bayyurt, Fatih University, Istanbul. Abdülkadir Civan, Fatih University, Istanbul. Editorial Assistant: Erdoan A. Shipoli, Fatih University, Istanbul Editorial Board Ahmet Çal›flkan, Fatih University Ahmet Kuru, San Diego State University Ali Akdemir, Çanakkale 18 Mart University Andrzej Ananicz, Polish Institute for International Affairs Birol Akgün, Selcuk University David S. Shipley, Samford University Ercan S›rakaya, University of South Carolina Frank Pfetsch, University of Heidelberg Gökhan Bac›k, Zirve University Ibrahim Demir, Benedict College Jim Walsh, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joan Manuel Cabezas, University of Barcelona Klaus von Beyme, University of Heidelberg Lokman Gündüz, The Turkish Central Bank Mehmet Hasgüler, Çanakkale 18 Mart University Michael Maloney, Clemson University Naim Kapucu, University of Central Florida Nejdet fiensoy, Marmara University Neyran Orhunbilge, Istanbul University Sergei Markedenov, Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis Turan Kayao¤lu, The University of Washington Vahram Ter-Metevosyan, Yerevan State University Hadi Yektafl, University of Melbourne European Journal of Economic and Political Studies (EJEPS) (ISSN: 1307-6000) is published twice a year by The Graduate School of Social Sciences, Fatih University, Istanbul. Indexing and Abstracting: European Journal of Economics and Political Science (EJEPS) is indexed in Index Copernicus, Ulrich, and Index Islamicus Production and Advertising Office: Fatih University, The Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hadimkoy Kampusu, Buyukcekmece 34500 Istanbul Turkey. Copyright © 2010 Fatih University. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission from Fatih University.

AIMS AND SCOPE European Journal of Economic and Political Studies (EJEPS) is an international peer-reviewed academic journal, publishing research articles in the field of economics, business administration, international relations, political science, public administration and related fields. The aim of EJEPS is to provide an intellectual platform for social-scientific studies, a platform in which research in alternative paradigms for economic and social inquiry could be presented and debated. The journal seeks to promote interdisciplinary studies over the issues of theoretical, practical, and historical importance in dealing with the rich array of problems in economic, political and social processes.

GUIDE FOR AUTHORS Any paper submitted to the European Journal of Economic and Political Studies (EJEPS) should NOT be under consideration for publication at another journal. 1. Papers must be in English. 2. Submit manuscripts electronically to [email protected] 3. Papers that are submitted to EJEPS for publication should not be under review at other journals. 4. The first page of the manuscript should contain: (i) the title (ii) the name(s) and institutional affiliation(s) of the author(s) (iii) the address, telephone and fax numbers (as well as the e-mail address) of the corresponding author (iv) an abstract of 50-200 words (v) JEL categories 5. Manuscripts should be 1.5 spaced. Please use Times New Roman font in 12 pt. type and maintain a 1-inch (2.5-cm) side, top, and bottom margins. Equations and symbols should be typed as well. 6. Figures and tables should be numbered consecutively. 7. References should be listed at the end of the main text in alphabetical order. They should be cross-referenced in the text by using the author's name and publication date in the style of (Sen 1970: 128). References should be typed in the following style: Books: Sen, A. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day. Articles: Ng, Y.K. 1971. "The Possibility of a Paretian Liberal: Impossibility Theorems and Cardinal Utility." Journal of Political Economy 79: 1397-1402. Chapters in Books: Watkins, J.W.N. 1968. "Methodological Individualism and Social Tendencies," In M. Brodbeck (Ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. London: Macmillan. pp. 269-280. Web sites: Biography Center. http://www.gayegroup.com/BiographyRC/. (accessed October 25, 2007). Working Papers: Isabel, M. 2004. “An Efficient Descending-Bid Simultaneous Auctions for Multiple Objects.” NBER Working Paper, 97-06. Conference Papers: White, M. 2009. “The Evolution of Political Stabilization in the Middle East.” Fatih University International Relations Conference, Istanbul, Turkey.

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Vol: 3

No: 2

Winter 2010

Fatih University 2010 Graduate School of Social Sciences

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies Contents Vol: 3

No: 2

Winter 2010

Forecasting Turkey’s Natural Gas Consumption by Using Time Series Methods Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim

……………….……......….

1

Market Rationality: Efficient Market Hypothesis versus Market Anomalies Kadir Can Yalçın …………………………………………….………..….………………….………..…….…23

Hegemony, Aid and Power: A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the World Bank Sadık Ünay ……………………………………………..……………………………...………………………………39

A Decade of SAPs, Market Liberalization and Environment in Tanzania (1987 - 1998) Mette Nordahl Grosen, Bezen Balamir Coflkun

…………….……………….

53

1941 Resolutions of El-Hidaje in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Case of Traditional Conflict Transformation Onder Cetin ……………………………………………..…………………………………….……….……..…. 73

State Response to Religious Revivalism in Post-Soviet Central Asia Eren Tatari, Renat Shaykhutdinov ………………………………...………….………..… 85

The Doctrine of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” as Official Ideology of the September 12 and the “Intellectuals’ Hearth – ” as the Ideological Apparatus of the State Ümit Kurt ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….….. 113

Justice, Human Rights, and the Quasi-Civil Society in a Muslim Context Hakan Yeflilova …………………………………………….………..….…………………………………… 129

Attitudes Towards the Status of Women in Turkish Society: The Case of Istanbul Ömer Çaha …………………………………………….………..….………………..…………….……………. 147

Coup-proofing in Turkey Gokhan Bacik, Sammas Salur …………………….….……………….……………...……… 165

An Attempt at Pseudo-Democracy and Tactical Liberalization in Turkey: An Analysis of Ismet Inönü’s Decision to Transition to a Multi-Party Political System Kemal Ozden, Ihsan Yilmaz …………………….….…………....……….……………...………191

The Relationship Between Terrorism and Liberal Democratic States Bekir Çınar …………………….….………………………………………………………..……………...……… 209

Reconsidering the Incompatibility Between European Orientation and Cyprus Policy: Westphalian and Post-Westphalian Approaches to Turkey’s Cyprus Policy and the EC/EU Özlem Demirtafl Bagdonas …………………….….……………….…….……………...……… 229

-3 (2), 2010

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Forecasting Turkey’s Natural Gas Consumption by Using Time Series Methods

Mustafa Akkurt*, Omer F. Demirel**, Selim Zaim***

Abstract

Strategic energy planning processes, which include natural gas demand, are commonly used as a tool to design the regional and local energy system and encourage renewable energy development. The oil and natural gas market plays a very important role in the strategic energy planning process in a country. In recent years, natural gas consumption has become the fastest growing primary energy source in Turkey. In this study, natural gas consumptions of Turkey in different time periods are forecasted by using various time series methods such as exponential smoothing, winters’ forecasting and Box-Jenkins methods. These methods are compared with each other in terms of the superiority in forecasting performance. The findings reveal that in the yearly data set, double exponential smoothing model outperforms the other alternative forecasting models. On the other hand, in term of monthly data set, SARIMA model provides the better results than the others. Keywords: Forecasting, Time Series, Natural Gas

* ** ***

Fatih University. [email protected] Fatih University. [email protected] Fatih University. [email protected]

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Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim

Introduction Energy is one of the most important inputs required to maintain social and economical improvement in a country. It is necessary that energy demand should be performed at the right time economically, and be of good quality and respectful of increasing environmental consciousness in order to preserve national development and a high standard of living. Natural gas is an alternative energy source that has cleanliness, burning easiness, high thermal value and resource availability (Aras and Aras, 2003). All over the world, the use of natural gas is projected to nearly double between 1999 and 2020, providing a relatively clean fuel for efficient new gas turbine power plants. The largest increases in gas use are expected in Central and South America and in developing Asia, and the developing countries as a whole are expected to add a larger increment to gas use by 2020 than are the industrialized countries. Turkey is located at a strategic place between the Middle and Near East, where rich oil and natural gas reserves prevail, and the Western world, where the main energy consumption takes place. Turkey is also situated near the Caspian Sea, where natural gas and oil production are expected to increase substantially. Turkey has made a remarkable contribution to the stability of the region and still continues to maintain this policy. It is accepted that creating a balanced international cooperation setting is an important factor for acquiring more reliable energy supply (Ozturk and Hepbasli, 2003). Turkey is an important candidate to be the ‘‘energy corridor’’ in the transmission of the abundant oil and natural gas resources of the Middle East and Middle Asia countries to the Western market. Furthermore, Turkey is planning to increase its oil and gas pipeline infrastructure to accommodate its increased energy consumption. Naturally, Turkish natural gas usage is projected to increase remarkably in coming years, with the prime consumers, expected to be industry and power plants (Kilic, 2006). Turkish energy consumption has risen dramatically over the past 20 years due to the combined demands of industrialization and urbanization. The usage of the natural gas can be classified into 3 groups; the residential users, the industrial users and the commercial users. The demand characteristics of these three categories differ significantly. The residential customer demands are typically temperature sensitive, increasing on weekends. The commercial customers are also typically temperature sensitive, but decreasing on weekends. Industrial customer demand is much less temperature sensitive, decreasing significantly on weekends. Historically, many methods have been used to predict daily demand. Gas controllers have used methods such as looking at use patterns on similar historical days and scatter plots of use versus temperature. Often these methods are only successfully applied by experts with years of experience at a Local Distribution Company (LDC). LDC firms are

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

taken into consideration as distributors for cities. LDC faces many challenges in the business of supplying gas to their customers. The gas supply system of an LDC consists of gate stations, compressors, gas storage, and customers. The LDC must operate these systems to assure delivery of gas in adequate volumes at required pressures under all circumstances. For efficient, economical, and safe operation, the daily gas demanded by the customers must be known in advance with some degree of accuracy. The customer base of an LDC consists of many individual customers, each with unique demand characteristics. Customers use gas for space heating, known as heating load, for heating water, drying, cooking and baking, and other processes, known as base load, and for electric power generation (Brown et al., 2005). Forecasting the natural gas demand is important for planning gas production and transmission. The challenges of this forecasting are the volatility of consumer profile, the strong dependency on weather conditions and the lack of historical data (Viet and Mandziuk, 2000). Forecasting Natural Gas Consumption There is wide range of studies about forecasting natural gas consumption in the literature. Liu and Lin (1991) estimated the residential consumption of natural gas in Taiwan by using linear transfer function method. Brown and Matin (1995) made a study about development of feed-forward artificial neural network models to forecast daily gas consumption in Wisconsin. Durmayaz et al. (2000) estimated the residential heating energy requirement and fuel consumption in Istanbul based on degree-hours method. Khotanzad et al. (2000) has used the artificial neural network (ANN) forecasters with application the prediction of daily natural gas consumption needed by gas utilities. Gumrah et al. (2001) analyzed the factors and their relationships that influencing the gas consumption in Ankara, and they suggested a model based on degree-day concept including annual number of customers, average degree days, and the usage per customer. Sarak and Satman (2003) forecast the residential heating natural gas consumption in Turkey by using degree-day method. Aras and Aras (2003) have described an approach to obtain appropriate models for forecasting residential monthly natural gas consumption in terms of time series analyses and degree-day method. Viet and Mandziuk (2003) analyzed and tested the several approaches to prediction of natural gas consumption with neural and fuzzy neural systems for natural gas load in two different regions of Poland. Siemek et al. (2003) implemented the Hubbert model based upon Starzman modification to describe the possible scenario of the development of the Poland gas sector. Liu et al. (2004) used the support vector regression (SVM) technique for natural gas load forecasting of Xi’an city, and they

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Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim

compared the result with the 7-lead day forecasting of neural network based model. Gil and Deferrari (2004) presented a generalized model which predicts mainly the residential and commercial natural gas consumption in urban areas of Argentina, for the short and intermediate ranges of time. Brown et al. (2005) presented the mathematical models for gas forecasting in their study. Gutiérrez et al. (2005) used Gompertz-type innovation diffusion process as a stochastic growth model of natural gas consumption in Spain and compared stochastic logistic innovation modeling and stochastic lognormal growth modeling of a non-innovation diffusion process. Al-Fattah (2006) presents a methodology for developing forecasting models for predicting U.S. natural gas production, proved reserves, and annual depletion to year 2025 using time series modeling approach. Kenisarin and Kenisarina (2006) investigated the energy saving potential in the residential sector of Uzbekistan. Ivezi (2006) showed the results of investigation of an artificial neural network (ANN) model for short term natural gas consumption forecasting. This methodology uses multilayer artificial neural networks to incorporate historical weather and consumption data. Wong-Parodi et al. (2006) compared the accuracy of the forecasts for the natural gas prices of Energy Information Administration’s short term energy outlook and the futures market for the period from 1999 to 2004. Potocnik et al. (2007) proposed a strategy to estimate forecasting risk of natural gas consumption in Slovenia. This strategy combines an energy demand forecasting model, an economic incentive model and a risk model. Sanchez-Ubeda and Berzosa (2007) presented a model based on decomposition approach to capture demand patterns in a very large number of different historical profiles. Ediger and Akar (2007) used ARIMA and SARIMA methods to estimate the future primary energy demand of Turkey from 2005 to 2020. K1z1laslan and Karlık (2009) used seven neural networks algorithms as forecasting models they tried to find the best solution on forecasting of monthly natural gas consumption The Research Study The analyses used in this study are conducted in two stages. First stage involves monthly forecasting analysis based on a various time series models. In the second stage, yearly data set has been considered to forecast the natural gas consumption in Turkey. Finally, these time series methods are compared with each other in terms of the superiority in forecasting performance. Data set was collected from the stateowned Turkish Pipeline Corporation (BOTA). All these stages are explained in the following subsections.

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Monthly Natural Gas Consumption of Turkey In this part of study monthly natural gas consumption data of Turkey are taken into account. The consumption values were provided by International Energy Agency (IEA) from 1999 to 2008. In total 120 data points are observed. When we plot the monthly natural gas consumption of Turkey, it exhibits seasonality and increasing trend as clearly seen in Figure 1. Like other natural gas consumption data sets, the consumption values are increasing in winter months and decreasing in summer months. As Turkey’s total natural consumption is growing the data has an increasing trend. Figure 1 Monthly natural gas consumption of Turkey from 1999 to 2008 (IEA)

Forecasting Monthly Natural Gas Consumption with Exponential Smoothing Type Methods SmartForecasts software is utilized for a search on forecasting methods. The data values from years 1999 to 2007 were used. The consumption values of 2008 were used for testing the selected forecasting method. The results obtained from SmartForecasts are given below in Table 1.

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Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim

Table 1 SmartForecasts results Rank

% Worse Avg Error

Forecasting Method

1

(winner)

160.10

Winters' Multiplicative, weights = 26% 26% 26%

2

33.8%

214.21

Winters' Additive, weights = 54% 54% 54%

3

37.1%

219.49

Simple Moving Average of 1 periods

4

37.4%

219.93

Single Exponential Smoothing, weight = 97%

5

76.2%

282.05

Double Exponential Smoothing, weight = 69%

6

82.4%

292.01

Linear Moving Average of 12 periods

Winters’ multiplicative method with weights 0,26; 0,26; 0,26 is suggested by SmartForecasts for monthly data. The forecasts for 2008 are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 Winters’ multiplicative method forecasts Winters' Method with 2008

Real

0,26; 0,26; 0,26

Lower Limit

Upper Limit

Error

January

3647

3,831

3,480

4,182

184

February

3680

3,622

3,261

3,982

-58

March

3685

3,574

3,202

3,945

-111

April

3001

2,874

2,491

3,258

-127

May

3000

2,579

2,182

2,975

-421

June

2753

2,442

2,031

2,852

-311

July

2368

2,552

2,127

2,977

184

August

2882

2,576

2,135

3,017

-306

September 2880

2,557

2,100

3,015

-323

October

2947

2,778

2,303

3,252

-169

November 3121

3,241

2,749

3,733

120

December 3164

3,657

3,146

4,167

493

MAD

234

Forecasting

Monthly

Natural

Gas

Consumption

with

Seasonal

Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (SARIMA) Model We have generated Box-Jenkins SARIMA model for forecasting monthly natural gas consumption of Turkey in 2008. We have also used the consumption values from 1999 to 2007 to form the SARIMA model. SPSS time series function module is utilized.

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

SPSS Time Series function recommends SARIMA (0,0,2)(1,1,0) model. The model constant is estimated as 263,224 where as MA(1) parameter estimate is -0,473 and MA(2) is -0,471. Seasonal AR(1) parameter estimate is -0,425. The forecasts obtained from SARIMA model are given in Table 3. SARIMA has slightly better MAD value than Winters’ multiplicative method and unlike Winters all the real values are in forecasted limits. (The consumption value of May was out of the Winters forecasted limit.) SARIMA should be selected for forecasting method to predict monthly natural gas consumption of Turkey. Lastly to diagnose whether the proposed model is appropriate for this data and the underlying assumption of uncorrelated residuals (error terms) is violated or not we have drawn the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation function of the residuals. As clearly seen from Figure 2 there is no significant correlation between the residuals and our model is appropriate for the monthly consumption data.

Table 3 Forecasts of SARIMA Model.

2008

Lower Upper Real SARIMA Limit Limit Error

January

3647 3,364

2,889

3,839

-283

February

3680 3,323

2,746

3,900

-357

March

3685 3,332

2,683

3,982

-353

April

3001 2,971

2,321

3,621

-30

May

3000 2,715

2,065

3,365

-285

June

2753 2,625

1,975

3,274

-128

July

2368 2,553

1,904

3,203

185

August

2882 2,586

1,936

3,236

-296

September 2880 2,701

2,051

3,351

-179

October

2947 2,916

2,266

3,565

-31

November 3121 3,357

2,707

4,006

236

December 3164 3,604

2,954

4,254

440

MAD

233.64

Residual ACF and PACF plots are given in Figure 2.

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Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim

Figure 2 Residual ACF and PACF plots of SARIMA(0,0,2)(1,1,0) Residual

ACF

Residual

PACF

24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16

Lag

15 14 13

VAR00001 - Model_1

12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

-1,0

-0,5

0,0

0,5

1,0- 1 , 0

-0,5

0,0

0,5

1,0

Residual

Annual Natural Gas Consumption Turkey’s need for energy sources is growing fastly therefore total natural gas consumption has risen rapidly in the last 20 years. Annual natural gas consumption values from 1987 to 2008 are provided by BOTAS (Turkey’s petroleum and natural gas pipeline corporation). The plot of annual natural gas consumption data shows an obvious increasing trend and no seasonality in Figure 3. Trend analysis would be meaningful to explore future expectations about annual natural gas consumption of Turkey.

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Figure 3 Annual natural gas consumption of Turkey from 1987 to 2008 (BOTAS)

Forecasting the Annual Natural Gas Consumption of Turkey with Trend Analysis Trend analysis can be done with different ways in time series models. Commonly used models are linear trend model and quadratic trend model. Linear trend model accounts for linearity in the trend. Quadratic trend model accounts for curvature in the trend. In this research double exponential smoothing is investigated for forecasting annual natural gas consumption of Turkey. More over double exponential smoothing’s level and trend parameters were optimized in MINITAB software. The plots of all three methods are drawn in Figures 4, 5 and 6 and Error values of these models are listed in the Table 4.

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Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim

Figure 4 Trend analysis plot of annual natural gas consumption of Turkey by applying regression model Trend Analysis Plot Regression Yt = -3740 + 1416*t

Variable A ctual F its F orecasts

30000 25000

A ccuracy Measures MA PE 57 MA D 2042 MSE 5750200

20000 15000 10000 5000 0 2

4

6

8

10 12 Index

14

16

18

20

Figure 5 Trend Analysis plot of annual natural gas consumption of Turkey by applying quadratic trend model Trend Analysis Plot

Quadratic Trend Model Yt = 2108 - 179*t + 75,95*t**2 35000

Variable A ctual Fits Forecasts

30000 25000

A ccuracy Measures MA PE 25 MA D 676 MSE 686926

20000 15000 10000 5000 0 2

4

6

8

10 12 Index

10

14

16

18

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Figure 6 Plot of annual natural gas consumption in Turkey by applying double exponential smoothing model Double Exponential Smoothing Plot Double Exponential Method

40000

Variable A ctual Fits Forecasts 95,0% PI

30000

Smoothing C onstants A lpha (lev el) 0,22680 Gamma (trend) 3,43330

20000

A ccuracy Measures MA PE 13 MA D 676 MSE 741555

10000

0 2

4

6

8

10 12 Index

14

16

18

20

Table 4 Error values of different models Methods

MAPE

MAD

Regression

57

2.042

Quadratic Trend

25

676

13

676

Double

Exponential

Smoothing

with 0,23 and 3,43 weights

The mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and the mean absolute deviation (MAD) values of quadratic trend and double exponential smoothing are lower than linear regression in Table 4 therefore, quadratic trend and double exponential smoothing are appropriate models for forecasting. We use consumptions from 1987 to 2006 for forming the model and forecast 2007, 2008 consumptions for testing the model. The SmartForecasts software is used to forecast the annual consumptions of 2007 and 2008. SmartForecasts runs automatic search to select forecasting method with minimum error and proposed double exponential smoothing method with both 0,71 weights as the best method. Forecasts of double exponential smoothing and quadratic trend for 2007 and 2008 are shown below in Table 5. Note that LL is lower limit and UL is upper limit of forecasts.

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Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim

Table 5 Forecasts for 2007 and 2008 Quadratic

DES

Years

Real

Trend

Error

(0,71; 0,71) UL

LL

Error

2007

35,064

31,842

-3,222

34,031

36,440

31,623

-1,033

2008

37,128

34,928

-2,200

37,864

40,922

34,805

736

MAD

2,711

MAD

884

The forecast values demonstrated that double exponential smoothing method has minimum MAD value and acceptable lower and upper limits. We suggest double exponential smoothing model to make long term forecasts. For further improvement, we made a parameter search on double exponential smoothing. For level and trend constants we have tried parameters values of 0,2; 0,4 and 0,6. The results in Table 6 have shown that parameter values of

(0,6; 0,6)

combination has a lower MAD value than others. Table 6 Parameter search on double exponential smoothing DES Level Trend MAD 0.2

0.2

7811

0.2

0.4

5826

0.2

0.6

3635

0.4

0.2

4482

0.4

0.4

2754

0.4

0.6

2001

0.6

0.2

3019

0.6

0.4

1671

0.6

0.6

866

In Table 7 the limits and MAD value of (0,6; 0,6) parametered model is compared with double exponential smoothing with (0,71; 0,71) parameters. Here also Double exponential smoothing with 0.6 and 0.6 parameters has better MAD value. So we can take that model as our forecasting model.

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Table 7 Comparison of double exponential smoothing models DES (0.6; 0.6) Year Real

DES (0.71; 0.71) Forecast LLr

UL

Error

Forecast LLr

UL

Error

2007 35,064 33,437

30,870 36,004 (1,627) 34,031

36,440 31,623 (1,033)

2008 37,128 37,023

33,961 40,086 (105)

40,922 34,805 736

MAD

37,864

866

MAD

884

Forecasting the Annual Natural Gas Consumption with Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) Model As clearly seen in Figure 3, annual natural gas consumption of Turkey has an increasing trend. That makes the data non-stationary one. This kind of series must be transformed into stationary form in order to make time series analysis according to Box-Jenkins procedure. Differencing is one of the transformation methods to make the data stationary. It is particularly useful for removing a trend. For non-seasonal data, first-order differencing is usually sufficient to attain apparent stationarity, so that the new series

{y1 ,K, y N 1 }is formed from the original series {x1 ,K, x N } by y t = xt +1  xt = xt +1 First-order differencing is widely used. Occasionally second-order differencing 2

is required using the operator  , where (Chatfield, 1996)

 2 xt + 2 = xt + 2  xt +1 = xt + 2  2 xt +1 + xt Firstly, we take the first difference of the data and then we plot the new data in Figure 7. Time series plot of first difference of the data has a trend. Autocorrelation function (ACF) is reducing slowly in Figure 8. The autocorrelation function shows high correlation coefficients with lags. The slow decline of the ACF and time plot of first difference of data suggests that second differencing is required.

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Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim

Figure 7 Time series plot after first difference of annual natural gas consumption of Turkey Time Series Plot of 1st diff 5000

1st diff

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 2

4

6

8

10 Index

12

14

16

18

Figure 8 Autocorrelation function plot of first difference of annual natural gas consumption of Turkey Autocorrelation Function for 1st diff (with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations) 1,0 0,8

Autocorrelation

0,6 0,4 0,2 0,0

-0,2 -0,4 -0,6 -0,8 -1,0 1

2

3 Lag

4

5

Second difference of the data is plotted in Figure 9. The trend is removed and the stationarity is obtained. Its autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation function plots are also shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 respectively.

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Figure 9 Time series plot after second difference of annual natural gas consumption of Turkey Time Series Plot of 2nd differ 4000 3000

2nd differ

2000 1000 0

-1000 -2000 -3000 2

4

6

8

10 Index

12

14

16

18

Figure 10 Autocorrelation function plot of second difference of annual natural gas consumption of Turkey Autocorrelation Function for 2nd differ (with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations) 1,0 0,8

Autocorrelation

0,6 0,4 0,2 0,0

-0,2 -0,4 -0,6 -0,8 -1,0 1

2

3 Lag

15

4

5

Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim

Figure 11 Partial autocorrelation function plot of second difference of annual natural gas consumption of Turkey Partial Autocorrelation Function for 2nd differ (with 5% significance limits for the partial autocorrelations) 1,0

Partial Autocorrelation

0,8 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,0

-0,2 -0,4 -0,6 -0,8 -1,0 1

2

3 Lag

4

5

Order of autoregressive process of the ARIMA model is determined by the number of partial autocorrelation function coefficients. Similarly, order of moving average of the ARIMA model is decided by the number of autocorrelation function coefficients. The peak points of these functions show the order of models (Goktas, 2005). This approach is employed to find out the orders of annual natural gas consumption of ARIMA model. Autocorrelation function plot of the second difference in Figure 10 has the peak point at the first lag. Moving average order should be first order. Partial correlation function plot of second difference in Figure 11 has the peak at the first lag. So autoregressive process order should be first order for the model. As a result of that analysis, ARIMA (1,2,1) is decided to make annual natural gas consumption forecasts of Turkey. In order to check our findings we also run SPSS software. SPSS made an automatic search on the orders of ARIMA and suggested the ARIMA(1,2,0) model for annual gas consumption data of Turkey. Coefficients of both ARIMA models are listed in Table 8. We have compared forecasting performance of both models in Table 9. ARIMA(1,2,1) model is performing better than ARIMA(1,2,0) model in forecasting 2007 and 2008.

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Table 8 Coefficients of ARIMA models Coefficients Model

AR(1)

ARIMA (1,2,0)

-0,708

ARIMA (1,2,1)

-0,642

MA(1) 0,194

Table 9 Results of ARIMA models ARIMA Years Real

(1,2,0)

ARIMA UL

LL

Error (1,2,1)

UL

LL

Error

2007

35,064 34,920

37,080

32,760

-144

34,872

37,103

32,642

-192

2008

37,128 38,782

42,311

35,253

1,654 38,725

42,331

35,119

1,597

MAD

899

MAD

894

The ARIMA(1,2,1) model compared with double exponential smoothing in terms of forecast and limit values in Table 10. Double exponential smoothing with 0,60 and 0,60 parameters error value is lower than ARIMA(1,2,1). As a result, double exponential smoothing produces better long term forecasts than ARIMA for annual natural gas consumption of Turkey. Table 10 Comparison between ARIMA model and double exponential smoothing DES Years Real

(0.6; 0.6)

ARIMA UL

LL

Error

(1,2,1)

UL

LL

Error

2007

35,064 33,437

36,004 30,870 -1,627

34,872

37,103 32,642 -192

2008

37,128 37,023

40,086 33,961 -105

38,725

42,331 35,119 1,597

MAD

866

MAD

894

Forecasting the Last Four Years of Annual Natural Gas Consumption of Turkey and Comparing with Ediger and Akar’s Arima Study. Ediger and Akar (2007) made a study about forecasting of primary energy demand by fuel in Turkey. They have used autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) method to predict future primary energy demand of Turkey from 2005 to 2020.

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Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim

One of the findings of Ediger and Akar is that natural gas will continue to be a key element of the Turkish energy system in the future. In order to understand the future changes, they forecasted the consumption values of natural gas period between 2005 and 2020. This section of our study provides the comparison of forecast values between our study and the Ediger and Akar’s study. Annual natural gas consumption data of Turkey from 1987 to 2004 is used. As our previous findings recommend double exponential smoothing we have used the same data and make forecasting with double exponential smoothing. Table 11 represents the comparison table of forecasts related to applied methods. Our double exponential smoothing forecasts were performed better than Ediger and Akar’s ARIMA model for forecasting 2005 to 2008.

Table 11 Comparison table of methods Methods

2005

2006

2007

2008

MAD

Ediger and Akar's Study Forecast

22,319 24,155 26,569 28,378 7,032

Double Exponential Smoothing Forecast

24,623 26,919 29,216 31,512 4,320

Real Values

26,865 30,493 35,064 37,128

Double exponential smoothing with 0,41 and 1,37 parameters should be considered for forecasting years of 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. Conclusion Recently, considerable attention has been focused on the energy resources and energy policies in Turkey. Energy is one of Turkey’s most important development priorities. Natural gas consumption is the fastest growing primary energy source in Turkey. Turkish natural gas is projected to increase dramatically in coming years. Energy planning is not possible without a reasonable knowledge of past and present natural gas consumption and likely future natural gas demand. Overestimating the natural gas demand may cause redundancy in resources, while underestimating may cause series energy crises. Therefore forecasting the gas demand became very important aspect to manage the energy policy with respect to gas consumption and use in Turkey. Time series forecasting is one of the most important quantitative model that has received considerable amount of attention in the literature. The accuracy of time series forecasting is fundamental to many decision processes and hence the research for improving the effectiveness of forecasting models has never stopped. With the efforts

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of Box and Jenkins, the ARIMA, exponential smoothing and SARIMA models have become one of the most popular and traditional methods in the forecasting research and practice. In this study, natural gas consumptions of Turkey are forecasted by using various time series methods such as exponential smoothing, Winters’ forecasting and Box-Jenkins methods in a monthly and yearly base. These methods are compared with each other in terms of the superiority in forecasting performance. The findings reveal that in the yearly data set, double exponential smoothing model gives the better results than the other alternative forecasting models. On the other hand, in term of monthly data set, SARIMA model provides the better results than the others. However, this study does not claim that double exponential smoothing and SARIMA models are superior to other alternative forecasting methods. In future study, more sophisticated analytical techniques such as genetic algorithms, neural networks, and fuzzy models must be utilized to forecast the natural gas consumption in Turkey. In addition that it will be very valuable to add some other variables such as price and weather temperature when developing and improving the forecasting model. This study can be extended by measuring the relationship between gas consumption of Turkey and gas price and weather temperature and their influence on gas consumption. References Al-Fattah, S.M. 2006. “Time Series Modeling for U.S. Natural Gas Forecasting”. E-

Journal of Petroleum Management Economics. Vol.1. Aras, H. and Aras, N. 2004. “Forecasting Residential Natural Gas Demand”. Energy Sources, Part A: Recovery, Utilization, and Environmental Effects. Vol. 26:5, pp.463-472.

BOTAS Annual Report. 2005. Boru Hatlar1 ile Petrol Tasima A.S (BOTAS), http://www.botas.gov.tr/icerik/docs/faalrapor/2005/fr2005_full.pdf. BOTAS Annual Report. 2006. Boru Hatlar1 ile Petrol Tasima A.S (BOTAS), http://www.botas.gov.tr/icerik/docs/faalrapor/2006/fr2006_full.pdf. BOTAS Annual Report. 2007. Boru Hatlar1 ile Petrol Tasima A.S (BOTAS), http://www.botas.gov.tr/icerik/docs/faalrapor/2007/fr2007_full.pdf. Box, G.E.P. and Jenkins, G.M. 1970. Time Series Analysis, Forecasting and Control, San Francisco: Holden-Day (revised edn. published 1976).

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Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim

Brown, R.H. and Matin, I. 1995. “Development of Artificial Neural Network Models to Predict Daily Gas Consumption”, Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE IECON 21st

International Conference , Orlando, Vol.2, pp.1389-1394. Brown, R.H., Marx, B.M and Corliss, G.F. 2005. Mathematical Models for Gas Forecasting, GasDay Report No.129. Chatfield, C. 1996. The Analyses of Time Series: An Introduction, Fifth Edition. Chapman & Hall. Durmayaz, A., Kadioglu, M. and Sen, Z. 2000. “An Application of the Degree-Hours Method to Estimate the Residential Heating Energy Requirement and Fuel Consumption in Istanbul”. Energy. Vol.25. pp.1245-1256. Ediger, V.S. and Akar, S. 2007. “ARIMA Forecasting of Primary Energy Demand by Fuel in Turkey”. Energy Policy. Vol.35. pp.1701-1708. Gumrah, F., Katircioglu, D., Aykan, Y., Okumus, S. and Kilincer, N. “Modeling of Gas Demand Using Degree-Day Concept: Case Study for Ankara”. Energy Sources, Part A. Kenisarian, M. and Kenisarina, K. 2007. “Energy Saving Potential in the Residential Sector of Uzbekistan”. Energy. Vol.32. pp.1319-1325. Khotanzad, A., Elragal, H. and Lu, T.L. 2000. “Combination of Artificial Neural-Network Forecasters for Prediction of Natural Gas Consumption”. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks. Vol.11. pp. 464-473. Kilic, A.M. 2006. “Turkey’s Natural Gas Necessity, Consumption and Future Perspectives”. Energy Policy. Vol.34. pp.1928-1934. Kizilaslan R. and Karlik B. 2009. “Combination of Neural Networks Forecasters For Monthly Natural Gas Consumption Prediction”. Neural Network World. Vol. 19. pp. 191-199. Liu, H., Liu, H., Zheng, G., Liang, Y. and Ni, Y. 2004. “Research on Natural Gas Load Forecasting Based on Support Vector Regression”. Fifth World Congress on Intelligent Control and Automation . 15-19 June 2004. Vol.4, 3591A-3595. Liu, L.M. and Lin, M.W. 1991. “Forecasting Residential Consumption of Natural Gas Using Monthly and Quarterly Time Series”. International Journal of Forecasting. Vol.7. pp.3-16. Ozturk, H.K. and Hepbasli, A. 2003. “The Place of Natural Gas in Turkey’s Energy Sources and Future Perspectives”. Energy Sources, Part A: Recovery,

Utilization, and Environmental Effects. Vol.25. pp.293-307.

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Potocnik, P., Thaler, M., Govekar, E., Grabec, I., Poredos, A. 2007. “Forecasting Risks of Natural Gas Consumption in Slovenia”. Energy Policy. Vol.35. pp.4271-4282. Sanchez-Ubeda, E. and Berzosa, A. 2007. “Modeling and Forecasting Industrial EndUse Natural Gas Consumption”. Energy Economics. Vol.29. pp.710-742. Sarak, H. and Satman, A. 2003. “The Degree-Day Method to Estimate the Residential Heating Natural Gas Consumption in Turkey: A Case Study”. Energy. Vol.28. pp.929-939. Siemek, J., Nagy, S., and Rychlicki, S. 2003. “Estimation of Natural-Gas Consumption in Poland Based on the Logistic-Curve Interpretation”. Applied Energy. Vol.75. pp.1-7. Goktas, O. 2005. Teorik ve Uygulamal1 Zaman Serileri Analizi. Besir Kitabevi. Viet, N.H., and Mandziuk, J. 2003. “Neural and Fuzzy Neural Networks for Natural Gas Consumption Prediction”. IEEE 13th Workshop on Neural Networks for Signal

Processing. 17-19 September 2003. pp.759-768. Wong-Parodi, G., Dale, L. and Lekov, A. 2006. “Comparing Price Forecast Accuracy of Natural Gas Models and Futures Markets”. Energy Policy. Vol.34. pp.4115-4122.

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-3 (2), 2010

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Market Rationality: Efficient Market Hypothesis versus Market Anomalies

Kadir Can Yalçın* Abstract Market efficiency theory suggests that market is rational and provides correct

pricing. That is, the current prices of securities are close to their fundamental values because of either the rational investors or the arbitragers’ buy and sell action of underpriced or overpriced stocks. On the other hand, observed market anomalies have a challenge for this argument. They claim that irrational investment activities and the arbitrage opportunities’ being limited in markets cause some market anomalies that are inconsistent with efficient market hypothesis. The most commonly seen anomalies are the “volume”, “volatility”, “cash dividends”, “equity premium puzzle”, and the “predictability”. This work is a literature survey, and its main objective is to deal with efficient market theory and market anomalies in order to examine the question “Are markets rational or not"? Keywords: Market Rationality, Efficient Market Hypothesis, Arbitrage, Market Anomalies

*

Fatih University, stanbul / Turkey. [email protected]

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Intro duc tio n According to the traditional finance, markets are “rational”; that is, they are efficient in the sense to reflect the correct prices supporting the efficient market hypothesis. On the other hand, behavioral finance argues about this kind of market rationality with the observed market anomalies that are not explained by the arguments of the efficient market hypothesis. Many researchers including DeBondt and Thaler (1985), Black (1986), De Long et al. (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1995), Thaler (1987, 1999), etc. exhibited many observed market anomalies. However, despite many observed market anomalies, the efficient market hypothesis is still the dominant paradigm in order to organize and rule the markets. In this sense, the aim of this study is to deal with efficient market theory and market anomalies in order to examine the question “are markets rational or not"? Because if markets are not rational as traditional finance presumes, all the market rules, dynamics and mechanisms have to be questioned. The paper will begin with a history of the market efficiency from the start of random-walk theory and the forms of the efficient market hypothesis. Next, the arguments about the concept of arbitrage which is one of the main important assumptions of market efficiency will be elaborated. Finally, observed market anomalies that are not explained by the arguments of the efficient market hypothesis will be presented.

Efficient Market Hypothesis Historical Development of Efficient Market Hypothesis We first see the concept of market efficiency by Louis Bachelier in 1900. He worked on stock and commodity prices in order to find out if they fluctuated randomly or not. In 1905 Karl Pearson introduced random-walk, also known as the drunkard-

walk concept (Dimson et al., 1998:91-92). Unfortunately, Bachelier’s first attempt showing the difficulty to outguess the market and the random characteristics of the prices and also Pearson’s random-walk concept was ignored or at least no further study had come until 1930s. Cowles (1933) presented the results of analysis of the forecasting efforts of some professional agencies including insurance companies, investment professionals and financial publications which have attempted to predict which specific securities would be most profitable and the future movements of the

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

stock market itself. He found that these professional agencies have no obvious skills to beat the market. Subsequently, Cowles (1944) continued his research on stock market forecasting and did a similar study, but this time extended the sample period. In his later study, he found that the record of the forecasting agency with the best result is only 3.3% better than the forty years average of the stock market return. Kendall (1953) who for the first time used the term random-walk in finance literature, examined 22 British stock indexes and American commodity prices in order to find out regular price cycles. He found that prices seemed to follow a random-walk; they may go up or go down on any particular day, regardless of what had occurred on the previous day. Roberts (1959) found similar results with American data for both indexes and individual companies and verified that changes in the Dow Jones Index seem to be generated from a cumulated random number. Osborne (1959) demonstrated that US stock prices seemingly have random movements just like molecule particles. Fama (1965a) discussed some empirical evidence supporting random-walk theory in his doctoral dissertation. Later, he (1965b) presented a condensed, nontechnical version of his PhD thesis at the 1965 Management Conference in University of Chicago. Fama (1965b) uphold random-walk theory as an accurate description of reality. He then, challenged proponents of technical and fundamental analyses in order to prove their arguments. At that time, the technical or fundamental analyses were the commonly used and supported methods in predicting the stock prices by the market professionals. Fama positioned random-walk theory which has appeared in academic journals, but has not been appreciated in later years, against the technical and fundamental analysis which is too complicated for the non-mathematicians. As he declares, the logic behind the technical (chartist) theories is that history tends to repeat itself. That is, if we look at the past behavior of an individual security or a stock market itself, we can foresee their future path by analyzing past sequence of price changes. According to him, it is impossible to gain abnormal profit by looking at the history of the price change series because successive price changes are independent (chartist theories says dependent), exactly what random walk theory says. Moreover, he thought that the market professionals rely on the fundamental analysis rather than technical because the technical analysis has not a secure basis. The assumption of the fundamental analysis approach depends on the belief that security has an intrinsic value other than actual price. Intrinsic value is the value of a security’s potential earnings. Some fundamental factors such as quality of management, the overall situation of the industry

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in which the firm operates and the economic condition itself can affect a security’s potential earnings. Therefore, an analyst can predict the future price of a security by evaluating these fundamental factors by finding out the intrinsic value and comparing it with the security’s actual price. If actual price of the security is lower than its intrinsic value, sooner or later the actual price will go up through its intrinsic value and vice versa. Against the logic behind the opponents of fundamental analysis and Fama (1965b:3-4), for the first time in literature, defined an efficient market as:

“a market where there are large numbers of rational profit maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of individual securities, and where important current information is almost freely available to all participants”.

This definition implies that a multitude of rational participants who compete with one another lead to the elimination of discrepancies between the actual prices and intrinsic values even though the latter are hard to estimate. The neutralization process of discrepancies between the actual price and the intrinsic values will cause the actual price fluctuates randomly around its intrinsic value. The actual or expected new information can change the intrinsic value. According to Fama, in this situation, the actual prices will be immediately changed by absorbing the new information and try to find the new level of intrinsic value because of high competition between many intelligent participants. Around the same time, Samuelson (1965:41) demonstrated that the series of successive price changes are independent by claiming that: “in a competitive market there is a buyer for every seller and if somebody is sure that a price would rise, it would have already risen”

He inferred that the unpredictability of prices was the sign of efficient working of the stock markets. Fama (1970) presented a landmark paper on the efficient market which focused on comprehensive review of the theory and beyond the theory to empirical work. He defines market efficiency very clearly (Fama, 1970:383): “A market in which prices always fully reflect all available information is called efficient.”

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

According to the definition of the efficient market hypothesis, an efficient market can exist if the following conditions hold (Jones, 1993:626; Shleifer, 2000:2):

i. A large number of rational profit maximizing investors exists who actively participate in the market, hence value securities rationally. ii. If some investors are not rational, their irrational trades are canceling each other out or rational arbitrageurs eliminate their influence without affecting prices. iii. Information is costless and widely available to market participants at approximately same time. Investors react quickly and fully to the new information, causing stock prices to adjust accordingly.

The Forms of the Market Efficiency In the definition of the “relevant information set” that prices should reflect, Fama distinguished three nested information sets: past prices, publicly-available information, and all information including private information (Kondak, 1997:36). Efficient market hypothesis is divided into three stages as the weak form, semi-strong form, and the strong form with respect to the availability of the above mentioned three information sets.

Weak form of efficiency claims that the current stock prices already reflect all historical market data such as the past prices and trading volumes (Bodie et al., 2007). The assertion of weak form of efficiency is very much consistent with the findings of researches on random walk hypothesis; that is, the price changes from one time to another are independent (Dixon et al., 1992). In other words, one can not make a superior profit by only examining the historical prices information. Therefore, the technical (trend) analysis which is a technique using the derivation of past price movements in order to find out a meaningful sign to predict the future path of an individual stock or stock market itself is useless (Jones, 1993). However, one can beat the market and make superior profits in the weak form of efficient market by using the fundamental analysis or by insider trading.

Semi-strong form of efficiency states that, in addition to the past prices, all publicly available information including fundamental data on the firm’s product line, earnings forecasts, dividends, stock split announcements, quality of management, balance sheet composition, patents held, accounting practices etc., should be fully reflected in security prices. Thus, one can not make a superior profit by using the fundamental analysis in the market which is efficient in the semi-strong form. It is obvious that technical analysis can not work at the semi-strong form of efficient market because, if a market is efficient in the semi-strong form, it is also efficient in the weak

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form, because past prices are also publicly available information (Dixon et al., 1992; Bodie et al., 2007). However, insider traders can make superior profits in semi-strong form of efficiency.

Strong form of efficiency states that market prices reflect all information including both the past prices and the all publicly available information, and plus all private information. In such a market, prices would always be fair and any investor, even insider traders, can not beat the market (Brealey et al., 1999). Again, none of the technical and/or fundamental analysts can beat the market to make an abnormal return in strong form of efficiency because, if a market is efficient in the strong-form, it must be efficient in both the weak form and the semi-strong form. Thus, the techniques that do not work in the weak form and the semi-strong form efficient markets naturally can not work in strong form efficient markets. Figure 1 exhibits the three nested information sets and the types of market efficiency.

Strong Form ( All Information) Semi-strong Form (Publicly Available Information) Weak Form (Past Prices)

Figure 1: Cumulative levels of market efficiency and the information associated with each level (Jones, 1993:628) Market Efficiency and the Arbitrage The efficient market hypothesis has three basic assumptions. First, investors are rational; that is, they value the securities with respect to their fundamental value. As discussed at the previous section, when investors learn something about a security, they immediately reflect this knowledge to the price of that security. Second, some investors may be irrational; however, their investing activities are in the random fashion and uncorrelated; therefore, their trading cancels each other without affecting the price. The logic behind this assumption is that investors’ trading activities are poorly correlated with each other. Third, if they are highly correlated with each other,

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which means if they do not cancel their irrational activities out, this time some professional arbitragers eliminate their activities, and make profits. In short, efficient market hypothesis says that the current prices of securities are close to their fundamental values because of either the rational investors or the arbitragers’ buy and sell action of under or overpriced stocks (Shleifer, 2000). However, some empirical evidence tells a different story. Black (1986) called the irrational investment activities as a noise, because investors value the securities on a noise rather than by using the information about the securities. Moreover, according to De Long et al. (1990), the beliefs of irrational investors’ affect the securities’ prices and more importantly create a risk which causes to block the willingness of arbitragers to position against the irrational investors in order to gain a profit which they called a noise trader risk. The logic behind the noise trader risk is the unpredictability of noise traders’ future opinions. An arbitrager will give up or be afraid of an arbitrage, because of the possibility of noise traders’ continuation of irrational investing activities. That is, an arbitrager who buys an underpriced security relative to its fundamental value has not ignored the possibility of the continuation of the noise trader pessimism in the near future. Otherwise, when they need to sell the security in order to liquidate the investment they will face an unexpected loss. This situation is also valid for securities which are overpriced relative to their fundamental values. An arbitrager who sells an overpriced security in short thinks it will soon lose value and he or she can buy it at the low value relative to its selling price. However, again, an arbitrager must be aware of the possibility of noise trader optimism continuing in the near future (De Long et al., 1990). Moreover, besides the risk that mispricing becomes more extreme by the noise trader, there is another limitation against an arbitrage. That is, who makes the arbitrage? Fama (1965a, 1965b) viewed the arbitrage as an activity which involves a large number of investors taking small position against mispricing. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1995), it is an activity which is done by relatively few and highly informed professional investors who use the resources of outside investors to take a large position. If this view is true, then an arbitrager has to attract outside funds in order to make an arbitrage in a market because the greater deviation from the fundamental value needs greater funds for an arbitrage activity. However, usually investors are not well informed about markets and only few of them can distinguish a good arbitrager from the bad one and they evaluate the performance of the arbitrager with respect to his or her past track records. Therefore, investors supply limited resources to arbitragers and increase or decrease the limits or even withdraw the funds causing the arbitrage position to shut down before it has profit. As a result, despite the greater mispricing of securities from their fundamental values gives a

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chance to have a superior profit to an arbitrager and brings prices close to their fundamental values, arbitragers avoid such an activity (Shleifer et al., 1995). The Mar ket A no ma lies There are many observed market movements that are not explained by the arguments of the efficient market hypothesis. In the standard finance theory, such market movements that are inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis are called

anomalies (Bostancı, 2003). According to Tversky and Kahneman (1986:252) “an anomaly is a deviation from the presently accepted paradigms that is too widespread to be ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as random error, and too fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing the normative system”. The most commonly seen anomalies are (Thaler, 1999:13-14): i.

Volume

ii.

Volatility

iii.

Cash Dividends

iv.

The Equity Premium Puzzle

v.

Predictability

Volume If investors are rational as stated in the expected utility theory and the efficient market hypothesis, they do not trade too much except when they need liquidity and have desire to re-shape their portfolios. We expect too little investing activities by only using the publicly available information from the rational investors; however, we visualize millions of buying and selling orders in stock markets even when no apparent reasons exist. For example, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)’s total volume is approximately 5-6 billions in a normal day where around 3600 stocks are listed. In such a market, it is impossible to explain the exchange of the 700 millions IBM shares in a day even there was no reason. Which information is used by the seller and why does not the buyer have that information if they invest by using all the available information (Bostancı, 2003; Oran, 2008; Thaler, 1999)?

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Volatility In the standard finance theory, the value of a stock is found by discounting its expected future dividends to present. From the efficient market point of view, the price of a security changes only when there is dividend expectation or when new information has arrived. However, there are too many cases of excess volatility observed in stock markets that could not explained by market efficiency perspectives (Oran, 2008). LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) studied S&P 500 Index, DJIA and some blue chip stocks and showed that the volatility in securities is five to thirteen times higher than the changes in present value of future dividends. Cash Dividends According to Black (1986), dividend policy is a tool through which managers can communicate with company’s shareholders especially for the things that they do not want to say sharply and quickly. Therefore, it has been always an important indicator for the determination of market price. The commonly used dividend policies are cash-dividend, stock-dividend, stock-splits and stock-repurchase plans (Brealey et al., 1999). According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividend policy is irrelevant in determining the value of the company and its stock price under the no tax world assumption. Unfortunately, we do not have this kind of “perfect world”; on the contrary, tax concerns always exist. At this point, the cash-dividend anomaly occurs. That is, if the company wants to give stock to its shareholders as dividends and if the shareholders want to realize their gains by selling the stock, then it is subject to capital gain. It is valid both for the stock-splits and stock-repurchases by the company. Moreover, capital gains are subject to tax only when realization happens. However, in most countries, cash dividends are subject to higher income tax rates than capital gain. Nonetheless, cash dividends are more preferable than others despite higher tax disadvantage (Miller, 1986). Moreover, when the company announces a cash dividend program, its stock price rises (Long, 1978). While, whether the reason for this is market inefficiency is highly controversial, it remains as an anomaly and needs to be answered (Thaler, 1999). The Equity Premium Puzzle Mehra and Prescott (1985) compared the historical returns of stocks and Treasury Bills (T-Bills) for the first time in the United States using relevant data dating back to 1926. Later, it was updated by Mehra (2003) extending the historical data from

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1889 to 2000, and including data from the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and France. The average yearly return of the market index in the United States was 7.9% after inflation adjustment, where the T-Bills’ average annual real return was only 1% between the years 1889 and 2000. This means that about 6.9% equity premium has been realized in every year for about a period of 110 years in the USA. The premium between the market index and the relatively riskless security is so dramatic in the period between 1926 and 2000. The mean real return of market index was 8.7% where the inflation adjusted rate of return of T-bills was only 0.7%. It simply means that if you invest 1$ in the market in 1926, it becomes nominally 2,586.52$ and 266.47$ after the inflation adjustment in 2000. On the other hand, if you invest in T-bills rather than market index in the USA, your 1$ becomes 16.56$ nominally and only 1.71$ in real terms in 2000. Furthermore, we realize same type of equity premiums in England, Japan, Germany and France where the average inflation adjusted premium between market index and these countries’ government bonds varies from 6.6% to 4.6%. To sum up, we have a clear picture as shown in the real data that stocks outperformed T-bills with a high margin what Mehra and Prescott (1985) called “the equity premium puzzle”. In such a case, why do not people invest all their savings in stocks rather than holding T-bills? Benartzi and Thaler (1995) explained this puzzleanomaly with the notion of myopic loss aversion and the mental accounting which are the factors affecting the investors’ psychology.

Predictability According to efficient market theory, it is impossible to predict the future path of the security prices by using the available information in the market. However, there are numerous types of empirical evidence suggesting that it can be possible to predict future prices by utilizing, for example, dividend yields, price-earnings ratio, earningsprice ratio, price-to-book ratios, earnings announcements, size of the company, share repurchases, initial public offerings, etc. (Thaler, 1999). Rozeff (1984) and Fama and French (1988) used dividend yields (D/P) and found out meaningful clues to predict the future returns of stocks; that is, if the yield is high, then the stock return will be high. Campbell and Shiller (1988) used earnings-price ratio (E/P) and found E/P ratio is a powerful tool for the prediction of stock return especially when the past earnings averaged over 10 years.

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Basu (1977) used price-earnings (P/E) and found that stocks that have low P/E ratio tend to outperform over the stocks that have a relatively high P/E ratio relatively. Lakonishok, Shleifer, Vishny (1994) used price-to-book ratios (P/B) and found that the stocks with low P/B provided higher return than the stocks with high P/B. Ball and Brown (1968) noted for the first time a delayed reaction to the earnings announcements that cause a possible prediction of abnormal return. They labeled this under-reaction fact as post-earnings-announcement drift which is later confirmed by Foster et al. (1984) and Bernard and Thomas (1989). A large part of the post-earningsannouncement drift occurs within 60 trading days despite some evidence of occurrence within up to 180 trading days (Bernard et al., 1989). The under-reaction of the stock prices to the publicly available, easy to reach earning announcements varies between 5.3% and 2.8% relative to the size of the company causing larger postannouncement drift (Foster et al., 1984). Similar to the earnings announcements, Michaely et al. (1995) investigated the effect of dividend omissions and initiations over the market price and found a long-term drift after the dividend initiations, but mainly for omissions announcements. Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) showed another surprising anomaly, “size effect”, against the market efficiency. That is, the average stock returns of the smaller firms’ portfolio is higher than that of larger firms’ portfolio by an average of 10.3% annually. Many subsequent empirical studies also suggest that the existence of the inverse relationship between the size of the firm and the average return of the firms’ stocks. Two of them are Arbel and Strebel’s (1982) study about the neglected firm

effect, and Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) study labeled liquidity effect. Actually, both the neglected firm effect and the liquidity effect are highly related to the size effect; indeed probably a result of it. That is, because the information about the small firms is less available, they can be neglected by the institutional investors causing lower liquidity in these stocks. Thus, these non-brand names, less liquid, unpopular kind of stocks may provide an abnormal return especially in January. Another anomaly which needs to be clarified is the negative performance of the initial public offerings (IPOs) in the long run which is asserted by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). After a careful evaluation of over 1500 IPOs in the USA in the period between 1975 and 1984, Ritter (1991) found that if an investor bought from IPOs and held it for 3 years, his or her terminal value of the 1$ purchased stock would be 1.3447$ whereas his or her terminal value of the 1$ worth of matching firms’ stock became 1.6186$. IPOs’ underperformance was around 16.9%.

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Perhaps the most highly debated and controversial anomaly against the market efficiency is the overreaction hypothesis. DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) investigated the future performance of the past losers and past winners. They formed a portfolio consisting of top 50 extreme stock winners and 50 extreme stock losers from NYSE in the period 1926-1982. Prior losers’ portfolio outperformed by an average of 31.9% over the prior winners’ portfolio within the three-to-five year period. Abnormal returns especially for the losers’ portfolio occurred mostly in January. Dreman and Berry (1995) confirmed the overreaction and asserted a mispricing-correction hypothesis which is the process of the investors’ correcting action of the over or under-valued prices (original misprice) through its fundamental value in the long run. Besides all these anomalies about the predictability of stock prices, there are also anomalies about the seasonal movements in security prices. Very briefly, the dayof the week effect or weekend effect is the anomaly of positive stock return in Fridays and the negative stock return in Mondays. The intra-day anomaly is related with the continuous positive or negative stock return measurable in the specific hours or minutes. The January-effect anomaly is the fact that returns of the securities are higher in the January than the other months of the year. It is observed especially for the stocks which have low P/E ratio, and which are past losers or small size firms. The intra-month anomaly is the different return levels of second part of the month (days from 15 through 30) relative to the first part of the month or vice versa in any month of the year. The turn-of-the-month anomaly is the higher stock return in the last couple of days of previous month plus the first couple of days of the current month relative to the other days of the month in any month of the year. The turn-of-the-year anomaly is the higher stock return in the last couple of days of December plus the first couple of days of January relative to the other days of the year. The holiday’s anomaly is related with the abnormal returns of stocks before the start of various holidays (Özmen 1997; Barak, 2008). Also, there are other anomalies related with weather, emotional state of human beings, geomagnetic storm, etc. (Oran, 2008). Co nclusio n There is no question about the existence of empirically observable market anomalies. Even, Fama (1991) accepts their existence. The question is whether these occur because of inefficiency of the market or some other problems and by chance. It is easy to discover an anomaly inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis; however, highly difficult to explain the reason for their occurrence. Two views have been proposed to explain the anomaly. One side lead by Fama and French (1998)

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claimed that the resulting problems (anomalies) are caused by asset pricing theories, or they can be attributed to chance. The other perspective lead by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) tries to explain anomalies by behavioral approaches. According to behavioral approach, investors suffer some cognitive limitations when they have to make decisions. Those cognitive limitations cause erroneous (irrational) investment decisions. Investors’ systematic erroneous investment decisions are the barriers in front of arbitrage which cause inefficient markets. Market rationality is the dominant paradigm in order to organize and rule the markets, and if Fama and French (1998)’s perspective is not true, then these market rules, dynamics and mechanisms will be questioned. However, there is an ongoing debate about the possible reasons of observed market anomalies and whether they are the powerful sign for inefficiency of the market or not. Still, there is much to be done in this area. Refer en ces Amihud, Y; H. Mendelson. 1986. “Asset pricing and the bid–ask spread.” Journal of

Financial Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 223–249 Arbel, A; P. Strebel. 1982. “The Neglected and Small Firm Effects”. Financial Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 201-218 Ball, R.; Brown, P. 1968. “An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers”

Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp 159-178 Banz, R. W. 1981. “The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of Common Stocks” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp 3-18 Basu, S. 1977. “Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to Their PriceEarnings Ratios: A Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis” The Journal of

Finance , Vol. 32, No.3, pp 663-682 Benartzi, S.; R. Thaler. 1985. “Myopic Loss Aversion and The Equity Premium Puzzle” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.110, No.1, pp 73-92 Bernard, V. L.; J. K. Thomas. 1989. “Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift: Delayed Price Response or Risk Premium?” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 27, pp. 1-36 Black, F. 1986. “Noise”. Journal of Finance. Vol.41, No.3, pp. 529-543 Bodie, Z.; A. Kane.; A.J. Marcus. 2007. Essentials of investments, 6th edition, McGrawHill / Irwin. Bostanc1, F. 2003. Davran1flç1 Finans. SPK Yeterlilik Etüdü, stanbul.

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Brealey, R. A.; S. C. Myers.; A. J. Marcus. 1999. Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill. Campbell, J. Y.; R. J. Shiller. 1988. “Stock Prices, Earnings and Expected Dividends,

The Journal of Finance , Vol. 43, No.3, pp 661-676 Cowles III, A. 1933. “Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?” Econometrica, Vol.1, No. 3, pp. 309-324 Cowles III, A. 1944. “Stock Market Forecasting?” Econometrica, Vol.12, No. 3/4, pp. 206-214 De Long, B. J.; A. Shleifer.; L. H. Summers.; R. J. Waldman. 1990. “Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.98, No.4, pp. 703- 738 DeBondt, W.; R. Thaler. 1985. "Does the Stock Market Overreact". The Journal of Finance , Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 793-805 DeBondt, W.; R. Thaler. 1987. “Further Evidence On Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality”. The Journal of Finance . Vol. 42 , No. 3, pp. 557-581 Dimson, E.; M. Mussavian. 1998. “A Brief History of Market Efficiency". European Financial Management. Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 91-103 Dixon, R.; P. Holmes. 1992. “Financial Markets: An introduction”, International Thomson

Business Press, 1992, p.16 Dreman, D. N.; M. A. Berry. 1995. “Overreaction, Underreaction and the Low-P/E Effect” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp 21-30 Fama, E. 1965a. “The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices.” The Journal of Business, Vol. 38, No.1, pp. 34-105 Fama, E. 1965b. “Random Walks in Stock Market Prices”, Selected Papers. No.16, University of Chicago. Fama, E. 1970. “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work.” Journal of Finance , Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 383-417. Fama, E. 1991. “Efficient Capital Markets: II”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, No. 5, pp. 1575-1617 Fama, E.; K. R. French. 1988. “Dividend Yields and Expected Stock Returns” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.22, No.1, pp 3-25 Foster, G.; C. Olsen.; T. Shevlin. 1984. “Earnings Releases, anomalies and the Behavior of Security Returns” The Accounting Review, Vol. 59, pp 574-603 Jones, C. P. 1993. Investments. John Wiley & Sons.

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Kahneman, D.; A. Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis Decision Under Risk” Econometrica, Vol. 46, No.2, pp 263-292 Kendall, M. 1953. "The Analysis of Economic Time-Series-Part I: Prices". Journal of the

Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 116, No.1, pp. 11–34. Kondak, N. E. 1997. ”The Efficient Market Hypothesis Revisited: Some Evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange.” Capital Board of Turkey. No.83 Lakonishok, J.; A. Shleifer.; R. Vishny. 1994. “Contrarion Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk” Journal of Finance, Vol. 49. No. 5, pp. 1541-1578 Leroy, S. F.; R. D. Porter. 1981. “The Present Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds” Econometrica, Vol.49, No.3, pp 555-574 Long, J. 1978. “The Market Valuation of Cash Dividends: A Case to Consider” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.6, No.2-3, pp. 235-264 Loughran, T.; J. Ritter. 1995. “The New Issue Puzzle”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 23-51 Mehra, R. 2003. “The Equity Premium: Why Is It a Puzzle?” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 59, No.1, pp 54-69 Mehra, R.; E. C. Prescott. 1985. “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 15, pp 145-161 Miller, M. H. 1986. “Behavioral Rationality in Finance: The Case of Dividends”, Journal of Business, Vol. 59, No.4, pp 451-468 part 2: The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory Miller, M.H.; F. Modigliani. 1961. “Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares” Journal of Business, Vol.34, No.4, pp 411-433 Oran, J. S. 2008. “Fildii Kuleler Sars1l1yor”, Öneri: Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Vol.29, pp. 33-42 Osborne, M.F. 1959. “Brownian motion in the stock market”, Operations Research, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp.145-173. Özmen, T. 1997. Dünya Borsalar1nda Gözlemlenen Anomaliler ve stanbul Menkul K1ymetler Borsas1 Üzerine Bir Deneme, SPK Yay1nlar1 , No. 61, Ankara. Reinganum, M. R. 1981. “Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing: Empirical Anomalies Based on Earnings Yield and Market Values” Journal of Financial Economics , Vol. 9, pp 19-46 Ritter, J. 1991. “The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings”, The Journal of Finance , Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 3-27

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Roberts, H.V. 1959. “Stock-market patterns and financial analysis: methodological suggestions”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 14, No.1, pp. 1-11. Rozeff, M. S. 1984. “Dividend Yields Are Equity Risk Premiums” Journal of Portfolio

Management, Fall 1984, pp 68-75 Samuelson, P.A. 1965. “Proof that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly.” Industrial Management Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 41-49. Shiller, R. 1981. “Do Stock Prices Move Too Much To Be Justified By Subsequent in Dividends?” The American Economic Review, Vol.71, No.3, pp 421-436 Shleifer, A. 2000. Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance. 1st edition, Oxford University Press, USA Shleifer, A.; R. Vishny. 1995. “The Limits of Arbitrage” NBER Working Papers, No. 5167 Thaler, R. 1999. “The End of Behavioral Finance” Financial Analysts Journal, Nov/Dec 99, Vol.55, No.6, pp. 12-17 Tversky, A.; D. Kahneman. 1986. “Rational Choice and the Framing of the Decision”

The Journal of Business, Vol.59, No.4, Part 2: The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory.

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Hegemony, Aid and Power: A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the World Bank

Sadık Ünay*

Abstract There have been various attempts over the course of recent years in international relations and international political economy literatures to develop theoretically-informed analytical perspectives to conceptualize the changing roles and functions of international institutions. Aimed at contributing to this emerging literature, this study is predicated on an analysis of the World Bank in line with the neoGramscian theoretical framework formulated by Robert W. Cox with special reference to the notion of hegemony. To this end, a precise outline of the neo-Gramscian framework as conceived by Cox is presented by referring to his conceptions of critical theory and complex multilateralism. Afterwards, the advisory and financial roles of the World Bank are described along with the major points of criticism raised against this critical institution. Regarding the prospects for transformation and institutional reform at the Bank, a crucial case-study conducted by Robert O’Brien is highlighted pertaining to interactions between global economic institutions and global social movements. The study concludes by presenting broader remarks from the Coxian/Neo-Gramscian perspective concentrating on the impact of social pressures on the transformation of institutional structures that make up the global governance architecture. Keywords: World Bank, Robert Cox, Neo-Gramscian Analysis, Global Governance, Hegemony, Critical Theory.

*

Bal1kesir University. [email protected]

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Introduction Among numerous analysts that have been striving to develop novel paradigmatic constructs, analytical perspectives and approaches to the study of the global political economy, Robert Cox occupies a distinguished position thanks to his pioneering work aimed at adopting a rejuvenated neo-Gramscian perspective focusing on the role of power structures and social blocs formed around them. That is why; it is of great importance to conduct theoretically-informed studies on the main fields, issue areas, actors and institutions in the global political economy. Relying upon a strongly historical and theoretically informed analytical perspective, Robert Cox’s method of understanding global change represents a powerful challenge to the ontological assumptions of mainstream theorizing about international relations. Rather than discussing states as the predominant actors operating in the international realm whose interaction ought to be understood, explained and predicted; the work of Cox has focused on the transformation of main

forms of state and how these forms change under pressure from forces from above (world order) and from below (civil society). Cox considers states as the “focal terrains of domestic and international conflict” and foremost “institutional means of coordinated action”. In his worldview, the future represents an opportunity to break with the political structures of the past and thus the potential to escape the strictures that bind human potential (Sinclair, 1996, 3). The shifting character of the existing world order crystallized in the end of the Cold-War and the growth of competitive pressures in the global economy provided a broad context ripe for the flourishing of alternative patterns of thought. In this context, the neo-Gramscian theoretical framework gradually formulated by Robert Cox and his colleagues over the course of last three decades attracted special attention in the international relations and international political economy literatures. This was mostly due to its unparalleled analytical strength in providing a sound basis to understand the institutional and power-related origins of the existing world order and envisage prospects for its transformation in the wake of accelerated global economic integration. Predominantly for this reason, for analyses focusing on the World Bank originally conceived as one of the fundamental pillars of the original Bretton Woods system and standing on the threshold of a “post-Bretton Woods reshuffle” following the subprime crisis, the Neo-Gramscian framework drawn by Cox represents one of the most suited theoretical perspectives. As will be shown throughout the study, the analytical map formulated by Cox in his various writings constitutes an unparalleled and sophisticated tool to conceptualize the nature of structural transformations in the

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global political economy with special reference to institutional configurations such as the World Bank. As far as organizational framework is concerned, the study starts by presenting a precise outline of the neo-Gramscian framework as conceived by Cox with special reference to his conception of multilateralism. Afterwards, the analysis moves on to a descriptive account of the World Bank Group in an effort to provide the reader with preliminary information about the organizational structure and different functions of the World Bank. The part in which major points of criticism raised against this critical institution are highlighted will be followed by an analysis regarding the prospects for transformation and institutional reform in the Bank by referring to a case-study conducted by Robert O’Brien in which the changing patterns of interaction between global economic institutions and global social movements are studied. After emphasizing the reflections of social pressures on the institutional structure of the Bank, the study concludes by presenting general remarks concerning the interpretation of the World Bank in the light of the Coxian/Neo-Gramscian framework. Theoretical Backdrop: Key Elements of the Neo-Gramscian Framework The foremost prerequisite to understand Robert Cox’s theoretical construction concerns an awareness on the fact that he starts formulating his theory with a totally different basic assumption in mind than that of neorealist and neoliberal scholars. Cox does not believe the existence of a theory divorced from a standpoint in time and space, and contends that “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (1996a, 87). He differentiates between two broad purposes for formulating theories: The first is problem-solving theory which takes the world as it finds it with prevailing social and power relationships, and institutions into which they are organized as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these institutions and relationships work smoothly by dealing with particular sources of trouble. Problem-solving theories are fragmented among a multiplicity of spheres of action, each of which assumes a certain degree of stability in other spheres, since the general pattern of interactions is not at all questioned (ibid. 88).

Critical theory, on the other hand, does not take the institutions and social power relations for granted. It questions the very origins and improvement potential of the existing patterns of interaction, focusing on the social and political complex as a whole, rather than its separate and fragmented aspects. Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favor of an alternative social and political order, but limits the range of choices to apparent alternatives, which are feasible transformations of the existing

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world. According to Cox, problem-solving and critical theories are not mutually exclusive, and their salience to international relations will vary depending on particular circumstances. Problem-solving perspective would be favored under conditions of relative stability in the world order, because it represents a guide to tactical actions which sustain the existing order; whereas critical theory would come to the forefront during times of crisis, systemic transformation, or paradigmatic change, as it can guide strategic actions aimed at an alternative order (p.90). Building upon the Gramscian notion of hegemony, Cox contends that in order to become truly hegemonic, a state would have to establish and protect a world order which is universal in conception. In other words, this would not be an order in which a dominant state exploits others, but an order which will be perceived by -at least the major- subordinate states as compatible with their interests. A world-hegemony entails a social structure, an economic structure and a political structure ; and it emerges as a result of a widely appreciated sense of supremacy in the inter-state system, global political economy, as well as social and ecological systems (Cox, 1996b, 136). International organizations are the primary mechanisms in this framework through which universal norms of a world-hegemony are clearly expressed. Cox cites five major characteristics of international institutions expressing their hegemonic role of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular global order: First, international institutions embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of dominant economic and social forces, but at the same time permit adjustments to be made by subordinate interests with minimum pain. Second, international institutions and rules are generally initiated by the particular state which establishes the hegemony. At the very least, they must have that states’ support that will try to secure the international hierarchy of powers through influencing the decision-making processes directly or indirectly. Third, international institutions ideologically legitimate the norms of the existing world order. They reflect orientations favorable to the dominant social forces; thereby defining policy guidelines and supporting certain practices at the national level. Fourth, international institutions recruit and co-opt elite talent from peripheral countries in a manner called “transformismo” by Cox. Outstanding personalities from the periphery are recruited to the central organizational hierarchies in order to allow them to internalize and transfer elements of modernization into their local settings. Finally, transformismo simultaneously serves to absorb potentially counter-hegemonic ideas and recapitulate them to be consistent with the hegemonic doctrine (p. 138).

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Robert Cox’s Conception of Multilateralism “World order” and “multilateralism” are two closely interrelated concepts in the theoretical framework drawn by Robert Cox the two-way relationship between whom is characterized by a classical “agency vs. structure” problem of determination. Although multilateralism can only be understood within the historical structure of the world order, it can also appear as an active force shaping that order. Dominant trends in the existing world order can be conceptualized as a global system comprised of three principal components namely a global economy, an inter-state system and a biosphere, or global ecosystem (Cox, 1996c, 494). Cox contends that two dimensions of multilateralism, economic and political respectively, are closely interrelated. Economic multilateralism indicates the structure of world economy most conducive to capital expansion on a world scale and political multilateralism indicates institutional arrangements made for inter-state cooperation on common problems (ibid. 495). The relationship between the economic and political aspects of multilateralism can be perceived in a mutually reinforcing or inherently contradictory manner, depending on the main perspective one adopts. In the light of this broader theoretical framework, Cox applies the dichotomy of problem-solving vs. critical theory to the study of multilateralism and states that: Multilateralism can be examined from two main standpoints: one, as the institutionalization and regulation of the established order (problem-solving perspective); the other, as the locus of interactions for the transformation of the existing order (critical theory approach). Multilateralism, in practice, is both…the question of transformation is the more compelling of the two (ibid. 496-497).

The neo-Gramscian underpinnings of Robert Cox’s peculiar conception of multilateralism are unraveled with the adoption of the methodological perspective of historical dialectic. As expressed by the architect of the methodology himself, The approach…begins with an assessment of the dominant tendencies in the world order, and proceeds to an identification of the antagonisms generated within that order which could develop into turning points for structural transformation. Multilateralism, in this context, will be perceived as in part the institutionalization and regulation of the existing world order, and in part the site of struggle between conservative and transformative forces (Cox, 1996c, 514).

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Unravelling the World Bank group When delegates from forty four nations gathered at a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944 their chief goals were reforming the global governance architecture which was heavily dented by the impact of the Great Depression and laying down the foundations of a new era of stable growth through intergovernmental co-operation. The World Bank, formally called The International

Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was established on this occasion, together with International Monetary Fund (IMF) to oversee the birth of the new international economic order; while parallel negotiations in Havana failed to pave the way for the foundation of the third major institution, International Trade Organization. Instead, GATT survived for fifty years as a de facto substitute of the ITO to oversee negotiated liberalization of international trade relations. Unquestionably, the world has changed greatly over the past fifty years, and so has the World Bank in its membership, organizational structure and mainstream development agenda. Recently, it expanded to nearly universal membership and affiliate institutions were established, such as the International Development Association, leading to the formation of the World Bank Group. However, throughout this period of substantial change, the Word Bank’s two major roles remained the same and constituted the framework for Bank operations: First, mobilizing financial resources from both private savings and public sources. Second, lending accumulated resources for development projects by assisting the client countries on “what” and “how” of development. Currently, World Bank acts as the chief multilateral development lender, as well as a foremost rating agency for other institutions that finance development projects. Hence, the Bank has a major impact on LDC development strategies as a nonprivate lender, as a research centre and policy advisor. World Bank’s lending decisions and country analyses affect bilateral donors, regional development banks and private investment decisions. The Bank has also been effective by creating new theories and approaches to development. Developed states generally prefer to give official development assistance directly to recipient countries. Yet multilateral assistance including the funds transferred 5through World Bank projects increased from 5% in the 1960s to 30% in the 1990s (Gore, 2003, 332). The Financial Role of the Bank Originally, the World Bank was established to constitute one of the major intermediary institutions to facilitate international financial flows to Europe in the

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context of post-war reconstruction and the developing countries in the context of infrastructure and socioeconomic development projects. This task has been traditionally accomplished mainly through two channels; the International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Agency. Historically, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development soon came to be known as simply the World Bank. Yet, it is not a bank in the conventional sense of the term, because the IBRD accepts no deposits, does only have governments as shareholders and lends merely to its members with rather limited access to international capital markets. However, its organization is similar to a private sector corporation and voting rights are proportional to the contribution to the overall equity investment. The administrative expenses are financed through issuing bonds in private capital markets on commercial terms. Regarding its role in financial intermediation, the IBRD borrows in international capital markets and adding a marginal value of profit, passes these resources to the borrowers on terms that would never been available to them through standard channels (Lateef, 1996, 295). IBRD board is based on weighted voting in relation to country quotas, where G-5 (USA, Japan, Germany, France and Britain) hold most of the voting rights. IBRD membership requires IMF membership and IBRD Presidents are conventionally appointed under the political clout of the American administration. Besides the IBRD, the World Bank Group comprises International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Development Agency (IDA), International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). IFC was formed in 1956 to encourage private business and investment flows to LDCs and currently provides the largest source of loans and equity finance for private-sector projects in the Third World. IBRD loans are directed to governments, and IFC operates where IBRD could not operate by bringing domestic and foreign investors together. Both IBRD and IFC charge near commercial interest rates, hence some circles question whether their resources should count as official development assistance (ODA-foreign aid). The IDA, on the other hand, functions as the concessional arm of the IBRD group. Since its foundation in 1960 upon widespread complaints coming from Third World countries regarding the scarcity of development finance, the IDA provides loans that are interest-free and have long term maturity periods (around 40 years). The IDA is principally funded by ODA grants originating from richer members released to be lent to the poorest and least creditworthy states. Its loans are concessionary, but main criteria for eligibility are strictly determined. Countries qualify for IBRD or IDA loans, or a mix of the two depending on their overall level of development. Currently, the focus

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is on the strength of a country’s commitment to reduce poverty in an environmentally sustainable manner and its per capita income (Picciotto, 2003, 349). In principle, IBRD and IFC loans are borrowed from international capital markets whereas IDA loans are directly provided by the donor countries as part of their ODA budgets. Therefore, they frequently become subject to considerable delays and politically motivated moves, such as waiting for the clarification of the attitude of the US administration on a particular country. Liberal authors tend to oppose channeling development finance via the IDA arguing that it is wrong to “give handouts” for LDC development. Instead, private market actors and international trade relations should lead the way. The Advisory Role of the Bank Relative to the financial role, the significance of the advisory role of the World Bank has expanded substantially over the course of its long and eventful historical experience. Generally speaking, the advisory role of the Bank has been carried out in four major forms: First, the Bank engages in intensive policy dialogue with all of its borrowers not only on policies that influence the outcomes of public investments it sponsors, but also on the overall macroeconomic environment, public expenditure policies and long-term economic performance. This dialogue is informed by regular and thorough analyses of economic and sectoral issues undertaken in close collaboration with the existing and potential borrowers. Second, the Bank does actively involve in shaping project preparation, technology choice, organizational structure, procurement, monitoring and supervision to promote the use of most effective practices. Third, the Bank lends in the developing world extensively for technical assistance, personnel training and institution building. Last, but not least, the Bank tries to continually refine its experience regarding effective development strategies through academic research and publications, the most important being the regular publication of the World Development Report (Gilpin, 1987). The remaining two organs of the IBRD are more closely related to the advisory role of the Bank. To illustrate, International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has been trying to encourage FDI flows to LDCs and provide impartial international courts for disputes since its foundation in 1966. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), on the other hand, has been working to provide assurances to foreign investors against non-commercial risks –such as civil wars, military coups, expropriation and state failure- in Third World settings since 1988. Both of these institutions played important roles in promoting foreign trade in investment flows to LDCs.

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Fifty Years on: Major Criticisms Raised Against the World Bank Group Although it is beyond the scope of this study to present the full spectrum of criticisms raised against the World Bank, a selection of major critiques will be given to indicate the overall direction of the Bank’s institutional transformation. Over the course of its lifetime spanning to a period longer than half a century, the World Bank has been subject to strident criticisms from a wide audience ranging from the anti-globalization left to the market triumphalist right. In the meantime, the Bank has become involved in intense disputes about whether its policies reflect sound economic management or whether it amounts to a strategy of ‘recolonization’ (Tandon, 1994). It was also claimed that the Bank’s raison d’être in the form of environmentally sustainable poverty alleviation became irrelevant as the Bank continued to serve the predominant interests of industrialized countries and their corporate elites (Rich, 2003, 353). Analyses by Rich (1996, 313) and Cohn (2003, 376) represent some of the most appropriate categorizations of the fundamental points of criticisms brought forward regarding the global developmental role of the Bank, its decision-making processes and specific operations. The primary criticism raised against the World Bank concerns the fact that, in its fifty years record, the Bank has failed to accomplish either of its goals in its inception. It could not become the chief agent of post-war European recovery, which was predominantly realized through the Marshall Plan, and it could not promote development in the Third World. On the contrary, it was accused for undermining LDC development by prioritizing Western official and corporate interests, aligning itself with the orthodox neoliberal paradigm and making vital mistakes in the selection of projects. Second, the Bank is widely accused of adopting a top-down hierarchical approach to the design and implementation of development policy by imposing its will and conditions to national governments. It is maintained that high ranking developmental technocrats, rather than the public officials and civil society institutions from the borrowers determined the policy priorities in Bank operations. Moreover, strict conditionality of Bank loans which were frequently incorporated into IMF-led structural adjustment packages created significant pressures on the borrowing states. Third, the Bank is fiercely criticized for ignoring the social and wider environmental impact of its policy recommendations and projects in site of frequent lip service to social cohesion and sustainable development. The critiques in this context focused on the ecological destruction and social displacement effects of specific Bank projects across the developing world.

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Fourth, various criticisms are directed at the Bank’s history of extensive involvement with many of the world’s most notorious dictatorships in line with American and Western foreign policy interests. The most notable examples cited concern cordial relations between the Bank and the Apartheid Regime in South Africa, Nicolai Ceausescu of Romania and Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines which resulted in the release of generous credits. Breaches of fundamental human rights and liberties, in some cases, were openly supported through economic support programs and project sponsorships designed to consolidate authoritarian regimes. The last cluster of criticisms specifically focus on the involvement of the Bank in intensifying policy dialogue with Southern governments since the 1980s and its increasingly active role in Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) partnering the IMF. It is widely argued that the Bank predominantly emphasized market-friendly growth policies to create sound macro-economic environments, while often neglecting the severely negative social repercussions including the dissemination of acute poverty associated with those policies. Besides these mainstream criticisms, some analysts asserted that the Bank has been essentially a creature of the Cold War environment designed to contain the spread of communism in the Third World. In the same vein, it is argued that the World Bank has totally lost its relevance to global configuration of power in the post-Cold War era and partial attempts at institutional rejuvenation through emphasis on poverty alleviation and sustainable development were doomed to failure from the beginning. Reforming the Bank: Trajectory of Institutional Transformation The hitherto presented descriptive account on the organizational structure of the Bank as well as paramount criticisms voiced against this critical institution need to be contextualized within a theoretically informed analytical framework in order to constitute the basis for a radical transformation in terms of both development discourse and policy priorities. To start with, most of the ideologically motivated criticisms portray the World Bank as an oppressive/hegemonic institution which is out of time and place as far as profound transformations in the global political economy are concerned. However, interestingly enough, the findings of a research conducted by Robert O’Brien, one of the foremost followers of Robert Cox, on the interaction between international economic institutions and global social movements (NGOs) has revealed that the World Bank has been the most successful international institution to change its ways in line with the social demands coming from below (O’Brien, 1997, 9).

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Mainly building upon the Neo-Gramscian framework drawn by Cox, O’Brien examined the comparative institutional transformation trajectories of the World Bank, IMF and WTO as they responded to demands of the global movements defending the rights of women, labor and environmental issues (ibid. 16). He contended that increasing activities of various groups of civil society operating internationally and transnationally has began to challenge an exclusively state-centered notion of multilateralism by quoting Cox’s definition of new or complex multilateralism: “It is an attempt to reconstitute civil societies and political authorities on a global scale, building global governance from the bottom up” (Cox, 1997, xxvii). Accordingly, complex multilateralism is seen as a manifestation of critical theory in the sense defined by Cox in that it attempts to radically restructure existing forms of interaction between stable institutional frameworks and emerging social groups. Complex multilateralism differs from old-fashioned multilateralism in three major respects: First, it represents an emerging conceptual entity that is still in the process of evolution and does not exist in its final form. Second, it attempts to form a new form and architecture of global governance by starting from the demands of key social movements operating independently of the state elites. Last, but certainly not the least, complex multilateralism constitutes an attempt at post-hegemonic theorizing and organization representing a radical paradigmatic shift from the established forms based on elite consensus (O’Brien, 1997, 6). Being fair to the World Bank, O’Brien contends that the process of adaptation to the demands of social movements has gone and will go furthest in the case of the World Bank compared to the IMF and WTO. He explains the tendency of the Bank staff to form extensive contacts with social movements by referring to two major factors: First, the World Bank traditionally runs particular development projects in the developing world which are extremely vulnerable to disruption by social movements. Wide sectors of local populations could be more easily mobilized for their immediate interests affected by World Bank-sponsored projects than general policies of IMF and WTO, which forces the Bank to be relatively responsive towards social demands. Second and more importantly, the operations of the World Bank are heavily dependent upon US Congressional politics for financial support. If social movements are strong enough to influence interest articulation and representation at the US Congress, they have to be taken seriously into consideration to be able to secure financial backing for the proposed Bank projects (ibid. 13). Motivated by the abovementioned factors, O’Brien maintains, the World Bank began to develop a systematic institutional framework to incorporate rising social demands in its policy structure since the 1980s. Particularly, the environmental and gender effects of proposed

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projects started to be seriously considered during project design and execution stages. Furthermore, a broader network of policy dialogue was constituted to provide the exchange of information between the Bank and non-governmental organizations to improve its capacity of social responsiveness (ibid. 10). For being able to keep pace with the changing global conditions and social demands, the World Bank has started to adjust its institutional structure in recent years. The emphasis in Bank operations has gradually shifted from individual development projects to long-term macroeconomic policies that help a variety of projects to succeed on a sustainable basis. The initial top-down and hierarchical approach was replaced by a more eclectic approach also involving bottom-up channels of beneficiary participation, and the idea of maximum exploitation of natural resources was substituted, at least in rhetoric, with a commitment to ensure sustainable development. As a formal reflection of these trends, the Bank has created four new Vice-Presidencies in the mid 1990s entailing Vice-Presidencies for human resources and operations policy (to deal with poverty reduction); environment and sustainable development; finance and private sector development and Europe and Central Asia (to facilitate transition to free-market conditions). Furthermore, five new major areas of operation were determined, namely pursuing economic reforms to enhance growth and reduce poverty; investing in people; protecting the environment through sustainable growth; stimulating the private sector; and reorienting governments for sound macroeconomic policies (Lateef, 1996, 300). Despite much lip service to these priorities which involved elements of orthodox or nuanced neoliberal approaches to development, World Bank reform continued to occupy central stage in global governance agenda alongside IMF reform well into the first decade of the new millennium. Concluding Remarks: The World Bank as an Hegemonic Institution To conclude the study, it is worth stressing our clear impression that the World Bank was initially established at the Bretton Woods Conference as a hegemonic institution in the neo-Gramscian/Coxian sense and has been functioning in the same vein despite partial changes in the 1990s. It carries all the characteristics of hegemonic international institutions expressed by Robert Cox: To start with, the Bank embodies the rules, which facilitate the expansion of dominant social forces, i.e., economic expansion and neoliberal macroeconomic management/development paradigm. Moreover, the Bank was initiated by the US, the state which established the post-war hegemony and continued to influence decision-making processes directly or indirectly. The Bank facilitates ideological legitimization of the power balances and

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norms of the existing world order through its academic and policy related studies and publications. It also reflects orientations favorable to the dominant social forces in local environments by observing the interests of the core countries and corporate bodies; thereby defining policy guidelines and supporting compatible practices at the national level. Unquestionably, the Bank recruits and co-opts elite talent from peripheral areas which is a practice aimed at absorbing potentially counter-hegemonic ideas and recapitulate them to be consistent with the hegemonic doctrine of market ideological neoliberalism (Gilpin, 2001, 379). However, as O’Brien indicates, faced with the intense mobilization of various forces of civil society, the World Bank has taken some steps to adopt itself into a bottom-up approach since the 1990s. We would describe the Bank as “the most reformed and adaptable example of global hegemonic institutions.” But clearly, attempts at World Bank reform were realized in a problem-solving mentality in Coxian terms which assumed the immutability of existing structures and patterns of interaction. Profound transformations postulated in an approach of critical theory are obviously difficult to achieve unless a radical shift occurs in the global distribution of power. Fundamental change, especially in the institutional axis, takes longer. Empirically speaking, the future of the World Bank in the aftermath of the subprime crisis and re-articulation of the Bretton Woods trilogy of IMF-WB-WTO is bound to be influenced by dynamic changes and paradigmatic shifts in the global political economy. A great number of would-be borrowers (mostly in East-Asia) have developed their sui-generis methods of raising development finance since the Asian crisis and regional development banks as well as monetary unions gained increasing prominence in recent years. Furthermore, the abundance of private and public lenders in global capital markets stimulates competition among potential donors, in line with the increasing economic importance of BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) as well as middle powers such as Korea, Mexico, Turkey and Indonesia vis-àvis the US and Europe. Despite these structural changes, however, there is no doubt that the World Bank will certainly occupy a crucial position in the global governance architecture for some time to come. References Cohn, Theodore. 2003. Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice. Second Edition. New York: Longman. Cox, Robert. 1996a. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”. In R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (1996) Approaches to World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Originally published in 1981).

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Cox, Robert. 1996b. “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method”. In R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (1996) Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Originally published in1983). Cox, Robert. 1996c. “Multilateralism and World Order”. In R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (1996) Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Originally published in 1992). Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gilpin, Robert. 2001. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gore, Charles. 2003. “The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries”. In C. R. Goddard, P. Cronin and K.C. Dash (eds.) International Political Economy: State-Market Relations in a Changing Global Order, Second Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lateef, Kamal. 1996. “The World Bank: Its First Half Century”. In C.R. Goddard, J.T. Passe-Smith and J.G. Conklin (eds.) International Political Economy: State-Market Relations in the Changing Global Order, London: Lynne Rienner. O’Brien, Robert. 1997. “Complex Multilateralism: The Global Economic Institutions– Global Social Movements Nexus”. Seminar Paper presented in Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System Conference (31 October-1 November 1997), Center for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, the University of Warwick. Picciotto, Robert. 2003. “A New World Bank for a New Century”, in C. R. Goddard, P. Cronin and K.C. Dash (eds.) International Political Economy: State-Market Relations in a Changing Global Order, Second Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Rich, Bruce. 1996. “The World Bank/IMF: 50 Years is Enough”. In Goddard, C.R, PasseSmith, J.T. and Conklin, J.G.(eds) International Political Economy: State-Market Relations in the Changing Global Order, London: Lynne Rienner. Rich, Bruce. 2003. “Still Waiting: The Failure of Reform at the World Bank”. In C. R. Goddard, P. Cronin and K.C. Dash (eds.) International Political Economy: StateMarket Relations in a Changing Global Order. Second Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Sinclair, Timothy. 1996. “Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert Cox and Approaches to World Order”. In R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (1996) Approaches to World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tandon, Yash. 1994. “Recolonization of Subject Peoples”. Alternatives. 19-2.

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-3 (2), 2010

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

A Decade of SAPs, Market Liberalization and Environment in Tanzania (1987 - 1998)

Mette Nordahl Grosen* and Bezen Balamir Coflkun**

Abstract

This article aims to explore contestations between the expansion of market liberalisation in Tanzania and the self-protection of society against its disruptive social and environmental effects, and to discuss the confrontations between macro-level policies and their micro-level effects. In order to analyse these contestations, mining sector in Tanzania is chosen as it has been one of the driving sectors for Tanzanian economic growth during 1980s and early 1990s.

Keywords: IMF, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), Tanzania, Environment, Mining Sector

JEL: F02, F33

* **

Aalborg University. (corresponding author) Zirve University. [email protected]

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Introduction After the decolonization of Asian and African countries in 1960s, dynamics of international politics and economical affairs have shifted from the conflicting relations between the East and the West to profit-based North-South interactions. In this context, global economic relations have been organized through creating international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) who introduced a liberal international economic order to the wold. Since, there were uncertainties about which political direction these states who had newly gained their independence would follow, the Western powers tried to ensure that they will not turn into an anti-Western or communist course. As a result of this, Western policy makers formulated and implemented democratic and capitalist development path that will serve the Third World countries as a satisfactory alternative to communism (Marchand 1994:289-290). In this context, Washington Consensus was formed and in the Third World countries, some Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were introduced. The SAPs that were introduced in Africa in the early 1980s, were aiming to create more efficient economies by increasing productivity and enhancing competitiveness. However, most of these programs failed, mainly due to the political complexities and social upheavals associated with the implementation of reforms in Africa’s statist, resource-based economies (Gibbon 1995:190). Until the economic crisis of 1980s, Tanzania has adopted a socialist development model called Ujamaa in Kiswahili which emphasized state intervention, nationalization of foreign owned enterprises through state enterprises and physical relocation of rural population in village settlements (Gibbon 1995:10). Proclaimed goals of Ujamaa -equity, participation and self-reliance- failed to improve the welfare of the country. The GDP declined and finally in 1980, the Tanzanian economy collapsed (Reed 2001:11). Along with policy failures of the Tanzanian Government, several external factors brought the Tanzanian economy into this economic crisis: weak demand for her agricultural products in international markets, worsening terms of trade and proliferation of protectionism as a non-tariff measure by the industrialized countries (Ponte 1999:5). In 1986, IMF stabilization program was accepted. This program focused on liberalization of foreign investment regulations, deepening the reforms in agricultural sector and privatization of public sector. Richness in natural resources constituted the epicenter of the program and reforms held in mining sector were focusing on attracting foreign capital. This approach led new economic agents to enter in the natural resources sectors. At an aggregate level, economic reforms conduced generally positive economic outcomes in Tanzania during this period. For example, its real growth

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averaged 3.3 percent annually during the reform period between 1987 and 1998. Meanwhile the budget deficit decreased from the 11 percent of the GDP in 1986 to 4.6 percent in 1998. However, social and environmental costs of these reforms reached extremely high levels, because of the policy and implementation failures (Reed 2001:15). Due to the Tanzanian economy’s desperate need of foreign investment, reforms in the mining sector started just before the adoption of the SAPs. Since 1979, a series of laws establishing a framework that grants licenses for private ventures engaged in mining activities and gives priority to attract large amount of foreign investment have been promulgated. These incentives and liberalized policies rendered the mining sector to become one of the most dynamic sectors of the Tanzanian economy (Reed 2001:13). In Tanzania, the mining sector is still the fastest growing economic field and the gold mines are the most important cash crop of the country. With the informal activities in the sector, more than one million people are involved in mining activities (Gibbon 1995:9). And some of the world’s largest gold mining companies have been operating in Tanzania, the third largest gold producer country in Africa after South Africa and Ghana (Knight 2001). The expansion in the mining sector in Tanzania that is associated with a weak regulatory framework encouraged private mining and marketing companies to engage in rent-seeking activities, gold smuggling and tax evasion. Due to incentives and priorities favoring large-scale or middle-scale mining companies and merchants, significant inequalities occurred among people who are occupied in mining activities. Most of the small-scale miners lost their businesses because of the harsh competition with powerful large-scale companies who can easily manipulate the market prices and the official support. Moreover, many people who live in mining areas have lost their lands and the base of their livelihoods because of the policies in favor of mining companies. Besides the social inequalities, environmental costs of the expansion of mining have been tremendous. Studies in the Arusha, Mwanza and Tanga regions depict a widespread water contamination, deforestation, biodiversity loss and degradation of agricultural fields (Reed 2001:13). In spite of the contribution of mining to the economic growth of the country, the gold mining has caused enormous environmental problems. Land surfaces and water resources, for example, have been seriously affected by the gold mining. Mining methods used to unearth the gold expose the land surface, create waste dumps and leave great pits open which eventually lead to land slides and soil erosion. The forests in the region, on the other hand, started to disappear. Furthermore, the lands around the open pits are becoming useless for agricultural activities. The most serious problem regarding the gold mining activities is the water pollution in the Lake Victoria, which is the most important natural resource for the local people’s livelihoods (Chachage 1995:102-103). Toxic chemicals used to extract gold

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have leaked into people’s drinking water (Knight 2001). These chemicals are highly dangerous for human beings and all other living creatures. The above-mentioned environmental problems have been accompanied by the lack of official regulations and weak legislations, which have raised a contestation between the livelihoods of the rural people and the interests of the mining companies. The destruction of the land caused by the mining activities decreases soil fertility, and thus diversely affects the agricultural sector and undermines the livelihood of small farmers. According to Chachage, ‘throughout Tanzania’s history, the unlimited exploitation of natural and mineral resources has always been taken for granted as a “necessary cost” of economic and political “progress.” Even today, such issues are part of the agenda only because of pressure from external forces … This explains why there has been hardly any serious intervention on environmental issues in mining’ (Chachage 1995:98). In short, natural resources, including minerals, are seen as a fundamental source for a developing country to become a part of the global economy. However, as it is seen in Tanzania, environmental problems of the Third World do not just reflect policy failures of national governments; they also demonstrate the influence of global political and economic forces. In this article, the authors will explore the contestations and confrontations between the market liberalization policies implemented between 1987 and 1998 and show their disruptive effects on livelihoods of Tanzanian people. Here, taking the gold mining sector as the case, both socio-economic and environmental aspects of the matter will be discussed to be able to answer the following question: What are the repercussions of the dispute and competition between the expansion of market liberalization in Tanzania and self-protection efforts of the society against the disruptive social and environmental effects of these policies? The first part of the article analyses the power relations in the world economy, which will be followed by a review of colonial political economy of Tanzania. The third section focuses on market liberalization practices in Tanzania and their effects on the society and the environment. In the Following sections, Tanzanian mining sector will be discussed and the macro-level liberalization policies imposed by the IMF and their micro-level effects will be revealed.

Power Relations in the World Economy As some universal values are effectively represented in their social, economic, political and legal systems, the power of the West, at present, means the power of definition. As Ziauddin Sardar notes ‘the West defines what is, for example, freedom, progress and civil behaviour; law, tradition and community….The non-western

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civilisations have simply accept these definitions or be defined out of existence’ (Ziauddin 1999:44). The development criteria –Human Development Index, recipes for economic growth, Washington Consensus and SAPs- and the loci and foci of international political economics are defined and formulated by leading international powers which are located mainly at the western side of the global map. The rest of the world have been left with no choice but to follow the rules of their system, which is called ‘the capitalist world system’ by some dependency theorists. Besides its power to define, the centre of the capitalist world system also has resource structural powers, as pointed out by Galtung. Thanks to these powers it possesses, the centre of the global hierarchy succeeded to create a global economy whose logic had been already defined by itself as liberalisation, and a liberal international economic order was introduced by international financial organisations in accordance with the strategies of the centre (Marchand 1994:289-290). Thanks to the expansion of the capitalist world system since the fifteenth century, all parts of the world have been integrated into the world economy. As a result of the economic globalization and internationalization of the world economy, national governments have lost their full autonomy over the economics of their countries. Especially, at the periphery of the world economy, economic policies and decisions are mainly influenced or imposed by international financial institutions and Trans National Companies (TNCs) at the cost of social and environmental degradation. Like many other African countries, Tanzania has always been one of the weakest actors of the capitalist world system. Countless economic recovery programs had been adopted in the country without considering their effects on human livelihoods and environment. In the Tanzanian case, apart from its economic dependency on the developed world, heritage of the colonial political economy and the socialist ideology of the former Tanzanian Government played important roles in determining the country’s position in the capitalist world system.

Colonial Political Economy of Tanzania Tanzania was subjected to German and British colonialism. During the German colonial period, the most effective actor over Tanzanian economy was German East Africa Company. This company surveyed all the available resources of the country. Moreover, they built roads, bridges and railways from interior parts of the country to the coast to serve as transportation links. Finally, the colonial government created an attractive investment climate for German investors by offering them low company

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taxes, cheap agricultural lands, profit repatriation guarantees, subsidized internal transportation costs, and control of labour relations. The best lands of the country were presented to German settlers and indigenous peasants were pushed to less habitable marginal areas. The traditional economy was restructured to produce commodities which were mainly industrial raw materials, for complementing the needs of the German and later the British economies. Furthermore, Tanzania served as a ready market for Germany’s manufactured products (Raugmanu 1997:95-97). When Germany was defeated in the World War I, Britain took control over Tanzania, but she did not make substantive changes in the structures that were left behind by the Germans. The British controlled the direction of trade which was dominated by the British trade firms. Thus, the British controlled more than a third of Tanzania’s international trade. By introducing measures like the Credit to Natives (Restriction) Ordinance, the colonial rule discouraged Africans from conducting important commercial operations. As a result of this, indigenous entrepreneurs were displaced by transnational corporations (Raugmanu 1997:98101). The Government ruled by the British focused on the expansion of the mining sector, mainly in diamonds and gold. During the accumulation period of the crisis broke in 1920s, British rulers focused on the exploitation of raw materials and minerals, particularly gold, for the Central Reserve Bank from the colonies. Gold rush to Tanzanian gold mines had started in 1922, but it then only attracted small-scale miners. Although the government began to actively encourage large-scale investors in mining after the second half of the 1920s, low prices of gold caused a discouragement in the gold mining. Furthermore, with the World War II, the gold production began to decline because of bitter consequences of the war economy. Many of the most important gold mines were closed by the late 1940s, since the relative unimportance of the gold in the international monetary system which was unprofitable for large companies (Chachage 1995:52). The mining sector was nationalized just after the independence but many of them stagnated from poor management and lack of investment (Reed 2001:11). The colonialism in Tanzania has imposed the division of labour principle of the capitalist world system which meant that it secured a production structure for complementing the centre’s needs of accumulating goods. Moreover, it caused new consumption patterns for European manufactured goods which undermined the economic basis for self-sufficiency (Rugumanu 1997:104). In 1961, Tanzania became an independent state with a population of 9.4 million people and a per capita income of only 20. As a heritage of the colonial rule, the new nation lacked the physical and locational assets for attracting foreign capital, and had

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shortages of local capital due to scarcity of local entrepreneurship and skills which are necessary for overcoming the handicaps of the country. As an extension of the colonial economic policies, comprising the 59 percent of the GDP, agriculture was the backbone of the economy and the agro-based exports constituted approximately 80 percent of the total exports. Manufacturing, on the other hand, contributed less than 4 percent to the GDP. As a result, the 80 percent of the manufactured goods consumed in Tanzania were imported, which resulted in enormous imbalance of payment problems and made the country’s economy vulnerable to changes in the international trade regime (Rugumanu 1997:104-105). As a result of this vulnerability, the weak demand for agricultural products in the international markets and worsening terms of trade during the 1980s, have induced a dramatic economic bankruptcy.

Market Liberalization and SAPs in Tanzania After the economic crisis in 1980s, a radical passage from ujamaa type of policies to the market liberalization was initiated in Tanzania. According to the adjustment need marked by the World Bank with Berg Report noted that socialist macroeconomic policies of sub-Saharan African countries in general, and of Tanzania in particular, had lost their validity (Rugumanu 1997:104) and that an adjustment should be used as a tool for transforming Tanzanian socialist policies into market liberalization (Ponte 1999:3). Especially after the 1980s debt crisis, the IMF and the World Bank planned to supervise the credits for the developing countries; therefore, they had the capacity to affect the organization of production and trade in the periphery, to the benefit of the centre of the capitalist world system: ‘The scope and the detail of the combined IMF conditionality rules and the World Bank’s structural adjustment contracts have amounted to a degree of economic intervention in the debtor countries, which matched, perhaps even exceeded the direct administration of by-gone colonial governments’ (Hoogvelt 1997:166-167). In Tanzania, the IMF and the World Bank, together with the Tanzanian Government, conducted necessary policy changes and structural changes necessary towards a liberalized market economy. In 1986, the IMF and the World Bank approved an ‘Economic Recovery Plan’ and with the IMF, a standby agreement was signed. This standby accord was followed by an IMF Structural Adjustment Facility which focused on liberalization of foreign investment regulations and privatization of public sector (Gibbon 1995:12). After the standby agreement Tanzanian Government’s official policy was significantly influenced by the discourses of the liberal international political economy.

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This newly emerged paradigm rejected, even blamed, the old ujamaa policies and praised liberalization and privatization. President Mwinyi’s speech at the Eighth National Economic Policy Workshop in 1992 was a clear example for this new discourse:

Despite the problems facing the World Trading System and the unequal exchange between the products and services of the Third World with those of the developed countries, there is no escaping from participating in the world economy… It is necessary for us (Tanzanians) to reexamine the role of the state in economic development… State control, which suffocates individual and cooperative initiative in the economy, is not conducive to sustainable economic growth and social progress. Development is brought about by the people themselves (Gibbon 1995:12).

Tanzanian adjustment passed through three phases. The first phase mainly focused on trade liberalization practices, while in the second phase foreign investment deregulations emphasized and the final phase focused on establishing parastatal and civil service reforms, reducing the number of civil servants by closing down some state offices (Gibbon 1995:12-14). Below, the analysis of the results yielded from the first phase in practice can be seen. Although Africa’s total share of global trade is around 21 percent, trade is still the most important source of foreign exchange for African countries (Clapp 2000:212). Since the developed countries charge higher tariffs on manufactured goods of developing countries, Tanzania intensively focuses on exporting raw materials. This trade policy, which is mainly based on exploitation of natural resources, has been supported in the context of Tanzanian economic recovery program. In short, the trade regime reforms in Tanzania were mainly concerned with measures for rationalizing behavior and actions in internal and, especially external trading and for promoting exports (Kiondo 1991:34). According to Kangero, the IMF’s trade liberalization policies have followed a return to classical type of colonial agrarian economy. Within such an imperialist dominated system, the free trade results in a control by the monopolist TNCs in alliance with local comprador classes, as it has been experienced in the Tanzanian case (Kangero 1991:78). The TNCs have influenced the governmental decisions that shape the country's economic policies and law in favor of their interests through direct investments and technical or financial assistance. As a result of the TNCs strong position within the economy, local industries and small producers have not been able to survive and many of them declared bankruptcy.

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As it is pointed by Amin and Frank, one of the main reasons of the underdevelopment of the periphery is the inequitable distribution of the trade and investment assets. The trade liberalization efforts, which are imposed on developing world through SAPs, have been biased in favor of the benefits of the exporters of the developed world. Quota restrictions, health and safety regulations, nominal and effective tariff structures, etc., are used as tools for protection of the products sold by the developed world (Rugumanu 1997:33). According to Hoogvelt, ‘even if the structural adjustment programs were not successful to improve the living standards of the masses in African countries, they were very successful to the acceleration of the process of globalization. They helped to shift the resources of the continent more tightly into the service of the capitalist world system’ (1997:171). After 17 years of the IMF policies, and despite Tanzania’s formal political independence,

in

the

new

millenium,

the

country

is

still

suffering

from

underdevelopment and increased dependence on the centre because of its continued raw material exporter role in the international division of labour. The only difference between the colonial political economy and the postcolonial political economy of the Tanzania is the external actors who have influential power over the Tanzanian economy. During the colonial period, the main external actors were the colonial powers, while during 1990s, they were replaced by the IFIs (International Financial Institutions) and TNCs. As foreign investment, which usually comes with investments of TNCs in key sectors of developing economies of the periphery, the TNCs play a dominant role for developing economies like Tanzania. However, these have used more resources than they have invested. Capital has tended to flow out from Tanzania through profits, debt service, loyalties and fees imposed by the TNCs manipulation of import and export prices (Rugumanu 1997:34). That is why, Samir Amin defines this period as a neocolonial or neo-imperial period. Losers of the system, however, remain the same: the actual producers and underprivileged masses. Applications of SAP policies designed by the IMF and the World Bank did not consider the real needs of the society at all and nearly entirely undermined them. Trade liberalization policies, on the other hand, raisen an extremely competitive environment for local industries and reproduced inequality within the Tanzanian society by spreading a consumerist social behavior. The material basis of these policies is derived from the expansion of commodities and markets beyond national boundaries and incentives given to private bourgeoisie to expand their investments. The most vulnerable and poorest sections of the society have been dramatically

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affected by the deregulation of the labour markets, cuts of social welfare provisions and declining expenditures on health and education. The structural adjustment policies have repercussion at the micro-level of the Tanzanian society and to have severe socioeconomic impacts on people’s livelihoods. According to a number of conditionalities formulated by the IFIs, Tanzania was experiencing serious imbalance of payments and in order to make Tanzania capable of paying back its debts, its economy was needed to be stabilized. One significant condition of these structural adjustment policies was the cutbacks in the public spending which naturally caused severe implications upon lower class people: ‘The implementation of the IMF package has affected the public service sector badly […]. Currently dispensaries and hospitals are without drugs, rural water taps are dry, higher education is for the wealthy people, and three meals a day are for the high-salaried class’ (Kiondo 1991:36). The cuts in government spending which was one of the conditions imposed by the IFIs which led to drawbacks in the public sector, also imposed a further strain on poor rural people by the cutting down on spending on antipoverty measures. Thus, the distribution of resources within the Tanzanian society became even more uneven than before the implementation of the SAPs. Hence, as the social security nets and the antipoverty measure had vanished, the poor rural people have been forced to sustain themselves by occupying themselves in employments in which they are submitted to more health hazards. As a result of the necessity of economic adjustment, guidelines were defined by the World Bank, and the Tanzanian economic policies were transformed from their socialist pattern into a liberal pattern. During this transformation period and later policies, which remedied a deepening of the liberalization in the country, Tanzanian society, particularly the rural masses and their livelihood, had not been considered. The economic reform policies, which focused on trade liberalization, reproduced a colonial type of economic dependency instead of welfare. The benefits of the liberalization had not been felt by the majority of the Tanzanian society. They were still under pressure of the negative side-effects of these policies such as unfair opportunities, cuts of public expenditures and labour insecurity.

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NeoLiberal Policies, Environment and Society According to Mittelman, neoliberal policies and forces of globalisation enhanced the production and growth. Thereby, the use of natural resources which has been symptomatic for the situation of the environment, now shows signs of the destructive ideology of capitalism in terms of environmental degradation:‘The root causes [of environmental abuse] are in social structures reinforced by the development paradigm. The paradigm is the villain’ (Mittelman 2000:186). James O’Connor argues that the mechanisms for accumulation of capital creates ecological crises. For a capitalist economy to avoid an economic crisis, certain economic mechanisms are needed to provide for capital accumulation. However, the problem of capitalist self-expansion is that it has no economic limits. Since the capital accumulation and the capitalist expansion have no limits, nature is undervalued regardless of the fact that the nature’s economy is organized on very different principles than the capitalist economy i.e., nature’s productivity is self-limiting. There are few limits to the capitalist expansion, so it moves on in the search for making profits regardless of the damage it will cause. Thus, the capitalist expansion has been described as pointed by Gary Snyder, ‘[capitalism] spreads its economic support system out far enough that it can afford to wreck one ecosystem, and keep moving on’ (O’Conner 1995:181). If the economy is expanding, the demand for raw materials will also grow. As a result of this, raw materials become many of constant capital outlays, therefore, a greater share of the value of commodities which means that capitals must alter a larger proportion of their profits into more natural resources. In this case, increases in the demand for resources and expanded resource exploitation raise average costs, tending to depress the rates of profit and accumulation. Individual capitals, then, attempt to overcome bottlenecks by investing in equipment, technology, and infrastructure to open up new mineral and fossil fuel deposits, arable land, and so on. If there are lower average costs at higher levels of production and use in raw material sectors, costs and prices will fall, and hence, the higher the average profit rate is, the more rapid the exploitation of raw materials and capital accumulation. This pursuit of profits and capital accumulation lead to a vicious circle: ‘…high profit rates lead to high accumulation rates which in turn lead to greater demand or raw materials; higher levels of exploitation of raw materials lead to lower production costs which result in still higher profit and accumulation rates. In sum, if raw materials are cheap, the rates of accumulation and depletion and exhaustion of resources will be relatively high…’ (O’Conner 1995:181).

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While explaining the workings of social structures and their impacts over the people and the nature as a consequence of the neo-liberal policies nexus in society, Mittelman (2000) states that these developments in society are caused by the development paradigm that involves the promise of economic gain and the neo-liberal requirements that the developing countries are supposed to follow. Only then they will have the opportunity to reach a higher stage in the global economy and become a part of the global hierarchy of power and production. The higher levels of economic globalisation, which have been promoted by the SAPs, result in the production of poverty and the marginalization caused by the substantial amount of expenditure reduction on social services and separation of economic reforms from social policy. The interactions or clashes between societies and global ideas or theories, which are imposed by hegemonic powers, can be explained by Karl Polanyi’s double movement argument. Polanyi argued that there has been a development through the time which has had great affects on the interrelation between the market and the society. According to Polanyi, modern society can be explained with struggles between market expansion (first movement) and society's self-protection against disruptive effects of the market expansion (second movement). Forces represented by the market clash with forces of society that resist the ideas accompanied with liberalisation. As a result of this struggle, the society either de-links itself from the global trend or fits into it (Hettne 1995:11). With the introduction of neoliberal policies, man and nature had to adjust and diversify the speed and the flexibility of the liberalized market as a result of which winners and losers appear both at the microlevel and at the macro-level (Mittelman 2000:78).

Market Liberalization, SAPs and Tanzanian Mining Sector Mining sector plays two contradictory roles in the economies of developing countries like Tanzania. First, in accordance with the strategic policies of the government, the mining sector is one of the key sectors promising for the country’s prospect of development as it is an important canal for hard-currency income. This, however, leads to foreign investments domination which causes instability due to fluctuating commodity prices and continuous dependency on new technologies (Kalyala 1987:125). Nevertheless, since the Governments encouraged private investments in the mining sector as a condition of implementing the IMF's economic reform programs, private entrepreneurs found favorable conditions in most of the subSaharan African countries. By adopting the SAPs, governments have tried to enforce measures to make their countries more attractive for foreign investment. In the

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Tanzanian case, the wealth gained from natural resources formed the backbone of the economic reform program and the mining sector was the selected attraction site for foreign capital. World Bank's reports note that to attract foreign private mining companies, which have the capital and the expertise, they needed to create an enabling environment for the mining industry that involves incentives and attractive taxes (Chachage 1995:40). As a result of liberalization policies, many new agents entered into the sector in forms of TNCs and medium-sized mining companies and gemstone merchants (Reed 2001:11). Just like other sub Saharan African countries who are rich in mineral resources, Tanzania’s gold mining activities are also concentrated in the hands of major multinational companies. These TNCs have used their superiority of having big capital and technology as a means for bargaining power to exert influence on official views, procedural changes and even laws. Their influence over the economic domain have many times conduced the basic necessities and rights of the local people who are directly or indirectly involve in mining activities to be undermined. One of the best examples of this kind of influence was from the Canadian Kahama Mining Corporation Ltd. This company gained possession and control over the Bulyanhulu area; one of the mining fields in the Mwanza region, with the license issued for a completely different area, in a completely different district, and in a completely different region. With this license they appropriated the possession of the lands and the people living in these lands have been forced to move (LEAT 2002). As it is seen in the above mentioned example, the expansion in the mining sector accompanied with the rent-seeking behavior of private mining companies and official agents, contributed to factors that maintained a weak regulatory framework. Within this weak regulatory framework, the mining companies exercised collusions with government agencies who held the responsibility for granting concessions for mining, collecting taxes and monitoring the activities of mining companies. As a result of these collusions, private mining companies behaved audaciously in acting against laws and regulations. They had been able to acquire licenses wherever they wanted to invest, and they ignored the local people’s property rights on those lands and denied them to have healthy livelihoods. For example, although the Mining Act of 1998 addressed some environmental problems which were caused by mining activities and demanded the mining companies to conduct some environmental impact assessments, the mining companies successfully evaded these requirements with the assistance of some official agents who were responsible of monitoring their assessments, by not considering the environmental and social consequences of these companies' actions

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(LEAT 2001). In the bulk of the cases, people who were affected from the impacts of mining companies, had no power to defend their rights because of this “political mafia” and the weak official regulations (Reed 2001:13). Another dark side of the expansion of mining was its effects on the environment. In its origin, mining is a dirty industry which is why it has been one of the industries that had moved into the Third World. As Frank noted, to reduce the costs of the production centre countries, ‘the policy… to move … capital-intensive crises ridden industries (and those that are polluting or incur high anti pollution costs), … to Third World…’ (Frank 1983:190-191) was applied. Major environmental problems seen in Tanzania related to the mining are deforestation, water pollution and soil degradation (Mwalyosi 1999:123-124) which are very well acknowledged by the mining officials and policymakers. Due to the cruiciality of the sector for the Tanzanian economy, the government officials prefer to underestimate these problems by describing them as simple destructions and inevitable cost of economic growth and reflect the complaints about the problems as irrational reactions of small-scale producers. Hence, the whole picture of degradation related to the market liberalisation policies has not been able to be officially and impartially explored and discussed (Chachage 1995:98). A major failure of the Tanzanian Government regarding liberalization policies is that the state has not been able to create conditions in which all economic actors can compete fairly. In the mining sector, due to the incentives and priorities in favor of large-scale or middle-scale mining companies and merchants, significant inequalities have been created among people -whether they are involved in the mining activities or not. For example, small-scale miners or artisanal miners have not been able to compete with these large companies who can easily manipulate the market prices and turn the official support in favor of their own benefits. Therefore, most of them went bankrupt and lost their businesses. Another consequence of this has been that the local farmers and villagers living around the mining areas lost their lands and have been forced to relocate. These inequalities eventually led to conflicts and struggles between small-scale miners and middle and large-sized mining companies, and between local people and mining companies. As the mining sector is one of the backbones of the liberal economic reforms of the Tanzanian Government, implications of the reforms in the sector have been strong enough to be able to represent the whole socio-economic picture of Tanzania. With the incentives, taxation priorities and lax regulations, an enabling environment was created for private enterprises to boom in the mining sector. Tanzanian economy’s desperate need for foreign capital caused a blindness towards social and ecological

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impacts of the mining sector. As an inevitable part of wild capitalism, rent-seeking attitude of private mining companies and public officials became a norm thanks to the weak regulatory system. In midst of the collusions occurred between the interests of private enterprises and those of official agents, the local people’s interests and livelihoods were completely ignored. As a result of these unjust treatments, which were created by the state itself for the sake of liberalisation, a competition between the private and the public interests appeared on the stage.

From Economic Crisis to Ecological Crisis: A Vicious Circle Owing to the SAPs, there was a boom in the industry of excavation of natural resources in Tanzania, which depicts a grim economical scene that depends on natural resources to overcome the economic crisis the country is suffering. James O’Connor argues that economic crises egress every so often in the capitalist world system tail along serious ecological crises, as it is the case also in Tanzania. Tanzania unfortunately sets a perfect case study showing how natural resources are exploited in periods of economic crises. An economy mechanism that prompts this kind of exploitation of resources is responsible for forming a vicious circle. That is, in a continuous search for capital accumulation, mining companies desperately want to increase their production. To be able to expand their capital accumulation, mining companies continue to take over more lands which are normally possessed by rural local people. Thanks to the licences that they easily obtain from government officials, they force people to move out from their lands from where only they can earn their livelihoods. Following the expansion of these mining activities, natural resources begin to be exploited and while the capital accumulation problem is diminished, an ecological crisis arises on the other end of the line. In this way, not only the raw materials are depleted and exhausted very rapidly, a highly destructive manner also takes place which has severe impacts on the environment, which has been the case in Tanzania. Adoption of the SAPs were not only thought to alleviate Tanzania’s economic problems, they were likewise believed to benefit the environment by reducing policy distortions that formerly underpriced natural resources and led to more excavation of the natural resources and more environmental degradation as a result of the vicious circle created by the craving for more capital accumulation. On the contrary, however, the SAPs did not work to the benefit of the environment; they have even been a cause for a number of environmental problems. Being under the international pressure demanding to protect the environment, many of African countries, because of severe

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budget cuts under SAPs, have faced difficulties to find funds for improving the protection of the environment (Clapp 2000:211). Following this expansion in the mining sector, a significant ecological degradation came along (Mlambiti 1999:35). Since huge amounts of funds are needed for actualizing the government programmes prepared for environmental protection and conservation, environmental degradation has continued and its scope of expansion went out of control. Additionally, as in the case of gold mining and its implications on people’s livelihoods, diverse problems advanced together with the extraction of natural resources. Not only, the gold mining activities occupy much of the land on which people rely for their sustenance, the land also increasingly suffers from environmental damages owing to high-intensive processes which are applied during the extraction of gold.

Conclusion Tanzania is, as other sub-Saharan African countries, located in the peripheral part of the capitalist world economic system. Due to her peripheral position, the economic direction of the country has been determined by the centre of the world economic system since the colonization period. As a result of the Tanzanian dependence to the centre, most of the macro-economic policies of the country mainly echoed from the centre. As it is explored within the context of SAPs in Tanzania, economic decisions have been designed and applied without considering any associated social and environmental effects. The environmental problems in the Tanzanian mining regions can be regarded as symptoms of shortcomings of the market liberalization policies and unforeseen outcomes of the SAPs that were expected to bring a sustainable development in Tanzania. On one hand, the capitalist accumulation and search for more profits remedied by principles of an unfettered market have resulted in economic growth in some sectors like the gold mining sector in Tanzania. On the other hand, however, the economic growth has been unevenly distributed due to the liberalization forces created a vicious circle in which people and nature are alienated and made into commodities which has put strain on both man and the nature. The mining companies’ motive of profit maximization and the Tanzanian Government’s motive of economic growth had induced social and environmental problems. Natural and mineral resources have been taken for granted and the exploitation of them has been seen as a necessary cost of economic growth in Tanzania.

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Power relations in the mining sector in Tanzania directly reflect macro-level power relations. In Tanzanian mining sector, the most powerful actors have always been foreign or local large-scale mining companies. Since they possessed both resource-power and structural power, their control over natural resources was inevitable. On the other hand, weaker actors of the stage, in our case rural people who sustain their livelihoods from the environment, had nothing else to do except finding ways of adaptation or coping with the disruptive practices of mining companies. Largescale mining companies, which acted in collaboration with the government, oppressed the grassroots actors by both forcing them to leave their lands and polluting their basic livelihood sources. As a result of economic and ecological oppression, the grassroots actors have not been able to resist or confront against the disruptive practices of powerful actors.

References Chachage, S.L.C. 1995. “The Meek Shall Inherit the Earth,” in P. Gibbon (Ed.).

Liberalized Development in Tanzania. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. pp.37108 Clapp, J. 2000. “The Global Economy and Environmental Change in Africa,” in R. Stubbs and G. R.D. Underhill (eds.). Political Economy and the Changing Global

Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.208-217 Frank, A. G. 1983. “Crisis and Transformation of Dependency in the World System,” in R. Chilcote and D.L. Johnson (Eds.). Theories of Development: Mode of Production or Dependency. London: Sage Publications. pp.181-200 Gibbon, P. 1995. “Merchantisation of Production and Privatisation of Development in Post-Ujamaa Tanzania,” in P. Gibbon (ed.). Liberalised Development in

Tanzania. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, pp.9-36 Hettne, B. 1995. “Introduction: The International Political Economy of Transformation,” in B. Hettne (Ed.). International Political Economy: Understanding Global

Disorder. London: Zed Books. pp.1-30 Hoogvelt, A. 1997. Globalisation and the Post Colonial World. London: McMillan Press Kalyala, D. H. and Mudenda, G. N. 1987. “The Effects of the World Recession on the Mining Sector in the SADCC Region,” in S. Amin and D. Chitala et al. (Eds.), SADCC: Prospects for Disengagement and Development in Southern Africa. London: Zed Books. pp.109-127

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Kangero, M.N. 1991. “Ethical Duality and Ideological Recomposition,” in H. Campbell and H. Stein (Eds.). The IMF and Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Southern Africa Political

Economy Series. pp.48-66 Kiondo, A. 1991. “The Nature of Economic Reforms in Tanzania,” in H. Campbell and H. Stein (eds.). The IMF and Tanzania, Zimbabwe: Southern Africa Political

Economy Series, pp. 23-47 Knight, D. 2001. “Tanzanian Gold Mine Pollution Causing Deaths,” - March 3. http://www.afrol.com/news2001/tan005_env_goldmine.htm. (accessed October 5, 2010) LEAT. 2001. Review of the Decentralization Process and Its Impact on Environmental and Natural Resources Management in Tanzania. www.leat.or.tz/publications/decentralization/1.3.env.problems.php. (accessed October 5, 2010) LEAT. 2002. International NGO Fact-Finding Mission on Bulyanhulu Barred from Visiting Bulyanhulu Communities, http://www.leat.or.tz/about/pr/2002.04.02.buly.fact.finding.php. (accessed October 7, 2010) Marchand, M. 1994. “The Political Economy of North – South Relations,” in R. Stubbs and G. R.D. Underhill (Eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 289-301 Martinez-Alier, J. 2002. The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological

Conflicts and Valuation. London: Edward Elgar. Mittelman, J. H. 2000. The Globalization Syndrome – Transformation and Resistance. New Jersey: Princeton University Press Mlambiti, M.E. 1999. “Tanzania: Implementing Structural Adjustment Programmes – Learning From the Past,” in P. G. Forster and S. Maghimibi (Eds.). Agrarian

Economy, State and Society in Contemporary Tanzania. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. pp.26-41 Mwalyosi, R. B. and Sosvele H. 1999. “National Environmental Policies in Tanzania: Process and Politics,” in M. Salih and S. Tedla (Eds.), Environmental Planning,

Policies and Politics in Eastern and Southern Africa. London: McMillan Press. pp.121-140

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O’Connor, J. 1998. Natural Causes – Essays in Ecological Marxism , London: The Guilford Press Ponte, S. 1999. “Trading Images: Discourse and Statistical Evidence on Agricultural Adjustment in Tanzania (1986-95),” in P.G. Forster and S. Maghimbi (eds.), Agrarian Economy, State and Society in Contemporary Tanzania. Aldershot: Ashgate. pp.3-25 Reed, D. 2001. Economic Change, Governance and Natural Resource Wealth: The

Political Economy of Change in Southern Africa, Earthscan Publications Rugumanu, S. M. 1997. Lethal Aid: The Illusion of Socialism and Self – Reliance in

Tanzania, Eritrea: Africa World Press Sardar, Z. 1999. “Development and the Locations of Eurocentrism,” in R. Munck and D. O’Hearn (Eds.). Critical Development Theory. London: Zed Books. pp.44-62

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1941 Resolutions of El-Hidaje in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Case of Traditional Conflict Transformation

Onder Cetin* Abstract

During the Second World War, Bosnia and Herzegovina was under the authority of the Independent State of Crotia (NDH). The ruling Ustaa leadership of Ante Paveli committed haunting atrocities, especially towards Serb and Jewish population, aimed to “cleanse” the region. Despite the relative privileges that were granted to them by the Ustaa leaders, who treated Bosnian Muslims as Muslims of Croat nation, this article will present how Muslim ulama, convened under the framework of el-Hidaje Ilmijje organization, protested the atrocities committed towards both Muslims and the aforementioned victims of NDH, mainly through Resolutions circulated in several cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1941. I will argue that, these resolutions does not only represent an act of tolerance, such as Reis-ul-ulema Demaludin auevi `s initiatives during the anti-Serb riots after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, but also represent important clues and prospects how a religious organization can include in peacemaking in terms of conflict transformation at the grass root level, such as publicly condemning believers on their side who took part in these events and taking a stance vis-à-vis state bodies in times of crisis. Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, El-Hidaje, 1941 Resolutions, Second World

War, Conflict Transformation

*

Fatih University. [email protected]

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Introduction: Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War Following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bosnia and Herzegovina1 became a part of the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. While the Belgrade regime recognized the territorial integrity of Bosnia in 19192, this regional integrity was gradually abolished in the following decade, first by the abolishment of the regional government in 1924, and then by the territorial and political re-organization of the state following the proclamation of the personal regime of King Alexander in 1929. Moreover, the rising internal political tensions in the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Kingdom resulted in a political compromise between the government of Dragia Cvetkovi and the main opposition party (Croatian Peasant Party/Hrvatska

Seljaka Stranka) leader Vlatko Ma ek in August 1939. While the Croatian party recognized Muslims of Yugoslavia as Croats in the ethnic sense, they succeeded in the establishment of an autonomous Banovina [Regional Unit] of Croatia and the division of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia. However, Cvetkovi- Ma ek agreement further instigated the political crisis of the Kingdom in the following years, marked by ethnonational conflicts as well as an increasing subordination to Germany, which would result in the coup in March 1941 led by General Duan Simovi (Redi 2005, 4-6). Rather than keeping Yugoslavia out of the increasing tension approaching its northern borders, it instigated Hitler's blietzkrieg. Axis forces attacked Yugoslavia on 6 April. Following the surrender of Yugoslavia to Hitler`s Germany on 17 April 1941, only 11 days after the start of the invasion of Axis forces, Bosnia became an integral part of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisne Drave Hrvatske/NDH), founded by the retired Colonel Slavko Kvaternik on 10 April 1941 (Redi 2005, 7). This decision was indeed realization of an already proclaimed approach of the leader of the extremist Croatian nationalist elite, namely Ustaa, Ante Paveli, who stated in July 1938 that Bosnia “[is] not considered a country in its own right.” (Friedman 1998, 122). Moreover, this approach on the statehood of Bosnia was directly related to the distinctive nationhood of Bosnian Muslims. For the Ustaa ideology which regarded Bosnia as the “heart of the Croat state,” Bosnian Muslims was the “flower of the Croat nation,” with their religion as one of the religions of the Croat nation (Redi 2005, 110). Under the authority of the NDH, several groups fought against each other in Bosnia: Axis forces led by German and Italians, Ustashas of the NDH, Serb paramilitary forces (Chetniks) of Draa Mihailovi, pro-German Muslims fighting under the SS division Hander and Partisans led by Tito. However, what was more detrimental for 1

Bosnia hereinafter.

2

Bosnia was, then, ruled by the government of the National Council of Serbs, Croats and Muslims as an integral part of the new Yugoslav Kingdom.

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the Bosnian Muslims was NDH`s policy towards “the others.” According to the ruling elite, NDH had to be cleansed from the Serb and Jewish population, alongside communists. Revealing their approach both towards Muslims and the other nonCroats, Mile Budak, the then Minister of Education, stated in 1941 that “a third of the eight hundred thousand Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be expelled, a third killed and a third converted to Catholicism,” adding that “the NDH was to become a nation of two religions, Catholicism and Islam.” (Friedman 1998, 122) 3 For their part, Muslims now were not only under attack but also in a sensitive situation especially towards Serb and Jewish population under the Croat nationalist leadership, which put them directly as the target of the Serbian irregular armed forces, etniks` desire for revenge. In this paper, I will present how, the society of Bosnian Ulama el-Hidaje publicly reacted to crimes, committed by the Croatian forces and some elements of Muslim society who joined them in these atrocities, by issuing several resolutions in 1941. Bosnian Muslims under the Authority of NDH The Bosnian Muslim leadership aimed at three main objectives during the war: security, religious freedom, and some sort of autonomy (Donia 2006, 186). Confirming Malcolm's (1996, 185) argument on the choice of Bosnian Muslim politicians and clergy in between choosing Zagreb or Belgrade, Paveli sent a representative to the leader of Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, Fehim Spaho on 25 April 1941 to present his guarantees to Bosnian Muslims to feel “free, contented and possessed of equal rights” (Malcolm 1996, 185). Muslims were assured to experience freedom of religion, including their educational system and eleven former JMO politicians were invited to join the pseudo-parliament in Zagreb. Accordingly, the leader of JMO Osman Kulenovi , as well as his successor D afer Kulenovi , were appointed as the vicepresidents of the NDH government on November 1, 1941.” Regarding the appointment of JMO officials, Friedman (1996, 123) notes that NDH officials and Ustaa members included more than 12 percent Muslims, adding that other sources put the number of Muslim Ustaa at 20 percent, such as “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Yugoslavia”. However, there was not a unanimous approach among the Bosnian Muslim political and religious leadership towards the Croat leadership and the idea of the “Croatization” of Bosnian Muslims. Describing the stance of the majority of the official religious leadership, Zajim arac, the former Yugoslav minister of commerce, stated that:

3 Donia and Fine (1997, 141) notes direct or tacit involvement of involvement of Catholic Church and Bosnian Franciscans in the conversion campaign in Bosnia, which amounted to over 200,000 Serbs convert to Catholicism.

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“The majority of the ruling circles placed itself at the service of the fascist invaders … The circles of the high Ilmia, among whom Reis-ul-Ulema Spaho, gave their blessings to German arms and together with the treacherous politicians described the occupation as being the liberation of the Moslems” (Friedman 1996, 125)

However, despite such conformist position of religious and political leadership towards Paveli regime,4 the compliments of Paveli’s Ustaa state such as transforming the Art Pavillion of Ivan Metrovi to Poglavnik’s [literally Fuhrer] Mosque in Zagreb on 18 August 1944 (Banac 1996, 141; Popovic 1995, 243), or proclaiming Bosnian Muslims as the “pearl of the Croatian nation” (Lampe 1996, 208) could not attract Muslim leadership in general. Here, it should be noted that Paveli first proposed an Orthodox Church in the Preradovi Hill to be demolished for the construction of the Mosque in its place, which can be regarded as an act to deteriorate the relationships between Muslims and Serbs in addition to other alleged attempts such as wearing the traditional Muslim clothes and fez during their armed attacks against Serbs. (Imamovi 1990, 279) Actually, there was not a unanimous attitude among the Islamic clergy towards the rising idea of the “Croatization” of the Bosnian Muslims, even among those who identified themselves with Croathood. For instance, Mehmed Spaho’s brother Fehim, who was the leader of Yugoslav Muslims as the Reisu-l-Ulema from 1938 to 1942, was a self-identified “Croat” who played a leading role in the Narodna Uzdanica, the proCroat Muslim cultural association.5 However, Malcolm asserts that, “Fehim Spaho was also keen to preserve the special identity of the Muslims, which he felt was under threat. And so he issued instructions against mixed marriages and against these of non-Muslim names for children; he even advised Muslims not to enter Catholic churches, for fear of having to take off their fezes if they did so.” (Malcolm 1996, 158).

Beside such divergent attitudes, the fundamental initiative in presenting Muslims` opposition towards the extreme nationalist leadership was the 1941 Resolutions of the Bosnian Ulama Organisation [Udruenje lmijje] El-Hidaje, which was later going to be referred as “the most manly` act of the war in the whole of the Balkans.” (Filandra and Kari 2004, 144) 4 It can be observed symbolically on the decision to put the portrait of the “Poglavnik” (Führer), Ante Paveli, on the front pages of some issues of the official journal of the-then Islamic Community (Islamske Vjerske Zajednice Nezavisne Drave Hrvatske) See, for example, Glasnik 9 (8) and 9 (11), p. 1. 5

The rival association, Gajret, preserved its pro-Serb stance.

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Bosnian Ulama Society El-Hidaje and 1941 Resolutions El-Hidaje was established during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Sarajevo in 1936. Its establishment was based on a meeting of the ulama regarding the problem of school textbooks, which “gave preferential treatment to Serbian history and the Serbian Orthodox religion.” (Kari 2004, 422). In its Annual General Meeting held on 16 September 1936, el-Hidaje adopted eight points clarifying its mission on the “religious, cultural and economic advancement of all levels of Muslim society.” (Kari 2004, 425-426) 6 Accordingly, the periodical el-Hidaje started to be published in December 1936 under the editorship of Muhamed Panda, succeeded by Mehmed Handi from August 1937 to July 1944. In the editorial of El-Hidaje`s first issue, the aforementioned aim was rephrased as “to uplift and advance Muslims and lead them into a better and happier future, so that as citizens of their great and free people`s state they will be able to fulfill their duties both as Muslims and as citizens.” (Prva rije 1936-1937, 4) Principally, El-Hidaje recognized the principle of nonintervention in politics under the leadership of Handi. From the notes of Kari (2004, 426-427), we see that in its meeting held on 15 August 1940 El-Hidaje confirmed that “the involvement of politics and partisanship in the administration of the Islamic Religious Community has been to the great detriment of the ilmiyya,” adding that “politicians exploit each moment and endeavor to instrumentalize the ilmiyya for their own purposes.” This primarily marked a divergence in ulama's towards politics when we consider the then Reis ul ulema, Fehim Spaho's

sympathy for the Yugoslav Muslim Organization.

(Imamovi 2008, 132). Despite this principal distance to politics, El-Hidaje later supported the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in 1941, guided by the aim to regain the freedom in religious practices and organizations lost in the 1st Yugoslavia rather then attracted by the idea of Croathood (Malcolm 1996, 185; Kari 2006, 291, 304). This was explicitly stated in the editorial of El-Hidaje periodical on 14 July 1941 with the title “El-Hidaje in the new circumstances,” where Handi clarified that policy change as follows: 6 These principles were basically as follows: (1) holding lectures on “religious and moral tenets of Islam, either in mosques or in other “appropriate places”, (2) “[f]or the purpose of improving the economic position of Muslims, to identify ways in which our economy can be strengthened to the greatest possible extent, and to arouse among Muslims the sentiment of mutual economic cooperation…,” (3) “to identify ways of improving the material resources of the Islamic Religious Community…, (4) “to conduct a publicity campaign to encourage every alim to become a member of El-Hidaje and to join this great religious movement and in addition, for the preservation and advancement of their material interests, to join their professional organizations. By so doing, to raise the authority of the ilmijja class as the spiritual leadership of Muslims.,” (5) “To found a youth religious section..,” (6) “To ensure the closest possible cooperation with the secular intelligentsia in the general activities of cultural and educational advancement., (7) “To provide [imams , muallims and mudarrises] with all possible moral and material resources,” (8) “To launch an organ of the society (a periodical) to be edited for publicity and religious moral purposes and to disseminate the ideas of the society, and at the same time to be the journal of the professional ilmijja organization.” See, Enes Kari, Povijest slamskog Miljenja u Bosni i Hercegovini, 423-424)

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“During the twenty years of rule of Yugoslavia the Muslims have been thrust backwards in the religious and moral sense more than during the forty years of Austrian rule. This is because religion has been demeaned and degraded everywhere … We hope that now such behaviour will cease, that everyone will honour and respect religion, whether his own or that of his brother of another faith.” (Handi 1940-1941, 221-223).

In general, it can be stated that the main motive of Bosnian Muslims was their hope to regain their religious freedom lost under Serb-dominated first Yugoslavia. Regarding Bosnian Muslim leaderships` position during the war, for instance, Donia (2006, 186) underlines two main objectives: “They first aimed to protect all Bosnian Muslims from violence and violations of their right to the free exercise of their religion. Secondly, they sought to secure some form of autonomy for Bosnia-Herzegovina under one or another external state sponsor.” In consistence with this general policy, “Memorandum of the Governing Board of El-Hidaje on the religious and educational autonomy of Muslims in the Independent State of Croatia” was addressed to the Deputy Head of State and Minister of Religious Affairs and Education of NDH, Dr. Mile Budak in July 1941,7 which was followed by a proposed constitution of the Islamic Community sent to Paveli on August, 7, which was not adopted by NDH. (Donia 2006, 186). This support was withdrawn in synonymous with the rising Ustaa atrocities, mainly towards Serb and Jewish population. In the meantime, while a JMO delegation under the leadership of Dafer Kulenovi8 presented their loyalty to NDH and Paveli's leadership in mid-August (Redi 2005, 167), El-Hidaje adopted a fundamental document condemning Ustaa crimes. Mehmed Handi, a professor at the Gazi Husrev Beg Madrasa and the Islamic shari’a theological faculty, was the principal initiator of the adoption of El-Hidaje`s Resolution during its assembly on 18 August 1941, issued against the expulsion of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and other peoples and individuals forcibly expelled from Bosnia during that period. The Resolution of El-Hidaje, in the words of Filandra (1998, 184), emerged as the “architect” of the subsequent Resolutions in several towns of Bosnia. Following the declaration of Prijedor Resolution on 23 September, Sarajevo Resolution was declared on 12 October 1941 with the approval of 108 prominent Bosnian Muslims, including Ahmed Burek, the then director of Gazi Husrev-Beg Medresa, Husein ozo, member of the Supreme Council of el-Hidaje, and Fejzullah 7

This was published in El-Hidaje 5(9-11), on 14 July 1941.

8

Kulenovi was later appointed by Paveli as Deputy Prime Minister in November 1941 and served the following three and a half years as an NHD governer. However, as Redi (2005, 167) emphasizes, his position was not more than a symbolic one, which was generally reduced to “receiving complaints from Muslim religious, state and political officials, while Vjekoslav Vran i, State Secretary, shaping and representing Ustaa policies towards Bosnia and Bosnian Muslims.

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Hadibajri, the late sheikh of Sinanova Tekija of Sarajevo. These were followed by the adoption of the following resolutions in Mostar on 21 October, in Banja Luka on 12 November, in Bijeljina on 2 December, and in Tuzla on 11 December 1941. The Resolution, prefaced by the arguments on the challenges of the war and war-time government’s policy for the Bosnian Muslims, stated that the situation of Muslims was “very difficult,” adding that “it would not be an exaggeration to say that in their history Muslims of this region have not experienced more difficult moments.” (ElHidaje, 1941c). By reminding that despite statements from the responsible elements, situation had not been improved but rather aggravated day by day, it was underlined that it will lead to the disappearance of Muslims in Bosnia if not timely prevented. (ElHidaje, 1941c) El-Hidaje particularly criticized the approach of the ruling bodies of NDH, arguing that “such moves from the sides of the individuals holding power rather incite fiercer reactions by the rebels, so by this way miserable and unprotected population to still more unmerited suffering.” Furthermore, in the second clause of the Resolution, it was stated that “many Catholics deliberately cast responsibility on the Muslims for all wrongdoings and crimes which has been recently committed, and they represent all these events as a mutual settling of accounts between the Muslims and Orthodox.” Although it was admitted that there are “people with Muslim names” among perpetrators committing several crimes/wrongdoings, culpability and responsibility could not be cast on Muslims, adding that Muslims previously dissociated themselves from these crimes. El-Hidaje particularly underlined in the fourth clause of its original Resolution adopted in its assembly on August 14 that these crimes could only be committed by “riff-raff and criminal types, who exist in every community.” In the following statement, NDH`s role was exclusively emphasized by underlying that “[those Muslims] did not do these things of their own, until they had been given arms, uniforms, authorization and frequently even orders.” However, el-Hidaje also pointed out some manipulations, namely how the authorities used Muslim names and Muslim fez during attacks, beside exploiting the aforementioned “ill-mannered individuals” within Muslim community. Beside publicly condemning and excluding the ill-mannered individuals among themselves, El-Hidaje stated that “Muslims were neither prepared nor thought of any evil,” adding that “Muslims in their history in Turkish period, while they were the sole rulers, tolerated all faiths without differentiation and did never do ill [zulum] to anyone. [Nor can the] Muslims can be presented today as the initiators of crime.” The Resolution was concluded by calls to “the responsible elements and all Muslim religious and political representatives.” Under these seven additional articles,

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el-Hidaje called for (1) virtual security of life, honor, property and faith for all citizens in the country irrespective of identity, (2) virtual protection of innocent people with strong military defense, (3) not to permit such actions to be committed in the future, (4) criminal elements to be detained by issuing legal responsibility and given the strictest punishment according to the law for all criminals and those who commended or provided opportunity for such crimes, irrespective of the faith they belong to, (5) the law to be applied only for regular authority and army, (6) all religious intolerance to be banned, and (7) material help to be provided for the innocent people who suffered in this disorder.” (El-Hidaje, 1941c) Resolution as an Initiative of Conflict Transformation El-Hidaje initiated its Resolution at a time when the worst atrocities were committed by Ustaas mainly against Serbs, Jews, and Roma of Bosnia. Moreover, as the Resolution were explicity regarded by the Ustaa officials as a “declaration against Croat state and against ustaa movement,” (Hadijahi 1974, 20) the signatories were subjected to explicit threats by the official bodies. For instance, Ustaa Commissioner in Sarajevo, Jure Franceti threatened all the signatories would be taken into concentration camps. (Hadijahi 1974, 21). The situation were further exacerbated on the ground by the etniks' retaliatory attacks and crimes against Bosnian Muslims. Beside this historical significance in terms of a humanitarian responsibility and committed action, El-Hidaje's Resolution also presents significant characteristics of a traditional conflict transformation initiative by the religious actors with its aim to restore the “order and harmony of the community.” (Boege 2006, 7) Primarily, it rephrased the developments on the ground by eliminating the idea of collective responsibility. It labeled Muslims who participated in atrocities towards Serbs as as “ill-mannered,” “riff-raff and criminal types.” Irrespective of their faith, it called for legal measures only for those who committed such crimes within regular military bodies. Thus, by refuting the idea of collective guilt, the Resolution emerged as a call for restorative justice rather than a mere call for punitive justice. As clarified by Zartman (2000, 222), such initiatives generally focuses on “a compensation for loss” of the victim rather than “a restoration for offense.” With its aim to facilitate healing the wounds of the victims, the Resolution adopts a holistic approach in dealing with the conflict and its transformation. It does not emerge only as a call for political or judicial measures, it further includes social and cultural dimensions in its attempt to restore inter-communal relations. By emphasizing “cultural traditions” in a reconstructed image of the past, El-Hidaje employed a crucial

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tool, which was framed by the prominent theorist of conflict resolution John Paul Lederach (1997) as fundamental resources for peacebuilding. Here, while reminding Muslims that they “tolerated all faiths irrespective of their faith and did never do ill to anyone”, it called them “definitely to abstain from all wrongdoings,” by referring to the spirit of their religious faith.” (El-Hidaje, 1941a) It further emphasized that “any kind of intolerance or unequal treatment in terms of religious affiliation hurts public interest.” (El-Hidaje, 1941b) With these messages guided by the aforementioned fundamental of of conflict transformation, El-Hidaje primarily positioned itself as a strategic and key role between the top and grass-roots level as outlined by Lederach (1997, 38-43), while being exempted from their inherent disadvantages such as political calculations of the former as well as survival demands of the latter (Lederach 1997, 42). This strategic position enables this initiative to contribute “reducing prejudice as well as increasing community decision making.” (Lederach 1997, 55) Finally, when we consider the role of some clergy who gave their blessing to regular armies or paramilitary gangs on their way to war crimes during 1992-95 war, El-Hidaje's resolution issued five decades ago presents how religious actors can play a positive role in promoting peace and reconciliation as well as restoring justice by reframing the conflict at the symbolic level by developing dehumanized images of the warring parties. Ackn ow led ge me nts This article is a part of my Ph.D. research on Bosnian ulama. I’m grateful to the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science for providing funds in realizing my research. I also would like to thank to Asef Bayat, Xavier Bougarel and Ali Murat Yel for their comments on the earlier versions. References Banac, Ivo. 1996. “Bosnian Muslims: From Religious Community to Socialist Nationhood and Postcommunist Statehood, 1918-1992.” In The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, edited by Mark Pinson, 129-153. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Boege, Volker. 2006. Traditional Approaches to Conflict Transformation- Potentials and Limits. Accessed July 16, 2008. http://www.berghof-handbook.net. Donia, Robert. 2006. Sarajevo: A Biography. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

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Donia, Robert. J. and John V. A. Fine, Jr. 1997. Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed. London: Hurst and Company. Filandra, a ir and Enes Kari . 2004. The Bosniac Idea, translated by Saba Risaluddin. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus. Filandra, a ir. 1998. Bonja ka politika u XX. Stolje u [Bosniak politics in the 20th century], Sarajevo: Sejtarija. Friedman, Francine. 1998. The Bosnian Muslim National Question. In Religion and the War in Bosnia, edited by Paul Mojzes. Atlanta: Georgia: Scholars Press. Friedman, Francine. 1996. Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation . Colorado, Oxford: Westview Press. Had ijahi , Muhamed. 1974. “Muslimanske Rezolucije iz 1941. Godine.” [Muslim Resolutions in 1941]. Glasnik Vrhovnog Islamskog Starjeinstva u SFRJ 37(1-2): 13-21. Hand i , Mehmed. 1940-1941. “El-Hidaja u novim prilikama“ [El-Hidaje in the new circumstances]. El-Hidaje 4 (9-11): 221-223. Imamovi , Mustafa. 2008. Vjerske Zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini i Jugoslaviji Izme u

Dva Svjetska Rata [Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia between Two World Wars]. Sarajevo: Pravni Fakultet Univerziteta u Sarajevu. Imamovi , Mustafa. 1996. Historija Bonjaka [History of Bosniaks]. Sarajevo: PreporodBo njaka Zajednica Kulture. Jelinek, Yeshayahu A. 1990. “Bosnia-Herzegovina at War: Relations between Moslems and Non-Moslems.” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 5(3): 275-292. Kari , Enes. 2004. Povijest Islamskog Miflljenja u Bosnia i Hercegovini XX Stolje a [Islamic Thought in Bosnia in the 20th century]. Sarajevo: El-Kalem. Lampe, John R. 1996. Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lederach, John P. 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: USIP. Lopasi , Alexander. 1981. “Bosnian Muslims: A Search for Identity.” Bulletin (British

Society for Middle Eastern Studies) 8(2): 115-125. Malcolm, Noel. 1996. Bosnia. A Short History. London: Papermac. Mladi Muslimani. 2002. The Young Muslims 1939-2000. Sarajevo: Udru enje graana Mladi Muslimani. Popovi , Alexandre. 1995. Balkanlarda  slam , tr. by Commission. stanbul: nsan.

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Prva Rije [The First Word]. (1956-1937). El-Hidaje 1 (1): 2-4. Redi, Enver. 2005. Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War. Translated by Aida Vidan. London and New York: Frank Cass. Redi, Enver. 1987. Muslimansko Autonomatvo i 13. SS Divizija: Autonomija Bosne i

Hercegovine i Hitlerov Tre i Rajh [Muslim Autonomy and the 13th SS Division: Autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Hitler’s Third Reich]. Sarajevo: Svjetlost. Zartman, I. William. 2000. “Conclusions: Changes in the New Order and the Place for the Old. In Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict “Medicine,” edited by I. William Zartman, pp. 219-230. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner. Zulfikarpai, Adil in dialogue with Milovan Djilas and Nadeda Gae. 1998. The

Bosniak. London: Hurst&Company. Documents El-Hidaje. 1941a. Rezolucija El-Hidaje, done ena na Glavnoj god. Skuptini odranoj

14./VIII. 1941. Available at Arhiv Gazi Husrev-Begove Biblioteke u Sarajevu, No: A-463/B El-Hidaje 1941b. Rezolucija El-Hidaje, doneena na Glavnoj god. Skuptini odranoj 14./VIII. 1941. El-Hidaje, 5(1), 27-29. El-Hidaje. 1941c. El-Hidajina (Sarajevska) Rezolucija, Available at Arhiv Gazi HusrevBegove Biblioteke u Sarajevu, No: A-380/B El-Hidaje. 1941d. El-Hidajina Rezolucija- od 18.X.1941 , Available at Arhiv Gazi HusrevBegove Biblioteke u Sarajevu, No: D- 3200.

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State Response to Religious Revivalism in Post-Soviet Central Asia

Eren Tatari* and Renat Shaykhutdinov** Abstr act After gaining independence from the USSR in 1991, the Islamic heritage of the Central Asian Republics became an alternative ideology to fill the political and social vacuum. Islam gradually started to take its place on the social scene following Gorbachev’s Glasnost, as it partially eased the communist oppression towards religious belief and expression. Religious education institutions, mosques, and other religiously affiliated organizations began to emerge. Some of these organizations steadily led their way to political parties with Islamic agendas, and politicization of Islam became a prominent reality. While religious revivalism took sway in Central Asian societies, their governments had an instrumentalist view of religion. Religious expressions were encouraged where they contribute to the goal of nation-building and legitimization of the dominant power coalitions as defined by the power holders. Yet, Central Asian governments proceeded in the opposite direction implementing oppressive policies against extra-governmental religious groups and institutions perceived as a threat. It was anticipated for the Central Asian societies to revive their Islamic heritage that has been suppressed under the Soviet regime and combine religion with nationalist sentiments as a catalyst in the nation-building process and political transition. However, the suppressive state response to this religious revivalism was unpredicted and led to prolonged conflict between state and society. This article seeks to identify the factors that explain the competing courses of the governments’ push for secularization through historical institutionalism and cultural and national values approaches. Ke yw ords: Central Asia, Secularization, Church-State Relations, Islam in Central Asia

* **

Rollins College. [email protected] Florida Atlantic University. [email protected]

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Introduction After gaining independence from the USSR in 1991, the Islamic heritage of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan - became a potential alternative to fill the political and social vacuum.1 Islam gradually took prominence in society after Gorbachev’s Glasnost, which relaxed the communist oppression towards religious belief and expression. Religious education institutions, mosques, and many other forms of religiously affiliated organizations started to (re-)emerge. Some of these informal organizations steadily led their way, in some countries, to political parties with Islamic agendas, in which the politicization of Islam became a prominent reality. While the Central Asian societies were undergoing these developments and religious revivalism took sway, the Central Asian governments were largely proceeding in the opposite direction and implementing anti-religious policies. It was anticipated for the Central Asian societies to revive their Islamic heritage that has been suppressed under the Soviet regime, and combine religion with nationalist sentiments as a catalyst in the nation-building process. While this process did take place to some degree, the suppressive state response to this religious revivalism and the rigorous push for secularization was both more general and unpredicted, thus leading to prolonged conflict between state and society. This article explores the factors that explain the competing courses of the governments pushing for radical secularization to control Islam.2 The main focus of this study; therefore, is on identifying and discussing the key causes of the secularization process in the CARs through historical institutionalism and cultural and national values approaches. The findings suggest that authoritarian political leaderships, the institutionalized ideology of secularism (both of which are inherited from the Soviet regime), and the political interests of the leaders to trump political rivals, explain the push for rigorous secularization by the Central Asian governments. The question of the state policies towards religion in the Central Asian context entertained in this article is important for several reasons. Religious policies of the state have direct implications on the day to day lives of millions of Muslims in the CARs and bare ramifications for human rights. Moreover, this subject is crucial from the standpoint of the overall transition of the CARs, the stability of the region, and its 1

Islam is a system of legal codes, moral principles, property rights, social justice rules, welfare policies (provision for needy citizens from state treasury). More than merely a spiritual tradition, Islam is an all-encompassing system that sets guidelines for economic, social, spiritual, political, and personal matters. Its comprehensive nature makes Islam a plausible alternative for the CARs in transition. 2 Even though the term secularism takes on different meanings when used in the West, I will refer to the religious attitude of the Central Asian governments and all the suppressive religious policies as secularization since this is the umbrella term employed by the governments themselves in public rhetoric to identify state attitudes towards religion, policies… etc. In the discussion section, I will analyze the use of this term and situate the Central Asian version of secularism with the Western version.

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sociopolitical repercussions that demand scrutiny. Also, a number of countries in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa and even Europe are faced with the challenging question of what the role of Islam is or should be in a democratic system. Although the issue will be discussed in the context of the CARs, the findings and arguments have broader implications and contribute to the literature on political Islam, secularization, citizenship rights, and democratization. In order to understand why the transitional governments push for radical secularization, it is necessary to analyze institutional government structures, political leadership, the role of Islam for the Central Asian societies (and the shifts thereof), the Islamic political parties, and government responses to these parties and other religious institutions. While tracing the attitudes of the CAR governments to USSR’s policies on religion, in this paper the relevant developments in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan will be compared and contrasted. Research Design This article employs a qualitative study of multiple country cases for the purposes of theory development and hypothesis testing. While this research is not intended to be an in-depth analysis of any particular Central Asian country, it intends to provide an overall analysis of the secularization process in the socio-political context of the region. Despite the idiosyncrasies of each country, the overall patterns of social change and development show great resemblance.3 I use the process-tracing method to test my hypothesis by observing and analyzing the policies and events that took place in Central Asia since independence (although I do draw on policies and events from the Soviet era). As Van Evera states, “In process tracing the investigator explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes. The cause-effect link that connects independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step.” (Van Evera 1997, 64). Even though I will analyze the contemporary phenomenon of secularization, the actual dynamics of state-building during the transition period can only be understood by looking at the past (the state-dominated social engineering policies such as secularization of the Soviet era) and identifying the causal chains. The analysis of causes of the push for secularization requires unearthing the (formal and informal) institutional structures, the forces and ideologies that drive current policy making, and 3

The variance between the attitudes of the states certainly exists and should be analyzed in greater detail in further research. However, the purpose of this study is to identify and explain the overall pattern in the statist push for secularization in the CARs.

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the decision making process (particularly the political leadership) that leads to the current outcomes. Therefore, I trace backward the causal process by trying to infer “what caused the cause” at each stage, and seek to pinpoint the prime cause of state imposed secularization (Van Evera 1997, 70). Thus, this case study of the CARs lends itself perfectly to this methodology, and I think process-tracing is the “method of analysis best suited to the question and the data” (Weldon 2002, 25) of this particular study. Theoretical Approach I employ two theoretical approaches to analyze the case of secularization: historical institutionalism and cultural and national values theory. I do not argue that these two approaches are a priori superior to other approaches employed in political science. The specific research question of this study, the available facts, and the context are best explained by combining these two approaches. Cultural and National Values Theory4 This theory states that culture (or political culture) and national values of a country account for the contemporary policy making process, state attitudes, and policy outcomes. As Castles argues, “history leaves a legacy of ideas, customs and institutions –in sum, a c ul ture- that influences the present behavior of those who shape the policies of the state and those who make demands of the state.” (Castles 1993, xvi). Therefore, there is an underlying principle of cultural continuity that helps explain the unchanging nature of cultural and religious affiliations in the CARs. Moreover, Eckstein’s theory of political change accounts for the effects of radical revolutions on the culture, and this explanation fits perfectly with the dynamics of the communist rule in the CARs. He argues that even when cultures are exposed to radical forceful reforms, and as soon as these coercive factors are lifted, people return back to their cultures even stronger then before. He defines political transformation as “the use of political power and artifice to engineer radically changed social and political structures, thus culture patterns and themes: to set society and polity on new courses toward unprecedented objectives.” (Eckstein 1988, 798). This fits perfectly with the Soviet’s transformative processes that were carried out by great power and control (Eckstein 1988, 799). Eckstein outlines the outcomes of these types of social engineering projects as: “If the conventional norms and practices of political life are disrupted by revolution, what can be put in their place? We may posit the answer that 4

For definition of culture see Eckstein 1988, Appendix, 802.

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revolutionary transformation will initially be attempted by despotic or legalistic means. What, after all, can “order” societies and polities in place of conventional, internalized culture? Only brute power, or else the use of external legal prescriptions as a surrogate for internal orientational guides to behavior.” (Eckstein 1988, 799)

Moreover, he argues that the long-run outcomes of these types of revolutionary transformations will “diverge considerably from revolutionary intentions and resemble more the pre-Revolutionary condition of society.” (Eckstein 1988, 800). Exactly as his theory predicts, the ‘massive cultural disruptions’ that took place in this region led to ‘unintended outcomes’, in that contemporary religious revival was what Soviets sought to eliminate. Therefore I utilize the cultural theory to explain the society side of the puzzle and account for the factors why the society underwent religious revivalism right after independence. Historical Institutionalism Historical institutionalism explains “the way institutions shape the goals political actors pursue and the way they structure power relations among them, privileging some and putting others at a disadvantage.” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 940). Similarly, to comprehend the rigorous push for secularization, it is necessary to trace the political processes and unearth the role of formal and informal institutions in policy-making (Thelen and Steinmo, 2). Also, historical institutionalism attributes ‘social causation’ to path dependency claiming that the effects of operative ‘forces are mediated through contextual features of a situation inherited from the past.’ (Hall and Taylor 1996, 942). In other words, ideas and other factors that shape society and the policy-making process of today are path dependent on the history. It is inclusive of other factors, such as ideas, beliefs, and culture, which analyzes macro contexts accounting for combined effects of institutions and processes rather than narrow contexts (Pierson and Skocpol , 3). In this study, I employ both the traditional use of the term institution and emphasize the impact of state institutions that have ‘legitimate authority’ (Weldon 2002, 107) as well as the concept of informal institutions. Formal institutions refer to the legislature, executive, judiciary, and the military components of the state (in other words the authoritarian nature of the state structure, and the lack of separation of powers). Whereas informal institutions represent social institutions such as culture, norms, religion, and national identity. Secularization is also analyzed as an institutionalized state objective both during the Soviet era and after independence. I utilize historical institutionalism to explain how the Soviet institutions (authoritarian political leadership and rigorous secularization) have been carried on to the new state structures of the

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CARs, and demonstrate that these factors account for the current secularization process in the CARs. I therefore reject the argument that there was a sharp break when the USSR collapsed, and the institutional structures of the new independent states do not share similarities with the Soviet institutions. Here, I will demonstrate how the contemporary institutions resemble the Soviet institutions, and how religiously oppressive secularism ideology of the Soviets have been carried over to the new states. Literature Review, Conceptualization, and Hypothesis There is an unanimous consensus in the literature that Central Asia has been experiencing religious resurgence since the Glasnost, which has accelerated after independence. Some scholars argue that Islam constitutes only a cultural/national identity, and has no impact on the political realm. On the other hand, others claim that Islamic resurgence in Central Asia has a fundamentalist and political nature and has great potential to lead to Islamist governments, and cause instability in the region.5 I believe that the fact that fundamentalist Islam does not have wide popular support but is only represented by a small number of groups (Luong 2004; Abashin 2002; Sjukijainen 2002) is evidence that society at large is experiencing non-militant, moderate religious revivalism. Political parties are not necessarily militant but do have explicit Islamic agendas, such as demands for more religious freedom and political representation. On the other hand, there are militant groups, though small in number, which make a greater impact due to their violent activities. Therefore, in this study, I use the term religious revivalism broadly to refer to the revival of religious sentiments; Islamic identity and faith, the sheer increase in the number of practicing Muslims, and the observable phenomena such as increase in the number of mosques

5

One group of scholars, therefore support the traditionalist/primordialist view arguing that the increasing role of Islam since independence is evidence that the pre-Soviet identities have resurged. One of the leading scholars of this view who have formulated the basis for the argument in 1989 is Polyakov. He argues that the religious and social fundamentals of the CARs remained the same throughout the Soviet rule, modernization efforts were only superficial, and that Islam moved to the foreground in both political and social life. Supporting Eckstein’s theory, Abashin claims that the form of Islam that is observed today is “the form of Islam that had predominated in the nineteenth and twentieth century before Russians came and religion was subjected to massive pressure.” He also argues that, ironically, “atheism added more fundamentalism to the minds of Central Asian Muslims” that strengthened the Islamic heritage from the pre-Soviet era. In this view, Islam is viewed as a cultural force that is part of the national identity, and it does not function as a political ideology, and any regional Islamic militant network is rejected. Any local militant activity or group is attributed to spill overs from neighbouring countries such as Afghanistan or Pakistan. Other scholars support the fundamentalism view claiming that it is a totally different/new form of Islam that emerged after independence. Unlike the cultural form of Islam in the pre-Soviet era, the idealized form is fundamentalism with the following features: purification of religion from all later additions, different schools of thought (madhab) are rejected, outer jihad is emphasized, even other Muslims who adhere to more flexible interpretations of Islam can be targeted…etc. For instance, Luong argues that “militant Islamic groups have developed domestic roots primarily in response to post-Soviet political repression.” Fundamentalism view states that there is resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism and a regional network of militant Islamic groups dedicated to establish Islamic governments.

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and Islamic schools,6 along with the emergence of militant groups that perform violent activities, such as bombings. Since the independent variable, suppressive secularism advanced by the state, is defined as an attitude ‘in relation to a solid religious revivalism occurring in society,’ it is important to explain the development of this phenomenon. Many scholars argue that in the pre-Soviet period, Central Asians were ‘cultural Muslims,’ and started to become ‘conscious Muslims’ in recent decades, especially after independence (Abashin 2002, Luong 2003, Olcott 2002). During the Soviet era, Central Asians would identify themselves as Muslim since they were born into a Muslim family, and were adhering to the cultural rituals such as the Islamic wedding ceremony and funeral. They would only be familiar with a few prayers, and not observing the fast or daily prescribed prayers was not considered a great fault (Abashin 2002, 66). However, modernization and social changes have also altered the social role of Islam in Central Asia. Islam slowly became a ‘personal choice’ rather then part of a tribal or communal identity. People started to observe obligatory prayers and other forms of worship, and learn the essence of their faith. There was a general awakening that Islam was not only a cultural way of life composed of rites and traditions, but a comprehensive religion with personal and social requirements. In this sense, the social changes in society brought by modernization, the relaxing of the Soviet suppression of religion, search for spiritual fulfillment after 70 years of atheist indoctrination, and the impacts of the events happening in the neighboring Muslim countries, all contributed to the religious revivalism (Luong 2003; Abashin 2002; Hunter 1996). Also, there is extensive literature arguing that Islam was the source of resistance to Soviet rule “…because modernization was equated with secularization, and Islam was depicted as the primary weapon against the forces of Soviet modernity. Thus, Islam was considered the symbol of CARs’ inherent ability to resist Soviet rule and the Soviet Union’s failure to achieve modernization in this region.” Compared to the plethora of studies on religious revivalism in CARs, there is surprisingly limited research conducted on the secularization process in the CARs. Most of the works analyze the nature of political Islam, Islamic resurgence, and the government suppression thereof. However, there is no in-depth study of the causes of the secularization in CARs, or why the governments have embarked upon radical 6

Since independence 5,000 new mosques opened in Uzbekistan only (Sagdeev and Eisenhower,39), numerous political parties and Islamic organizations (legal or illegal) have been formed in each CAR, local funds were establish to finance the reconstruction of religious buildings and sites that were destroyed or just left to ruins during the Soviet era, thousands of people each year started to go to Mecca to perform pilgrimage, Islamic schools opened to teach young people how to recite the Qur’an and basics of Islam, it became common to see pamphlet distributors on streets proselytizing (Gleason, 172; Olcott 1996; Hunter 1996). Trofimov’s research found that the strength of religious associations in Kazakhstan increased from 46 to 1,652 between 1989 and 2003 (where he used several indicators and codified them to obtain a numerical measurement of the strength of the associations).

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secularizing reforms, and are suppressing even non-militant forms of Islam. Nonetheless, the few scholars voice a unified opinion in their analysis of the nature of the secularization process, and claim the government policies to be oppressive and detrimental to the democratization process in Central Asia (Hunter 1996; Olcott 1996; Luong 2004).7 Some scholars attribute the religious oppression to the personalities of the individual political leaders and their authoritarian regimes (Polat in Sagdeev and Eisenhower 2000; Allison and Jonson 2001). Particularly, the case of Uzbekistan renders itself perfectly to this explanation since Islam Karimov has been the President under a rather authoritarian regime since independence, and has displayed a dictatorial leadership. Another explanation forwarded by Abashin and Sjukijainen is that secularization is being used as a tool to control the resurgence of militant Islam, and it came about only as a reaction to extremist movements. The state retorted to this tool to fight back the unpredictable and erratic effects of the Islamic revivalism. In other words, this argument claims that secularism came to life as a reaction to a phenomenon, and does not display any historical dependency. However, I argue that, even though individual leaders may be the apparent actors implementing the oppressive policies, and militant activities might have caused tighter control by the states, in-depth analysis of the phenomenon is required to find the underlying reasons that cause these leaders in all the CARs to pursue parallel suppressive attitudes towards religion. To this end, I will test if the following independent variables account for the dependent variable, the suppressive secularization process advanced by the Central Asian governments:

Independent Variable 1 and 2: This puzzle of why the Central Asian governments have embarked upon suppressive secularization process can be explained by an institutional argument. The institutionalized secularization process and the dictatorial leadership structure of the Soviet regime have been institutionalized into the framework of the new independent states. The continuation of the rule of the former Communist Party bosses, now under different titles, in the CARs even after independence may support this view. In this perspective, the current secularization process can be viewed as a continuation of the anti-religious policies of the Soviet era that have been incorporated into the institutional structure of the Central Asian states. Current political leaders, most of whom were Communist Party officials, believe that secularism is the only way to modernize their countries. The failed democratization efforts and the lack of democratic institutions (due to path dependency to dictatorial Soviet institutions) resulting in authoritarian regimes to varying extents in different 7

These authors cite numerous incidents where the government allowed officers to open fire on Islamic groups protesting, clergy disappearances, executions without fair trial, closing down of religious schools and associations…etc. in the CARs.

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CARs also support this argument. This hypothesis can be substantiated with the historical institutionalism approach.

Independent Variable 3: Secular policies are used as means to cover the religious oppression (or the oppression of the religious groups in opposition), which serves the political interests of the leaders and help them to get rid of potential political rivals.

Authoritarian Political Leadership

Push for Suppressive Secularism by Central Asian Governments

Institutionalized Soviet Secularism

Political Interests of the Leaders

(Islamic Parties as political rivals)

As illustrated in the above model, based on the historical institutionalism theory, I hypothesize that the main causes of the secularizing policies of the CARs can be attributed to the institutionalized Soviet attitudes towards religion, the lack of democratic institutions, and the political interest of the leaders to crack down on potential political rivals (Islamic political parties).

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Comparing across Central Asia Since 1992, Central Asian governments “have embarked on a policy of preventing all political manifestations of Islam in their countries while co-opting a quietist type of Islam” and “political parties with the slightest tinge of Islam have been banned…” (Hunter 1996, 37). The following three case studies are intended to demonstrate the state attitudes towards religion in Central Asia. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan have been selected on the basis that they illustrate different shades of politicization of Islam, domestic conflict and political instability, state policies towards religion, and social reactions to forced secularization.8 For instance, in Tajikistan Islamist groups are incorporated in the government, in Uzbekistan they are a strong opposition but the religious suppression of the government continues for political reasons. Among the three cases, Kazakhstan has the most secular society (Malashenko in Allison and Jonson 2001, 49) and the influence of religion in politics in the country is relatively small, yet the government still pursues restrictive religious policies. Uzbekistan The state of affairs on religious revivalism and secularism in Uzbekistan has in the most part been shaped by one person, President Karimov. Karimov’s communist background and the policies he has followed causes him to be criticized as a hypocrite and apostate (Olcott 1996, 117). After independence, Karimov strategically embarked upon public efforts to construct an image as a ‘Muslim’ leader sympathetic of Islamic rituals (i.e. taking oath on the Qur’an, making pilgrimage to Mecca, establishing an Islamic university, and instituting an Islamic TV channel). Religious leaders, knowing that Karimov’s legitimacy depended partly on them, used this advantage politically to extend numerous demands, including ones for religious education in public schools and Friday to become the official holiday instead of Sunday. Karimov did meet many of their demands in order to strengthen his position. However, as the political situation worsened in the neighboring Tajikistan with the outbreak of the civil war, Karimov’s fear escalated, and his attitude towards various religious groups and movements shifted drastically. The-then Tajik President Nabiev’s concession to share power with the Islamic and secular opposition was another potential spillover that had likely threatened Karimov’s hold on power.9 As summarized by Luong, when Karimov’s

8

Sociological studies of Central Asia produced rankings of Islamic adherence of populations in the CARs, and accordingly the Tajiks are strongest, and in decreasing order comes Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and Turkmen (Malashenko in Allison and Jonson, 51), 9 Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party of Islamic Liberation) were all Islamic political groups demanding political recognition at the time.

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calculations of strengthening his legitimacy fell to the fear of opposition, his ulterior motive to eliminate all potential political rivals came out of the closet: “President Karimov of Uzbekistan in particular has maintained Soviet attitudes toward religion and dissent. He has moved beyond the notion that the state should simply “manage” Islam by institutionalizing and depoliticizing it, however, to the conviction that it must be eliminated as an independent social force. Thus, while Karimov created his own Committee for Religious Affairs to perform essentially the same function as the Soviet Islamic Central Asian Directorate – to oversee the practice of Islam – he has also executed a widespread crack-down on nonmilitant Islamists, which includes practicing Muslims and imams in both officially recognized and unofficial mosques.” (Luong 2004, 22)

Karimov’s regime “suppressed all autonomous appeals to or manifestations of Islam – a state policy that began in the city of Namangan in 1992 and accelerated out of control in 1997 with the arrest, detention, and torture of thousands of Muslims…” (Luong 2004, 18). The Uzbekistani authorities have routinely bullied the popular religious leaders and dissidents using the state-controlled mufti offices and often accusing them of the radical ideologies of wahhabism (Cichok 2003). In the rhetoric of the Karimov government Islam has been similarly depicted as a religion incompatible with the secular nature of the Uzbek state. Reaffirming that Uzbekistan is “proceeding along the correct path towards building a new democratic and civilized state” at a meeting with foreign ambassadors and the media, Karimov stressed that “Islam shall not be raised to the political plane in our country [and] Uzbekistan shall remain a secular state” (ITAR-TASS 1999). One possible explanation for the acute policies of official secularism is the one usually advanced by the Uzbek authorities – the presence of religious militants that aim at overturning the government and establishing a theocratic rule. Even though the Uzbek variety of Islam is seen as “the most religiously fervent” (Haghayeghi 1994, 250) in Central Asia and some religious movements espouse illiberal ideologies, there is no direct evidence that the adherents of different streams of unofficial Islam in Uzbekistan advocate a violent change in government (Rotar 2005). This is even true of the Wahhabis – the self-proclaimed advocates of a pure Islam. While both the authorities and the lion’s share of the Uzbek Muslims are united in disliking this form of Islam (using this term rather liberally to denote anyone they disagree with or do not like), the most salient public stance of the Uzbek Salafis, as the Wahhabis are also referred to, are directed against lavish funerals and weddings popular among the great majority of Uzbeks. Salafis argue that these practices were cultivated during the Soviet times and impoverish an already poor population of the country. Believing that

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worshipping at holy places and having expensive stones are the signs of idolatry, they were accused in the mid-1990s of the destruction of some tombstones. With that exception, there was “no compelling evidence as of 2005 that Uzbek Salafis advocate the violent overthrow of the Uzbek government” (Rotar 2005). The Tabligh Jamaat movement and Hizb ut-Tahrir are among other groups singled out by the Uzbek authorities as extremist. While the literature on Tabligh Jamaat is limited, there is a prominent view that it is a peaceful and law abiding movement expressed by a renowned French specialist on Islam Oliver Roy (Roy 2002). There is, however, an opposing view challenging Roy. Expressed by Alexiev (2005) it accuses Tabligh of a direct terrorist activity. As far as Uzbekistan is concerned, Alexiev cites the accusation of Tabligh by the Uzbek government of sending some 400 Uzbek people to the terrorist camps. The Russian translation of his article, (but not the current English online version) also blames on them the 1999 bombing in Tashkent. While the Russian and Uzbek-speaking researchers share Alexiev’s negative view of Tabligh’s overall worth for world peace, there are at least two of them who are more nuanced in their assessments of the Uzbek (and Kyrgyz) Tabligh movements than are Alexiev and the Uzbek government itself. According to Bakhtiyar Babadzhanov, senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, “it is still early to talk about the direct terrorist activity in the Central Asian region of Tabligh… I do not know about the politically extremist slogans of the Tablighists. But it is possible that they are not advertised as…the Tabligh propagandists are usually used blindly”10 (Fergana.ru 2009 a). When asked about the recruitment activity for terrorist organizations pointed out by Alexiev, Babadzhanov responds that despite its informed nature the article contains factual errors. For instance, Tabligh did not take part in orchestrating the February 1999 Tashkent explosions. He also tells that a significant part of Alexiev’s sources are comprised of the Indian news agency reports and publications, which may have affected the judgment of the author. Babadzhanov also claims that “concerning the status of the recruiters for terrorist organizations, it seems that the author

did not produce direct evidence even though his assumptions are not illogical” (Fergana.ru 2009 a, emphasis added). In a similar vein, when asked about the hunt after Tablighi Jamaat in the neighboring Kyrgyzstan, Petr Topychkanov, research fellow at the Institute of Asian and African Studies in the Lomonosov Moscow State University, expresses his surprise and curiosity over the reasons for the Tabligh’s ban. He claims that even in the 10

Translated from Russian by the second author.

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countries where Tabligh is active and its members may in fact be linked to terrorism, such as India, Pakistan, and Great Britain, the organization still functions and is highly popular and respected by the society. He speculates that the action of the government is linked to the possible limitation or even cessation of the US military operation in Afghanistan. Under such conditions, the influence of Taliban-like movements is likely to increase and the government is likely taking preventive measures to check the future developments (Fergana.ru 2009 b). Thus, despite the secretive nature of the top echelons of Tabligh, the concerns that the openly propagated ideas of peace are not sincere and merely the outcome of Tabligh’s adaptation to Central Asian realities, scholars of the region refrain from accusing the organization of direct terrorist or violent activity. While Tabligh openly denounces its involvement in politics, Hizb-ut Tahrir is open about its political goals. Its most salient political goal is to unite all Muslims in one state. While its commitment to democracy and minority rights are not clear, they are known for denouncing violence for achieving political means. Yet, while in the West the presence of Hizb-ut Tahrir is usually tolerated, the movement is banned in Uzbekistan, Russia, and other Central Asian countries.. Numerous trials of its alleged members take place in Uzbekistan and Russia’s Muslim regions, among others. While the movement’s ideology may raise brows among the Western and Central Asian masses and elites, the banishment and imprisonment of the essentially peaceful political organization is questionable. Even if the ban on the organization is justified by some versions of western liberalism, the lengthy sentences, torture administered by the authorities, the planting of drugs, and vague definitions of what constitutes “extremism” are certainly not. Some Sufi adherents of mysticism in Islam, claim no repression from the Uzbek authorities. While this is partly true, there is evidence that many are followed and reported to the authorities (Rotar 2005). This is not to say that Uzbekistan did not experience violence initiated by the religiously-based opposition. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU, renamed into the Islamic Movement of Turkestan, IMT) was the primary source of such concerns and actions. It was responsible for the 1999 car bombings in Tashkent, launching an attack in the southern part of the country from the neighboring states penetrating deep into the country as close as sixty miles from the capital Tashkent (Weitz 2004, “Terrorism in Uzbekistan: The IMU remains alive but not well.”). While IMU did pose a serious security threat to the Uzbek regime, there are several reasons for why the use of IMU as a wide-brush justification for the suppression of the general Islamic revival by the Karimov regime is problematic. First, IMU’s

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influence in the region and especially in Uzbekistan is greatly diminished following the government crackdown in the aftermath of the Tashkent bombing the US let anti-Taliban military operation in Afghanistan. While IMU claimed to have 10,000 adherents in Uzbekistan, it only amounts to some 0.04 percent of the population (Weitz 2004, cited in Burton 2004). Further, in the wake of the 1999 bombing, the government had jailed some 4,000 persons belonging to Islamist organizations, while human rights groups claimed the number to be 7,000 (Burton 2004). As the base of IMU’s operation is now confined to the mountainous regions of Pakistan, even there it faces problems due to the resistance from the local population and the US-led military action. Consequently, there is little real threat of violence posed by IMU to justify continuation of the repressive tactics against all non-governmental religious organization in the country. Second, IMU failure to take on the nonviolent interpretations of the Islamic teachings has likely generated a lot of sympathy from the domestic and international publics for the Uzbek government’s repressive actions for Islamic expressions outside governmental control. Yet, apart from IMU, to the best of our knowledge, there is no other religious movement in Uzbekistan and indeed in the entire (ex-Soviet) Central Asian region that advocates violence and employs bloodshed in the course of its political action. While the political message espoused by some of those groups is far from that of liberal democracy, their denunciation of violence increases their legitimacy vis-à-vis the government. Similarly, the government makes it clear that democracy does not set the rules of the game in Tashkent, yet it asymmetrically uses repressive tactics against nonviolent Islamist groups. The position of the regime might have been strengthened if they engaged in an open political debate and competed for public sympathy in a non-repressive manner. Third, it is not clear whether the presence of IMU did in fact result in the government repression against it and not vice versa. While the government of Uzbekistan was notoriously repressive since early 1990s, the IMU did not come to existence and made its inroads to Uzbekistan until the late 1990s. It is, therefore, not illogical to argue that the repressive nature of the Karimov regime laid fertile soil for IMU’s support in the country. The overall, and less than fortunate, result of these practices is that many, if not most, Uzbeks equate Western democracy with the assertively secular but undemocratic regime of president Karimov – something that does not have base in reality (Rotar 2005). One of the most vivid expressions of such instability are the 2005 Andijan (Andijon) events. The unrests, which resulted in at least 187 dead, were found to be instigated by

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Akramiya, a Hizb-ut Tahrir’s splinter group, according to the Uzbek authorities. This view is backed by Bakhtiyor Bobojonov (Bakhriyar Babadzhanov) of Tashkent’s Institute of Oriental Studies who served as an expert witness for the government at the trials of the Andijon arrestees. Yet, the Uzbek government’s role in the Andjan incident draw ire from the EU and the United States; it was not investigated independently and the details of the event may never be known (Corwin in RFE/RL 2006). Tajikistan Like the other CARs, Tajikistan also became reluctantly independent.. “Russian supported neo-communist government ran by the native elite derived from the former Communist Party leadership” (Savin 1993, 1) took power immediately after the fall of USSR. In the early 1990s, the government tried to suppress the opposition composed of liberal, democratic and religious forces. As a result, large part of the opposition armed itself and employed more fundamentalist slogans in lieu of the democratic ones. What followed was a bloody civil war that was only resolved in 1998. The fighting sides signed a peace agreement through the efforts of several countries and international organizations. The government allotted 30 percent of all state positions to the opposition, which in return abandoned its radical slogans and violent agenda. The fact that a substantial part of the opposition consisted of the democratic and liberal forces may have helped them overcome extremist views and brutal tactics. The Tajik experience was an example of the regime’s incorporation of extremists into the civil government and bureaucracy structures, According to Malashenko (2001, 50), “since 1998, one-third of the seats in the ruling coalition have been assigned to the United Tajik Opposition, which is influenced by fundamentalist ideology…”\ Fundamentalist ideologies waned down gradually, but democratic and liberal treatment of religious manifestations is still far from the reality. Religion is under state

surveillance,

and

religious

policies

require

every

association,

even

neighborhood Qur’an teaching schools, to register with the government (Roy, 142). The president of the country Emomali Rakhmon issued a decree prohibiting female students and pupils who wear satr or hijab from attending educational institutions starting in 2008 (Isamova in RIA Novosti 2010). The actual implementation of the ban began even earlier as the Tajik Ministry of Education’s decision to prohibit wearing hijab in state and educational facilities was promulgated as early as 2007 (Sarkorova in BBC Russian 2007 a). Ironically, according to the vice rector of the Dushanbe Foreign Language Institute Zieev, not only hijab-wearers were to be banished from the university but also students in mini-skirts and “lightheaded” blouses

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(Sarkorova in BBC Russian 2007 a). The same year a Dushanbe court upheld the Ministry’s position denying a woman wearing hijab (Sarkorova in BBC Russian 2007 b). Recently, in September 2010, Rakhmon demonstrated his peculiar interest to female clothing by criticizing Tajik women for wearing foreign-styled cloths. In the speech delivered at the Tajik National University and broadcasted on all channels of the statecontrolled TV, Rakhmon pointed out that “if any of you [women] likes the styles of some [other] country, I will send you [there]” (Isamova in RIA Novosti 2010). In a related clarification, Tajik President’s press secretary stated that the President meant women wearing traditional clothing of Indian, Pakistani, Iranian, Arab, and Turkish origin (Isamova in RIA Novosti 2010).Rakhmon had repeatedly called on the ban of Muslim female head scarves in Tajik schools. While the supreme organ governing Tajikistan’s Islamic establishments – the Council of Ulema – are disappointed with the headscarf ban, the only religious party in Central Asia, the Islamic Party of Tajikistan’s Revival, claimed that the prohibition was unconstitutional (Sarkorova in BBC Russian 2007 a). In addition to the limitation on visual representation of Islamic images in public, a number of religious organizations are banned in Tajikistan. These include Hizb utTahrir, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan/Turkestan, Bayyat, Salafiya, and Tablighi Jamaat (Rasul-zade in Ferghana.ru 2009). However, religious situation is more nuanced in Tajikistan than that observed in Uzbekistan. Tajikistan hosts the only in-system religious political party in the entire region. Further, official restrictions on religious dresses and Islamic movements were enacted relatively late. As religiously dressed women were not admitted to schools since 2007, the Salafiya movement was declared illegal by the Supreme Court of the republic in January, 2009 (Ferghana.ru 2009 c). Yet, fresh reports point to an escalation of the situation between the Rakhmonov regime and the former opposition. On September 19, 2010, the military of the Tajik Defense Ministry were attacked resulting in three dead and two injured (Ferghana.ru 2010 a). One interpretation of this move deals with Rakhmonov’s desire to do away with the former opposition figures even though they are absorbed in the country’s bureaucracy (Ferghana.ru 2010 b). Consequently, the calls against the fight on terror and extremism are only a pretext for getting rid of the opposition (Ferghana.ru 2010 b). President Rakhmov has been accused for collaborating with IMU and providing them with weapons during the 1998 invasion of Uzbekistan in order to “punish and frighten Tashkent”; it is further suggested that the secret friendship between Rakhmov and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan continues to exist as it benefits Rakhmon, according to the leader of the “Vatandor” (“Patriot”) movement leader and opposition journalist Dodozhon Atovulloev (Ferghana.ru 2010 b).

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Kazakhstan Kazakhstan’s experience with politicization of Islam has been slightly different then Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Like these countries, Kazakhstan also accepted independence rather reluctantly, (Olcott 2002, 24) and is the most secularized among the CARs without major conflicts (Malashenko in Allison and Jonson, 49). Economic and social turmoils that have affected all the CARs to different extents also hit Kazakhstan and engendered vacuums that led to frictions with radical Islamist groups (Akiner 1995; Olcott 1995; Madelbaum 1994). There have been quite a few occasions in the last decade where extremist group members were arrested and waves of Islamist ideologies would spill over from neighboring countries. However, unlike the other CAR governments, the Kazakh authorities maintained realistic and practical attitude towards this problem. They acknowledged the Islamic heritage of their society and did not take pro-active measures to cleanse of all manifestations of Islam from the private and public sphere. On the other hand, the government recognized the problems in a narrow focus, the radical groups, which included only a very small portion of the population. In 2000, the government took steps to identify the potentially ‘dangerous’ groups through establishing a Council for Contacts with Religious Associations. Religious groups were required to register with these local councils to enable government supervision. Indeed, the most radical groups did not register with the Council, but other groups that could have otherwise fall under the spell of the radical groups chose to register for the incentives provided by the government. Another step to deal with the situation was through the legislature. In 1999-2000, a law on the Freedom of Religion and Religious Associations in the Republic was drafted in order to “tighten the control over religious activities and limit the freedom of conscience (especially for the followers of the so-called nontraditional religions).” (Trofimov 2003, 48). This bill raised protests from wide segments of society and was put on the shelf by the parliament. All these measures demonstrate the legitimate concerns of the Kazakh government for the rise of uncontrollable radicalism- possibly as a result of a likely spill-over from abroad or other Central Asian countries. However, due to the lack of a major political party that has gained substantive public support, Islamic revivalism does not constitute an immediate danger to the government. Institutionalized Religious Attitudes during the Soviet Era After describing the secularization attempts and the contemporary situation in the CARs, let us now try to trace back these state attitudes to the formal and informal (i.e. religious attitudes) institutions established during the Soviet era. In order to properly identify Soviet’s attitude toward religion, it is necessary to analyze the original

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communist doctrines on religion. The Communist Manifesto outlines that communism regards religion as one of the social realities that is bound to change and deteriorate by time (Raines 2002, 143). Marx very clearly states that “…communism abolishes eternal truths; it abolishes all religion, morality…11” Accordingly, the Communist Party also regarded religion as a relic of the past, a sign of backwardness, and something that would fade away as people became more educated. The main issue was not about theology or doctrine but rather about the primacy of loyalty to the state (USSR) and the Party. The Party attempted to crack down the social aspect of religion and turn it into a matter of individual conscience. Turning religion into a personal issue has been the overriding goal of the Soviet government concerning religion. As long as people practiced at their homes, in private, and not form organizations to pursue public prayers and events, religion was permissible. Thus, all religious leaders and organizations were to be kept under state surveillance. Public places of worship were converted into other uses, but the state did not attempt to suppress folk religion rigorously. There is an overriding belief in communism that religion is only a phase that will eventually die out. As people are more educated and obtain a scientific approach to life, they would not need to seek spiritual fulfillment. The Party’s role is to fasten this process that would otherwise take a long time on its own. However, the Party did not use direct force to abolish religion at once, but adopted policies to supervise all organized religion in order to keep it under control. Direct assault on religion was in fact denounced claiming that it creates anti-state sentiments. Also, the role of the state was outwardly stated as adherence to the policy of religious freedom, whereas engaging the religious leaders in the indoctrination of the public. Religion is recognized as a primitive form of human consciousness that hinders advancement. Therefore, in the USSR “Islam as a religion was officially tolerated while being eradicated in full conformity with the theories of scientific atheism.” (Sjukijainen 2003, 120). Similar to the attitudes of the European colonies, the Soviets saw it as their duty to enlighten and civilize the ‘backward’ nations of Central Asia. Luong summarizes the state’s attitude towards Islam as: “…the politicization of regional cleavages coincided with the repression and depoliticization of Islam. The Soviet regime succeeded in transforming Islam, reducing it from a potential supranational ideology to a local and primarily cultural identity marker across Central Asia. Elites who desired career advancement in the state and party organs were instructed to separate their belief in Islam from their political ideology because Islam was associated with both cultural 11

www.anu.edu/polsci/marx/classics/manifesto.html. “Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1848, by Karl Marx and Frederich Engels.”

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backwardness and disloyalty to the Soviet state. Although the continuation of Islamic faith and rituals was allowed within local communities, the Soviet regime made it clear from the outset that atheism was the state’s official ideology and that even at the local level Islam was subordinate to secular political institutions. This further weakened Islam as a political force by destroying the capacity for Islamic ties to form the basis of an organized mass movement. At the same time, more than seventy years of Soviet rule engendered the belief among Central Asian elites that Islam was more prone to instability and conflict…” (Luong 2004, 13-14)

Shahrani argues that Soviets established numerous institutions, the most effective being the education system, to implement the secularization along with discrediting Islam (Mesbahi 1994, 65). The attempts of the USSR to strip the Central Asian populations off their religious beliefs depict their views on the role of religion. Evidently, the Soviet leaders believed that religion has a major role in the lives of the Central Asian societies, it is a strong tool to mobilize and unite them, and possibly pose a threat for communism and state control. As a result of these Soviet attitudes, Islam was confined to the private sphere, and became a cultural norm more than a religious identity. However, as the cultural/national values theory predicts, the Soviet regime did not succeed to completely eradicate the Islamic heritage but drew it into the private sphere or underground (the religious revivalism observed today supports this argument). Analysis and Discussion As the case descriptions depict, the main causes of the religious oppression of Central Asian governments are institutionally path dependent. First, political leadership is still authoritarian, continuing the institutional and political culture of the Soviet regime. According to the Freedom House’s democracy index Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are 5.5, Uzbekistan is 6.5, and Turkmenistan is 7.0 out of a 1 (most democratic) to 7 scale.12 In other words, none of the CARs succeeded in their democratic transition, and are either authoritarian or have many authoritarian aspects. Moreover, the Center for Religious Freedom categorizes all of the Central Asian countries as ‘not free’ in terms of religious freedom index. The ‘not free’ category is

12

http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/averages.pdf. The Freedom House organization’s democracy index employs both electoral and civil freedoms attributes to define democracy. Countries are labeled on a scale of 1 (most democratic) to 7 (most democratic). Electoral freedoms include adult suffrage, competition for public offices, and legitimate influence of elected representatives on public policies. Civil rights that are taken into account are freedom of organization, freedom of expression, human rights and economic opportunities. The scores for the two attributes are averaged together and the countries are categorized as free, partly free, or not free. Although this index also has weaknesses, it is the most widely employed one since it provides data on almost all the countries around the world, and it is extremely up to date.

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described as a country where “religion is tightly controlled and basic religious freedom is denied.” 13 Second, anti-religious policies of the Soviets have been institutionalized into the education system and the political structure, and elites view secularism as the necessary means to modernize their countries. Communism viewed religion as ‘the opium of the masses’ that can be easily used to exploit people, as well as an obstacle in the way of communism. Atheistic indoctrination has been the basis of all communist governments, such as China and Vietnam, and the CAR leaders could not break off from the historical dependency of these ideologies. Even though religious freedoms are protected by the constitutions of the CARs, as the highly ‘democratic’ USSR constitution, there is a deep discrepancy between theory and practice. Third, political leaders are using secularism to oppress Islamic political opposition; therefore secularism serves the political interests of the leaders. Even though the CARs’ governments give limited religious freedoms to the people, they want to keep the populations and all movements under control. As communism is slowly fading away, CAR leaders strategically use nationalism and religion as a substitute doctrine to unite their nation.14 However, the CAR leaders perceive any significant concessions to one of the religious groups, or in the same token any extensive religious freedoms, as a sign of weakness that might trigger groups to increase their demands and to gain political power. Thus, the rise in religious sentiments poses a threat undermining the legitimacy of the leaders who are suppressing religious manifestations to serve their political interests. The overall pattern shows that state policies on religion are undemocratic and against freedom of religious belief and expression. Even though there are democratic institutions, a popularly elected legislature, a constitution, and judiciary, the functioning of the overall state mechanism is undemocratic. There are clear contradictions between what is written in the Constitutions, the inconsistent religious policies oscillating with the fears of the political leaders, and the discretionary rule of law

13

http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/pdfdocs/rfiwmap.pdf After independence, religious and political leaders started to use Islam strategically to legitimize their authority. Even though Islam, in combination with the pre-Soviet cultural heritage, was seen as a threat to their political power, political leaders took advantage of it to serve their interests by deceiving the public. The irony is that most of these leaders “remember that they themselves carry considerable responsibility for religious persecution under Soviet power” (Malashenko in Allison and Jonson, 50). For instance, Uzbek President Islam Karimov took oath on the Qur’an, made pilgrimage (and made sure it was widely publicized by mass media), and approved “a secular state constitution that explicitly maintains a special status for Islam and recognizes its importance in the nations’ history” to show his support for Islam (Luong, 18). The goal was to “create a state-dominated Islamic establishment and win popular approval by building mosques and religious schools…” (Hunter, 37). This phenomenon, or strategy, is very popular in predominantly Muslim countries, such as Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries, where the politicians insincerely try to publicize their adherence to Islam to appeal to the masses.

14

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molded by the leaders. The suppressive religious policies illustrate the power of the states over individual freedoms; which in turn is a sign that the CARs have not completed their democratic transitions. The loopholes in the Constitution, the unclear definitions of secularism, and the authoritarian nature of state secularism allow for the undemocratic rulings. In other words, the judiciary is not an independent institution, the military has the most power in judicial decision-making, and the separation of powers is non-existent. Conclusion Even before the fall of the USSR, many scholars predicted that Islam would be the main element to fill the political and social vacuum created. Affirming these predictions, immediately after independence, Islam came out of the closet in all of the CARs. The reasons of why Islam took a dominant role in the Central Asian societies are easier to explain by theories of historical determinacy, the role of informal institutions, religion, and cultural influences. However, why the governments are taking such suppressive measures against all kinds of religious manifestations came as a surprise to scholars. In this article, I have tackled this puzzle and proposed an institutional explanation to this phenomenon. The majority of the Central Asian populations are Muslims who have been becoming more conscious and observant. Therefore, the problem of compatibility between Islam and a secular democracy has to be addressed with effective policy solutions. The state has to resolve how to democratically reconcile demands of (the majority of) its citizens with statist goals of secularization and modernization. All the theoretical issues of secularism demand practical solutions to ease the culminating tensions between the state and citizenry before more bloody clashes emerge. It is not compatible with democracy for a state to deprive its citizens from basic human rights based on assumptions or fears of some possible ‘future’ threats to stability or to their personal political power. As Galeotti states it “the possibility of the free rider fundamentalist, who makes an opportunistic use of liberal institutions to destroy them, seems more a fantasy of the Western mind than a real threat.” (Galeotti 1993, 602). The state should outline clearly where the demands of Islamic groups would impinge upon democratic principles of the state. For example, a demand to replace the entire constitution with Islamic Law (Shari’ah) would not be compatible with democracy. The state should state what democratic principle the policies are based on; i.e. harm principle, Westernization, or its own discretion?

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It is essential for the CARs to find peaceful and democratic resolutions to the demands of the peaceful religious groups, while making the distinction with the militant groups. There is a growing need to draft policies compatible with the principles of ‘real neutral democratic’ version of secularism and incorporate the demands of the majority of its citizens by pursuing more inclusive strategies. There are many predictions about how the Central Asian governments will deal with the issues arising from political Islam, and if the instability of the region will be resolved more undemocratically through religious suppression, or through democratic incorporation of the religious groups into a pluralist society. It seems as though, despite continuing religious oppression, the example of Tajikistan has many lessons to teach to the other CARs that have not so far displayed very promising attitudes for democracy. Islamic revivalism is triggering a vivant civil society actively demanding more rights from the government; therefore it can be viewed as a potential antidote against authoritarian regimes. Also, the Turkish political history is suggestive of how “an Islamic opposition may integrate itself into a modern democratic system” (Ozdalga 1998, 93) therefore it constitutes a crucial example for the other Muslim countries. However, this peaceful and democratic integration is possible only if “Islamic values are not banned from politics by a fanatical call for secularism, but respected as a legitimate voice.” (Ozdalga 1998, 93). Stability of CARs largely depends on the ability of the state to adopt new social contracts that accommodate ethnic and religious diversity.

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The Doctrine of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” as Official Ideology of the September 12 and the “Intellectuals’ Hearth –Ayd1nlar Oca¤1” as the Ideological Apparatus of the State Umit Kurt*

Abstract

Within a particular social formation, there does not exist merely one dominant ideology, rather there are many antagonistic ideologies. The dominant ideology per se becomes dominant as long as it suppresses other ideologies not by applying violence or force. Instead, dominant ideology can manage to do it through the support of ideological apparatuses of the state. This article, in the sense of theoretical and conceptual framework drawn above, focuses on the Intellectual’s Hearth (Ayd1 nlar Oca¤1 ) as one and the most important of the ideological apparatuses of September 12 regime and tries to analyse its “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis Doctrine”, which constitutes the cement of social formation of dominant ideology of the dominant class. In this article, there will be observations and considerations by following 1970s and September 12 1980 military coup period as a historical theme regarding the changing nature of the Intellectual’s Hearth particularly after the 1980 period that neoliberalism and globalization gained momentum in Turkey. Keywords: Intellectual’s Hearth, Ideological Apparatuses of the State, “Turkish-

Islamic Synthesis” Doctrine, 12 September 1980, National Culture.

*

Zirve University. [email protected]

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Introduction In reality, ideology is not merely grained in thinking or in idea; it does not constitute a conceptual system by itself. As Gramsci correctly emphasized ideology disseminates and penetrates into the traditions and conventions and even life-styles of individuals in a given society. In that sense, ideology becomes a far more concrete within a social formation. Indeed, a predominant ideology “forms the fundamental power of classes within a given society” (Poulantzas, 2004: 351). Above all, Gramsci insisted on that not simply the state function as having the monopoly of use of force in Weberian sense but also it bears an ideological function function (or hegemony). Thus, he remarked that the state should be considered as “organizer of the hegemony” (Gramsci, 2005). Dominant ideology becomes blatant within the particular apparatuses and institutions of society such as churches (religious apparatus), political parties (political apparatus), unions, schools and universities, media tools (newspapers, radio, cinema, t.v.), and family to a certain extent. These are ideological apparatuses of the state (Althusser, 2003: 168-169). These are different from repressive apparatuses of the state (military, police, bureaucracy, courts, and government) in a relative sense. In brief, the repressive apparatuses of the state fulfill the monopoly use of violence of the state. The upshot of vigorous class struggles for capturing ideologocal apparatuses of the state has been laid bare lately (Althusser, 2003: 130-131). In this respect, dominant ideology in a particular society, as Althusser vehemently underlines, “does not hold state power without applying its own hegemony over/in ideological apparatuses of the state” (2003: 172). All these explanations compel us to apply Marxist definition of the state. According to this definition, a state is not only defined holding power of the use of force but also is defined in terms of social and political functions. State with having classes enables political class domination in a system of class struggle. The function of state with classes is the last “point/resort” in Althusserian sense for providing social integrity and togetherness and reproduction of the social forces of production. Function of the ideological apparatuses appears in that situation depicted above. Generally, dominant ideology forges the cement of a social formation. Repressive apparatus of the state does not solely contribute to its own reproduction, at the same time it provides political dynamics of the function of ideological apparatuses of the state by means of suppression. As Althusser pointed out the role of ideology of the dominant class that holds the state power mostly comes out here. However, ideological apparatuses of the state both in reciprocal relationships with themselves and relationship with the state apparatus have “relative autonomy” that repressive apparatuse of the state does not have. This relative autonomy attributed to the ideological apparatuses of the states is

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based on the fundamental dimensions of class struggle in the field of ideology. Within a particular social formation, there does not exist merely one dominant ideology, rather there are many antagonistic ideologies. The dominant ideology per se becomes dominant as long as it suppresses other ideologies not by applying violence or force. Instead, dominant ideology can manage to do it through the support of ideological apparatuses of the state. This article, in the light of theoretical and conceptual framework drawn above, focuses on the Intellectuals’ Hearth (Ayd1 nlar Oca¤1 ) as one of the most important ideological apparatuses of the September 12 regime and tries to analyse its “Turkish-

Islamic Synthesis Doctrine”, which constitutes the cement of social formation of the dominant ideology of the dominant class. The leftist ideas flourished in the cultural and political life of Turkey by means of broad liberal atmosphere vis-à-vis the past that the 1961 Constitution brought about (Ahmad,1993). In those years, a group of right-wing conservative university academicians and writers came together in order to make their voices heard and to create an alternative against the left. Their primary purpose was to struggle against the dissemination of leftist ideas and to unite Turkish right. The Intellectuals’ Hearth was established on 14 May 1970. Some of its main figures and founding members were rather important names coming from conservative milieu such as brahim Kafeso¤lu, Altan Deliorman, Muharrem Ergin, and Ahmet Kabakl1 . The Intellectuals’ Hearth started to work as a think-thak center where nationalist-conservative intellectuals came together and organized panels and conferences to discuss crucial issues regarding Turkish political life. The Intellectuals’ Hearth was also open to public. Their ideas gained of great importance and had substantial impacts. The main impetus and motivation behind the establishment of the The Intellectuals’ Hearth in 1970 was to obstruct the rift between the right power block of nationalist intelligentsia and right mass grassroots. The Intellectuals’ Hearth tried to make a compromise between Turkish nationalism and universal Islamic community issued its first official declaration in 1973 under the name of a book titled “The Vision of

the Intellectual House: Today’s Issues of Turkey”. In this volumunious and comprehensive book, the ideas in accordance with “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” was defined and systematized in details. These ideas articulated in this book made guidance to September 12 military coup in political and ideological fields. As has it been mentioned above, the most important historical motivation lying behind establishment of the The Intellectuals’ Hearth was to curtail the separation that happened in “great right federation (Justice Party + Nationalist Action Party + National Salvation Party) and to prevent different power rhetorics of these political entities. For

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the The Intellectuals’ Hearth, this kind of danger might have led to an insurmountable peril for the sake of Right vis-à-vis the Left, particularly the Republican People’s Party (RPP). Indeed as Tan1 1 l Bora and Kemal Can emphasizes: “As a result of ossification by reinforcing specific discourses of the DP and more importantly the NSP and the NAP appear ‘risk’ of cleavage of the Right in a permanent manner” (1991:131).

The leading figures of the The Intellectuals’ Hearth such as brahim Kafeso¤lu, Altan Deliorman, Muharrem Ergin and Ahmet Kabakl1 were depicted as: “They are neither under the effect of mason sides of the JP, nor NSP’s religious and the NAP’s nationalist contours, they are close to all segments but do not stand for anyone.” (Dilipak, 1988: 50-61)

This argument is very significant to take into account since it basically indicates the politico-ideological emptiness of the Intellectuals’ Hearth. But, the Turkist (Turkcu)nationalist pasts of the first president of the Intellectuals’ Hearth, brahim Kafeso¤lu, and the most visible figure of the Intellectuals’ Hearth in daily political life, Muharrem Ergin, and also anti-communist parameter that constituted central point in the establishment of the Hearth became highly influential in terms of building a political bridge between the JP and the NAP. When we look at the position of Islam in the ideology of the Intellectuals’ Hearth; we can argue that the Hearth fairly had an instrumental understanding with respect to the Islam. In that context, it can be said that the tradition of the DP and the JP with regards to the understanding of Islam, which was secular in its essence and status-quo-conservative, and also which regarded religious as one of the elements that tranformed people into a nation, was carried on. In this sense, ideology of the Hearth does not conceive Islam as a determining point and category. This perception reflected the Intellectuals’ Hearth political practices and deeds. For instance, the proponents of the Hearth did not support Erbakan’s National Order Party. This stance led to a far more official and even aloof relationship between the Hearth and the National Salvation Party. In fact, reaction and backlash of the Hearth against the coalition government between the NSP and the RPP in 1973/74 aggravated political distance between the Hearth and the NSP. The first real visibility of the Intellectuals’ Hearth in political arena was the role that it played in the establishment of the first National Front government. The Ortado¤u

(Middle East) newspaper in which the Hearth members wrote and especially the

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campaign activity, held under the leadership of Muharrem Ergin, which envisaged to unite nationalist parties in line with anti-communism shaped content of this role mentioned above. The Intellectuals’ Hearth as a leverage and an anchor of the first National Front within the intelligentsia gained significant fame in the eyes of dominant bloc and National Front parties. Obviously, the Nationalist Action Party had a peculiar, distinguishing and special place among this dominant bloc. The putative emphasis on Islamic motives and patterns in the NAP’s rhetoric towards the mids of 70s increased its harmony, nexus and rapproachement with the Intellectuals’ Hearth. However, it sould be underlined that this harmony and amiable relationship was confined to “civil-military bureaucratic state elites who were very close to Türkefl” (Bora & Can, 1991: 132). The first and foremost level of identification of the Intellectuals’ Hearth as the agency of the dominant state apparatus with the Kemalist civil-military bureaucracy, which seriously contradicted the populism of the Turkish right, manifested itself in asssessment and interpretation of the leading figures of the Intellectuals’ Hearth concerning May 27. One of the leading figures of the Hearth, Muharrem Ergin, critiziced the DP in his book named as T ürkiye’nin Bug ünk ü Meseleleri-Today’s

Issues of Turkey in order to think of: “Eighty percent of the country is peasant, we (DP) will stay in power until 2000 by relying on peasants- memleketin yüzde sekseni köylüdür, biz yaln1 1 z ona dayanarak 2000 y1 1 l1 1 na kadar iktidarda kal1 1 r1 1 z” (Ergin, 1973: 219);

and explained main reason of May 27 as: “incomparable undermining and neglect of officers and intellectuals in Turkish history” (1973: 235).

Although attitude of the Intellectuals’ Hearth towards May 27 showed a serious deviation from the populist demoracy rhetoric associated with general stance-line of Turkish right that was much unexpected, this deviation undubiously made the Intellectuals’ Hearth and its intellectuals rather sympathetic in the eyes of bureaucracy and particularly of military. There was an evident positive relationship with “Kemalism or Ataturkism-Atatürkçülük-” and Ataturk in the Intellectuals’ Hearth rhetoric/discourse. The striking repercussions of this positive and organic relationship could be seen in texts of the Intellectuals’ Hearth regarding “Ataturk reforms and Ataturk principles”, which was situated in the book of “Today’s Issues of Turkey”-Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri. In

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these texts, “Atatürkçülük” was taken up at doctrinaire level and it was claimed that these texts were the most correct and the purest version of “Atatürkçülük”. Indeed, intellectuals of the Intellectuals’ Hearth perceived the early years of the Republic when Ataturk was alive as ‘old happy days´- asr-1 saadet”. In their imagination, Ataturk was the most progressive Turkish nationalist (Ergin, 1973: 320323). In addition to this, for intellectuals of the Intellectuals’ Hearth, the state took “national culture” as an essential issue in the era of Ataturk (Ergin, 1973: 312-313). Intellectuals’ Hearth maintained authority for designing social structure and process. It took its legitimacy from conformity with national culture and hence allegiance to national culture was sufficient to regard political authority as legitimate. It did not have any difficulty to bear parallel ideological parameters with Kemalist authoritarianism, which associated people’s will with nation, nation’s will with language, history, culture with the State (Köker, 1990: 79-85, 115-117). Intellectual climate and map of the Hearth always had an approach that praised and sublimed Turkish military with chauvinist, offensive and anti-communist elements. This was also in parallel with identification of the military with nation. The Intellectuals’ Hearth supported the military government of the September 12 regime without any conditions by emphazising more often the militarypeople/nation character of the Turks aftermath of September 12 and gave of great importance to build up solid relationships with military officers. The Intellectuals’ Hearth had a prerogative to present its prepared constitution draft to the National Securty Coucil in 1982 when there was a prohibition for making proposal on behalf of the institutions. Indeed, leading people of the Intellectuals’ Hearth overtly pointed out that the 1982 Constitution was tantamount to their prepared draft at the rate of 75-80% (Bora & Can, 1991: 134). Activity of the Intellectuals’ Hearth in September 12 and afterwards depended upon its restructuring of official ideology. The “National Compromises” in which the Hearth presented, formed core of the official ideology and its basic dimensions. “National Compromises” and Historical Outlook to the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis At the very beginning, it should be essential to argue that the “Doctrine of TurkishIslamic Synthesis”, which the Intellectuals’ Hearth underwent its prepondarence and ideological carrier, was a fundamental vehicle and symbol of the Hearth operations and unduly nationalist intelengisia aftermath of September 12. The efforts for generating a synthesis between Turkishness, Islam and the West in Turkish intelengisia go back to the era before the Republican period. As Taha Parla perfectly emphasized:

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“In 250 years cultural identity quest of Turkish ruling class, ‘Turkishness, Islam, and West(ernism)’ elements had become fundamental; differentiations were determined according to how, in what extent these three elements were synthesized. Also, Kemalizm as an official ideology explains synthesis of West-Turkishness-Islam according to order of importance by marjinalizing Islamic element” (Parla, 1986: 40-41). Since the mid-1960s, the right-wing version of Kemalist interpretations grasped all sectors of society that wondered about existence of the regime by setting out polarization between the right and the left as principal structure to political life and in this framework by getting strong opposed forces against the left under the name of anti-communism. By and large, “civil-military sectors” that socialize in the RPP’s tradition was not excluded from this effect (Bora & Tak1 n, 2001). In that sense, endeavour of this republican elite in order to subsitute regime with a conservartive one should be considered within dynamics of the ‘Right’ version of Kemalism-Sa¤

Kemalizm -. Because the indispensable factor of ‘Right’ Kemalism was actually the preaching of Kemalism as nationalism. At this point, the doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis enabled official Kemalismthe Right Kemalism to make more organic integration with national-conservative. Muharrem Ergin, in his book named as, Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleri, depicted nationalism, which played a dominant role in this integration as: “Nationalism was an essential principle of Ataturk’s doctrine that gathers all other principles around itsself. Ataturkism referred to the nationalism and its requirements. So, in Atataturk, nationalism is essential component and other principles complement to it” (Ergin, 1973: 320-321). Since 1960s the NAP and the NSP represented two mainstreams in the struggle of intensification of Turkishness and Islam of the right bloc defined as nationalistconservative. The NSP focused on an area where Islam was hegemonic ideology and the NAP focused on an arena where Turkishness was a basic category. The Intellectuals’ Hearth doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in its practical political meaning was an attemption to set up common point and bridge between the NAP and the NSP and official ideology or official synthesis which united with Right Kemalism (Sa¤ Kemalizm) or conservative republicanism or nationalist-conservatism. The reason why such a political imagination was presented as a “doctrin” is the fact that it obtained practical political validity and endorsement and last but not least became a basis for an ideological identity. Doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis could be evaluated as an eclectic and vulgar rheotic-discourse not an integrated theory. Its “Success” was based on the fact that authoritarian regime projection (Bora

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& Can, 1991: 138-143) presented by “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” constituted ideological baggage, support and legitimacy of September 12 government. At the beginning of September 12 1980 military intervention, it was evident that efforts of regime restoration was limited to high politics and cultural institutions and also Kemalism was not able to provide mass support and consistent successes. Escalation of political polarization in 1970s made Kemalism, which was lack of doctriner and programmatic content, ambigious, not cyristalized and presented as an empty framework, deprived of a possibility that made Kemalism as a power with its hegemonic codes until that time. As a matter of the fact, the military, as an entrenched defender and guardian of Bonapartist power haunt (Bora & Tak1 n, 2001: 529-545) the way in which 12 September regime forged and bare framework of “neutral” Kemalism, noticed of the fact that it was necessary to transform Kemalism to both doctriner and popular project. In this manner, since September 12 government needed anti-communist motivations of nationalist-conservative elites, they tried to made alliance with nationalist-conservative elites. 12 September leardership recognized that supports of republican conservatives who were ideologically close to September 12 leardership both in the fields of economics and culture for generating legitimacy and consent did not suffice. So, the “intellectuals” particularly around the Intellectuals’ Hearth, who were able to unite nationalist-conservative thematics and sensibilities with authoritarian-statist ferment and “spontenausly” (Copeaux, 1998) doctrinated rhetoric of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in cultural dimension of restoration policies, gained significance. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis enabled September 12 rule was to integrate Islam to the official ideology. As Tan1 l Bora and Kemal Can stated (1991), this situation facilitated association of official ideology alongside Islam by not doing this at the expense of depreciating or ignoring weight of Turkishness and Western elements. Name of doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis for the Intellectuals’ Hearth was preached as “Synthesis of Turkishness-Islam-West” (Bora & Can, 1991: 139). Inclusion of the West in Synthesis at the level of alliances between technology and economics, political and military made doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Syntehsis closer to projections of the NAP rather than the NSP. In brief, quintessences of the doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis carved out an endeavour to combine Turkishness and Islam in efforts with an authoritarian regime imagination on the axis of vulgar and eclectic discourse. This content of the Synthesis was presented and appealed as an unwritten constitution under the name of “National Compromises” and in essence it also generated central mentality and spirit of writtenofficial constitution (1982 Constitution). The bunch of suggestions, which consisted of

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an organic integration and overlapped with basic parameters of the regime was gathered under the title of “National Comprimises” in conjunction with 40 articles in the seminar of “ Ülkemizi 12 Eylül’e Getiren Sebebler ve Türkiye Üzerindeki Oyunlar-

The Causes that brought Our country to 12 September and The Games Over Turkey”, organized by the Intellectuals’ Hearth in 1984. In this seminar, approaches and suggestions of Turkology Professor Muharrem Ergin’s book Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri-Today’s Issues of Turkey” were summarized. Muharrem Ergin, who was the second president of the Hearth, heavily played a crucial role in determining daily political strategies of the Hearth since the establishment of National Front governments. The Synthesis of Turkishness-Islam- (West) as a political-ideological premise was first manifested itself in this declaration and it was specified that “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is unchanging core, on the other hand the West wing is subject to changing and developing dimension” (Bora & Can, 1991: 140-142). The most important problematique of “National Compromises” is the “continuinty of Turkey”. The importance of that was depicted within the classical anticommunist cold war rhetoric as “Four sides of Turkey were surrounded by enemies-

dört yan1 düflmanlarla çevrili Türkiye-” (Ergin, 1973: 74-76) by September 12 rule and high military officers. This “myth of threat” is in accordance with an understanding of racist-chauvenist “Turkishness” and in line with which of “national culture” almost presented as “engine of history” in an anti-communist context: “The most mature, the strongest, and the greatest one of human societies is nation. Culture and cultural factors solely give this characteristic to nation”. (Ergin, 1973: 19)

On the other hand, Turkish culture was one of the most valuable cultures in the world and came up with “formation of an ideal society that gave direction to world history.” (Ergin, 1973: 19). According to Muharrem Ergin, the reason for the “collapse” before September 12 was a failure of fulfilling requirements of being a national state, in other words failure of applying or realizing national culture policy. Ergin, who regarded September 12 as “an elusive opportunity” (Ergin, 1973: 211-213), viewed September 12 as path breaking in terms of making national culture predominant again and realizing second “Turkish renaisance” aftermath of Ataturk renaissance. However, for achieving this “Turkish renaissance” and solving all urgent problems, it was a condition to provide “political peace” as the most important problem after “continuance case-beka davas1 ”. According to Ergin, political peace in Turkey especially was broken afterwards Ataturk’s era and democracy period between 1938

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and 1945. For Ergin, the reason of this situation was “wrong democracy”. To him, democracy was carried out in a wrong way and at this point losing of hegemonic position of national culture had a strong place. According to Ergin’s understanding of democracy: “democracy means national will... national will refer to the national culture” (1973: 230). As it was seen, Ergin thorougly placed “national culture” in the focus of politics and he looked for practical political solution of every problem in this magical word that he made. From this perspective, for Ergin, it was rather appropriate that September 12 launced “drive of returning national culture”. Because, according to him, September 12 intervened “wrong democracy” and he defined it as: “Actually it took aim at “culture” of Pentagon more than “national culture” and it was a “sacred movement” by preventing a calamity”. Both intelengisia of the Intellectuals’ Hearth and publishing organs that were defenders of idealist movement -Ülkücü Hareket-in the period of September 12 such as Bak1 , Yeni Hamle, Yeni Düflünce, acted entirely in line with Middle East strategy of the U.S. Ergin contemplated and envisioned a nationalists-corporatist social model and regime that made the state sublime authority and that was without classes, doctrine, and

ideology

and

not

based on

right-left

polarization.

These

ideas

and

contemplatations of Ergin had an intimate nexus with explanations of Kenan Evren at the period of September 12 and in accordance with political regime of September 12. This intimate nexus tried to provide legitimacy for September 12 regime in the full sense of the word. Ergin believed in that, September 12 regime with its constitution “met a democracy necessity of Turkey for a centruy” (Ergin, 1973: 242). According to Ergin, “failure to provide supremacy of mind and science” (1973: 283) gave rise to economic instability, hampered political and social peace/order and harmed security of the country. This positivist diognasis of Ergin, as Tan 1 l Bora and Kemal Can (1991) marked, reflected the idea that in every field, authority and power ought to be left experts and technocrats who worked “neutrally” without being influenced political considerations. The principle of supremacy of mind and science preached that significant preferences, which had important social and political outcomes, should be considered as “out of politics”. This Westernization perception of Ergin, who defined it as “ taking technic and civilization in the light of mind and science” (1973: 325), and positivist standpoint mentioned above were important reference points of an ideology of the Intellectuals’ Hearth in the process of integration of it to Kemalizm. In this respect, another important reference point that is worthwhile to be explained here is that redefinition of Kemalism by embracing Ziya Gokalp’s differentiation between culture and civilization. Here, the Intellectuals’ Hearth in its “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” maintained Westernization-modernization mission of

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Kemalizm that was perceived as “positive science-müsbet ilimcilik”. This stance of the Intellectuals’ Hearth became cyrstillazed in “National Compromises”. According to Muharrem Ergin, there was a problem of “wrong democracy” just as there was a problem of “wrong Kemalism”. “Correct version of Kemalism” was depicted as “culture or scientific nationalism”, which explained social development and basis of humanity according to nation and national culture (1973: 310-312). At this point, it was argued that Ataturk transcended Ziya Gokalp who was the founding father of Turkish cultural nationalism and Gokalp’s culture-civilization distinction was applied; in other words: “These two notions were completely excluded each other, affluent interaction between civilization-culture and among cultures was ignored.” (Bora & Can, 1991: 144) The founding father of doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and of its history thesis that was based on this doctrine and the first president of the Intellectuals’ Hearth was Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Kafeso¤lu. Kafeso¤lu made a book this thesis of “synthesis” under the name of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (Ayd1 nlar Oca¤1 Yay1 n1 , Istanbul 1985). Actually, perspective of Kafeso¤lu in this book was not inherently different from his approach about the period of Romantic Turkism particulalry in terms of dealing with the issue of Islam. There is a contuinuty in his ideas in terms of conceving TurkishIslamic Synthesis as a stage of “ideal of Turk’s world sovereignty” (Tan 1 l Bora/Kemal Can, 1991:145). In this doctrine, Islam is not a categorical priority and transacendental idea; rather it is one of the elements of Turrkish culture and cultural nationalism. For that reason, national culture and patterns of cultural nationalism are superior to Islamic vein and prioritoze Islam. The existence of Islamic notion of national culture as a secondary factor became much more concerete in Kafeso¤lu’s book. The existence of Islam as a secondary component including national culture was materialized in Kafeso¤lu’s book. Kafeso¤lu tried to explain Islam as an amenable religion for monotheism of Turks. In that respect, he “easily” disclosed coalescence of Turks as an ethnicity with Muslims. Compatibility of the belief of “ Gök-Tanr1 ” with Islam was exaggeratedly presented in Kafeso¤lu’s book as: “Turk converged much more solid, book-learned and convincing system than their ancient beliefs” (1985: 159-164). In this way, admitting Turks to Islamism in a massive way, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis entered into the way of realization (Bora & Can, 1991: 145-146). These ideas articulated in Kafeso¤lu’s book together with considering Turkishness as primary

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premise by ascribing its jointed link with Islam, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis reached its channel. The framework of “ National Compromises-Milli Mutabakatlar” and doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis constituted footings of September 12’s policies towards Islam. The formula of Muharrem Ergin that he used in “ Today’s Issues of Turkey-

Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleeri” was a clear-cut summary of these policies: “Turkey will not be a religious country, but he will always stay devaout.” According to Ergin, religion as a peaceful establishment had an important place in social life and “Islam was very strong spiritual gun that protected Turkishness” (1973:199-207). Ergin thought that strengthening and organizing of religious sects in Turkey were important “obstacles for a modern community, which has to fulfill necessities of contemporary world” (1973: 199-207). In that case, functions that were expected from religion in Turkey ought to be realized through state intervention. (Ergin, 1973: 199-207). That kind of approach is in harmony with religion policy of Kemalism that aimed at controlling religion and creating a civic religion in accordance with laisicit policy that is peculiar to Kemalism. Indeed, religion policy was the most concrete area in which September 12 regime made use of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as an ideological apparatus of the state. In order to disseminate this ideology (to reproduce itself) the Intellectuals’ Hearth, by organizing a seminar under the title of “National Education and Religious Education” in 9-10 May 1981, put forward the view that “state has to give compulsory religious education and this situation does not contradict with compulsory religious education of secularism”. Nationalist intelengisia and most of the other intellectuals who were close to the NAP supported this stance of doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in terms of uniting it to the official ideology of September 12. Consequently, compulsory education in secondary schools was both stated in 1982 constitution and was enforced. Another remarkable development that enabled doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis integrate into the official ideology of September 12 and penetrate into all aspects of social life as an ideological apparatuse of the state (by producing its own consent mechanisms) is the fact that this doctrine was suggested in order to draw a framework of official culture policy by Supreme Institution of Ataturk Culture, Language and History. This event was a striking development in terms of acceptance of doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the eyes of military as a genuine protector-defender of official ideology. Doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis did not work well to realize its holy mission/purpose and its establishment ethos, which was based on synthesizing and embracing ideological expansions of the Turkish Right. It did not bring the Turkish Right to come into power. As stated at the beginning of this article, in terms of intensive

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ideological eclectisim, pragmatism and intrumentalism of the doctrine of TurkishIslamic Synthesis did prevent this situation. Doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was rather voluntarily accepted by nationalist intelengisia vis-à-vis Islamic intelengisia. This identification of nationalist intelengisia with Turkish-Islamic Synthesis has emerged out of ideological motives and strategic and clientalistic calculations in political sense. In terms of ideology, since doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was obviously depended upon priority of “Turkishness”, (Ortayl1 , 1988: 46-47) it became effective on nationalist intelengisia in terms of associating with Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Vulgar and ajitative discourse “Nationalist-conservative” of nationalist intelengisia in this doctrine, which was plastered with anti-communism, had the opportunity to refresh its “faith” and ritualize. In the period of 1983, this social segment, who tried to protect and reproduce its political identity by identfying itself with September 12 and acted together with the NAP’s staff in a consistent manner, welcomed organic nexus of doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis with official ideology as a development that apperantly confirmed the motto of “his idea is in power but he is in prison-fikri

iktidarda kendi zindanda” Concluding Remarks Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was established on 14 May 1970 for the purpose of “expanding national culture, national consciousness and Turkish nationalism” (Dursun, 2006) by rightist intellectuals and thinkers gathered around the Intellectuals’ Hearth. The Synthesis draws its ideological horizon by organizing the promise for protecting unity and integrity forever and for providing social order after the September 12 coup when extraordinary conditions existed. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as an official ideology of September 12 1980 military coup tried to become a hegemonic ideology having political, social and cultural codes in the process of restructring relationships between state and society. In this context, it functioned as an ideological apparatuse of the state. The real claim of this ideology is that the nexus between Turkishness and Muslim or Islam is a relation of harmony. According to this, Turkish nation obtained a privileged position with its vanguard role in the history of Islam’s diffusion and by embracing tevhid-unity principle; it gained the feature of being nationhood. According to the Synthesis, the ideal one is that all Muslims ought to have an understanding of being one ummet or nation in contemporary sense. At this point nationality bears great importance and Turkish nation was privileged as “en fazla rahmaniyete mazhar olmu- (emphasis U.

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K.)” (Ergin, 1973: 199-207) among Islamic nations. In fact, such a privileged position of the Turkish nation made it easier to integrate with different identity elements, which were based on ‘ummetcilik’. As a result, the imaginary bond between Muslim or Islam and Turkishness was reinforced in the ideology of Synthesis. Before 1980 military intervention, this ideological spatial that emphasized being a Turk was possible with being Muslim turned into a framework, which restructured social arena for “unity and integrity”, desired after September 12. This ideological spatial of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis came into scene for the purpose of perpetuating social and political status quo of the period that was too resilliant to change (Güvenç and et al., 1991). The interesting point that I want to argue here is that since the day of its establishment the House, as the most important thinking place for the Right that played a crucial role in terms of determining who came to power in Turkey and defended Turkish-Islamic Synthesis idea, is drawing a new route for itself nowadays. Although fulfilling an encompassing umberalla in the Right by maintaing Turkish-Islamic Synthesis idea and acting together with nationalist wing-Ulusalc1 lar-or Red Apple

Coaltion under the guidance of Kemalism and embracing nearly the same discourse of these two old disputed groups create surprising situation for the Intellectual’s Hearth and its ideology actually, this picture vindicates our explantions that I tried to put forward above by indicating the eclectic and volatile ground-basis of the ideology of the Intellectual’s Hearth. I would say that the new thing today is the fact that this ancient authoritarian and nationalist propensity (nationalist left, third world left, or Turkish left), which insists on defining itself as the left, became parallel with the conservative parameters of TurkishIslamic Synthesis. This nationalist left and natinonalist conservative convergence, which got realized under the shadow of the holy state, beloved nation and magnificent saviour, are being guided by Kemalism. This new synthesis is trying to rely on the golden age of Kemalism by increasing its religious-mystic dimension.

References Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. The Making of the Modern Turkey . London: Routledge. Althusser, Louis. deoloji ve Devletin ideolojik AygI tlarI . stanbul: thaki YayI nlarI . Bora, TanI l, Can, Kemal. 1991. Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh: 12 Eylül’den 1990’lara Ülkücü

Hareket. stanbul: letiflim YayI nlarI .

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Bora, TanI l, TaflkI n, Yüksel. 2001. “Sa¤ Kemalizm,” In Ahmet nsel (ed.), Modern

Türkiye'de Siyasi Düflünce: Kemalizm. Cilt 2, stanbul: letiflim YayI nlarI . Pp. 529545. Copeaux, Etienne. 1998. Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-slam Sentezine. stanbul: Tarih VakfI Yurt YayI nlarI . Dilipak, Abdurrahman. 1988. Türkiye Nereye Gidiyor? stanbul: Risale YayI nlarI . Dursun, Çiller. www.radikal.com.tr/ek_haber.php?ek=r2&haberno=5909 “Türk-slam Sentezi ideolojisinin failini tanI mak”. (Accessed on 28 MayI s 2006). Ergin, Muharrem. 1973. AydI nlar Oca¤I ’nI n Görüflü: Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri. stanbul: Garanti MatbaasI . Ergin, Muharrem. 1976. Milliyetçiler KorkmayI nI z Birlefliniz. Ankara: Ekonomik ve Sosyal YayI nlar. Güvenç, Bozkurt, Gencay, fiaylan Tekeli, fiaylan Turan, fierafettin. 1991. Türk-Islam

Sentezi. stanbul: Sarmal YayI nlarI . Gramsci, Antonio. 2005. “Power: a critical reader” In Daniel Egan, Levon A. Chorbajian (ed.), Hegemony, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. Kafesolu, brahim. 1985. Türk- slam Sentezi. stanbul: AydI nlar Oca¤I yayI nI . Köker, Levent. 1990. Modernleflme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi. stanbul: letiflim YayI nlarI . OrtaylI , lber. 1988. “Türk slam Sentezinde BatI lI Olan Nedir?” Mülkiyeliler Birli¤i Derne¤i: 46-47. Parla, Taha. 1986. “Dinci Milliyetçilik”. Yeni Gündem: 40-41. Poulantzas, Nicos. 2004. Faflizm ve Diktatörlük. stanbul: letiflim YayI nlarI .

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-3 (2), 2010

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Justice, Human Rights, and the Quasi-Civil Society in a Muslim Context

Hakan Yeflilova*

Abstract

Frequently misunderstood and portrayed negatively in the media, Islam and history of Muslims are not duly appreciated in our times. Islam’s stance to science, rational thinking, and free thought are more often than not disregarded extensively, if not completely. Efforts to develop a globally valid “human rights” project have produced many useful documents and conventions in the twentieth century; however in many ways Islam’s holistic worldview and prescriptions to “why”s and “how”s regarding human existence are not reflected in these documents. This paper aims to present evidence from Islamic code of ethics and justice with an emphasis on universal human rights and to discuss the ulama’s influence on the protection of human rights in the history of Islamic civilization. I prefer to call ulama “quasi-civil society,” for “civil society” as understood today does not have a fully matching counterpart in premodern times, and ulama seems to be the closest instrument balancing the state’s authority. I briefly touch on the guilds, which can also be considered as another quasicivil society, during the Ottoman times, as well. Keywords: Justice, Human Rights, Islam, Ulama, Civil Society, Quasi-Civil

Society, Dharuriyat

*

Fatih University. [email protected]

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Introduction Social science covers a wide range of scholarly domain which constantly evolves. Concepts of the past are subject to be replaced with new ones and new vocabulary is adopted to fill the vacuum. Meanings are not fixed or static; they differ depending on time and place, culture and society. “Civil society” is such a concept and its emergence dates back to a relatively recent era; thus it would not be an overstatement to claim that its meaning and frame of reference still continue to be processed for a better definition. Likewise, “human rights,” is purported as if a rather new concept like civil society, and as if it has reached its perfection in the West in the modern times. Some even claim “that most non-Western cultural and political traditions lack not only the practice of human rights but the very concept. As a matter of historical fact, the concept of human rights is an artifact of modern Western civilization” (Donnelly 1982, 303). “Justice,” on the other hand, is generally considered to date as far back as the birth of human history, and, be it by either Christians or Muslims, justice is recognized “as one of the defining characteristics of God,” thus believers sought it to fulfill the mandate that have been laid on them as their obligations “toward God and toward the other.” So, there seems to be a clash between the so-called duties brought down by “justice” and the supposedly liberating “human rights” the latter of which “appears to embody and presuppose a principle of human autonomy and assertiveness that may fit uncomfortably with a traditional religious orientation” (Ipgrave 2009, ix). The human rights side of the clash stands for the secular worldview in a way to claim rights from God to be emancipated from the divine yoke imposed by religions, which are thought to be teaching us nothing but duties. Reading justice and human rights from the above-mentioned dichotomical conflictual framework does not reflect the perspective adopted in this paper. It is true that it was a different world before the second half of the twentieth century in terms of human rights; but this does not mean there was no sense of rights before either. What we call “rights” today had its meaning reflected in “necessities” (dharuriyat, as will be discussed later in the paper); while it is thought that we claim our rights today, they were granted, so to speak, in the doctrine before. I argue here that however the origins and motivations were different from today, human rights were an important aspect of human life in the past, at least as far as Muslim societies were concerned, expressed quite clearly in the essential doctrine and extensively implemented in real life. Islamic law governs all spheres of a Muslim’s life; thus it is not a faith confined within the walls of a mosque only, it is a way of living, culture. Having said that, notwithstanding many onthe-spot clear-cut judgments expounding every detail of a matter (tafsili), the universal principles of Islam, especially the Qur’anic injunctions, address the human condition in a

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concise (ijmali) way, leaving a vast space for believers in general and jurists in particular to engage in intellectual activity and reasoning (ijtihad) and to produce legal judgments in line with the zeitgeist.1 Comparison of what took place in premodern times in an Islamic context with the legal judgments pertaining to human rights today, or comparing a Qur’anic injunction that explains consequences that will be revealed in the afterlife with the modern perception of civil rights or penal code is at best an anachronistic effort, and at worst a cosmic flaw, mixing two different things. Additionally, referring to certain figures of the past and some marginal schools of thought that are brought to the agenda more frequently than the mainstream interpretations fails to give a full account of Islam’s perception of rights.2 A fair approach to religion—Islam in this case—from a non-religious perspective that has “human rights” in its axis would be to analyze whether the given essentials speak of our human condition in a way that is compatible with the definition of rights as formulated today, and whether these essentials approve—or do not disapprove—these rights. Philosophy of Rights There are two perspectives on the ground through which history and philosophy of rights are discussed: 1) Euro-centric evolutionist and 2) Universal.3 According to the first view, past civilizations were the childhood stage of humankind which attained maturity in the Western world whose roots go as far back as ancient Greek philosophy. For the supporters of this view, human rights were defined best in the West and yielded its fruits in modern times, whereas the rest of the world has never been truly familiar with such a term. Nevertheless, although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed in 1948, since then many countries, or coalition of countries, signed subsequent conventions. This is evidence in a sense that documents developed in the West do not always guarantee a full-coverage of rights for all human beings and societies in other parts of the world. The supporters of the second view approach from a rather eclectic perspective in which they emphasize commonalities among human beings, thus human rights conventions of respective communities should be benefited from.

1

On the nature of Islamic law covering all spheres of life as a culture and the role of ijtihad, see Yilmaz 2005:192. Vincent J. Cornell’s paper “Religious Orthodoxy and Religious Rights in Medieval Islam: A Reality Check on the Road to Religious Toleration,” is an example of this approach. Cornell focuses on some examples like ibn Taymiyya’s comments on dhimmis and some salafi exponents today to the point of undermining many virtuous principles embraced and exemplified by an overwhelming majority of Muslims. 3 For a broader discussion on these two perspectives, see fientürk 2006, pp. 109–110. 2

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In this paper, I would like to present how human rights have been formulated in the Islamic experience. I will lay down evidence from the main sources of Islam, i.e., the Qur’an and hadith (the practice of the Prophet, peace be upon him). By this, I aim to show that Islam does not assume a reductionist approach to the cosmos; it engages both with the material as well as the spiritual dimensions of existence. I will bring examples from the history of Muslim societies to reflect how theory was implemented in practice, not least in terms of human rights vis-à-vis state-society relationship. Various Muslim social formations, which I call quasi-civil society, play a significant role in the perception and protection of human rights in relation to the state apparatus. Among these formations I will also touch on the ulama experience of past Muslim societies in their role as a leading component of this quasi-civil society. Pre-Historic Roots of Human Rights Human rights emerged as a question perhaps first time when Abel was murdered by Cain.4 We do not know how Cain was punished by his family (the one and only form of social unit then), for this event is pre-historic and we do not have any information other than the stories mentioned in the Qur’an (Maidah 5:27–31) and the Bible (Genesis 4, 1–9). What makes this story very significant and directly relevant to this paper is that the brief Qur’anic account of this murder is followed by the injunction of the most basic human right, i.e., right to life. Not only did this murder mark the beginning of an evil tradition; but it was also instrumental, at least in the Qur’an, in establishing a legal rule that was also recognized and endorsed globally only as late as twentieth century through a number of human rights declarations and conventions: He who kills a soul unless it be (in legal punishment) for murder or for causing disorder and corruption on the earth will be as if he had killed all humankind; and he who saves a life will be as if he had saved the lives of all humankind. Assuredly, there came to them Our Messengers (one after the other) with clear proofs of the truth. Then (in spite of all this), many of them go on committing excesses on the earth. (Maidah 5:32)

As far as essentials are concerned, the basic needs, potentials, and desires are almost the same for all human beings. We breathe air, sleep, consume food; we grow, get old and die, leading a life competing or cooperating with others for similar, almost identical ambitions. Jails of the twenty-first century are full of murderers who were tempted to kill, just like Cain’s defeat against his carnal soul, for similar reasons: 4

These names are mentioned in the Bible. There is no name mentioned in the Qur’anic account.

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jealousy, revenge, hatred, etc. Thus, if humankind continues to preserve similar faculties, ambitions, and virtues, which is naturally the case, then human rights have always been a natural component of human existence throughout history and regardless of time and place. Yet if you stretch out your hand against me to kill me, I will not stretch out my hand against you to kill you. Surely I fear God, the Lord of the worlds. (Maidah 5:28)

Abel’s decision not to fight back to kill is a proof that even the first generation of humankind were aware of what is right and what is wrong. Nevertheless, if human beings were to remain faithful to the law, there wouldn’t be any need for thousands of messengers to come generations after generations and the mission would have been fulfilled with Adam. As the hadith goes, “Adam forgot, so did his children.” The world would not be a secure place of residence, if evil acts in the form of all sorts of crime were left without response and the criminals did away with. Then, the question is: how are we going to respond to a crime? Who is the referee whether there is a crime or not? Who will decide on the punishment? What is a crime? What is a right and when is it violated? What are duties? Is a full compensation of a violation possible? How is a dead person compensated for his murder? How was Abel compensated? The number of such questions can go up as many as we can think of, and they in fact explain why there is a need for a law to establish justice. Rights and Justice It is indeed very difficult to single out a period in history in which all members of the human family without exception were happy with the state of affairs. “What is happening” might not always correspond to “what should be.” There have always been efforts to frame the latter of this duality by devising various formulations of law and the law is expected to serve “justice” which is the ultimate aim of a legal system. Thus, the efficiency of a legal system can be measured by the level of justice it guarantees. Justice, on the other hand, is possible when rights and duties are clearly defined for a society. Contemporary political scientists discuss “rights” in three categories: 1) human (natural) rights, 2) civil rights, 3) economic rights. By nature, human beings can discern instantly, unless completely out of his or her mind, that it is wrong to kill innocent people. Life is a natural right, so, unless there is a good cause, it cannot be violated. Human beings are “free from” all sorts of tyranny and violation because of their natural

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human rights. Civil rights, which are rather a newly adopted set of rights, are more relevant with modern democracy. Although some of them overlap with human rights, they are less self-evident. They define freedoms to speak and vote and cover issues like press freedom or set up an opposition right. Economic rights, however, is perceived more with a socialist construct and refer to demands for a job, education, and an adequate life. “Human rights” have come to be perceived as rather exclusively linked to international human rights law in our times. This was mainly an outcome of the transformation of the state in the West to a more liberal, secular, and democratic form starting from the eighteenth through twentieth centuries. Added to that, the entire world had to pay high toll both in terms of life and economy in the two, but especially in the latter, world wars; so, not to suffer from this tragedy another time it was felt necessary to arouse a global human rights consciousness. Nevertheless, a true human rights consciousness can be established only if non-western value systems are also taken seriously into consideration. According to Jeremy Bentham “right is the child of law,” meaning that a right is a right in the true sense of the word when it is mentioned in a constitution or statutes. This is the reason each state has a set of rules and there are declarations of human rights signed by countries. Nevertheless, the world is not comprised of one nation or family. Each country or group of countries has their own cultural, religious, or philosophical heritage which is reflected either very openly in their scripts of law or is carefully woven into the text in between the lines. This differentiation is not only in legal issues; the cleavage between different societies might be as far deep as to include variations in the perception of the world, human life, and the overall meaning of our existence. As a response to this perception, almost every national, regional, or cultural groupings of countries have produced their own human rights declarations. Then, how is it possible to establish a peaceful way of relationship between different nations of the world? fientürk argues that it can be possible by approaching the law at two levels: In my view, law operates at two levels, universal and communal. Both levels have conceptual and sociological dimensions. The former is characterized by uniformity while the latter is characterized by diversity. In other words, there are certain principles on which there is universal consensus while certain issues vary from culture to culture (fientürk 2005, 2).

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Despite variations in worldviews, there are many dynamics inherent in the nature of humankind which can set the common denominator for peoples of the world to agree. Otherwise, it will not be possible for the global society to reach a “consensus on the rules of exchange, such as reciprocity, for international trade, sports, law and politics” (fientürk 2005, 2). In a globalized world, political borders have almost remained as symbolic thanks to phenomenal influx of new communications technologies and transportation facilities. Concept of “nation” has transformed from a chauvinistic framework to be more inclusive of differences in language, color, religion; thus, there is a need for axiomatic principles (müsellemat in Islamic legal terms) of law that can define the rights and duties of the global society in their mutual relations. Islam is a religion of scripture and Muslims boast of unchanged script of the Qur’an which has been preserved as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. Along with the Qur’an, the hadith is an advanced branch of scholarship that has meticulously recorded and analyzed the practice and sayings of the Prophet, producing a vast source of reliable reference for Muslims. Based on these two firm foundations, Muslims have been able to formulate a universal philosophy of human rights. Islamic Universality and Justice Islam claims universality from its onset. Islam is the perfected form of one universal belief that has been revealed to humanity through messengers whose sole mission were to guide their respective communities; this is the point where the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, differs from previous messengers. He did not come for Arabs only, but to all nations: We have not sent you (O Muhammad) but as an unequalled mercy for all the worlds. (Al-Anbiya 21:107) Say (O Messenger to all humankind): “O humankind! Surely I am to you all the Messenger of God …” (Al-A’raf 7:158)

The demographic profile of Muslims reveals that Arabs comprise only twenty percent of the ummah which is spread across a vast span of the world (Esposito 2002, 2). Islamic universality is emphasized in all aspects of its message, not least with the following verse which resonates with contemporary perceptions of global society: O humankind! Surely We have created you from a single (pair of) male and female, and made you into tribes and families so that you may know one another (and so build mutuality and co-operative relationships, not so that you may take

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pride in your differences of race or social rank, or breed enmities). Surely the noblest, most honorable of you in God's sight is the one best in piety, righteousness, and reverence for God. Surely God is All-Knowing, All-Aware. (AlHujurat 49:13)

This diversity in cultures, religions, and tribes is indeed retold in the Qur’an as evidence to God’s existence and one of the manifestations of His will and signs of creation: And among His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the diversity of your languages and colors. Surely in this are signs indeed for people who have knowledge (of the facts in creation, and who are free of prejudices). (ArRum 30:22)

The universality of a message is proportional to the level of justice it purports for all humanity. Justice is one of the four pillars of the Qur’anic message which are: 1. Tawhid. Demonstrating God’s existence and unity 2. Prophethood 3. Proving and elucidating afterlife with all its aspects and dimensions 4. Promulgating the worship of God and the essentials of justice (Ünal 2008, xvi–xvii).5 This concise summary regarding the purpose of the Qur’an is interesting in the sense that worship is considered together with justice. Justice in Islam does not only cover issues that are confined to this world and human relationships whose consequences are dealt with in this worldly lifetime. While there are some legal sanctions in countries which applies shariah, fulfilling religious duties and other human’s responsibilities toward God (huququllah) or failure to do them will be rewarded or punished in the Hereafter. The story of Salman al-Farisi and Abu adDarda is exemplary about God’s rights over humanity: Narrated by Abu Juhaifa: The Prophet established a bond of brotherhood between Salman and Abu ad-Darda’. Salman paid a visit to Abu ad-Darda and found Um Ad-Darda’ dressed in shabby clothes and asked her why she was in that state.? She replied, “Your brother, Abu ad-Darda’ is not interested in the luxuries of this world.” In the meantime Abu ad-Darda came and prepared a meal for him 5

See also Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, flaratü’l–’caz, Istanbul: fiahdamar Yay1 nlar1, 2007, p. 9.

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(Salman), and said to him, “(Please) eat for I am fasting.” Salman said, “I am not going to eat, unless you eat.” So Abu ad-Darda’ ate. When it was night, Abu adDarda’ got up (for the night prayer). Salman said (to him), “Sleep,” and he slept. Again Abu-ad-Darda’ got up (for the prayer), and Salman said (to him), “Sleep.” When it was the last part of the night, Salman said to him, “Get up now (for the prayer).” So both of them offered their prayers and Salman said to Abu ad-Darda’, “Your Lord has a right on you; and your soul has a right on you; and your family has a right on you; so you should give the rights of all those who have a right on you. Later on Abu ad-Darda’ visited the Prophet and mentioned that to him. The Prophet, said, “Salman has spoken the truth.” 6

Islamic worldview assumes the purpose of law to provide guidelines for humankind so that they are able to recognize their reason for existence, to pursue a life in accordance with the divine will of the Creator, to make this divine will rule over their selves (nafs)—for their selves are created with a potential to incline both to right and wrong7—in order to attain God’s good pleasure and to qualify in this world of trials where opportunities for goodness and risks of error exist at the same time.8 Higher objectives of Islamic law (maqasid al-shariah) set the legal dimension of Islam into three main tangible categories: 1) Daruriyyah 2) Hajiyyah 3) Tahsiniyyah. Daruriyyah deals with unavoidable necessities, while Hajiyyah covers general needs and Tahsiniyyah is about conditions to lead a decent life. Among these, the first one Daruriyyah is more directly relevant to the inalienable rights of all human beings. It overlaps with the natural rights concept in the West in the sense that Daruriyyah emphasizes five essential rights to be “free from” any kind of violation: 1) Protection of life (nafs), 2) Protection of religion (din), 3) protection of family (nasl), 4) protection of reason (aql), or freedom of speech, 5) protection of property (mal). Definition of rights are in fact based on the overall worldview of a society. What is human? What are they supposed to do in this world? What is life about? Answers given to such questions provide the starting point and main guidelines for understanding of human rights in a given society. Many Qur’anic verses and records from the sayings of the Prophet give clear answers to these questions. According to Islam, humans are superior because they are human:

6

Bukhari, Adab, 86, Sawm 51, Tahajjud 15; Tirmidhi, Zuhd, 64. See also Abu Dawud, Salat, 317. “And the human selfhood and that (All-Knowing, All-Powerful, and All-Wise One) Who has formed it to perfection, and Who has inspired it with the conscience of what is wrong and bad for it, and what is right and good for it” (Qur’an, Shams 91:7–8). 8 “And We have shown him the right way, whether he be grateful (and follow this way) or ungrateful (and follow the way opposed to the right one)” (Qur’an, Insan 76:3). 7

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We have honored the children of Adam. (Isra 17:70) Surely We have created human of the best stature, as the perfect pattern of creation. (Tin 95:4) Humans are honorable, thus they are blessed with inalienable rights: Each human being is the worth of an entire human family: Killing one person unjustly is like slaughtering the whole of humanity; saving one of them is like saving all humanity (Maidah 5:32) Harming oneself or committing suicide is also forbidden (Nisa 4:29)

Human rights are also mentioned extensively in the famous Farewell Sermon of the Prophet9: • Inalienable rights: “Your life, property, and chastity (honor) are sacred and inviolable to each other. • Economy: Injustice caused by interest-usury is abolished • Vendetta: Blood-feud is abolished • Women: “Just like you have rights over your women, they also have rights over you. Do treat your women well and be kind to them.” • Rights of one’s soul and other needs: “Do not commit injustice to yourselves (nafs), your selves have rights over you too.” • Equality: “Your Lord is one, and your father is one; all of you are of Adam, and Adam was of soil. An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab—except by piety and good action.” (In another hadith, it is reported: “You will obey your ruler, even if he is a black Ethiopian slave”10)

Another example of Islam’s universal nature is found in the letter Ali the fourth Caliph wrote to the governor he assigned to Egypt. Ali warns his governor, saying “There you are going to meet two kinds of people: brothers and sisters in faith, and your equals in humanity.” In Islam, the entire universe, that is to say, everything other than God Himself, is a manifestation of His Beautiful names and attributes. From this perspective, all conceptualizations about human rights are in a sense derivations from one of the divine names al-Haqq, which denotes “right” while literally referring to a wide frame of connotations including the Ultimate Truth, true faith, true knowledge, etc. 11 Mentioned 247 times in the Qur’an, the plural form of this word is huquq, which has been used to correspond “justice” since the early decades of Islam. In Islamic terminology, all rights originate from God’s will and are each a blessing entrusted 9

See, The Farewell Sermon of the Prophet Muhammad, New Jersey: The Light, Inc., 2004. Muslim, Imara, 37. 11 For a broader discussion on this term, see fientürk 2002, 8. 10

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involuntarily and as a sign of His grace (cebri-lutfi) to humanity. Rights, therefore, are granted to every human in their creation and they cannot purchased or traded, reduced or increased, or exchanged; they cannot be transferred to the discretion of the sovereign nor can they ever be used as a commodity (Yeni Ümit 2004, 2–7). Al-Adl is another divine name regarding Islamic vision for justice. Meaning All-Just, this divine name is considered to be one of the names of God having all-comprehensive manifestations (ism-i azam) (Nursi 2008, 472) and it does not refer only to legal affairs between humanity, but rather to all forms of balance and justice in the universe. It is best interpreted together with “mizan” which means balance, measure, and order that govern all the activities in the universe. Mizan is used repeatedly in the Qur’an, but especially in chapter Rahman; Rahman is an attribute of God, meaning “All-Merciful”: And the heaven He has made it high, and He has set up the balance; so you must not go beyond (the limits with respect to) the balance; and observe the balance with full equity, and do not fall short in it. (Rahman 55:7–9)12

From a true Islamic perspective, all sorts of rights pertaining to humanity as well as the rest of creation can only be truly appreciated in relation to the parameters God Almighty enjoined through religion. Principles drawn from religion cover both legal and moral rights with equal importance, and sanctions can be due both in this world and hereafter. For instance, the following hadith describes a set of moral rights Muslims are expected to observe in their relations: Every Muslim has five rights over every other Muslim: the right to a reply, should he greet him; an acceptance, should he invite him; a visit, should he fall ill; a prayer, should he sneeze; a presence at his funeral, should he die. (Mazrui 2005, 26)

The universalistic school of jurisprudence, which is represented by Abu Hanifa, assumes these rights to be valid for all human beings. “I am therefore I have rights” (entürk 2005, 1) philosophy governs in this context. Drawing on from the discussion above, this aphorism-like motto can also be rephrased as “There is God, therefore there is justice” from the Islamic worldview in which God is believed to be actively present since time-eternal, constantly creating and administering all affairs, and everything is in fact the manifestations of His names and attributes.

12

Nursi’s treatise on the name All-Just gives an extensive interpretation of this name in relation to mizan concept in chapter Rahman. See Nursi 2008, 432–435.

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The universalistic philosophy differs from the communalistic philosophy, which is represented by Imam Shafii and other imams of the Islamic schools of jurisprudence, in its interpretation of human rights. The communalistic school approach rights more from a state-citizen perspective. Thus, rights are granted by the state to its subjects and services are provided in exchange of taxes. While on the other hand, the universalistic school assumes the Daruriyat al-hamsa to be valid for all humans, regardless of citizenship; they are God-given and cannot be traded for. This difference in their perspectives shapes the nature of politics an Islamic state should adopt. From the universalistic perspective, an Islamic state has to intervene human rights violations even outside its borders, perhaps without further legal enforcement; however, according to communalistic school, intervention or protection arise from a contract between the state and its citizens; when there is no such a contractual relationship, the state does not intervene outside its borders, for they have no power of enforcement. Similarly, while the communalistic school offer protection for the minorities in an Islamic state in return for the jizya, the capitation tax, whereas the universalistic school assumes responsibility to protect them even without taxes paid, for all human beings are entitled for protection as a birth-right. The Charter of Medina While justice is frequently emphasized in the overall Islamic message, there are other concepts like ihsan (goodness, excellence), mercy ( rahma), forgiveness. The Arabic word for the society is ummah, which is derived from Umm, meaning “mother.” “Mother” is distinguished with her mercy towards the child. Rahma (mercy) also comes from “rahim” which means the womb. Thus it can be argued that an ideal society in Islam is the one in which values like mercy, forgiveness and goodness dominate in all levels of human relations. The Charter of Medina is a good example of how Islam recognizes differences and respects rights arising thereof. This charter provides an interesting field of research especially in our time where it has been clearly seen that it is not possible to define other communities with a uniform set of regulations developed according to a set of paradigms that originate from one particular culture. This might result in self-alienation and intellectual dependence on other cultures.13 The Medina Charter, which is considered by some scholars as one of the first human rights conventions in human history, lays down legal principles in order to fairly administer a society that comprised of diverse communities. Early seventh century 13

For more discussion on “self-alienation” see Introduction in Recep entürk. Ibn Haldun: Güncel Okumalar (Ibd Khaldun: Contemporary Readings), Istanbul: z Yay1nc 1l1 k, 2009.

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Medina (then Yathrib) was a chaotic city with a severely damaged social structure due to endless warfare between various tribes. The importance of this Charter is that these tribes legally recognized the existence of other tribes and agreed with their claim for certain rights. When this Charter was signed Muslims were only 15 percent of the entire population of the city (1,000), whereas Jewish and polytheist Arabs were the majority. Thus, non-Muslims were not considered under dhimmi status; all parties to this Charter participated in equal terms. Each tribe was distinctly mentioned in order to give them the opportunity to be represented in the charter and to voice their conditions; “participation” rather than “domination” marked the nature of this agreement. As agreed upon in this charter, Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, was chosen as the higher seat of rule, for warring tribes did not trust one another and the Prophet was notable for his justice. Another importance of this charter was its emphasis on multiple legal systems. In a pluralistic society as in Medina, several private laws were stipulated in this contract. Thus, it is understood that Islamic law was binding only upon Muslims, while non-Muslims were bound by their own religious legal systems.14 Quasi-Civil Society in the Muslim Context According to The Federalist Papers, No 51, written by James Madison in 1788, the purpose of civil society is justice (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 316). What kind of conceptualization Madison had in mind back in the eighteenth century regarding civil society, we cannot be certain in absolute terms, for the term civil society has been defined in a variety of ways. Civil society is more commonly used to describe institutions that are “private” in that they are independent from government and organized by individuals in pursuit of their ends. It, therefore, refers to “a realm of autonomous groups and associations, including businesses, interest groups, clubs, families, and so on” (Heywood 1997, 8). Certain attitudes, like “tolerance of differences in opinions and behaviors, willingness to cooperate with others, propensity to negotiate in order to approach consensus and to avoid violence in the resolution of differences, and a sense of shared identity with others,” are centrally associated with the existence of civil society. An effective community and democracy is not possible, even though a society can still be considered developed, without a civil society (Danziger 2003, 245–6). So, these autonomous groups “mediate between private and public life.”

14

For more information on the Charter of Medina, see Ali Bulaç, 2006, 85–106.

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Civil society, for some other scholars, is largely identical with constitutional democracy, thus all of these mediating institutions preserve a balance of power between the ruling class and ordinary citizens (Kelsay 2002, 3). For an efficient enforcement of human rights, the existence of a middle class and civil society which are “educated about and committed to human rights is a prerequisite”: Even if human rights exist in a culture on the conceptual level, if there is no civil society to vigilantly defend them for all, they will be violated by the governments on the ground. In countries where there is no middle class, we cannot expect human rights to be implemented in a continuous manner because there will be no deterrent and punishment if the state violates them. (fientürk 2005, 6)

The ulama circle within the Islamic community seems to be the closest analogy to civil society. In Kelsay’s words: Through the associated institutions of the masjid (mosque, place of communal gathering), the madrasa (religious school), and eventually the jami’a (university), the ulama established a kind of sphere of influence, politically relevant but not quite “governmental,” that limited the power of government officials. (fientürk 2005, 10)

The power of the ulama rested mainly in their knowledge, not in their political expertise. Although the caliphs were the political leader and they also assumed religious authority, they could not compete with the ulama in matters related with the presumption of legitimacy in knowing the sources of Islam. Even at times, when the caliph willed to intervene with the scholarly field, they were refuted back, as in the case of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who was noteworthy for his insistence on financial independence from the government. When Caliph al-Ma’mun wanted to test scholars with the question whether the Qur’an was created or not, Imam Hanbal argued that alMa’mun went the beyond the rights of a Muslim ruler (fientürk 2005, 11). Imam had sensed the intention of the Caliph to regulate the influence of the ulama by imposing on them to answer his question the way he wants them to. Imam Malik’s refusal of the Abbasid Caliph al-Ma’mun to make his book alMuwatta the only book of legislation is also very significant in the sense that he did not

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want to prevent free-thinking by declaring his legal principles as the only overarching corpus of law.15 Especially in the eleventh century, when the Islamic state was ruled by Turkish military elite, who were in fact alien to the local community in Baghdad, and there were constant political upheaval, the ulama were the sole civilian elite capable of bridging the gap between the indigenous population and the administration. The ulama, then, enjoyed an autonomous role in the public sphere. The political rulers did not intervene in the qadi’s court except in matters relating to public order, even though qadi was very much dependent upon the rulers for his employment. Al-Ghazzali explains in detail why the ulama have to abstain from any connections with officials. Al-Ghazzali himself was a personal example when he resigned from his prestigious teaching position in the Nizamiya Madrasa of Baghdad (Ephrat 2000, 125–135). The authority of the ulama was maintained in the Ottomans as well. Halil Inalc1 k notes that “according to Muslim theory political authority was merely a means for the application of the fleriat : The state is subordinate to religion. For this reason the ulema class regarded the secular authority as its subordinate and strove to put this theory in practice” (Inalcik 2000, 171). Along with the ulama, another form of quasi-civil organization were craft guilds. Although the origins of guild organizations date back to pre-Islamic periods, they emerged with somewhat unique form and nature in the Islamic civilization. Inspired by Sufi orders and futuwwa ethics, guilds performed a number of public functions and became a political force in the cities. They acted independently in many ways and always resisted government interference in the election of kethüda, the most important member of the Ottoman guilds who represented it to the outside world. They rejected

kethüdas whom the governor or qadi wished to impose on them. So, the central government recognized the autonomy of the guilds and qadis registered as independent once their ketküda is elected. Like the trade unions of modern times, guilds discussed and decided on fixing prices and quality among themselves and negotiated with the representatives of the government, who “intervened mainly to ensure tax revenues from this source” (Inalcik 2000, 150–153). Conclusion “Human rights” is an essential field of study which necessitates a holistic approach. Human beings are not comprised of a biological form only; moral faculties make up a significant part of human nature (fitrat). They have needs and desires that 15

TDV slam Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 27.

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have extensively been the same since the first human. While they have many similarities in these needs and desires, they also differ from one another in terms of culture, language, color, etc. Although many Muslim societies, which are under the yoke of authoritarian regimes, are unable to represent many universal values they are normally obliged to observe by their faith, Islam offers many useful contributions both in theory and practice to the human rights efforts at the global level. This potential seems to be latent presently, but it was realized throughout long centuries in the past. Islam offers a philosophy in which the rich is enjoined to pay zakat from his wealth, not as a favor for the poor, but in order to redeem their natural right. It offers social structures like shura and biat which are the principles that define what we call political participation today. It urges the society to keep vigil against the violation of their rights, while ordering them to take care of their neighbors. An ideal Islamic administration honors justice over anything else with the consciousness of the hadith, just like the Ottomans who raised the Tower of Justice as the tallest building in the Topkap1 Palace in Istanbul and hung on its entrance this hadith of the Prophet: “Observing justice for one hour is more rewarding than eight-years of worship.” Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights which was declared by the Islamic Council of Europe (est. 1973 by Salem Azzam) in 1981 and The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam adopted by the Organization of Islamic Conference in 1990 were significant attempts which were developed mainly from Islam’s universal teachings. Most of the clauses adopted in the conventions overlap with UN Human Rights Declaration in many issues like free association, political participation, family, etc., and they are useful contributions to the efforts devoted for defining human rights in a way that can be acceptable by all peoples in the world. With these declarations the Muslim world engages with the human rights project which it was not fully involved in the beginning. and they present the potential for a distinctively Islamic perspective on human rights seeking to apply global values which Islam already embraces inherently. An unprejudiced approach to the rich heritage produced across the globe could help us work out an ideal formulation of human rights that can reflect both universal and communal dimensions of human nature. References Bulaç, Ali. 2006. “Medine VesikasI nda Dinler ve Topluluklar ArasI Diyalog” (Dialogue among Religions and Communities in the Charter of Medina) in Diyalo¤un Dini

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ve Tarihi Temelleri (Religious and Historical Foundations of Dialogue), stanbul: Yeni Ümit KitaplI I . Cornell, Vincent J. 2009. “Religious Orthodoxy and Religious Rights in Medieval Islam: A Reality Check on the Road to Religious Toleration,” in Justice and Rights: Christian and Muslim Perspectives, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Danziger, James N. 2003. Understanding the Political World: A Comparative Approach

to Political Science , Longman. Donnelly, Jack. 1982. “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytical Critique of NonWestern Conceptions of Human Rights” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 2, 303–316. Dreisbach, Daniel L. and Mark David Hall. 2009. The Sacred Rights of Conscience: Selected Readings on Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations in the

American Founding, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Ephrat, Daphna. 2000. A Learned Society in a Period of Transition: The Sunni ‘Ulama’ of

Eleventh-Century Baghdad, New York: Suny. Esposito, John L. 2002. What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam . New York: OUP. “Hak Kelimesi ve Ötesi” (Al-Haqq and Beyond). 2004. Yeni Ümit , No. 63. Heywood, Andrew. 1997. Politics. New York: Palgrave. Hunter, Shireen T. and Humma Malik (editors). 2005. Islam and Human Rights:

Advancing a US-Muslim Dialogue . Washington D.C.: Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS), Significant Issues series. Inalcik, Halil. 2000. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600. London: Phoenix Press. Ipgrave, Michael (edited by). 2009. Justice and Rights: Christian and Muslim

Perspectives. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Kelsay, John. 2002. “Civil Society and Government in Islam,” in Sohail H. Hashmi (edited by), Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism, and Conflict , New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Mazrui, Shaykh Al-Amin Ali. 2005. (translated by Hamza Yusuf). The Content of Character, USA: Sandala LLC. Nursi, Bediüzzaman Said. 2007. flaratü’l–’caz, Istanbul: fiahdamar Yay1 nlar1 .

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——. 2008. The Gleams: Reflections on Qur’anic Wisdom and Spirituality, New Jersey: The Light, Inc. entürk, Recep. 2002. “Adamiyyah and ‘Ismah: The Contested Relationship between Humanity and Human Rights in Classical Islamic Law.” slam Araflt1 rmalar1

Dergisi. ——. 2005. “Sociology of Rights: ‘I Am Therefore I Have Rights’: Human Rights in Islam between Universalistic and Communalistic Perspectives.” Muslim World Journal

of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 1, Article 11. ——. 2006. nsan Haklar1 ve slam: Sosyolojik ve F1 khi Yaklafl1 mlar, Istanbul: Etkileflim. ——. 2009. Ibn Haldun: Güncel Okumalar (Ibd Khaldun: Contemporary Readings), Istanbul: z Yay1 nc1 l1 k.

The Farewell Sermon of the Prophet Muhammad. 2004. New Jersey: The Light, Inc. TDV  slam Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 27. Ünal, Ali. 2008. The Qur’an with Annotated Interpretation in Modern English, New Jersey: Tughra Books. Y1 lmaz, hsan. 2005. “Inter-Madhhab Surfing, Neo-Ijtihad, and Faith-Based Movement Leaders,” in The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress, edited by Peri Bearman, Rudolph Peters, Frank E. Vogel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Attitudes Towards the Status of Women in Turkish Society: The Case of Istanbul* Ömer Çaha

Abstract

Moving from the case of Istanbul this paper emphasizes on the attitudes of Turkish society towards women’s status and roles. Based upon a field work carried out in Istanbul, in 2008, it quests how Turkish society perceives woman’s nature, her familial, social, economic and political roles. As the result of this investigation indicates Turkish society seems to develop an egalitarian attitude towards gender roles either in familial or social and political life. This can be associated to the modernization of Turkey that has been followed for two hundred years on the attempts to articulate women into the public life in particular through education and employment. It can be said that women have been taken by the ruling elites as the mark of Turkish modernization over the basis of western values. Despite the deep rooted patriarchal values in Turkish culture, perhaps this pattern of change has paved the way for the development of an egalitarian attitude towards gender roles in Turkish society. Keywords: Gender, Gender Roles, Social Attitudes, Equality, Women’s

Movement, Turkish Women.

*

This study has been financially supported by Fatih University. I would like to send my sincere thanks and appreciations to Fatih University Project Development Center. 

Fatih University. [email protected]

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Introduction Based upon a case study carried out in Istanbul, this paper focuses on the attitude of Turkish people towards women’s status and roles. More clearly put, while scrutinizing societal perception on both women’s nature and role in family, society and politics, the key question asked in the paper will be whether or not the Turkish public has an egalitarian point of view as far as the gender roles in not only familial but also social, political and economic life are concerned. In that respect, the paper will deal with, more specifically, such diverse issues as cultural perception on women’s nature, popular attitude toward the gender division of labor at home and in the society, women’s employment in the public sphere, women in administrative positions, domestic violence against women, and the traditionally-observed honor crimes mostly in rural areas.

Research Method and Sampling As described above this research is based upon a survey done in Istanbul during the period of 15-30 September 2008. The survey has been conducted in ten different districts of Istanbul over a sampling group including 560 respondents aged over 18 years old. In the selection of the sampling group the gender, age and educational quotas have been considered carefully. In respect to the gender quota, men and women have been included in the survey equally. With regard to the age category the sampling group aged in between 18-35 seems to be the dominant one which is close to the true picture of Turkish population. When the education level is considered it seems that the high school and university educated respondents take place more than less-educated respondents. This is because of the fact that Istanbul is a city with a high number of university students. Therefore, it is much more likely that the rate of university students in the survey is higher than its average in Turkey (TÜK). The following table gives the demographic distribution of the sampling.

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Table 1: Demographic Features of the Sampling GENDER

Frequency

Percent (%)

Women

280

50,00

Men

280

50,00

18-25

153

27,32

26-35

196

35,00

36-45

119

21,25

46-60

84

15,00

61 and over

8

1,43

5

0,89

Primary school

116

20,71

Secondary school

81

14,46

High school

208

37,14

University

150

26,79

560

100

AGE

EDUCATION Non-literate

Total

The questionnaires used in the survey have been applied in accordance with the simple random sampling technique. Thus, the questionnaires have been applied to the sampling group in formerly determined streets of ten districts in a random way. The analysis of the data has been done according to the gender difference as well as diverse education levels of the respondents. In the following tables the differences between the attitudes of the genders to the same issue are clearly seen. However, the differences between respondents’ attitudes from different education levels to the same question are not given in the tables because of space limitation. But as said above each table is reviewed in reference to the role of education as well as the gender difference.

Attitudes towards the Equality of Men and Women The attitudes of respondents to the equality of men and women are quested over the basis of two points. In the first point they are asked about the natural equality of the genders, however in the second they are asked about their perception on the social roles of men and women. The following table reveals how the respondents think

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about men’s and women’s nature. As it seen in the table, 58 percent of the respondents have an egalitarian understanding of men’s and women’s nature. Those who believe that men are naturally superior to women are limited with only 30 percent. Nearly 7 percent of all respondents believe that women are naturally superior to men. As seen in the relevant table those who think in this way are mostly women.

Table 2: What do you think about the Men’s and Women’s Nature? (%) Wo me n

Me n

Tot al

Men and women are naturally equal

57,9

58,6

58,2

Men are naturally superior to women

26,4

33,6

30,0

Women are naturally superior to men

8,6

5,7

7,1

Men and women are naturally different

5,7

1,1

3,4

Other answers

0,6

8,0

0,7

No answer

1,1

0,0

0,5

Tot al

10 0

10 0

10 0

In respect to the attitudes indicated according to the gender difference it seems that there is almost no difference between men and women. They both believe that the genders are naturally equal. As seen in the table, men seem to be more likely close than women to the idea that they are naturally superior to women. An opposite attitudes is seen in the reactions of women. Some women believe that they are naturally superior to men. The question above has been analyzed also according to the level of education but it seems that the level of education brings statistically no significant difference between the sexes. In other words, the respondents with high level of education think in the same way with those with lower level of education on the nature of men and women. The attitudes towards the equality of two genders have been analyzed also in reference to the social division of labor between the genders. Moving from this the sampling group has been asked about their opinion on the social roles of men and women and the replies given by them to this question are seen in the following table. Table 3 reveals that a considerable part of all respondents have a traditional point of view to the gender roles. As seen in the same table nearly 30 percent of respondents believe that a man is primarily responsible from the social issues, however a woman is primarily responsible from the familial issues. It is noteworthy to remark that this

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research has been conducted in one of the most developed metropolitan cities of Turkey. One can naturally imagine that a traditional attitude like this is probably more disseminated in the rural areas than the urban areas. Nonetheless to say, 58 percent of the respondents think that men and women are equal in respect to the social division of labor. This means that the modern attitudes on the social roles of men and women seem to be dominant to the traditional attitudes in Turkish society.

Table 3: What do you think about Men’s and Women’s Social Roles? (%) Women

Men

Total

They should have the same role everywhere

59,6

55,7

57,7

Women should be responsible from the

22,9

36,8

29,8

14,6

5,4

10,0

Other answers

0,7

0,5

0,5

No answer

2,2

1,6

2,0

Total

100

100

100

domestic but men from the public issues Social roles of the sexes change according to different conditions

A statistically significant difference is apparently seen in the attitudes of men and women when gender difference is considered. It is clearly seen that the percentage of those who believe to the equality of the genders is higher among female respondents than the male respondents. Male respondents are more likely than female respondents to think that men are responsible from social issues while women from the domestic issues. The Table 3 clearly reveals that the percentage of male respondents thinking in this way is nearly 14 percent higher than female respondents. One can conclude that men seem to be more traditional than women in respect to their attitudes towards men’s and women’s social roles. The level of education plays statistically significant role as well. The lesseducated respondents are more likely to have traditional attitudes than are the moreeducated respondents in that respect. The percentage of those who believe that men and women are equal in respect to their social roles is clearly higher among the university educated respondents than others. Another question asked to the respondents is the one which quests the division of labor at home. As the following table reveals the percentage of those who believe that

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men and women are equal in respect to the housework are only 28. About 11 percent of respondents think that the housework is absolutely under the responsibility of women, while 61 percent believes also that women are responsible from the housework but their husband can help them when they need it. This data clearly declares that Turkish society has traditional attitudes towards domestic division of labor.1

Table 4: What do you think about Domestic Division of Labor? (%) Women

Men

Total

Housework belongs to women not to men

6,4

16,1

11,3

Men and women should be equal in doing housework

35,0

19,6

27,3

Man should help his wife at home when she needs it

57,9

62,9

60,4

Other answers

0,3

0,7

0,5

No answer

0,7

0,7

0,7

Total

100

100

100

The gender variable plays statistically important role in that regard. As the data in the relevant table shows, those who believe that the housework belongs to women are mostly male respondents. However, most of the female respondents describe that men and women should be equal at home on the issue of housework. Based on this, one can claim that women are more likely than men to develop an egalitarian reaction to the familial roles of the genders. The education variable brings almost no difference on this issue. In other words, there is statistically no significant difference between the attitudes of less-educated respondents and more-educated respondents about this issue. They behave almost in the same way.

Attitudes towards Women and Family The attitudes towards women and family have been tested over the basis of several questions. These questions are about such issues as women’s work in the public sphere, familial violence against women, the honor crimes seen in the rural 1

It is worth for note to remark that even in developed countries women are the disadvantageous part in respect to the division of household labor (Fuwa 2004: 751-67)

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areas and the size of family. The following table, which is about the first question, reveals that most of the respondents have a positive attitude towards women’s work in the public domain. The percentage of those who believe that women should never work is only 8.6 percent. Rest of the respondents thinks that women should work in the public life either on their demand or because of the need of their family. In Turkey over the course of last decades a discussion has developed under the impact of feminist movement on the work of women in a way that work in the public sphere brings freedom to women. According to this discussion women should work in the public sphere independent to economic need of their families. This is needed for women’s self esteem and self realization (Friedan 1974). The following table indicates that this idea has a large acceptance among respondents. It seems that about 40 percent of all respondents react in this way.

Table 5: What do you think about Women’s Work in the Public Sphere? (%) Women

Men

Total

Woman shouldn’t work even if her family needs it

4,3

12,9

8,6

Woman can work if her family needs it

32,9

57,9

45,4

Woman should work independent to the need of her family

57,4

22,3

39,8

Other answers

7,5

5,0

6,3

No answer

0,2

2,0

0,2

Total

100

100

100

As seen in the Table 5 a statistically significant difference is appeared between women’s and men’s attitudes towards women’s work outside of family. When men support women’s work in the case of family’s need, women support it independent to any need. The percentage of women thinking in this way is two times more than the percentage of men. If the reactions against the work of women portray modern and traditional attitudes, one, moving from the table above, can clearly conclude that men are behaving more traditional than women in that respect. As previously said women’s employment has been an important issue discussed in the media, among academic circles and in Turkish cinema in last decades (Çaha, 2010). Those who bring this issue under discussion defend women’s work for women’s self realization as well as for the possibility of depart from the traditional roles. It seems that a vast

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majority of Turkish women approve this idea. The education plays an important role in the reaction of respondents on this issue. The university and higher educated respondents favor more than the less- educated respondents to the work of women in the public arena. One of the problems seen in Turkey, perhaps as elsewhere, is the domestic violence against women.2 The following table reveals how the respondents respond a question related to this issue. As it is obviously seen in the table a vast majority of the respondents disapprove the beat of women by men, -their husbands, lovers, brothers or fathers. But 8 percent of all respondents still approve this and this should be considered as a significant sociological problem against women. The domestic violence against women has been a critical issue politicized by feminist movements in Turkey.3 Despite passionate debates on this issue we have, indeed, little scientific data on the rate of women violated at home (KSGM1). The data seen in the following table indicates the percentage of respondents that legitimize the beat of women by their husbands.

Table 6: What do you think about the Domestic Violence against Women? (%) Women

Men

Total

Women should never be beaten

97,70

85,4

91,6

Women can be beaten when it is needed

2,21

13,1

7,5

No answer

0,0

1,1

0,5

Total

100

100

100

When the beat of women at home is reviewed according to the gender difference it is clearly seen that the gender factor leads to a statistically significant difference. The percentage of those men who approve the beat of women by their husbands is nearly six times more than that of women. Women are seen more likely to react against domestic violence against women than are men. When education is considered there seems a negative correlation between the level of education and the 2

It is estimated that the rate of women violated at home is in between 25-35 percents in Turkey, while it is 15 percent in Japan and 71 percent in Ethiopia (Özvarı and others 2008).

3

One of the issues that led feminist groups to go into street actions in 1980s was, indeed, the existence of domestic violence against women in Turkey. A street action they realized under the name Purple Needle Campaign in 1989 was a very effective massive action discussed in media and in academia for long time. This campaign was resulted with the establishment of a foundation devoted to the women violated in domestic life. The Purple Roof Foundation has been established after this campaign and it has devoted its energy to struggle against domestic violence against women and to promote the establishment of shelters for women violated at home.

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approval of women’s beat. Those having university education react against the women’s beat, while those with lower education approve it (KSGM2). One of the important local problems suffered by Turkish women, in particular by those living in rural areas, seems to be the honor crimes, referring to the killing of women having sex outside of marriage. There have been some dramatic stories lived by Turkish women as in the case of Güldünya Tören, originally from the rural part of Turkey, who was killed by her two brothers in 2004 on the claim that she had sex and got pregnant before marriage. Her death penalty was given by her family and it was executed by her brothers in Istanbul. This dramatic event, indeed, shocked Turkish society and became o hot topic in the agenda of Turkish media and among academic circles for long time. Feminist groups drew attention of Turkish public to this specific event and criticized it as an indication of patriarchal norms giving authority to men to control and rule women’s body. As seen in the Table 7 a great majority of the respondents disapprove honor crimes. The percentage of those who strongly disapprove is, as seen in the relevant table, about 68 percent and other 21 percent disapprove it as well. But still 10.5 percent of all respondents approve this action. They think that the action of honor crime can be performed when it is needed. When one considers that this research has been conducted in a metropolitan city like Istanbul and reflects the true picture of Turkish society he can imagine that the percentage of people thinking like this is higher in rural areas than the one given in the following table.

Table 7: What do you think about Honor Crimes? (%) Women

Men

Total

Approve

5,0

16,1

10,5

Disapprove

17,1

24,6

20,9

Strongly disapprove

77,9

57,9

67,9

No answer

0,0

1,4

0,7

Total

100

100

100

Given the gender difference, it seems that the attitudes towards honor crimes changes between sexes. Those who approve honor crimes are mostly men. A great percentage of female respondents more than male respondents report that they are strongly against honor crimes. The percentage of women thinking in this way is about

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20 percent more than that of men. It is clearly seen that male respondents are more traditional than women on the issue of honor crime. The correlation between attitudes towards honor crime and level of education seems to be positive, but statistically not so significant. The less-educated respondents favor honor crimes more than university educated respondents. But as expressed above, the difference between two levels of education seems to be not significant statistically. Another issue analyzed in respect to the attitudes towards women and family in this study is the size of family. As it is well known family is in an extended form in traditional societies, while it is nucleus in modern societies. The extended family includes more than one generation as well as has lots of children. The family size tested here considers the number of children desired in a family. Therefore the respondents were asked how many children they think that a family should have. The data in the following table reveals that most of respondents do not favor a family having more than three children. The mostly desired number of children seems to be two or three. Those who think that two children should be found in a family are about 50 percent of all respondents, while those who think that a family should have three children are about 30 percent. The total percentage of respondents thinking in this way is about 80. It is obvious that the third children are mostly desired as an insurance against the high rate of children mortality in Turkey (TÜK2). It is a fact, as the following table clearly reveals, a small sized family has been envisaged in Turkish society.

Table 8: How many Children do you think that a Family should have? (%) Women

Men

Total

Only one child

11,4

3,9

7,7

Two children

52,1

47,9

50,0

Three children

25,0

35,7

30,4

Four children

9,3

7,5

8,4

Five or more than five children

1,8

4,6

3,2

No answer

0,4

0,4

0,4

Total

100

100

100

Although there is statistically no significant difference between the genders in respect to the number of children desired in a family, the percentage of women desiring less children is obviously higher then the percentage of men. Particularly

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

those who want to have only one child are mostly women. The percentage of women in that regard is three times more than that of men. When three or more than three children become the case the percentage of female respondents decreases more than that of men respondents. The education variable gives a statistically significant difference between the genders. The respondents having higher education report that they desire less than two children in a family while those having lower education express that they demand more than two and even three children. Those who want more than four children are mostly less-educated men. In short, considering the four points analyzed above one can clearly claim that a decreasing trend is seen in Turkish society towards traditional values in respect to women and family. It also can be said that women place more value on modern way of life than men in Turkey, considering the data presented above. In addition to the gender variable the education also plays a significant role in the evolution of traditional values towards modern ones. The increase in the level of education clearly results with a tendency towards egalitarian values between men and women in Turkey. The decrease in the level of education, by the same token, gives way to the traditional way of life.

Attitudes towards Women Movement and Organizations As previously expressed an important women movement has developed in Turkey in the post-1980s and it succeeded to draw attention of Turkish public to the local problems suffered by Turkish women (Tekeli 1990). Women movement has a considerable popularity in media and among academic circles. But it is a matter of question how ordinary citizens, in particular, women with no political stance are familiar with this movement. This is the reason why this issue has been quested in this study over the basis of two interrelated questions. The answers given to the first question, which is abut the respondents’ familiarity with women movement, is clearly revealed in the Table 9. As seen in the relevant table nearly half of all respondents are familiar with feminist movement and they know what feminism is about. Also about 23 percent of all respondents have heard the name of feminism but they don’t know what feminism is absolutely about. Those who are not familiar with feminism are about 27 percent. The table clearly indicates that feminist movement has been successful in getting Turkish public heard or known about it even though it is a late developed movement, comparing with its western counterparts (Tekeli 1989).

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Table 9: Have You Heard about Feminism? Do you know what it is about? (%) Women

Men

Total

I haven’t heard it and I have no idea about it

14,6

40,0

27,3

I have heard it, but I don’t know what it is about

23,2

24,3

23,8

I have heard it and I know what it is about

61,4

35,0

48,2

No answer

0,7

0,7

0,7

Total

100

100

100

The gender difference plays statistically significant role in the popularity of feminism. As evidently seen in the table above those who are familiar with feminism are mostly women. Nearly 61 percent of female respondent remark that they are familiar with feminism and they know what feminism is about. The rate of female respondents who are familiar with but don’t know about the struggle of feminism is about 23 percent. It means that nearly 84 percent of female respondents are familiar with feminism in this or that way. But the total percentage of those male respondents who are familiar with feminism and know about its claims is about 35 percent. These records evidently reveal that the gender difference plays an important role in the popularity of feminism. By the same token, the education variable also plays positive role in the popularity of feminism. Nearly 80 percent of illiterate respondents denounce that they are not familiar with feminism. However, only 7 percent of the respondents having university education are not familiar with feminism. This means that education gives about 73 percent difference in that respect. The respondents who are familiar with feminism and know what feminism is about have been asked about their attitudes towards feminism. The following table reveals the reaction of these respondents about feminism. As the relevant table indicate almost half of all respondents approve feminism while other half does not approve it. But it seems that those who remark that they support feminism are more than those who describe that they are against it. The percentage of pro-feminist respondents is about 19. However, those who are strongly against feminism are nearly 12 percent. The opponents of feminism in Turkish media have propagated it, for long time, that it is an anti-man movement. Given the existence of such a negative propaganda against feminism, one can obviously claim that the percentage of those who favor feminism is quite important.

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Table 10: What do you think about Feminism? (%) Women

Men

Total

It is needed and I strongly support it

23,8

10,2

18,9

It is needed, but I don’t support it

30,8

27,6

29,6

It is not needed and I don’t approve it

36,6

42,9

38,9

It is not needed and I’m strongly against it

8,7

18,4

12,2

No answer

0,4

0,4

0,4

Total

100

100

100

The gender variable seems to play statistically significant role in favoring or disfavoring feminism. Women, as presented in the table above, take a pro-stance position to feminism while men take an anti-position. While nearly 24 percent of female respondents strongly support feminism, only 10 percent of male respondents support it. Similarly nearly 9 percent of female respondents clearly denounce that they are strongly against feminism. On the other hand this percentage is about 18 among male respondents. One can shortly say that women are more likely than man to clearly give support to feminist movement. The education variable does not play any statistically significant role in that respect. In other words there seems almost no serious difference between the attitudes of respondents with different educational levels. Feminism has developed in Turkey, at the beginning, in the streets along 1980s. But when coming to 1990s it started to follow a different policy. In other words, feminism has evolved into what is called “institutional movement” from being a “street movement” (Bora and Güldal 2002). The reason why Turkish feminism is defined as an institutional movement after 1990s, by those who study feminism, is because of the associations that they have found. Feminist groups have established different associations, each dealing with a different issue concerning women in a way. The Association to Support and Train Female Candidates (Kad1 n Adaylar1 Destekleme

Derne¤i), the Flying Broom ( Uçan Süpürge), and the Purple Roof (Mor Çat1 ) are some of the prominent women’s associations established by feminist groups. But also nonfeminist groups have organized under the banner of different associations. The respondents in this survey have been quested if they have affiliation with any feminist or non-feminist women’s organization. The following table reflects the replies of the respondents to this question.

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Table 11: Are you affiliated with any Women’s Organization? (%) Women

Men

Total

Affiliated with any one or more

2,68

0

2,68

Affiliated with no one

97,32

100

97,32

100

100

100

Total

As seen in the table above the percentage of respondents affiliated with any women’s organizations seems to be quite less. Only 2.68 percent of female respondents are affiliated with any women’s organizations. On the other hand, no male respondent seem to have membership of any women’s organizations. The data presented here mirrors, indeed, the interest of Turkish citizens in the civil societal organizations. As seen above even though most of female respondents agree with the claims of feminist groups, only a small part of them participate in the activities of feminist or even non-feminist organizations. This indicates an evidently visible paradox between the attitudes and behaviors of Turkish citizens. As it is commonly known the “attitude” refers to a person's inner thoughts and feelings, while “behavior” to an outward expression of attitude.

Attitudes towards Women’s Participation in Politics It is a matter of fact that women form a small minority of political representation in both local governments and national parliament in Turkey. The less-representation of women in representative bodies has been passionately marked as one of the fundamental problems of Turkish women by feminist groups. Turkish women were given election right in 1935. But the percentage of their representation in the parliament had never exceeded 4.5 until 2007 general elections. It was the first time that women’s rate reached to 9.1 percent in the national parliament in this election (TÜK3). This is found still less by feminist groups, drawing attention to the welldeveloped democratic societies. The representation of women in the local assemblies is less than their rate in the national parliament. It is evident that women’s percentage has never gone over 3 percent in Turkish local councils (Çaha 2008). This is the reason why feminist groups demand application of gender quotas. For them the application of gender quota will give positive discrimination to women and thus will serve the increase of their representative in the parliament and in the local assemblies (Say1 n 2007). Through this study the respondents have been quested

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if they support the application of gender quotas to the genders or not. The following table presents the reaction of the respondents to this question. It is clearly seen that those who approve gender quotas are less than those who disapprove it. As presented in the table, 61 percent of all respondents are against any quota. Only about one third of all respondents agree with the implementation of gender quotas.

Table 12: What do you think about the Application of Gender Quotas? (%) Women

Men

Total

Approve

34,3

32,5

33,4

Disapprove

59,3

62,5

60,9

Other answers

2,9

2,9

2,9

No answer

3,6

2,1

2,9

Total

100

100

100

It is obviously evident, as seen in the table above, the gender variable plays statistically no significant role in that respect. In other words, there seems almost no difference between men’s and women’s attitudes towards the application of gender quotas. Male and female respondents develop the same reaction to a policy envisaging different quotas for the genders. The education also brings no difference. The reaction of less-educated respondents to the gender quota is almost similar to the reaction of more-educated respondents. As a complementary question to the question above, the respondents have been asked a further question which quests the percentage of women MPs that they want to see in the national parliament. Those who want to see no woman MP in the parliament are less than 5 percent. But the existence of disapproval to the election of women candidate is an interesting point and indeed is a matter of different research. As the following table reveals the percentage of those respondents who want to see less than 20 percent women MPs in the parliament are about 19. However, the percentages of those who want to see women MPs in between 21-50 percents in parliament are about 65. Nearly 9 percent of respondents wish to see more than 51 percent of women MPs in the parliament. It is noteworthy to remark that the data in this table indicates that Turkish citizens are open for seeing women MPs more than their current proportion in the parliament even though they don’t agree with the application of gender quotas.

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Table 13: What do you think about the Rate of Women MPs in the Parliament? (%) Women

Men

Total

There should be no woman MP in the parliament

3,2

5,7

4,5

Women MPs should be in between 1-20 percents

10

27,8

19

Women MPs should be in between 21-50 percents

69,7

60,7

65,3

Women MPs should more than 51 percent

14,3

3,6

8,9

No answer

2,9

2,1

2,5

Total

100

100

100

When the analysis is done according to the gender difference it becomes clearly evident that gender variable plays statistically significant role in attitudes towards women’s representation in the parliament. The percentage of female respondents who want to see a high proportion of women MPs in the parliament is clearly higher than the percentage of male respondents. As seen in the relevant table the percentage of male respondents wishing to see less than 20 percent of women MPs in the parliament are greater than the percentage of female respondents. However, the percentage of female respondents who want to see women MPs in between 21-50 percent is apparently higher than male respondents. A sharp distinction is seen in the item about the percent of women MPs more than 51 percent. As clearly seen the percentage of female respondents wishing to see more than 51 percent women MPs is almost four times more than the percentage of male respondents. A similar difference to the gender variable is seen in education variable. Education also plays statistically significant role in that regard. Those having lesseducation want to see fewer women MPs in the parliament while the more-educated respondents envisage seeing more women MPs in the parliament.

Conclusion As a concluding remark, as presented in the tables above, one can say that Turkish society seems to develop modern attitudes towards gender roles. It is apparently evident, as presented in the tables above; an egalitarian attitude has been disseminated among Turkish public towards women’s and men’s nature as well as their social and political roles. This can be associated to the modernization of Turkey. As it is well known, Turkey has undertaken a modernization project over the course of last two hundred years. Either during the Ottoman Empire or the Republican Turkey,

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established in 1923, the reference for modernization and change has always been western values. Western values, particularly those related to women’s equality with men have always stimulated and still motivate the leaders of the reforms. It is generally accepted by the students of Turkish politics that women have been taken by the reforms, during the course of two hundred years, as the mark of Turkish modernization over the basis of western values (Göle 1992: 64). The reformist leaders in both Ottoman Empire and Turkey, therefore, have given priority to the education of women as well as to their articulation in the public life. Despite the long breath and deep rooted patriarchal values in Turkish culture, perhaps this pattern of change is the basic factor which paves the way for the development of egalitarian attitudes in Turkish society.

References Bora, A. and Güldal, A. (eds). 2002. 90’larda Türkiye’de Feminizm. stanbul: letiflim. Çaha, Ö. 2008. Kad1n Sivil Toplum Örgütleri ve Yerel Demokrasi: stanbul’daki Kad1 n

Kurulufllar1n1n Yerel Düzeydeki Siyasal ve Toplumsal Kat1l1ma liflkin Tutumlar1 . stanbul: stanbul Büyükflehir Belediyesi. Çaha, Ö. 2010. Sivil Kad1n: Türkiye’de Kad1n ve Sivil Toplum. Ankara: Savafl Yay1nlar1. Friedan, B. 1974. The Feminine Mystique. New York: Dell. Fuwa, M. 2004. “Macro-level Gender Inequality and the Division of Household Labor in 22 Countries.” American Sociological Review. 69, 6: 751-67. Göle, N. 1992. Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Örtünme. stanbul: Metis Yay1nlar1. KSGM1. 2008. Türkiye’de Kad1na Yönelik Aile çi fiiddet Araflt1rmas1 2008. Ankara: Kad1n1n Statüsü Genel Müdürlü¤ü. KSGM2.

2008.

http://www.ksgm.gov.tr/tdvaw/doc/tdvaw_summary.pdf.

(accessed

November 5, 2008). Özvar1fl, fi. and others. 2008. Kad1na Yönelik Aile çi fiiddetle Mücadelede Sa¤l1k Hizmetleri. Ankara: Kad1n1n Statüsü Genel Müdürlü¤ü. Say1n, A. 2007. Kota El Kitab1. Ankara: KA-DER. Tekeli, fi. 1989. “‘80’lerde Türkiye’de Kad1nlar1n Kurtuluflu Hareketinin Geliflmesi.”

Birikim 3.

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Tekeli, fi. (Ed.). 1990 Kad1n Bak1flaç1s1ndan 1980’ler Türkiye’sinde Kad1n. stanbul: letiflim Yay1nlar1. TÜK1. 2008. “E¤itim statistikleri.” http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?tb_id=37&ust_id=11. (accessed October 15, 2008) TÜK2. 2008. “Demografik statistikler” http://www.tuik.gov.tr/demografiapp/olum.zul. (accessed October 25, 2008). TÜK3. 2008. “Seçim statistikleri. “http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=42&ust_id=12. (accessed October 20, 2008).

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-3 (2), 2010

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Coup-Proofing in Turkey

Gokhan Bacik* and Sammas Salur**

Abstract

Is the traditional civil-military relations changing in Turkey? Does Turkey have a new generation of political elites equipped with the capacity of coup-proofing? In the past, the army easily ousted political elites with no coup-proofing ability. However, today, the government can react to the military intervention; full generals are arrested by civil courts. The government’s reaction to the army’s 2007 memorandum and the ensuing investigations of officers by prosecutors proves that political elites have gained the needed instruments of coup-proofing. In line with recent developments, the major contribution of the article is to demonstrate the complex nature of coup-proofing in Turkey, an overlooked aspect of civil-military relations. Keywords: Coup, Coup Proofing, Army, Turkish Politics.

*

Zirve University. [email protected]

**

Fatih University. [email protected]

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Introduction On 27 April 2007, the Turkish army intervened by memorandum into the politics once again and strongly criticized the political elites for their grave mistake of violation of principle of secularism they made particularly in the election of the President. The memorandum also criticized the candidacy of Abdullah Gül, a deputy of the Justice and Development Party government (JDP). Yet, the memorandum reminded that the army would not refrain in stepping forward if needed. Rather than the memorandum, surprising was the reaction of the government. Unlike the previous governments which resigned facing a military intervention, the JDP government declared that the memorandum was unacceptable and reminded that the army was constitutionally under their control. Several months after the memorandum, in 2008, upon the demand of a prosecutor, several high-level retired military officers including full generals were arrested for being involved in illegal activities against the government. In ensuing process, many active officers including military cadets were also arrested or detained. Similar to the government’s reaction to the memorandum, the prosecution of soldiers is also an extraordinary case These developments bring serious questions: Is the traditional civil-military relations changing in Turkey? Does Turkey have a new generation of political elites equipped with the capacity of coup-proofing? In the past, the army easily ousted political elites with no coup-proofing ability. However, today, the government can react to the military intervention; full generals are arrested by civil courts. Symbolizing this change verbally, R. Tayyip Erdo¤an, the Turkish premier, declared that in case of a military intervention, “I will not leave the office as some former politicians did before, instead I will react.” (TRT Interview: 2009) The government’s reaction to the army’s 2007 memorandum and the ensuing investigations of officers by prosecutors proves that political elites have gained the needed instruments of coup-proofing. In line with recent developments, the major contribution of the article is to demonstrate the complex nature of coup-proofing in Turkey, an overlooked aspect of civil-military relations. Coup- Proofi ng Despite having structural coup risks and lacking the needed infrastructural instruments of civil rule, some coup-prone states have the ability of preventing coups which is called coup-proofing. Coup-proofing is “the set of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup.” Accordingly, the essence of coup-proofing is the creation of structures that minimize the possibility of a coup (Quinlivan 1999: 133). Coup-proofing

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aims to silence the structural causes that prevail in a society by employing several means. “Silencing” does not mean eliminating structural causes. To a large extent, the main strategy in coup-proofing is to manipulate triggering causes, which are shortterm factors that precipitate a coup, lest they do not activate the structural ones. Also, coup-proofing helps us to understand how non-democratic societies’ elites can prevent military interventions. For instance, the coup risk is very low in the US because civilian institutions, the rule of law, the freedom of press and other similar factors are very strong in this country (Belkin ve E. Schofer 2003: 597). However, despite lacking such institutions, the Syrian political elites, like their counterparts in Saudi Arabia or Libya, have prevented a coup thanks to coup-proofing strategies. Actors may follow different coup-proofing strategies such as the exploitation of family, ethnic and religious loyalties, the creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military, the development of multiple internal security institutions, the fostering of expertness in the military and the financing of such measures (Quinlivan 1999:133), party penetration, the use of intelligence, civilian command structures, divided command

authority,

and

geographic

dispersion,

maintaining

rival

security

organizations, satisfying corporate concerns and even allowing for military participation in politics (Danapolulos 1992: 15) All coup-proofing strategies are various reflections of different actors’ capacity to mobilize and finance their strategies which require having needed number of people with certain qualifications to realize certain strategies, having the political ability to realize all mobilization without any unwanted halt, and finally having the needed financial resources. The Difficulty of Studying the Turkish Case The study of coup-proofing in Turkey is difficult for two major reasons. First, despite a vast literature on civil-military relations, there is almost no study which specifically examines coup-proofing. The impenetrable nature of coup-proofing as a political incident explains this paucity. As set of secret business, the nature of coupproofing obstructs collecting the needed data. The second difficulty originates from the Turkey’s political system which has fabricated a fuzzy coup-proofing model. Normally, the study of coup-proofing in totalitarian states is easy as the power holders as a homogenized group follow usual strategies such as creating alternative intelligent units or implementing sectarianism. However, in the Turkish case, thanks to the division of labor between state and political elites, which will be analyzed below, the analysis of coup-proofing takes

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place in a highly blurred procedure. Since 1950 Turkey, except the short term military regimes, has never been ruled by a highly homogenized group with the ultimate capacity of employing strict coup-proofing agendas. There has always been intra-state tensions, bargains in the state machinery originating from ideological differences. As the division of labor between political and state elites impedes the ultimate domination of state machinery by any group, the analysis of the actors of coup-proofing and their agendas is a complex work. The authoritarian characteristics of Turkish politics has made coup-proofing a complex process in which it is difficult to clarify agents and their strategies. The division of labor between state and political elites, which is the foundation of Turkey’s idiosyncratic coup-proofing strategies, is thus the first subject to be analyzed to highlight in what conditions actors employ their strategies. Theorizing the Turkish Model The early Kemalist regime which ruled Turkey since 1923 faced several important challenges in the late 40s that caused serious reforms. The first shake came out during the Republican regimes’ attempts to try multiparty elections. In each attempt, opposition parties won an unexpected support (Emrence 2006: 101). The second came from the international system. To escape from the threats posed by the Soviets, Turkey asked for American protection, which ended up with serious consequences. Turkey was asked to realize several reforms at least to improve its dictatorial appearance in the West (Erhan 2001: 537). Challenged by domestic and international developments, the ultimate question to the Kemalist elites was how to reconcile the need for reform to guarantee Turkey’s position in the Western camp and how to protect the Kemalist nature of the state. As a solution, the Republican elites kept the Kemalist tradition but at the same time permitted the rise of several intermediary institutions. Consequently, Turkey transformed into a post-totalitarian state in the post1946 period in which “institutional pluralism is exercised within the party-state or within the newly tolerated parallel culture” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 46). It was a kind of hybrid regime in which several limited intermediary corridors and institutions were injected into the strict Kemalist model. In this model, pluralism, rather than social, is treated as institutional, enabling state elites having capacity to intervene legally. State elites through those institutions declared themselves as having the responsibility of safeguarding the long-term interests (Heper 1991: 40). The state elites’ authority was not derived from those of the political elites. The Republican elites, schooled in the Atatürk-nönü tradition and

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located in the universities and the upper reaches of the civil service (Heper 1996: 487) including the army, present themselves as the intrepid guardians of the Kemalist regime. They control the political game through several ways such as autonomous bodies i.e. civil and military bureaucracy, legal codes, and manipulating the public. Political elites are responsible for representing particular interests. With the model, the state elites became the major actors to dictate to the politicians the general guidelines of the political game (Heper 1996: 484-485). It was mainly the parliamentary system that provides corridors of manipulation to the state establishment. It is a system of state and society relations in which organized social groups are segregated from each other and segmentalized; the state exercises power of close supervision over each segment (Sunar 1988: 82). At the end, a mixed system was invented in which sovereignty is divided between the state elites and political elites. The model was then constitutionalized after the 1960 coup. The 1960 intervention was the reaction of state elites against the ‘unhealthy’ autonomization of economic and political groups at the expense of the Kemalist contract, mainly during the rule of Democrat Party between 1950-60 (Karabelios 1999: 141). Having defeated the opposition, the Republican elites realized that there was no nation waiting their prescriptions. Read carefully both domestic and international dynamics, they adopted a more rationalist agenda which paved the way for a new system in which certain institutional restraints would always guarantee the Republican elites’ corporate interests. The 1961 Constitution thus is a masterpiece of this intention since it introduced a new understanding of sovereignty, totally different compared with that of the 1920s. The principle of national sovereignty was kept but it was constitutionally declared that “the nation exercises its sovereignty through the authorized agencies in accordance with the principle laid down in the Constitution.” The clear intention of this sentence was to put an end to the supremacy of Parliament. With the 1961 Constitution, the Grand National Assembly ceased to be the sole organ with the power to exercise sovereignty on behalf of the nation (Aybay 1977: 23). By introducing several institutions with the capacity of sharing the use of sovereignty with the nation, the Republican elites secured their positions. Yet, the judiciary was given a considerable share in the exercise of sovereignty. A Constitutional Court was founded which was expected to counterbalance political institutions, which had provided ‘ample proof in recent history of their tendency to abuse their powers’ (Aybay 1977: 24). The tension between state and elites thanks to Turkey’s mixed system laid the foundations for a complicated coup-proofing model. Unlike for instance with typical cases like Syria or Saudi Arabia where political elites can carry out radical coupproofing strategies, Turkey has no capacity to carry such strict strategies like creating

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a parallel army. Since political elites have never had the capacity to control all state mechanism, they could never initiate traditional coup-proofing strategies. Instead, the bargain with the state elites has forced them to follow a low profile and intricate tactics. 1923-1950: Coup-Proofing in a Totalitarian System In this period, it was the ruling Republican elites as harmonized and united group that were the main agents of coup-proofing. The Republican elites also formed coalitions with other actors such as city intellectuals and the traditional class of notables in the countryside, including landowners (Sherwood 1967: 56).As an integrated group, their major strategy was to prevent any attempt to overthrown the new regime. The first fear was a popular uprising for religious or ethnic reasons. The Kurdish uprising in Eastern Anatolia in 1925, the Dersim rebellion in 1937 created major concerns. The second risk was a mutiny of various officers as some were keeping their reservations about Atatürk’s leadership. However, they were purged in various ways with no serious difficulty. In this period, the Republican elites did not implement other typical coupproofing strategies such as creating parallel institutions thanks to self-reliance and incapacity of the peripheral actors to move to the center. Instead, they tried to construct a highly central bureaucratic structure. In 1923 a totally new model was founded. The Republican elites had all opportunities to model a new state according to their choices. Thus, the elite recruitment can be studied as the most sophisticated coup-proofing strategy of this period. All phases of recruitment and education were under the strict control of the Kemalist bureaucracy and its sterile recruitment and indoctrination procedures were totally closed to alternative actors. The new regime through certain radical laws annihilated major traditional corridors that used to bring peripheral actors to the center. In 1924, the unification of education law was declared and traditional schools were closed. In 1928, the Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin. It was a radical challenge to the traditional elites. With this, they lost their ability to bring their ideas to the centre. A new law made the use of surnames as compulsory in 1934 which was a big threat to the traditional networks in the rural annihilating the mythos of tribe and large family (pflirli 2009: Personal interview). In 1925, religious lodges were also banned. With these reforms, the traditional elites lost their corridors to become part of the political game. The only legitimate corridor was the Kemalist socialization. Since they had no chance to operate through their traditional values and institutions, the peripheral actors could move to the centre only as naked. (Huntington 1969: 196)

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1950-2000: The Rise of Contending Coup-Proofing Strategies The era was radically different than the previous term, regarding that who sought coup-proofing has changed in it. The republican elites employed coupproofing strategies towards peripheral actors during 1923-1950. However, after 1950, they were political elites who tried some techniques and strategies towards central actors. Democrat Party (DP) came to the power in 1950. The DP elites became the main agents of coup-proofing by 1950. However, DP, mainly because of the power share with the state elites, could not implement a coup-proofing technique save various personal contacts with the high level military officers. Surrounded by a highly consolidated Kemalist bureaucracy, political elites’ capacity was very limited. However, various policies of DP should be seen as structural advancements which contributed to the long-term coup-proofing capacity of political elites. By definition, DP was not an anti-Kemalist party, instead including its founders many of whom were from the Republican tradition. However, DP is radically different in various fields. DP had a more liberal agenda. Yet, the social basis it represented was different. Sociologically, DP, like its successor Justice Party (AP) in the 60s, was supported by the small-holder peasants, who were emerging from poverty. They are allied with expanding, but still small, commercial, industrial, urban labor groups and newly wealthy farmers. These groups represent the sociological phenomenon of rising social groups in competition with the older elite (Sherwood 1967: 55). As expected the coalition with the DP and those groups facilitated the transfer of peripheral values to the centre. Peripheral and religious groups saw DP as an actor to stop the ultra secularization process. Indeed, DP invited religion back to the public and politics. It abandoned Ataturk’s prohibition of the Arabic call to prayer. Religious groups who had been excluded since 1923, found a more liberal atmosphere with the DP. The critical question was that how the traditional elites would react to DP, which was certainly a risk for the Kemalist establishment. The Republican elites presented DP as a threat to the Kemalist order. For them, DP was destructing the basic pillars of Kemalism such as secularism and statism. Truly, the policies of DP were weakening the temple of Kemalism which had been protected with high elitist walls. DP launched huge projects in which it became almost impossible to keep the elitist nature of the regime. Compared with the former 27 years Republican People Party’s rule, DP was very successful in extending various public services such as infrastructure, education, communication to the periphery,almost quadrupling the number of villages with public utility service. The area of irrigated lands was doubled. By opening four new universities, DP increased the number of university students from 20 to 65 thousand (Milliyet 2008). As expected, the path-dependent nature of such policies created major

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risks to the elitist-Kemalist order. DP policies produced new corridors for peripheral actors through which the survival of the elitist Kemalist regime became difficult. Republican elites were critical of DP rule for its unhealthy autonomization of different groups. Confirming this, the major rationale of the 1960 coup was the annihilation the DP and the new groups they had created (Karpat 1964:62). As stated, due to the enormous power of state elites, DP elites had no capacity to carry out any coup-proofing strategy. They were deprived of required mobilization and financing capacity which should be seen as the substance of all types of coupproofing strategy. Instead, they had to accept a cohabitation model with them who had the absolute control of state bureaucracy including army, intelligence, judiciary, university. Political elites were strong in the parliament and other second degree political offices. This model was the characteristic of this period up until 2000s. In 1960 government was overthrown and the Prime minister was executed. In 1971, the army intervened by memorandum and the government resigned. In 1980, the governments along with all civil institutions such as syndicates, political parties were shut down. In all cases, civil actors were either jailed or excluded from politics. Thus, as a major characteristic of this period, political elites were weak and had very limited capacity of coup-proofing strategy. Asked why he quickly gave up, Süleyman Demirel, a politician who was ousted two times by the army replied as follows: “who was going to be behind us if we had opposed to the coup?” (Yaprak 2008: 35). The only option was following a lower caliber of simple coup-proofing strategies such as developing personal good contacts with generals, not threatening the corporate interest of officers or co-opting several people from the Republican elites. In this period, political elites tried to rule Turkey while they were isolated by Kemalist bureaucratic military and civil elites which were not cooperative to the government. For instance, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MT) never informed the political elites. To give an example, having no information from MT, headed by a military general, in 1971 Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was sending his wife to family visits to the officers’ families to gather intelligence about ongoing developments in the army. Demirel once said “MT brings all detailed information about Angola or Syria. But MT never helped to the governments before a military coup.” (Birand, Dündar Çapl1 : 2002: 199) Another famous case was the arrest of Celal Bayar, the third president of the Republic, by his presidential guardians in 1960 coup. Such cases confirmed that political elites were not supported even by the closest bureaucrats. The government’s helplessness against the bureaucratic elite never allowed to initiate any structural coup-proofing strategy.

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Thus, rather than coup proofing agendas, the transformative policies of political elites in this period should be analyzed in detail. Especially the AP, the successor of DP in the period between 1960 and 1980, played a critical role. Through the AP’s policies, the representation of peripheral actors increased. To begin with, AP –following DPexpanded the spatial boundaries of modernization. Led by Süleyman Demirel, AP governments paid enormous attention to the development of villages and little cities. Like DP, AP created new opportunity corridors for peripheral actors. Among them, the issue of Imam Hatip Schools - a high school with lessons about religion opened to train imamshould be cited. During his different terms Demirel opened more than three hundred such schools (Milliyet 2004). These schools quickly became the major corridor that brought country men with their values to the upper echelons of bureaucracy. Critical of the radical secular nature of the Kemalist education, masses devotedly embraced those schools by donating the construction of more than 66% of all these schools (Adam 2004: 164). Secondly, Demirel quickly became the symbol of conservative masses. His simple citations of Quranic verses created a huge enthusiasm. Conservative groups including religious orders supported him which opened certain low level bureaucratic positions to those groups. Thirdly, Demirel emerged as the undisputed representative of the nascent Anatolian bourgeoisie (Ahmad 1980: 20) To conclude, AP policies contributed to the rise of peripheral actors in politics. In this vein, another actor was Turgut Özal. Actually, Özal can be read as the continuation of the DP-AP tradition. To begin with, Özal decreased the role of state in economy which ended up with the rise of market actors. The first major privatization programs were realized in his era. Secondly, Özal challenged state-centric political discourse. For instance on the Kurdish issues in a taboo breaking way he declared that “even we should debate about creating a federation with the Kurds” (Referans 2007). Also on Islam he declared “individuals cannot be laic, it is state that should be laic” (Hürriyet 2007). Though symbolic, the discoursive immunity of the Republican elites was challenged in this way. He enlarged the discursive area which is vital for civil actors. Thirdly, Özal increased the level of interdependence between Turkey and the West. (Aral 2001: 85). Turkey was following a pro-Western foreign policy since the late 40s. However, Turkey’s relations with the West were highly securitized and had limited affect on domestic politics. Özal attempted to use relations with the international community as leverage in counterbalancing the state elites at home. In 1987 Turkey applied to the European Community, in the same year the government adopted personal application to the European Court of Human Rights. Similarly, he contributed to de-securitization of Turkish foreign policy by prioritizing the economy. Businessmen flying with Özal during foreign visits became the symbolic face of this change. Özal

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with such policies attempted to construct a functional corridor between international community and Turkey according to which Turkey was expected to adapt itself to the norms of contemporary world politics. In the second period, to sum up, parties coming from the DP-AP tradition attempted to enlarge the boundaries of politics. Indeed, those policies created a more heterogeneous political culture. And in the long term, those policies strengthened political actors’ capacity of creating mobilization and financial leverage. But still, led by army the bureaucratic elites had the final say. After 17 years, the government was forced to resign in 1997. All military interventions from 1960 to 1997 took place without any major opposition. Still as an isolated actor, governments could not employ any coup-proofing strategy. Returning back to the division of labor between state and political elites, the former also followed a special strategy in order to limit the political elites lest they would transform the Kemalist state. Reminding Quinlivan’s definition, state elites in Turkey created certain mechanism and strategies sharing major similarities with the essence of coup-proofing. It was state elites’ priority to preclude political elites in changing the Kemalist nature of bureaucracy. Firstly, as a product of the 1961 constitution, an autonomous body of civil and military bureaucratic corps was created. The Turkish system depends on a very ideological system in bureaucracy. The government has very limited power in electing the bureaucratic cadre. There are also many autonomous bureaucratic bodies which are free from governmental influence. Expected from political elites were to respect those bureaucratic decisions. When state elites felt that political elites were threatening their autonomy; high courts immediately intervened against the political elites. Any political decision be it appointing a new governor or making a new regulation about the teachers, if felt risky, were immediately brought to the high courts. Thus, the Turkish judiciary emerged another autonomous bureaucratic agent which plays a critical role in the state elites' struggle with political elites. With a mission of protecting the status quo , it is very normal to see frequent tensions between the high courts and the political elites. For example, in the past the council of state underlined that the primary mission of Turkish universities is to educate young Kemalists (Radikal 2006). Also, they frequently issue press communiqués reflecting the importance of Kemalism and the need to be cautious against threats to the secular system. Secondly, a strong presidency was created as a guaranteeing mechanism. The presidency was created to form the autonomous higher bureaucracy according to the state elites’ priorities. Yet, any appointment decree for other posts by the government must be signed by the president. By creating such a strong presidency, it was planned

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to guarantee the regime against unwanted developments. Since the presidency holds such importance, the election of presidents has always come with political crisis. Thus, civil actors, with very few exceptions, were not permitted to elect their candidates even though they had parliamentary majority. Therefore, it has been a normal practice to elect several non-political but loyal figures for the presidential post. For example, all Turkish presidents between 1961 and 1989 were former chiefs of staff. 2000-2009: The Rise of Coup-Proofing Political Elites Political elites in this period have capacity to implement various coup-proofing strategies. Structural developments that now enable them in coup-proofing can be analyzed under two titles: Firstly, political elites have gained a capacity to mobilize man power in state bureaucracy. With this capacity, through recruitment, they can transform the Kemalist characteristics of the bureaucratic elites. In other words, unlike the previous periods, today, political elites are in alliance with a large group of bureaucrats in major units of state machinery. Thus, they are in coalition with intellectuals, professors, judges, prosecutors, police, businessmen and journalists. The rise of educated alternative elites is mainly the product of complex social developments such as the expansion of modern education institutions and the efforts of religious movements in educational sphere. The state elites could not keep the sterile Kemalist nature of nucleus bureaucracy. In the end, the undiluted Kemalist core of bureaucracy is mixed with those new elites coming from the periphery (Gülay 2007: 39, see also Yilmaz 2005 and Yilmaz 2009). Secondly, to realize such strategies, political elites have also gained financing capacity. The rise of new middle class in Anatolian towns ended the monopoly of statecentric capital which had always been with the Kemalist elites. Political elites, particularly in the case of the JDP, are backed by a complex conservative protobourgeoisie. The rise of new industrial centers in Anatolia such as Kayseri and Gaziantep, the volume of exports for each is not less then 1.5 billions US dollars a year, increased the competence of political elites. Traditional Anatolian bourgeoisie, the backbone of conservative political elites like the JDP, became a significant element of the political equation. Consequently, political elites, almost as a unique case, are capable of mobilizing man and financial power against the Republican elites. Therefore, various coup-proofing techniques analyzed below should be seen as the products of the complex social transformation summarized above.

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The ‘fall’ of Presidency: Since the presidency was created to protect the contract between the state and political elites, the worse thing to the Republican elites is to lose presidency. When the JDP attempted to elect Abdullah Gül in 2007, it quickly became a state crisis. The Constitutional Court, after a highly controversial decision, invalidated the early rounds of the elections, the army intervened by memorandum. The crisis obliged early elections. Despite the political chaos, Gül was elected as the eleventh president of the republic. With the election of Gül, political elites gained an unprecedented instrument which may play a significant role in coup-proofing. In other words, with Gül’s presidency, political elites captured the nucleus of the state machinery. Gül himself is a typical peripheral actor which has no Republican elite origin. Coming from a religious tradition and served in several previous religious parties, Gül was certainly a deviation from the traditional Republican line. In terms of coup-proofing, the first issue is the military aspect. Gül is now the commander of the armed forces. First of all, any high level military appointment requires his consent. All major military appointments and promotions also require his official endorsement. Yet, the traditional alliance between the president and the army against the government was dissolved. In the past, the corridor between the army and the president worked so far as an instrument of influence over the political elites. The formula “army plus the president”, to remind six of the former presidents were generals, put the government into a restricted zone. Thus, by the fall of presidency, the officers lost a very important historical corridor that kept them legally in the political game. Now, putting aside a third costly option they should either obey the president or stop. Ironically, as a result of this situation, weekly meetings are scheduled between the prime minister and chief of staff as no routine tête-à-tête meeting ever took place before. The lack of such a regular meeting in the past was basically the army’s autonomous position. Gül’s presidency, a man out of the traditional Kemalist quota, weaken the traditional role of army vis a vis political elites. Secondly, with regards to Turkish politics, the president has a huge influence on the system. First, any governmental decision or appointment requires the president’s consent. For example, even an appointment of a governor or an ambassador requires the president’s endorsement. However, as the second, more important is the appointment of higher bureaucrats and judges. Most of the higher bureaucrats and judges, such as the members of the Constitutional Court, university presidents are appointed by the president. The mixed system in Turkey in order to keep those high level positions independent of political elites’ influence had made the president the key actor in forming them. The original expectation was that the post would always be

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fulfilled by Kemalists. The president, who is the key actor in protecting the state elites’ autonomy against the political elites, is now from the quota of political elites. As expected, Gül, by his appointments to different important posts is changing the statist nature of the higher bureaucracy. In so doing, Gül carries out the most efficient coup-proofing strategy as no name appointed by him comes from the orthodox Kemalist tradition. A typical sample is the transformation of higher university bureaucracy which was completely changed by Gül within two years. For example, in 2003, it was possible to see that university professors joined by their rectors holding a poster bearing messages inviting the army to protect the regime against the government (Akflam 2003). However, less then two years, the ideological structure of the university system with regard to rectors and member of Higher Council of Education (YÖK) was changed by Gül. More as president Gül has appointed many university rectors which also paved the way to more complicated changes in all university mechanism in Turkey. The presidential influence is not limited with appointments. For example, Gül did not endorse the appointment of professors to YÖK, for his personal reservations, even though the election of professors was conducted upon the legal procedure. Interestingly, the Turkish legal system does not say anything concerning the President’s ex officio acts, even such as not appointing a professor who is elected legally. The role of the academics should not be underestimated remembered their role as legitimacy sustaining actors in the previous coups. Thus, the traditional cooperation between the army and the universities was weaken after Gül’s appointments. Instead, after Gül’s appointments, many universities have sided with the JDP government even on critical issues such as the Kurdish problem. The case of university appointments is an important sample to illustrate how the president is influential in transforming the higher echelons of Turkish bureaucracy. To conclude, with the ‘fall’ of presidency, political elites gained the most important instrument in employing full scale coup-proofing strategy that is capacity to transform the nucleus of the state elites. To paraphrase the Kemalist fear, President Gül may dramatically change the structure of the Turkish high bureaucracy by his appointments during his term up until 2014. More dramatic is the recent amendment of the election process of the President with a referendum in 2007. Despite the strong criticism of Kemalist elites, the JDP amended the constitution with a referendum. Accordingly, from now on, the president will be elected by a direct and popular vote, which virtually ended the leverage of the Republican elites. By conveying the right of president to the people, the Kemalist tradition faced an unprecedented blow since all other bureaucratic and autonomous units are dependent on the presidency.

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Strengthening Police Intelligence: The problem of intelligence gathering forced political elites to create an alternative mechanism. However, political elites’ impotence in creating a specific parallel intelligent service drive them strengthening an existing intelligence unit within the police: Emniyet stihbarat (E). It quickly became the most important intelligence unit that is used by political elites in chasing various activisms within the army as a small unit which works under the general directorate of police. But, it has always been under the control of governments. Historically, E can be traced back to the 30s. In 1937, a special unit was founded for private missions. In 1951, it was turned into a “private bureau”. In 1958, small units after special courses were sent to major cities. The creation of small intelligent units was important development in terms of expanding the civilian intelligent. As expected, the military regime in 1960 abolished those units. It was in 1975, the intelligent unit was rehabilitated as an independent branch within the police. It was after the 80s, the role of this in coupproofing strategies became more distinctive. In 1983, the government decided to create police intelligent units in all provinces with a new law. With a new regulation in 1985, E was given the authority of making intelligence activities across the country. E has a very well trained staff working with high-tech that makes it more functional than others. Additionally, the governments gradually strengthen its authority by legal regulations. Those regulations gave extra-ordinary authority to E including surveillance and monitoring. For example, with the approval of a court, E can even monitor private phone calls. Today, E is an influential organization in coup-proofing strategies of the political elites. It is equipped with all technical and legal capacity to follow illegal attempts even among the military officers, a key factor in coup-proofing. The acts are reported and disseminated via media that pose a legitimacy question for the military elites and work as a further coup-proofing technique. In 2008, several generals, as a unique case, were arrested based on E reports. As another unique case, a prosecutor demanded the trial of several generals depending on serious E intelligence reports. To give some samples these reports include very noteworthy cases: Meetings of generals to organize a coup against the government, several military attempts to influence the Turkish constitutional court, how soldiers try to stop the government in recognizing the Annan plan in Cyprus (Radikal 2008). Likewise, E, after analyzing an arrested journalist’s computer, published detailed notes of several meetings in which army generals met to decide how to topple down the government (Sabah 2009). The arrest of Levent Ersöz, a retired fugitive general, is another sample that displays how E operates. Ersöz escaped to Russia upon an arrest order by a court for involving illegal affairs against the government. Ersöz came back to Turkey in secret ways. However,

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he was arrested by police in hospital while accompanied by non-commissioned officer (Sabah 2009). To conclude, E, a unit which gathers detailed information even about the most secret meetings of the military elites, has become an effective coup-proofing instrument in the hands of political elites. Unsurprisingly, it is the most bothersome organization for the military and bureaucratic elites and blamed for being under the control of several religious orders (Radikal 2009). Strengthening Police: The police’s manpower is around 190 000, approximately one third of the army’s manpower. As a highly professional organization, the Turkish police deserve to be labeled as one of the most high-tech corps. Yet, as a professional unit, it has a chance to choose and train young citizens for long years. Also, the police have several highly professional and trained units such as Özel Harekat Dairesi (Special Forces Unit). Organized in 48 provinces, Özel Harekat Dairesi is like a small army with heavy weapons. In a Weberian sense, the police have been the most important agent to the central governments in realizing a full authority. Unlike many other units, the police have always been under the civilian control. It has been the most loyal bureaucratic unit. Moreover, most of the police force is from the peripheral and low-income earning parts of the society. Students which are accepted to police colleges mainly come from small villages (Ça¤lar 2004: 348-364). Sociologically, the police is a peripheral organization which is unlike the army more open to traditional and religious patterns. Especially center-right parties have paid much attention to the police recruitment in order to create a loyalist force. Thus, the Turkish police have been an organization with conservative or center-right worldview. Part of coup-proofing strategy, political elites have been the champion of strengthening the police. In this vein, they created special units within the police. Secondly, sophisticated weaponry was bought for these units. Even during the civilmilitary tension in the late 90s, the army demanded the confiscation of the heavy weaponry possessed by the police. The list of heavy weapons included rockets, special machine guns and anti-aircraft rockets (Star 2008). However, political elites in the 2000s resumed strengthening the police’s armed capacity. The Turkish police today have a very sophisticated armed power including Skorsky helicopters. The rise of police with such armored instruments has always been a concern for the military elites. Since police directly symbolizes the political elites’ authority, frequent problems with the army take place. For example, the army demanded Özel Harekat Dairesi leave the South Eastern Anatolia. In 2008, after eleven years, special police forces

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were invited back due to the frequent raids of PKK. Similarly, frequent tensions are very normal between the police and the gendarmerie. Gendarmerie controls more than 90 percent of the Turkish territory, virtually all rural areas. Police face serious difficulties in terms of intelligence gathering in these areas (Yeniflafak 2001). Disputes between the police and the gendarmerie over several issues such as controlling various strategic points such as ports are also frequent (Zaman 2008). Political elites naturally want to strengthen police and decrease the role of gendarmerie. Another point to be underlined in this vein is the army’s rejection of exempting military service for the policemen. And finally, it should be reminded that after each military intervention, intelligence units of police were abolished yet heavy weaponry were transferred to the army. Actually, the tug of war between the police and the army is the reflection of disputes among the civilians and the army. The civilians, in that way, isolated themselves against the direct, harsh effects of the military. The Transformation of MIT: Coups are illegal therefore they are matured under secret conditions (Needler 1966: 617). Thus, for governments, intelligence is critically important in coup-proofing. In Turkey, MT is the central institution given the responsibility of gathering intelligence concerning national security at all levels. However, MT in the past was a more military organization. The first civilian director to MT was appointed by Adnan Menderes in 1957. But, after the 1960 coup, MT was militarized quickly and a general was appointed as the director. More, important officers who played major roles in coups have MT origin. For instance, Major General Naci Akun who ruled MT after the 1960 coup was an important military officer who was among the first soldiers planned a coup against the Menderes government. Similarly, a leading name of the 1980 coup, Nurettin Ersin ruled MT in 1971-1973, appointed by the junta leaders of the 1971 intervention (Zaman 1998). To keep MT under the military control, no full general was appointed as a director. The directors of MT were all been lieutenant or major generals who still had some expectations of promotions in the army hierarchy which kept them loyal to the army (Sabah 2007). An appointment of a full general was perceived risky. The military characteristic was dominant so much so that in the early 1990s, the number of soldiers working in the MT was less than 4%; however the number of military rulers was 35% (Sabah 2007). The dominance of military officers created two major problems: First, they never cooperated with the governments. They always worked with the army. Even MT became a military instrument chasing the civilians. Different junta seeking generals used MT in chasing the parliamentarians, the prime minister and even the rival soldiers. MT was used by the Republican elites as an instrument in controlling

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risky actors. Consequently, with some exceptional cases, the governments ruled Turkey without any proper intelligence. Secondly, due to the military characteristics, MT was not very professional and successful. In 1972, thirty officers led by Hiram Abas wrote a letter to the directorate, criticizing the major problems of MT, emphasizing the need for professional reform (Zaman 1998). Political elites dreamed a civilian MT which is under their control. Thus strengthening the civilian control over the MT has been a major coup-proofing strategy in Turkey. For example, Turgut Özal attempted to appoint Abas part of his reform program. However, Abas was assassinated (Radikal 1998, Milliyet 2001). Finally, in 1992, Sönmez Köksal, a former ambassador, was appointed as a civil director. Köksal launched a complex reform agenda. MT started employing the graduates of leading universities. Also, as a first time, instead of the former secret process, MT published advertisements in popular newspapers. Recruitment process became more transparent. Köksal also in this vein promoted retirement process in order to purge the older officers (Aksiyon 1995). Naturally, civil cadres transformed MT into a different organization. Part of this, the former military discourse was abandoned. MT started to credit new approaches with regard to political problems such as the Kurdish issue or civil-military relations. For example how Cevat Önefl, the former assistant director of MIT, commented on those issues are important proofs in this vein. According to Önefl, the official policies employed towards the Kurdish issue have failed. He believes that Turkey committed grave mistakes in the past. How Önefl as a former director of MT, interpreted the PKK is itself striking case to confirm the transformation: “I appreciate the discourse which is defended by PKK which underlines the need for solution within Turkey’s integrity” (Milliyet 2007). As another case, Sönmez Köksal as a former director of MT, argued that Turkey’s capacity of intelligence gathering should be criticized. To him, unlike many states such as the US and Germany reformed their intelligence organizations after the Cold War era, whereas Turkey failed in this task (Milliyet 2002). Finally, Emre Taner’s, the incumbent director, policies display the radical transformation of MT. Taner defends a completely different perspective on major issues of Turkey such as the Kurdish problem (Yeniflafak 2007). Under Taner’s administration MT became an important bureaucratic unit which helps the government in initiating a civilian agenda on the Kurdish issue. The transformation of MT contributed to coup-proofing capacity of political elites in two major ways. The first, as stated above, was the emergence of a civilian discourse in approaching several problems such as the Kurdish issue. MT, in so doing, contributed also the de-securitization of domestic politics which automatically

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increase the leverage of political actors. Secondly, and more importantly, MT after the transformation, became a governmental agent which even chased the military officers. For example, in 2005, MT opened a file on twenty officers in the army and informed the prime minister and chief of staff. According to the MT report several officers formed an illegal organization with an agenda of an anti-government action. Akflam ’s, a newspaper, heading summarizes the significance of the event: “Historic inquiry!” (Akflam 2008). In 2003, it was later learnt that, MT had presented a secret file to the prime minister about the several developments in the army. The rise of MT with this role even chasing the military officers for illegal actions is indeed a new development. MT becomes an organization that informs the government even about the secret plots in the army. Murat Yetkin eloquently summarized this as follows (Radikal 2008): MT, an organization which had been criticized for not informing the government about the illegal affairs in the army during the 1960, 1971 and 1980 coup periods, is now chasing all illegal activities even in the army and informing the government.

Intra-Army Factionalism: Officers of the armed forces are not dominated by a single political viewpoint (Maniruzzaman 1992: 741). Similarly, despite a strict recruitment process and the dominance of a Kemalist ideology, there are contending political viewpoints in the army. Historically, the Turkish army has had a divided corpus of generals, yet, the division has played major roles in all historical events from Balkan Wars to the military interventions in the republican era. The 1960 coup itself was a brilliant example proving the divided nature of the army. For example, the 1960 coup was a surprise for the incumbent government. The Chief of Staff and more than fifteen high level generals confirmed their loyalty to the Prime Minister just before the coup (Yeflilbursa 2005: 126). Paradoxically, the coup was carried out by a group of colonels and it was humiliating for an army, boasted for its strict hierarchy (Heper 2005: 36). Factionalism among the junta leaders of the 1960 coup was itself a built-in stabilizer for further coups in army. For instance, soon after the coup, in 1961, a group of officers defended that another intervention was needed. A protocol was signed named “9 February” aiming another coup which also failed due to factionalism. One needs a long list to detail all factions in this period: 21 May Coup attempt, 11 Air Force Officer Group, 14 February Process Officers, 22 February Process officers… (Kayal1 2005: 75-112). The 1971 military intervention was by far the most divided as “different juntas at work, one within another and sometimes independent of one another” (Michaud-Emin

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2008: 28-29). Actually, it was also a coup against the radical left officers who were planning a coup in the following weeks. The period before the intervention was even worse. Tens of groups existed with different targets. Of all, Talat Aydemir, the commander of military academy, deserves special attention who attempted three coups. Even in 1963, Aydemir, as a retired general, had an influence over the officers. In 1963, during the coup attempt of Aydemir, the 1st Division of the Air Forces operated against the Aydemir faction reminding a domestic war. To display the dimension of factionalism, military airplanes flew over the Military Academy and a general even ordered shooting ‘insurgent officers’ (Batur 1983: 117). Reminding the previous samples, the politicization of the army in the late 90s again supported the rise of intra-army factionalism. Roughly, the period that had its inception in 1995 which continues today is an exceptional period in which the army is highly politicized in a continuos format. As expected the continues politicization of the army increased the political competition among officers which strengthens political elites coup-proofing capacity. Three major potential types of divisions can be used to analyze the Turkish army: The first is the difference between the old and young officers. On 23 May 2003,

Cumhuriyet, a Kemalist newspaper, published a headline: “Young Officers Distressed” (Cumhuriyet 2003). Accordingly, young officers were unhappy about the JDP government’s policies for challenging Kemalism. The young officers’ phenomenon is frequently used in the civil-military relations. However, the problem is quite complex as it is not clear what the young officers’ political position is. Different from Cumhuriyet , some others argue that young officers, different than the older ones, are not coupseeking actors. For instance, Salim Derviflo¤lu, a retired commander of the navy, argued that the presentation of young officers as coup-seeking actors is not correct (Yeniflafak 2009). Similarly, Hilmi Özkök, a former chief of staff, argued that the young generation in the army are more democratic (Today’s Zaman 2009). Thus, the phenomenon of old and young is explanatory in analyzing the behavior of military officers. The second is ideological differences which have always played important role among the officers. Ideological difference here refers to various type of intellectual positioning such as being communist or liberal. More precisely, the corpus of the officers in the army embraces different officers with different ideological orientations. There are officers with various political ideas such as left-leaning, communist, anti-American, pro-Russian, anti-EU, liberal, pro-EU, conservative. For example, Muhsin Batur, a former general commander of the Turkish Air Forces, noted in his biography that many officers were reading the books of leading Turkish communists in the late 70s (Batur 1983: 139). To give how officers may differ in foreign

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policy today, Tuncer K1 l1 nç, full general and the last military Secretary of the MGK, while he was in office, declared that “Turkey should have closer relations with Russia and Iran as an alternative to the EU.” However, he was quickly criticized by several other generals (Milliyet 2002). But, the idea of close contacts with Iran, remembering the traditional military discourse on this state, displays how military officers are divided deeply. The third divisive point is the contending ideas on how to protect corporate interests of the officers. Along with radical officers who always believe coup is normal when it is necessary, there are moderate officers who argue that coup is not the only option to protect their corporate interests. As expected, the competition of different approaches is important. For example, in 2003, a meeting organized at the headquarters of the army to decide how the army would react to the government’s policies. In the meeting, the commander of the navy, Yener Karahano¤lu urged for a plan, Aytaç Yalman, commander of the land troops, suggested a memorandum, Ibrahim F1 rt1 na, the commander of the air forces, demanded closure of parliament. However, Hilmi Özkök, the chief of staff, emphasized that anti-democratic measures were not logical (Star 2009). The analysis of factionalism is beyond the scope of this article (Özda¤ 2004: 75205). Important is how factionalism contributes to the political elites’ capacity of coupproofing. To begin with, political elites form loose alliance with the moderate generals. The cooperation with Erdo¤an government and the Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök is a good example of such alliances. Özkök played a critical role during his tenure particularly disapproving radical officers’ intervention plans (Heper 2005: 217). Such alliances play significant role especially when the governments come up with reform demands. The political elites have an unprecedented capacity to make various bargains with generals mainly due to the intra-army factionalism. Secondly, intra-officer tensions helped political elites in discovering several plots. Officers who are unhappy about the radical officers’ plans do not refrain from revealing the information they have. They send even the official documents to reveal various clandestine organizations in the army. For example, recently, an officer sent a letter and informed prosecutors about illegal attempts in the army against the government which ended up with the arrest of an officer (Radikal 2009). Seeing that the government backed by prosecutors makes use of such documents, officers in different factions become more cooperative in revealing their information. Unsurprisingly, the discord of officers prevents them in creating strong and effective coalition against the government. Recent revelations of official documents proves that there is a considerable number of officers who disagree with the army headquarters and behave independently. Finally, intra-army factionalism wakens the social prestige of the army which in the long run paradoxically help the

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political elites in coup-proofing. For example, thanks to the information revealed part of the factional rivalry among officers, the army became almost a kind of transparent institution whose even secret files can be seen on newspaper pages. Creating a New Media: In the past, the Turkish media in unison supported the army. Military declarations were published as flash news without any substantial criticism. No mainstream newspaper criticized major military interventions. In general, for long years what are meant by the mainstream media were nationalist, Kemalist and secular newspapers. However political elites particularly during the JDP era have been successful in breaking Kemalist monopoly in the media. The rise of a critical media in line with the political elites has become an efficient coup-proofing strategy. To begin with, alternative media organs, which used to be labeled for long years as marginal, have come to the fore as strong actors. Having their origins in the 80s, in this vein, conservative newspapers rose as major actors in the 2000s. Several newspapers such as Zaman, Türkiye and Yeniflafak became leading newspapers with mass circulations. They are all owned by conservative groups with somehow Islamicleaning worldviews. Unlike the mainstream newspapers, they are very critical of the army. The public influence of those conservative newspapers is very effective so much so that the army has already lost its previous untouchable position. Secondly, with the help of the JDP government, various newspapers were passed into other hands. Several major newspapers such as Sabah, Star and Bugün were bought by mainly conservative groups, dramatically changing the general appearance of the media.

Sabah, which is known for its pro-army line during the 1997 military activism, has now a totally different policy. A paper which supported military activism in the late 90s reacted to the army’s intervention by memorandum in 2007 with a radical headline which deserved to be labeled as the first of this type: “No more coups!” (Sabah 2007). Similarly, other papers which changed hands such as Star and Bugün have a highly critical position on the army’s political policies. Thirdly, newspapers were founded with a radically anti-army publishing line such as Taraf. Papers like Taraf as independent publish the utmost criticism about the army. It is very normal to read some news, also supported by several leaked out records from the army, in such papers about the corruption scandals in the army. As expected, the cited transformation of the media in Turkey was paralleled by the similar developments in other branches such as TV channels, radios and internet media.

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New Judiciary Elites: Despite all sorts of political activity of soldiers are illegal in the law, the Turkish junta leaders enjoy a highly immune environment. Rare attempts such as prosecutor Sacit Kayasu, who attempted to judge the leaders of the 1980 junta, was quickly stopped and even the prosecutors were dismissed from the profession. However, the picture changed dramatically in 2007. Part of a legal prosecution which is named as Ergenekon, upon the public prosecutor’s demand, the court arrested several full generals among which there was the former general commander of gendarmerie. Part of the same prosecution, the former military secretary of the MGK was also taken into custody and brought to the court. More importantly, the court ordered the arrest of several active officers and even military cadets for involving illegal actions against the government. It was also later learnt that part of the same process, many retired and active soldiers were already being chased by various intelligent services with a court approval. The legal activity agains the military officers, which should be seen as another coup-proofing strategy, is the product of several developments. First, the JDP has been ruling Turkey since 2002 with a huge majority in the parliament. Unlike the previous weak or coalition governments, the JDP’s political elites are more organized and strong against the state elites. Second, again as a result of long reign of seven years, where an average government continues less then two years, the JDP through his appointments is the most transformative party in terms of changing the formation of bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, like in other fields, the JDP government’s appointments changed the composition of the judiciary elite. Third, the JDP government has brought several cases to the courts which are related to the illegal anti-government affairs in the army. For instance after a Turkish newspaper published a news that said that a group of officers were involved in the preparation of document to topple down the JDP government, the government immediately brought the case to the public prosecutor and demanded the punishment of those involved. As expected, the government’s avidity in activating legal mechanism against the officers enhanced the ability of prosecutors in dealing with such cases. Finally, the government publicly declares its support to prosecutors who open files against military officers who are blamed for being in illegal affair against the government. For instance, once the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges (HSYK) attempted to remove the judges and prosecutors who initiated the Ergenekon case, the JDP government’s minister of justice boycotted the HSYK as in his absence no decision can be made. More, the government including Prime Minister Erdo¤an publicly declared their support to the prosecutors in the

Ergenekon case. To conclude, the political support and immunity behind the prosecutors in their litigations concerning the illegal affairs of military officers paved

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the way for another significant coup-proofing strategy: The use of judiciary mechanism against the suspected soldiers. Conclusion Political elites in Turkey owed a special debt to the previous political leaders who created the basis of mobilization for peripheral actors which worked as the historical coup-proofing machinery. The history of coup-proofing in Turkey reveals that it is no longer possible to create certain sterile structures due to serious domestic and international dynamics. The traditional Kemalist model has no chance to survive upon the rise of new official and civil institutions that dynamically keep coup attempts at bay. The Turkish state machinery is no longer a homogenized chorus. Politics in Turkey now is under the effect of complex social formations such as conservatives and Kurds along with the conservative elites. Given the development of several transformative dynamics such as civil society and market economy, political elites’ coup-proofing capacity is likely to improve. The rise of new social groups and elites representing those created a real rationale for a contractualist model to replace the former one. Equally important is the recognition of citizenship as the organizing principle of politics. So far, citizenship has forgotten on paper and instead various ideological, religious and ethnic communal ‘citizenships’ have substituted citizenship. Thus, the rise of coup-proofing elites is a structural dynamic that provokes the consolidation of modern citizenship in Turkey.

References Adam, H. 2003/2004. “The Profile of Imam-Hatip Schools in Turkey”, Journal of Academic Studies 5(19). 156-172. Ahmad, F. 1980. “The Political Power of the Turkish Bourgeoisie Has Been Increasing with Every Decade”, MERIP 84, (January). 19-22. Aral, B. 2001. “Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society During the Özal Decade, 1983-93”, Middle Eastern Studies 37(1), (January). 72-88. Aybay, R. 1977. “Some Contemporary Constitutional Problems”, Bulletin 4(1). 21-27. Batur, M. 1983. An1 lar ve Görüfller (stanbul: Milliyet) Belkin, A. and E. Schofer. 2003. “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 47(4). 594-620.

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Birand, M. A., C. Dündar, B. Çapl1 . 2002. 12 Mart (stanbul: mge) Calar, A. 2004. “Recruitment in the Turkish Police”, Policing & Society 14(4), (December). 348-364. Danapolulos, C. P. 1992. “Civilian Supremacy in Changing Societies: Comparative Perspectives” in Constantine P. Danopoulos, (ed.) Civilian Rule in Developing World Democracy on the March? (Westview Press: Boulder, San Francisco) Emrence, C. 2006. Serbest Cumhuriyet F1 rkas1 (Istanbul: Iletisim,). Erhan, Ç. 2001. “ABD ve NATO’yla liflkiler”, in Baskin Oran (ed.), Turk Dis Politikasi (Istanbul: Iletisim). 681-715. Gülay,E. N. 2007. “The Gülen Phenomenon: A Neo-Sufi Challenge to Turkey’s Rival Elite?”, Critique, Vol. 16, No. 1 pp. 37-61. Heper, M. 2005. “The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy”, South European Society & Politics 10(1), (April). 33-44. Heper, M. 2005. “The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey”, Turkish Studies 6(2), (June). 215-231. Heper M. 1996. "Parliamentary Government with a Strong President: The Post-1989 Turkish Experience," Political Science Quarterly 111(3), (Autumn). 483-503. Heper, M. 1991. "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 18(1). 38-51. Huntington, S. 1969. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press) Karabelios, G. 1999. "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95," Middle Eastern Studies 35, 4 (October). 130-151. Karpat, K. 1964. “Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey”, World Politics 17(1), (October). 50-74. Kayal1 , K. 2005. Ordu ve Siyaset, (stanbul: letiflim) Linz, J. J. and A. Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation

Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University) Maniruzzaman, T. 1992. “Arms Transfers, Military Coups, and Military Rule in Developing States”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(4), (December) . 733-755.

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Michaud-Emin, L. 2008. “The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the Seventh Harmonization Package and its Ramifiations for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, Turkish Studies 8(1), (March). 25-42. Needler, M. C. 1966. “Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America”, The American Political Science Review 60(3), (September). 616-626. Özda¤, Ü. 2004. Menderes Döneminde Ordu-Siyaset liflkileri ve 27 May1 s htilali (stanbul: Boyut) Quinlivan J. T. 1999 “Coup-Proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East”, International Security 24(2), (Autumn,). 131-165. Sherwood, W. B. 1967. “The Rise of the Justice Party in Turkey”, World Politics 20(1), (October). 54-65. Sunar . cited in Clement H. Dodd. 1988 "Aspects of the Turkish State: Political Culture, Organized Interest and Village Communities," Bulletin 15(1/2). 78-86. Yaprak, F. 2008. Military Rule and Democracy in Greece and in Turkey , Unpublished PH D Thesis: University of Virginia. Yeilbursa, B.K. 2005. “The ‘Revolution’ of 27 May 1960 in Turkey: British Policy towards Turkey”, Middle Eastern Studies 41(1), (January). 121-151. Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2005. “State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey”. The Muslim World, 95. 385-411. Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2009. “Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst”. Insight Turkey, 11(2). 93-112.

Newspapers Aksiyon Weekly, 4 February 1995. Daily Akflam Daily, 18 July 2008. Aksam Daily, 26 October 2003. Cumhuriyet Daily, 23 May 2003. Hurriyet Daily, 16 Ekim 2007. Milliyet Daily, 25 June 2008. Milliyet Daily, 18 January 2007. Milliyet Daily, 3 May 2004. Milliyet Daily, 22 November 2002.

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Milliyet Daily, 9 March 2002. Milliyet Daily, 22 July 2001. Radikal Daily, 15 January 2009. Radikal Daily, 12 November 2009. Radikal Daily, 19 July 2008 Radikal Daily, 26 December 2008. Radikal Daily, 14 February 2006 Radikal Daily, 4 September 1998, Referans Daily, 4 Mart 2007. Sabah Daily, 23 March 2009. Sabah Daily, 15 January 2009. Sabah Daily, 29 April 2007. Sabah Daily, 23 December 2007. Sabah Daily, 19 July 2007. Star Daily, 28 March 2009 Star Daily, 13 October 2008. Today’s Zaman Daily, 25 March 2009. Yeniflafak Daily, 3 April 2009. Yeniflafak Daily, 9 January 2007. Yeniflafak Daily, 6 May 2001. Zaman Daily, 4 September 2008. Zaman Daily, 30 August 1998. Zaman Daily, 30 August 1998

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

An Attempt at Pseudo-Democracy and Tactical Liberalization in Turkey: An Analysis of Ismet Inönü’s Decision to Transition to a Multi-Party Political System

Kemal Ozden* and Ihsan Yilmaz**

Abstract

Turkish experiment of transition to multi-party politics in 1946 has been seen by transition to democracy comparativists as an example of the cases in which the ruling elites deliberately decide that the society is diverse so this diversity needs to be translated into the political sphere by allowing multi-party politics. However, this study challanges this view and suggests that a close reading of the critical juncture of 1946 when the President and the leader of Republican People’s Party smet nönü decided to allow other parties to operate shows that it was not that the President nönü succumbed to the reality of diversity but domestic and international concerns forced him to act towards a multi-party political structure. In his mind, he had a pseudodemocratic system where he and his party would continue to rule the country in a hegemonic party system setting where a ruling party monopolizes the political arena, using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to deny formally legal opposition parties any real chance of competing for power. Keywords: Pseudo-Democracy, Tactical Liberalization, Multi-Party Politics,

Democratic Elections, Turkish Politics, smet nönü

*

(corresponding author), Fatih University. [email protected]

**

Fatih University. [email protected]

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Introduction What conditions make democracy possible and what conditions make it thrive? Political scientists favor types of explanations for this question. First, stable democracy is connected with certain economic and social background conditions. Second explanation argues that there is a need for certain beliefs and attitudes among the citizens for democracy to survive. Third explanation looks at the social and political structure (Rustow 1970, 337-338). But the problem is, these explanations do not address the question how democracies emerge in the first place (Rustow 1970, 339). Rustow (1970) argues that the vast majority of citizens must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to in order democracy to emerge. Secondly, the dynamic process of democratization is “set off by a prolonged and inclusive political struggle” (Rustow 1970, 352). The emergence of new elite that arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social group into concerted action could start such a struggle (Rustow 1970, 352). Polarization not pluralism is the defining characteristic of the emergence period (Rustow 1970, 354). Thirdly, emergence of democracy is related to deliberate decision of the political leaders to acknowledge the existence of diversity and to be ready to transmit the diversity into political parties by allowing political parties to be established and freely operate (Rustow 1970, 355). Turkish experiment of transition to multi-party politics in 1946 has been seen by scholars, and Rustow is one of them, as an example of the above-mentioned third explanation that the political leaders delibaretely decided that the society was diverse so this diversity needed to be translated inti politics by allowing multi-party politics but a close reading of the critical juncture of 1946 when the President and the leader of Republican People’s Party (RPP) smet nönü decided to allow other parties to operate shows that it was not that the President nönü succumbed to the reality of diversity but domestic and international concerns forced him to act towards a multi-party political structure. But again, a close scrutiny of his decisions and behaviours before and after the decision shows also that in his mind he had a pseudo-democratic system where he and his party would continue to rule the country in a hegemonic party system setting. In a hegemonic party system, “a relatively institutionalized ruling party monopolizes the political arena, using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to deny formally legal opposition parties any real chance of competing for power” (Diamond 2002, 25). In the words of Volpi (2004, 1063), “the term “pseudo-democracy” resonates distinctively with the contemporary era, in which democracy is the only broadly legitimate regime form, and regimes have felt unprecedented pressure (international and domestic) to adopt—or at least to mimic—the democratic form” (see also Collier and Levitsky 1997, Levitsky and Way 2002, Diamond 2002, 24). In such a

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political setting, “the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination.” (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1999, xviii). Some other scholars labe this phenomenon as “tactical liberalization” (Brumberg 2004). In these tactically liberalized pseudo-democracies, “elections and other “democratic” institutions are largely façades, yet they may provide some space for political opposition, independent media, and social organizations that do not seriously criticize or challenge the regime” (Diamond 2002, 26). Our analysis of the Turkish case suggests that this is what the President nönü had in mind when he opted for multiparty politics in 1946’s Turkey just after the World War II. To perceive that the transition to a multiparty era was an event that appeared at a stroke would no doubt be a grave error. In Turkish political history, and in particular in the process of democracy, many national and international social, political and economic factors were effective in reaching this very crucial stage. A single party emerges from a society that is believed to be classless. There is only one party in the system because there are no other classes. The RPP elites, due to this belief, assumed that there was no need for other political parties and even today the heated debates surrounding Islam-state-society issues show that the RPP elite has always wanted to maintain their imagined monopolist political hegemony over the public sphere by several means (see in detail Yilmaz 2002, 2005, 2009). In a party congress in 1923, Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Turkish Republic and RPP stated that “In my view, our people will follow many different interests from each other and because of this, does not reside amongst the various classes that are in conflict with each other. The classes within the nation are of the nature that are necessary, that complement each other and form a whole. For this reason the People’s Party will work to provide the rights, the reasons for advancement and the prosperity for all classes” (Saribay 2001, 43-44). Thus, initially the Kemalist elite advocated the view that there was no need for a second party as the nation was assumed to be monolithic and homogenous. But as a result of the domestic and international pressures, they had to accept a second party but this time they implicitly argued that there was no need for a second ideology. That is why they only recognized a party that was established by their former party colleagues. As a matter of fact, like Mustafa Kemal before him, nönü encouraged his former party colleagues to establish a party. 1946 is the strongest evidence to show that what nönü was doing was not different from what Mustafa Kemal did. He only needed a weak opposition party to tackle domestic and international pressures. As far as the international setting, concerns and pressures were concerned, this was indeed a reminiscent of the modernist and

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western-oriented Ottoman elite tradition of the nineteenth century: any time they wanted to please the Western powers they announced liberal changes such as 1839 and 1856 but hesitated to apply them. Domestic Pressure One of the main domestic pressures that forced both Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his successor smet nönü to move towards tactical liberalization or pseudodemocracy was the fact the Turkish society experienced democracy and multi-party politics well before the establishment of the Republic in 1923 which started a one party authoritarian regime. Thus, to say that a multi-party system in Turkey commenced in 1946 is in one respect a mistake for prior to the single party era in 1923, a multi-party political system was present in the Ottoman state and even during the Independence War between 1920-1922, the Parliament had two main groups that opposed each other on several issues. Domestic pressure had always existed during the time of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and even in his most powerful years he responded to these pressures by having a satellite party established in 1930. But observing the new party’s meteoric rise in popularity, he shut down the party after 3 months of operation even though the new party’s ideology was identical to his own ruling party (Republican People’s Party) and its founders were his old friends, including his sister. When looking at political parties during the Ottoman period, we first note that they emerged as a “society” or “committee” (cemiyet) and later took the name “party” (f1 rka). Even though certain organizations had “party” or a “prototype party” characteristics, the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (ttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) is considered to be the first political party. Aside from this, the Ottoman Union Committee (ttihad-1 Osmani Cemiyeti) founded in 1889, the Private Enterprise and Re-Administration Committee (Teflebbüs-i fiahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti) founded in 1902 and in the following years, the Ottoman Freedom Party (Osmanl1 Ahrar F1 rkas1 ), the Ottoman Democracy Party (Osmanl1 Demokrat F1rkas1 or F1rka-i bad), the Moderate Freedom Lovers Party (Mutedil Hürriyetperveran F1rkas1 ), the People’s Party (Ahali Partisi), the Ottoman Socialist Party (Osmanl1 Sosyalist F1rkas1 ), the Freedom and Alliance Party (Hürriyet ve tilaf F1rkas1 ), the National Constitution Party (Milli Meflrutiyet F1rkas1 ), the Social Democrat Party (Sosyal Demokrat F1rkas1 ), the People’s Participation Party (Halk  fltirakiyun F1rkas1 ) and numerous other political parties whose names have not been mentioned here clearly indicate that parties continued their activities throughout the late Ottoman era.

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Even if it is believed that a one-party system reflects the characteristics of a classless society, soon after the Parliament began its activities, different viewpoints, political movements and power groups began to emerge. Different from Mustafa Kemal’s First Group, the Second Group continued its activities as an opposition group. dris Küçükömer explained the reason for this separation as, “Competition among bureaucrats.” According to Küçükömer, this Second Group was in fact parallel to the Ottoman Freedom and Allegiance Party. After its founding in 1920, certain dissidences appeared in the Turkish Parliament, Turkey Grand National Assembly (TGNA). In essence these differences can be gathered into two groups. The first group was those that supported the ideas and programs under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and the second group, which allegedly were the so-called supporters of the sultanate and caliphate. In fact, Heper says that, religion was never used as a tool for the mobilization of the masses of people other than the first years of the War of Independence (Heper 1986, 375). Since the separation of the Parliament prevented the rapid working of the reforms, Mustafa Kemal sought measures that would accelerate the work of the TGNA. One solution was to form a large group within the Parliament thereby obtaining a majority and thus have the Parliament work move forward again. To this end, Mustafa Kemal formed the Anatolian and Rumelia Legal Defense Group together with 151 of his friends on 10 May 1921. In the election that took place on the same day, Mustafa Kemal was elected to the Group’s leadership. In time those who were outside the Anatolian and Rumelia Legal Defense Group were given the name “the Second Group” and this group by opposing certain activities became an opposition movement (Yucel 2006, 53). The first group within the Parliament became the Halk F1rkas1 in 1923. The name was changed to the Cumhuriyet Halk F1rkas1 on 10 November 1924 and to the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP (Republican People’s Party- RPP) in 1931 (Kili 1976, 21). The RPP had assumed the centralist, secular and nationalist roles of the unionists (Turgut 1986, 435). Since a preparation for elections was in question, the duality that arose in Ottoman society and as a consequence the resistance against the Islamist-Eastern front’s power that could win a majority, forced this Group to cooperate among themselves. While under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the First Group contained representatives that were not prepared for the declaration of the Republic and even those who opposed it (Küçükömer, 100). The Second Group could not prepare for the 1923 elections and did not enter the elections. Later it dissolved by itself. Actually, new amendments on the Treason Act in 1923 ( hanet-i Vataniye Kanunu) of is an important

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factor behind the dissolution of the second group (Erdo¤an 2003, 53). Because more than 1500 death penalty were given according to this act between 1920-1923. Progressive Republican Party In the transition to a multi-party system and up to the Democratic Party, two important party experiments took place in Turkey. The first was the Progressive Republican Party (Terekkiperver Cumhuriyet F1 rkas1 ) (PRP) and the other was the Free Republican Party ( Serbest Cumhuriyet F1 rkas1 ) (FRP). The events that took place in the transition to a multi-party system, led the RPP to believe that other parties would violate the reforms. This situation was the cause for the postponement to a multi-party transition for a considerable period of time (Kili 1976, 81). Those who were outside the First Group in the Parliament were uneasy due to the fact they were not a strong opposition, that there was only one power in the Parliament and as a consequence they were not faced with a secure opposition and in their view that this was a danger to democracy. After the War of Independence, certain disputes appeared among Mustafa Kemal and his friends in the Parliament on the question of a series of reforms to be undertaken. Within time these differences became deeper and wider. Certain representatives who were uncomfortable with the actions of the Republican People’s Party and who opposed them considered resigning. In fact, an important number of them were Mustafa Kemal’s comrade-in-arms prior to and after the War of Independence. Among the leading figures in this group were Kaz1 m Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele, Rauf Orbay and Adnan Ad1 var. Within this context a total of eleven individuals resigned from the Republican People’s Party and formed a new party under the name of the Progressive Republican Party in 1924. Following the allowance of a multi-party system with the 1924 Constitution, the founders of the Progressive Republican Party, which was founded on 17 November 1924, were concerned that without the existence of an opposition all powers lodged in the Parliament would create an authoritarian administration. The objective of the Progressive Republican Party was to establish a democratic balance within the country. The Progressive Republican Party thus became the first opposition party in the history of the Republic. Tense relations between the Republican Party and the Progressive Party took place in the Parliament, whereas some members of the Republican Party claimed that the two parties’ programs were similar and that the Progressive Party was founded needlessly. As a result of the election, Kaz1 m Karabekir became the chairman of the Progressive Republican Party, Rauf Orbay as the deputy chairman and Ali Fuat Cebesoy was appointed to the position of general secretary. The program of the Progressive Party stated that it was faithful to the Republican

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administration and in any event the word “republican” in its name can be seen as an indication of this declaration. In other words, it had no intention of bringing back the sultanate and the caliphate as their adversaries claimed. However, they claimed they were bound to the will of the people and that the reforms which would modernize society should not take place immediately but through time by adjusting to the process. The Progressive Party’s program, to summarize, emphasized its loyalty to the will of the nation and its adherence to the republican administration and that the reforms necessary to modernize society should not take place rapidly but rather piecemeal. Compared to the Republican People’s Party, the PRP adopted more liberal and democratic views and attached greater importance to individual freedoms. Within a short time adding 28 representatives, the PRP followed a liberal democratic platform and in this respect its objective was to revive the liberal economic policies spearheaded by the Private Enterprise and Re-Administration Committee founded by Prince Sabahattin. The party shortly found wide support in the press (Tuncay 1981, 106). However, with the Sheikh Said uprising, before it could complete its seventh month of political life, the PRP was closed by the government on 3 June 1925. Shortly after the party’s closing, on the justification that the party had a role in the “Izmir Assassination” attempt against Mustafa Kemal, the founders and members of the PRP were tried in court and as a result 17 of the party members were executed. Rauf Orbay and Adnan Ad1 var were sentenced to ten years of hard labor (Zurcher 1992, 123). Later, nönü pointed out that the Independence Tribunal which banned this party, exaggerated “so called” conservative discourses of Progressive Party (Heper 1998, 177). Free Republican Party With the closing of the Progressive Republican Party on 3 June 1925, the multiparty experiment in Turkey came to an end and once again a one-party period commenced. When looked from the outside, the one-party administration had been led to wrong assessments and the view that Turkey was governed by a dictatorship was becoming widespread. Feeling uncomfortable from the negative image formed outside, Mustafa Kemal considered a new party towards a transition to a new multiparty system. In addition, the reforms carried out between 1922 and 1930 had led to a resistance against the government. An opposition movement was simmering throughout the country. Certain goods coming under state monopoly and the effects of the economic recession spreading throughout the globe had given a momentum to this opposition. Political and economic stagnation had led to citizens questioning the one-party government. Atatürk’s principle of etatism was perceived wrongly by those within the party and a monopolism or state capitalism took place in its implementation

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(Kucukomer 1994, 95). Mustafa Kemal asked his school friend Fethi Okyar to be the leader of this new party. Aside from the party’s founder, the party’s name, program and the members of the Parliament to be transferred to the new party were determined personally by Mustafa Kemal. Thus, the Free Republican Party was founded on 12 August 1930. Fourteen members from the Republican People’s s Party transferred to the new party (Tuncay 1995, 71). Among the important members of the FRP, Atatürk’s sister Makbule Atadan is mentioned (Tunaya 1952, 630). With this party Mustafa Kemal sought to end the negative dictatorship image seen from the outside; control the opposition from the inside, and warn and require vigilance against the thought of the Republican People’s s Party members and smet nönü that the reforms have been set, what was necessary has been done and that the principles of the Republic have been completely adopted. According to the party program of the FRP, it was attached to the principles of republicanism, nationalism and secularism, that it defended liberalism and the granting of political rights to women (Akin 2002, 148). The FRP found a large mass of followers among the nation soon after its founding. Those who opposed the RPP government and those against the reforms quickly gathered around the FRP. For this reason Fethi Okyar’s visit to the Aegean region as a political rally prior to the local elections became the stage for important developments. Meetings that took place in this region witnessed very wide citizen participation. The Izmir visit became the vehicle for significant events and the cry, “Fethi Bey is coming” shook the region. The people of Izmir gathered at the meeting area in wave after wave and nearly went down on their knees for Fethi Bey shouting, “Save us, save us.” In this confusion the father of a child shot by a policeman laid the child at his feet and pleaded, “This is our first sacrifice but if more sacrifices are necessary we are willing to do so, but please save us.” Despite all the precautions taken at these meetings, demonstrations against the government and reforms nevertheless took place. This situation, from the view of the vitality of the reforms, indicated that it was too early to form an opposition party. However, expanding very rapidly during a short period, the FRP won 22 out of 500 municipalities in the 1930 local elections. FRP’s win at Samsun and Silifke provinces caused a shockwave in the government and claiming that the FRP had committed fraud; certain municipal election results were cancelled. Silifke was punished by decreasing its administrative structure from a province to sub-province. This change of administrative structure resulted in a lot of economic, social and cultural disadvantages for the dwellers of these provinces.

This type of punishments has unfortunately

appeared from time to time in Turkish history of democracy. A similar situation took place during the Democratic Party era. After Osman Bölükbafl1 was elected to the

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TGNA from K1 rflehir province as an independent candidate, the Democratic Party turned K1 rflehir into a sub-province. The allegations that the FRP engaged in irregularities during the local elections caused heated debates in the Parliament and brought Mustafa Kemal and Fethi Bey face to face with one another. Fethi Bey not wanting to be in a predicament where the FRP rapidly became a party of those focused against the Republic and the reforms, dissolved the party by submitting a petition to the Ministry of the Interior. During the foundation of the Free Party, Atatürk wrote a letter to Fethi Bey stating that as the President he is above party politics and that he could not intervene in the activities of both parties (Tunaya 1952, 633). The FRP closed on 17 November 1930 after three month of political life. Thus, not being “free” despite its name and with the closing of a “satellite” party, the continuation of a one-party regime in Turkey until 1950 became inevitable. Despite the fact that the FRP used the word “free” in its name, it is quite obvious that this party was neither “free” nor “independent.” Consequently, one cannot claim that with this party a transition to a multi-party system took place. On the contrary, this period only shows that a transition took place from a single-party to a “dominant” party system. In a dominant party system, there can be more than one party but only one party is given the opportunity to come to power. The other parties either do not have the power to govern or such a power and opportunity is not accorded to them. After the Free Republican Party, a number of other parties were tried to be established in 1930 and 1931, but either they were not allowed to be formed or those established were shut down a short time later. Examples that can be provided are the Turkish Republic Workmen and Farmers Party, the People’s s Republic Party and the Secular Republic Workers and Farmers Party. As the support given to the Progressive Republican Party and the Free Republican Party had shown that the reforms had not been sufficiently embraced by the people, which had pushed them to seek new avenues of recourse. The sociological factor that made this recourse meaningful was the deepening conflict of interest between the “war affluent” and the large land owners on the one side and the bureaucracy on the other. The reason for this was that the RPP, through the Law on the Provision of Land to Farmers and based on its belief in populism, wanted to elevate the living standards of the poor segments in the country but that this ultimately infringed the interests of the more powerful segments of society (Saribay 2001, 51). Insufficient infrastructure in the countryside and basic necessities such as roads, water and electricity not reaching villages had opened RPP’s legitimacy to debate. In 1953, only 10 villages out of 40,000 had electricity. Inflation had risen and civil servants

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were the segment most affected by this rise. The discomfort felt by villagers due to heavy taxes had gone as far as becoming the subject of jokes. The 1942 wealth tax had put pressure on the upper class and had left them in difficult circumstances leading them to openly realize that the RPP did not protect their interests. During the Second World War, the government by lowering the prices of agricultural produce in order to fight inflation and introducing an Agricultural Tax had left farmers in a precarious situation. The 1945 Law on the Provision of Land to Farmers created bitterness among large land holders and led the way for the strengthening of the opposition. Together with all of these negative factors, the disenfranchisement of basic political rights by citizens, the ban on political organizations, for example trade unions, had increasingly strengthened the argument for an opposition throughout the country. By the end of the Second World War, smet nönü’s government had become deeply unpopular, even hated, by the large majority of the Turkish population for a variety of reasons. Zurcher (2003, 206) notes that the small farmers in the rural areas, who made up about 80 per cent of the total population had not seen any great improvement in their standard of living, in health, education or communications. For instance, as late as 1953 the total number of villages that had been linked up to the electric grid was only ten (10), or 0.025 per cent of Turkey’s 40,000 villages. On the other hand, the one characteristic of the modern state with which the villagers had become familiar during the 25 years of Kemalist rule was only the state’s effective and sometimes ruthless control over the rural masses and the gendarme and tax collector became more hated and feared than ever (Zurcher 2004, 206). The landlords and villagers “had been alienated by laws which virtually allowed forced collection of farm produce” (Ahmad 1993, 102). Moreover, “the state’s secularist policies, especially the suppression of expressions of popular faith, severed the most important ideological bond between state and subject” (Zurcher 2004, 207). The erosion of the political alliance between the military-bureaucratic elite, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie made the status quo impossible to maintain (Ahmad 1993, 102). As Zurcher (2003, 207) underlines, nönü’s government lost the support of important elements of the ‘Young Turk coalition’ since during the WW II, the government, faced with the necessity to feed and equip a large army, had paid for its needs by having the Central Bank print money, thus creating inflation. At the same time, nönü “had tried to mitigate the social effects of this policy by establishing price controls and by punitive taxation on excessive profits through the wealth tax and the tax on agricultural produce. The inflation had led to a sharp drop in purchasing power for the civil servants, who numbered about 220,000. For lowerranking civil servants the drop was about one-third; for senior civil servants it was as high as two-thirds, which was something that led to tensions within the bureaucracy”

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(Zurcher 2004, 207). In addition, even though its main victim had been the non-Muslim business community, the wealth tax ( varl1 k vergisi) of 1942 had caused suspicion among the nascent Turkish bourgeoisie who perceived that the Kemalist regime, dominated as it was by bureaucrats and the military, was not an reliable supporter of the bourgeoisie’s interests (Zurcher 2004, 207). Similarly, large landowners who had been an essential element in the ‘Young Turk coalition’ since the First World War, had also been alienated by the nönü’s “policy of artificially low pricing of agricultural produce to combat inflation during the war” (Zurcher 2004, 208). nönü was aware of the domestic tensions and pressure and remembering Atatürk’s experiment with the Free Party in 1930, he decided to allow a degree of political liberalization and the formation of a political opposition as a safety valve. But as Zurcher (2003, 208) highlights, his tactical liberalization move owed also something to international developments. International Pressure and Multi-Party Discussions In 1945, as the Second World War came to an end, the winds of freedom and democracy were blowing throughout the world. Fascism, which represented an authoritarian state ideology in Europe and Asia, had been eliminated and the atomic bombs dropped on Japan had changed the course of the war signaling the defeat of the Axis Powers. As a result, a more liberal and democratic government view had taken over from an authoritarian state view and, with that, an etatist and authoritarian state understanding in Turkey began to be questioned. In a very general sense, the defeat of the Axis powers in the WW II was in itself a victory for democratic values of the The United States of America, a pluralist, capitalist democracy, and its allies. The USA “emerged from the war as the dominant world power and its example could not fail to impress many in Turkey, just as it did in countries all over the world” (Zurcher 2004, 208). But as noted by Zurcher (2003, 208), there were more immediate reasons why nönü felt compelled to move closer to the West and especially to the United States. Even though a close relationship with the Soviets had been the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the relationship had been soured first by the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact and then by Turkey’s neutral stance during the WW II and as a result the Soviets “announced that it would not renew the friendship treaty with Turkey after it lapsed in 1945 and in June that year, in conversations with the Turkish ambassador, Molotov formulated a number of conditions that would have to be met before a new friendship treaty could be signed. They included a correction of the border

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between the two countries, returning to the Soviet Union the areas in northeastern Anatolia that had been Russian between 1878 and 1918, and the establishment of a joint Turkish–Russian defence force in the area of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, in order to guard the Black Sea” (Zurcher 2004, 208). To the chagrain of Turks, “when the Soviets tabled their proposals at the inter-allied Potsdam conference in July, neither the British nor the Americans immediately rejected them” (Zurcher 2004, 208). In other words, the pressure exerted by the Soviets regarding the eastern provinces had led Turkey to accelerate its search for alliances and her request to join the United Nations was answered with the demand for greater democracy by the West. Moreover, with the outbreak of the Cold War and civil war in neighbouring Greece, nönü became well aware that “the West desired a politically stable Turkey” (Ahmad 1993, 108). It was clear to nönü “that, in order to profit fully from the American political and military support and from the Marshall Plan, it would be helpful for Turkey to conform more closely to the political and economic ideals (democracy and free enterprise) cherished by the Americans. Thus we can say that the political and economic change in Turkey after 1945 had both domestic and international roots” (Zurcher 2004, 208). Signs of Pseudo-Democratic and Tactical Liberalization Intent of smet nönü As a result of these domestic and international pressures, the RPP government and “National Chief” smet nönü faced softening their stance through liberal policies. Starting from the beginning of 1945, democracy was given a place in the statements made by nönü. In his speech on 19 May 1945, while emphasizing the importance of democracy, underlined the need for measures to make the regime more democratic and gave his word on this matter. Accordingly, on the opening session of the Parliament on 1 November 1945, he stated the need for an opposition party and that a direct voting system was necessary (Saribay 2001, 52). Moreover, in 1947 important structural changes were made in the RPP organization in order to adapt the multi-party system (Kili 1976 , 99). In fact, in some of his meetings, nönü had emphasized the importance of democracy. He stated that there was a virtue in democracy and during one of his trips, he told the people that they would learn to discover the trutj within a democratic life (Heper 1998, 137). After the legal obstacles to a multi-party system had been lifted, 15 political parties were founded within one year. These parties were the following: The National Development Party founded on 18 July 1945 and the Democratic Party founded on 7 January 1946. Other political parties established in 1946 are the Social Justice Party, the Liberal Democracy Party, the Farmers and Villagers Party, the Social Democracy Party

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of Turkey, the Socialist Party of Turkey, the Socialist Workers Party of Turkey, the Workers and Farmers Party of Turkey, the Socialist Laborer and Villager Party of Turkey, Only for Country Party, the Ergenekon Villagers and Workers Party, the Refinement and Protection Party, the Islam Protection Party and the Homeland Duty Party. The first founding stage of the Democratic Party can be considered with the “Declaration of the Four” of 7 June 1945. Karpat states that formal opposition to the republican party originated first within its own ranks over the question of land reform in 1975. The rebels eventually formed their own party, the Democratic Party in 1946 (Karpat 1973, 320). The opposition within the RPP was focused around Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü. These members of the Parliament submitted a motion to the RPP group asking for a full implementation of the constitution and the lifting of all obstacles to democracy. This warning known as the “Declaration of the Four” can be considered as symbolizing the first powerful opposition within the RPP. These declarations were supported both by the liberal leaning Vatan and the left leaning Tan newspapers. Such events were evidence of an increasing opposition to the RPP and the government between the right as well as the left wings of the party. Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü wrote critical articles in Tan and Vatan newspapers, respectively. The Declaration of the Four eventually led to the expulsions of Menderes, Köprülü, and Koraltan from the RPP on 21 September 1945. Later Bayar resigned from the party at his own request. The departure of these four members of the Parliament signaled that a new party was on the horizon. During the formation of a new party, Celal Bayar worked together with smet nönü and Bayar received the approval from nönü on 6 January 1946. The following day, on 7 January, the Democratic Party officially came into being and Celal Bayar was appointed as the chairman of the party. Bayar and nönü worked closely together in the preparations for launching the new party. “The fact that Bayar was a veteran Young Turk, and trusted as someone who subscribed to the fundamental tenet of secularism, undoubtedly eased the acceptance of the existence of an opposition party by the Kemalist bureaucracy and party” (Zurcher 2004, 211). The RPP appeared as it was satisfied in the founding of the Democratic Party and saw it as a party that would oversee the government and pronounced that they were not apprehensive of it. There was no sense of alarm in RPP circles at the news of the opposition party as “its leaders were all Kemalists of long standing who espoused the same basic philosophy as their opponents with only a difference in emphasis. Mahmud Celâl Bayar was, with smet nönü, the grandee of Turkish politics” (Ahmad 1993, 103).

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Feroz Ahmad (1993, 105) notes that: The Democrat Party was expected to behave as the Free Republican Party had done in 1930 and the Independent Group during the war, as a token opposition which would keep the government on its toes without actually challenging its legitimacy. That is why nönü pressed Bayar to become the leader of the opposition even though Bayar was (Ahmad 1993, 104). uncertain of the outcome. Initially, therefore, the DP came to be seen by the public as a ‘control party’, a safety valve which could be turned on and off so as to deflect public hostility and head off a popular explosion. Initially it seemed as though the Democrats would serve precisely that function. Their programme hardly differed from that of the ruling party. They adopted the ‘six principles of Kemalism’, as was required by the constitution, but said that they would interpret them according to the needs of the times (Ahmad 1993, 105).

On the other hand, the Democrat Party, wanted to rid itself of the image that it was a satellite, “a simulated” party (Kocak 2002: 181). But “its own programme differed less and less from that of the RPP. The DP subscribed to the basic Kemalist tenets of nationalism and secularism, so it could not differentiate itself from the government on that score” (Zurcher 2004, 213). Celâl Bayar agreed that there were no ideological differences (Ahmad 1993, 109). nönü did not intend to hand over the power to the DP so “national elections were brought forward from July 1947 to July 1946, clearly in the hope of catching the Democrats before they were fully established” (Zurcher 2004, 212). As Demirel (2005, 248) underlines “the RPP garnered 3,165,096 votes ofthe 7,953,055 votes cast in the 1950 election, after twenty-seven years of rule”, showing that “the use of force or intimidation remained under control during the years of single-party rule” and based on this, nönü must have been calculating that he could win the elections. The RPP won the 1946 elections. But, One reason the RPP was returned with a majority was that there had been massive vote rigging. The electoral procedures were far from perfect: there was no guarantee of secrecy during the actual voting; there was no impartial supervision of the elections and, as soon as the results were declared, the actual ballots were destroyed, making any check impossible. It has to be remembered that at this time all local and provincial administrators were RPP party members, who had great difficulty in discriminating between political opposition and high treason. The scale of the fraud was so obvious that there was an outcry in the country. Celâl Bayar stated that, according to a DP inquiry, the real number of seats won by the party was much higher and that there had been ‘wickedness involved in the election’. His statement to this effect was published in the newspapers in disregard of a government notice that strictly forbade any criticism of the elections (Zurcher 2004, 212, see also Kocak 2002, 183).

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Ahmad (1993, 107) cocuncurs: “There was a general consensus that the election had been conducted in an atmosphere of fear and repression”. Moreover, “the parties of the left were ruthlessly crushed after 1945 and not allowed to function until the early 1960s” (Ahmad 1993, 110), showing that understanding of both RPP and its ideological twin, DP, of democracy was limited. Conclusion Turkish experiment of transition to multi-party politics in 1946 has been seen as an example of the cases in which political leaders delibaretely decided that the society was diverse so this diversity needed to be translated into politics by allowing multiparty politics. However, but our analysis of the domestic and international pressures and events surrounding the 1946 elections suggest that it was not that the President nönü realised the diversity of society but domestic and international concerns forced him to allow multi-party politics. His decisions and behaviours before and after the decision shows also that in his mind he had a pseudo-democratic system where he and his party would continue to rule the country in a hegemonic party system setting where “a relatively institutionalized ruling party monopolizes the political arena, using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to deny formally legal opposition parties any real chance of competing for power” (Diamond 2002, 25). Our analysis of the Turkish case suggests that pseudo-democracy was what the President nönü had in mind when he facilitated transition to multi-party politics in 1946’s Turkey just after the WW II. As the vote-rigging of the nönü’s party RPP shows, in tactically liberalized pseudo-democracies, elections and other “democratic” institutions are largely façades and autocrats would stubbornly stick to power by whatever means.

References Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. The Making of Modern Turkey . London and New York, NY: Routledge. Akin, Sina (Ed.). 2002. Yak1 nça¤ Türkiye Tarihi, 1. Cilt, 1908-1980, stanbul: Milliyet Kitapl1 ¤1 . Brumberg, Daniel. 2004. “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy”. Journal of Democracy , 13 (4). 46–68.

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Collier, David and Steven Levitsky. 1997. “Democracy with adjectives: conceptual innovation in comparative research”. World Politics, 49 (3). 430–451. Demirel, Tanel. 2005. “Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective”. Armed Forces & Society, 31(2). 245-271. Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1999. Democracy in

Developing Countries. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Diamond, Larry. 2002. “Thinking about hybrid regimes”. Journal of Democracy, 13 (2). 21–35. Erdoan, Mustafa. 2003. Türkiye’de Anayasalar ve Siyaset, 4th ed. Ankara: Liberte. Heper, Metin, 1986. “Türkiye’de slam, Siyasal Sistem ve Toplum Orta Do¤udaki Baz1 Ülkelerle Bir Karfl1 laflt1 rma”. Türk Siyasal Hayat1 n1 n Geliflimi. (Ed. Ersin Kalayc1 olu, Ali Yaflar Sar1 bay ). Istanbul: Beta Bas1 m Yay1 m Da¤1 t1 m. Heper, Metin, 1998. smet nönü, The Making of a Turkish Statesman, Leiden: Brill. Karpat, Kemal H. 1973. Social Change and Politics in Turkey, Leiden: Brill. Küçükömer, dris. 1969. Düzenin Yabanc1 laflmas1 , Bat1 laflma. Istanbul: Ant Yay1 nlar1 . Küçükömer, dris. 1994. Bütün Eserleri 5, dris Küçükömer’le Türkiye Tart1 flmalar. Istanbul: Ba¤lam Yay1 nc1 l1 k.

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1980, 7th edition, (Ed. Sina Akflin), Istanbul: Cem Yay1 nlar1 . Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A Way. 2002. “The rise of competitive authoritarianism”. Journal of Democracy, 13 (2). 51–65. Rustow, Danwart A. 1970. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”,

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The Relationship Between Terrorism and Liberal Democratic States Bekir Çınar

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between terrorism and liberal democracy because there is a link between terrorism and liberal democracy. In other words terrorism, whether national or international, is operating in liberal democratic societies and has been one of the major problems of liberal democratic governments since the 1960s. Further, one particular aspect of this relationship will be highlighted in this paper, that is, the legitimacy of both liberal democracy and terrorism. The core discussion revolves around the question; does a liberal government have legitimate authority to put some limitations on ‘human rights’ and ‘basic western values’ for the sake of preventing and combating terrorism? If the answer is yes, to what extent does the government do so? So far, we have noticed that many Western liberal governments have changed their counter terrorism laws. In these laws, some argue that there is violation of human rights which is more important than the prevention policies. It is clear that there is no need to limit the western liberal values since these are not a weakness of liberal democracy. The weakness is not using security forces and technological development properly in prevention and combating of terrorism. Ke yw ords: Democracy, Terrorism, Human Rights, Prevention Policies, Countering Terrorism and Political System



Epoka University, [email protected]

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Introduction This paper attempts to examine the relationship between terrorism and liberal democracy concerning the nature of liberal democracy and its link with terrorism, as well as the legitimacy of both liberal democracy and terrorism. Since September 11, 2001, there have been many new developments in this area. One of these developments is that the perception of terrorism has changed. Second is that governments have formulated new prevention policies, and many parliaments have passed new legislation and amended old laws. Not all of these countries have terrorism, but they have acted in this way as a preventative measure. Third is that people have discussed whether ‘democracy’ is able to prevent terrorism or is providing a soft environment for terrorism. Ever since academics started discussing and writing on terrorism, terrorism has always been seen as a ‘politically motivated act’ due to the malfunctioning of a certain political system where terrorism was/is active. One clearly advocates that terrorism may be a product of a political system. In other words, every political system has the potential to produce a form of terrorism. Since the establishment of the ‘nation state’ system, several nation states have experienced some form of terrorism within its boundaries. It is also a known fact that nation state systems have been evolving since their establishment and this evolution will continue until it reaches an ideal political system which is identified as the Weberian ‘ideal types’ political system ‘and it is doubtful if any liberal democracy anywhere, anytime, has lived up to these perfect forms’ (Hassan 2010). In this paper, initially, it is stated that ‘terrorism is conceived as a form of political communication’ (Crelinsten 1989), because a group of people who cannot communicate by democratic tools with the government, may resort to terrorism as a form of communication in any political state including liberal democratic states. Consequently, a form of terrorism is operating in liberal democratic states. Secondly, the legitimacy of the liberal democratic states and violations of this legitimacy in relation to preventing terrorism will be highlighted. It is important for a liberal democratic government to stay within the boundary of laws when it is implementing its policies concerning the prevention and combating of terrorism. Despite the fact that democratic states are limited and constrained by nature. Therefore, it is not always true that to be lawful means to be legitimate. As a result, and there is an expectation that a liberal democratic government's actions should be both lawful and legitimate. Thus, there is historical evidence that putting limitations on civil liberties has neither prevented nor eliminated terrorism and terrorists. For example,

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Turkey is still fighting the PKK; Israel is still fighting HAMAS; and so forth where heavy restrictions have been placed on human rights, especially ‘freedom of expression’. Thirdly, the legitimacy of terrorism and its consequences will be discussed. There is no way to justify terrorism. However, at the same time, what is and what is not terrorism is important. In other words, it is not the case that every violent opposition or extreme form of political violence against the existing political authority, in many case nation states, can be categorised as terrorism. Finally, a summary will be drawn from this paper. Terrorism and Liberal Democratic States It is stated that ‘terrorism is more likely to originate in countries that exhibit closed political systems. […] political openness and responsiveness to citizens matters’ (Loayza 2008, 1-16) and is ‘the product of political systems’ (Cinar 2010, 58), because the political system might have ‘created widespread resentment and dissatisfaction among citizens who importantly lack a legal and non-violent means to express their displeasure with the status quo’ (Piazza 2008). Liberal democracy, for all its positive benefits, is not a perfect system, and therefore it has potential to produce terrorism too. For example, the UK is known as one of the better western liberal democracies but has had ‘an ethnic terrorism’ for decades. Further, since 1995, the USA has faced several terrorist activities, in the states and abroad, towards its overseas establishments. Because, as Blomberg and Hess conclude, ‘transnational terrorism incidents tend to be associated with higher-income countries’ (Hess 2008). Liberal Democratic States A state is a clear and widely accepted index of power and the authority given to the state to make and enforce laws over a geographically bounded territory is generally accepted (Berridge Second Ed, 1992, 9). The state commands supreme power in that it stands above all other associations and groups in society; its laws demand the compliance of all those who live within the territory (Heywood 1994, 37). Liberal democracy is a political system where there is a ‘government that recognizes that the individual has rights that exist independently of government and which ought to be protected by and against government’ (Government 2002, 16). A longer definition states that it is ‘a form of representative democracy where elected representatives that hold the decision power are moderated by a constitution that emphasizes protecting individual liberties and the rights of minorities in society (also called constitutional liberalism), such as freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of

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religion, the right to private property and privacy, as well as equality before the law and due process under the rule of law, etc’ (Wikipedia 2010). Liberal democratic states are ‘characterised by constitutional government, a system of checks and balances amongst major institutions, fair and regular elections, a democratic franchise, a competitive party system, the protection of individual rights and civil liberties and so forth’ (Heywood 1994, 39). Democracy has meant liberal democracy -- a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property (Fareed 1997).

At the top of the liberal democratic state stand elected politicians who are publicly accountable because they operate within an open and competitive system. Non-elected state bodies like the civil service, judiciary, police, and army and so on, carry out their responsibilities with strict impartiality, and are anyway subordinate to their elected political masters (Heywood 1994, 40). Liberal democracy is highly respected as one of the better political systems in the world. The system is ruled by people who are democratically elected by the public, and who form a government that serves the people or acts in their best interest. Any political changes should be made by public discussion with a free press and freedom of speech. Links to Terrorism It is assumed that the liberal democratic state is the best form of political system that humanity has achieved and there seems to be no room for any kind of terrorism in this system. Despite this, there have been terrorism and terrorist activities in liberal democratic political systems. For example, ‘the strong and admirable democratic system in Israel has been the subject of terrorist assault, but has also produced some number of its own terrorists, including the assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’ (Gause 2005). The reason is that liberal democracy has defects, albeit ‘ones of incomplete implementation of the twin principles of liberty and equality on which modern democracy is founded, rather than of flaws in the principles themselves’ (Blunden 2005). Since the 1960s, explanations of political violence in European and other liberal democracies have suggested that the cause was an absence of equality in wealth and justice, and also of liberty for minority ethnic groups within the state. The European

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States did not consider that injustice, inequality and rights of ethnic communities for some time. This caused political unrest in some European capitals and some people used political violence in order for their voices to be heard. However, criminal enforcement techniques were used to counter the political activities of these groups. This caused frustration owing to an inability to introduce a proposed case for changes effectively into the democratic process (Narveson 1992, 116-169), that lead a group of people to use terrorism as a means of protest, threats, fears and above all a way of communication. As one Humberside police inspector observed ‘frustration was one reason why people use political violence against the government’ (Private interview, 2003). In another example: The reversal of democracy explains Algeria’s religious violence. This argument is that the closure of political space leads to frustration and frustration leads to armed conflict. This is especially so when such a closure is accompanied by explicit state terror, repression, and general human rights violations (Testas 2002, 161-183).

Moreover, as it is stated ‘terrorism constitutes a direct repudiation of liberal and humane values and principles, and that terroristic ideology is inevitably and constantly deployed in a struggle to defame and discredit liberal democracy’ (Wilkinson 1977, 80). In short, terrorism is alive in the liberal democratic political system and this system needs to consider its weaknesses and faults which cause terrorism. According to Martha Crenshaw: In the case of terrorism that is generated within a democracy, the degree of social, ethnic, and political heterogeneity or fragmentation within the state appears to be a critical variable. Highly contentious polities (sic) and divided societies are likely to be associated with a greater risk of terrorism. They are typically associated with the prevalence of other forms of political violence as well. The instigating factors for violence constitute a complex, dynamic equation that is difficult to solve regardless of regime type. (Crenshaw 2005, 13-18)

Crenshaw draws our attention to terrorism which has been generated within a democracy. This is not because democracies are vulnerable to acts of terrorism, (Sandler 1995, 1-9) but it is the belief of many that democracy is a perfect political system, in reality it is not. It is clear that terrorism is also threatening the very existence of the values underlying liberal democracy. This threat should be prevented, eliminated and combated by the governments of liberal democracy.

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However, the threats from terrorism to liberal western democracies today are not directed to their political system or existence, but to their populations and economies. In other words, it is argued that terrorists do not directly target the democracy, but they try to convey their cause to the rulers of the democracy through spreading fear on the public. Terrorists assume that these fears enable the politicians and political institution to correct its faults and create fairer, equal and just society. Domestic Terrorism The term ‘domestic terrorism’ is used to identify the acts of terrorists who are based and act entirely within the state or its territory (Wilkinson(b) 2000, 19-49) without foreign direction and help. Until recently, terrorism was generally understood as domestic terrorism. Within the state, left and right-wing political violence and also ethnic violence are considered as terrorism. Thus, ‘terrorism was practiced by a group of individuals belonging to an identifiable organization with a clear command and control apparatus who had a defined set of political, social, or economic objectives. Radical leftist organizations such as the Japanese Red Army, Germany’s Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion). This is commonly referred to as the BaaderMeinhof group and the name was given because Mahler admired the name and action of the Red Army’ of Japan (Becker 1981, 122-138). Italy’s Red Brigades the birth of extreme left guerrillas was influenced also by some external factors, such as the Vietnam War and the fierce, highly ideological debate over the role and objectives of imperialists forces in the world. China’s ‘cultural revolution’ was another important factor, especially as it offered visible proof of an alternative to the ‘revisionist’ trend of Moscow and the PCL’ (Silj 1981, 139-152), as well as the so-called ‘ethno-nationalist terrorist movements’ like the PKK, the IRA, and the Basque separatist group, ETA, reflected this stereotype of the traditional terrorist group’ (B. Hoffman 2001, 417-428). Domestic terrorism may be the result of government ignorance, lack of appropriate response to citizens, and use of political discrimination by the state against select ethnic or political groups of individual citizens. For example, one can see that during the 1980s, there was a ‘relatively low incident of politically motivated violence in the United State’ (Hoffman 1989, 230-240). One of the main reasons may be that its population felt that its demands were met by the government, or at least that the process by which political decisions were made was fair. At a later stage in history, the majority of terrorist activities in the United State involved ‘ethnicseparatist or émigré terrorists’ (Hoffman 1989, 230-240). This is probably because the immigrant communities in the USA felt that they had been treated differently from the main community.

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International Terrorism The term ‘international terrorism’ is used to define groups or individuals who are involved in terrorist activities in a country which is not their own. According to Wilkinson, ‘the term "international terrorism" is often used so loosely that it implies only that terrorism is a world-wide problem or that most terrorism has some influence, however marginal or indirect, on international opinion and behaviour’ (Wilkinson 1977, 173). He also states that ‘political terrorism becomes international in the strict sense when it is (i) directed at foreigners or foreign targets; (ii) concerted by the governments or factions of more than one state; or (iii) aimed at influencing the policies of a foreign government’ (Wilkinson 1977, 174). Today this term is often used to explain the terrorist activities which are directed against the USA. It is concluded that domestic terrorism might be a product of domestic politics. Similarly, international terrorism could be a product of international relations and international governance. After the collapse of the communist bloc, the USA became the sole superpower in the world, and its international policies and relationships have a huge impact on the political and economic development of the world. In some ways, one may even see the world as a country and the USA as its government. The decisions on foreign policies of this assumed government (the USA) may not be recognised as just and fair by many people who become upset. They feel that their unhappiness and demands have not been considered properly by this assumed government and their domestic suffering and injustice in their land derived from the USA foreign and bilateral policies with those states that might be a cause of international terrorism. ‘One of the main sources of terrorism is chronically bad governance. … If we are serious about getting at the roots of international terrorism, we must get serious about fostering development that gives people hope and dignity and improves the quality of their lives. That requires dramatic improvements in governance, and these will not come without increased international incentives and assistance’ (Diamond 2002, 14). For example it is stated that ‘Bin Laden and his followers declared war on the United States in 1996, ostensibly to secure the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Arabian Peninsula and the broader Middle East’ (Blanchard 2010 ). Consequently, Nawaz Sharif mentioned that ‘terrorism was directly linked to Pakistan’s foreign policy’ (DawnNews 2010) when he was speaking about the Data Darbar attack at a press conference. Further statements have been made by Ramadan: Tony Blair and his government have obliged civil servants to deny that a link exists between terrorism and British foreign policy. While the invasion of Iraq can

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never be claimed as ethical justification for terrorist attacks against innocent citizens in London, it would be absurd to deny the reality of the political connection between the two. The illegal invasion of Iraq, blind support for the insane policies of George Bush, British silence on the oppression of the Palestinians - how could these issues not have a direct bearing on the deep discontent shared by many Muslims toward the west in general, and toward Britain in particular. Even though this is not the sole explanation for terrorism, it is certainly part of the explanation (without arguing that it can be justified) (Ramadan 2007).

Consequently, it is wise to accept that there might be a link between foreign policies of stronger states and terrorism. Legitimacy of the Liberal Democratic State Like all other types of state, the liberal democratic state has a duty to prevent terrorism. If there is a form of terrorism, this state has to fight with terrorism. The question here becomes, how does a liberal democratic government prevent terrorism yet fight with terrorism? The response should be that the actions of this type of government have to be ‘legitimate (legal)’, ‘justifiable’, ‘fair’ and just. Therefore, these terms will be discussed in the following part of this paper. The word ‘legitimate’ is defined as ‘in accordance with the law or rules; lawful; that can be defended; reasonable’ (Hornby 1990, 718). Rawls appeals to the ‘liberal principle of legitimacy’: Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of which principles and ideas are acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy (Rawls 1993, 217).

When we start to think of responding to terrorism, we face a question of legitimacy: ‘what legitimate responses are open to us?’ (Narveson (b) 1991, 116-169) As a liberal democratic government. It is necessary to mention that maintaining Western European norms is vital when responding to terrorism. When the states start to use countermeasures, these have to be legal and constitutional and democratically acceptable. Any sort of intervention in the lives of citizens necessitates a strong justification. It seems that two legitimate ways of combating terrorism are open which provide justifications for government actions. The first of these two requires the authority to depend on justice, which in turn is of two sorts: ‘absolute justice’ and ‘relative justice’.

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Absolute justice necessitates acting within the pure laws, rules and conventions that are reflections of an ideal world. Relative justice requires flexibility from absolute justice, because of the prevailing conditions. In absolute justice, ‘whoever slays a soul, not to retaliate for a soul slain, nor for corruption done in the land, shall be (judged) as if he had slain mankind altogether’ (The Qur'an 5:32). The implication of the verse is ‘no individual, so long as he is innocent, may for any reason be deprived of his right to life; he may not be sacrificed for the sake of the community’ (Nursi 1994, 73). It is also evident that there are similar principles in the writings of Kant, such as the 'Categorical Imperative' (Johnson 2008). Therefore, whether major or minor, any right is a right in the sight of God, and it is considered a fundamental right of humans and cannot be abolished or limited for the sake of another. In contrast, ‘relative justice’ means that part or some can be sacrificed for the sake of the whole. In other words, for avoiding a greater evil and maintaining the wellbeing of the community, a lesser evil should be preferred and the authority should not give any consideration to the rights of the individual in that circumstance. Nevertheless, ‘we should, however, point out here that it is wrong to make ‘relative justice’ the rule where ‘absolute justice’ is possible’ (Nursi 1994, 73). In addition, we should bear in mind Kant’s principle that ‘humanity in each person must always be treated as an end itself, never simply as a means’ (Hill 1991, 196-229). The second way requires that the government stays within its laws, which means that ‘there is no nation that should be used to intervene in the private lives of citizens (unless the requirement to uphold social stability dictates otherwise) or to enforce any particular pattern of behaviour’ (Tamar 2005, 62-181). In other words, the government should act lawfully against terrorism. Moreover, the required responses have to be justified and must not result in the erosion of civil liberties, (Terrorism 2000) - hence the European Convention on Human Rights, which requires that even suspected terrorists are afforded basic human rights guaranteed in that instrument. This necessarily has an impact upon their detention and their trial, among other things. Violations of law and order by the government undermine its legitimacy. The government expects people to obey the rule of law. In return every citizen expects equal treatment from their government. Equal treatment requires that the liberal state not favour particular groups and individuals because of their differences. In addition, the liberal political system is obliged to keep the fundamental rights of people protected against authority. People deserve these rights by virtue of being human beings (Klosko 2000, 10). However, ‘the liberal state has the right to use the state’s monopoly of legitimate force in order to preserve internal peace and order, to enforce the law, and to defend the community against external enemies’ (Wilkinson(c) 1986, 17).

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In sum, not every problem in modern democracies has a simple solution. For the last 25 years, terrorism in the liberal democracies of Western Europe, such as Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, have been waiting to be responded to in a manner that is consistent with the democratic Western norms of legitimacy and acceptability (Chalk 1995, 10-44). Does Government need to Compromise? Many argue that the state has to compromise the politics of democracy in order to be effective against terrorism (Chalk 1995, 10-44). This is not totally true, because democracy does not only mean civil freedoms but also refers to legitimate and constitutional methods. As long as it does so by legal and constitutional means, the government can legislate against terrorism without compromising political traditions and the civil way of political life. Dealing with terrorism should be in a way that is widely agreed to be in conformity with existing political and judicial principles. Abiding by these principles will strength the commitment of the state to democratic institutions and to control or limit the terrorism. Netanyahu states that ‘the belief in the peaceful resolution of disagreements, in the basic rights of other individuals, and in the law of the land- all these are the building blocks of a democratic education, indeed a democratic world view, which forms an impenetrable wall in the mind of each citizen against participating in political violence’ (Netanyahu 1995, 12). He concludes that ‘the battle against terrorism should be waged relentlessly, resisting the attempt to glorify or mystify its perpetrators or their causes in any way’ (Netanyahu 1995, 22-23). According to him, the state has to defeat terrorism by using all means at its disposal. The question here remains how a liberal democracy does that. Netanyahu gives an answer with which I do not agree, but which is worth stating, that: The government of free societies charged with fighting a rising tide of terrorism are thus faced with a democratic dilemma: if they do not fight terrorism with the means available to them, they endanger their citizenry; if they do, they appear to endanger the way freedoms which they are charged to protect (Netanyahu 1995, 30).

Is it necessary to put Limitations on Rights? Limitation of human rights is an important issue in combating terrorism. ‘Liberals accept the necessity of restricting individual freedom as being the most effective means to enhance the general level of liberty in society, they are also adamant that

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there must be clear limits imposed on state authority and its power over the individual’ (Chalk 1995, 10-44). As seen in this quotation, restrictions on individual freedom are only acceptable for enhancing the general level of liberty in society. Independent committees of judicial and legal oversight are required to administrate the limitations to ensure that they are properly enforced. However, combating terrorism should not be used as a pretext for discrimination against any segment of society. Terrorists often claim that they are acting on behalf of ethnic groups, religions, or even entire nations. These claims are untrue, because terrorists generally represent only a minuscule faction of any such group. Authorities accept that the state ‘must sacrifice some of its democratic substance in order to be effective against terrorism’ and ‘for the sake of upholding those civil and political traditions’ (Chalk 1995, 10-44). This seems to be a dilemma of distribution of justice. Obviously we are not talking about the criminal laws which are a necessary and desirable restrain on liberty and seen as an essential tool by the liberal democratic states. We are now talking about extra restrictions of human rights which have been introduced because of terrorist activities. As a result of these restrictions, terrorism has increased in various parts of the world, such as Turkey and Britain. Is An Act of Terrorism Justifiable? Is an act of terrorism justifiable? There is no clear answer to this question, because each party has got their own answer for it. In other words, terrorists do not accept that their actions are ‘terrorism’ and not justifiable. Likewise, Camus assumes that terrorism is justifiable: He pointed to a specific human impulse, ancient and august, which is the impulse to rebel-the impulse that got its start as an impulse to rebel against God. …in Ramadan’s opinion, the impulse to rebel in Western culture follows directly from the esteem that is accorded to scepticism and doubt. You begin with scepticism and doubt, and you push those attitudes one step further, and you arrive at full-scale rebellion (Berman 2003, 26-27).

This view clearly states that rebellion is natural and justifiable. In addition ‘utilitarians’ and ‘consequentialists’ come to similar conclusions. Some of the consequentialists say that if terrorism brings better consequences than its alternatives, it is justifiable (Held 1991, 59-85). Wilkinson, Hare and Kai Nielsin, however, disagree and think that terrorism may not be justified, because according to them ‘terrorism always produces results that are worse on consequentialist’s grounds than their

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alternatives’ (Held 1991, 59-85). Alternatively, many scholars, such as Laqueur, Wellmer, Tilly, Closer and Falk, accept that terrorism has sometimes brought political progress and the removal of unwanted political figures. The requirement of justification itself is bound up with the idea that people have inherent dignity and should be treated with respect. People are entitled to be governed according to principles they could accept, for much the same reasons they are entitled to rule themselves, to have equality of opportunity, and basic rights (Klosko 2000, 3). From a narrow consequentialist view, it may not be wrong to recognise that some forms of terrorism are justifiable and morally acceptable for the sake of political progress. However, it is right to question whether either the terrorists or the government have tried any other option for making that political progress? Then, they were unable to remove unwanted political situations, injustice, unfairness and suffering of communities. In other words, if the answer for the terrorists, is no, or for the government, is yes, then terrorism cannot be justified. On the other hand, if the answer for the terrorists, is yes, or for the government, is no, and terrorism was chosen as a last resort for making political progress, then terrorism may indeed be justifiable on the basis of the consequentialist approach. However, if basic human rights are threatened and violated by terrorists or governments’ forces, then both of their actions are not justifiable, regardless of the consequentialist logic above. In contrast, theoretically, in certain circumstances, where the state and its institutions violate basic human rights and if political violence and its extreme form, terrorism, brings respect for basic human rights, consequently terrorism may be morally and legally justifiable. In order to clear what base this justification is, one need to provide an answer to this question: ‘can terrorism as a considered method to overcome oppression with as little loss of life as possible be, in contrast, less unjustifiable than state terrorism?’ (Held 1991, 59-85). The obvious answer is no, because the judgement of justifiability relies on ‘political progress’ and ‘respect for the rights of the human’; it does not rely on ‘the loss of life’. Further, one argues that if human rights, such as the right to liberty, personal security, life, property, and respect are being violated by states, can these violations justify terrorism? It is not right to make a judgment on the basis of ‘state’ as a political unity and ‘terrorism’ as an extreme use of political violence, because the main argument on the ‘justification’ are ‘political progress’ and protecting basic human rights; despite this, ‘many theorists still define the state in terms of its monopoly on the use of violence considered legitimate’ (Held 1991, 59-85).

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Legitimacy, as discussed in this paper earlier, states that in the twenty-first century, none of the liberal democratic governments are able to justify the legitimacy of ‘use of violence’. Therefore, if the usage of violence by the state is considered legitimate, that state cannot escape being labeled a ‘terrorist state’ and in the same manner, the use of violence by terrorists has never been considered legitimate. Therefore, in my view, violations of human rights are never justifiable even if the parties have got reasons and one way the other justified their action in the common ground. On the one hand, fears of terrorism may be inevitably and continuously degrading people’s lives. This may push the liberal democratic state out of the liberal state system. Mistakenly, the state may begin acting in an exceptional manner, such as disregarding its constitution, human rights and the international conventions it has signed. As a result of this process, the state may justify terrorism and become a socalled ‘police state’ that definitely alienates people and drives them into an active cooperation with the terrorists. If the chain of mistakes continues in the liberal democratic state, the disintegration of the state will be inevitable and the terrorist may defeat the state without any military battle. This is the worst-case scenario. Historically, however, there is no record of a liberal state having been overthrown by terrorism in this fashion. On the other hand, terrorism is therefore not legitimate and is a type of behaviour that cannot be tolerated inside of the laws of any liberal democratic state. However, at least for the terrorists, there are many reasons that make their actions legitimate and morally justifiable in their own eyes. One of those reasons is the liberal democratic states’ actions and their ruling styles, since the state is seen as repudiating basic human values and principles (Wilkinson(c) 1986, 81). Responses to terrorism are also about how authorities see terrorism. In this respect, there are two different schools that see terrorism in different ways. One is that of Wilkinson, who sees the terrorist as a person who ‘sacrifices all moral and humanitarian consideration for the sake of political end’; he also defines ‘political terrorism as coercive intimidation’ (Wilkinson(c) 1986, 51). Some other scholars agree with Wilkinson, among them Netanyahu (Netanyahu(b) 1986, 29-30) and Walzer (Walzer 1988, 238). However, Holmes thinks that ‘terrorism per se is morally no worse than many conventionally accepted forms of violence (Held 1991, 59-85). A further argument is raised by Falk who states that unless one is opposed to the ‘tactics of potential or actual warfare that rely on indiscriminate violence or that deliberately target civilians’, one cannot be sincerely opposed to terrorism (Held 1991, 59-85). Assuming that ‘a legal system violates the human rights of those on whom it imposes its will, the violence or terrorism it uses to do so is surely no more justified than the violence or terrorism used against it, and quite possibly, it is less so’ (Held 1991, 59-85).

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These two different approaches to terrorism indicate that there are huge gaps between the two schools. One sees terrorism as a form of criminal activity, and as coercive intimidation for a political end; therefore it cannot be justifiable. However, the other sees terrorism as a form of political activity for a political solution; therefore it can be justifiable. These differences lead them to find different solutions to the problem. In general, most scholars agree that terrorism is not morally and legally justifiable. But, as we stated above, terrorism may be justified under special circumstances in some people’s eyes. These circumstances are where there are violations of human rights by the legitimate state and terrorists trying to defend these rights. Then, some people may begin to use the liberties guaranteed to them in liberal democratic states to plot bombings in order to make radical change or destroy the state (Wilkinson(c) 1986, 119). Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy: Countering Terrorism The question is how? It seems that there is only one way which is ‘democratic states must carefully choose their counter-terrorist strategies so as not to undermine their own values’ (Jebb 2003, 126-154). The prevention and combating of terrorism policies should be continued within democratic and international norms. Even if national measures can be devised and possibilities for international cooperation exist, constraints are still placed upon democratic states in how they choose to protect themselves and their citizens. Having experienced terrorists’ activities, governments believe that the state ‘must sacrifice some of its democratic substance in order to be effective against terrorism’ and ‘for the sake of upholding those civil and political traditions’ (Chalk 1995, 10-44). But there are problems with this approach for governments and the public. First of all, it is not very clear which civil liberties should be limited and to what extent. Secondly, there is no academic research on the relationship between the causes of the terrorist actions and particular civil liberties, proving that the existence of any particular liberty helped the terrorists to carry out their evil actions. Thirdly, there is the question of whether the limitation of that particular civil liberty would actually help authorities to prevent, or combat, any terrorist atrocities. Without clear answers to these questions governments of liberal states could be pushed into unproductive breaches of traditional liberal values. When the traditional liberal values have been broken, the public will have strong government but they will have no more security than before. Hence, after the 11th September 2001, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and some other states were blamed for limiting ‘liberal values’

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because they have made changes to their laws in order to fight terrorism better. Unfortunately, ‘Anti-terrorism measures have done little to ensure Britain is safe and secure from terrorist attack, but much to infringe the civil liberties of those living in the UK’ (Liberty 2005). Changes in British anti-terrorism law did not prevent the attacks in London on 7 July 2005, for instance. The question is this: can all these changes in the law help governments to prevent terrorism? The answer is that they can if the changes are used only for deterring terrorists. In order to deter terrorists, the changes require employing trained people and establishing new security units, which increase the size of the security system and its funding. The changes will help these people to monitor people who might be suspected terrorists or have links with terrorists and to arrest them. They provide more room to manoeuvre which is important in combating or fighting terrorism but they will not by themselves prevent terrorism. Any potential curtailment of liberty can be justified only if it is reasonably estimated to be both necessary for and effective in enhancing public safety (Tamar 2005, 62-181). Conclusion There is a link between terrorism and liberal democracy, terrorism being a result of political decisions made within imperfect liberal democracies. Thus terrorism, whether national or international, is operating in liberal democratic societies and it has been one of the major problems of liberal democratic governments since the 1960s. Terrorism is not justifiable, because it violates others’ rights. However, the terrorists believe it to be justified because they think that their rights are being violated. This shows that the core issue is one of rights. For this reason, governments should not violate human rights when implementing counter-terrorist policies. The violation of human rights is more important than the prevention policies. Now, nearly all western liberal governments have tried to produce a solution to this new form of terrorism. So far, their solution has been about limiting western liberal values and freedom. Some observers (Heymann 2002, 441-456) state that there is no need to limit western liberal values since these are not a weakness of liberal democracy. The weakness is not using security forces and technological developments properly. Distribution of justice and equality is an important element in the prevention of terrorism. There is a need to dry out the sea, not to kill the fish. Terrorism is the product of a process. One should look at the production process in order to offer an accurate solution. People should believe that liberal democracy is strong enough to

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Reconsidering the Incompatibility Between European Orientation and Cyprus Policy: Westphalian and Post-Westphalian Approaches to Turkey’s Cyprus Policy and the EC/EU Özlem Demirtafl Bagdonas*

Abstract

The recent changes in Turkey’s Cyprus policy have spurred a new debate as to whether Turkey’s foreign policy has been Europeanized, now that the previous sources of tension have seemingly been abated. Focusing on how this policy has been defined in the official discourse in relation to Turkey’s European orientation, hence taking European orientation as a domestically constructed discourse, this study seeks to show that it would be problematic to view the government’s tendency to refrain from framing the issue as a security issue as an intractable process of according with the EU’s stance on the issue. By the same token, if 'Europeanness' is liberated from the preset values and situated in its domestic context, it would be equally misleading to interpret Turkey’s security-centered approach to Cyprus as a non-European feature of Turkish foreign policy, and to view the recurrent Cyprus crises as a deviation from Turkey's European orientation. Keywords: Turkey’s Cyprus policy, European Orientation, Security, Discourse,

Identity

*

A draft of this paper was presented at the Sixth Pan-European Conference-SGIR in Turin, Italy, 12-15 September, 2007. The author would like to thank Thomas Diez, the Chair of the panel on “The Framing Conflict and Intervention” and the participants of the panel for their valuable comments. Fatih University. [email protected].

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Introduction For many in Turkey, the European Union (EU) has made the biggest mistake in admitting the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) to the EU before the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Nevertheless, a notable part of the literature considers the EU as an address for conflict-resolution, and Turkey’s security-centered Cyprus policy and non-European characteristics as a major hurdle for Turkey’s EU membership and European orientation. Many have pointed out that the issue had been kept primarily as a security matter and beyond the realm of democratic debate until recently (Kiriflçi, 2006; Kaliber, 2005). In this vein, the “daring” (Mufti, 1998) changes in Turkey's handling the issue in the last decade were explained by reference to the democratization, ‘civilianization’ (Kiriflçi, 2006), Europeanization and/or desecuritization of Turkish foreign policy in the context of Turkey’s EU integration. In this regard, the literature refers to the role of the solution-oriented foreign policy of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) (Aras & Karakaya Polat, 2008; Diez, 2005; Kaliber, 2005), Turkey’s EU accession process and EU conditionality (Ayd1 n & Aç1 kmefle, 2007; Diez, 2005; Barkey, 2000; Önifl, 2003, Kiriflçi, 2006), the diminishing role of the military in shaping political processes in Turkey (Karaosmano¤lu, 2000), globalization (Bilgin, 2005) and attempts of the civil society/societal actors to prioritize the EU agenda (Rumelili, 2005; Bilgin, 2007). Some, on the other hand, have been skeptical of the success of this shift and argued that the attempts of the JDP government to frame the Cyprus issue outside the national security terms were not successful since the government could not take societal actors along its solution-oriented policy (Bilgin, 2007). Bilgin, for instance, argues that the government’s discourse remained marginal vis-à-vis the securitycentered arguments in relation to Cyprus (Bilgin, 2007: 564). Indeed, the recent debates on the opening of Turkey’s ports to the RoC showed that there has not been a clear departure from the security-centered policy towards the Cyprus issue. What is more, the EU’s suspension of the negotiations on eight chapters upon Turkey’s refusal to fulfill the terms of the Additional Protocol signaled a new mismatch between the EU’s and Turkey’s views on the issue. In this context, this article investigates the following questions: Should we understand Turkey’s securitycentered approach to the Cyprus issue as irreconcilable with her European orientation? Can we talk about Turkey’s European oriented foreign policy only in those instances when her behavior is not at odds with the EU’s stance towards an issue? This article contends that the juxtaposition of the security identities of Turkey and the EU as well as the characterization of Turkey's Cyprus policy as a deviation from Turkey's EU orientation is misleading if one focuses on how 'Europe' is defined in the domestic context.

Relying on the premises of poststructuralism and taking

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constructions such as ‘European identity’, ‘European orientation’, and ‘national cause’ as a point of contention, rather than exogenous to the discursive processes (Hansen, 2002: 5), this study examines how certain conceptions of ‘Europeanness’ get articulated in the concepts that structure the discourses on the Cyprus issue. In pursuing this line of argumentation, I focus on the approach that views Cyprus as a national security issue (the Westphalian approach) and the one that seeks to remove the national security element from the Cyprus policy (the post-Westphalian approach) and examine whether the Cyprus policy was seen as an anti-European move or an extension of Turkey’s European orientation from these perspectives. The analysis shows that while there are certain differences in the way these approaches defined the European identity, neither of them saw Turkey’s Cyprus policy as a deviation from Turkey’s European orientation. In addition, there has not been any dramatic chronological shift in Turkey’s Cyprus policy from a security-centered/Westphalian approach to a security-free/post-Westphalian one. Rather, both have co-existed and have been employed by the same political elites on different occasions. Neither was the government exempt from a security-centered discourse, nor were the other parties raising exceptionally security-centered arguments in relation to Cyprus. This is because the main discursive clash that is at stake here is not between the governmental and societal discourses, but rather between the Westphalian and postWestphalian approaches to the Cyprus issue which transcend the borders between different parties in Turkey, regardless of their social democratic or conservative identities. Approaches to the Cyprus Puzzle Turkey’s refusal to comply with the terms of the Additional Protocol may be puzzling from the rationalist perspective, which assumes that the ‘carrot’ of membership and the ‘stick’ of the suspension of the negotiation process would pave the way for a more compromising approach towards the sensitive issues such as Cyprus, especially after the RoC gained membership in the EU. Similarly, Turkey’s recent foreign policy move remains puzzling if one assumes a pre-given set of European norms and a conforming mode of behavior by the countries that are undergoing a process of Europeanization. This perspective is based on the premise that, as a country gets closer to being a member and socializes into the European norms of behavior, it gradually moves away from a defensive or aggressive approach built on threats towards an understanding of security that is built on mutual trust and cooperation.

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According to this view, acting upon the immediate national security threats is characteristic to a Westphalian/modern state. The Westphalian model (a sovereign state with exclusive authority within its own territorial boundaries) is a basic concept for describing the characteristics of the state that purportedly emerged after the Peace of Westphalia 1648.1 Indeed, it has been the common reference point (especially for the neo-realist and the neo-liberal institutionalist approaches) in describing the modern state as a unitary rational actor operating under an anarchic environment and struggling to enhance its welfare and security (Krasner, 1995, 1996: 121). The basic norms and values of this system are the following: ability to exercise control over a given territory, self-reliance and independence in matters of security and foreign policy, the protection of national security against the potential threats from other states, and the right to enter into international alignments (ibid). Juxtaposing these values to those of the contemporary Europe, the EU, it is argued, is the most developed example of a post-Westphalian/postmodern state system, exhibiting the characteristics of mutual interference in the internal affairs and mutual surveillance, the rejection of force in the resolution of disputes, as well as the growing irrelevance of borders, and representing security through transparency, mutual openness, and interdependence of mutual vulnerability (Cooper, 2000). This view outlined above takes the EU as a post-Westphalian security community, which involves a unique security identity based on these values. The EU, from this perspective, represents an evolution whereby the definition of security exclusively as ‘the protection of sovereign national borders from military threat’ is replaced by ‘mutual cooperation’ (Rieker, 2000). In such a system, it is argued, states no longer rely on balance of power mechanisms and deterrence but develop a high degree of trust, common identity, and a common vision for the future, as the integration is seen as a bulwark against the previous insecurity caused by the balance of power, war, and nationalism (Wæver, 1996). According to this view, a successful desecuritization process, defined as moving an issue off the security agenda and back to politics, could be possible only within a post-Westphalian institutional environment of the EU (Wæver, 1998; and Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998) and only if the EU is seen as a 'peace community' rather than an 'international organization' (Rieker, 2000). Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) observe that security referents within postWestphalian Europe have gradually moved from 'nation-state' to 'society' and 'individuals'. In such a system, soft security and non-military measures, such as

1

It should be noted here that some scholars oppose the idea that there was ever such a golden age of the Westphalian state by arguing that it has never been an empirical regularity: the violations of the Westphalian model have been an enduring characteristic of international politics (Krasner, 1999: 9) see also Osiander (2001).

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'engagement', are preferred to hard-security measures such as 'containment' (Larsen, 2002; Ouzlu, 2003; Tocci, 2007). Due to this peculiar security identity, the European integration is also expected to have a “catalytic effect” of conflict resolution, by means of a conforming identity transformation in the EU's neighborhood (Diez, 2000, O¤uzlu, 2003; Tocci, 2007). Some underline that this security identity defines the EU's response to the enlargement such that the adoption of the EU's security model is considered to be more important than the geopolitical significance of the candidate countries or their fulfillment of the accession criteria per se (Engelbrekt, 2002; Grabbe, 2002; O¤uzlu, 2003). It is against this context that Turkey’s EU policy is considered to highlight the lack of understanding of the EU norms and identity (Tocci, 2007: 16). Since the style with which Turkey had pursued the Cyprus policy, mainly, “bullying” and “blackmailing”, did not accord with the above-mentioned ‘European’ way of dealing with the issue, it is argued, the pre2002 Turkey was too hard as a security actor to accede to the Union (O¤uzlu, 2003: 294; O¤uzlu, 2004: 108; Melakopides, 2006: 74; see also Buzan & Diez, 1999). The problem with this approach is that it assumes a fixed to-be-acquired 'European' identity and rationality for the countries that are undergoing the process of European integration. Indeed, neither the discourse of the EU countries could be expected to be beyond the modernist discourse to talk about an ideal postmodernist view on security (Diez, 1999), nor could the applicant countries be categorized to represent the totality of the modernist discourse. Admittedly, inter-state fears are still present in conflicts in the EU, e.g. the Baltic states, Hungary and its neighbors, in the Balkans, and between Turkey and Greece (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 365). What is more, in any given foreign policy discourse, the identities involved therein are all contested since “there is no underlying principle of fixing - and hence constituting the whole field of differences” (Laclau & Mouffee, 1985: 111). Hence, if one focuses on how European integration is domestically defined via the concepts that already exist in the discursive arena, and stays at the level of discourse, one cannot expect to find a homogeneous construction of what the European integration means, as well as whether the material concerns prevail over the ideational ones, or whether the securitizing tendencies prevail over the desecuritizing ones in an applicant country. Both Westphalian and post-Westphalian discourses co-exist instead of representing isolated periods of construction. Thus, a nationalist twist in the course of European integration (as seen in Turkey's refusal to fulfill the terms of the Additional Protocol because of its commitment to the Cyprus cause) could arguably decelerate (if not reverse) this discursive process whereby post-Westphalian meanings are attributed to the modernist elements that are available in the domestic repertoire.

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Indeed, if one understands Europeanization as a redefinition of domestic elements in terms of European integration without assuming a pre-given European identity, Turkish foreign policy can be argued to have long been Europeanized. While remarkable changes have taken place in the last decade, the acknowledgment of apparent desecuritization should not come at the expense of overlooking how the securitizing approach in the Turkish context may also have pursued a pro-integration discourse. The task ahead is to analyze how these approaches in the Turkish context have legitimized Turkey’s Cyprus policy, how they defined the European identity, and last but not the least, whether they identified the Cyprus issue as a confirmation of or a move against Turkey’s European vocation. Main Concepts of Turkish Foreign Policy: The statements made in the government programs reveal that continuity, rather than change, seems to represent the main parameters of Turkish foreign policy. The Turkish political elite have reassured to keep the main principles of the Kemalist foreign policy intact. There is a general consensus on defining these principles as 'fullindependence', an objective that originated during the Independence War; 'peace at home, peace in the world', which is taken as the non-adventurist and the nonaggressive characteristic of the Kemalist foreign policy; 'adherence to the international law', which is seen as dependent on the former principle; and 'civilizationism', which is also defined as 'raising Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization' (Feyzio¤lu, 1984). Based on these principles, the Kemalist foreign policy has been characterized as a non-aggressive, rationalist, and non-submissive policy, which has the goal of protecting the national honor and interest, serving as a model to all the oppressed nations, and increasing respect for Turkey among the Western states. It has been a long tradition to state in the government programs that the foreign policy of the government would advance the Kemalist foreign policy by adhering to the principles of ‘peace at home, peace in the world', full-independence, sovereignty, respect for territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs. However, these objectives have also been identified by the political elite as part of the traditional foreign policy without making a direct reference to Kemalism. Taken as such, the concepts attributed to the Kemalist foreign policy show similar patterns with the values of the Westphalian state discussed above. The emphasis on the independence, non-interference in domestic and foreign affairs, equality (reciprocity) and freedom of action in the conduct of the foreign policy reflect the vision of the state as a sovereign entity that acts upon self-reliance and independence in matters of security and foreign policy. The principles of 'peace at

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home, peace in the world', 'serving as a model to the oppressed nations', and 'raising Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization', on the other hand, do not reveal a conception that is based on self-reliance as such. Yet, it would be sufficient to argue here that their meaning depends on how they are defined in the Turkish foreign policy context. Westphalian Approach to Cyprus and the EC/EU Cyprus as a Strategically Important Territory At the core of the Westphalian approach is an emphasis on the concepts of sovereignty, national security and freedom of action. From this perspective, the security priorities of Turkey were to protect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the country, preserve the gains of the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty and the 1960 arrangements on Cyprus, and maintain the strategic preponderance in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (O¤uzlu, 2003). Cyprus was seen as Turkey’s 'national cause' due to its strategic location and, considered important for Turkey’s national security due to its role in preserving the balance of power between Greece and Turkey. The possibility of Enosis (the unification of Cyprus with Greece) haunted the political elite that approached Cyprus from this perspective since 1950s, as it would not only disrupt this balance, but also pose a grave threat against Turkey’s strategic interests in the region. Indeed, shortly after the inter-communal clash began in the island, the Prime Minister and the Head of the Democratic Party Adnan Menderes, referring to the Turkish Independence War, declared: “This reminds us the dangerous and sad years and the great sacrifices we made for our national existence” (Fırat, 2000b: 25). At the London Conference of 1955, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rütü Zorlu expressed the strategic importance of Cyprus for Turkey and that if the previous status quo were to be disrupted, that should be by handing the island to Turkey (ibid.) In a similar vein, smet nönü, the Head of the Republican People's Party RPP), stated in 1956: “It is obviously a security cause for us to ensure that Cyprus does not pass on to the hands of Greece” (Erdemir, 1959: 10). Cyprus as a 'national cause’ was also legitimized by viewing the Turks living on the island as “a part and an extension of the Turkish nation” (Erim, 1963: 3), and considering the territory of Cyprus as an extension of Turkey’s territory. In this sense, while fighting against the Enosis plan of the Greek Cypriots and hence 'saving' the Turkish Cypriots from colonization formed the former element of the 'cause' that was seen as Turkey’s “honor debt” (ibid), exercising control over the Cyprus territory because of its strategic importance for Turkey constituted its latter dimension. This was

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well expressed in the remarks of Alparslan Türke, the Head of the Nationalist Action Party, who defined the Cyprus cause as the “Independence War of Turks against the Greek imperialism” by recourse to the narrative that had emerged after 1955 (Türkefl, 1979: 191,192): A military plane that takes off from Greece cannot return to Greece after bombarding Ankara or Erzurum. But whoever has the island acquires the opportunity to bombard Ankara and Erzurum and go back […] In addition, the fact that 130,000 Turks live on the island makes the island an important territory for Turkey. Last but not least, Turkey has historical rights over Cyprus. Cyprus has never belonged to Greek sovereignty […] Hence, the fairest solution would be to hand Cyprus over to Turkey (Türkefl, 1979: 276, 277).

While Enosis was considered as an imminent possibility until the mid-1970s, the events that took place in the 1990s and especially the RoC's application to the EU once again triggered the same narrative. In December 1993, Greece and the RoC launched the Joint Defensive Dogma with the aim of defending the Hellenic space against Turkey, which involved joint military exercises and the construction of a military base (Süvarierol, 2003). This prompted Bülent Ecevit, the Head of the Democratic Left Party to state that Northern Cyprus should be autonomous from Turkey only in its 'domestic affairs' and that Turkey should reject negotiations with those who do not recognize TRNC (F1 rat, 2000a). When the RoC announced its decision to deploy S-300 missiles with a range of 150 km in 1997, this once again turned the Cyprus issue into the main security problem for Turkey and produced a vigorous response by the Turkish Army that this attempt would be perceived as a casus belli and that a preventive bombing would take place (Süvarierol, 2003). In the same vein, smail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that any attack against the TRNC would be perceived as an attack against Turkey and that Turkey would go ahead with her plans to integrate Northern Cyprus should the EU launch accession talks with the island’s Greek Cypriot government. (smail, 1998). By the same token, in the program of the coalition government composed of the Motherland Party, Democratic Left Party and the Nationalist Action Party, it was stated that Cyprus had a great significance for Turkey's national security and that this importance increased (F1 rat, 2000a). It was within this context that when the European Council’s Luxembourg Summit of 1997 declared that the EU would start the accession negotiations with Cyprus and excluded Turkey from the list of candidates for the next round of enlargement, the integration plans between the TRNC and Turkey were accelerated. As a symbolic response to the Summit’s decision, the first meeting of the Association Council

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between the two countries took place on the date the EU began negotiations with Cyprus (see smail, 1998; Haktan1 r, 1999; Manisal1 , 2000). Interpreting the accession of Cyprus in the Union as a threat to the existential interests of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, the corollary balancing move involved supporting the confederation thesis of the TRNC and redefining the peace at home peace in the world principle accordingly: “‘Peace at home, peace in the world’ is not a product of a passive policy but an active one that can transcend itself…a positive, bold step that is oriented to building the future” (D1 fliflleri Bakan1  smail Cem, 1999: 658). Similarly, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit remarked that, in case Cyprus became a member of the EU before a settlement, Turkey might as well go and annex Cyprus (Süvarierol, 2003). Yet the securitization of the opening of the accession talks with Cyprus did not parallel the securitization of Turkey’s EU vocation. The following statement of Cem is illustrative in this respect: “We have no tendency or intention to use Cyprus against the EU in our evaluation of the problems between the current situation of Cyprus and the EU (D1 fliflleri Bakan1  smail Cem , 1999: 60). Europe as an Unreliable Ally and the Concepts of 'Independence' and 'NonInterference in Domestic and Foreign Affairs' A Westphalian approach to Turkish-EC/EU relations have mostly emphasized the principle of non-interference in domestic and foreign affairs and rejected the intervention of the EC and later the EU countries to the conflict. The Turkish elite were of the view that a secure relationship between Turkey and the EC/EU required the respect for Turkey's Cyprus policy since it emanated from Turkey's legal and historical rights. So long as these rights and principles were respected, Turkey, on its part, would act to protect the Western European strategic interests around her borders to have her European identity acknowledged (O¤uzlu, 2003). Viewing the EC/EU just as any other Western intergovernmental organization, and especially NATO, where Turkey stood on par with her Western allies, the Turkish elite hoped that her equal status with the countries in the EU would lead the EC/EU act in accordance with Turkey's sensitivities in relation to Cyprus (O¤uzlu, 2003; Bilgin, 2003). According to this perspective, Turkey had a right to join the EC/EU but was excluded from it for various security and political reasons. Notwithstanding this suspicious view of the EC/EU, these arguments did not define the EC/EU in antagonistic terms but rather as an untrustworthy strategic ally. In viewing the EU as a biased player and reassuring Turkey’s intentions to resolve the conflict, this narrative not only rearticulated the suspicions with regard to the EC/EU but also reconstituted Turkey’s identity as adherent to international law.

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While Turkey was consistent and sincere in her intentions to both integrate with the EC/EU and resolve the Cyprus issue, this was blocked by the EU, which ignored the Greek Cypriots’ role in the conflict and made Turkey's revision of Cyprus policy a condition for Turkey’s membership in the EC/EU. Cyprus issue, from this perspective, was one of the cards the EEC/EU was unfairly playing to distance Turkey from her European orientation. The following statement by President Evren is illustrative: “They are trying to make us disincline from our European vocation by demanding that we remove our military forces from Cyprus […] See how they are interfering in our domestic affairs?” ( Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet

Baflkan1 , 1988: 269). As this statement indicates, Turkey’s holding on to her Cyprus cause was not viewed as a departure from her European orientation but that the EEC was considered to pursue a clandestine plan to push Turkey off this path. The emphasis on 'non-submission', 'sovereignty', and 'non-interference in domestic affairs' in the above-quoted remark also reveals that Cyprus is seen as a domestic problem in which the EC had no right to interfere. This suspicious and non-submissive approach to the EC/EU was apparent especially after the RoC became a member in 2004. Defining Cyprus as a national security issue (Erdo¤an, 2003c), and emphasizing that Turkey did what she needed to do, Prime Minister and Head of the JDP Recep Tayyip Erdo¤an stated that any further imposition by the EU was unacceptable (Erdo¤an, 2004a). For the then Head of the RPP, Deniz Baykal, on the other hand, the national foreign policy of Turkey could only be based on Turkey’s survival and security (Baykal, 2006). As the EU was interested in keeping Turkey as the “permanent candidate for the EU” (Baykal, 2005a), a submissive policy would prevent Turkey from gaining an honorable and respected status in the international arena. Based on this, Baykal stated that Turkey should not make any concessions on her ‘national causes’, mainly, her Cyprus policy, interests in the Aegean Sea, and the minority rights perspective that is grounded in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 (Baykal, 2005b). Notwithstanding this suspicious view of the EC/EU, the Westphalian discourse on Cyprus did not constitute an anti-European identity, since Europeanness found a domestically-driven definition. In this regard, Cem had noted: “Turkey has already been European for 700 years. She does not have a problem or an obligation to have her Europeanness verified by foreign countries.” (D1fliflleri Bakan 1 smail Cem, pp. 12). Thereby, both Turkey’s Cyprus cause and the European orientation were reconciled by virtue of having a domestic origin and being 'deserved'. A similar view was reverberated in 2004 in the words of Baykal. Stating that Turkey should not open her ports to Cyprus given the uncertainty as to the arrival of yet other demands by the

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EU, he said that Turkey should be able to stand up and say that both the EU membership and Cyprus are Turkey’s rights (Baykal, 2004). In the same vein, Erdo¤an stated: Turkey hopes that the EU conducts its relations with Turkey openly, honestly and fairly. Who dares to belittle Turkey’s Cyprus cause! Who dares to look down upon the Turkish state! Who dares to turn the Northern Cyprus, every inch of which is covered with the Turkish nation’s blood, into an issue of political haggling! Our government sees the Cyprus issue as a matter of realist diplomacy, rather than a tool for a conflictual policy (Erdo¤an, 2006).

The post-Westphalian Approach Apart from the defensive approach discussed above, the foreign policy articulations regarding the Cyprus issue and the EC/EU also involved a desecuritized version of the domestic elements of Turkish foreign policy. Those who employed this approach did not consider the EU or the Cyprus issue as a national security issue but rather emphasized the role of Turkey in integrating the European ideals and spreading it elsewhere by serving as a peculiar role model to the countries in Turkey's neighborhood. From this perspective, the EU was not regarded as a rival, an untrustworthy ally or a negative Other against which Turkey needed to protect her own national interests and sovereignty, but rather as a coalition of values. Protecting the Rights of the Turkish Cypriots as a 'National Cause' and Exporting 'Peace' and 'Democracy' The Cyprus intervention of 1974 was not only considered as a national security issue for Turkey, but also, and predominantly, as an operation that purported to export the 'peace and democracy at home' to Cyprus. Redefining Turkey’s 'national cause' as the protection of the rights and interests of the Turkish Cypriots, the government program of the Justice Party stated: “In order to resolve the Cyprus question, which is our greatest national cause, in a way that ensures the rights and interests of the Turkish community is an unchanging objective of our government […] It is inconceivable that Turkey will be ignorant to Turkish Cypriots’ colonization” (Da¤l1 & Aktürk, 1988: 125). The following remarks of the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit prior to the operation are also illustrative of how the representation of the Turkish Cypriots as 'oppressed' by the Greek dictatorship reconstituted Turkey as a 'liberator' and a 'hero' that was driven by the sole purpose to democratize and hence rescue the one in need: “The victory to be achieved in Cyprus will not be a victory for the Turkish nation alone, but will also be

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the victory of democracy over dictatorship; it will be the triumph of freedom over oppression.” (Milliyet, 21 July 1975). In a similar vein, Ecevit stated the following on another occasion: “The RPP believes that the Turkish Cypriots also have the right to free democracy, which Turkey considers to be inalienable” (Milliyet, 23 July 1974). This was in line with how the 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle was defined prior to the operation. By the same token, the election declaration of the RPP stated that the party would “realize 'peace at home, and peace in the world' not through pressure, punishment or fear, but through freedom, love and respect” (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 1973: 213). The following remark also reveals how the concepts of 'democracy' and 'freedom' were used with an emphasis on 'the aim of spreading them' to redefine the common identity of the Western alliance: Our friends in the West have usually evaluated Turkey according to the contribution that Turkey might make to collective defense through the bravery of our people, but I think Turkey deserves to be evaluated according to other criteria as well, particularly according to the criteria of her success in democracy because, after all, our alliance is not merely a military alliance [….] It is an alliance aiming at strengthening and spreading democracy and freedom (Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, 1978: 159).

In this sense, the redefinition of the 'national cause' in the 1960s and the 1970s in terms of protecting the interests and rights of the Turkish Cypriots was not immune from either the values attributed to the Western community or the concepts in the domestic repertoire, which were revised to integrate these concepts. While the above-quoted reference situated these values within a general 'Western' identity which was the main discursive instrument of the Cold War politics, specific references to the 'European identity' were also abundant during the same period. The main discursive move in this regard was to define 'spreading the freedom and democracy' as an extension of Turkey’s goal of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization'. The following statement delivered by the then Prime Minister and the Head of the Justice Party, Süleyman Demirel also shows how the concepts employed to define the EEC were seen reconcilable with Turkey’s domestic goals and hence with Turkey’s national identity: Great Atatürk’s direction to be followed by the Turkish Republic in political, economic and social justice terms is the pathway towards the West… For Turkey, the EEC is a real success of the democratic order. The reason why Turkey takes part on the side of the EEC without hesitation is because it shares the same ideal and understanding of democracy with it. The economic order the EEC

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represents is the one that Turkey chose for herself. Turkey believes that this order, which gives priority and great value to the individual and the private entrepreneurship, is the one that will take the nations to welfare and happiness (Milliyet, 17 May 1967).

This narrative was reproduced in the discourse of the successive governments during and after the Cold War, and most recently in the discourse of the Prime Minister Erdo¤an, who stated: “We do not see membership in the EU as a goal but as a means to raise the Turkish people to the level of the contemporary civilization which they deserve (Erdo¤an, 2003b). While viewing the European vocation within the context of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization' reconstituted the old narrative, Erdoan added new concepts to this chain by arguing that “what makes Turkey European is the fact that Turkey embraces the values that Europe represents: mainly, the participatory democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, human rights, secularism, and freedom of thought and conscience” (ibid). Again, as before, it was underlined that Turkey could help the strengthening and the spread of these values by serving as a model to other countries. It is interesting to observe how this pro-EU stance paralleled an attempt to frame the Cyprus issue as a 'problem' rather than a 'security matter' (Bilgin, 2006). Before the EU's Copenhagen Summit of 2002, the JDP government undertook to initiate a new understanding of the Cyprus issue, called as “the policy of solution” (Erdo¤an, 2003a). This approach suggested that Turkey should take an active role as a guarantor state in resolving the conflict, and push for an immediate settlement, instead of viewing the issue from a security angle (Erdo¤an, 2003d). While this pragmatist desecuritizing take was not new, since a prior failed attempt was made by Turgut Özal in the 1980s (Barlas, 1994; F1 rat, 2000a; Uzgel, 2007), it definitely diverged from the Cyprus policy of the previous governments and challenged their view. Similar to Özal’s approach to the issue, Erdo¤an argued that a policy that resists any compromise and is centered on Turkey’s national security interests had been contrary to Turkey’s goals, exacerbating the resolution of the conflict, leading to further isolation of the Turkish Cypriots instead of bringing peace, and becoming an ever-present obstacle for Turkey’s EU membership (ibid). However, in contrast to Özal’s suggestion to remove the Cyprus policy from the top agenda, Erdo¤an did not see a reason to denationalize the cause while attempting to desecuritize it. In this context, “to demand a solution” meant not only protecting the interests of Turkey but also “safeguarding the future of the Turkish Cypriots” (ibid). In defining the final version of the Annan Plan, which aimed for the integration of Cyprus into the EU as a unified state, as an extension of the 'harmony of civilizations'

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thesis, this discourse integrated yet another concept that sat well with the concept of 'pluralism' which Europe was argued to represent (Gül, 2006). This was also legitimized by means of the domestic concepts available in the Turkish discourse. In this vein, by redefining Turkey's support for both the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots in their goal of 'reaching the EU standards' as an extension of Turkey's own goal of 'reaching the level of the modern civilization', Turkey would not only contribute to the spread of the European norms and values (ibid) but would also, as stated by Erdoan during his visit to the TRNC in 2002, “prove the world that democracy and Islam culture could coexist” (Erdo¤an, 2002b). Revising the Concepts of 'Full Independence', 'Sovereignty', and 'NonInterference in Domestic Affairs' While the Westphalian articulations employed the concept of non-interference in the domestic affairs within the context of EU conditionality and, securitized the RoC's entry in the Union, the post-Westphalian arguments desecuritized the EU conditionalities and removed the “non-interference in the domestic affairs” from the context of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Instead, the concept was emphasized in relation to the sovereign rights of the TRNC which furthered the view that Turkey respected the independence and democracy of Cyprus and preferred to refrain from deciding on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot state. Responding to a question whether Turkey would intervene after the Greek Cypriots voted “no” in the referendum for a unified Cyprus, Erdoan said: “Cyprus is an independent state. As an independent state, she will make her decisions herself. We cannot intervene” (Erdo¤an, 2002a). In a similar vein, the JDP also gave priority to individualism as illustrated in Demirel's remarks above. While the security dimension was also absent in the earlier forms of this approach, the change in the discourse of the JDP from the earlier versions of this discourse involved the juxtaposition of the security-centered values to those based on individual rights: Our party sees Turkey’s full membership in the EU as a natural consequence of our modernization process... The ideological attitudes of the antiEU segments of the population with regard to national sovereignty, national security, national interest, national and regional culture hinder the realization of the Copenhagen criteria. Our party subscribes to the view, which replaces these concepts that aspire to maintain the bureaucratic and statist tradition, with a democratic, civilian and pluralist understanding that ascribes a higher value to the individual and with that which is centered on the participation of the public (Adalet ve Kalk1 1 nma Partisi, 2002).

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Here we also see how this approach diverges from the Westphalian approach in the way it interprets the concepts of 'full-independence' and 'sovereignty'. While the Westphalian approach to these concepts underlines Turkey's ability to employ a foreign policy independently from the involvement of other states, according to the post-Westphalian approach, these principles are not seen irreconcilable with having a common policy with other states. As the remarks quoted above show, the postWestphalian approach employs the concepts of 'sovereignty' and 'independence' in relation to the rights of the Turkish Cypriots rather than focusing on how the EU’s interference in Turkish 'foreign' policy impinges upon the sovereign rights of Turkey. In this regard, having a more compromising view on Cyprus has not been seen as submissive towards the EU, or as being undertaken only for the sake of becoming a full-member but as an extension of Turkey’s 'domestically owned' concepts. Hence, from this approach too, there is no incompatibility between Turkey’s European vocation and the Cyprus cause by virtue of this link and because both serve to reach the same goal. Conclusion This contribution argued that it would be problematic to see Turkey’s European orientation and the Cyprus cause as representing divergent paths of development if one takes the European integration not as the conformation of a country to a pre-set European identity or rationality but as a contested discursive process whereby the values attributed to European integration and identity resonate with the concepts available in the domestic repertoire. Remaining at the level of the discourse has led us to pursue a different form of inquiry as to whether certain policies represent a deviation from the general foreign policy orientation and how the identity construction takes place along this process. Hence the article proceeded to show how the European identity was discursively constructed, instead of examining the degree to which a proper European identity has taken roots in the Turkish context. Thought of this way, it would be erroneous to conceptualize a security-centered (or Westphalian, as discussed in the previous article) discourse as a representative of a non-European identity. Equally misleading would it be to assume stability within the party discourses given the contested nature of the each concept that is employed in the discursive arena. Drawing on this insight and based on the differentiation made between the Westphalian and the post-Westphalian approaches, this study examined the main legitimating criteria for both European orientation and the Cyprus cause in the Turkish

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foreign policy context. Indeed, such a differentiation has not proven unproblematic either, as these discourses were not mutually exclusive. Yet, the categorization chosen here mainly centered on how the former defined the Cyprus issue as a matter of Turkey’s own national security and Turkey's EU accession as uncertain if not impossible, and how the latter sought to remove the security dimension out of the definition of the Cyprus as a 'national cause' and Turkey’s European orientation. It was shown that both of these approaches attributed different meanings to the same concepts. It was also demonstrated that the legitimization of the Cyprus cause and Turkey’s European vocation in terms of these concepts, as well as their translation in terms of the values attributed to the European integration, did not permit viewing the Cyprus cause and Turkey’s European vocation as separate paths to be chosen over the other. A more national security-centered interpretation of these concepts paralleled the securitization of the EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus and the involvement of the EU in the conflict. On the other hand, despite its occasional offensive moves, this approach did not suggest an alternative to Turkey’s European vocation, but rather saw it as a right, pursued despite the 'surreptitious' efforts by the EU to exclude Turkey. In contrast, the post-Westphalian approach argued for the need to move away from this narrative as it was seen as derailing both the solution of the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s aspiration to be a full member of the EU. Yet, as this study showed, this approach was not exempt from the concepts used by the Westphalian approach either, but merely constructed a different narrative out of them. As to whether the recent post-Westphalian overture of the JDP can be seen to represent a lasting process, further remarks can be made here. While the postWestphalian approach had long been present in the Turkish foreign policy discourse, it is reasonable to submit to the view that it gained more resonance after a clear timetable was set for Turkey’s EU membership. Yet one should not read this as the dependence of the discourse solely on the dynamics between the EU and Turkey, although Turkey’s security-centered approach reached its peak when Turkey was either far from acceding in the EEC (1970s) or excluded from EU’s enlargement framework (the 1997 Luxembourg Summit). The remarks made after the suspension of the EU negotiations have confirmed this line of argumentation. Stating that even if the negotiations ended in a deadlock Turkey would still not move away from its European vocation revealed that the EU is seen as a means to 'reach the level of the contemporary civilization goal' that has been set long before the EU integration. It would then be fair to argue that not the prospect for membership but an affirmative

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interpretation of the dominant concepts circulating in the foreign policy discourse can serve as an anchor for Turkey’s Europeanization. Admittedly, the recent developments showed that one should not take the recent affirmative interpretation as an inevitable move towards a gradually more compromising attitude towards the Cyprus issue or an incremental divergence from the Westphalian approach that has occasionally entered the discursive repertoire of the present government. Just as the discourse of the JDP has provided a postWestphalian approach to the Cyprus cause immediately after it came to power, it has not refrained from employing the nationalism of the opposition parties after being accused of challenging the foundational principles of the Republic. This is not surprising at all, given its oft-stated aspiration to be the center party of Turkey. This was crystallized into a rather Westphalian statement in the new program of the JDP government, which states: As a result of our active policy on Cyprus pursued as of 2002, Turkey, which has long been beleaguered by the international pressure regarding Cyprus, has gained a great capacity for maneuver in the international arena without making any concession on our national interests. Until now, not a single soldier has been withdrawn from Cyprus, and not even a square meter of territory has been given away (Adalet ve Kalk1 1 nma Partisi, 2007).

In the light of what has been argued above, it can be claimed that while a move from a Westphalian interpretation in the course of European integration is not a smooth or intractable process, its sustainability does not only depend on who hegemonizes the 'domestically-owned concepts' but also which meanings are seen as more legitimate in the domestic context. The above-quoted statement reveals that a total disappearance of the Westphalian approach to the Cyprus issue does not seem possible given the present discursive dynamics in Turkey. On the other hand, as the present contribution has endeavored to show, viewing the Cyprus cause as a policy to be pursued at the expense of European orientation is not possible given the present consensus on associating Turkey’s European vocation with the maxim of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization.' The latent rhetoric on the ideational importance of the EU orientation is arguably another confirmation of this stance. This suggests once again that what has really anchored Turkey to her European orientation is more to do with how 'Europeanness' was defined in the local context rather than how 'European' Turkey was seen from abroad.

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Mustafa Akkurt, Omer F. Demirel, Selim Zaim Forecasting Turkey's Natural Gas Consumption by Using Time Series Methods Kadir Can Yalç›n Market Rationality: Efficient Market Hypothesis versus Market Anomalies Sad›k Ünay Hegemony, Aid and Power: A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the World Bank Mette Nordahl Grosen, Bezen Balamir Coflkun A Decade of SAPs, Market Liberalization and Environment in Tanzania (1987-1998) Onder Cetin 1941 Resolutions of El-Hidaje in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Case of Traditional Conflict Transformation Eren Tatari, Renat Shaykhutdinov State Response to Religious Revivalism in Post-Soviet Central Asia Ümit Kurt The Doctrine of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” as Official Ideology of the September 12 and the “Intellectuals' Hearth - Ayd›nlar Oca¤›” as the Ideological Apparatus of the State Hakan Yeflilova Justice, Human Rights, and the Quasi-Civil Society in a Muslim Context

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Ömer Çaha Attitudes Towards the Status of Women in Turkish Society: The Case of Istanbul Gokhan Bacik, Sammas Salur Coup-proofing in Turkey

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Kemal Ozden, Ihsan Yilmaz An Attempt at Pseudo-Democracy and Tactical Liberalization in Turkey: An Analysis of Ismet Inönü's Decision to Transition to a Multi-Party Political System Bekir Ç›nar The Relationship Between Terrorism and Liberal Democratic States Özlem Demirtafl Bagdonas Reconsidering the Incompatibility Between European Orientation and Cyprus Policy: Westphalian and Post-Westphalian Approaches to Turkey's Cyprus Policy and the EC/EU

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