European Union, neo-corporatist, and pluralist ...

European Union, neo-corporatist, and pluralist governance arrangements: lobbying and policymaking patterns in a comparative perspective Tom R Burns and Marcus Carson* Jean Monnet Visiting Professor, Schuman Centre for Advanced Study, European University Institute, I-50016 Florence, Italy; Uppsala Theory Circle, Department of Sociology, Uppsala University, Box 821, 75108 Uppsala, Sweden

International Journal of Regulation and Governance

2(2): 129–175

Abstract Legislative and policy-making processes within democratic structures are multi-agent, collective decision processes. Interest representation, including lobbying, may have a substantial effect not only on policy outcomes, but also on the structure of democratic institutions themselves. In view of current trends and challenges facing democratic institutions, better understanding of the processes and mechanisms by which policy-making and lobbying operate is particularly important. This paper applies the new institutionalism to the comparative analysis of governance and policy-making in different political systems, particularly those in Europe and the US. Pluralist and neo-corporatist arrangements of influence articulation are distinguished and contrasted. It is argued further that these do not correspond to or fit EU (European Union) arrangements for policy-making and lobbying. A model of EU arrangements is outlined. The article considers the degree of openness, flexibility, extent of predictability, and patterns of policy production and development in the different systems. The EU system, which is a type of ‘organic’ or informal democracy, operates with highly flexible but well-organized procedures to engage interest groups from industry and civil society as sources of information and expertise and to act as brokers in EU policy-making; deliberation and negotiation typically result in consensus. We conclude that many of the advantages of the EU system with its flexibility and adaptability to sectoral specific issues and conditions are a source of its problems of non-transparency and ‘democratic deficit.’ * Department of Sociology, Stockholm University, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden and Department of Sociology, South Stockholm University College, 14189 Huddinge, Sweden

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Tom R Burns and Marcus Carson

Introduction Group-interest articulation and pressure-group politics in general are processes by which sub-groups of a societal population attempt to influence policy-making and regulation in pursuit of their particular interests and goals.1 These processes are part and parcel of what we often mean by democracy. However, such activity places significant strains upon democratic institutions that they were neither designed nor expected to deal with. This consideration is especially significant in the light of other developments that have tested the limits of democratic institutions: globalization, the increasingly technical nature of many public issues, increasing specialization and the accelerating pace of change, among others (Kaase and Newton 1995; Burns 1999). Held (1996) points out correctly that ‘the history of ... political institutions reveals the fragility and vulnerability of democratic arrangements.’ The fact that interest-group pressures and lobbying have the capacity to amplify many of the other forces straining democratic systems makes it especially important and urgent that we more thoroughly understand these mechanisms and processes. This paper, adopting a new institutional approach (Bulmer 1994; Burns and Carson 2002; Burns and Flam 1987; March and Olsen 1989; Meyer, Scot, Rowan, et al. 1983; Pierson 1996; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995; Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez et al. 1987, Warleigh 2002, among others), compares and analyses distinct governance and policy-making systems focusing on group-interest representation, pressure-group politics and lobbying, and participation in policy-making. The underlying premise is that institutions matter in the definition of problems, in establishing agendas, and in formulating solutions.2 The 1

In this pursuit of interests, success often comes at the expense of other groups in a society. Such a view of pressure groups is elaborated by, among others, Becker (1983, 1985) who analyses the competition between pressure groups as a game. This game is zero-sum with regard to influence, and negative sum with regard to taxes and subsidies. What one interest wins in the form of subsidies, the other loses due to increased taxes. Since all of this is distributed and administrated by a central authority, there are also costs, or ‘dead weight losses’, where no one gains. 2 An institution is a complex of relationships, roles, and norms, which constitute and regulate recurring interaction processes among participants in socially defined settings or domains. Any institution organizing people in such relationships may be conceptualized as an authoritative complex of r ules or a shared rule regime, which commands loyalty, authority, and commitment among members of a given community (Burns,


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first section provides an initial characterization and comparison of two historically prominent types of policy-making and lobbying systems: pluralist and neo-corporatist type systems. In the second section, we introduce the EU system and compare and contrast it with neo-corporatist and pluralist systems. The distinction between closed, well-structured policy systems, on the one hand, and open, fluid policy systems, on the other hand, is particularly stressed. The third section is a short, concluding section with tables comparing the three systems.

Interest representation and lobbying in contrasting governance and policy-making systems3 Both neo-corporatist and pluralist systems entail ‘elitist democracy’—the domination of rule-making and policy-making footnote 2 continued Baumgartner, and Deville 1985; Burns and Flam 1987; Burns and Carson 2002 ). Institutions are exemplified by, for instance, family, a business organization or government agency, markets, democratic associations, and religious communities. Each structures and regulates social interactions in particular ways; there is a certain interaction logic to a given institution. More precisely: (1) An institution defines and constitutes a particular social order, namely positions and relationships, defining the actors (individuals and collectives) that are the legitimate or appropriate participants (who must, may, or might participate) in the institutional domain, their rights and obligations visà-vis one another, and their access to and control over resources. In short, it consists of a system of authority and power. (2) It organizes, coordinates, and regulates social interaction in a particular domain or domains, defining contexts – specific settings and times – for constituting the institutional domain or sphere. (3) It provides a normative basis for appropriate behaviour including the roles of the participants in that setting – their interactions and institutionalized games – taking place in the institutional domain. (4) The rule complex provides a cognitive basis for knowledgeable participants to interpret, understand, and make sense of what goes on in the institutional domain. (5) It also provides core values, norms, and beliefs that are referred to in normative discourses, the giving and asking of accounts, the criticism and exoneration of actions and outcomes in the institutional domain. Finally, (6) an institution defines a complex of potential normative equilibria which function as ‘focal points’ or ‘coordinators’ (Schelling 1963; Burns and Roszkowska 2003). 3 ‘Lobbying’ has become a common term in speaking about the activities of associations and NGOs and other pressure groups in EU policy-making and regulation (Andersen and Eliassen (1991, 1995, 1997), Bern (1994), Marks and McAdam (1996), Mazey and Richardson (1993), Pedler and van Schendelen (1993), Potters (1992), Streeck and Schmitter (1991), van Schendelen (1993), Wallace and Wallace (2000), Wallace and Young (1997)). However, the forms and mechanisms differ substantially from other political systems such as European national systems and the US. This is one of the main points of this paper. Nevertheless, interest group articulation and political pressure are part and parcel of a common understanding and experience of modern democracy.


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processes by elites within the framework of democratic nationstates (Table 1).4 The Scandinavian countries, Netherlands, Austria, and, to a certain extent, Germany have represented cases of until recently what were relatively tightly organized neocorporatist systems, although with considerable variation among them.5 (Adams 2002a; Berger 1981; Katzenstein 1984; Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter, et al. 1996; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). These societies regulated social tensions and conflict with explicit integrative strategies and well-defined societal and public agents as well as particular organizational arrangements and procedures. The neo-corporatist type of social organization exhibited in, for instance, tripartite or multipartite institutions, includes organs for representatives of capital, labour, and government to participate in consultation, bargaining, and collective decision-making processes. The complex of organs has not simply been an ‘additional sphere’. Rather, it has provided an institutional framework on another level. Within the neo-corporatist institutional frame, rule formation and regulatory processes take place at the macro level in relation to, for instance, ‘market’ and ‘state’, and to issues such as wages, pensions, working conditions, taxes, economic policies, and social policies. In particular, they have dealt with the interfaces – and contradictions – between ‘state’, ‘market’, and the agents representing them. 6 The US, in contrast, exemplifies pluralist principles. Here only limited attempts are made at integration and regulation of 4

There have been several attempts to formulate systems of classifications of policy networks (Jordan and Schubert 1992; Schneider 1992; Rhodes and Marsh 1992; van Waarden 1992). Consideration of these would take us beyond the scope of this paper. We prefer initially to work with two general types of networks for the sake of simplicity. In practice, the networks in which we are interested are empirically described and analysed. On a more theoretical-methodological level, our approach takes as a point of departure the different ways societies organize power, construct agency, and established governance in different types of organizations, organizational domains, and policy-making processes (Burns and Flam 1987; Jepperson and Meyer 1991). A major implication of this perspective is that different types of state structures/political systems imply differences in policy-making arrangements and processes and, therefore, differences in pressure group and lobbying patterns (Flam 1994). 5 Such arrangements were never effectively established in France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, among other European countries, although there were attempts. 6 Adams (2002b) argues that neo-corporatism at the state level is being eroded by EU (and global) challenges, but this is a matter beyond the scope of this paper comparing different systems of governance.


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Table 1 Pluralist and neo-corporatist systems of social organization and policymaking Neo-corporatist

Pluralist

Integrative, multi-lateral consultation and decision-making. Particular actors or classes of actors are empowered and held collectively responsible. Engagement, commitment, and interlinkages are relatively formal and stable. Principles of inclusive involvement in rule-making, ruleinterpretation and implementation are explicit and provide normative force.

Unilateral and bilateral decision-making, hence fragmented. In principle, a high degree of access. However, engagement, commitment, and interlinkages may be relatively unstable (or uncertain) in any given rule-making, rule interpretation, and implementation process.

Institutionalization and regulation of interorganizational relationships, conflict, and conflict resolution according to norms of fairness (not only procedural, but substantive). In general, high degree of attempts at societal integration and regulation.

Minimum formal institutionalization and regulation of inter-organizational relationships, conflicts, and conflict resolution. The state simply guarantees associational freedom and contractual rights. In general, relatively low degree of state intervention, regulation, and integration.

Norms of inclusion and ‘compromise’, ‘collective benefit,’ ‘redistributive norms’.

Norm of access but not necessarily of inclusion, nor of ‘collective benefit’ and ‘fairness.’ Such norms may be advocated but are vulnerable to challenge or de-legitimation.

Organizational or societal power is an important factor in influencing policymaking but mediated by rules, including distributional norms. Social power also exercised on the basis of appeal to key or core norms.

Resource power is important in influencing policy-making or actors involved. Compromise may be pursued as a strategy, but shifts in bargaining power are followed rather quickly and often dramatically by shifts in strategies. Compromise and the pursuit of mutual advantage are based on self-interest (‘enlightened’?) and are not normatively grounded in or derived from normative force.

Relatively high predictability and certainty of policy processes and outcomes under normal conditions, but less flexibility than a pluralist system.

Relatively high uncertainty and low social predictability in many policy areas. Particularly high uncertainty and low predictability in peripheral policy areas compared to core or strategic areas (relating, for instance, to economic interests and capitalist institutions). Relatively high flexibility.

Source Burns and Flam (1987, p. 380)


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social tensions and conflict through highly organized, macrolevel multilateral negotiations. In the multilateral consultations and decision-making of neo-corporatism, even actors representing interests that are more peripheral may become involved, although the extent and quality of involvement varies considerably (see later). Indeed, this is a distinctive feature of the system: the conscious incorporation (even co-optation) of peripheral actors, after they have mobilized, into the policy-making process. In this way, peripheral institutions and key groups in these domains have opportunities to express their opinions about – and to try to prevent or reduce – negative, unintended impacts on their own spheres. They become involved in the rule formation process as ultimate veto groups, providing also powerful incentives for them to abide by the outcome (conditions of cooptation). The involvement itself provides incentives for those from a particular periphery sphere to coordinate their strategies within the more encompassing frame. For example, mobilized groups may enhance their influence on central, organized decision-making by functioning as a ‘segment’. This also has the secondary effect of providing an organizational basis for more coherent structuring and regulation of the segment in which they are engaged. This institutionalization of multilateral consultation and decision-making, along with segmentation of peripheral domains, tends to reduce the problem of incoherent structuring and regulation in modern societies—a problem characterizing a pluralist system. In sum, a neo-corporatist model emphasizes the articulation of interests through highly organized, stable relationships between government and interest organizations; the state is substantially interventionist with respect to economy and society, shaping, managing, coercing domestic interest group relations, and behaviour. The pluralist, interest-group model focuses on more competitive and less formal or structured mechanisms and pathways of influence. And, in general, the state is less interventionist than in the neo-corporatist arrangement (Andersen and Eliassen 1991, 1995, 1996b). Andersen and Eliassen (1996b) have argued that these two well-established models are inadequate for investigating and understanding the process of interest representation within the EU. We concur and believe that the difference in these two perspectives may well have more to do with the way in which policymaking and lobbying have evolved in the American and


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European national political contexts than in the particular functions of lobbying and policy-making in the political process—or the ways in which lobbyists proceed in plying their trade. Among other things, they suggest identifying the differing institutional and situational conditions within historically given, macro-structural contexts. The strategic choices available to actors in the process of lobbying tend, therefore, to look significantly different in diverse systems, as we show later. The lobbying, consultation, and negotiation in both of these distinct institutional arrangements within democratic systems allow some affected groups and interests to make their voices heard and to influence to varying degrees policy processes and their outcomes. Economic power as well as political weight – including mobilization to lobby – are the foundations for influence over rule and policy-making in a pluralist system. Weaker groups can gain entry in a given situation, for instance, through finding resource-rich and influential allies. But they generally have few opportunities to remain in and influence the system unless they make up a substantial organization or movement, or are otherwise able to independently institutionalize their own organizational structure and resource base. Wealthy and powerful groups are often in a position to countervail the demands of substantial interests including voter majorities. Such established power is occasionally thwarted by mobilized organizations, political parties, mass demonstrations, and media attention, resulting in elite concessions. However, these concessions may be reversed once mobilization subsides and/or established powers counter-attack, and offset. In addition, pluralist systems are relatively ineffective at the integration of multiple domains or sectors and addressing the problems of incoherence, negative interaction effects, and unintended consequences (Burns and Flam 1987). Neo-corporatist systems have their vulnerabilities and failings as well. One of the problems concerns the matter of representation—the fact that peripheral groups feel, in many instances, that they have not been sufficiently taken into account, or have been co-opted. Nonetheless, they have ‘participated,’ ‘been heard,’ and are ‘recorded in the protocols’—it may be claimed that these groups’ overarching ideology and proposals have, in fact, been properly taken into account. Periodically, there may be revolts and re-negotiation about the terms of participation, including the rules and organizing principles for consultation,


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deliberation, and negotiation (Andersen and Burns 1992). In general, neo-corporatist regimes have much less flexibility than pluralist regimes—both in terms of who participates, what are relevant issues, and how are they to be handled, and by whom (Adams 2002b). A highly turbulent and changing environment is particularly problematic for a neo-corporatist system and sets the stage for crisis and instability. The issues may concern what precisely is the directorial role or the most effective policies for the interventionist state under substantially changed economic and social conditions. This might concern the emergence of a service or information economy or an aging population; or the question of which emerging units or segments should be included or excluded from incorporation. Andersen (1986) points out several conditions under which well-developed corporatist systems break down or experience substantial failures: n a substantially new economic or social challenge emerges; or an entirely new sphere or domain of activity arises. Established organizing principles and norms are difficult to apply at the same time that practical experience with and know ledge of the new conditions are, of course, minimal; n powerful external agents (e.g. multi-national corporations), which do not share the neo-corporatist ideology and institutional frame, break out or refuse to enter in and thereby contribute to challenging and destabilizing the entire neo-corporatist system. In sum, a neo-corporatist system is designed to operate as an integrated whole, through mechanisms of centralization and coordination of multiple segments, as well as of institutionalized procedures of negotiation and conflict resolution. A high degree of policy coherence and continuity may be achieved; this may be at the expense of flexibility and adaptability. In a pluralist system, on the other hand, there is considerable autonomy of segments and their agents. Initiatives can come from many different agents and directions, with the economically powerful agents having, of course, substantial advantages in these processes. Coordination, to the extent it occurs, takes place through alliance formation, multiple bilateral and ad hoc or temporary multilateral negotiations. Typically, flexibility and adaptability are accomplished at the expense of coherence and continuity in policy-making. The rules of exclusion (and openness) of the two systems also differ. There is more apparent openness in a pluralist


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system, but the openness is difficult to exploit, in many instances, without substantial economic resources or some form of political currency, such as the kind of credibility and legitimacy that some public interest organizations enjoy. In a pluralist system there may be de facto closure because of resource limitations, whereas in a neo-corporatist system, exclusion is more formal or institutionalized. In general, the capacity to mobilize resources – power – is important in both systems. But as suggested above, economic power is a particularly strategic resource in a pluralist system. Moreover, it is ‘right and proper’ to use such power, as long as one plays according to the rules of the game. In a neocorporatist system, while power, in particular economic power, is important, normative argument and fitting in or adhering to the logic of integration and coherence plays a key role (as also in the EU, see below). Thus, participants should (or are expected to) exhibit a concern for collective benefit, just or fair distribution, and readiness to compromise self-interest—all of which countervail to some extent pure power factors. Thus, the sustained participation of weak or peripheral groups – through explicit inclusion principles – is achieved to a much greater extent as a result of their institutionalized roles in the policy-making process. Participation gives some substantial opportunities of influence even to relatively weak agents, because there are norms of recognition, collective deliberation, and self-sacrifice in neocorporatist systems.

The EU system in comparative perspective EU policy-making arrangements7 Several of the most distinctive features of the EU type of gover nance characterizing the EU can be summarized as follows (Schmitter 1996). 1 There is no single locus of clearly defined supreme authority. 2 There is no established and relatively centralized hierarchy of public offices but rather multiple hierarchies and networks. 3 There is no predefined and distinctive ‘public’ sphere of competence within which the EU can make decisions binding on all.

7

This section draws on earlier work characterizing the EU and several of the key mechanisms of its operation [see Burns, Carson, and Nylander (2001); Andersen and Burns (1996); Burns and Nylander (2001)].


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4 There is no fixed and (more or less) contiguous territory over which it exercises authority (for instance, Denmark, Sweden, and England are outside on some matters, in particular the new monetary union with the Euro). 5 There is no unique capacity for the direct implementation of its decisions (laws, policies) upon intended individuals and groups. 6 There is not a pervasive ability to control the movement of goods, services, capital, and persons within its borders. 7 There is no unique recognition by other polities, membership in international organizations, and exclusive capacity to conclude international treaties (since member states retain much of this). 8 Many agents, and a variety of types of agents, are engaged in EU governance, and they expand and adapt it in a variety of ways. While there is considerable agreement on such descriptions of the EU, there is little consensus on what precisely is the EU’s form of governance. Indeed, it continues to be described in various ways. For example, some see it from an inter-governmental perspective (Moravcsik 1998), focusing on the intentions and preferences of member states. Member states meet and negotiate in inter-governmental conferences, and revise the Treaty (that is, the series of EU treaties commencing with the Treaty of Rome (1958)). However, treaty articles can be quite vaguely formulated, giving considerable room for interpretation and, as Hix (1999) points out, ‘…treaty reform is a blunt instrument. When signing treaties, governments cannot predict the precise implications of treaty provisions and new decision-making rules, or exactly how the Commission will behave when granted new powers’. Nugent (1995) stresses, more over, ‘Treaty provision is no guarantee of policy development nor is lack of provision a guarantee of lack of development’. Thus, EU policy outcomes are generally not understandable as simply the output of negotiations among member states (although this aspect must be taken into account); in addition, the relative importance of such negotiations appears to have dwindled. The EU is also seen as a type of federative, or possibly confederative, system. Again, this characterization does not fit very well either. Arguably one of the most influential perspectives views the EU as a unique form of multi-level governance with loosely coupled segments and


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networks (Kohler-Koch 1997; Peterson 1995, among others).8 Networks of policy-making agents and lobbyists crisscross and overlap, extending across functional areas. Some configurations of actors in a policy area or domain are very issue-specific. Others make up more or less institutionalized policy communities – with established norms and principles for organizing policymaking – which addresses a variety of issues. The EU consists of a complex of institutions—an inter-institutional arrangement. But this is true of any modern state. What is unique about the EU is that the boundaries between the functions and roles of its different institutions are unclear and shifting. For instance, the three basic branches of government – legislative, executive, and judiciary – are discernible in the EU, but demarcation lines are fuzzier than in most national systems (Hix 1999; Warleigh 2002). Warleigh (2002) stresses that ‘both the initial design of the EU structure, and the way it has since 8

The EU ‘state’ (in contrast to Weber’s (1968) general characterization of a state) is sui generis, but is likely to become a more common form in the context of heterogeneous populations, societal differentiation, and globalization (Burns 1999; Burns, Jaegur, and Kamali et al. 2000b). It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by ‘legislative action’, but lacks tax and welfare systems. The administrative staff is oriented to, and partially regulated by, an administrative and legal order. It is important to add that in the EU, this regulation is very loose and flexible, allowing extraordinary initiative and freedom of action of the main administrative body, namely the Commission. It also allows the participation of a large number of other agents without constitutional or formal roles, such as interest groups and lobbyists. The key agents and representatives of the EU institutional arrangements claim binding authority in certain areas (single market as well as areas of competence defined by the Treaties), not only over member states and their citizens, but over all relevant actions taking place in the area(s) of its jurisdiction. This authority is regulated by legislation, as well as judicial and other relevant normative orders—that is, it is legitimate. In this sense, the EU ‘state’ is an authoritative association of governance grounded almost entirely on legitimacy and material interests in diverse jurisdictional areas. The exercise of EU authority is regarded as legitimate only insofar as it is ‘delegated’ by the member states or prescribed by them, e.g. in EU mandates (in treaties, etc.). Hence, it is an ultimate authority derived from general agreements (treaties) or principles. There is a framed or bounded exercise of authority, which is essential to any jurisdiction and certainty of authority. Note that Weber defined the modern state as a compulsory association with a territorial basis. The EU clearly fails in meeting this criterion. Even the criterion of territory is problematic since the EU has flexible boundaries: when it comes to the Euro, the ‘territory of jurisdiction’ is truncated. When it comes to market regulation, it is expanded to include to a large extent Norway and Switzerland. Note also that monopoly over the use of force is not essential to the EU jurisdiction and continuity of authority, at least thus far. Legitimate use of force by the EU is only permitted for the time being by its member states or as prescribed by them.


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developed, relied upon complex interdependencies between the institutions rather than a strict and clear separation of powers as in the constitution of the US. In addition, the Union is (presumably) still evolving (Marks and McAdam 1996). The founders of the EU were unable to create a new federal state since the necessary support was lacking at both elite and popular levels. Instead, they set in train a process which binds the member states and the EU institutions ever more closely together, while leaving the difficult constitutional problems such as the separation of powers and relationship between the different tiers of government to be decided gradually or simply emerge organically.’ In short, there is unclear separation of powers in the EU Treaty (which has served thus far as a type of constitution). These conditions provide very substantial opportunities for entrepreneurial and informal politics (Andersen and Burns 1996; Burns 1999), much more so than in typical modern states (see later).9 The EU arrangement entails, roughly speaking, democratic representation and legislative function (European Parliament), administrative or executive order (the Commission), judiciary (the European Court), legislative body with quasi national representation (the Council of Ministers), an inter-governmental negotiation framework (the European Council with heads of member state governments), among others. As any large complex of institutions (Machado and Burns 1998), the EU entails many cross-currents and tensions as a result of conflicting values and interests and substantially contradictory institutional arrangements (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001). The particular ways in which these cross-currents conflict, coexist, and reinforce one another shapes 9

To be more precise, the Treaty does not define precisely the material limits of EU jurisdiction (Weiler 1999). Weiler (1999) points out that in most federal (that is, explicitly multi-level) systems, the relationship between the general polity and its constituent units is conceptualized by the principle of enumerated powers, but in the case of the EU no core of sovereign state powers was left beyond the reach of the EU (based on several doctrines supported by the European Court of Justice, that which makes EU law the law of the land; the doctrine of the supremacy of EU law, that is, EU law trumps conflicting national law; the doctrine of implied powers, e.g., the competence of the EU to negotiate and include international treaties; the doctrine of human rights. As we have argued recently (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001), the single market principle – and community issues – can be used for many different initiatives. Where will it stop? We tend to agree with Weiler (1999) that under the present, highly flexible and in many ways effective arrangements, there is no stopping the train. Some of the support for a new constitution is apparently motivated by a genuine interest in putting limits to the growth of community competencies (Weiler 2000).


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the environment in which policy-making and policy development takes place. The EU is then not only a segmented, multi-level system, but a highly open and dynamic system with poorly defined boundaries between its functions, jurisdictions, and authorities; this also characterizes the relationship between the EU and its member states. Among other things, the lack of precise boundaries and well-defined functions and responsibilities makes for lack of clarity about authority relationships as well as about responsibi lity for policy initiatives and failures. These conditions of pervasive vagueness and ambiguity also contribute to the notorious non-transparency of the EU. Boundary unclarity and openness offers great freedom and opportunities for entrepreneurs, both those within the system and many outside of it (who have resources and/or are organized and want to influence policy or restructure the system in practice).10 This is a major factor in making for a highly dynamic and expanding system. Such EU entrepreneurship operates, of course, under some constraints. These include general constitutional and institutional constraints, as well as the opposition of other agents. An important factor in the EU, for example is nationally-oriented agents who seek to block the increasing expansion of EU powers and structures, that is, to maintain a status quo with substantial sovereignty (Burns and Nylander 2001). In the type of governance that the EU embodies, the direct influence of people through formal representative democracy has only a marginal place (Andersen and Burns 1996; Schmitter 1996; Weiler 1999). Individual citizens voting in free, equal, fair and competitive Euro-elections exercise little or no influence over the composition of Euro-authorities, much less bring about a rotation of those in office. For instance, a majority vote generated 10

The freedoms have parallels, in a certain sense, to those of a market. They allow po werful private and public actors, but above all the Commission itself, extraordinary (in the perspective of a normal democratic state) initiative and freedom in what they do, who they engage or collude with, and thus a degree of agency that is uncommon within most ‘democratic states’ (for the latter do not permit such degrees of freedom for go vernment agencies. Even in tyrannical regimes, where government agents may enjoy considerable freedom, individuals and groups of society must worry about arbitrary and, therefore, unpredictable action from the tyrant). Given this relative freedom from constraints, EU-wide initiatives are grounded or justified in terms of the ‘single market,’ ‘European standards,’ ‘European quality,’ European-wide problems. The substantial opportunities for initiatives allow for possible gains in power, resources, and legitimacy.


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by the European electorate at large cannot be translated into an effective and predictable change in government or policy. The EU is not, in general, a political system in which ru lers are held accountable by citizens for their public policies and actions, and where competing elites offer alternative programmes and vie for popular support at the European level. In this sense, it is not a typical political democracy (Andersen and Burns 1996; Schmitter 1996), although it satisfies general cultural notions of democracy (Andersen and Burns 1996; Burns 1999).11 These conditions have led to critique and discussions about a ‘democratic deficit’. There has been, however, some partial developments increasing democratic accountability. For instance, food safety problems beginning with BSE (bovine spongiform encephalitis or ‘mad-cow disease’) have not only triggered crises of confidence in the safety of food; they have also threatened to further undermine the legitimacy and authority of the EU, and particularly the Commission (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001). Intense pressure from NGOs and citizen groups was clearly felt, and continues to be, although new channels of accountability remain quite different than those in a more typical parliamentary democracy. Clearly, the EU is not a state in the traditional European or even contemporary international sense. It is a new form of supra-national authority (see footnote 8). It is still in principle based on strong national systems which have surrendered – or are surrendering – degrees and types of national sovereignty in a wide spectrum of policy areas. European Community law has priority over any conflicting law of a member state. However, the rate of implementation and degree of compliance varies consi derably, between, for instance, Italy and Denmark, to take two extremes.

Entrepreneurship and lobbying The Commission plays the key role in initiating legislation.12 When final decisions are made, the Council is the major actor. 11

Although parliamentary institutions are considered the core of western political systems, they are currently undergoing systematic erosion (Andersen and Burns 1996; Burns 1994; 1999; Burns et al. 2000b. 12 Generally speaking, the Commission is the single most key actor in EU policy-making (Nylander 2000; Pollack 1998). This is, in part, because of its organizational, technical, and discursive capabilities, its key role in agenda setting, preparing investigations, and preparing legislation. It has the role of initiating (or responding to inquiries about)


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Parliament has been politically weak, with limited initiative or positive influence. However, the role and strength of Parliament has been progressively increased, first in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and more recently, in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). At the same time, the Commission has further strengthened its position through linkages and coalition building with European lobbyists and interest associations. Indeed, it has been an explicit policy of the European Commission to encourage direct contact with specialized affected interests and organizations, and those who mobilize expertise. This takes place above all in diverse, specialized policy networks and subgovernments. In a system that lacks conventional democratic legitimacy and accountability, this can be seen as an alternative approach to developing some form of constituency and the legitimacy it entails. ‘Public’ authority is dispersed in these arrangements, which integrate public and private agents. There is not only the lack of a clear centre of authority, but also very weak formal procedures regulating access to sub-governments and policy networks.13 More than a thousand advisory and consultative bodies have been established, so called Euroquangos, involving representatives

footnote 12 continued policy-making as well as mediating interests within the EU governance structure. But it is important to note that it does not operate as a traditional public administration. It is, on the one side, more responsive to pressures on it, more like a political assembly, and on the other, enjoys much greater flexibility and freedom of action in how it proceeds in dealing with any particular issue or policy area. It is both responsive to interest pressures but also takes its own initiatives in shaping and balancing interests. For instance, in pursuit of the liberalization of electricity markets, it formulated the agenda, helped shape a lobby of industrial electricity users, and encouraged them to appeal to the European Court if the national public utilities refused to accept liberalization (Nylander and Engstrand 1999). In general, it may make use of its formal resources and procedures as well as mobilize external resources, experts, and procedures, including key agents and networks outside its domain. The Commission is particularly influential when it has legal competence, a mandate, or established praxis in an area, when it is in possession of, or can mobilize, greater expertise and information than most competing or opposing agents, when it can refer to established principles, norms, rules, and procedures of policy-making, when it can define its policies in universalistic or at least neutral terms, or can resolve conflicts among interests, including between or among member states (Nylander 2000). 13 When specific national interests are strong (e.g. agricultural and food issues), the process may take the form of (or revert to) international bargaining among the member state representatives.


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of both interest organizations and Community institutions. Roughly two-thirds of them were formed by the Commission (van Schendelen 1998). Seventy of the Commission committees are consultative committees, which are formally institutiona lized arrangements. Of the council committees, there are 150 advisory committees, 60 management committees, and 80 regulatory committees (van Schendelen 1998). More generally, there are in the EU elaborate networks of contact between a multitude of societal interests and lobbyists, on the one hand, and EU institutions, on the other. Indeed, governance networks with the involvement of public and private actors are the real core of the political system. Of course, there continues to be a ‘representative authority’ in the system. Formal decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers (representing the member states) and, increasingly, the European Parliament representing the ‘European peoples.’ Generally speaking, the EU has a high degree of openness to various types of representation, not only national and popular forms, but forms for engaging many different types of special interests and political agents. Among the most prominent forms of representation is through ‘lobbying.’ The EU is characterized by vast networks of lobbyists (Andersen and Eliassen 1991, 1995, 1997; Andersen and Burns 1996). Since 1987, EU lobbying has virtually exploded.14 Estimates of the number of lobbyists operating in Brussels go up to 10 000 or more depending on how lobbyists are defined. The highest count includes all who act to gain and maintain access to key actors at the EU level of decision-making. This includes those who come to Brussels to pursue particular issues as well as those more permanently positioned in the European capital (Andersen and Eliassen 1991, 1995, 1997; Greenwood 1997; Wallace and Young 1997). Earlier Brussels lobbyists were, to a large extent, the same types of actors exercising influence at national levels. First and foremost, these were national and European interest associations. For 14

The key institutional development that set off the exponential growth in lobbying and the emergence of entirely new types of lobbying groups was the passage of the Single European Act (1987). This made EU policy-making an important political arena. The stage was set for vital and profound decision-making processes in Brussels. Before 1987, lobbying of the main EU institutions was mostly done by representatives of national organizations, who often also presented the views of special interests within the country involved. The major channel of influence was through national representation of the Council (Andersen and Eliassen 1991).


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instance, in 1980, European federations for agriculture, labour, industry, business, commerce, and finance had by far the strongest representation in Brussels. The interest groups on the EU scene today include associations and NGOs ‘representing’ such sectors of society as education, culture, social services, environment, consumers, public health, and women (Wallace 2000). EU institutions have increasingly engaged – and interact with – an extraordinary range of ‘lobbyists.’ The Commission has developed a comprehensive network of contacts that cut across, and in many instances are independent of, member states and national representatives. Increasingly, it is necessary for lobbying to be based on broad alliances representing a more ‘European’ perspective.’ The EU system is more lobbying-oriented than any European national system (Andersen and Burns 1996). Private and public interest groups from within and outside the EU can be influential in shaping decisions either through formal consultation or by acting as sources of information, expertise, strategic advice, and mediation between other actors (Greenwood 1997; Warleigh 2002) ‘Lobbying’ in the EU operates according to the normative democratic principle that directly affected parties may claim the right to participate in and influence policy- and law-making. This is the basis for specialized self-representation in particular policy networks or sub-governments. At the same time, expertise plays a central role in the deliberation, negotiations, and decision-making. The technical aspect, including technical expertise, disciplines the political bargaining in the specialized networks or sub-governments. It also provides a language and means of framing problems and their solutions, that is, to structure the discourses and negotiations of policy. 15 In sum, 15

The concept of framing captures the deliberate definition of a particular issue and the particular context in which it should be understood (Diani 1996; Gottweis 1998; Snow, Worden, and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1992). Framing has proved a very useful concept in research on EU policy, above all because of the stress on deliberation, persuasion, negotiation, ‘soft measures,’ etc. (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001). Specific EU research developing and applying the concept of framing are found in Dudley and Richardson (1999); Harcourt (1998); Nylander (2000); Radaelli (1995, 2002), among others. The concept of framing stems from Goffman’s (1974) dramaturgical approach and is developed in the literature on social movements. Building on Goffman, some of the main representatives of this research, Snow and Benford (1986) define frames as ‘schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrence within their life space and the world at large’. Snow, Worden, and Benford (1992) argue that framing is a process-derived phenomenon,


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representation, participation, and political influence are not primarily based on, or linked to, EU citizenship. They are based on specialized, organized interests, and the mobilization of relevant expertise.

Diversity and characteristic features of policymakers and lobbyists in EU governance Initiatives for policy and legislation may come from the Commission, from members of Parliament, or from member states, or from powerful and diverse lobbyists. In general, great numbers and variety of entrepreneurial agents are formally and informally involved in EU governance. The Commission as entrepreneur Thus far, in the history of the EU, the major public entrepreneur has been the Commission and its various Directorates General (DGs), for instance DGI, External relations, DGII (Economic and financial affairs), DGIII (Industry), DGIV (Competition), DGV (Employment, industrial relations, and social affairs), DGVI (Agriculture), DGXII (Science, research and development), DGXXIV (Consumer policy and health protection). The Commission is not only active in the consultation process, engaging lobbyists and experts, but also is a key agent in its own right (although there is considerable variation among DGs in this regard). Some DGs are in a strong position, others much more weak and unsure of their mandate. Even with a mandate (or ‘competence’), it takes time to build up networks of experts, develop legitimizing discourses with arguments, and gain authority and influence in relation to other DGs as well as other agents in the EU complex. In each policy sector, a DG strives for a ‘constituency of support’ (Richardson 1996).

footnote 15 continued which involves agency at the level of reality construction. However, framing does not imply complete constructions of phenomena, but rather that some elements are emphasized over others, and that particular interpretations of reality are made. Thus, Goffman’s frames are designed to avoid complete relativism but to show multiple realities (Collins 1988). Framing means roughly putting a frame around a picture, but it is essential to recognize that there are several layers of frames. Around the first frame, a larger frame could be put, and a smaller frame can be put within the first frame. In other words, some frames are more fundamental than others. Fundamental policy frames are often referred to as policy paradigms (see conclusion).


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Literature on the EU often describes the Commission as a strategic actor, or involved in ‘policy entrepreneurship’ (Cram 1997, Majone 1996, Matlàry 1997; for a conceptualization of public entrepreneurship, see Woodward, Ellig, and Burns (1994). The Commission has the task of balancing and mediating national interests as well as interest-group opinions in order to come forward with proposals that will be also accepted by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, and the engaged associations and NGOs across Europe. However, it is also an agent with goals of its own. One raison d’être of the Commission is to promote European integration, and it uses alternative venues and means for achieving its goals. The Commission often co-operates with the ECJ (European Court of Justice) to promote European integration, since the ECJ shares with the Commission a preference for deeper integration (Pollack 1998). Those adhering to the inter-governmental view of the EU consider the Commission only as an agent expressing the will of the member states. Our research and that of others shows that the Commission is a powerful actor in its own right and a major entrepreneur in EU policy-making and institutional reform. Diffusion of policy initiative (or delegated entrepreneurship) One characteristic of the Commission is that it relies on a constituency of external consultants and lobbyists for part of its political/policy support. It organizes this support in part, by opening up spaces for ‘outside actors’, associations, NGOs, and other representatives of interests, etc. to play entrepreneurial roles. In this way, initiatives may come from any number of sources, including not only interests and lobbyists, but also technicians. Typically, a private entrepreneur has greater discretion and freedom of action than public entrepreneurs, because of the expectations that public entrepreneurs will be monitored, their initiatives will be transparent, and their actions subject to public law and norms, and accountability (Woodward, Ellig, and Burns 1994). This holds in general, but there are important exceptions, particularly in the case of the EU, where democratic norms of transparency and accountability are still weak. But legitimacy for initiating and carrying through a policy remains important, and policy entrepreneurs must establish it one way or another in the EU public space. For instance, a lobbyist who wishes to push


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through a new policy will require that the matter be taken up by a legitimate policy actor, e.g. an appropriate DG. On the other hand, the Parliament has found it difficult to be an initiator of policy, although they are able to block in some cases, and they are expanding their public power, which, ultimately, can be translated into initiatives. The Parliament needs a qualified majority in order to come forth with its ‘own initiative’. This has proven difficult. Not only is the ‘legitimacy of the actor’ a major factor, but the ‘legitimacy of the problem area’ is also a point of contention. Some problem areas of initiative are considered (or have been) ‘national’. This does not preclude EU policy initiatives, but it requires developing an argument why the area should become a matter of concern for the EU. One has to demonstrate – provide evidence and arguments – about why the problem is a ‘legitimate problem for EU action’ (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001; Burns and Nylander 2001). Such issues or problems are, among others, (1) EU integrated market problems or problems of common standards of market products, which have high legitimacy for EU initiatives; (2) new problems not dealt with at the national level; (3) global problems that call for collective solution; and (4) regulatory gaps.

Multiple-access policy system The EU is a multi-access policy system in that entrepreneurs may gain access and exercise influence at various points and levels. Of course, some points are more readily open, or give more likely influence over the policy process and outcome, than others. For instance, if a matter is already on the agenda of the Commission and the agent agrees with its thrust and likely outcome, then it may simply try to add weight through the Commission or through contacts to the Commission. If, however, the interest is at odds with the Commission’s orientation and likely proposal, then it may have to consider such channels as the national authority or political leadership or the European Parliament. Or, in case an opposition is established and operates in the policy process organized by the Commission, the agent will find it advantageous to throw its weight in with the opposition. Although the Commission is the key agent with the legitimacy and power to formally initiate policy, various entrepreneurial actors may put an issue on the policy agenda. Policy entrepreneurs provide problem-solving perspectives as well as new arguments and discourses. The more radical the proposal, or the perspective,


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the greater the resistance. A radical proposal requires considerable power, possibly normative or legal power, as in the case of pushing through the liberalization of electricity markets; or it calls for the mobilization of support, the formation of alliances, and the formulation of an argument that is difficult to counter, given the ethos and governing principles of the EU. In the case of electricity liberalization, the single market principle as well as the principle of opposition to monopoly were the basis for the argument and mobilization supporting a paradigm shift and reframing electricity distribution problems (Nylander 2000; Nylander and Engstrand 1999). Normative arguments were highly effective in developing environmental policies as well as ‘mainstreaming gender’ in EU policies. In sum, several of the EU’s key institutional arrangements, cultural elements, and dynamics can be characterized as follows. 1 As in any complex institutional arrangement, there are contradictions in values and rule complexes, manifested as zones of stress and tension, for example at the boundary regions between particular institutional arrangements such as the European Parliament and the Commission; between the EU Commission and Parliament, on one side, and the Council of Ministers, on the other; or between groups representing diverse values and institutional arrangements such as those supporting more centralized European policy-making and those supporting national sovereignty and decentralization. 2 The tensions and conflicts result not only out of different institutionalized values and organizing principles, but also out of actors’ struggles for power as well as attempts to realize particular values. One major cleavage is that between those representing and struggling for centralized EU power and those representing and struggling for member state sovereignty and formal democracy (see later). The former may act in the name of the EU and take initiatives, in part trying to expand its powers and domains of responsibility and authority for policy-making and regulation. 16 16

What is particularly characteristic of the supranational/national cleavage is that it cuts across most legislative and policy areas. Along such lines, Hooghe and Marks (1997) stress this distinctively European dimension of contestation: ‘nationalism versus supranationalism,’ which depicts the conflict about the role of national state as the supreme arbiter of political, economic, and cultural life. At one extreme are those who wish to preserve or strengthen the national state; at the other extreme are those who wish to press for ever closer EU and believe that national identities can co-exist with an


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3 While the roles and functions of the different EU institutions are specified in the Treaty of Rome (1957) (with revisions in the Single European Act (1986), Maastricht (1992), and Amsterdam (1997) treaties making up a type of constitution), these are not precisely specified and the roles are negotiable and shifting. Boundaries are also negotiable and flexible, not only within the institutional arrangements of the EU but between the EU and external agents, particularly the many non-government agents and private interests. In general, the successive treaties have created a framework on which to build, rather than boxes within which to operate. There is a culture of democratic governance (entailing not only forms of participation, deliberation, argumentation, and negotiation but also general values such as democracy, rule of law, due process, the necessity of expertise (rationality)). The culture informs and provides a point of departure for deliberation and collective decision-making as well as multiple innovations in concrete policy arenas and developments. (This is much more open-ended than that operating within institutional arrangements that are relatively fixed since it provides

footnote 16 continued overarching supranational (European) identity.’ The reactions to the Maastricht Treaty, especially in Denmark but also in France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, suggest continuing controversy around the question of national sovereignty, EU sovereignty, and forms of democratic governance. The cleavage between the Commission and the Parliament in opposition to the Council, and between the EU and national governments relate to centre-periphery power struggles within the EU (for instance, as found in earlier state and empire formation. One major pattern entails a ‘central movement’ competing with and winning over (as well as losing in some instances to) peripheral agents (and movements). The point is that the EU as an expansive, transformative order does not proceed linearly or monotonically. While there are multiple interests and interest configuration with incentives – and resources – to develop the ‘centre’ – and this process attracts additional agents, resources, and makes for careers, alliances etc., there are plenty of opponents. Among the key entrepreneurs carrying the EU project further, elaborating it and deepening it are the Commission, global business, and public interest lobbyists; as well as experts of diverse kinds who find opportunities and niches in the dynamic EU order). This explains why the EU expansion and transformation does not take over completely, why it is piecemeal, and subject to a variety of constraints and countervailing forces (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001). Also, the centre-periphery dialectic is complicated by the fact that member states, through the Council of Ministers and the European Council, also influence community processes. So, the EU can be seen as an instrument of member states rather than a purely usurping power (Weiler 1999).


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substantial opportunities for introducing and developing organic forms of governance).17 4 The EU shapes and regulates a variety of areas: markets, technologies and technical developments, environment, some aspects of welfare (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001) including public health, issues of citizen rights, and some aspects of foreign policy, particularly commercial and trade policy. In addition to making rules (including its own rules and procedures) and regulating, the EU also resolves conflicts, redistributes resources, and defines collective problems and possible solutions, specifically at the ‘EU level’. There is a stream of problems, issues, and predicaments that can be defined or established as EU concerns and put on the growing policy and legislative agenda. 5 A great variety of entrepreneurs (inside and outside of EU institutions) raise issues (and search for issues and constituencies) and try to solve problems in EU terms, drawing on EU authority, discourses, allies, and resources (Burns and Nylander 2001). They contribute in this way to also reproducing or expanding EU values, principles, and institutional arrangements. These are part of a general ‘EU movement’ without necessarily ‘coordinating’ or colluding with one another. 6 There are multiple modes of policy-making, with modes differing by arena and sector as well as by the agents involved in an issue, initiative, negotiation (Carson, Nylander, and Burns [2001]; Wallace [2000], Warleigh [2000]). For example, ‘international negotiation’ at the level of the Council entails negotiating treaties and new global initiatives. The European Parliament, the Commission itself, and the Council may initiate a comprehensive policy process as, for instance in 1986, they adopted a joint declaration against racism and xenophobia, followed by a number of other related resolutions and declarations of intent during the early 1990s (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001). Negotiation and implementation of the structural funds brought the Commission into direct relation 17

This is a major factor underlying the organic character of EU governance (see below), which is often ‘democratic’ in some respects (Andersen and Burns 1996; Burns 1999). The future constitution, now under preparation by the Convention, may make the EU into a more fixed, less fuzzy arrangement. However, the trend in contemporary governance is toward more organic forms and practices (Burns et al. 2000b).


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with regions and sub-national authorities (Wallace 2000). In the area of electricity (moves to liberalization and formation of a single European market), the Commission interacted with national public utilities (often powerful agents in the home context) and eventually helped mobilize large industrial consumers to pressure utility monopolies to accept market liberalization. In a number of prominent areas of policy-making such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, a vast network of industrial associations, powerful enterprises, and NGOs and other public interest organizations are involved in EU policy-making together with the Commission (and a number of its DGs) and the European Parliament. 7 A number of factors drive innovation and development in the EU, with diverse public and private entrepreneurs exploiting the freedom and opportunities in the system: (i) expansion in the size of the EU requiring institutional innovation; (ii) centre-periphery struggle; (iii) technological and globalization transformations, which, among other things, generate problems that are often of a community character, for instance, telecommunications, biotechnological developments, industrial agriculture; (iv) in the context of transformations, structures are generated offering opportunities for economic, political or other types of gain, possibilities of power, status, and prestige, etc.; (v) democratic deficits; (vi) institutional failings and regulatory gaps (as in the case of EU food crises); and (vii) cultural transformations in connection with the construction of European identity (Delanty 1995, 1998), in part through addressing concrete collective problems such as the conflict and violence in South-East Europe and in interacting (competing and negotiating) with the US on trade policy, environment, new technologies such as GMOs (genetically modified organisms), etc. 8 The increasing Europeanization proceeds hand-in-hand with the gradual erosion of ‘national sovereignty’ in a number of policy domains – such an evolution will continue (Burns and Nylander 2001; Weiler 1999). The development is not converging to a single centre, but is instead leading to a polyarchic complex. In other words, there is a movement from the level of European member states to a higher, polycentric level. But the expansion and deepening of EU regulation is constrained and selectively developed as a result of opposition from those with vested interests in, and


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representing and struggling for, member state sovereignty and more conventional ideas of democracy. This struggle is manifested in the debates and struggles at the convention on an EU constitution. On a more general level, there is in the EU a well-established culture of democratic governance (with understandings, beliefs, values, and norms as opposed to merely formal constitution of government (Burns 1994)). This provides the basis for the forms and evolution of EU governance.18 The EU can be characterized as a type of ‘organic democracy’ (Andersen and Burns 1996). This refers to a number of contemporary forms and practices of governance that diverge from the principles of formal, representative democracy based on territory; distinctions between ‘public’ and ‘private’ are vague or fuzzy; procedures for deliberation, negotiation, and decision-making are diverse and readily adapted to sectoral needs or requisites of specific policies; governance may range from a mostly public agency set-up (‘government’) through mixed forms, to largely ‘private forms’ (Andersen and Burns 1992, 1996; Burns 1994, 1999).19 These forms are democratic in the sense that ‘voice’ and ‘participation’ are to a greater or lesser extent available in matters that affect particular interests (not because they refine or extend citizen democracy or parliamentarism). This conception does not refer only to ‘organic government,’ where state agents reach out into and steer many realms of society. Of course, this also goes on, but in an organic democracy, we find agents of civil society, 18

Governance has become a useful concept with which to refer to EU developments (but also emerging national forms), because of mixtures of private and public, informal and formal, irregular and regular, non-standard ‘laws’ and ‘regulations’, etc. 19 The EU countries experience a deep cleavage between the emerging diffuse culture of organic democracy and traditional concepts of national parliamentary democracy. This has resulted in conflicts and recurring mobilizations in opposition to the EU state, just as we find tensions and conflicts between formal parliamentary democracy and organic types of democracy within most modern nation-states (Burns 1994,1999). The tensions and struggles within the EU over questions of sovereignty and centralized control have contributed to a reassessment of the role of national parliamentary forms. For many, these are especially symbolic of national sovereignty, and of popular democracy. At the same time, ironically enough, a great deal of major ‘public policy-making and rulemaking’ in modern states takes place outside of the domain of authority and responsibility of Parliament and the central government, although these institutions remain largely responsible, or at least accountable, for such decisions (Burns 1999; Burns et al. 2000b).


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NGOs, business associations, companies and unofficial private actors, who engage in governance activities, often on their own initiative, claiming their ‘democratic rights’ and recognition of their expertise and experience. In general, there is the interpenetration of state agencies and agents of civil society. Although government representatives (of agencies) are partners or mediators in many of the organic processes, they are not in a position to unilaterally decide or implement rules, whether they concern the economy, research, education, or technological development (Kohler-Koch 1995). In short, ‘hierarchy’ gives way to ‘reciprocity’ and ‘multi-lateral systems,’ and the boundaries between ‘public’ (and government) and ‘private’ (contractual) becomes fuzzy. Finally, there are particular organizing principles and rules of the game governing discourse, negotiation, and decision-making in any given policy network or community. Particularly important value orientations or values are the pursuit of the common good and finding positive sum agreements (KohlerKoch 1995).

EU policy-making compared to neo-corporatist and pluralist policy-making systems The three systems can be compared on the basis of, on the one hand, the organizing principles for arranging or conducting policy-making activities and, on the other hand, the number and variety of actors.20 In the view of some researchers, the EU policy-making apparatus represents a new composition of structural elements, differing substantially from either neocorporatist or pluralist orders (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2000; Burns and Nylander 2001; Weiler 1999). The EU as a system of policy-making and legislation is usually more organized and formalized than typical pluralist systems such as those in the US. On the other hand, it is more open to multiple interests and has much more differentiated and specialized governance and policy-making structures than do most neo-corporatist systems. Among the major institutional and structural differences, we have stressed the centralized and institutionalized character of the neo-corporatist system, as opposed to the polycentric and shifting structure of the liberal/pluralist system of policymaking. The EU represents a complex hybrid in which there is 20

In work we have come across recently, Weiler (1999) compares the EU system to neocorporatist and con-associational systems.


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increasing ‘centralization’ in the form of the gradual crowding out of ‘national sovereignty’ in a number of policy domains. This is true, for instance, in energy, pharmaceuticals, and economic policy (Carson, Nylander, and Burns 2001). But this centralization is not converging to a single authoritative centre, but is instead evolving into a central polyarchic complex. In effect, there is a marked, but selective movement from the level of European member states to this supranational, polycentric level. The expansion and deepening of EU regulation is constrained and developed selectively as a result of opposition from those with vested interests in, and representing and struggling for, member state sovereignty and national parliamentary democracy (Burns and Nylander 2001). In a neo-corporatist system – as well as in some sectors of the EU (Carson, Nylander, and Burns 2001) – policy processes are carried out in accordance with well-defined institutional arrangements. Certain procedures and norms make for orderliness, conflict resolution, and more or less predictable outcomes. But established procedures and norms are not per se necessarily integrating and stabilizing. Some contribute in a particular socio-political context to instability and unpredictability. This is the case of the neo-corporatist system – as well as some EU policy sectors — that ignore deep cleavages and substantial minorities. This may occur when these are not defined as an integral part of the system – and therefore not included in deliberative and conflict-resolution processes. Pluralist systems are more open and flexible to emerging groups and interests, if the latter can mobilize resources or find powerful allies. However, such systems leave the policy process exposed to powerful, resource-rich interests (at the expense of resource-poor interests) as well as self-proclaimed interests who can readily mobilize resources or allies. Pluralist systems are also vulnerable to the chaotic introduction of problems or issues as well as ‘solutions’ or strategies. In other words, the policy process is vulnerable to ‘garbage-can’ type policy-making (March and Olsen 1976; Andersen and Burns 1992). Any modern society is characterized by multiple cross-clea vages. But these cleavages articulate differently, and are mediated differently in different policy-making systems. There is formal as well as informal bridging and regulation of cleavages in neo-corporatist systems. The cleavages are relatively welldefined and institutionalized in particular ways in a pluralist


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system. There is more fluidity, more self-definition and self-representation, and cleavages may be articulated in a variety of possibly shifting ways. However, they may fail to be ‘bridged’ or regulated in any systematic or orderly way. The EU recognizes and institutionalizes cleavages, e.g. between the supra-national and national levels, between capital and labour interests, between industry and consumer and environmental interests. This recognition translates into recruitment (and encouragement) of interest groups to participate in policy-making even to the point of providing resources to such groups to be able to operate and participate in lobbying and policy-making. In the neo-corporatist system, the participating actors are relatively few, but well-defined collective interests such as central employers’ associations, central labour unions, and the central government. The participants are expected to adhere to agreed-upon principles of overall, collective benefit, distributive justice, and compromise. In a liberal/pluralist system, on the other hand, special or individual interests tend to take precedence over general or collective interests. In the EU, the stress is on EU collective interests, at the same time allowing for considerable initiative and negotiation by special interests and lobbyists. In established policy areas, there are well-organized and clear-cut procedures. Hence, these sectors in the EU demonstrate many of the organized characteristics of neo-corporatist systems. In a neo-corporatist arrangement, established pressure groups have highly institutionalized engagements and relationships. Allies and opponents are well defined, as are discourses, resources, and data. Outside lobbyists target these institutionalized lobbyists. In a pluralist system, there are, of course, norms guiding the process of policy-making (and even lobbying), but any given policy process is less formally institutionalized than in neocorporatist or many EU policy-making processes. In pluralist systems, just as there are shifts in the actors participating, there are ambiguous, shifting discourses, resources utilized, and data called upon (although typically not reaching the degree of openness and ‘chaos’ envisioned in the ‘garbage-can model’ of policymaking [March and Olsen 1976; Andersen and Burns 1992]). In other words, pluralist policy processes are neither as orderly, nor are the outcomes as predictable, as in integrated, multi-actor regimes with well-defined relationships and forms of policymaking and more or less predictable policy outcomes. The EU is


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characterized by a spectrum of arrangements and processes between these two poles; that is, there are highly institutionalized, well-defined and well-organized areas of policy-making that approach a neo-corporatist type of order, on the one hand, and more open, issue-driven processes and fragmented (or as-of-yet non-integrated), unpredictable policy-making (as in the alcohol or public health areas), on the other. Governance and policy-making systems can be distinguished in terms of their degree of openness (Flam 1994). For our purposes here, we dichotomize open and closed policy systems corresponding to pluralist and neo-corporatist systems, respectively. Alternative concepts for relatively open as opposed to relatively closed policy systems are issue networks and policy communities, respectively (Rhodes 1991).21 A policy community – such as in a neo-corporatist set-up or in well-established EU sectors such as energy or pharmacy – is characterized by highly restricted membership and stable relationships and procedures, as stressed earlier. These relatively closed structures are likely to have a well-defined bargaining centre or power locus, or to be highly homogeneous.22 The concept of issue networks, on the other hand, is close to that of open networks. Such networks have no single focal point or dominant centre where actors negotiate and bargain. The structures are polycentric; there are several centres, typically heterogeneous, rather than simple homogeneous relations or a clear-cut bargaining and power centre in the network. Such structural concepts (Knoke 1990) should be regarded as ideal types. Neo-corporatist arrangements (and also some well-established EU sectors such as agriculture) tend to be relatively closed and solitary (that in a certain sense accomplish homogeneity), with a defined core of participants and procedures, and 21

The distinction between closed, stable, and predictable structures and open, dynamic, and unpredictable ones relates to older distinctions in the institutional and organizational literature such as ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’ or ‘institutionalized’ and ‘non-institutionalized’. The most extreme form of ‘open process’ is the ‘garbage can’ process (March and Olsen 1976; Andersen and Burns 1992). This proposition probably relates to Greenwood’s hypothesis (Greenwood 1997) that ‘well-defined and relatively concentrated sectors’ have an advantage in organizing at the European level, because they can develop common cognitive frames, normative orders, strategies, etc. 22 These hypothetical models of networks, polycentric, clearly polarized, etc. (Knoke 1990) are, however, not mutually exclusive in the real world, and should be regarded as ideal types.


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rather predictable outcomes and developments. They have relatively standard and effective procedures for producing policies, negotiating, resolving conflicts, etc. The maintenance of closure usually indicates a commitment to – or acceptance of and even trust in – a common rule regime (including rules for excluding irrelevant agents, potential deviants, and irrelevant or improper issues and strategies). That is, other things being equal, the more closed the structure, the more orderly and predictable the policy process.

Agent strategies in open and closed policy structures If we assume that agents, in trying to influence policy processes to their advantage, try to create and maintain social linkages that are effective, then we would expect different strategies in different types of structural contexts. Actors participating (or trying to participate) in policy-making will develop strategies for forming ties as a function of whether a policy structure is open or closed. In order to achieve this, they try to create and maintain, for instance, network ties that are effective. These would include, for example, networks that provide lobbyists the necessary opportunities or efficiency in the mobilization of resources and influence in striving for their goals. In an open network, one establishes redundant linkages for mobilizing sufficient levels of each potentially essential resource, as well as other resources that might be important in an uncertain and unpredictable future. Thus, the actors strive to maximize their contacts and to foster redundant contacts, since the context is much more uncertain and risky than in closed networks. Actors cannot know beforehand what might be ‘redundant’ or ‘unnecessary.’ In other words, given that the actors in open networks are more likely to be faced with an uncertain and risky environment – but also one with potentially new (and yet to be discovered) opportunities – they strive to maximize contacts and even to make ‘redundant’, or apparently ‘unnecessary’ contacts. This very strategy tends to increase the size of the network but does so in ways that elaborate its open, unstable nature. Thus, one would expect to find linkages to several actors in each type of position or role, whether they be bureaucrats, interest groups, or experts—corresponding to known, essential valuables. Thus, what might appear to be non-essential or redundant linkages (but which relate to potential future needs or valuables)


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tend to be established. In contrast, within closed policy structures such as a neo-corporatist arrangement or the EU energy and pharmaceutical sectors (Carson, Nylander, and Burns 2001), the policy processes are more stable and predictable. Participating actors’ level of uncertainty and sense of risk are lower. In such contexts, actors tend to minimize redundant or unnecessary contacts (at least those that entail costs or burdens) so as to reduce costs and to free up resources for investment in core relationships. Participants know the major resources – and how to mobilize them – in the network of neo-corporatist relationships. That is, they know which actors to turn to for information, resource mobilization, and alliances. Interaction processes are relatively stable and predictable. The level of perceived risk tends to be low and to a certain extent can be calculated. Consequently, one can strategically minimize redundant or ‘unnecessary’ contacts. In general, in a closed structure, an actor may determine the strategic values (resources, programmes, contacts), which he/she requires in exercising influence in the network. He/she establishes linkages with those agents who can provide each of these. There would be one link for each valuable, provided that the link is secure and enables the level of the valuable necessary. If a key resource is accessible through a given linkage or channel is not sufficient, then the actor would be motivated to establish additional ties (sufficient to providing the necessary resources, votes, etc.). Such a self-limiting or conservative and deliberative approach to establishing social ties for policy purposes contrasts sharply with the expansive character of open networks. This argument corresponds to Burt’s (1992) hypothesis that closed networks (as defined here) are characterized by non-redundant contacts. The aim of participants is not to build large networks, but to build a network out of nonredundant contacts sufficient to deal with the problems, resource mobilization, voting requirements, etc. that confront them (Burt 1992). There is, then, a built-in tendency to limit the extension or size of such closed policy structures. The distinction between open and closed structures – and more specifically, open and closed social networks – suggests strategic and behavioural patterns as illustrated in Figure 1.23 23

Network structures are, however, never fully closed. Even if new actors are not readily admitted, there are external developments which impact on the network, generating


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Social structural conditions

Pluralist and EU structural conditions (open, flexible)

commitment to multiple, redundant relations to deal with an uncertain, unpredictable, risky context; loyalty and trust limited; flexibility high

Neo-corporatist structures (closed, stable)

commitment to a few key relationships (deep, non-redundant commitments); high loyalty and high mutual trust, low flexibility

Figure 1 Strategic and behavioural patterns in open and closed social networks

Conclusions Each governance arrangement, which we have examined in this paper, is a particular authoritative rule complex or regime providing a systematic, meaningful basis for actors to orient to one another and to organize and regulate their interactions, to frame, interpret, and to analyse their performances, and to produce particular commentaries and discourses, criticisms, and justifications. Each system specifies to a greater or lesser extent who may or should participate, who is excluded, who may or should do what, when, where, and how, and in relation to whom. It organizes specified actor categories or roles vis-à-vis one another and defines their rights and obligations – including rules of command and obedience – and their access to and control over human and material resources. Each system has not only a certain footnote 23 continued new problems or suggesting new strategies and initiatives. Thus, the principle formulated earlier that closed structures provide for more stability of the policy process and predictability of policy outcomes calls for qualification. Under some conditions, opening up a structure may serve to stabilize a policy process and policy outcomes (that is, just the opposite of the principle that closure would stabilize the policy process and make policy outcomes more predictable). In the EU, a key actor such as the Commission manages policy networks, opening them up in some ways, even creating new networks, or making a network more exclusive in order to reinforce support for, and the realization of, a policy initiative. These moves are intended to stabilize and make more predictable policy processes and outcome.


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interaction logic and coherence – and pattern of development – but also established expectations, meanings, and symbols as well as normative discourses (the giving and asking of accounts, the criticism and exoneration of actions and outcomes within the particular institutional arrangement). Our previous research utilizing the perspective of the new institutionalism – and in particular our EU research – emphasizes the role of culture in explaining the ways in which conceptions of governance and policy areas guide action and policy outcomes. That is, attention is focused on the ways in which public issues and ‘problems’ as well as ‘solutions’ are framed and defined within a particular culturally defined conceptual framework established (and reproducing) system of governance expressing or embodying a public policy or governance paradigm. Thus, each of the governance arrangements is not only a different institutional arrangement but is an expression or embodiment of a distinct model or paradigm for governance, public policy-making, and regulation (Burns and Carson 2002; Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001; Carson 2002; Hall and Taylor 1996). More specifically, a public policy paradigm typically indicates or articulates: (1) which problems or issues are ‘public’ and call for public policy-making (also, which issues should be defined as ‘private’ and excluded from public consideration); (2) the location and distribution of appropriate problem-solving responsibility and authority to frame problems and solutions, make judgments, adopt strategies, and initiative action; (3) the location and distribution of ‘experts’ that are knowledgeable on the problem and its solution; and (4) solution complexes for dealing with the problem or issue, that is appropriate institutional practices, technologies, and strategies. Variation in public policy paradigms entails differences in one or more of these components, for instance the contrast between a ‘liberal or free market’ paradigm and a ‘public interventionist’ paradigm, or the contrast between a national policy paradigm and a ‘Euopeanisation’ paradigm. In sum, these social systems of governance not only operate in very different ways and generate different policy-making patterns and developments, but entail substantially different ways of thinking about and judging matters of governance and politics, policy-making, potential problems, and solutions. Our characterization of the three governance and policy-making


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systems is summarized in the following tables (this structure is based on a multi-level, evolutionary systems perspective, 24 stressing not only macro-structural factors (Table 1), but interaction and strategic conditions (Table 2), and outputs (including feedback effects) (Table 3). Table 2 specifies the opportunity structures and strategic conditions characterizing the three systems. Table 3 shows some of the outcome and development patterns, in particular, degree of stability and predictability in the different systems. Clearly, the EU policy-making apparatus differs in several ways from either neo-corporatist or pluralist orders. On the one hand, the EU, as a system of policy-making and legislation, is more organized than typical pluralist systems. On the other hand, it is more open, flexible, and diversified than neocorporatist systems. The neo-corporatist arrangement is more stable and predictable than the EU system, and the latter is more so than pluralist systems. The latter are likely to function more effectively in a turbulent context than either the neo-corporatist or the EU systems, addressing new problems and issues, in part because they are more open and adaptable, less formally institutionalized. Arguably, the EU combines the best of both systems. The EU modes of policy-making, like those of the neocorporatist system, stress the management of conflict and the use of technical knowledge and cooptation in conflict resolution. This is not to overlook the serious problems and challenges to the EU system such as the following. 1 EU policy processes are highly fragmented as in pluralist systems. Neo-corporatist systems tend to generate greater overall coherence in policy-making. The proliferation of EU 24

Underlying our analysis is a multi-level, evolutionary systems perspective (Burns, Baumgartner, and DeVille 1985; Burns, Baumgartner, Dietz, et al. 2003; Burns and Carson 2002; Burns and Dietz, 1992; Burns and Flam, 1987). This theory focuses on configurations of actors (individuals and collectives) exercising agency, their interaction processes, the institutional arrangements within which and on which they operate, selective environments, and key evolutionary processes (processes of generating innovation and variety, selection and reproduction and transformation). This perspective stresses the importance of human agents – in cooperation and in conflict—in the generation, selection, and development of institutions – a factor largely missing in conventional evolutionary and functional approaches (or, if human agency and social conflict is considered at all, it is done in an ad hoc and incoherent fashion).


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Table 2 Opportunity structures and situational conditions generated in diverse policy-making systems Policy-making system Opportunity structures and interaction processes

Neo-corporatist (e.g., Sweden, Holland, Austria)

Target agents n Inside or outside the formal policymaking process

n

Strategic pathways n Formal and informal pathways

n

n

n

Appropriate or normatively grounded strategies of lobbyists

n

n

Liberal/pluralist (USA)

Neo-corporatist structure or its representatives, central actors (labour unions, business interests, government agencies) in the neocorporatist structure (or those with linkages to them, for instance their subunits.

n

Formal, clear-cut strategic pathways through wellestablished interest organizations. Relatively few informal pathways, except for constant movement of personnel between key organizations and government.

n

Establish ties to formal representatives or those with linkages to them; establish oneself as a representative through recognized interests. Appeal to common good and/or right of particular interests to have a say; mobilize legitimacy.

n

n

n

European Union

Key individual members and staff in executive, legislative and judicial branches, Key lobbyists, interest organizations or other agents with contacts to any of the above.

n

Multiple, divergent pathways; formal and informal linkages corresponding to multiple segments.

n

Establish ties to formal representatives or those with close linkages to them including agents involved in developing or preparing legislation; establish oneself as a representative of recognized interests, by demonstrating connection to relevant constituency, or by demonstrated relevant expertise. Mobilize power. Appeal to abstract rights, or rights to have a ‘voice.’

n


n n n

n

n

Directorates General (DGs), key expert groups or networks, involved interests. European Parliament. Member States, relevant agencies. Organizations, persons or agents with contacts to any of the above.

Multiple, divergent pathways, corresponding to multiple segments. Certainty of genuine influence varies widely. Multiple informal pathways.

Establish ties to formal representatives or those with linkages to them, including agents involved in developing or preparing legislation; establish oneself as a representative through recognized interests, by demonstrating connection to relevant constituency, or by demonstrated relevant expertise. Show problem a relevant ‘European issue.’ Appeal to hegemonic EU principle plus expertise and systematic data.

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Table 3 Outcome and development patterns in diverse policy-making systems Policy-making system Outcomes and developments Institutional continuity

Prominent institutional developments

Neo-corporatist (e.g. Sweden, Holland, Austria) n

n

Pluralist (USA)

Relatively stable arrangement, characterized by established rules and processes including those for participation. Stable groupings of actors with relatively orderly movement of actors into and within the policy-making system.

n

The norms of a corporatist order require inclusion of all parties considered ‘relevant’. The normative order offsets in part the power differences.

n

n

n

n

European Union

Actor movement in and out of policymaking system may be rapid and highly unpredictable. Extremely complex and changing system characterized by shifting and relatively unpredictable configurations of actors, power relationships, and policy developments.

n

Proposals are introduced when powerful interests (and their allies) participate and dominate. On the other hand, proposals are blocked when they fall too far outside the interests of any dominant interest or coalition (that can be formed). Policies that emerge may not resolve, and may exacerbate conflict and undermine legitimacy of policymaking system. Openness and flexibility. Most likely to function optimally in addressing new patterns and issues when there is diversity among actors.

n


n

n

n

The established sectors display orderly, wellorganized patterns of policy-initiating and -making. Increases in number and variety of interests and lobbyists involved, both in established and emerging policy sectors. Developing or emerging arenas display relative disequilibrium, with rapid changes in actors and procedures. Spectrum running from multi-agent-highly organized systems to pluralist systems, depending upon the sector. Established sectors (especially areas central to EU’s goals of integrated market, harmonization, etc.), tend to be characterized by consistent, wellorganized procedures and well-defined participants (as in the case of EU competition policy-making or of the EU energy or pharmaceutical sectors (Carson, Nylander, and Burns 2001). Emerging sectors are often characterized by less clear mandates, new and emerging or shifting participants, and changing relationships (for instance, health, alcohol, and other social issues) (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001)

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modes of governance – with highly diverse (and flexible) arrangements – results in incoherence and contradictions or interference between sector-specific policies. There are attempts to overcome this at the Commission level by increasingly involving multiple DGs in any given policy area. 2 EU organic forms of governance typically lack transparency and parliamentary oversight. Standardization and simplification would contribute to transparency. However, the proliferation of modes of governance and the very adaptability to specific situational conditions effectively operate in opposition to standardization and reduce insight and control. 3 One of the most characteristic features of EU organic governance is the involvement of diverse interests in committees and quasi committees25 for preparing policy and carrying through policy processes. Committee participants come from member states, often with technical expertise, together with independent experts, and representatives of industry, NGOs, and other stakeholders. They participate because they expect that policies and regulations will impact on their interests and that they should and can try to influence them (Weiler 1999). But there are major problems with these arrangements as indicated earlier—issues of transparency and representation, equal access, and political accountability. The ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU is multi-dimensional and a threat to long-term stability and viability (Andersen and Burns 1996, 1998). As Weiler (2000) argues, ‘…the intolerability of governance without government will, indeed become intolerable. The violation by Europe of the most basic and fundamental norms of democratic accountability – the ability of the electorate ‘to throw the scoundrels out’ – and its violation of the most basic and fundamental norm of democratic representation – the 25

This form is referred to as Comitology (Føllesdal 2000; Weiler 1999). It is unlike corporatist mechanisms or normal lobbying in pluralist systems. It is less open and more organized than the latter. It is less fixed – more open to new participants and issues – than neo-corporatist systems. Above all, Comitology in the EU context – unlike neo-corporatist mechanisms or lobbying in pluralist systems – in that such activities are regulated, at least formally, by national parliaments that remain sovereign to overrule such processes. These EU arrangements remain beyond the control – and hence beyond the responsibility and accountability – of any single directly or indirectly elected body; the European Parliament has challenged Comitology as undemocratic and lacking in transparency, a major area where the de facto and de jure powers at EU level are not sufficiently under democratic control (Weiler 1999).


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ability of the electorate to influence, through elections, the policy orientation of European institutions – will begin to undermine the success of the past and impede would-be successes of the future. Hence the need to touch the hitherto untouchable: the basic Community architecture.’

Acknowledgements The research presented in this article was conducted in collaboration with Johan Nylander. We are grateful to Helena Flam and Claudio Radaello and two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions relating to an earlier draft of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Sociological Association’s 4th European Conference of Sociology, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 18–21 August 1999. The research underlying this paper has been funded by the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences, the Swedish Council for Social Research, and the Swedish Institute of Public Health.

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