Food and Water Security - Future Directions International

INDEPENDENT STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF

AUSTRALIA’S GLOBAL INTERESTS

Research Institute

Food and Water Security: Our Global Challenge Landmark Study

MAY 2014

About Future Directions International Future Directions international is an independent, not-for-profit Research Institute established to conduct comprehensive research of important medium to long-term issues facing Australia. FDI’s primary aim is to provide informed, balanced advice, which ultimately will result in policy changes that will enhance the quality of strategic decisions at senior levels of the public and private sectors in Australia for the benefit of all Australians. Future Directions International (FDI) has two roles: to ensure that Australians recognise they are part of a two-ocean continent and that West Australians see themselves belonging to a dynamic, national entity in a developing region of the world. Much of Australia’s external focus has centred on the Pacific, Southeast and Eastern Asia. With its developing wealth, increasing population, evolving trade and shipping capabilities and expanding geographic, political and security significance, however, the Indian Ocean and its littoral states will play an increasingly important role in Australia’s future. Australians need to understand the challenges and opportunities they face, nationally, regionally and globally. To achieve these outcomes, leaders and their policy makers and implementers need to be aware of the geo-strategic complexities of their region. With this in mind, FDI has established four areas of research that embrace the following: • • • •

Developments in the Indian Ocean Region, including its littoral states; Implications for Australia of the developing global food and water crises; Developments in Northern Australia and their impact on the economy, population, infrastructure, environment, security and foreign relations; and Meeting Australia’s energy requirements by 2030

FDI will continue to ensure that its product is passed to an increasing number of Associates who will benefit from its future looking research. In so doing, FDI is establishing itself as an Australian centre of excellence in these four areas. Launched in 2000 as the Centre for International Strategic Analysis (CISA), by the then former Governor of Western Australia, Major General the Honourable Michael Jeffery. FDI has since grown over the past decade to become a respected Australian research institute. As a Perth-based independent research institute for the strategic analysis of Australia’s global interests, it has proven itself to be a centre of ongoing influence in shaping government policy and public discussion.

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Food and Water Security: Our Global Challenge FDI Landmark Study

Food and Water Security: Our Global Challenge Landmark Study Future Directions International

Contributors

Prof. Rudi Appels Research Leader Comparative Genomics, Murdoch University Neil Andrews Senior Economist, ABARES Dr Ingrid Appelqvist Theme leader, Food Futures, CSIRO Prof. Jayashree Arcot UNSW Faculty of Engineering, School of Chemical Engineering, (Food Science and Technology Group) Associate Peter Arkle Head of Corporate Affairs - Australasia, Syngenta International David Archibald Independent researcher; climate change Professor Peter Batt Food and Agribusiness Marketing, Curtin University Dr Matt Barton Strategic Horizon, Defence Intelligence Organisation Richard Bartlett Director, inGov. Advisory Dr Denis Blight Executive Director, Crawford Fund Aric Bendorf Scholar and FDI Associate Chris Baker Research Analyst, Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney Prof. Peter Batt Professor and head of agribusiness within the School of Management, Curtin Business School Prof.Robin Batterham Kernot Professor of Engineering, School of Engineering, Melbourne University, former Australian Chief Scientist Prof. Bill Bellotti Vincent Fairfax Chair in Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development, School of Natural Sciences, University of Western Sydney Dr Monika Barthwal-Datta Food Security Programme Leader, Centre for International Security Studies,University of Sydney Paul Belesky School of Political Science and International Studies & School of Social Science, University of Queensland Simon Bronitt Director, Centre for Excellence in Policing and Security, ANU Prof.Richard Bell Professor Sustainable Land Management, Murdoch University Julian Cribb Author, journalist and science communicator Prof. Les Copeland Faculty of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources, University of Sydney Veronique Droulez Marketing Manager, Meat and Livestock Australia Mr Rob Delane Director General, WA Department of Agriculture and Food Dr Paul De Barro Senior principal research scientist, CSIRO Ecosystem Sciences Professor Carlos Duarte Director, The Oceans Institute, University of Western Australia Prof. Lindsay Falvey Former Dean and Chair of Agriculture, University Melbourne Patrick Francis Editor, the Australian Farm Journal Dr Ian Fairnie President, Agribusiness Alumni Association Adam Fitzpatrick BAE Systems Dr Sandy Gordon Visiting Fellow, Regulatory Institutions Network, Centre for Excellence in Policing and Security, ANU Simon Gould Planning coordinator, Regenerating our Landscape Program- Soils for Life,Outcomes Australia Jim Geltch Nuffield Australia , CEO Kevin Goss Adviser, Future Farm Industries CRC Munir A. Hanjra Snr. Research Scientist, Intl. Centre of Water and Food Security, Charles Sturt University Bill Hutchinson Adjunct Professor, SECAU Security Research Centre, Edith Cowan University Paula Hanasz Consultant, Noetic Group Jennifer Hawkins Nuffield Scholar Andrew Hartwich Regional Manager Africa, Oxfam Dr Simon Hearn Principal Advisor, Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Dr Samsul Huda Associate Prof. School of Natural Sciences, University of Western Sydney Phillip Hirch Professor, Director Mekong Research Group, the University of Sydney

CMDR Warren Kemp (retd) President, Royal United Services Institute,Victoria Mick Keogh CEO, Australian Farm Institute Andrew Lang Chairman, SMARTimbers John Lloyd CEO, Horticulture Australia Ltd Alopi Latukefu Director, Food Security and Policy, AusAid Paul McKenzie Agrarian Management Peter McDonald Prof. of Demography and Director, the Australian Demographic and Social Research Institute David Molden Deputy Director General for Research, International Water Management Institute Sue Marriott Director, Secretariat for International Landcare Inc. Don McDonagh Outcomes Australia Dennis Moon Director, Goulburn Murray Water, Victoria and a Nuffield Scholar Peter Nixon International Chairman of the Nuffield Farming Scholarship Program Mark Pascoe CEO, The International Water Centre Pty Ltd Joseph Poprzeczny Author and Journalist Geoff Puttick Chair, WA Arab Chamber of Commerce Neil Pankhurst Director, Goulburn Murray Water, Victoria Leon Ryan Nuffield Scholar and Farmer Colin Richardson Adjunct Prof. Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney VADM Chris Ritchie National President Royal United Services Institute of Australia (RUSI) Tim Siegenbeek van Heukelom Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney Ben Shepherd PhD Candidate in the Food Security Programme, University of Sydney Centre for International Security Studies W/Prof. Kadambot Siddique Chair in Agriculture and Director, UWA, Institute of Agriculture Dr Andrew Selth Research Fellow, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University Dr Keith Suter Foreign and International Affairs Commentator, Global Directions Sarah Scales Director, Goulburn Murray Water, Victoria Sashi Sharma Chair Biosecurity and Food Security, Murdoch University W/Prof. Richard Weller School of Architecture, Landscape and Visual Arts, UWA Simon Winter Senior Research Manager, Global Challenges Program, Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (RIRDC) Andrew Western Professor, Department of Civil and Environmantal Engineering,University of Melbourne Peter Zurzolo CEO, Future Farm Industries CRC Dr Jian Zhang Senior Lecturer at the Australian Defence Force Academy, University New South Wales

FDI - Global Food and Water research programme MAJGEN J Hartley AO (retd) CEO and Workshop Chairman Gary Kleyn Jay Vella Lauren Power Tom Davy Sinéad Lehane Jack Di Nunzio Charlotte Jones


Contents

Foreword

5

Introduction

7

Chapter 1

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Population and Food Demand Pressures Chapter 2

23

Water Security to 2050 Chapter 3

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Land Availability Chapter 4

43

Climate Change and Global Agriculture Chapter 5

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Poverty, Wastage and Market Failure: Distribution Issues in the Global Food System Chapter 6

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Building Sustainable Agricultural Systems Chapter 7

67

Science,Technology and Innovation Chapter 8

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Food and Water Insecurity and Geopolitical Conflict Conclusion

85

What Does the Global Food and Water Crisis Mean for Australia? FDI Donors and Sponsors

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Chairman’s Foreword

Will there be a global food and water crisis in 2050? This is the key question that Future Directions International (FDI) has sought to answer in a three year study that involved numerous experts: academics, policy officials, scientists and researchers. Population growth and aging, the rapid expansion of urban areas and changes in diet will significantly increase demand. The alarming decline in arable land and the ever increasing need for fresh water during a time of climate change are all the more concerning as they are barely understood and few in-depth and sustained programs exist to counter their negative impacts. The impact of demand and supply also required consideration of wastage and market failure, the building of sustainable agricultural systems, the role that research, technology and investment must play and the potential for displaced populations and conflict within and between states. So will we have a global crisis in the coming decades? Some would argue that such a crisis exists now in parts of the world. But with an increase of perhaps a third of our global population, with most of this occurring in parts of the world that are already struggling to feed its people, with nearly 1.5 billion who are overweight and many more who do not have access to food that has key vitamins and minerals, there is no doubt that we face a significant challenge on a global scale. Not only do we need to produce more and better food and manage its distribution more effectively, but we also need to recognise that global agriculture is often harming the environment and failing substantially to narrow the economic inequalities that affect so many. This timely publication by FDI is an on-going study. In particular, we need to refine our conclusions and to alert and encourage awareness and understanding of these issues to the wider public, so that those who have the influence and authority to take positive actions do so in a timely and appropriate manner. We need to recognise that this is a global issue that will affect us all. FDI will continue to report and research the food and water situation from a global and regional perspective. It will also become increasingly involved in analysing and reporting the impact of these issues on Australia and what we should do about it. Part of this approach is to consider how we might regenerate our soils, especially in northern and inland Australia. The future is alarming with many challenges. But there are also opportunities and these must be understood and grasped. I gratefully acknowledge the researchers, associates, interns and all who added their invaluable input into this publication. I commend the reading of this Landmark Study.

Major General the Honourable Michael Jeffery AC, AO (Mil), CVO MC (Retd) Chairman, Future Directions International (Former Governor General of Australia)


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Food Food and and Water Water Security: Security: Our Our Global Global Challenge Challenge Landmark Landmark Study Study Future Future Directions Directions International International

Introduction

¾¾ Population growth, urbanization and changing consumption patterns will lead to rising demand for food between now and 2050. It is estimated that food production will have to increase by 70 per cent on current levels to meet future food needs. ¾¾ Key food production resources are experiencing severe and ongoing degradation. The natural resource base will be adequate to meet future global food demand only if degradation is stopped or considerably slowed and rapid action is taken to mitigate climate change threats. In the absence of these actions global food shortages are likely. ¾¾ Although sufficient food production resources may be available on a global scale, the resources are not mobile and are not located in the areas where food and water demand will rise most dramatically. Without functioning resource and food distribution mechanisms some regions will experience severe shortages which could be a major driver of conflict both between and within states. ¾¾ The world possesses the resources, knowledge and technology required to build a sustainable food system, ensure long-term food security and eradicate hunger. The potential for global food and water crises between now and 2050 depends largely on whether political will is mobilised and rapid action taken.

In 2008, over 100 million people were driven into poverty and the number of people experiencing chronic hunger topped one billion for the first time in history because of skyrocketing food prices. Since the global food crisis, food security has emerged onto the world stage as a key item on the agenda of many nations, regional bodies and international organisations. The United Nations states that access to food and freshwater is a basic human right. It is essential to survival, not only for individuals but also for states. A nation that fails to provide for the food security of its citizens undermines the legitimacy of its own government. As the global population grows, and competition over essential resources increases, providing food and water security will become one of the defining challenges of the 21st New “players” - such as the century. The persistent existence of widespread hunger is a security private sector, emerging threat, a moral failing and a missed opportunity for development and economies and Philanthropic prosperity. organisations are increasingly reshaping the structure and FDI’s landmark study explores crucial questions about global food and nature of the global food water security. It will ask: What is the risk of further food or water policy landscape. crises occurring on a global scale between now and 2050; if crises are likely, in which parts of the world would they occur and why; and, do we have the knowledge, technology, resources and political will to avert potential crises? Understanding these questions is the starting point for regenerating the global food system and seeking to sustainably reduce hunger worldwide.


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Rising Food Demand By 2050, the world’s population will have grown to 9.6 billion, a third larger than it is today. This population growth will not be distributed evenly across the globe but will be centred in developing countries. Almost all of the growth will be absorbed by towns and cities as urbanisation proceeds at a rapid pace. Income levels will increase across the board, causing a change in consumption patterns and increased demand for resource-intensive diets. In order to meet the food demands of this larger, wealthier, urban population, it is estimated that food production will have to increase by between 60 and 110 per cent. Global agriculture will have to produce at least another one billion tonnes of cereal each year and meat production will have to rise by 200 million tonnes. Against a background of growing resource scarcity, this food will have to be produced more sustainably and with fewer resources than current practices require. Resource Scarcity The major constraints on increasing food production to meet future needs are the availability of arable land and freshwater. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), report that, theoretically, the world should have the resources needed to increase food supply and eradicate hunger. On a net global scale we should have sufficient arable land reserves and fresh water available to produce food for the growing population. There are considerable land reserves which could theoretically be converted into arable land and significant room for sustainable intensification of existing agricultural areas. Global per capita water availability is between 5000 and 6000 cubic metres of water. Even as the population expands, this will remain above the 1000 m3 benchmark set to indicate water scarcity. These resources are subject to severe and ongoing degradation however. Long term assessment studies on resource availability suggest that the natural resource base will be adequate to meet future global food demand only if degradation is stopped or considerably slowed. Widespread degradation can reduce agricultural yields and in extreme cases, make land unproductive or water un-useable. If we fail to overhaul our resource management practices to ensure the sustainability of our water and food production systems, continued water shortages and global food crises will be the outcome. If we succeed in building a more sustainable food system, the outlook for production increases is cautiously optimistic. Even if we do succeed in halting degradation processes and make sustainable use of the resources available to us though, the potential for crises and conflict will still exist. While we may have enough land and water to meet our food needs on an aggregate level, these resources are not mobile, and their availability does not match areas of high and increasing demand. Our future food and water system will be defined by areas of shortage and surplus and the potential for conflict in correcting these allocations. Climate Change Exacerbating existing resource scarcity, climate change will pose another major threat to food production in the 21st century. While impacts will vary from region to region, higher temperatures are expected to reduce crop yields, allow damaging weed and insects to spread, and shift precipitation patterns worldwide. If we fail to build resilience in the agricultural sector, the impacts of climate change could seriously undermine food security and trigger crises by causing a steady rise in food prices and increasing the incidence of extreme weather events and price volatility. A Global Crisis? A global food crisis occurs when widespread food scarcity causes sharp increases in the rate of hunger and malnutrition at a global level. Food demand will increase between now and 2050 and climate change and degradation of the resource base will place additional pressure on food production systems. If the world does not take immediate and decisive action to sustainably increase food production and improve food access, global crises are highly likely. The question of potential future crises, however, overshadows the fact that we are currently in the midst of

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an ongoing crisis of chronic hunger. Even though the world produces more than enough food to adequately feed our population, one in eight people are currently severely undernourished. To achieve global food security between now and 2050, we must not only increase the food supply in line with population growth, we must also reduce hunger below its current level. Our ability to avert potential food and water crises depends on how we manage existing resource challenges. On a global scale, we have sufficient resources, knowledge and technology to sustainably meet our future food needs and avert crisis; however, resource allocation and distribution issues and the lack of action on food system and climate sustainability undermine the viability of a stable future food system. Regional Resource Shortages Uneven distribution of food production resources causes hunger and poses a serious threat of conflict in coming decades. Some areas of the world will experience severe resource shortages between now and 2050. South Asia has almost no arable land available to extend production onto. The Middle East and North Africa are extremely water scarce. Sub Saharan Africa has land and water resources but lacks the technology and infrastructure required to successfully develop its agricultural sectors. These areas also have fast growing populations and are undergoing major demographic shifts that are altering their food consumption patterns and supply chains. Food demand is likely to rise most in the areas that are least able to produce their food needs from domestic resources. This mismatched allocation will place pressure on supply chains and create the potential for conflict over available resources. Global Food Trade To achieve global food security in the presence of localised resource shortages, well-functioning distributive mechanisms are required. International trade of agricultural commodities should allow products to flow from areas of food and water surplus, to regions that are experiencing shortages. However, overreliance on trade-based food supplies can expose a country to price volatility and supply risks. Uneven allocation of resources is also likely to cause population movements as people seek to leave chronically food and water insecure regions and resettle in countries with abundant food and water supplies. Trade, population movements, resource shortages and food insecurity are all a potential source of conflict, both within and between countries. Hunger and Conflict Heightened resource scarcity and food insecurity could lead to an increase in countries encroaching on resources they share with their neighbours or seeking to expand their domestic resource base through territorial disputes or attempts to contractually acquire land in foreign countries. Water sharing in transboundary river basins is likely to be a significant source of conflict in the coming decades. Food insecurity within states is also likely to result in an increase in civil conflicts. While food shortages are rarely an explicit cause of conflict, they can act as a destabilising factor, risk multiplier and catalyst for existing tensions. Volatile food prices and rising food insecurity can induce people to demonstrate and riot. Various food price spikes between 2007 and 2013 have been linked to protest movements that have, in some cases, precipitated regime changes. There is also a close link between chronic hunger and protracted communal violence. If the global food security situation worsens to 2050, the world is likely to experience an upsurge in instability and conflict on both a local, regional and global scale. The current state of chronic global hunger is the result of poverty, harmful economic systems and conflict. A strong cyclical relationship exists between poverty, hunger and conflict. The existence of all three factors is mutually reinforcing, but positive action on any one of the three can likewise improve the situation of the others. While the current global food system is failing to adequately perform its distributive function and ensure food security, with strong policy action it is possible to avert future food and water crises and reduce poverty, hunger and conflict.


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Building a Sustainable Food Future The required increase in food production can only be achieved if the necessary research and investment is undertaken and policies conducive to sustainable agricultural production are put in place. Achieving food security will require more than just increasing food supply. It will also require measures to enhance access to food by combatting poverty, strengthening supply chains and creating fair and dependable markets. There are six key areas where decisive policy action and targeted investment can transform our food system to reduce the incidence of hunger and threat of conflict: 1. Integration and cooperation on water management The sustainable management of water resources has historically been overlooked in the management of other industries and sectors. The need for greater integration of water management in the cycle of projects and production is critical to increasing water use efficiency and preventing demand from various sectors resulting in conflict. Successful integration and prioritisation of water will require a greater degree of leadership and commitment to sustainable values. Furthermore there is a need for greater collaboration worldwide to ensure water sustainability. 2. Support for sustainable agricultural systems A paradigm shift is required in the way that agricultural systems operate to enable farmers to produce more food from fewer resources. Many current agricultural practices involve resource wastage and contribute to the degradation of the landscape. This undermines future food security. Well managed agricultural practices can ensure that farming has a positive ecosystem impact, enabling regeneration of the landscape and water sources so that we can sustainably produce food to 2050 and beyond. 3. Strong action on climate change Climate change variability is one of the key threats to food systems between now and 2050 and is expected to have even more dire impacts in the second half of the 21st century. Countries need to take action now to reduce carbon emissions, mitigate the impacts of climate change and build resilient agricultural systems. 4. Increase investment in research and development Investment in agricultural research and development has declined across the world over recent decades leading to a decline in yield growth rates. Developing country agriculture is in particular need of research and development, extension services and investment if we are to stimulate income growth and food production in the areas of the world most vulnerable to food insecurity. 5. Strengthen distribution systems Huge gains could be made in food security without increasing production, simply by reducing the extent of wastage in the food system, improving biosecurity and strengthening supply chains. We could also reduce price volatility and facilitate smooth functioning of food distribution mechanisms by building a global trade system which is fair and dependable. 6. Combatting poverty The primary cause of hunger in the world today is poverty. Policies to promote broad-based income growth and provide social safety nets to the most vulnerable are necessary to ensure that increases in the food supply actually translate to reductions in hunger levels.

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Action and Political Will The world has the resources, knowledge and technology needed to sustainably increase food supply and eliminate hunger between now and 2050. What is required is the political will to undertake the policy and investment decisions needed to transform the global food system. If the necessary actions are taken, the FAO believe that it is possible to achieve food security by 2050, raising global average daily calorie availability by 10 per cent and reducing the proportion of the global population suffering from chronic hunger to 5 per cent. If we fail to achieve the goals outlined above we can expect widespread resource degradation, falling yields, reduced global food supply, rising prices and skyrocketing hunger levels. This, in turn, would cause a serious upswing in conflict levels across the globe, both at domestic and international levels. Since the global food price crisis in 2008, there have been concerted efforts to achieve multilateral cooperation on food and water security issues. A conflict between national interests and global interests in the short and long term though, has meant that some states have pursued policies that are detrimental to global food security and even domestic food security in the long term. A failure to cooperate on poverty reduction and agricultural development initiatives will lead to starvation, security crises and reduced global growth between now and 2050. Averting global food and water security crises is one of the great challenges of the 21st century and a clear understanding of the problems and solution are essential to spurring action towards a secure and sustainable future.

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Food Foodand andWater WaterSecurity: Security:Our OurGlobal GlobalChallenge Challenge Landmark LandmarkStudy Study Future FutureDirections DirectionsInternational International

Population and Food Demand Pressures

1

CHAPTER

¾¾ Studies estimate that global food demand will increase between 60 and 110 per cent by 2050. ¾¾ With one in eight people around the world currently suffering from chronic hunger, the world is already experiencing a global food crisis. Food demand is not being met. ¾¾ The current global population of 7.2 billion people is projected to grow more than a third by 2050 to reach 9.6 billion. ¾¾ Population growth will not be distributed evenly across the globe and will be concentrated in regions facing resource scarcity and a low capacity to ensure food security. The concentration of population growth in developing regions heightens the risk of global food and water crises occurring. ¾¾ By 2050, the number of people living in urban areas will swell to 6.2 billion. Urban areas will absorb almost all population growth between now and 2050. Most of this will occur in the developing world.

The key factor driving the threat of food and water security crises between now and 2050 is demographic change. Population growth, urbanisation, rising incomes and nutritional transitions will shape future consumption patterns and food and water demand. An understanding of where population growth will occur and how population structures will change is necessary to discover where food and water demand will be rising and where there could be a potential deficit in supply. The global population will continue to grow between now and 2050. The majority of that population growth is expected to be centred in the developing world, in countries that already have food security issues. Adding to demand pressures from a larger population, food consumption patterns are expected to change as urbanisation and income growth cause a shift towards a globalised western diet with a higher intake of foods like meat, dairy and fruit. Changing consumption patterns will place pressure on the environment and agricultural resources. Urbanisation will also increase the chance of food and water crises as the distance between population centres and food sources increases. One in eight people around the world currently experience hunger because the global food system cannot meet demand. One billion people don’t have access to clean, safe drinking water. As the population increases and diets change, the world will face ever-increasing difficulties in preventing food and water insecurity. i. Population Growth Since the publication of Malthus’s Principles of Population in the late eighteenth century, there have been fears that as a population grew, over time it would outstrip its means of subsistence and be forced into decline due to resource scarcity. The world’s population has tripled since the 1950s yet the Earth has not yet met its ‘carrying capacity’ thanks in part to the agricultural advances of the Green Revolution. Our current global population of 7.2 billion people is projected to grow by more than a third by 2050. Whether the planet will be able to cope with the burden of this additional population growth is a question of utmost importance to global security. Food and Water Security: Our Global Challenge Landmark Study Future Directions International

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World Population Growth 1950-2050

Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects, The 2008 Revision.

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ (UNDESA) World Population Prospects 2012 revision projects that the global population will grow by almost one billion people in the next 12 years, reaching 8.1 billion in 2025. Further increases will see the population top 9.6 billion in 2050. These projections are an upwards revision of the 2010 forecasts due to higher than expected fertility levels. The projections are based on a medium level of growth and assume that fertility rates will continue to decline in developing countries while only marginally increasing in the developed world. Small differences in the trajectory of fertility over the period could yield major differences in long-run population size, structure and distribution. If fertility rates deviated from the medium-variant prediction by only half a child per woman the global population would differ by 1.3 billion people by 2050. In the high variant case it could reach 10.9 billion people and in the low variant case only 8.3 billion. Future population growth is highly dependent on the path of fertility. Given the current fertility path though, population growth is almost inevitable even if the predicted decline in fertility rates occurs faster than expected. Demographer Professor Peter McDonald observed, at the FDI population roundtable, that substantial progress has already been made in reducing population growth. During the 1970s the world average was five births per woman. If it had remained at that level, the population would already have reached nine billion and would continue to rise to 16 billion by 2050. The structure of the population will change over the period, aging considerably although remaining young in developing countries. Globally, the number of people aged over 60 is expected to more than double from 841 million in 2013 to 2 billion in 2050. This will occur mostly in developed countries. In developing countries the population will remain relatively young. Currently, children under 14 constitute 40 per cent of the population in the least developed countries. Young people (aged between 15 and 24) account for

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a further 20 per cent. The implications of both trends are high dependency ratios, which strain the ability of households to achieve food security for their members. Families and society on the whole will become responsible for feeding more unproductive citizens. An ageing population will mean a reduced agricultural labour force. Fortunately, in most areas experiencing population aging now, agriculture is relatively capital intensive. The ageing of rural communities can still lead to a loss of human capital an on-farm experience that could jeopardise food production. This is a problem Australia will face in coming decades. The aging of the agricultural workforce will be a particular threat to China where the one-child policy has led to a rapidly aging population and where farming remains a labour intensive practice. Meanwhile, developing countries will need to create education and employment opportunities for their young populations if they are to prevent increases in poverty, social and political instability, and food insecurity. Fears that the growing population will exceed the Earth’s carrying capacity have thus far proved unfounded as world agriculture continues to produce a quantity of food sufficient to feed the existing population. However, despite agriculture producing an adequate supply of food, distribution issues mean that over ten per cent of the world’s population are currently undernourished, while a still higher proportion are vulnerable to food insecurity. ii. Population Distribution The scale of projected population growth raises considerable concerns for the impact that it will have on food and water demand. The situation is exacerbated however, by the expected distribution of the growth. FDI Associate Aric Bendorf stated in his strategic analysis paper, ‘World Population Trends Toward 2050 and Beyond’, that more than 70 per cent of the world’s population growth between 2010 and 2050 will occur in 24 of the world’s poorest countries. Of the additional 2.4 billion people expected to live on earth in 2050, almost all will be living in the developing world where the population will increase from 5.9 to 8.2 billion between 2013 and 2050. Populations in developing countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Nigeria and Pakistan are predicted to more than double between now and 2050. As these countries already struggle with high rates of unemployment, poor education opportunities and poverty, their rapidly increasing populations will place further burdens on their already scarce resources. Population expansions in under-developed or resource scarce areas of the world create a considerable risk of food and water crises. The population in more developed regions will change minimally, from 1.25 billion in 2013 to 1.3 billion in 2050. This will largely be the result of migration from the less developed world. This movement is forecast to average 2.4 million people annually from 2013 to 2050. Were it not for this intake of people from the developing world, developed countries would experience a natural decline in population. Australia is forecast to be the fourth largest net receiver of immigrants between 2010 and 2050, accepting 150 000 international migrants each year. From United Nations data it is apparent that the population of Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to expand. The population, which currently stands at more than 863 million, is forecast to rise to 1.7 billion by 2050. Should fertility rates remain constant at current levels, however, the real population could reach as high as 2.7 billion. As many countries in this region already experience a high degree of food insecurity, strong population growth could precipitate food availability crises. South Asia will continue to experience booming population growth. According to The World Bank, South Asia has a combined population of 1.4 billion people. By 2050 a further one billion people will be living in this region. India and Pakistan will be the major contributors to this growth. China’s population is expected to peak at around 1.4 billion people in the next decade and remain at that level until 2050. South East Asia, with a population of more than 500 million, is expected to add a further 150 million people by 2050. Indonesia already contains almost half the population of the region and will account for a third of the population growth of South East Asia between now and 2050. Its population is expected to reach 288 million by 2050.


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Distribution of Population Growth 2008-2050

Source: CIA World Factbooks 2011

Growth will be particularly dramatic in the least developed countries whose total population is expected to increase from 898 million to 1.8 billion between now and 2050. The 49 least developed countries (LDCs) as a whole have the world’s fastest growing population, increasing at 2.3 per cent each year. Many of these countries will see their populations triple or quadruple by 2050. Of the 25 countries for which the UN projects the fastest population growth between 2010 and 2050, 23 are in Africa. These countries include Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania. These countries already experience widespread difficulties feeding and providing security for their populations. As their populations continue to swell, the capacity of countries to raise and effectively distribute requisite food to prevent famine while maintaining order amongst their populations will be challenged. The threat to security from civil unrest and terrorism in these conditions is likely to rise substantially. iii. The Urbanisation Phenomenon The world is currently undergoing the largest wave of urban growth in history. The year 2008 marked a watershed moment in demographic development when for the first time in human history, the number of people living in urban areas exceeded that living in rural areas. This change occurred at an unprecedented rate; fifty years ago, only 28 per cent of people lived in urban centres; if current trends continue, the urban population will be approaching 70 per cent in another fifty years’ time. Urbanisation is a phenomenon occurring across the globe. By 2030, the number of people living in urban areas will swell to almost 5 billion. By 2050, the projected rise is to 6.2 billion. This growth will be concentrated primarily in Asia and Africa. While the growth of mega-cities has captured much public attention, the majority of new urban residents will move into smaller cities and towns, which will lack the resources to cater to expanded populations. The majority of urban growth will occur in the developing world, which is expected to increase its urban population by close to 5 billion by 2050, absorbing almost all of the population growth across the period. In contrast, the urban population in the developed world is expected to increase by only 100 million people.

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© World Wildlife Fund. 2012. Living Planet Report 2012. WWF International, Gland, Switzerland.

In Sub Saharan Africa it is estimated that the urban population will grow by almost one billion people by 2050 as urbanisation increases from 40 to 60 per cent. In Asia, the urban population is projected to increase by 1.8 billion by 2050. A large driver of the urbanisation shift will be China, but even India, which has shown a lower inclination to urbanise, is expected to more than double its urban population over the period. Most of the new urban dwellers will move to existing cities which will morph into mega-cities with populations topping 10 million people. In recent decades urban growth has been caused by continuous rural-urban migration as people are lured into urban areas to pursue perceived economic and social opportunities. In principle, cities generate jobs and income and with good governance they can provide education, healthcare and other services more efficiently than in rural areas. Cities are also more conducive to social mobilization and women’s empowerment. While cities offer opportunity, poor planning and a dearth of resources means that many cities are ill-equipped to deal with rapid increases in population. Poverty is now growing faster in urban than in rural areas. More than a billion people are living in overcrowded and polluted urban slums which lack basic services such as clean water and sanitation. Without a concerted effort to expand urban infrastructure, particularly in developing cities, urban growth could increase the likelihood of food, water and human security crises.


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Urbanisation will have serious implications for food and water security as consumption patterns change and supply chains lengthen. As almost all of the population growth predicted to 2050 is expected to be centred in urban areas, in some areas the proportion of the population available for agricultural labour will decrease. Despite urbanisation, however, rural populations in most transforming areas are still expected to grow faster than employment in primary agriculture. This will require governments to facilitate and support the gradual transition into non-agricultural employment. Agricultural production will also face challenges as cities grow and invariably expand onto fertile peri-urban agricultural land. Competing uses of arable land will result in agriculture being continuously pushed onto more marginal land. Not only could urbanisation remove labour from food producing regions in some areas and encroach on arable land, it also separates population centres from their food sources. Demography Professor Peter McDonald has observed that feeding the growing cities will present significant logistical and distributional challenges for food and other goods. Food supply chains will lengthen further, requiring better transport infrastructure, cold storage and logistical arrangements. The length of supply chains will render urban populations more vulnerable to food crises. Julian Cribb has stressed that in Australia, food delivery relies on over 80 000 truck movements each week. The reliance on transport means that disruptions to supply chains, such as a crisis in fuel availability, could quickly lead to hunger in big cities. Urbanisation is also a key factor involved in shifting consumption patterns that have a serious impact on global food security. iv. Changing Consumption Patterns: the Global Nutritional Transition Changes in global food systems have led to nutritional transitions as populations have shifted away from traditional diets towards globalised intake patterns, characterised by the consumption of energy dense, processed foods. Low and middle income countries have converged on a “western diet”, with high intake of refined carbohydrates, added sugars, fats and animal source foods. Urbanisation and rising incomes are the major driving forces behind nutritional transitions. Urban populations face heightened exposure to food marketing and greater availability of imported processed foods, through the presence of multinational supermarket chains and fast food restaurants. Lifestyle changes and greater involvement of women in formal labour markets, means less food preparation occurs in the home and more takeaway and street foods are consumed. Time spent in traffic and offices reduces energy requirements, while energy consumption increases. In addition to urbanisation, rising incomes are a driver of the world-wide nutritional transition. Trends in global income growth indicate that an unprecedented expansion of the middle class is occurring in emerging markets. It is estimated that by 2050, approximately three billion people will have joined the middle class; approximately 40 per cent of the current global population. In China, India and Russia, average gains to real income of around 4 per cent per annum are expected to 2050. This will lead to considerable changes in spending habits and consumption patterns, which will impact on food and water demand. Lifestyle changes associated with higher incomes will increase water demand and growth in total consumption will place pressure on scarce resources. As discretionary spending increases, food consumption patterns change. Meat, fish and dairy products play a greater role in meeting the daily energy needs of higher income earners. Diets that are heavy in energy dense, processed foods can meet daily energy requirements, while failing to deliver sufficient nutrients. The rapid transition of diets in the developing world has led to the emergence of “dual burdens” of nutrition in many countries, as obesity emerges as a health problem alongside undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies. The dual burden exists not only at a country and community level, but can exist within households and even individuals, who may be both overweight and micronutrient deficient. Globalisation has increased the pace of these transitions; for developing countries, the nutritional transition is occurring earlier in the development process than it did in already developed countries, as people are exposed to altered global food systems.

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As populations undergo a nutritional transition they may become prone to food insecurity if their energy intake does not provide sufficient nutrients to fulfil their health requirements. The nutritional transition also has an impact on food security because the consumption of a ‘western diet’ is far less environmentally sustainable, requiring land and water intensive farming practices that can lead to resource degradation. High demand for foods such as sugar, vegetable oils and animal products, diverts water and arable land resources away from vegetable and grain production for human consumption. Onethird of global food production is used for the nutrition of livestock animals that contribute, at most, a quarter of total dietary energy supply; far less in most developing regions. Around two-thirds of agricultural land is devoted to this purpose, while only 8 per cent produces food for direct human consumption. At a rough estimate, the production of one calorie of beef requires 14 plant derived calories. Therefore meat consumption diverts considerable resources away from forms of agricultural production that would enable greater improvements in food security. The globalisation of diets also reduces the diversity of foods consumed and produced. Wheat, sugar, vegetable oils and soy are predominantly produced as monocultures. This fuels environmental degradation, reduces biodiversity and lowers the nutritional wealth of diets. v. Demographic Trends and Water Security Beyond changes in food consumption patterns, urbanisation has also reshaped the way in which water is supplied and consumed. According to the UN, 141 million urban dwellers worldwide do not have access to improved drinking water, while one out of four urban residents lives without access to improved sanitation facilities. Long term under-investment, rapid urbanisation and poor planning have all led to acute water security challenges in urban areas of developing states. The Global Water Partnership predicts urban water consumption will double by 2025, exacerbating already over-allocated resources in urban centres. In Africa, the UN estimates 40 per cent of the continent’s one billion people live in urban areas, 60 per cent of these in slums, where access to water and sanitation is severely inadequate. A lack of access to safe water and sanitation can lead to serious environmental and health problems, including outbreaks of cholera, malaria, and water pollution. In the 2012 World Water Development Report the UN identify urban settlements as the main source of global water pollution with over 80 per cent of wastewater worldwide not treated or collected. With little capacity to develop the appropriate infrastructure with public investment alone, the developing world will face acute water challenges toward 2050 in urban centres. To address these shortfalls in urban access to appropriate water and sanitation facilities, increased public-private partnerships are required to ensure proper planning and infrastructure development are achieved. Investment to increase the level of basic sanitation and water services is critical, particularly for the 828 million people living in informal settlements and slums not connected to main service systems. vi. Hunger, Nutrition and Food Security Fundamental issues with the organisation of world agriculture and food systems mean that households’ food demands are currently unmet in many parts of the world, while food overconsumption is rife in others. FAO data for the period 2011 to 2013 estimates that 842 million people, or 12 per cent of the global population, are currently undernourished. Concurrently, the world is experiencing exponential growth in rates of obesity. As the population expands to 2050, placing further pressure on global food production systems, distribution issues will need to be addressed in order to prevent global food crises.


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© International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 2013. 2013 Global Hunger Index.

The FAO defines undernourishment as the ‘status of persons, whose food intake regularly provides less than their minimum energy requirements.’ Also known as chronic hunger, undernourishment remains the single largest risk factor contributing to the global burden of disease in the developing world. Dietary energy shortfalls lower immunity to disease, result in severe chronic energy deficiency and lead to intergenerational transmissions of growth failure. Undernourishment is the primary indicator of malnutrition but alone it does not properly reveal the ‘quality’ aspects of food intake. Micronutrient deficiencies occur when food intake results in insufficient levels of vitamin and mineral consumption. Overconsumption leading to obesity is also a serious public health issue worldwide. Food consumption that is consistently above recommended energy requirements not only poses a health risk but also exacerbates pressure on scarce food resources. With one in eight people around the world currently suffering from chronic hunger, the world is already experiencing a global food crisis. Food demand is not being met. A key factor driving future food demand is the need to increase the food intake of people suffering from undernutrition. Agricultural production, food systems and population health are intimately linked. As undernutrition remains a major problem and regional obesity levels are forecast to rise, serious consideration needs to be given to improving the nutritional profiles of regional diets. Focus should expand from meeting minimum energy intake to enabling the consumption of balanced, nutrient rich diets that can address the needs of the undernourished without contributing to the incidence of micronutrient deficiencies or overweight. While the capacity of agricultural production to respond to increasing food demands is crucial to addressing future food security, health and nutritional outcomes will not improve if they continue to be treated as isolated from global food systems.

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vii. Food Demand in 2050 Studies estimate that global food demand will increase by between 60 and 110 per cent by 2050. The most recent UN backed report from the World Resources Institute concurs with the FAO projection that global agricultural production will have to rise by 70 per cent to meet this demand. The primary factors driving the growth in food demand are population growth, changing consumption patterns, and the need to reduce current rates of undernutrition. Rising incomes and changes in dietary composition will be a major component. The growth rate of food demand will be significantly lower than in the preceding decades, but will still place pressure on food systems. People are expected to consume 23 per cent more of their energy-intake from meat by 2050. Demand for meat will have increased by 85 per cent by 2030. Rising food demand will require the production of an additional one billion tonnes of wheat, rice and other cereals, and 200 million more tonnes of beef and other livestock. These figures could be larger in light of the UNDESA 2013 population revision. Future food needs will vary dramatically from region to region. Food demand in industrialised countries is expected to remain constant or even decline as “food saturation” occurs. In Asia, food needs will more than double. Given the limited availability of arable land, this increase will have to come from productivity improvements and imports. In the MENA region, food needs could increase almost three-fold. The Arab countries and West Asia will be unable to meaningfully increase their food production owing to serious resource constraints. Food security in the region will depend on the ability of individual countries to finance food imports. For Sub Saharan Africa, food needs may increase between five and seven-fold. While the FAO predicts that “world agriculture should be capable of producing the necessary food” to support global populations to 2050, population growth will not be distributed evenly across the globe and will be concentrated in regions facing resource scarcity and with a low capacity to ensure food security. Distributional issues already lead to over 10 per cent of the world’s population suffering from food insecurity and this could rise if food systems are not reorganized to respond to rising demand. Changing consumption patterns driven by urbanization, the rise of the middle class and nutritional transitions will also alter food demand profiles to 2050, potentially exacerbating resource scarcity issues. The concentration of population growth in developing regions heightens the risk of global food and water crises occurring.

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Water Security to 2050

2

CHAPTER

¾¾ An estimated one billion people do not have access to enough safe water. By 2025 it is expected half of all nations will face water shortages. ¾¾ As the growing global population drives up water demand to 2050, the incidence of water insecurity is forecast to increase. ¾¾ Uneven distribution of available water supplies will cause regional water insecurity. ¾¾ Rising urbanisation, particularly in the developing world, increases the risk of overburdening supply and infrastructure, leading to severe water crises. ¾¾ The unsustainable over extraction of groundwater, rising levels of water pollution and increasingly unpredictable climatic conditions all threaten future global water security. ¾¾ Regions at the greatest risk of food and water insecurity are also those predicted to experience the greatest growth in population and extreme weather events. ¾¾ Water security is of global concern, requiring an integrated and proactive management approach.

i. Water Availability and Demand The availability and supply of the world’s fresh water is of critical importance. With a rising global population and increasing demand from industry and agriculture, competition over limited water supplies will become more prevalent. Today an estimated one billion people do not have access to enough safe water. The United Nations expects by 2025 that half of all nations will face water shortages or anxiety. By 2050 as much as three quarters of the world’s population could face water scarcity Water insecurity is not due to a limitation in global freshwater sources but rather is a product of uneven distribution. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, if all freshwater were divided equally among the global population, there would be 5,000 to 6,000 cubic metres of water available for every person every year. The definition of water scarcity is less than 1,000 cubic metres per person, including water used for drinking and the production of food. Those countries with the most acute water insecurity have high population densities in addition to relatively low availability of freshwater. By 2050 water forecasters are expecting global water shortages or a ‘gap’ between the supply and demand for water, driven, in a macro sense, by an increase in population. David Molden, Deputy Director-General for Research, International Water Management Institute (IWMI) explains that an increased demand for water will also result from an increase in demand for milk, meat and other high waterusage agricultural products. In addition, growing affluence in many parts of the developing world will also increase demand for these high water use foods.


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Urbanisation will create further challenges for water supply and delivery to the urban population. In 2010 more than 50 per cent of the global population lived in urban centres. Members of these urban populations demand more lifestyle products, such as swimming pools and better food, which means per capita water footprints are likely to continue to rise. The urban population is projected to rise to 6.2 billion by 2050, the majority of this growth will occur in the developing world where the likelihood of overburdened utilities and underdeveloped infrastructure may lead to severe water crises. According to WHO/UNICEF’s Joint Monitoring Program, over 140 million urban residents worldwide lack access to safe drinking water, while over 750 million do not have access to appropriate sanitation facilities. The Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia are at the highest overall risk. These regions are already water scarce; low precipitation, limited freshwater sources, desertification, climate change and growing populations will place further strain on future water availability. South Africa and parts of China and the United States also have high water-stress levels. Areas of Physical and Economic Water Scarcity

Figure 1: Water for Food, Water for Life (Comprehensive Assessment Secretariat 2006)

Beyond physical scarcity economic water scarcity also creates an environment of water insecurity. As depicted in the figure above Africa is the greatest example of economic water scarcity. While water use is much lower than available sources, the limitations in infrastructure, finances and human capital prevent available water from being extracted and used. With the largest area of arable land available for food production to 2050 located in Africa, developing the infrastructure and management of currently inaccessible water could assist in reducing food and water insecurity and lower the number of poor and malnourished on the continent. Regions of water surplus have geographical characteristics including; high precipitation resulting in increased rates of runoff, large freshwater sources (aquifers, lakes, rivers, etc.), and low evaporation rates. Water surplus regions also have management characteristics including; effective water management, water pollution prevention, premium water quality, and fair treaties and agreements for shared water resources. In addition, these water surplus regions have water usage characteristics such as low population and effective usage of available water supplies. These geographical, management and usage characteristics are shared by most, but not all, regions of water surplus.

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ii. Major Threats While the global distribution of freshwater naturally means some states are more water insecure than others, growing demand, groundwater over-extraction, water contamination and climate change are threatening supply worldwide. Climate change presents one of the most challenging and unpredictable threats to global water security. This threat requires proactive management to ensure global food and water systems are prepared for increased weather and precipitation volatility. The challenges of climate change and potential mitigating management are discussed in detail in Chapter Four. There are a number of threats, identified below, which will potentially lead to future water crises in many regions and in some instances are already placing severe strain on national water supplies. Conversely technology adoption and integrated water management will provide the means to source water elsewhere and secure water supplies even as demand continues to rise. Groundwater over-extraction & Aquifer depletion Almost all parts of the global landmass hide a subterranean water body. Aquifers are underground beds or layers of permeable rock, sediment or soil where water stores and is accessible from the surface. There are 37 great aquifer systems of the world; these large aquifers jointly cover almost 35 million square kilometres. UN statistics suggest as much as 30 per cent of the total freshwater available globally is stored underground and potentially available for human consumption. At present, as much as 70 per cent of extracted water is used in irrigation, with a further 8 per cent used for domestic consumption including drinking water. For the majority of countries, water consumption from aquifers has been over-exploited for years with groundwater recharge incapable of replenishing aquifer extraction rates. This is an increasing problem, as demand continues to rise and deeper bore wells are drilled to access declining aquifers. In India long-term groundwater over-extraction has led to acute water stress and threatens the agricultural production of many states. While intensive groundwater withdrawals continue to keep food production systems afloat in many rural areas, it is this over-extraction leading to reduced aquifers and groundwater availability which drives food and water insecurity in the region. With the majority of the Indian population engaged in agriculture as a means of livelihood, reduced groundwater availability, increasingly varied rainfall patterns and polluted rivers will threaten food production and thus food security for not only India but the region at large. Undoubtedly, the threat to food security will directly manifest itself in India’s economy and trigger an increase in rates of hunger and malnutrition in the state. According to the World Bank, India’s per capita water availability is expected to decline to 1,240 cubic metres per person by 2030. With water scarcity defined as having less than 1,000 cubic metres of water available per person per year, India will be severely water stressed and dangerously close to water scarce.


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Figure 2: Global Groundwater Resources and Recharge (BGR/UNESCO 2008)

While scarcity continues to rise, the salinisation and polluting of groundwater, as well as the deterioration of water-based ecosystems, is growing. When groundwater extraction occurs at a rate greater than aquifer recharge, the potential for irreversible aquifer depletion and water contamination rises significantly. Groundwater recharge in much of the Indian Ocean Region is limited (Figure 2). With seasonal rainfall, long dry periods typical of much of the region and a prevalence of local and shallow aquifers, decreasing groundwater availability will require adaptive management and an urgent review of current water consumption practices. According to the UN, water use has been growing at more than twice the rate of population increases in the last century. An increasing number of regions are facing chronic water shortages and the over-extraction of groundwater resources has reached a critical point in much of the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. If extraction continues at the rate it currently is in countries including India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Saudi Arabia and China, aquifers may reach a point beyond recharge to one of permanent degradation and contamination. While the UAE and Saudi Arabia are managing their water scarcity through the development of other water sources (desalination particularly), in India, irreversible groundwater depletion threatens agricultural production and food security for the state as well as those dependent on India for agricultural imports. Pollution Water pollution and declining water quality is a growing issue globally. Rising populations, urbanisation and the expansion of the industrial and agricultural sectors all contribute to increased levels of water pollution. According to the UN’s World Water Assessment Programme (WWAP), two million tons of

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human waste is disposed of in water courses every day. In high-income countries the food sector contributes 40 per cent of organic water pollutant production, while this accounts for 54 per cent in low-income states. The UN predicts as much as 90 per cent of wastewater in developing countries flows, untreated, into rivers, lakes and coastal zones threatening food security, health and access to safe water. Pollutants are the cause of major water quality issues globally, with eutrophication the most prevalent concern. Eutrophication occurs through a high nutrient load in a water body, decreasing available oxygen in the water way and leading to the growth of microbial pathogens causing severe water contamination. Contaminants created by human activity include microbial pathogens, nutrients, heavy metals, organic matter, pesticides and other chemicals and suspended sediment in a water body. The agricultural industry also threatens water quality through nitrate-based fertilisers and runoff into waterways, livestock access to rivers and streams, increased nutrient loads from animal defecation and increased soil salinity causing groundwater salination. Future demands for food production and increased effluent through rising populations in the next three decades will, according to the WWAP, lead to a 10 - 15 per cent increase in nitrogen loading in waterways and coastal ecosystems. Caused by China’s rapid industrialisation and exploitation of the state’s natural resources, pollution has compromised China’s water security. According to China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection, in an annual environmental bulletin released in early 2013, over 30 per cent of the country’s rivers and more than 50 per cent of groundwater sources are below national water quality standards. China’s wastewater treatment capacity stands at 20 per cent, with the remaining 80 per cent discharged, often untreated, into waterways. Key pollutants are from industry, agriculture and residential sources through groundwater leaching and dumping of wastewater into the water systems. The World Bank estimated in 2009 that the water crisis was costing China 2.3 per cent of its national GDP, as the state struggles to address the serious degradation of water health. With an estimated 4,000 petrochemical plants along the Yellow River, a further 10,000 along the Yangtze, and numerous industrial, agricultural and residential planned developments further compromising water sources, deteriorating water quality has emerged as one of the key challenges for China moving toward 2050. There is a two sided approach needed to address increasing water pollution worldwide. First, institutions and governing bodies capable of implementing and enforcing laws and regulations on effluent release into waterways are required. In many developing states there is little monitoring or regulation on effluent discharge into waterways; of particular concern is the depositing of heavy metals and harmful chemicals from industry into waterways used for agriculture, domestic water use and drinking. This can lead to significant health implications and in areas where this occurs rising incidents of cancer and skin disorders, among others, are recorded. Second, long term education to change behaviours and reduce pollution is necessary to create a system of prevention rather than cure. It is that critical decision makers understand the importance of tackling wastewater challenges and sanitation. At the same time capacity building and education at the community level is necessary to change behaviours, increasing sanitation practices and linking effluent discharge with unhealthy waters which could lead to contaminated drinking water and food crops. Energy-Water Nexus Water and energy are highly interconnected and essential in supporting the transportation and availability of one another (Figure 3). Water plays an important role in producing energy through the generation of hydroelectricity and its function in cooling power stations. Energy on the other hand is critical for the supply of water to consumers, in collecting and treating wastewater and in the desalination process. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates as much as 90 per cent of total global power generation relies on water-intensive thermal and hydropower.


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According to the WWAP energy can account for 60 to 80 per cent of water transportation and treatment costs and as much as 14 per cent of the total water utility costs. One of the key industry uses for water is as a coolant for energy generation with consumption representing approximately 5 per cent of total water withdrawals. Energy consumption is expected to double by 2035, leading to water withdrawals for energy production to increase by 20 per cent according to the IEA.

Figure 3: Water-Energy Nexus (World Business Council for Sustainable Development 2009).

Where scarcity of energy or water exist trade-offs are often required, sometimes resulting in insecurity for both. Economic output is at risk of disruption if water supply is unable to meet energy demands. In areas with prolonged drought, electricity supply often suffers and as a result economic production declines. In Brazil’s northeast, prolonged drought in 2010 led to a decline in economic growth in 2011 due to a reduction in hydroelectric capacity and energy shortages state-wide. Economic growth and food production rely on the availability and access to both water and energy. Monopolising electricity through one source of energy can have severe repercussions should this supply be compromised for any reason. Hydroelectricity will be particularly vulnerable to climate change and increasing incidences of drought. Food production is very energy and water intensive. At the global scale the production of food is responsible for 80-90 per cent of all water consumption. The energy input for food production has increased significantly with the production of fertiliser, land preparation, irrigation and other inputs creating energy dependence in the production cycle. Where water or energy scarcity exists, food production is affected; alternatively, where food production leads to unsustainable land use, water availability can be compromised and energy output limited. The water-energy nexus is increasingly vulnerable in developing states where a lack of infrastructure can often limit the production and transportation of either energy or water and lead to trade-offs between the two. Population growth and urbanisation have created new issues, concentrating high demand in small areas and requiring greater supporting infrastructure. Increasing water demand leads to the need to access water from further afield, requiring more energy to transport over greater distances to consumers. Alternatively, urban centres require highly concentrated sources of heating, cooling and energy and therefore greater amounts of water. The potential for insecurity within the nexus is significant, where one is scarce or inaccessible it creates a domino effect of insecurity.

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An evaluation of management practices is required to ensure increased effectiveness in both the water and energy sectors. Historically, each sector has been managed and regulated separately with the reliance on one another for functionality often presumed to exist rather than factored into project planning. For example water for energy generation (aside from hydropower) is generally assumed available and often not considered in planning or implementation as a potential limitation to energy generation. Threats to future water security are multi-faceted; inter-linked with other production cycles (including industry, agriculture and energy), rising demand and growing populations, and uncontrollable weather events. Further, increased pollution and untreated wastewater have the potential to compromise what available water there is. Water scarcity will be felt more acutely in low-income developing states, where alternative sources and regulations on water use and management are limited. While the distribution of water will play a significant role in water scarcity patterns, demand and unsustainable water use will be the catalyst of future water crises. iii. Sourcing Available Water Given the threats to water security, as illustrated in the previous section, the diversification and expansion of water supply is required to meet future demand. Water consumption patterns and closed-loop water-use systems also require consideration if scarcity is to be addressed sustainably. Outlined below are key sources and concepts pertaining to sourcing future water and increasing food and water security. Desalination There are currently close to 16,000 desalination plants globally, with most capacity located in the Middle East, followed by North Africa, the United States and Europe. The global demand for desalination is projected to triple within the next six years. According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), global desalination water production per year is 24 billion metres cubed, or approximately 0.6 per cent of the global water supply. Desalination is the only climate independent source of water available. Other alternative sources, such as water recycling and storm water harvesting, still require sufficient amounts of water entering the water cycle to allow them to operate. From a global perspective, desalination technology is applied for several purposes, such as: providing fresh water for industrial sectors and supplying high quality drinkable water for the domestic and public sector. While not directly supplying the agricultural industry, desalination can potentially reduce competition over scarce resources and ensure water for agricultural production is not used at the expense of other important sectors. Desalination facilities have specific, expensive infrastructure and relatively high energy use, as such private financing has become a powerful driver in growing desalination plant construction, with public funding often insufficient to develop and maintain capacity. This is an important consideration, as developing states may not have the structures in place required to support such development. The political, economic and social instability of a state may create an unsuitable environment for private investment limiting the capacity to develop desalination plants. Development is further challenged by the negative impact of desalination on the environment. Desalination plants cause environmental harm through greenhouse gas emissions and marine environment degradation. Desalinated brine is believed to cause the most significant harm to the marine environment surrounding plants. Brine contains double the amount of salt found in water collected from the ocean. Furthermore, the release of brine into the oceans can increase water temperature by as much as 8 degrees Celsius.


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Energy is the most expensive component of running a desalination plant, responsible for approximately one-third to more than half of the cost of desalination. The majority of plants use energy from fossil fuels or nuclear power. According to IRENA the global production of desalinated water accounts for approximately 0.4 per cent of the global energy consumption. It is estimated that 73 per cent of all desalination plants worldwide will be produced by reverse osmosis by 2016. Reverse Osmosis requires less energy for lower saline water altering energy output requirements. Addressing environmental impact and high energy consumption challenges will increase the potential for desalination adoption worldwide. By reducing capital costs and by-product impacts desalination will become increasingly accessible and acceptable as an alternative source of freshwater. Wastewater Treatment As populations grow and demand for goods and services with it, wastewater is consequently produced at rising rates. . The question of reusing wastewater and in what capacity is one of critical importance as freshwater sources diminish and more countries face water scarcity. Wastewater has huge potential as an alternative source of water for agriculture, industry and urban greening. Using treated wastewater in the agricultural sector can reduce cost inputs significantly; firstly the diversion and use of wastewater to irrigate crops is often less costly than extracting groundwater from nearby aquifers, which requires greater amounts of electricity for pumps and is labour intensive. Secondly, the nutrients in wastewater (nitrogen and phosphorus) have the potential to significantly improve crop yields and reduce the need for added fertilisers. Within industry wastewater can be used effectively as a coolant, in the processing of materials and in energy development such as thermal, where water evaporation is a key component of energy generation. Urban greening, the watering of green spaces including parks, sports fields and roadside greenery, is also a viable option for treated wastewater. Recycling water can reduce the cost of water supply and support cyclical water use where water is continually captured, stored and reused within a production cycle. With each use the required treatment of wastewater varies. Agricultural use of wastewater requires monitoring and treatment to remove hazardous chemicals and pathogens which could transfer to crops and vegetables. In any use of wastewater the potential for untreated wastewater infiltration into aquifers and streams is considerable and could cause contamination of whole water bodies if treated inefficiently. To address the risks associated with wastewater there is a need for greater education, regulation and monitoring around reusing wastewater at the local, governmental and regional levels. While the treatment and management of wastewater as a resource requires closer examination, wastewater provides vast potential in terms of available water and supporting water security, particularly in waterscarce countries. Developed countries are to some extent already treating and reusing wastewater, however expanding use to developing states will require greater capacity and governance to ensure use without risking environmental or human health. Virtual Water An economic term used to quantify the amount of water used to produce a good or service, virtual water was originally used to identify the role agricultural trade could have in addressing water scarcity globally. As the FAO explains, by importing water-intensive products instead of producing them domestically, water-poor countries can achieve greater water security. The potential of virtual water as a tool to achieve water security and increase water use efficiency globally is a key contributor to the growing interest in the concept.

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Water, as the Water Footprint Network highlights, has much in common with oil. Both are abundant in some countries while scarce elsewhere. As key inputs to state economies, those with little of either commodity will increasingly depend on others that do. By importing water-intensive products rather than producing them locally, water demand shifts from the place of consumption to that of production. In water scarce regions like the Middle East, importing grains can reduce the demand on domestic water supplies, leading to increased water availability for other domestic uses. Cereals and meat represent the most water intensive food products. One kilogram of beef for example, requires as much as 15,000 litres of water to produce. From this argument then, water scarce states should focus on importing cereals and meat rather than producing them domestically.

Figure 4: Water Consumption by Product (WaterStat, Water Footprint Network)

There is however limitations to virtual water calculations, and calculating the volume of water used in production becomes increasingly complex as food moves along the production and processing chain. The calculation of virtual water may also lead to the assumption that all water sources are of equal value. This assumption supposes the approximate 15,000 litres of water required for the production of 1kg of beef can be used to greater effective elsewhere. It is important virtual water is not used as a stand-alone measure of water use for food and goods production. Its strength lies in the increased understanding it can bring to the consumer on water demand and consumption through food production and the potential for more equitable use of water globally through trade. iv. Water Security to 2050 Ensuring there is enough available water accessible to future populations and industry is a critical challenge to 2050. At a global scale, it is likely that we have sufficient water reserves for the required food production growth and general demand between now and 2050. The distribution of global freshwater naturally creates patterns of scarcity and abundance which rarely reflect demand requirements in regions. Regions with the greatest likelihood of future water and food insecurity are also those predicted to experience the greatest growth in population and extreme weather events. Beyond natural water cycles and distribution, man-made threats to available freshwater are reaching a critical point, beyond which irreversible damage to ecological systems and hydrological cycles are potential outcomes. Threats to water quality from industry, agricultural and domestic pollution, the over-extraction of groundwater supplies past recharge rates, increased incidents of extreme weather events and competing demands on increasingly scarce resources all threaten the future water security of states.


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The ability to respond to future threats will be critical in preventing potential water crises. There are ample opportunities for us to increase water use efficiency. Alternative water sources, including desalination and the treatment and recycling of wastewater, will require significant investment in infrastructure and production capacity, while addressing pollution will require strong governance and regulation. Water security is of global concern, with no region immune from the threats to future resources. It has the potential to compromise food systems, livelihoods, health and the productiveness of state economies. With current consumption patterns accelerating the threat of water insecurity around the world it is integral states invest in technology and education and take a proactive, integrated approach to ensuring their future water security.

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Land Availability

3

CHAPTER

¾¾ More land is needed to meet food needs to 2050, but food production faces competition for available land resources from alterative users including biofuel production. ¾¾ Soil degradation is widespread in agricultural systems around the world, posing one of the most serious supply-related threats to global food security to 2050. ¾¾ The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)’s Global Land Assessment of Degradation estimates that almost two billion hectares of land have been degraded since the 1950s worldwide. This means that half of the world’s cultivated land is moderately or severely degraded. ¾¾ If we don’t halt land degradation now, we may not have sufficient land available to grow enough food to prevent hunger by 2050. ¾¾ Three possible land availability strategies exist – we could increase the amount of arable land under cultivation; intensify production using existing cultivated lands; or conserve existing cultivated areas to curtail degradation. ¾¾ Land available for agricultural expansion is unevenly distributed and poorly corresponds with areas of the highest projected population growth and food needs; some areas of the world will face arable land shortages by 2050.

i. Future Demand for Arable Land The availability of arable land is essential to global agricultural production. As the world’s population grows and consumption rises we will have to produce more food. Competing land uses and ongoing soil degradation mean that we may be required to do this with fewer or less productive land resources. Soil degradation is widespread; erosion, salinity, nutrient leaching and toxicity are leading to lower yields and even to land becoming unfit for agriculture. While unused arable land exists, it is often not located in the areas with the greatest need of it. Furthermore, issues related to ownership and governance mean that available land is poorly utilised in some areas. ‘Arable land’ refers to land that can be used for growing crops; it not only includes land that is already cultivated, but also that which has the potential to be cultivated. That is, land where the soil and climate are suitable for agriculture, where there are no existing large-scale human settlements, or where the land is not protected by any land rights regimen. Whilst marginal land can be made arable by various artifices, arable land in our context refers primarily to land which can be used for production with little or no modification. This is because modifications designed to recapture arable land are often expensive, energy-intensive or politically untenable, and this discussion of arable land occurs in the context of a future facing greater limitations on non-renewable resources.


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Competing Land Uses While the quantity of land needed to meet additional food demand increases, food production also faces increasing competition for arable land resources from other users. Firstly, urban areas are rapidly encroaching on arable land. In Egypt, where the population of 84 million people all live within three per cent of the country’s land area, rapid population growth is leading to scarce arable land being developed for housing. The Punjab region in India, the country’s food bowl, was cited in FDI roundtables as another location where arable land was subject to urban encroachment and diversion to industrial uses. In China, it is projected that by 2050, 10 per cent of the cropland that was available in 2005 will have been lost to urban development, resulting in an 18 per cent reduction in food production capacity. The declining availability of arable land for food production has also been the result of increased investment in the biofuel industry. The promotion of biofuels as a “green” alternative to fossil fuels led to the quantity of grain used to produce biofuels tripling between 2005 and 2011. The diversion of grain production away from food and feed purposes was implicated in the 2008 global food price crisis. As oil prices rise it is likely that biofuel production will become more profitable. Without policy regulation, increasing production trends will continue, further decreasing the amount of land available for food production and driving up food prices to the detriment of low-income consumers. The demand for arable land will be further exacerbated by demographic shifts, primarily the rapid expansion of the middle classes in developing nations and the associated nutritional transition. Rising incomes have historically been drivers of increased consumption of animal products, including meat and dairy. The grain feed requirements of livestock mean that meat is a land intensive form of energy intake. Growth and shifts in consumption patterns will place further strain on existing land resources and necessitate greater efficiency in production and greater yields per hectare. ii. Soil Degradation Soil is a finite resource which is fundamental to global agricultural production, but is currently being degraded at a historically unprecedented rate. Soil degradation is widespread in agricultural systems around the world, and poses one of the most serious supply-related threats to global food security to 2050. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)’s Global Land Assessment of Degradation estimates that worldwide, almost two billion hectares of land have been degraded since the 1950s. This means that a quarter of the world’s cultivated land is currently highly degraded and another third is vulnerable. Only 10 per cent of arable landmass is improving in quality. The land that is being used to grow the world’s best crops falls within this area. IFPRI estimates that damages caused by land degradation incur an annual cost of US$66 billion. Over the next 25 years, land degradation may reduce food production by up to 12 per cent, resulting in an increase of world food prices by as much as 30 per cent. Poor land management and unsustainable agricultural practices are the primary causes of widespread degradation. Although significant growth in crop yields has been achieved over the past fifty years, these gains have come at a significant cost to the environment and the food security of future generations. Production gains from increased irrigation and fertiliser use have resulted in soil degradation that places future food production systems at risk.

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Over one billion people, primarily farmers in rural communities, are directly dependent on land which is being degraded. Many more indirectly rely on these lands for their food supply. If current trends were to continue a billion hectares of land would be cleared globally by 2050, an area greater than the landmass of China or the United States. This land would be highly vulnerable to degradation.

Erosion, Salinity and Desertification Erosion occurs when surface soil material is lost through wind and water flows. The process is accelerated by clearing vegetation which protects the soil from wind and by farming seasonal crops on slopes. Soils for Life estimate that at least 24 billion tons of fertile soil is lost to erosion each year, incurring an annual global cost of US$490 billion. Across northern China and southern Mongolia and south of the Sahara, two major dust bowls are forming which have the potential to cause widespread erosion and desertification of agricultural grasslands. This is of utmost concern given the time scale of soil development - it takes 2000 years to generate 10cm of fertile topsoil, so the impacts of current erosion are long term. Erosion harms agricultural productivity through the loss of nutrients and organic matter, decreased soil water retention capacity and associated negative impacts including declines in water and air quality. If unmitigated, the extent of soil erosion will increase in the future, especially in drylands, rangelands, cropping systems on slopes, and newly cleared land. Salinity is caused by the encroachment of saline water onto the soil surface, resulting in degraded and unproductive soils. This includes dryland salinity which occurs when indigenous vegetation (whose roots hold down surface water) are cleared and replaced with shallow rooted crops. In addition to drylands, irrigated systems are particularly at risk, as extraction of water from surface systems and aquifers results in altered hydromorphology, leading to altered flow regimes and the advance of saline water upstream from the ocean. It is estimated that in total, one third of the world’s cultivated lands are impacted


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by soil salinity. This may increase in the future, particularly in dryland and irrigation dependent systems. Salinity is one of the major environmental issues confronting Australian agriculture. Desertification occurs when formerly arable land becomes arid and too degraded to use, deficient in soil moisture or nutrients. It is caused by land clearing, drought, inappropriate agricultural practices, erosion and salinity. It is estimated that there are already 4 billion hectares of man-made deserts in the world that are no longer fit for cultivation. Desertification is experienced on 33% of the global land surface and affects more than one billion people, half of whom live in Africa. Other areas where desertification is prevalent are the Middle East, central Asia, and northern China. In the lead up to 2050 it is predicted that subtropical areas will also experience an enhanced risk of desertification due to more frequent and severe droughts which occur as a result of the changing climate. Soil nutrition and toxicity The lack of nutrient availability in soils is another major threat to arable land productivity. Lands that have been farmed for a long period become nutrient deficient, limiting the yields that they can produce. Erosion due to traditional agriculture is occurring 10 to 100 times faster than the soil’s natural formation process. Although lack of good data makes predictions highly uncertain, the Earth may only have 50 years of topsoil left. Returning nutrients to the soil requires long fallow periods or nutrient-regenerative crop rotations. To increase soil productivity, modern agriculture is heavily dependent on chemical fertilisers containing phosphorous, nitrogen, and potassium to produce good yields. It is estimated that one third of crop yields are attributable to fertiliser input. To intensify crop yields in the future additional nutrient input will be required; but there are a number of problems with over-reliance on chemical fertilisers. Overuse of chemical inputs causes soil toxicity and acidification. Soil acidification affects half of the world’s arable lands and its primary form, aluminium toxicity is a serious food security threat in many critical tropical food production regions. The use of ammoniumbased fertilisers on soil can cause manganese toxicity, phosphorous, nitrogen and calcium deficiency, and disrupt nutrient cycles. High levels of soil toxicity can reduce soil productivity and render food produced unsuitable for eating. Another key problem with this requirement is that the major sources of fertiliser materials are non-renewable resources and involve emissions intensive production processes. Potassium, for instance, is mined from potash: a non-renewable resource. Phosphorous is primarily produced from phosphate rock mining, also a finite resource that could be exhausted in the next 50 to 100 years. It is therefore possible that a situation of “peak fertiliser” could be reached after which phosphorous scarcity would be a major limiting factor to agricultural production. Fertiliser production is also an energy intensive process highly dependent on fossil fuels. Fertiliser prices are thus linked to oil prices and could increase dramatically in line with declining oil availability. Over-reliance on chemical fertilisers may also be an unsustainable practice for agricultural systems because the artificial addition of nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus to crops is not enough to maintain soil health and biological condition. Chemical use depletes soil health by reducing carbon content (and consequently, water holding capacity) and organic matter that is crucial to nutrient availability for plants and animals. Up to 60 per cent of carbon in the world’s soils and vegetation has been lost as a result of land uses since the 19th century. Studies by the US Department of Agriculture have linked degraded soil microbiology and micronutrients to a long-term decline in the nutritional quality of fruits and vegetables produced by commercial agriculture in the United States. By adopting regenerative landscape management practices it is possible to rebuild soil health and create sustainable nutrient availability in soils without intensive use of chemical fertilisers. Soil regeneration requires integrated management of soil, water and vegetation.

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iii. Moving Forward: Options to Ensure Land Availability To meet the world’s increasing food demand global agricultural output will need to increase. Yet widespread degradation and competing land uses threaten the availability and productive capacity of arable land. Three possible solutions exist –increase the amount of arable land under cultivation; intensify production using existing cultivated lands; or conserve existing cultivated areas to curtail degradation. An integration of the latter two options is the preferred pathway in terms of associated economic, social, and environmental impacts. However, it is likely that all three options will be pursued to some extent. Expansion The world has considerable land reserves available, which could be theoretically converted into agricultural land. The FAO projects that by 2050 the area of arable land in use will have expanded by 70 million hectares. This is an expansion of only 5 per cent. The net balance of this expansion is projected to be 120 million hectares in developing countries counteracted by a contraction of arable land by 50 million hectares in developed countries where productive land may be set aside for regenerative purposes or converted to other uses. The expansion of agricultural production into currently uncultivated land is the simplest option for increasing food production, and thus likely to be the most popular. However, it is also the most problematic as the possibility of negative environmental effects is substantial. While areas of good quality arable land remain available, the majority of the world’s unused cultivable landmass is marginal; seventy per cent of it would be subject to lower crop yields because of toxicity, low fertility, and ecological fragility. Ultimately, the amount of land available for agriculture is finite, and will become increasingly marginal overtime. Being less productive, this land would require greater amounts of finite inputs such as fertiliser and water compared with other, more productive lands. Furthermore, natural ecosystems cleared for agriculture to meet growing food demands would present a higher risk of land degradation because of their already marginal status. Additional land clearing is also harmful to agricultural production because of the impact that the release of sequestered carbon has on the climate. Clearing land for agricultural production may lead to the loss of ecosystems that could have a higher value from existence values, recreation and tourism, and provision of ecosystem services. This could ultimately result in a net loss of economic value. Nevertheless, agricultural expansion will inevitably occur in spite of these problems, especially in developing countries. However, it is estimated that only one quarter of the growth in food production to 2050 will come from expansion onto currently unused agricultural lands. Intensification Agricultural intensification to meet food security has two components – increasing yields, and increasing cropping intensity. It is estimated that intensification will account for almost 75 per cent of food production increases to 2050. Average yields around the world currently range from 20-80 per cent of potential yields, so there is indeed considerable potential for growth. Yet, the rate of yield gain has decreased or stopped improving at all for major global cereal crops – including wheat, rice and corn – in a third of our most important crop land areas. Some scientists suggest that plant productivity may have reached natural limits or plateaus; however, others argue that the stagnation is linked to a decline in investment in agricultural research over recent decades. Novel management approaches and renewed R&D will be needed to achieve further yield increases in already intensively cropped areas. Significant yield gaps exist in non-industrialised agricultural systems though, and there is significant potential to intensify production in these areas. Intensification would have a lower net cost for the environment in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss, and soil degradation, compared with the expansion approach. It would also be more


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economically efficient in the long term. However, this does not guarantee the adoption of intensification in favour of expansion. Developing countries have the greatest potential for yield increases, as currently achieved yields are often well below their potential ceilings. However, technology, extension services and a strong institutional framework are required for this to be possible. Weak governance systems mean that many of these countries are more likely to expand agricultural production by clearing new land. Institutional change and policy adaptation will therefore be needed to ensure that intensification is more viable than expansion in developing countries. Additionally, in order for the economic and environmental benefits of intensification to be fully realised, and to prevent intensification exacerbating land degradation, intensification must be complemented by conservation. Conservation Alongside extension and intensification, conservation practices are required to ensure that currently productive land does not become degraded. While available long-term perspective studies suggest that the world has sufficient arable land to meet future food demand at the global level, this will is only be the case assuming that degradation is stopped or significantly slowed. Conserving soil quality is essential to building a sustainable food system able to provide food security in the long term. Conserving soils involves maintaining nutrient levels, preventing salinization, erosion and toxicity, reducing acidification and improving biodiversity. Key mitigation practices include zero tillage, which has the benefits of increasing soil organic content and water retention capacity, inhibiting weed growth, and reducing the risk of soil erosion; implementing pro-biodiversity crop rotation systems; and strategic revegetation to decrease salinity and erosion risk and enhance biodiversity. These measures, when coupled with an integrated pest management approach can also reduce chemical pesticide use, which increases resource use efficiency and reduces economic and environmental costs. Effectively managing fertiliser input is also instrumental to decrease production costs as well as minimise environmental degradation. Investment in research and development, and the transfer of knowledge to producers will be needed to promote conservation agriculture. Such practices, if implemented successfully, would complement those aimed at agricultural intensification and greatly increase the capability of the world’s agricultural systems to meet growing food demand. Without these adaptations the long term sustainability of global agricultural production systems is compromised. iv. Is There an Arable Land Shortage? One of the key factors that will determine the world’s ultimate ability to feed its population between now and 2050 is whether or not we have enough good quality land to grow food on. At first assessment, there remains a considerable quantity of unused arable land available that could be used for food production. There is also considerable scope to intensify production in existing agricultural areas. Successive FAO analyses of food security prospects to 2050 have concluded that, theoretically speaking, the world has enough land and other food production resources to meet the projected increases in demand. Soil is a finite resource and degradation is widespread however; if we continue to degrade land resources at current rates, the FAO claim we may not have enough useable agricultural land to be able to feed ourselves by 2050. v. The Distribution of Available Land Regions of arable land surplus and shortage If we assume that sufficient uncultivated arable land exists for us to expand agricultural production onto, we are still confronted with the issue of that land not being distributed between nations in a way that matches populations’ food demand. Land available for agricultural expansion is unevenly distributed and poorly corresponds with areas of the highest projected population growth and food needs.

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Of the 2.7 billion hectares of land available for cropland expansion, 1.8 billion hectares are located in developing countries. Of this land, 90 per cent is in South and Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa, and half of the total is concentrated in just seven countries - Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Sudan, Argentina, Colombia and Bolivia. Some regions miss out entirely, and there is virtually no spare land available for expansion in many of the world’s most population-dense regions. The Middle East and North Africa region is an area of significant concern, with huge population growth projected and no spare land available for expansion onto due to soil fertility and water availability constraints. Grain production has already peaked in the Middle East due to the over-exploitation of non-renewable water resources and the region will increasingly rely on imports in the future. Asia is also a vulnerable region, with the least potential for expansion of arable land, and also the highest prevalence of degradation. In particular, China, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia are countries that have high projected population growths, followed by high levels of existing and projected degradation, and very low availability of land for expansion due to already high population densities. While there is currently a large quantity of land available for cropland expansion in Africa, degradation is occurring at a rapid rate due to poor agricultural practices, desertification, deforestation and erosion. UNEP has estimated that more than a quarter of the African continent is in the process of becoming useless for cultivation due to degradation.

Source: Bruinsma 2009

While Australia has some 2.67 hectares of arable land per person, at least 60 per cent of the land mass is affected by some form of human induced degradation that is caused mainly by wind and water erosion. The quality of soils generally is declining and the means to redress this decline is only just starting to be recognised. While some arable land is yet to be used for agricultural and pastoral purposes, much of that being used is degrading and arid areas are rapidly expanding. Food insecurity can only increase between now and 2050.


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vi. Ownership and Governance Complicating existing issues regarding the quality, availability and distribution of arable land are concerned with ownership and governance. Loose tenure arrangements, concentration of ownership, weak property rights and large-scale land acquisitions can all undermine the security and thus sustainability of farming operations. In many countries in both the developed and developing world, arable land ownership is concentrated in the hands of a small, wealthy portion of the population. Inequalities in land distribution often mean that food produced is less likely to be evenly distributed. Moreover, it is often exported for profit rather than sold locally, reducing domestically available supply. Inequitable land ownership is exacerbated by the uncertain tenure arrangements experienced by smallholder farmers in many developing economies. Security of tenure is important because it provides enforceable guarantees and protection against the arbitrary curtailment of land rights; results in increased investment and agricultural productivity; improves food security and incentivises the more sustainable use of natural resources. However few countries, particularly in the developing world have adequate institutional mechanisms in place for protecting the livelihoods of land users. This can result in inefficient and suboptimal use of land which could be resolved by policy reforms which target land governance. “Land Grabs” Disparities in land availability have led to a phenomenon of “land-grabs” sweeping the world since 2008 as governments, agribusiness companies and other private investors have contracted transnational purchases of arable land and long term leases arrangements. The majority of investors are from countries already confronted with or facing future shortages of arable land, including China, India, The Gulf States, South Korea and Malaysia. Countries targeted for acquisition are land-surplus regions predominantly located in Africa, including Ethiopia, Madagascar, Sudan and South Sudan; South East Asia, particularly Cambodia and the Philippines; and South and Central America, especially Brazil and Argentina as well as Pakistan and Kazakhstan. In 2011, the World Bank estimated that at least 140 million hectares of land had been acquired in transnational transactions since 2008 and that the figure could be much higher. To the extent that foreign investment may bring previously unproductive lands into cultivation, augmenting the world’s food supply and stabilising global food prices, land acquisitions could be beneficial to food security. Much of the land targeted for development requires considerable investment to be made productive and in many parts of the developing world, where most of these purchases have occurred, these funds are not available because of weak governance, debt or fiscal difficulties. Therefore the potential exists for these deals to be mutually beneficial for the investor and host communities if the developments are carefully managed. So far, this has proven not to be the case with the majority of developments. In many cases land grabs have negative consequences for the livelihoods and food security of local communities and households because of issues surrounding uncertain tenure. The areas where land acquisitions are occurring are predominantly poor, and chronic hunger is a feature of a vast majority of them, such as Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan. In these countries land tenure is often uncertain. In many cases large-scale land sales or leases to foreign investors have been negotiated without consultation with local people who were farming or herding stock on the land via customary rights but who had no formal land rights. Without legally recognised ownership, existing land holders lack legal recourse when investors acquire their land. This creates displacement and losses of livelihood when these populations are expropriated to establish industrial agriculture.

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Conclusion The availability of arable land is one of the major constraints on the increase in food production necessary to meet the nutritional needs of the global population to 2050. There is currently enough arable land available to expand food production to the level required to assure sustainable food security in 2050. Degradation of this land is occurring rapidly however, and if we fail to halt it, we will not be able to produce enough food to meet our future requirements. Without efforts to intensify production and adopt conservation practices, we will undermine our food system sustainability and cause global crises. Adding to the potential for food crises as a result of resource constraints is the fact that the distribution of available land does not meet up to population needs. The geopolitical implications of the mismatch between available arable land and national food demand are far reaching and could be a significant driver of interstate conflict to 2050.

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Climate Change and Global Agriculture

4

CHAPTER

¾¾ Climate change is the most challenging threat to food and water security between now and 2050. ¾¾ Temperature increases, changing rainfall patterns, rising sea levels, extreme weather events and climate variability will impact hydrological cycles and agricultural systems, undermining food and water security. ¾¾ The impact of climate change on agricultural production will vary across regions. In some areas changes in the climate will boost food production; however, the net impact on yields is forecast to be overwhelmingly negative. ¾¾ Developing countries with a low capacity for mitigation and adaptation measures are expected to bare 70 to 80 per cent of climate change related costs. ¾¾ The number of people at risk of hunger may climb by 10 to 20 per cent by 2050 as a result of climate change. ¾¾ Implementing mitigation and adaptation strategies can make the agricultural sector more resilient to climate change. Political will and immediate action is required to minimise impacts on food and water security.

Climate change presents the greatest threat to food and water security between now and 2050. It has the potential to cause increased insecurity within and between nations, changing the global hydrological cycle, affecting food systems and human security. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), climate change will have a significant impact on agricultural production by increasing water demand, limiting crop productivity and reducing water availability in areas where water is most needed (FAO 2011). The wheat producing regions of South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa will be the most severely affected by climate change, with production declines as great as 47 per cent predicted. Adapting to and mitigating the impacts of climate change on global food systems will require innovative solutions and commitment and collaboration across nations. i. Climate Change and Agricultural Production Changes in the global climate will have dramatic impacts on agricultural production, changing natural resource availability, exacerbating threats to the already vulnerable food system, driving up food prices and undermining global food security. The earth’s atmosphere has reached a carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration of 400 parts per million for the first time in approximately three million years. The last time CO2 levels were this high global temperatures were two to three degrees warmer and sea levels were as much as 25 metres higher. Without a reduction in GHG emissions, the impacts of climate change on agricultural production could lead to an estimated 10 – 20 per cent increase in the number of people at risk of hunger by 2050.


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Rising Temperatures Increased temperatures and shifting rainfall patterns are predicted to reduce agricultural yields worldwide causing difficulties in ensuring global food availability and access. Variations in growing periods due to climate change have the potential to affect 14.2 million hectares of agricultural land and undermine the food security of 400 million people. Rising temperatures will reduce crop yields because rates of evapotranspiration increase and soil-moisture reduces as lands get warmer and drier. To maintain the same levels of productivity, crops will need more water, but it may not be available. Spreading drought conditions will also reduce agricultural productivity and directly threaten availability of food in the global market. According to US Aid, riparian states along the Lower Mekong River will see a 4 – 6°C temperature rise by 2050. Alongside increases in rainstorms and rising sea levels, higher temperatures are expected to reduce the production of rice and other staple crops significantly. The control of pests and diseases will become more challenging as the climate changes. Variations in the climate will allow pests and diseases to invade areas that were previously uninhabitable. These threats include plant diseases, weeds and insects, which threaten ecosystems and the survival of crops. Temperature rises will encourage the migration of organisms, while extremes in weather variations will increase survival rates and crop damage. Rainfall Patterns Predicting the impact of climate change on rainfall patterns is far more difficult than predicting temperature changes because the impact on regional rainfall is difficult to distinguish from natural variations caused by El Nino occurrence. Climate experts agree, however, that increased atmospheric gases will shift precipitation patterns and cause higher incidence of storm events. Precipitation volumes are likely to increase one to two per cent for every degree of atmospheric warming because a warmer atmosphere traps more water vapour. In some areas, changing precipitation patterns will see heavier rainfall and storm events cause destructive flooding, while other areas will experience more frequent and prolonged droughts. This could cause desertification, loss of agricultural land, reduced aquifer recharge in arid regions and increased salinity and erosion through flooding. All of these effects have the potential to reduce agricultural production. Sea Level Rise & Glacier Melt Rising temperatures will also affect global water resources; increased rates of glacier melting and rising sea levels will lead to flooding, coastal erosion and increased salinity. Freshwater coastal aquifers that are subject to excessive groundwater extraction are at risk of salt-water intrusion, compromising available freshwater resources. The World Bank reports that important low-lying food-producing river deltas in Bangladesh, Egypt, Vietnam and parts of Africa are highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of rising sea levels. The report suggests sea level rise could reach as high as 30cm by the end of the century with the average rate of rise currently at 3.2 cm per decade. With a large percentage of the world’s population residing along coastal regions, sea level rise could severely impact on infrastructure and housing and lead to flooding of productive low-lying agricultural plains and river gardens. Glaciers and icepacks are shrinking at unprecedented rates. Rising temperatures and reduced precipitation are resulting in significant glacier melt in the Himalayan region, where some areas are predicted to shrink to nonexistence by as early as 2035. Glaciers in the Himalayas are retreating and losing mass but the net amount of runoff water from melting glaciers is expected to rise until at least 2050. This combined with the predicted increase in precipitation means that water availability in the region is not likely to decline during this century. River basins that depend on monsoon rains and glacier melt will continue to sustain the increasing water demands expected in these areas.

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In Greenland, where 12 per cent of the world’s ice is located entire sections of the icesheet are shifting into the ocean with serious implications to sea levels. Increased ice melt will give rise to greater water flow into rivers and out to oceans changing the hydraulics of waterways. Greater flow of rivers can cause scouring of river banks, erosion and flooding. For the many river-side inhabitants of South and South-East Asia dependent on the river for food production, changes in flow can affect crop cycles and lead to reduced food production. Increased sediment loads in river systems will also affect food security, upsetting ecological balances, interfering with fish populations and reducing water quality. In the Himalayan Region a reduction in glaciers will affect the size, location and intensity of seasonal monsoons. With the majority of agricultural production within the region reliant on rain-fed systems changes of any magnitude will have a detrimental effect on food production and thus food security. Climatic Variability While it is certain that climate change will have negative effects on agricultural production, localised impacts are difficult to predict. What is guaranteed is that changes will require costly adaptation measures and that on the whole; weather patterns will be less predictable in both the short and long-term, increasing the risk involved in agriculture. Seasonal variations will alter growing periods and could influence crop yields. Shifts in seasonal temperatures and precipitation patterns are already witnessed throughout the world with prolonged warmer seasons and shorter, dryer cold seasons. Rain-fed cropping is particularly vulnerable to changing weather patterns because it relies on seasonal precipitation. Increased variability could have devastating effects on food production and the livelihoods of farmers relying on rain-fed agriculture, particularly in developing states. In some areas of Africa even a short dry spell during the growing season has the potential to devastate food supplies. Variations will affect the time of year crops are sown and when they are harvested, often leaving a shorter window for growth before changing weather reduces potential yields. Given the unpredictability of precipitation and increased climatic variability historical data-based predictions become less accurate, increasing vulnerability to climate and decreasing the likelihood that crops will survive to be harvested. Farming in the developing world is already a high risk occupation; increased climatic uncertainty will undermine food security both by effecting agricultural yields and by destabilising incomes and livelihoods. Extreme Weather Events The severity and occurrence of extreme weather events is predicted to rise as a result of climate warming. Droughts, flooding, wildfires and cyclones cause severe damage to crops and can lead to localised food shortages and price spikes on a global scale. Higher temperatures increase both evaporation and the waterholding capacity of the atmosphere favouring increased climate variability more intense precipitation and more droughts. The area of land experiencing extreme drought at any time is projected to increase especially in the subtropics and low- and mid-latitudes, affecting more than a billion people by 2050. Increased precipitation intensity and variability are expected to increase the risk of flooding. Mean sea level is rising and this will contribute to increases in extreme coastal high-water levels. Locations currently experiencing adverse impacts such as coastal erosion and inundation will likely continue to do so in the future because of increasing sea levels. People living within about 100 km of a shoreline one-third of the world’s population will be hit especially hard because they are particularly susceptible to the effects of rising sea level including intrusion of saline water into coastal potable water sources. These events have compound effects on food security. Available food supplies can by decimated leading to market shortages. Furthermore, farmers’ incomes are cut when their crops are destroyed, reducing food affordability for already vulnerable rural populations. Natural disasters such as flooding and cyclones can also lead to serious land degradation by causing or contributing to erosion, salinization, pollution of water supplies and carbon loss from soils. Food and Water Security: Our Global Challenge Landmark Study Future Directions International

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Regional Disparities The impacts of climate change on agricultural systems will not be felt uniformly throughout the world. While many areas will be adversely affected by changes in weather patterns, some will benefit. Many areas, including parts of China, North Africa and the Middle East, will become drier and experience agricultural water shortages. In other areas, however, increased rainfall will boost crop production. Likewise, rising temperatures will reduce yields in many established agricultural areas but in temperate climes in the northern hemisphere, it is predicted that rising temperatures will prolong growing seasons, leading to increases in yield and agricultural productivity. Climate change may have a positive impact on rice production in some areas by allowing rice production in more northern regions such as China or increasing the length of growing season to allow for a second rice crop. Elsewhere however production is expected to decline. The International Food Policy Research Institutes ( IFPRI ) IMPACT model for example projects that that rice productivity will decline by 14% in South Asia 10% in East Asia and the Pacific and 15% in sub-Saharan Africa by 2050. This would result in price increases of between 32% and 37%. Changing temperatures and precipitation regimes will likely cause local extinctions of crop wild relatives as suitable natural ecosystems will decrease or disappear. Changes in yields of rain fed crops will be driven by changes in both precipitation and temperature while changes in yields on irrigated land will be driven by temperature changes alone. The impact of climate change on rain fed wheat rice and maize is expected to be lower than on irrigated crops because climate change will reduce availability of water for irrigation. It is expected that shifts in crop climates to 2050 will result in many countries facing novel climates that are currently not found within their boundaries. Changes in temperature and precipitation will not adversely affect all states. IFPRI predict that in Latin America wheat yields will increase by 13 per cent. However these benefits are far outweighed by yield reductions throughout the majority of the world. In South and South-East Asia the FAO predicts a 10 to 20 per cent increase in rainfall during the summer monsoon which could potentially cause widespread crop damage. Sub-Saharan Africa could experience a 10 per cent yield loss by 2050, accelerating to a 20-30 per cent loss by 2080 according to Oxfam. IFPRI predict rice production in the Middle East will fall by as much as 36 per cent.

Figure 1: Change in Yields due to Climate Change (World Bank 2010)

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Changes to precipitation patterns can severely impact agricultural production with drought and flooding threatening crop survival rates, increasing the financial burden on farmers, causing rising incidence of poverty, malnutrition and hunger, and creating greater food insecurity globally. The areas expected to be most hard-hit by climate change are those already experiencing the highest rates of food insecurity and resource shortages. South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa are predicted to experience the largest decreases in crop yields and yet are least equipped to mitigate and adapt to these challenges because of existing high rates of poverty and weak governance. The uneven distribution of climate change impacts will exacerbate existing inequalities and distribution problems in the global food system. ii. Climate Change and Global Food Security Climate change is among the foremost threats to global food security. As outlined above, long-term climatic changes, coupled with increased incidence of short-term extreme weather events, are predicted to severely impact on food production systems. Droughts, floods, increased aridity, salt-water intrusion, rising temperatures, increased incidence of pests and disease, reduced access to fresh water; all are serious threats to world food production, prices and farmer incomes. Feeding the world to 2050 will already prove difficult due to existing resource shortages, environmental challenges and market and distributional failures. Climate change will exacerbate these issues in ways that will increase uncertainty in food systems. Researchers have projected a reduction of around 10% in maize production in Africa and Latin America under various climate scenarios to 2055 corresponding to losses of USD 2 billion per year. The IFPRI IMPACT model projects that maize yields irrigated and rain fed will change by 8.7% to 9.5% between 2000 and 2050. Global aggregate figures mask major spatial and temporal variability. In 2030 for example using a mean of two climate models and two climate scenarios maize production is projected to increase by 18% in Kenya but fall by 9% in Uganda. Within these countries there is further variability between agro-ecological zones. The World Bank predicts that the impacts of climate change on African food systems will lead to large increases in poverty. According to IFPRI, reduced produce and increased global prices will see child malnutrition rise by 20 per cent to 2050. Regions under particular threat are Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. A report by Oxfam predicts that 50 years of gains in the development sector in poorer states will be permanently lost if urgent action against climate change is not taken. As climate change progresses it is increasingly likely that current cropping systems will no longer be viable in many locations. In Africa for example maize cultivation will no longer be viable across up to 3% of the continent under either higher A1 or lower B1 emissions scenarios. These areas which support 35 million people at present are expected to switch from mixed crop livestock systems to livestock only. Changing patterns of pests and diseases will call for an increased focus on integrated management systems. The International Potato Centre CIP has modelled the effect of climate change on potato production to 2069. This indicates that potential yield will decrease 18% without adaptation and by 9% with adaptation and that shifting of planting time and location will be less feasible at low latitudes than at high latitudes where expected changes in yield are relatively small resulting in large reductions in production. Climate change impacts will also create food price volatility. Over the long term rising temperatures and changes in precipitation will lead to a gradual price rise as yields and production fall. Baseline predictions indicate the 2010 average price of staple grains may double in the next 20 years according to an Oxfam Research Report conducted by the Institute of Development Studies. Gradual price rises allow greater time for adaptation, consumption shifts and risk management, reducing the threat of increased poverty and hunger in the long term.


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The more significant threat to food prices comes from the increased incidence of extreme weather events. Droughts in the US (2012) and Russia (2010) highlight the impact extreme weather events will have on the global food system. In 2010 Russia’s drought led the state to halt grain exports in an attempt to stabilise local food markets. In 2012 the US drought led to a spike in global food prices as crop failure reduced the availability of grains globally. In both instances crop loss led to a reduction of product on the global market causing rapid price rises. Such price fluctuations have the most detrimental effect on the world’s poorest people, who already spend the majority of their income on food. Small-scale producers will also be affected as their incomes are closely linked to agricultural production, thus their access to food could be significantly reduced. Unanticipated price spikes will exacerbate hunger and poverty for those most vulnerable to food insecurity. iii. Responses to Climate Change Addressing the threats of climate change to the global food system is integral to ensuring future food security. Given the difficulty predicting climate change impacts, management will require adaptability. The agricultural sector is not only vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, it is also a key contributor to global warming. By changing practices within the agricultural industry there is significant potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and slow the effects of climate change, reducing threats to food security. To do this we need to develop and implement mitigation and adaptation strategies. Agriculture’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions The agricultural sector accounts for between 17 and 32 per cent of global annual GHG emissions, with arable land development and forest clearing representing a further four to eight per cent. Agriculture is a major consumer of fossil fuels which are used in tilling, sowing, petroleum-based fertilisers, irrigation, harvesting, processing and transporting agricultural products. The production and use of nitrogen fertilisers also contributes to global warming. The majority of methane emissions from the agricultural industry come from gas production by ruminant livestock and rice cultivation in flooded conditions. Experts claim that agricultural mitigation measures have the potential to reduce 100 per cent of direct emissions from the industry. Mitigation Mitigation strategies could reduce the severity of predicted climate change impacts. Land and resource management will be particularly important in this area. Crop and grazing land management, reducing excessive use of nitrogen fertilisers, improving water use and restoring degraded lands will reduce agricultural GHG emissions. Beyond on-farm management, greater support and incentives are required at the national level to mitigate GHG emissions and encourage resource use efficiency. Food wastage and the overuse of critical resources, including water, require lifestyle changes in much of the developed world and greater education and promotion of sustainable consumption. At an international level, collective action and investment in research and technology development to mitigate climate change impacts will support on and off-farm mitigation management. Selective breeding can be used to reduce gas emissions from animals. Genetic strains which require less pesticides and fertilisers can reduce chemical fertiliser and water use. Globally these technologies are not widely utilised as issues with access and cost limit the number of food producers able to integrate this technology into their production. Making mitigation technology more widely available is essential to achieving food security in the developing world.

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Adaptation Adapting to climate change in the production cycle focuses on reducing risk in production, storage and delivery. Adaptive measures to reduce the effects of changing seasonal patterns on overall production output are integral to ensuring food security to 2050. Two key adaptation techniques for agriculture are diversifying crops and shifting planting dates to better suit changing seasonality. Diversifying crops reduces the risk of production and income losses and increases resilience to climate change impacts. Adapting seedlings to warming climate conditions increases the likelihood of crop survival and thus increases food security. Genetically modified crops designed for drought conditions can reduce the required water uptake for production, increasing crop resilience in water scarce scenarios. Increasing storage capacity for water will also be integral when dealing with climate change. The reduced but more intense incidence of rainfall will require an ability to store large quantities of water available during prolonged periods of drought. In some regions increasingly erratic rainfall will lead to irrigated systems becoming more important in ensuring crop survival; the FAO predicts irrigated land will produce at least 70 per cent of the additional food required under population growth and climate change scenarios. Shifting towards irrigated systems will be a key adaptation as will adapting to sustainable water use to reduce competition for the scarce resource. iv. Climate Change to 2050 Climate change is unquestionably the greatest challenge to global food security between now and 2050. With temperatures rising and the incidence of extreme weather events predicted to increase, securing food production requires action now. There may be as many as 200 million more food-insecure people by 2050, studies from the FAO suggest. Along with significant price increases for staple grains and other products, the global food system will face increasing vulnerabilities. The impacts of food insecurity driven by climate change will disproportionately affect the world’s poorest and least equipped to deal with the crisis. Climate change will present serious threats to the food system between now and 2050; however the situation is expected to become much worse in the second half of the 21st century. IFPRI warn that dealing with climate change post-2050 will present a far greater challenge with yields declining by as much as 29 per cent from 2000 levels. Investing in water and land management adaptations now is necessary to offset climate change impacts up to 2050, but also to prepare for the greater degree of difficulty and cost agricultural systems will face in the proceeding fifty years. There are a number of mitigation and adaptation strategies which can be adopted to address the impacts of climate change. The ability of producers and consumers to adopt these strategies requires governments and the international community to prioritise climate change and future food security in policy making and funding. Both public and private investment is required now to develop and increase accessibility to technologies and management systems both on and off-farm. Creating a more sustainable and less energy and resource intensive food system can only have positive consequences. Acting now to mitigate climate change will ensure future generations are not faced with a food and water crises beyond management or solution. While the developing world will experience a disproportionate degree of climate change impacts, in the form of extreme weather events and rising temperatures, the interconnectedness of the global food system will leave no state unaffected. Global leadership and initiative to address climate change is required today to ensure food security to 2050 and beyond.

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Poverty, Waste and Market Failure: Distribution Issues in the Global Food System

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¾¾ The primary cause of food insecurity in the world right now is not a supply shortage but rather the inability of millions of people to afford to purchase sufficient nutritious foods. ¾¾ Almost one third of the food produced for human consumption – approximately 1.3 billion tonnes per year – is either lost or wasted at some point along the faulty food supply chain; by halving this we could close the gap on food needs to 2050 by at least 20 per cent. ¾¾ The structure of the global food and agricultural resources trade creates an environment that is vulnerable to price volatility. Interruptions to this distribution mechanism are a major cause of food security crises. ¾¾ Supply and price risk deriving from reliance on external markets can create an incentive for nations to pursue self-sufficiency policies. While such policies can improve domestic security, they are often detrimental to global food security and longer term domestic concerns. ¾¾ If well designed and properly targeted, subsidy programs can improve food security and boost self-sufficiency; however poorly targeted programs, or those that prioritise political goals, can drain fiscal resources, distort market function and undermine long-term food security. ¾¾ As food supplies are stretched to 2050 and the prospect of global food shortages becomes more likely, the failure of global markets to allocate agricultural resources and products could precipitate major food security crises.

Increasing food supply is not sufficient to achieve food security to 2050. Conceptualising the food security challenge as a production problem excludes the serious distribution failures that are responsible for the majority of hunger and instability present in the global food system. The previous chapters demonstrated that the primary challenge facing the global food system is the allocation of resources. With proper management, we should have enough arable land and fresh water to feed the world’s population. However, the availability of these resources does not correspond with the areas that need them most. There will be national level supply bottle necks and the global food system will continue to be characterised by surplus and shortage. This situation will be exacerbated as the population increases to 2050. Agricultural trade should provide a mechanism to address food and resource distribution issues. The world currently produces an agricultural surplus- there is more than enough food to meet the needs of every person on the planet. Despite this, one in eight people – some 15 per cent of the world’s population – are hungry and suffering from chronic malnutrition. Alongside the experience of widespread undernutrition, almost 30 million people die each year as a result of illnesses associated with overeating.


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The fact that global food supplies are more than adequate to meet demand and yet at least 36 million people die of starvation each year because they are unable to afford to buy food is indicative of severe distributional failures in the current global food system. While chronic hunger is partially the result of conflict, poor governance and socioeconomic inequity, it is also caused by faults in the economic structure and functioning of the global market. Maldistribution occurs because of poverty, supply chain inefficiency, wastage and food loss, market failures, trade barriers, and a conflict between national security interests and the goal of global food security. So far, when regarding our ability to meet food demand to 2050, much of the focus has been on increasing production levels rather than improving distributional efficiency within the existing system. i. Poverty The primary cause of food insecurity in the world right now is not a supply shortage but rather the inability of millions of people to afford to purchase sufficient nutritious foods. Poverty, food prices and hunger are inextricably linked. Ninety eight per cent of the world’s hungry live in developing countries and cannot afford to purchase nutritious food or the agricultural inputs required to grow their own. While not all of the world’s poor experience food insecurity, almost all those who are hungry are also poor. Increasing production is not sufficient to eliminate hunger. Agricultural development must be complemented by policies that enhance access to food by reducing poverty, particularly in rural areas. People who earn low incomes spend a high proportion of their income on meeting basic food needs. While in Australia we devote less than 10 per cent of our income to food consumption (in the United States the figure is even lower at 6.9 per cent) in countries such as Egypt, Kenya and Pakistan, on average over 40 per cent of household spending is devoted to food purchases. For those living below or close to the poverty line, this figure can often top 80 per cent. This renders households extremely vulnerable to food price increases and volatility because of their limited ability to adjust their consumption patterns. When global or domestic food prices rise, the poor are forced to adopt negative coping strategies to maintain their food security, shifting away from the consumption of higher value food products like meat, fruit and vegetables towards low cost starchy staples. Even when total dietary energy intake does not fall, negative impacts can still be felt through a deterioration of dietary quality or sacrificial cuts in health or education spending. Those threatened by hunger may reduce the quality and diversity of their diet to consume cheaper and less nutritious foods, leading to micronutrient deficiency even if undernutrition does not occur. Hunger has a negative feedback effect on poverty levels. The World Food Program claims that “the poor are hungry and their hunger traps them in poverty.” This is because hunger lowers labour productivity and resistance to disease but also because the need to prioritise food consumption diverts income away from health care, education and the purchase of inputs to grow more food or increase agricultural productivity. Poor rural farmers who eat part of their seed stock to fend of starvation in a year of hunger will yield a smaller crop in the next year. Thus poverty and hunger can trap people in a downward spiral. Real agricultural prices are likely to increase between now and 2050 as a result of climate change, resource scarcity and volatility caused by a rising incidence of extreme weather events. Without policies to enhance access to food by fighting poverty, and the implementation of effective safety net programmes, hunger levels will persist. One of the key strategies to support global food security should therefore involve promoting inclusive economic growth and raising incomes to improve food affordability. The FAO’s State of Food Insecurity in the World 2013 report demonstrated that undernourishment occurs in line with global

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and regional poverty. Global economic growth over recent decades has provided considerable scope for reducing hunger and malnutrition. On average, for the entire world, dietary energy supplies increased by about 210kcal/person/day, or 8 per cent, over the past two decades. For developing countries as a whole, the incidence of poverty declined from 47.5 to 22.4 per cent between 1990 and 2010. In the same period, the prevalence of undernourishment fell from 23.4 to 14.9 per cent. These figures show a strong relation between poverty reduction and improved food security but they also demonstrate that we can’t assume the full effect of rising incomes will be translated into hunger reduction. The FAO states that in order for economic growth to enhance access to food that is adequate in quantity and quality, there are three key requirements. Firstly, growth must reach and involve the poor and provide them with expanded earning opportunities. Creating income opportunities and broad based income growth is essential to improving human wellbeing and delivering sustainable food security. Secondly, the poor must use their additional income to improve their diets, water access, sanitation and healthcare. Finally, governments need to spend additional public revenues on the provision of safety nets for the poor as well as key public goods and services. Ongoing price volatility and crop failures as a result of extreme weather events will continue to cause food insecurity amongst the most vulnerable even in a functioning system with an aggregate supply surplus. For this reason safety nets are required to ensure that short term hunger does not lead to long-term disadvantage. Recent decades have seen considerable reductions in poverty, a trend that is hoped will carry on as global incomes continue to rise. Despite this, reductions in hunger levels have slowed since the global food price spike of 2008 as ongoing high prices compromise food affordability for the poor. The poverty that undermines food affordability is closely related to the existence of conflict, and to economic and political systems that entrench inequality and fail to provide opportunities for all citizens. These factors, which can also be a direct cause of food insecurity and crisis, are not showing strong improvement throughout much of the world and on a global scale may be getting worse. For this reason, improving governance to enable poverty reductions is a key step in averting food crises and reducing the vulnerability of the poor to food insecurity. ii. Food Waste and Supply Chain Faults Almost one third of the food produced for human consumption – approximately 1.3 billion tonnes per year – is either lost or wasted at some point along the faulty food supply chain. This quantity of food could easily eliminate hunger amongst the current world population of 7 billion people. As the population grows to over 9 billion by 2050 the need to close the gap between potential and actual available food supply will intensify. Reducing food waste could contribute hugely to this goal. The World Resources Institute estimates that by halving the amount of food loss and waste we could close the gap on food needs to 2050 by at least 20 per cent, without employing any additional scarce resources. Food wastage occurs at all points along the supply chain. Wastage is not just a problem at the postharvest stage, but also occurs pre-harvest where poor biosecurity can lead to yield loss and poor agricultural practices and land management result in scarce resources such as water and fertiliser being wasted. In The Global Food Losses Report 2011, the FAO distinguish between food loss and food waste. Food loss measures the decrease in edible food mass throughout the production, harvest, post-harvest and processing stages of the supply chain. Food waste occurs at the retail and consumption stages when consumers or retailers throw away edible food. In the developing world, pre-harvest loss is a major concern for food supply because of insufficient investment in biosecurity practices. Post-harvest losses occur mainly because of pervasive corruption and meagre infrastructure. Consumer waste in the developing world is relatively low. Limitations in infrastructure in the developing world that lead to food waste include: investment and technical issues unfolding pre-harvest


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(eg. insufficient or non-existent biosecurity practices), lack of managerial competence, lack of sufficient storage or cooling facilities, inadequate packaging, uncoordinated transport networks, or simply having to cover post-harvest food stockpiles using nothing more than thin blankets. The situation is worst for smallhold farmers and has negative impacts on their incomes and the food security of the low income consumers who purchase their produce. Weak supply chains and limited market access for smallholders reduces the incentive to invest in agricultural improvements and creates harmful volatility in farm incomes. In India, 40 per cent of food is lost in transit due to a lack of cold storage, faulty electricity and poor roads. This is equivalent to more fruit and vegetables than the UK consumes and more grain than Australia produces each year. The situation is exacerbated by corruption and poor policy measures. Food waste is a much larger problem in the developed world where retailers and consumes dispose of large amounts of edible food as rubbish. Consumers in industrialised nations waste significantly more food than their counterparts in developing countries. This occurs due to the prioritisation of nutritionally irrelevant aesthetic standards, a failure to properly plan purchases and overzealous safety standards for labelling caused by litigious fears about food safety. Annual consumer waste in industrialised nations is nearly equivalent to the overall annual food production of sub-Saharan Africa.

Source: The Global Food Losses and Waste Report 2011, FAO.org

Food waste in the United States and Europe is particularly severe. In the US nearly 40 per cent of all food produced is wasted, while in Europe, the FAO estimate that 90 million tonnes – or 50 per cent of all food supply – is lost. The worst area of food loss (excluding wastage) is sub-Saharan Africa. It is no coincidence that the highest incidence of food loss coincides with the area bearing the highest index of global food insecurity. Australia also has a bad record of both food loss and waste. At the pre-harvest phase, almost 20 per cent of Australian wheat is lost due to pathogens. Weed invasion costs the country AU$3.9 billion each year. The

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National Waste Report, conducted in 2010, estimates that Australians throw out 4 million tonnes of food every year. The annual cost to the economy of the edible food thrown out by households amounts to $8 billion. This does not include commercial waste from restaurants or supermarkets, which would push the figure far higher. The current degree of food loss and waste is a serious flaw in the global food system. The result of failures in the supply chain, distribution issues undermine our ability to deliver food security. Reducing current levels of food waste would allow us to feed all those who are starving and will go a long way to closing the gap between food supply and food needs in the future. To correct these issues in supply chain distribution, developments in biosecurity and post-harvest technology are required; investment must be targeted towards infrastructure development and transport logistics; policy changes should be made to reduce corruption; and behavioural shifts are needed from consumers as well as procedural changes in waste reporting and food labelling by retailers. iii. The Global Market and Food Price Crises The global market for agriculture and food products should act as a distribution mechanism to correct resource mismatches. Ensuring food security and stable agricultural prices and supply is best managed through global cooperation. Due to political pressures and the need for states to ensure food security to maintain their legitimacy, however, it is predominantly treated as a national concern. Many measures taken in the interests of protecting domestic food security can be harmful to global agricultural markets and detrimental to the food security of import dependent states. This was seen during the global food price crisis of 2008 when trade restrictions implemented by some countries in response to market anxiety led to all out panic and severely exacerbated the world situation. Faults in the structure and operation of the global market can distort production and trade decisions and lead to high degrees of price volatility. Interruptions to the global distribution mechanism are a major cause of food security crises. The FAO reports that the global food and agriculture system, including current national agricultural trade policies and world trade rules, is highly vulnerable to extraordinary price shocks and scarcity. The size of global agricultural trade is small relative to total production. This is because over 80 per cent of food is consumed in the country in which it was produced. Because the majority of countries predominantly feed themselves from domestic sources, world trade in staple grains is dominated by a small number of producers whose production is greater than their domestic requirements. The vast majority of traded grain originates from the United States, Argentina, Australia, China, Canada, Ukraine and Russia. These countries all produce a consistent sizeable grain surplus. Australia produces enough food each year to feed 60 million people. With a population of only 23 million, this creates a large export supply. While our total production is tiny relative to that of larger states and the global total, the small size of the world grain market means that we are one of the major exporters. The small number of exporters and low volumes traded mean that the market for some staple grains can become very thin. This is particularly the case for rice, as some of the major producers – India, Indonesia and Thailand – all impose export restrictions. The structure of the market creates an environment that is vulnerable to volatility in the case of crop shortfalls, extreme commodity speculation and short term energy price hikes. Following the food price crises of the 1970s, the 1980s and 90s saw a period of structural oversupply in global markets due to strong growth in productivity and yields and high levels of domestic agricultural support in both the US and the EU. The market was flooded with excess stocks produced by these suppliers, leading to a long period of low food prices. While this was generally beneficial to food security, the distortion of global markets caused by the subsidy programs of the US and EU was destructive to the development of agricultural sectors in many low income countries.


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The extended period of excess food supply allowed for global reserve levels to remain high and act as a buffer against any short term supply shocks. The storable nature of grain means that prices are determined not only by production levels but also the level of reserves. The build-up or release of grain stocks can act as a temporary price buffer in the face of supply shocks. For this reason, maintaining strategic reserves is important to reducing price volatility and maintaining food security. It is estimated that a minimum world cereal stock to use ratio of 17-18 per cent is required to safeguard global food security. When grain reserves are low, the market is prone to price volatility in the case of supply shocks. In the lead up to the 2008 price crisis, supply and demand conditions shifted to create a thin grain market vulnerable to shocks. The first of the underlying factors was a decline in the growth of agricultural production. Reduced investment in agricultural research and development has led to declining yield growth in much of the developed world. Meanwhile, food demand from the emerging economies was increasing. China and India’s sustained rapid income increases were causing consumption patterns to change and leading to higher demand for both animal feed and grains for human consumption. Public support for biofuel production was also strong, causing production to be diverted towards maize and oilseed. These factors had the net effect of tightening the aggregate supply-demand balance for major grains, driving down stock levels over the years preceding the crisis (world stock-to-use ratios fell to 18 per cent for rice, 17 per cent for maize and 16 per cent for wheat in 2007/08). The situation of increasing scarcity was exacerbated by a string of short-term supply shocks. Firstly, a sharp spike in the price of oil increased food transport costs and stimulated an additional boost in biofuel production, reducing the availability of maize for consumption. The unprecedented extension of Australia’s multi-year drought in the Murray Darling Basin, along with a string of other production shortfalls related to natural disasters also acted to push down supply on the global market. The resultant grain price peak saw the world food price index increase by 45 per cent across 2008. The wheat price skyrocketed, increasing 130 per cent from 2007 levels. Likewise, soy rose by 87 per cent and rice by 74 per cent. The soaring food prices pushed the number of people experiencing chronic hunger from 850 million to above one billion for the first time in history. It was estimated that 100 million low income earners were pushed into poverty by the crisis.

Source: FAO, 2008, Crop Prospects and Food Situation, No. 4: 1, October

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The initial price rises caused by underlying factors and short-term supply disruptions were exacerbated when a number of key exporters acted to impose export controls, taxes and bans in response to domestic price concerns. Amongst the sequence of actions, major producers Argentina and Kazakhstan banned wheat exports, while India and Vietnam placed embargos on rice. These actions further reduced the quantity of grain available on the global market and shifted the market anxiety into panic. The soaring food prices unleashed considerable political instability and rioting occurred in 48 countries. The situation illustrates the high priority that states must place on ensuring the food security of their populations. A failure to provide for the basic needs of citizens undermines a state’s legitimacy to rule and can trigger unrest. At the same time, policies to control domestic food supply and prices can have detrimental effects on global food security by precipitating price crises. Studies conducted in the aftermath of the 2008 event demonstrated that many of the protectionist policies implemented also failed to improve domestic food security and were in some cases harmful to the countries’ needs. Due to the structure of the global food system, ongoing supply and demand pressures, and the reactionary policy moves of individual states, prices have remained high and volatile since the 2008 crisis. The past five years have seen three major price spikes; the first in mid-2008, the second in early 2011 and the most recent in the middle of 2012. We are currently experiencing a relative stabilisation. However, the FAO and other bodies continue to warn that the foreseeable future will be characterised by high prices and ongoing volatility. The structure of the global food market means that it is vulnerable to volatility that can precipitate food insecurity and can trigger price and supply crises. These risks can motivate countries to implement protectionist measures that further exacerbate global food insecurity. The global food distribution mechanism could become increasingly prone to crisis as national interests clash with global food security in an increasingly food scarce climate. iv. Food and Farm Subsidies in the Global Food System A free and open world agricultural market plays a key role in achieving food security on a global scale. The market should function as the primary mechanism to overcome resource distribution challenges. An open market limits obstructions, and enables food and agricultural resources to flow from areas of surplus to areas of shortage, thus reducing food insecurity. Relying on global markets to secure a country’s food supply reduces the level of investment needed in the agricultural sector and the costs and environmental harms incurred by countries that are ill-equipped for food production. It can be cheaper to import food from countries with abundant land and water resources than to grow food domestically on marginal lands or with limited water supply. Pursuing a strategy of comparative advantage also limits the environmental costs of marginal food production. The concept of “virtual water” trade advocates a similar solution to water security issues in water-scarce states by importing water-intensive grains from countries with abundant supplies. As seen in the previous sections though, failures in distribution systems can create an incentive for nations to rely more heavily on domestic supply. Cost and efficiency benefits can conflict with national interests and reliance on the global market can create price and supply risk for importdependent countries. Since the 2008 food price crisis a number of countries have moved towards food self-sufficiency strategies, including Australia’s closest neighbour, Indonesia, where rioting occurred in response to food price inflation during the global crisis. Like tariffs and embargos, which can contribute to food price crises, national policies to support domestic food security such as self-sufficiency plans and subsidies, can have complex impacts on both domestic and global food security.


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Pursuing a policy of self-sufficiency reduces a country’s exposure to price hikes and supply risks due to faults in external markets. Greater national control over the food supply also reduces security threats. However, these benefits can undermine longer-term food security if supporting domestic food production exceeds a country’s environmental or fiscal capacity. The environmental damage caused by farming on marginal land, over-extracting ground water or relying heavily on chemical fertilisers can reduce future food production capacity. Defying the efficiency benefits of pursuing comparative advantage can also make self-sufficiency strategies a costly alternative to trade. Depending on the policies used to support the goal, self-sufficiency can also produce harmful market distortions of an ongoing fiscal drain. National policies to encourage agricultural self-sufficiency are often accompanied by agricultural subsidies. Widespread use of subsidies, both to support agricultural producers and to make food more affordable for consumers, are a major feature of food systems in both developed and developing economies. Agricultural subsidies support farmers through the provision of cheap or free agricultural inputs such as water or fertiliser, or through programmes that guarantee farmers an administered floor price for their produce. Consumptionside food subsidies, such as food stamp programmes, reduce the price that people pay for certain staple food items. Both forms of subsidies, if well designed and properly targeted can improve food security and boost self-sufficiency; however poorly targeted programs, or those that prioritise a political goal, can drain fiscal resources, distort market function and undermine long-term food security. The primary function of food subsidies when they are implemented is to reduce household uncertainty about access to affordable foods. Subsidies transfer price fluctuations from the consumer to the government, thus averting food insecurity for the population. Consumption subsidies can have positive effects on real income and food security. They can also reduce the incidence of malnutrition particularly when implemented as a short term measure to address transitory price fluctuations and target assistance to vulnerable sectors of the population. In the majority of cases though, programs are not well targeted; they reflect political expediency rather than supporting those most vulnerable to insecurity. Poorly targeted programmes are not cost-effective and do not sustainably address the root causes of food insecurity. In the long-term, they may undermine the capacity of a country to maintain food security if the erosion of fiscal stability undermines the ability of the government to manage food supply. The majority of agricultural subsidy programmes fail to provide self-sustaining boosts to the farming sector and consequently become an ongoing fiscal drain. Their high costs can also divert resources away from public investment in infrastructure, research and development, extension services and social protection; investments that could create a more sustainable farming sector and have better longterm impacts on food security. Beyond their impact on domestic food security, subsidies can have serious impact on global markets. The subsidy programs of the US and EU encourage overproduction and lead to deflation of world prices. While low prices can benefit food security they can also destroy otherwise competitive agricultural sectors in developing countries. Subsidies are a tool that may have short-term benefits but that are ultimately inefficient, costly and unsustainable and can harm long-term food security. v. Inefficiency, Maldistribution and Food Crises Food insecurity is a major global problem with one in eight people experiencing hunger. This is not the result of a shortage of food, but rather because of failures in distribution systems. These failures range from poverty, waste, supply chain inefficiencies and structural issues in trade systems, to inefficient policies implemented because of disjoints between state and global food security interests.

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As food supplies are stretched to 2050 and the prospect of global food shortages becomes more likely, the failure of global markets to allocate agricultural resources and products could precipitate major food security crises. The primary strategy to reduce food security is not to produce more food – although this is helpful – rather it is to encourage inclusive economic growth that will raise income levels and enable low income earners to afford their food requirements. Structural issues in the global food trade means that market distribution systems can be prone to volatility, creating supply and price risks for countries that are dependent on trade for their food security. Volatility and risk in the global market create a disjoint between national and global food security and cause countries to adopt policies that distort markets and lead to inefficiency in production systems and heightened insecurity on a global level. This is the case with self-sufficiency policies which may increase national food security but incur a high cost, and subsidy programmes which can be inefficient, unsustainable and cause market distortions. Addressing issues with distribution and inefficiency should be a key priority in planning for future food security. As seen in 2008, these issues can precipitate major crises in the food system forcing millions of people into hunger and creating major national and regional security issues.

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Building Sustainable Agricultural Systems

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¾¾ To achieve global food security in the long-term, environmental sustainability is necessary to ensure that food production and consumption patterns do not deplete natural resources or damage the agricultural system in such a way as to prevent the food needs of future generations being met. ¾¾ To meet future food needs we must sustainably intensify our food production systems in order to produce more from the same or fewer resources while minimising negative environmental impacts. ¾¾ The key element of sustainable intensification is the need to ensure that the full environmental and social costs of food production are recovered in order to safeguard the viability of future food systems. For farming to be sustainable, it must also be profitable. ¾¾ Supporting smallhold farmers in developing countries is critical to sustainably meeting the food demands of the world’s most vulnerable people.

i. The Challenge for Farming Systems In our examination of prospects for global food systems to 2050 we have analysed changing patterns of food demand; seen how water scarcity and the limited availability of arable land will impact agricultural production and considered how flaws in supply chains and systematic inequity continue to cause hunger. Against this backdrop, we are led to ask the question; ‘How do we prepare farming communities to meet global food needs to 2050, as the world’s population increases to over 9 billion people?’ Due to the scarcity of key resources including arable land, water and fertiliser, only 27 per cent of the increase in food production needed by 2050 will come from expanding the area of land under cultivation; the remaining 73 per cent will have to be met from either yield increases or increases in cropping intensity. In the past four decades, massive advances were made in food production as the world more than doubled agricultural output to feed an additional four billion people. It is estimated that we will have to repeat this achievement to ensure global food security to 2050. The gains of the past forty years were driven by the expansion of industrial agriculture and the Green Revolution, which led to vast increases in the amount of fertiliser used, expanded irrigation management, mechanisation, new production agronomy and improvements in genetics and plant breeding. The Green Revolution caused levels of chronic malnutrition to fall from three in eight to one in eight people globally; however these advances came at a cost to the environment. Boosting yields has impacted considerably on ecosystems, biodiversity and the climate and has also led to serious depletion of water resources. Many parts of the world that rely on industrial agriculture are now experiencing stagnating yield growth or even diminished yields as a result of strains on the environment.


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Continued reliance on, and expansion of, environmentally damaging forms of agricultural production could lead to reduced productivity due to ecological costs. The sustainability of current agricultural systems is limited by high levels of input and food waste, and reliance on resources that are limited or non-renewable. Without moving to more sustainable modes of production we could threaten the viability of our future food supply. The challenge for farming systems is great: we need to produce more food with fewer resources and in a way that will not diminish the capacity of future generations to meet their own food needs. ii. Sustainable Intensification To meet global food needs to 2050 we need to fundamentally alter the way that food systems function. Although we currently produce enough food, we don’t distribute it well and the environmental damage caused by conventional agricultural processes means that we are, in effect, ‘borrowing against’ our future food production capacity. Food security revolves around four main pillars; availability, access, utilisation and stability. Many experts now argue that a fifth pillar of environmental sustainability is necessary to ensure that food production and consumption patterns do not deplete natural resources or damage the agricultural system in such a way as to prevent the food needs of future generations being met. To address the negative effects of agricultural practices, it is widely recognised that food production systems and the food chain in general must become fully sustainable. We must use resources at rates that don’t exceed the Earth’s capacity to replace them. To produce more food from the same area of land while reducing the environmental impacts, we need to promote the sustainable intensification of agricultural systems. ‘Sustainable intensification’ describes the paradigm shift that is necessary for agriculture to sustainably meet the food needs of future generations. Sustainability includes both purely environmental goals, such as ensuring that the natural resource base can remain productive into the future, as well as socioeconomic and profitability considerations, including the long-term economic viability of agriculture for farmers. These goals must be pursued alongside intensification as we need to increase production to meet food needs to 2050. The broad goals of sustainable intensification are to meet the “triple challenge” of producing more food from fewer inputs, reducing environmental harm and bringing more benefits to farmers. This form of intensification should increase production, incomes and nutrition, while reducing the negative impacts of agriculture on ecosystems, water resources and the global climate. More than just maximising productivity, we need to shift the operation of global agriculture to optimize a complex mix of production, environmental and social justice outcomes. To achieve these goals, farming production systems need to maximise input efficiency through the intensive use of knowledge, skills and technology while avoiding unnecessary use of non-renewable resources. In doing so, not only can we curb the negative effects of food production on the environment, but also implement agricultural practices that have positive ecosystem effects. Recent trends indicate that taking a systems perspective towards agricultural production and incorporating scientific principles of ecosystem management into farming practices, can enhance yields while minimising environmental harm. To do this, agronomic practices need to change; key methods include adopting integrated pest management methods, integrated management of waste in livestock production and use of agroforestry. Strategies such as zero or reduced tillage, contour farming, mulches, and cover crops can all improve water and soil conservation. Precision agriculture can also optimise the use of inputs by introducing technologies that allow the application of water, nutrients and pesticides only to the places and at the times they are required. By bringing agricultural processes more closely in line with the natural functioning

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of ecosystems we can conserve resources, reduce waste and generate positive environmental outcomes, including improved soil fertility and biodiversity. iii. Smallholder Farming and the Future of Food Security The majority of advances in agriculture have been predicated on increases in the size of landholdings and scale of production. On these grounds, it is often argued that commercial agriculture and agribusiness are the only “serious” sources of economic growth and food production. However, concerns are growing over the long-term sustainability of modern farming practices; while advances in agriculture have allowed us to produce enough food to (theoretically) feed our expanding population, there are doubts about whether industrial farming practices can continue to feed the world fifty or a hundred years into the future given the severity of resource constraints and serious pollution created by the farming industry. Large scale agriculture has been linked to declines in soil fertility and yield stagnation when natural systems reach their carrying capacity. In order to meet our future food needs though, the development of agricultural systems around the world must be more nuanced and greater emphasis must be placed on sustainability and the geographic and social suitability of food production systems. Despite the impressive yield growth associated with the expansion and intensification of western farming systems, environmental sustainability has not been taken into enough account. To create a balanced farming system that supports growth and the needs of those most vulnerable to hunger, agricultural development needs to focus on the potential agriculture in the developing world. Large swathes of the developing world require significant agricultural investment in order to fulfil their production capacity and maximise their sustainability. Weak governance, debt and fiscal constraints mean that in many cases much needed public investment in these sectors had not been forthcoming. The funds available for the research, development and extension services required are predominantly held by investment funds and agribusiness companies whose agricultural investment models are suited to the development of large-scale industrial food production systems. Partly for this reason, the successful development of agriculture in the developing world has been linked to a shift away from smallholder production towards industrial agriculture. If the primary goal of agricultural development is to reduce hunger rather than simply produce more food, then the development of smallholder farming systems may be a more efficient and sustainable way to achieve this goal. The vast majority of the world’s farmers are smallholders. Many of these farmers have not been supported by agricultural policy in recent decades, either at a domestic level or in international or global trade systems. Over 65 per cent of people in the developing world are engaged in the agricultural sector and over 80 per cent of people who are chronically hungry are smallholder farmers. Smallholder agriculture often demonstrates low levels of productivity due to a lack of extension services, weaknesses in supply chains and wide-spread rural poverty. Given this, improving productivity could yield huge returns for both agricultural output and economic growth and could significantly improve food security. In FDI’s roundtable consultations and expert interviews on farming sustainability, there was an overwhelming consensus among participants on the benefits of developing smallholder agriculture and maintaining and supporting rural populations. It has been demonstrated that growth in agriculture has double the impact on poverty alleviation than growth in other sectors. Agricultural development expert and advocate of smallholder farming, Professor Lindsay Falvey, pointed out that there are currently around two billion people involved in small farming – roughly a third of the world’s population – who are feeding themselves under most circumstances and in some cases are producing a small surplus. Falvey believes that having two billion people feeding themselves regularly is not something which should be interfered with unless a better model


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can replace it. “The risk of upsetting these systems”, he said, “goes far beyond economic downturns.” Furthermore, converting smallholder agriculture to large-scale systems is a major stimulus for urban rural migration. Levels of food wastage and loss are far higher in cities because of the length of supply chains. It takes 30 per cent more food to feed urban populations than rural ones, thus significant production gains would have to be realised for a shift in the scale of farming to be warranted. Currently, there is a wide variation in crop yields between agriculture in developed and developing countries, even across regions with similar climates. In South East Asia, rice yields are only 60 per cent of average maximum global yields. Similar yield gaps are found in rain-fed wheat production in Central Asia and rainfed cereals in Brazil and Argentina. The gaps between actual and potential yields in many parts of Sub Saharan Africa are even higher. Yield gaps occur because of technical constraints experienced by farmers who don’t have access to technical knowledge or skills; economic reasons arising from market conditions, such as where finance is not available to invest in new practices or crop or livestock varieties; and lack of secure land rights disincentivising investment in changing land management practices or making it harder to raise capital investment. Yield gaps can also exist because high levels of risk associated with changing practices or low expected returns from increasing production mean there is not sufficient incentive to raise production to the maximum level technically attainable. Substantially more food, as well as the income to purchase food, could be produced with existing crop and livestock varieties if methods were found to close these gaps. The view that ensuring future food security is dependent on developing small hold agriculture is increasingly gaining traction in the development community and from agricultural development organisations such as CGIAR and the FAO. In many regions, smallholder agriculture may be better suited to meet the requirements of the local economy by providing income for the rural poor in addition to a less intensive use of nonrenewable resources. It was frequently pointed out by participants in FDI’s consultations that smallhold farming systems have continued to adapt and produce within environmental constraints for thousands of years in many cases, while industrial farming methods seriously degrade large swathes of land each year. The FAO estimates that the total average annual net investment required to deliver necessary production increases in developing country agriculture (through both smallholder and large scale farming) would amount to US 83 billion. This is an increase of about 50 per cent on current investment levels. Developing the practice of smallholder agriculture is key to improving global food security. However different farming methods may be more sustainable in different contexts. The productivity and sustainability of different agricultural systems is related to their suitability to their landscape and socio-economic context. In sparsely populated regions with high labour costs and knowledge-intensive economies such as Australia, broadacre farming is the most appropriate and sustainable system of production. Likewise, in densely populated areas with low labour costs, labour intensive smallholder farming can be both environmentally and socially sustainable. Sustainable intensification should not be associated with any one approach to agriculture but should be treated as a necessary paradigm shift that must be applied to agriculture at all scales to ensure that food systems can provide for the needs of future generations. iv. Sustainability and Profitability The key element of sustainable intensification is the need to ensure that the full environmental and social costs of food production are recovered in order to safeguard the viability of future food systems. One of the overwhelming outcomes that resulted from our roundtable discussion was the conclusion that for farming to be sustainable it must also be profitable; both from the perspective of the people directly involved in it and it must also support and perpetuate rural communities. If farming systems fail to return a profit, farmers will leave the sector and this will undermine future food security. Furthermore, profitability is required to enable innovation and the introduction of sustainable technologies. This is a fundamental consideration for the sustainability of both large-scale and smallholder farming systems.

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The following chapter will demonstrate that our ability to transition to a more sustainable form of agriculture is not constrained by lack of knowledge or technology. Rather, developments are forestalled by issues related to profitability and market failures and a lack of investment in smallholder farming. In both the developed and developing world, farming is beset with narrow profit margins. In Australia, the agricultural sector is experiencing a cost-price squeeze that is driving many farmers out of the industry and leading to the collapse of rural communities. This is forcing farmers to defer environmental and social costs to the future, undermining the long-term sustainability of their systems. Low profit margins reduce the incentive to invest in research and development to improve agricultural sustainability, particularly for smallhold farming. Proximity to the poverty line means that smallhold farmers are particularly vulnerable to risk associated with price fluctuations. This is exacerbated by poor market access and supply chains. Low profitability means that it is often too costly or risky for smallhold farmers to change their production systems to implement sustainable technologies. v. Sustainability Challenges for Smallhold Farming Low profit margins and the associated risk involved in smallholder farming dis-incentivise the adoption of sustainable technologies and threaten its ongoing viability. Supporting smallhold farmers is critical to sustainably meeting the food demands of the world’s most vulnerable people; however, the systems must become more profitable for the model to be viable in the long-term. While the smallhold model remains relevant and holds great potential for increasing yields and incomes in an environmentally sustainable manner, a degree of consolidation or collaboration may be required to optimise the profit potential of smallhold agriculture. Increasing the size of holdings would enable farmers to adopt new technologies, give them better access to inputs and strengthen market linkages, reducing vulnerability to risk. This could be achieved through consolidation or by drawing individual farmers into collective marketing groups through contract farming or public-private partnerships (PPP). The size of smallhold farms – 85 per cent of the world’s farms are smaller than 2 hectares – prevents the adoption of many forms of technological innovation. Even where ground-breaking technology can be introduced the scale of its implementation limits the gains to farmers. Introducing conservation agriculture methods, such as minimum tillage crop sowing and the retention of residues, may produce an additional profit of US$50 per hectare, but if you only have a small farm, that game-changing technology is still only going to put an extra US$100-150 in farmers’ pockets. While this may be a 50 per cent increase in farmers’ incomes, it’s not enough to make life-changing improvements for a rural family. Richard Bell believes, ‘Realistically, those farms will have to get bigger over time. We might be talking about consolidation of 5 to 10 hectares so that the annual family product may be a few thousand dollars a year. That’s when you can really start to make a difference in people’s capacity to change their lives.’ Collaborative Farming Clusters Many of the benefits of physical consolidation can be achieved through the implementation of PPP and contract farming. Government funding for technological development and extension services is limited, thus PPPs become an important development alternative. PPPs are working throughout the developed world to integrate smallhold farmers into supply chains by organising smallholder farmers at a grassroots level into “clusters” or collaborative marketing groups. This allows technology to be disseminated to farmers in a far more efficient manner and for farmers to gain easier access to inputs. By creating more uniformity in supply chains and practices, farmers can improve their access to larger, more stable markets. Contract farming operates in a similar way; by bringing together small plots of land, delivering technologies and providing guaranteed payments, risk levels are reduced and systems can become self-sustaining. Collaborative smallhold farming clusters are an important strategy to sustainably boost yields and improve food security.


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By creating opportunities and incentivising investment in developing country farming, profitability can increase. This leads to a rise in incomes amongst vulnerable rural populations and enables the pursuit of more sustainable farming practices. vi. Sustainability Challenges in the Australian Agriculture Sector Issues surrounding profitability were also identified at FDI’s roundtable discussions as one of the primary threats to the sustainability of the Australian agricultural sector. A common view among farmers participating in consultations was that while Australia has sufficient land and resources, declining profitability and a subsequent loss of human capital are creating a deeply concerning situation for the future of the industry. The Cost Price Squeeze Peter Nixon believes that agriculture in the western world is not getting sufficient returns out of the food supply chain to give it the strength to develop new technology. To survive, farmers have been deferring costs of production, such as environmental and nutritional issues, to the future, seriously undermining the system’s sustainability. The primary causes of declining profit margins are social and political pressure for low food prices and the concentration of market power in supply chains. A serious issue facing large-scale agriculture generally and Australian farming specifically, is the concentration and aggregation of market power at opposite ends of the supply chain. Globally this is seen in the vertical integration of input supply chains by agribusiness companies such as Monsanto, whose expansion has led to significant private ownership of seed and fertiliser stocks. In Australia, the supermarket duopsony has seen farmers lose price negotiating power as the supermarkets have pushed to rationalise product lines and decrease prices. This has had a direct impact, causing rising input costs and diminishing returns; farmers are faced with a double edged sword. The Real Cost of Dinner This situation is exacerbated by the considerable pressure from consumers and politicians for food prices (and the consumer price index) to remain low. After decades of food overproduction leading to low food prices, people in the developed world have come to expect food to be cheap. The real cost of food though, in terms of environmental and social sustainability is not currently reflected in the prices paid at the supermarket. The full cost of food production is not being recovered in market prices. vii. Conclusion: Sustainability and Food Security Farming systems, both in the developed and developing world, are confronted with an inimical challenge to meet global food demand between now and 2050. To ensure future food security in the face of growing resource constraints, we must move towards more sustainable modes of food production. The need to improve resource efficiency, raise yields and reduce inputs is not confined to smallholder or large-scale production but needs to be applied to all agricultural systems. As will be shown in the next chapter, we already possess much of the knowledge and technology required to sustainably improve yields. A primary factor preventing the wide-scale adoption of these measures is limited profitability in the agricultural sectors, both for smallholders and independent Australian broadacre farmers. Sustainability entails more than just minimising harmful environmental impacts, for a system to be sustainable it must also support its associated communities on a socio-economic level. In the following chapter, we will examine the potential for technology, innovation and education to be deployed to sustainably increase yields and reduce the threat of future food crises.

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Science,Technology and Innovation

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¾¾ By investing in agricultural research and development, we can grow more food, more sustainably, in more parts of the world while also distributing it more efficiently, wasting less and optimising its nutritional value. ¾¾ Research and development in the areas of soil microbiology, irrigation systems, renewable horticulture and biotechnology offer considerable potential to sustainably increase food production. ¾¾ Agricultural research and development creates substantial social and economic benefits, but investment growth in the area has been slowing for decades. Increasing investment in R&D will lead to greater productivity growth in agriculture and the development of more sustainable agricultural practices. ¾¾ Extension services are crucial to agriculture development; without them, science, technology and innovation would have no impact on agricultural productivity or food security.

Despite the formidable challenges facing food systems to 2050, if we are able to mobilise investment and political will it may be possible to sustainably meet the world’s future food needs. Technological developments and innovation could allow us to meet global food needs from now to 2050 with greater efficiency than we are currently managing, even against a backdrop of resource constraints. Science, technology and innovation can be applied to food systems all along the supply chain to enable us to grow more food, with higher nutritional value, more sustainably and to distribute it more effectively. Over the past forty years, global food production has more than doubled as a result of technological advancements, partly through the Green Revolution. Technological innovations could revolutionise food production and distribution and allow us to lift production levels to new heights. There is a mass of research, development and innovation that has occurred or is currently occurring that could considerably alter the productivity of food systems. Major developments are possible in food production, distribution logistics and nutritional outcomes. This chapter will explore the scope for innovation in these areas. It will examine the potential of research and development in four innovative areas of food production that could impact the capacity and sustainability of our food system. For the potential innovation and development to be implemented, we need to reverse the slowing of investment in agricultural research and development to realise the considerable social and economic returns to be gained. In addition to new technological developments, there are also considerable gains to be achieved from adapting existing technologies and farming practices to smallholder farming and improving their accessibility. For this to occur, education and training is required along with support for extension systems and cultural adaptation. Thus, this chapter will also examine the role of these factors in improving our future food security.


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i. The Potential for Innovation in Food Systems Growing Food The majority of research related to improving food security focuses on the development of agriculture; on increasing yields and efficiency in input use. Producing more food with less intensive resource use is necessary to ensure the sustainability of food systems and ongoing food security. Soil nutrition research, improved irrigation practices, capital intensive renewable closed-system agriculture, and biofortification and genetic modification are four areas that have the potential to revolutionise elements of our food system and prevent food insecurity if sufficient research and development are devoted to them. Soil Nutrition: The next agricultural revolution? Research into soil health and nutrition is an area that could greatly contribute to alleviating future food insecurity by revealing ways to enhance productivity and mitigate degradation. Many aspects of soil structure and function are not fully understood, with knowledge gaps persisting due to the complexity and high spatial variability of soil. In FDI’s consultation on the role of technology and innovation in mitigating future food insecurity, there was widespread consensus that soil research demands urgent attention. Paul Mackenzie said that ‘understanding soil capabilities is our key not only to better productivity but also to better conservation of soil’. According to Julian Cribb, the next agricultural revolution could reside in microbiology and understanding how to regenerate soil to unlock nutrients. Productive soil is a finite resource, so understanding its characteristics, capacity and constraints is critical to ensuring the long term sustainability of agricultural systems. Dramatic increases in fertiliser and herbicide use have had a negative impact on soil microbiology. Soil microbial life is responsible for making nutrients bioavailable to plants, thus overuse of fertilisers can have an adverse effect on crop nutrition and productivity. Agricultural practices including tilling, removal of crop residue, monoculture cropping, and excessive grazing, have contributed to widespread losses of soil carbon. This constrains soil productivity due to the resultant losses in water retention capacity and microbial activity. According to Soils for Life, five to ten tonnes of carbon are lost per hectare of land each year. This net loss of organic matter is concerning given the long-term scale of soil regeneration. It takes over a hundred years to build a millimetre of fertile soil. Encouragingly, Australia’s widespread adoption of zero-tillage and pasture-crop rotation is contributing to enhanced soil carbon content, as well as reducing soil lost via erosion. Such strategies should be further developed. As a global leader in the adoption of these practices, Australia has an important role to play in transferring knowledge to improve productivity and food security in developing countries. Further research should focus on ways to increase soil carbon, to enhance water retention and productivity, and to mitigate climate change. Our understanding of microbial functions is limited; however recognition of their importance to agricultural development is growing. Improving our understanding of soil microbiology and how best to manage it should thus be a priority area for future research. Irrigation Practices Irrigation and food production is one of the greatest pressures on freshwater resources; according to the UN, approximately 70 per cent of global freshwater withdrawals used for agriculture. Historically, irrigation development has focused on large-scale projects which are both water and land intensive. As competing demands for natural resources grow alongside expanding populations, renewed investment and technology will be required to address shortfalls in the irrigation sector.

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According to the FAO, irrigating agricultural land can increase crop yields by 100 to 400 per cent. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where only four per cent of a possible 40 million hectares is irrigated, investing in irrigation technology could create a considerable increase in yield for farmers, contributing to food security and poverty alleviation for thousands. According to the IWMI, access to small-scale irrigation technology could improve crop yields by between 75 and 275 per cent for Sub-Saharan smallholders. At present most smallholders are reliant on increasingly unpredictable rainfall, raising the risk of crop failure and lower-than average yields. In Small Farmers Secure Food, FDI Associate Lindsay Falvey describes the role of small farmer irrigation on global food production systems. Smallholder farmers in Asia, he explains, produce 60 per cent of the world’s food grains on 34 per cent of Asia’s arable land. This 34 per cent of land also represents 70 per cent of global irrigated land, leaving a further 66 per cent of arable land globally limited by rainfed production. There are two key areas within irrigation which require commitment and increased investment. The first is access; smallholders require access to affordable and size-appropriate irrigation technology. The majority of irrigation technology is designed for industrialised countries where farms are much larger and more energy intensive than their smallholder counterparts. Beyond the size and energy requirements of these systems they are also often too expensive to be viable within less-industrialised countries. The treadle pump, developed by NGO iDE, is a human-powered device used to irrigate small-scale agriculture which is both cost effective and simplistic in design. In Bangladesh 1.4 million treadle pumps have reportedly been sold since 1985, leading to marginal farmers increasing their crop yields substantially and generating a greater income for their families. The second commitment should be on reducing water consumption through irrigation practices. Greater water use efficiency is integral to ensuring the expansion of food production is done without competing further with other water demands. The adoption of low-water intensive irrigation methods will play an integral role in both reducing agricultural water consumption and facilitating yield increases without increasing land use. Drip irrigation is one form of irrigation proven successful in reducing agricultural water consumption. Delivering water to the roots of plants, this form of irrigation improves soil moisture content; reducing evapotranspiration and run-off and leading to gains in crop yield, the reduction of fertiliser and water outputs and saves on labour associated with other more traditional modes of irrigation. Adopting irrigation technologies on smallhold farms has the potential to reduce hunger and poverty, stabilise food production and thus global market prices and, through micro-irrigation, reduce water consumption in agriculture. According to the FAO, well-managed irrigation systems can optimise growing conditions while also protecting the environment against long-term degradation. While access to irrigation for smallholders will increase global food production and reduce the vulnerabilities experienced by rainfed systems, current irrigation practices also require review. Large-scale irrigation has dramatically increased food production but has also led to increased evapotranspiration, runoff and water waste, which will be unsustainable as water scarcity rises globally. Increasing the percentage of irrigated farmland worldwide is the key to increasing productivity and food security. However to ensure water security and to minimise the competition between water users, wasteful irrigation practices need to be adapted to more sustainably utilise available water. Biotechnology, GMOs and biofortification Biotechnology is another area of agricultural research and development that has the potential to significantly contribute to food security and alleviate pressures on food supply and the environment to 2050. The term “biotechnologies” encompasses a wide array of techniques but is broadly defined as ‘any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make


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or modify products or processes for specific use.’ This can refer to conventional breeding practices, cell and tissue culture technology and numerous other techniques. Biotechnology also includes the range of different methods of gene manipulation and gene transfer, DNA typing and cloning of plants and animals collectively referred to as genetically modified organisms (GMO). There is little controversy surrounding most aspects of biotechnology, however the development and use of GMOs remains a fiercely contested issue within the global food system. The FAO state that biotechnology provides powerful tools for the sustainable development of agriculture and the food industry. It recognises that genetic engineering has the potential to help increase production and productivity in agriculture, fisheries and forestry. The use of GMOs could be particularly beneficial in developing countries where it could lead to higher yields on marginal lands that are currently unable to grow enough food to feed their inhabitants. In its Statement on Biotechnology, the FAO states that it is also aware of the concerns about the potential risks posed by certain aspects of biotechnology and GM both for human and animal health and environmental consequences. The potential benefits to food supply and environmental integrity from the use of GMOs are considerable. In terms of agricultural productivity, GM could produce crops with greater resistance to stresses from weather and pests, reducing the danger of crop failure. It could also increase productivity through yield growth and lead to the creation of more nutritious staple foods. Breeding crop strains with longer shelf-lives would reduce the currently massive level of wastage incurred in the food supply chain. Improved productivity could mean that farmers won’t have to bring as much marginal land into cultivation to meet food demands, thus preventing environmental degradation. By breeding crop strains with inbuilt insecticidal or herbicidal agents, the use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides could be reduced, greatly benefiting both human and environmental health. Crops could also be developed that are drought resilient or capable of rehabilitating damaged or infertile land. The major arguments against the use of GMOs in agriculture include the risk of “gene escape” where, for instance, herbicide-resistance genes could crossover into weeds with potentially devastating effect. There are also theories mutations may be possible, that there are potential risks to non-target species such as birds, pollinators and soil biota and that GMOs could outcompete wild or native species (this same risk exists for improved varieties developed by conventional breeding methods). It is also feared that GM may have negative effects on human health. The long-term impacts of consuming GMOs are as yet inconclusive. Some of the major objections though, are socioeconomic. Biotechnology research is carried out predominantly by private sector multinationals in the developed world that have market dominance in the agricultural sector. This leads to the risk that farmers could lose access to plant material and experience declines in profitability because of price gouging from seed suppliers. Farmers in the developing world are particularly vulnerable to this threat. Furthermore, many developing countries don’t have the technical or regulatory capacity to assess the benefits and costs of modern biotechnology in their domestic agriculture systems. This limits their ability to monitor the eventual inclusion of transgenic crops in their agriculture. If difficulties with intellectual property and poorly developed regulatory mechanisms can be overcome, the application of biotechnologies and GM to smallholder agriculture could have beneficial impacts on global food security to 2050. ii. Agricultural Research and Development Supporting agricultural research and development is crucial to ensuring ongoing food security. There is compelling evidence that investment in agricultural R&D yields consistently high benefit to cost ratios. A strong link has been demonstrated between R&D and positive health and nutritional outcomes for the poor. Growth and development in the agriculture sector has double the impact on poverty reduction that

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growth in other sectors does; it generates significant income growth and multiplier effects and reduces hunger levels through both direct and indirect impacts. Investment in the sector creates productivity improvements that can reduce harmful environmental impacts and allow countries to retain trade competitiveness. Long-term economic studies have shown that investment in agricultural R&D yields an average benefit cost ratio of 20:1 and can in many instances be far higher. The rate of return on investment for the AUD2.5 billion of aid directed into international agricultural research over the past three decades has been between $50 and $70 for every dollar spent. The agricultural R&D successes of the 1960s and 70s saved over one billion lives and allowed hunger levels to fall over a period when the Earth’s population doubled. The developments of the Green Revolution also lessened the environmental impact of increasing food production. Productivity increases and intensification of farming practices reduced agricultural water use and limited deforestation and the expansion of agriculture onto marginal lands. These gains meant that a steady decline in food prices occurred from the 1970s. Global food prices had stabilised at a low level up until the early 2000s. While this enabled improved food security around the world, it also removed the incentive for governments to invest in the area. Despite continued high social rates of return, public investment in agricultural research in many countries has been slowing. This reduced investment is contributing to a global decline in agricultural yield growth rates at a time when farm productivity needs to increase if we are to avoid facing food shortages. A key condition for meeting future food needs is to increase investment in R&D for sustained productivity growth, infrastructure, institutional reforms, environmental services and sustainable resource management. Investment in agricultural R&D is particularly pertinent for developing countries, whose agricultural systems have been overlooked in the research push of past decades. Investment in developing country agriculture has to increase by at least 60 per cent over current levels through a combination of higher public investment and better incentives for farmers and the private sector to invest their own resources. There is also a need to significantly increase the volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for agricultural and rural development. iii. Education and Extension Services To reap the benefits of agricultural research and development, strong extension services are needed. Agricultural extension refers to the process of applying scientific research and newly developed technologies to agricultural practices through training and education programs for farmers. Extension services are therefore crucial to agriculture development; without them, science, technology and innovation in the field would have no impact on agricultural productivity or food security. There is a great deal of opportunity for growth and improved profitability in smallholder farming. The majority of research and development conducted over recent decades has focused on increasing the yields and intensifying the resource use of large-scale, Western industrial farming. Substantial gains in productivity and output have been achieved, but these have had few benefits for smallhold farmers. By focusing attention on this large target population there is the potential to harness science and innovation to create significant benefits and considerably reduce food insecurity amongst the world’s most vulnerable. Much of the technology required to achieve productivity gains is already in existence but needs to be adapted to smallhold farming and made accessible through extension services. In FDI workshops, experts pointed to the need to develop affordable machinery suitable for small plots and to introduce conservation agriculture methods such as minimum crop tillage and the retention of residues to improve soil quality and halt degradation.


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Both for those technologies that need adapting for smallhold use and for those that are readily applicable, extension services are required to transfer knowledge and technology from the development phase to implementation. Because a great deal of food security risk is involved in altering the practices of smallhold farmers it is crucial that extension programmes are designed using a ‘best fit’ model that engages local people, reflects their priorities and builds trusting relationships between extension agents, farmers and other relevant stakeholders. In addition to encouraging farmers to adopt new practices, programs should follow through with effective management and implementation. This involves proper education on the reasons to alter practices, training, ensuring market connections, and if necessary, subsidising inputs and providing incentives in the start-up phase. Good communication is a crucial key to success and extension programs should focus on community participation. Above all, programs should be designed to take into account local conditions in relation to social structures, environmental characteristics, market conditions and the political situation. Expanding technology access to the marginalised through targeted extension services could significantly increase global agricultural output and alleviate food security pressures. Globally, around 43 per cent of agricultural workers are women, and yet in developing countries they have considerably less access to education, agricultural information and extension services than men. It is estimated that if women working in agriculture had the same access to productive services as men, they could increase yields on their farms by 20 to 30 per cent. This could raise total agricultural output in developing countries by between 2.5 and 4 per cent. Extension programmes are just as important to agriculture in the developed world as they are for smallhold farmers. Australia has a history of strong extension services focused particularly on sustainable land management. Studies are now indicating though, that the resources available for extension services have declined considerably in the past two decades, having detrimental effects on yield growth at a time when Australia needs to be maximising its agricultural output to capitalise on increasing world demand and contribute to alleviating global food insecurity. Considerable gains could be achieved in yields and food security to 2050 if education and extension services are properly deployed to maximise the potential of technology and innovations. iv. Political Will If the world is to be food secure by 2050, political will needs to be mobilised. We already have the knowledge and resources to end hunger, however political will is required to build the institutions that ensure key decisions on investment and allocation are undertaken and necessary agricultural and food security policies are implemented. Political will, must be mobilised on a number of levels; these include international calls for action from and to multilateral organisations; dialogues on food security at a country level, both involving governments and stakeholders, and governments and their international development partners. At a national level, good governance is crucial to development and reducing food insecurity. Governments must also work to provide effective institutions and put strategies in place that protect the food security of their citizens without countering efforts to achieve global food security. The potential conflict between national and global food security objectives will be discussed in the following chapter which will explore the implications of a failure to take action on food insecurity.

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v. Conclusion: Future Food Systems Given the required investment, there is considerable potential for technology and innovation to revolutionise global food systems and allow us to produce more food, more sustainably, in more parts of the world while also distributing it more effectively, wasting less and optimising its nutritional value. In this chapter we have looked at numerous areas of food system innovation that have the potential to alter the way we produce our food and in doing so contribute to future food security. Soil microbiology research is in the early stage of development but offers the potential to revolutionise agricultural practices. Genetic biotechnology has had considerable resources devoted to it but still remains a controversial development in food systems, a fact that may hamper its implementation and value. Resources and extension services are now required to create impact pathways to connect farmers with knowledge and technologies. While these areas are promising, the decline in agricultural R&D investment happening in many parts of the world is slowing progress on sustainably increasing crop yields and must be reversed if we are to meet future food needs. Policy changes are required at a local, national and global level to prioritise agricultural R&D and reduce food insecurity. There is also huge amount of benefit to be gained just from applying ‘on the shelf’ technologies or expanding the use of existing technologies. The key now is to give farmers access to that technology. This requires proper regulatory and policy frameworks, education and well-resourced and –designed extension services. No single technology or development is the answer but the space exists for us to considerably expand food production through the application of technology, innovation and education. Doing so could take us a long way towards abating the potential food crisis facing the planet by 2050.

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Food and Water Insecurity and Geopolitical Conflict

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¾¾ A cyclical relationship exists between food insecurity and conflict; violent conflict is a major cause of food insecurity, however scarce food resources can also act as a catalyst for conflict. ¾¾ In the 21st century, the majority of wars will involve failed states, rebellions, civil conflict, insurgencies and terrorism, triggered by competition over dwindling food and water resources, rather than global conflicts with clearly defined sides. ¾¾ Conflict over food supply is driven be four major factors: resource scarcity, price volatility, trade disputes and population movements. These occurrences can result in international disputes, civil conflict, protests and rioting, regime breakdown and communal or intergroup violence. ¾¾ Transboundary water sources will emerge as a significant conflict flash point.

Access to food and water is fundamental to the survival of both individuals and states; regular, ongoing access to food and fresh water is recognised as a fundamental human right by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The primacy of these needs means that in an environment of scarcity there is a serious risk of conflict. The ability to provide for the food and water needs of its citizens is a fundamental responsibility of the state and is necessary to the maintenance of legitimacy. The world experiences an ongoing food availability crisis; an eighth of our population is currently chronically hungry. In many cases this situation is the result of conflict, but it is increasingly recognised that this hunger can also be a cause or catalyst for conflicts. Global demand for food could almost double by 2050. Our ability to meet that demand is increasingly constrained by resource scarcity. Escalating competition for limited food and water resources has the potential to trigger interstate and civil conflicts, democratic and authoritarian breakdown, protests and rioting, and communal violence. Exacerbating existing triggers of unrest such as poverty, weak governance and resource disputes, food and water insecurity will shape the nature of conflict in the 21st century. The key source of food and water related conflict will be the maldistribution of resources; the arable land, freshwater and technology required to increase our food supply are not located in the areas that need them most. It is likely that in a macro sense there is enough unused agricultural land to bring into production and freshwater available to increase food production to the level required to feed the global population in 2050 and eradicate chronic hunger. This assertion is largely theoretical however; for these resources to be successfully brought into production would require unprecedented cooperation. National security may have to be subordinated to global interests and action on sustainability would be required, which may incur short-term costs. Without major improvements to resource distribution mechanisms, ongoing conflict and crisis are far more likely.


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Flawed distribution mechanisms are already a major problem in the global food system. While we currently produce more than enough food to feed the world’s population, many people still go hungry. The pressure on redistribution systems and the need to reallocate resources will increase as food demand grows. Populations are booming in areas with few resources available to increase their food production. Groundwater aquifers are drying out in the world’s three major population centres; the United States, China and India. Parts of MENA are running out of water rapidly, while its population is booming. India has very little available land to feed its expanding population. The world’s fertiliser supplies are depleting. Sub Saharan Africa has both land and water available but lacks the necessary technology, investment, stability and infrastructure to successfully increase food production. By 2050, more parts of the world will be unable to produce enough food to feed their populations. They will have to rely on other countries for their food supply or will experience shortages. Land and water cannot be effectively moved. Food and people can, and both will in response to resource scarcity. This will create serious potential for conflict. Between now and 2050, there is a high probability of global food and water crises. i. Food and Water Insecurity and Conflict Violent conflict is a major cause of food insecurity. This relationship is not one way however; it is increasingly recognised that food insecurity can trigger conflicts. It is likely that in the coming century, the circular link between food insecurity and conflict will intensify as a result of population pressures and resource scarcity. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflict and recognise that conflict, in turn, can lead to food insecurity and famine. According to the Wilson Centre report Harvesting Peace: Food Security, Conflict and Cooperation, conflict contributes to both chronic and acute food insecurity, exacerbating instability within societies, economies and polities. The reciprocal relationship between conflict and food insecurity can lead to a cyclical environment of instability. Research indicates that while food shortages are rarely a stated and explicit cause of conflict, food insecurity is a condition that drastically heightens the likelihood of unrest and can act as a catalyst or trigger in conflict situations. In his book Environment, Scarcity and Violence, director of the Waterloo Institute for Complexity and Innovation, Thomas Homer-Dixon explains that environmental – and by extension agricultural – stress, by itself rarely causes violence. Other factors must coalesce to bring about violent conflict, such as intergroup tension or the failure of economic institutions and governance. This finding is supported by research from the International Peace Institute. Food shortages are more often the catalyst for conflict than the driving cause. Danger exists when several inflammatory factors coincide to bring about a crisis; it is this scenario, of multi-layered stressors, that countries could be confronting by 2050. Water stress is more likely to be an explicit cause of conflict than food insecurity. Food insecurity is often a complex issue deriving from interconnected factors whereas water insecurity can be linked more directly to specific sources and supplies. The relative ease in identifying threats to water security makes the emergence of conflict directly linked to water shortages more likely. Water stress can cause conflicts of varying intensity and scale. Conflict is most likely when water resources are shared between multiple countries or groups. There are 263 international basins that cross the political boundaries of two or more countries. These basins cover approximately half of the earth’s surface area; they account for an estimated 60 per cent of the global freshwater flow and accommodate 40 per cent of the world’s population.

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Historically, evidence shows that despite the complexity of many water disputes, the majority have been handled diplomatically, rather than through military means. In the past 50 years, 37 acute disputes involving violence have been reported; while 150 cooperative treaties were signed. The Institute of Water and Watershed at Oregon State University has published a detailed account of historical and current international conflicts over water, as part of its Basins at Risk study. The report identified 1 831 water sharing events between 1948 and 1999, affecting 124 countries. Events ranged from formal declarations of war, political or military hostile actions, through to strategic alliances or treaties. Out of the 1,831 events, 28 per cent involved conflict, 67 per cent featured cooperation and the remaining five per cent were neutral or had no significance. Food security related conflicts have four primary sources; resource scarcity, price volatility, trade disputes and population movements. These occurrences can result in a variety of conflicts ranging from international disputes to civil conflict, protests and rioting, regime breakdown, and communal or inter-group violence. These geopolitical impacts are best grouped into two categories; interstate conflict, where disputes occur between nations, and intrastate conflict, where clashes are between a government and its citizens, political parties or other internal groups. The sources of geopolitical conflict are complex and interconnected however, and the categories of conflict are dynamic. Interstate disputes can spawn intrastate conflict and vice versa. Resource scarcity can lead to interstate disputes, civil unrest and communal violence. Price rises that undermine food affordability have caused protests and rioting, which in extreme cases can lead to changes of government or the overthrow of a regime. Trade disputes can damage relations between states and exacerbate both domestic and global food insecurity. Population movements are both a result and a cause of food insecurity and conflict. ii. International Geopolitical Implications of Food and Water Insecurity The legitimacy of a state is undermined if it cannot secure sufficient food and fresh water to provide for the needs of its citizens. Nations facing food or water shortages must look beyond their borders to meet their demand. Their options are twofold: to bolster food supplies through trade or to acquire resources from other states, either by force or theft. Acquiring the resources of other states by force to ensure domestic food security is an unlikely outcome. However, it is possible that growing resource scarcity could cause a rise in the incidence of territorial encroachment through border disputes or countries fostering instability within neighbouring states to effect political or policy changes that could shift resource use situations in the state’s favour. It is more likely that states would seek to increase their resource availability by impinging on shared resources. iii. Conflict Over Shared Water Resources For decades, commentators have been predicting the advent of “water wars” as the essential resource is depleted in some regions. These predictions are yet to eventuate and the overwhelming experience of interstate water-sharing is one of nominal cooperation. The threat of conflict over transboundary water resources is likely to increase in the future though as demand increases and countries compete for resources and test existing water sharing arrangements. While there has been minimal conflict thus far, the extent of cooperation has been overstated. Numerous water treaties exist, but most lack enforceable mechanisms or active collaboration on the long term management of resources. Severe water scarcity will put these treaties to the test. The chief transboundary water bodies that could be subject to conflict are river basins and shared aquifers. Conflict over transboundary river basins can emerge from a number of sources as upstream states undertake actions that reduce the quality or quantity of downstream flows. These can include pollution of water ways, water diversions projects, or the construction of hydropower dams that reduce downstream flow or block


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fish migration paths or silt loads. River systems that may prove a source of dispute in coming decades are the: the Nile, Euphrates, and Niger, and a number of the Himalayan river systems including the Tigris, Mekong, Ganges/Brahmaputra and Jamuna rivers. Transboundary water disputes can also occur within states. India has weak water sharing arrangements for its river systems and its states often come into conflict over water allocations. Much of the degradation of Indian river systems has been attributed to a failure of the states to cooperatively manage shared water resources. UNESCO estimate that 97 per cent of the world’s available freshwater is stored underground, making it the most important available source of water for human use. The majority of the world’s surface freshwater sources are over-allocated; as demand grows and competing interests for surface water limit availability, the rights and access to subterranean aquifers, when shared between two or more states, could lead to interand intrastate conflict. There are more than 400 transboundary aquifers globally according to the International Groundwater Research Resources Assessment Centre (IGRAC). Of these only four have an interstate agreement for cooperation. The over-abstraction of groundwater is creating increased stress on aquifers worldwide, compromising their water quality and sustainability. Despite the critical state of many, aquifers are less likely to lead to conflict than transboundary river basins because of the difficulty involved in monitoring and evaluating water extraction and aquifer health. It is difficult to ascertain how much water individual states and users are extracting, thus making it hard to pinpoint the overuse which could be a source of conflict. Number of Agreements per International River Basin

Data Source: Treaties- Wolf (1999b).

The Nile Basin The Nile is a highly contentious body of water as it is the only major reliable source of renewable water for many of its littoral states. The eleven countries of the Nile Basin have a combined population of 450 million; this is expected to double by 2050. Many of the Nile’s littoral states already experience a moderate to high degree of food or water insecurity.

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The Nile has the potential to be a major source of conflict between now and 2050, particularly given the river’s importance to Egypt. Egypt is heavily reliant on the Nile for its national livelihood; 97 per cent of the country’s water supply originates from the river. Egypt already overdraws its allocation and suffers from diminished water quality because of overuse and poor water management. The country is unable to support an agricultural sector capable of feeding its population and relies on imports for over 70 per cent of its food supply. As food demand grows, Egypt will need more water; however, shifting geopolitical power structures mean that its allocation is likely to decrease as demand from upstream neighbours grows. Egypt views the Nile as a key strategic priority; it has been vocal and aggressive in its defence of its entitlement in the past. It regards its allocation as an incontrovertible ‘historic right.’ Resource tensions have come to a head in recent years over Ethiopia’s decision to construct Africa’s largest hydropower project, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, on the Blue Nile, one of the two major tributaries. Egypt views the construction of the dam as a threat to national security, claiming it will require the diversion of 18 billion cubic metres of water and lead to higher evaporation, leaving it severely short of water in the future. Despite the release of the international impact assessment for the project confirming the dam will not significantly impact Egypt or Sudan, Egypt continues to voice objections to the dam. In a mistakenly televised ministerial meeting in June 2013, members of parliament were heard discussing methods of ‘absorbing the shock’ of the Renaissance Dam, including supporting proxy military groups within Ethiopia to destabilise the government. The temporary diversion of water flows in May to allow the next phase of the dam’s construction, prompted former Egyptian President Morsi to declare that; “If our share of Nile water decreases, our blood will be the alternative.’ Egypt’s aggressive rhetoric indicated the degree of the Nile’s importance; however, in reality, Egypt lacks the capability to act on its threats. Military analysts have highlighted the operational difficulties involved in an attack on the dam and the country lacks the internal stability or economic capacity to support military action. The incendiary comments are best understood as a “last ditch” attempt to maintain a hegemonic stance on the Nile that is bound to fail. While under current circumstance, military conflict is unlikely, the area remains one of high risk for international water disputes in the future. The Himalayan River Systems The Himalayan region is fast emerging as the most likely arena for transboundary water disputes and competition in the world. Located on average 4,500 meters above sea level, the Tibetan Plateau in the Himalayan Region is the largest repository of fresh water in the world after the Arctic and Antarctic. Located between India and China, and a source for a number of the world’s greatest river systems, the plateau supports close to half the world’s population in its watershed. China, driven by severe water shortages and polluted water systems, has begun to harness the water capacity of the plateau and divert water to the state’s industrial and densely populated north-east. The only state with no institutionalised water sharing agreement, China continues to plan hydroelectric dams and diversions with little transparency toward riparian states. This has led to increased tensions with downstream states, reliant on the Tibetan Plateau as a means of livelihood, food and water security. Upstream dams under construction on the Yarlung Tsangpo River have raised concerns for Bangladesh and India, who are reliant on the river’s run to feed the Brahmaputra. Building dams upstream will have a significant impact on the availability of fresh water to supply north-Eastern India and Bangladesh. Besides India and Bangladesh, water originating from the Tibetan Plateau is a source for rivers in Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, Cambodia, Pakistan, Lao, Thailand and Vietnam. Any diversion or damming upstream will negatively affect downstream riparian states. China controls the source of many of the major rivers running through these states and as such is strategically placed to control a large percentage of available water in the region. As water scarcity and degradation rises in many of these states, tensions over water allocations and control will grow.


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Experts predict in the next 20 years the Himalayas may become the most dammed region in the world. The ecological, social and political impact this will have on South and South-east Asia has barely been examined, yet planning and development continues at increasing speed. A water race between states is emerging, predominantly between China and India, with the goal to dam and develop as much of the Himalayan water system as quickly as possible. Water security, particularly for downstream states will become more precarious as Chinese strategy continues to focus on national interest and economic development over ecological values and the protection of flows to riparian states. Trade-Based Food Security The most common solution to a domestic agricultural sector that it incapable of providing for the food security of a nation is to import food from food-surplus countries. For economies that have the fiscal capacity to support ongoing food imports, trade based food security provides a viable alternative. The reliance on external markets to maintain food security does leave a state vulnerable to price and supply risks that can undermine food security and provoke conflict. In situations of extreme scarcity or rapidly increasing prices, exporters may not honour contracts and states may place embargoes on food exports to stabilise prices and ensure food security in their domestic markets. This occurred during the global food price crisis in 2008. Protectionist decisions by exporting states exacerbated already rising prices on the global market causing significant increases in global food insecurity and civil unrest in dozens of states. The imposition of embargos, trade barriers and other market distorting policies such as agricultural subsidies by food producing states could lead to a deterioration of international relations and trigger trade wars or the imposition of economic sanctions. As the availability of natural resources continues to decline and some states become increasingly reliant on the global agricultural market for their food security, the prevalence of international conflict due in part to the disruption or halt of food trade may rise. International “Land Grabs” To counter exposure to trade-based price and supply risk, nations that cannot supply the food needs of their populations from domestic resources may seek to expand their resource base. The potential for countries to encroach on the resources of their neighbours has already been discussed. A more feasible outcome is for countries to seek to expand the resource base available to them by purchasing or taking out long term leases on large tracts of agricultural land in other countries. International land acquisitions are a significant geostrategic phenomenon to have emerged out of the 2008 global food crisis. Acquisitions have primarily been by governments, investment funds or agribusiness corporations based in countries vulnerable to future food insecurity, such as the GCC states, China, India and South Korea. Land acquired has been in areas with excess arable land and weak existing tenure arrangements; predominantly in Sub Saharan Africa, parts of South East Asia and South and Central America. While these land acquisitions are an international geopolitical phenomenon, if investments are poorly implemented, they can impoverish local rural communities, accelerate environmental degradation and lead to a higher incidence of food insecurity in the host country. For these reasons they can be a significant source of conflict and civil unrest within the countries where land is acquired. An attempted land purchase in Madagascar in 2008 demonstrates the geopolitical implications of food insecurity and land acquisitions. Madagascar is chronically food insecure, suffering from high poverty rates, poor economic development and regular severe natural disasters. Despite its failure to provide for the food needs of its population, at the height of global food and financial crisis in 2008, the Madagascan government agreed to lease 1.3 million hectares of agricultural land to South Korean company Daewoo. This was equivalent to half of the country’s arable land. The deal was a source of popular resentment that eventually led to the fall of President Marc Ravalomanana. When the deal was reported in November 2008 it caused public outrage and formed a catalyst for long running dissatisfaction with the government to escalate into months of demonstrations that led to a military coup and change of government. When opposition leader Andry Rajoelina was appointed president by the military and constitutional court in March 2009, one of his first moves was to cancel the land lease arrangement.

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Land acquisitions are not a guarantee of food supply in times of scarcity and could trigger serious trade disputes. While investment in food production in foreign countries may improve food security and strengthen supply lines, the imposition of export embargos by host countries in times of extreme domestic food insecurity could still disrupt food supply to investor nations. Such actions would have the potential to cause significant international disputes. Population Movements Between now and 2050, the mismatch between population growth and food demand, and water availability and food production will grow, causing some regions to experience severe water and food insecurity. There are two ways that this mismatch can be mitigated; food supplies can be redistributed through trade systems and food aid or people can migrate from food and water shortage areas to surplus areas. The Food and Agricultural Organization has stated that population flows are the critical demographic issue of contemporary time, from both an analytical and a policy point of view. Migration is one aspect of population flows along with refugees and internally displaced people. Numbers of all categories have been increasing over the past decade and are believed to be at all-time highs. Numbers of economic and environmental refugees are expected to rise significantly in the next thirty years. Climate change, reduced arable land, and natural resource degradation will limit food and water security leading to mass migration within and between states. Yemen, a country which already houses a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to civil conflict as well as a large influx of refugees from the food insecure and war-torn Horn of Africa, is expected to become the world’s first source of waterrefugees. Yemen’s capital, Sana’a is expected to become the first major city to run out of water in the coming decades. If this occurs, Sana’a will become a source of IDPs and international refugees. The United Nations’ High Commission for Refugees says that the number of displaced people worldwide is the highest since the 1990s. An estimated flow of 2.7 million people is moving towards developed countries each year from developing regions. Refugees can place a considerable burden on the resources of the recipient country or region as well as the international community. Whereas migrants largely find their way into financially healthy economies, only 20 per cent of refugees make it to the developed world. Many of the world’s refugees are in camps in Africa or other developed countries . The challenge of dealing with refugees largely falls on ill-equipped countries struggling with economic constraints and restrictions on the supply of available land, food and water. As populations in the most developed parts of the world begin to decline while population growth remains highest in the countries least able to support a growing population, the world is likely to see an increase in all forms of population movement. While this development has the potential to alleviate food insecurity by shifting populations from food scarce to food surplus regions through migration, refugees and IDPs based in developing regions will only place additional pressure on scarce food and water resources in regions that lack the infrastructure to support population inflows. This situation has the potential to act as a food or water based conflict trigger. iv. Resource Scarcity and Internal State Conflict Food and water insecurity does not only cause conflict between nations, it is also a major source of intrastate violence and unrest. Conflict over food and water resources can take the form of protests and rioting, government breakdown, and communal and inter-group violence. Most food and water motivated conflict between now and 2050 is likely to be civil unrest, largely because over 80 per cent of food produced is consumed within its country of origin. In his book, The Coming Famine, Julian Cribb writes that the wars of the 21st century will involve failed states, rebellions, civil conflict, insurgencies and terrorism, triggered by competition over dwindling resources, rather than global conflicts with clearly defined sides.


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Protests, Rioting and Regime Change The world experienced widespread civil unrest in 2008 as the food price crisis pushed 100 million people into poverty and caused global hunger levels to skyrocket. Up to forty countries experienced protests and food riots because of the perceived failure of governments to protect food supplies. Protests erupted in at least fourteen countries in Africa and were particularly severe in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Senegal, Mauritania, Egypt and Morocco. Violent food riots occurred in Haiti, there were street protests in Indonesia and civil unrest flared throughout southern Yemen. The majority of these protests occurred in urban areas where food prices are more sensitive to fluctuation and there is a straightforward and substantiated link between high consumer prices and protest and rioting. As urban populations expand throughout the world, ensuring a stable food environment will be necessary to prevent civil unrest. Widespread food insecurity creates disaffected populations ripe for rebellion and can destabilise weak governments. Food insecurity following the global food price spike in 2011 has been widely linked to the Arab Spring that caused social and political unrest in countries throughout the Middle East. While a number of factors contributed to the uprisings, skyrocketing food prices were a significant catalyst triggering the protests. Middle Eastern countries’ dependence on the global food market for their grain supplies and other food staples makes them particularly vulnerable to sudden price changes or reduced food access. During the food, fuel and financial crises of 2007/08, food pricing, availability and political instability converged as key stressors for protesting and regime change. Given the interconnectivity of food security and political stability it is likely food will continue to act as a political stressor on regimes in the region. Egypt’s Revolutions: 2011 and 2013 A close relationship exists between food insecurity and political turmoil in Egypt. The country has a long history of bread riots and rising food insecurity was a driving cause of the nation-wide protests that led to the fall of former dictator Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi in June of 2013. Successive Egyptian governments have maintained extensive food subsidy systems in order to prevent social instability. The food subsidy system is wasteful and costly, draining 30 per cent of government spending. For the democratic transition to succeed in Egypt, substantial economic reforms are required to enable sustainable growth. Key to this process is the removal of the subsidy system; however, moves to reduce or target the program in the past have led to riots and dissatisfaction with the government. This further damages investor confidence and the opportunity to reform the economy, feeding further into the country’s food insecurity crisis. Food insecurity and inflation will continue to play a central role in Egypt’s political struggles in coming years. Communal Violence and Protracted Crises Acute food insecurity can be a major threat multiplier for communal violence and protracted crises. The predominant form of violent conflict has evolved over time from interstate wars; to civil wars between armies fighting for independence, separation or political control; to various forms of ongoing violence involving non-state actors such as rebels, gangs and organized crime, the form of which can range from civil conflict to urban unrest. These current and emerging forms of violence often have no clear military, political or ideological objective but are driven by a range of factors including political, economic, social or environmental issues. Food insecurity is prominent amongst these causes and multiplies the risk from other tensions. This variety of ongoing, low level violence induced by resource scarcity and maldistribution is expected to increase between now and 2050. These protracted crises are particularly prevalent in the Sahel, the world’s most food insecure region. Undernourishment is rife in the Sahel; Chad, Mali, Niger and Eritrea make up four of the seven countries ranked lowest in human development in 2012, with malnutrition rates ranging up to 65 per cent in Eritrea. Six of the nine Sahelian countries were involved in ongoing armed conflicts between 2012 and 2013. Food insecurity has been implicated as a cause of several of them. Studies have shown that people with

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uncertain access to food are more likely to participate in civil unrest or resistance movements if they believe they may improve their access to food. The conflicts themselves undermine regional food production and distribution networks, further exacerbating food insecurity and creating a vicious cycle of violence and hunger. Improving food security will be a key measure to reduce conflict risk between now and 2050. v. Resource Conflict to 2050 Increased resource pressures and difficulties distributing available resources and food supplies are likely to lead to increased conflict in the future as individuals, groups and states compete to ensure their food and water security and, ultimately, their survival. A cyclical relationship exists between violence and hunger. Conflict can cause food insecurity by disrupting production, supply chains and income, while food insecurity can be a motivator to join resistance movements or a source of tension over resources. Food insecurity is rarely an explicit source of conflict, but chronic hunger or fluctuations in supply multiply threat risks and can act as a catalyst in the presence of other tensions. Water shortages are more likely to act as an explicit cause of conflict because of the more direct and observable nature of supply, its lack of substitutes and its necessity to the majority of human activities. Increased resource scarcity means that we are likely to see states with arable land or freshwater shortages become more aggressive in their efforts to expand their resource base. The most likely manifestation of this will be encroaching on shared resources such as transboundary river basins and groundwater aquifers. Efforts to find mutually beneficial solutions to water sharing issues will be necessary to reduce conflict risk and improve regional water security situations. More likely than international conflict is civil conflict over available resources and food access within states. Ongoing price volatility could cause protests against governments perceived to have failed to ensure domestic food security. This will be ever more likely in the rapidly developing urban areas which are more vulnerable to fluctuations in food supply. Conflicts between territories or states, religious, ethnic or political groups, and local populations and corporations over resource access could increase. If chronic hunger rises, the spread of low-level protracted violence is also likely. These sorts of conflicts are complex and difficult to combat or resolve by conventional means. Food and water insecurity could change the nature of violence and conflict between now and 2050. While food and water shortages contribute to a downward cycle of violence, improving food and water security outcomes can trigger a positive spiral of conflict reduction. Improving food security and maximising the benefits of resource sharing and cooperation is therefore of key importance to creating a stable and secure global environment between now and 2050.

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Conclusion: What does the Global Food and Water Crisis Mean for Australia?

The risk that our planet will experience global food and water crises between now and 2050 is very high. As a nation we need to consider what it will mean for Australia to exist within a more hungry and resource scarce world. Food and water scarcity will create challenges, both globally and domestically, which will threaten Australia’s security and prosperity. As a comfortably food secure, advanced agricultural nation living in the midst of the world’s most food insecure region, Australia has a responsibility to lead for change in global food systems. Resource scarcity, price volatility, food insecurity and rising global food demand not only present challenges, but also create opportunities for Australia. We are well placed to benefit from the evolving global food market and in doing so, contribute to global food security. To be in a position to take advantage of these opportunities, Australia needs to take a close look at its own food system and the sustainability of its agricultural sector. Ensuring the long term viability of the Australian food sector is not only critical to maintaining domestic food security, it will also stimulate global production. In an increasingly insecure and crisis prone global food system, it is imperative that Australia understands its role in building a food secure future. As rising demand and deteriorating resources cause hunger and instability in global food systems, Australia finds itself in the middle of the world’s most food insecure region. Many of the countries at high risk of or currently experiencing severe food shortages are part of the Indo-pacific. One in four people in Sub Saharan Africa are hungry and half of the children in South Asia experience malnutrition. The Middle East already lacks the resources to feed its rapidly growing population. In Asia, where the vast majority of the increase in food demand will occur, there is little arable land left to expand production, and levels of water stress are on the rise. Australia’s global neighbourhood is the most food insecure in the world. As we saw in Chapter 8, resource scarcity and hunger will become a major source of conflict and instability in the region between now and 2050. Food insecurity could cause confrontations between countries over food production resources, lead to rioting and the collapse of governments, and to persistent violence among communities. The rise in hunger and conflict would push millions into poverty, halt progress on development and slow regional economic growth. This could disrupt Australian markets, trade routes and foreign investment, increase Australia’s regional obligations and heighten non-traditional security threats in the form of extremism and population movements. Australia must lead in changing domestic and global food systems to pursue food security, sustainability and growth and avert these regional and national threats. Although Australia only produces around 1 per cent of global food production, the small size of world agricultural trade means that we are a big player on the world’s tradeable food market. Australia is the second largest exporter of wheat and fourth largest beef exporter. By maintaining a strong production record, Australia can assist in maintaining stability on global markets and reduce food price volatility. Australia’s agricultural sector is highly productive. We currently produce enough food to feed 60 million people and export 70 per cent of our production. Through the international application of Australian research and agricultural expertise, we are able to contribute to the diets of an additional 400-500 million people.


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Australian agricultural research is well recognised internationally and yields high returns on investment. By continuing to support research and development of sustainable methods to intensify production and use resources more wisely, we can influence best practice improvements in food production throughout the world, alleviating resource pressure and improving food quality and availability. There are particular benefits to be gained from sharing this technology and expertise with farmers in developing countries. Australian investment in international agricultural research has yielded a return of between $50 and $70 for each dollar spent over the past three decades. Targeting Overseas Development Assistance at agricultural sector development and food security measures would have great success in improving food security in our region. Australia could also use its reputation as an open and productive economy to lead the multilateral push for fair agricultural trading systems. By acting as a leader in promoting global and regional food security, Australia has a lot to gain. Not only could our actions benefit us by stimulating growth and development and reducing the incidence of hunger, poverty and conflict in our region, there are also a number of direct economic gains. By increasing research and development into the sustainability of food systems, Australia can “do well by doing good”. There are considerable opportunities for Australia to improve the sustainability of our food system and benefit from rising global food demand. Our geographic location, in the centre of the Indo-pacific and south of Asia, places us in an ideal position to serve the food needs of the region. Australia may not have the capacity to dramatically increase its food production without incurring harmful environmental consequences; however we do have a reputation as a producer of safe, high quality food products. As diets change and an increasing number of people join the middle class, particularly in China and Indonesia, there is significant potential for Australia to take advantage of the opportunities presented to cater to the demands of these markets. By producing sustainable, high quality, niche food products for the Asian middle class, there is potential to turn around the country’s moribund agriculture and food processing industries, generating employment, economic growth and export earnings for Australia. Developing a long term strategy and increasing investment in the industry would stimulate growth in an alternate sector, diversifying Australia’s economic drivers as investment in the mining industry peaks. The shift in sectoral focus would align well with China’s transition from an investment to a consumption-driven economy. It is estimated that the real value of Australia’s agri-food production could be almost 80 per cent higher by 2050 than it was in 2007. To capture the benefits of these opportunities means first ensuring domestic food security and the sustainability of Australian food systems. Australia is one of the world’s most food secure nations. We produce more than three times as much food as we require to feed our population, and export enough food to feed 40 million people after satisfying domestic requirements. The area of arable land available per person is high, as is the quantity of renewable water sources. We have a strong export economy that is capable of supporting food imports, and by world standards, a highly productive agriculture sector. Our current state of comfortable food security is not something we should take for granted, however. Australia currently produces enough food each year to feed 60 million people. If the nation follows a ‘big Australia’ growth strategy though, our population could increase to almost 50 million people by 2060 and 70 million people by 2100. Under these circumstances our food surplus margins would narrow considerably. Putting further pressure on our food security are environmental pressures. Australia has fragile soils and much of our arable land is degraded. Over recent decades, broadacre agricultural productivity has been declining due to a slowdown in research activity and the impacts of climate change. Australia is one of the nations most vulnerable to climate change impacts on agriculture as small variations in temperature and rainfall here can cause big falls in productivity. If we plan to remain a food secure country in the long term and take advantage of opportunities for economic growth, we need to take firm action now to protect the sustainability of our domestic food systems.

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Australia needs to manage its natural resources better, change its consumption patterns to reduce food wastage and improve public health, and devote resources towards the development of the agri-food sectors. Investment in infrastructure is needed to strengthen supply chains and ensure market access for producers. Investment in research and development is required for us to be able to develop more sustainable and productive agricultural practices and use our land and water more efficiently. We need to raise public awareness of the challenges and opportunities facing our agricultural sector and food security, and mobilise political will to build a sustainable food system and become a global leader in preventing food and water crises. To do this is the great challenge of our generation. It could also be the great opportunity.

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